Communism and Regional Politics in East Pakistan Author(s): Marcus F. Franda Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol.

10, No. 7 (Jul., 1970), pp. 588-606 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2642957 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 07:30
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey.

http://www.jstor.org

COMMUNISM AND REGIONAL POLITICS IN EASTPAKISTAN I Marcus Franda F.

bases of in When India becameindependent 1947 one of the strongest theCommunist Partyof India (CPI) was the Provinceof Bengal.' While a of theboundaries Bengalhad undergone number shifts of priorto 1947 in India had remained subjectto a common the Bengali-speakers British 200 yearsof British for provincial administration all but six of the almost the rule.2 Becauseofthepartition 1947,however, major (predominantly of whilethe in of Muslim)portion Bengalcame to be included East Pakistan, remaining(predominantly Hindu) portionremainedwithinthe Indian Partyof India who had Union.Each of the members the Communist of workedin the unitedProvinceof Bengal thenhad to make a choice between in citizenship Pakistanor in India. leadersin bothIndia and Membership figures availablefrom Communist optedfor Pakistanindicatethatthe majority the BengaliCommunists of to Ahmad,one of Pakistan rather thanIndia in 1947. According Muzaffar in thefounder-membersthe Communist of movement Bengal,the CPI had a membership almost20,000 in Bengalin 1947, the majority which of of But despiteits relawentoverto East Bengalin Pakistanafter partitions tivemembership the moveadvantage thetimeof partition, Communist at from scholars ment East Pakistanhas neverreceived same attention in the thathas been givento the partyin WestBengal. Indeed,one searchesin vainforevenan introductory of movearticle thenature theCommunist on mentin Pakistan. The absenceof any discussion thePakistanCommunist of movement in the literature be tracedto two principalsources.First,the Pakistan can

'Gene D. Overstreetand Marshall Windmiller,Communismin India, (Berkeley: of University CaliforniaPress, 1959), pp. 356 ff. 2For a discussionof boundaryshiftsin Bengal since the advent of Britishrule see Marcus F. Franda, West Bengal and the Federalizing Process in India, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 8-12. 'Related in an interview with the authorin Calcutta in March 1969. These figures were corroborated othermembersof the Communist by movement West Bengal and in of by members the Pakistan Communist Party duringa visit to East Pakistan in September-October, 1969. 588

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

589

sincethe Party(PCP) has beensubjectto intense governmental repression founding Pakistan.In thewordsof a WestBengalscholar: of . .. theCommunist was under ban sincethebirth a of Party virtually Pakistan. Hundreds its workers of werein detention wereserving or of prison terms. Many went undergroundthere as were warrants arrest pending against them. Party, doubt, The no tookpartin theelections as [of1954]butit had no funds couldit do anyelectioneeringits nor meetings werebanned.4 The principalreasonsforthe ban on the PCP stemfromthe subversive activities PakistanCommunists East Bengalin theperiod1947-1952. of in Duringthisfive-year periodthePCP followed Zhdanovline of theinthe ternational Communist movement attempted foment and to revolutionary armeduprisings severalpartsof East Pakistan.The mostactiveComin munist units were thoseled byMoniSinghin Mymensingh district, Mitra Ila in thedistrict Rajashahi,and by a collective of leadership centered the in townof Barisal.In addition thesemovements, to whichsought support the of tribal, agricultural laborers and peasants, Communists the werealso reportedto have been active in a plot to use the armyto overthrow the Pakistangovernment. theRawalpindi In Conspiracy Case in January 1953, GeneralAkbarKhan and a number otherofficers thePakistanarmy, of in alongwith number Communist a of civilians, wereconvicted treason of and
sentenced to long prison terms.5 The repressionof Communistactivitiesin Pakistan since 1947 has severely hampered the ability of partyleaders to organize a large following,and has made it extremelydifficult gain a sense of what has happened to the to leaders of Pakistan Communistmovement.Many of the most highly-skilled the party (including Moni Singh) have been in jail during the last twenty years, while others (such as Ila Mitra) have taken shelter in India. In contrastto the party in West Bengal, the members of which have been imprisoned on occasion but have remained relativelyfreeto organize for electoral purposes, the party in East Pakistan has been unable to publish newspapers,journals, and pamphlets,or to organize meetings and demonstrations.This has severelyrestricted PCP contactswith Communistparties elsewhere and has necessitatedthe formationof small conspirational units which are extremely cautious in theirdealings with non-Communists. While Communistsand fellow-travellers India have maintained some channels in of communicationto East Pakistan, -the writingsof Indian intellectualson

'JyotiSen Gupta, Eclipse of East Pakistan, (Calcutta: Renco Publishers,1963), p. by 169. For similarstatements a Pakistani author see Kamruddin Ahmad, The Social Historyof East Pakistan, (Dacca: Pioneer Press, 1967), pp. 117-118,159. after 1947 is discussed in Rus'The subversiveactivitiesof Pakistani Communists Conflict(London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), pp. 123-124. sell Brines,The Indo-Pakistani

590

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

the valuein assessing and this topicare so emotional biasedas to be oflittle in movement Pakistan.6 Communist the of A secondfactorthathas played a role in diminishing interest has feeling thatCommunism little scholarsin the PCP is the widespread stuKhalid B. Sayeed,themostprominent appealforPakistanis. potential to less thana paragraph theCommunist devotes dentof Pakistanpolitics, since politicalsystem, Partyof Pakistanin a majorworkon thePakistani bothin India and Pakistanseemto be in his words"regionalmovements Partyorganizations."7 Other and stronger morepopularthanCommunist with incompatible Communist Islamis generally scholars arguethat regimes, like and especially an environment thatof Pakistan,wherethe nation in
was born in response to a religious separatist movement.8 and But despite its relative ineffectiveness the lack of publicityabout the PCP, there is still considerable discussion about the possibility of a Communistmovementdeveloping in Pakistan. Recent articles in the East Pakistan press have spoken of pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions within Pakistani parties and have even mentionedthe existence of small political groups thathave been daring enough to chant slogans in support of Indian Communistsat public meetings.9East Pakistani college studentsare now avid readers of Moscow and Peking publications,which have become available since the introductionof friendlyrelations between Pakistan and its Communistneighbors0 While the Communistparty itself is still banned and much of its leadership is still in prison, those CommunistParty members that remain outside of the jails are reported to have become increasinglyactive in recentyears. All of thesefactorshave in turnled to a renewed in discussion-particularly among studentsand intellectuals East Pakistanabout the futurerole of Communism in Pakistan. In this atmosphere the present article can do little more than provide an introductionto some of the major problems and activitiesof the PCP, by focussingboth on the statementsof Communistparty members and on and potential supporters. the attitudes and activities of fellow-travellers Moreover,by placing the PCP in the perspectiveof otherCommunistmove-

6See, forexample, Sakuntal Sen, Inside Pakistan (Calcutta: Compass Publications, 1964) and JayantaKumar Ray, Democracyand Nationalismon Trial: A Study of East Pakistan (Simla: Indian Instituteof Advanced Study,1968). See also New Age (organ of the CPI), June4, 1967,p. 13 and September 1967. 3, 'Khalid B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 186. 8Twolengthy statements the incompatibility Islam and Communism on of appear in Hamid Dalwai, Muslim Politics in India (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications,1968), pp. 79-85; and Muhammad Qutb, Islam: The MisunderstoodReligion (Delhi: Board of Islamic Publications,1968), pp. 325-343.See also Aziz Ahmad, Islamic Modernismin India and Pakistan,1857-1964(London: OxfordUniversity Press, 1967), pp. 195-207. 9Morning News (Dacca), October6, 1969,p. 1. "'For a shortsummaryof the Indo-Pakistanconflictof 1965 and the changing foreign policypositionsof Pakistan, China and the USSR see William Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations,1964-65 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 114-118.For a more detailed accountsee Brines,op. cit.,pp. 131-190.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

591

ments other in partsofAsia, it is at leastpossibleto drawtogether informationthathas a direct bearingon a number important of research questions. What was the social background the morethan 10,000 Bengali Comof munists thatoptedforPakistanafter partition 1947, and whathas the of becomeof them thelasttwenty in years?Whatare theprincipal goals and strategies thoseCommunist of partymembers activein Pakistan,and still how do theyrelateto the international Communist movement? How are relationships defined Communist by party members the one hand,and on student politicalparties,and intellectuals the other?It should groups, on be emphasized theoutset at thatthepresent article seeksto provide merely tentative answers suchquestions collecting to data drawnfrom by together a variety sources. of The Communist movement theunited in Province Bengalwas founded of by a smallnumber Muslim of political activists aroundtheleaderclustered shipofMuzaffar Ahmadin Calcutta the1920's.Working collaboration in in with N. Roy and other M. BengaliHindu emigres Europeand theSoviet in Union,Muzaffar Ahmadestablished working relationships theCominwith ternas earlyas 1921.11Duringtheseearlyyearsthe CPI in Bengalmade to attempts organize tradeunionsand peasantorganizations, to estaband lishf facilities publication party for of literature, thegrowth theparty but of as a significant factor Provincial in politics datesfrom 1930's.'2 Because the ofa successful recruitment in thejails during 1930's theCPI was drive the able to absorb or convert largenumber thenationalist a of terrorists that kad beenactivein Bengalsincethebeginning theTwentieth of century, and these recruits werelater joinedin theparty Bengaliintellectuals by returning from England, graduates thecollegesand universities Bengaldurby of of ing the1940's,and eventually a largesectionof theurbanmiddle-class by livingin and aroundtheCalcutta industrial belt. For a variety reasonsthe CPI in Bengal came to be dominated of by Hindupoliticians shortly after beganto expandto thelate1930's.By 1947 it lessthan5% ofthemembership theCPI in Bengalwas Muslim, of and only a handful Muslimpolitical of leaderswereprominent stateand national in party committees.13 vastmajority thoseCPI members The of whooptedfor Pakistanafter1947 weretherefore drawnfromessentially same social the backgrounds thosemembers the CPI who chose to remainin India, as of with place of residence beingthemainfactor their in decision.Thosemem"1Themost authoritative account of the beginningsof the CPI in Bengal is Muzaffar Ahmad,Myselfand The Communist Party of India (Calcutta: National Book Agency, 1970). For the role of M. N. Roy in establishingrelations between Calcutta and the Comintern Overstreet Windmiller, cit.,pp. 19-148. see and op. "2For an analysis of the growthof the Communistmovementin Bengal, see the first chapterof my forthcoming volume on The Phenomenonof Leftismin West Bengal (Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming 1970). "Related in interviews withpartyleaders in both East Pakistan and West Bengal in 1969.See also Overstreet Windmiller, cit.,pp. 357-358. and op.

592

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

bers of the partywho had homesand families(and a politicalbase) in East Bengalchose to remainin East Pakistan,whilethosewho were alreadyestablished West Bengal chose to remainin India. in On bothsides of theinternational bordermostCommunist partymembersweredrawn from predominantly the Hindu bhadralok, eliteunique an to theBengali-speaking area. Neither singleclass nor a singlecaste,the a bhadralok (literally "respectable people,"or "gentlemen"; sometimes called just "borolok"or "big people") are a privileged minority: mostfrequently drawnfromthe threehighestHindu castes (Brahmins, Kayasthas,and in or Vaidyas); usuallylanded or employed professional clericaloccupations; extremely jealous of theirsocial positions(whichtheyhave maintainedby caste and ritualproscriptions by the avoidanceof manual and very language, their literate cullabor); very well-educated, proudof their and their history; and highly skilledin maintaining theircommunal ture, Integration through fairly a complex institutional structure has proved that remarkably capable of adaptation.'4 a Duringthe 19thcentury Bengali bhadralok the experienced cultural renaissance Bengalischolars that frequently to theItalianRenaissance liken of the 13th'and 14thcenturies, flurry activities literary, a of in artistic, in of political, cultural and pursuits placed Bengalfirmly theforefront that almost Indian associational in the 19thcentury. the end of that all life By Calcutta was secondonlyto Londonamongthe greatcitiesof the century British empire, Bengalipoetsand writers weredistinguished leadinginas ternational literary figures(Tagore won the Nobel prize in 1914), and Bengalis wereprominent amongtheIndianprofessional classesand in government circlesin regions distant Sindhin theNorthwest Burma as as and to the East. In the 20thcentury, however, thiselitewitnessed seriesof a dislocations thatservedto restrict influence its members the of outsideof the Provinceof Bengal,while fundamental cleavagesdevelopedbetween varioussocial groupswithin eliteitself. a resultof thesedevelopthe As ments considerable a portion thebhadralok of adoptedMarxism a politias cal creedin the1930's. for severalreasons: it reMarxismappealed to bhadralokpoliticians -in jectedelectoral politicalsystems, whichan elitewas likelyto be outHindu ideas and behaviorat a time orthodox numbered;it denigrated withthe Hindu revivalism disenchanted of whenBengaliswerebecoming of the theBrahmanic heartland India; itpromised overthrow theBritish of thatwereguidedby their and commercial and theanglicized ruling groups a in ideas (and whocontrolled society which Calcutta); itpromised modern the intellectual wouldhave a moreprominent the position; it legitimized terrorist conspirational and in activities whichthe bhadralokhad staked
"4J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflictin a Plural Society: Twentieth-Century Bengal (Berkeley:University CaliforniaPress, 1968), pp. 5-6. For an East Pakistani view of of historicalbhadralok dominance see Muin-ud-dinAhmad Khan, Muslim Struggle for Freedomin Bengal (Dacca: Government East Pakistan, 1960) especially pp. 1-48. of

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

593

theirreputations since the 19thcentury;and it deniedthe usefulness of banyas (traders) and merchants, thosecaste groupsthatwere beginning to rise in statusin thetwentieth century, who in Bengal werealmost and all abhadra (non-respectable). thesametime, had little At Marxism appeal forMuslim political leadersin Bengal, whostoodto gain in electoral politics because of the preponderance Muslimsin the Province.In the decade of preceding partition 1947 thebulkof theMuslimpolitical the of leadership in Bengalpreferred align itself to in withtheBritish orderto gain control of the provincialgovernment, thereby creatingthe explosivecommunal situation resulted that from Muslim-British a coalition with business interests against increasingly an leftist-oriented leadershp.'5 Hindu Thisis notto arguethat Communist the movement Bengalwas inspired in bycommunal interests. Indeed, CPI in Bengal, in other the as partsofIndia, has attempted appealtobothHindusand Muslims has generally to and been moresuccessful recruiting in Muslimsthanhave other leftist parties. Even before partition CPI preferred deal withtheissue of Pakistanas a the to "nationality question"rather than becomeinvolved religiousand comin munal disputes. Thus the historic September 1942 resolution the CPI of Central whichlaid downa policyon the"nationality question" Committee, forthefirst time, was stated follows: as has Every section theIndianpeoplewhich a contiguous of territory common historical culas its homeland, common tradition, language, and economic would reclife be ture, psychological make-up, common as to as with ognized a distinct nationality theright exist an autonomous and or state the IndianUnion federation willhavetheright within free Indiaoftomorrow it . to secedefrom ifit mayso desire .. free would states thevarious of of be a federation union autonomous or nationalities suchas the Pathans, Western Punjabis (dominantly Muslims), AssaSikhs,Sindhis, Hindustanis, Rajasthanis, Gujeratis, Bengalis, mese, Beharies, Oriyas, Karnatikas, Maharashtrians, Tamils, Andhras, etc.16 Keralas, In theCPI election manifesto 1946 theparty of thatpower again advocated be transferred seventeen to different "sovereign nationalconstituent assemblies"ratherthan to India and Pakistan,the seventeen new nations to as corresponding the"nationalities" defined thepartyin 1942, with by of theaddition theBaluchis.'7Even as late as 1962 theleadingCommunist of history thefreedom in struggle India arguedthatthe Congresswas at

"The Hindu-Muslim conflict surrounding partition Bengal is traced out in Broomin field, cit.,see especiallypp. 308-315. op. 16People'sWar (organ ofthe CPI), October4, 1942,p. 10. 17P. C. Joshi,For the Final Bid for Power! (Bombay: People's Publishing House, 1946), pp. 32-34.

594

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

fault because "unfortunately Congress [the acceptedpartition] on the not basis of nationalities of religion."18 but This view,thatIndia shouldhave been partitioned thebasis of "naon tionalities" rather thanreligion, nowhere was morepopularthanin Bengal. Perhaps most Bengalis, including Communists. hopeful theyears the were in preceding partition something that wouldcomeof theschemes forth set by Sarat Bose and H. S. Suhrawardy a "unitedBengal,"independent for of bothIndia and Pakistan.Both Gandhiand Jinnah wereat timesreported to have agreedin principal such a proposal,19 the Communists to and and other leftist partiesin bothEast and WestBengalhave sincechargedthat partition "foisted was upon Bengal" by a coalitionof Britishand Indian business interests. thewordsof one East Pakistani In Communist leaderin 1969:
of We werenotopposed to the partitioning India in 1947-we would havelikedit ifthewholeofIndia werepartitioned-hut wereagainst we the partition Bengal alone, or the partition onlyBengal and Punof of jab. This has helped othersto exploit Bengal-as we predictedin
1947.20

It was sentiments such as these,when coupled withthe attachments of in and otherinterests East Bengali Communists theirland, families, to Bengal,thatmade it possibleforthemto opt for East Pakistanimmediatelyafterindependence. the Within fewyearsfrom timeof partition, a the however, positionof Most of in BengaliCommunists East Pakistanbeganto changedrastically. the activities thembecameinvolvedin insurrectionist following adoption the that oftheZhdanov linein 1948,with result an estimated 3,000members five Those that wereimprisoned duringthefirst yearsof Independence.2' the werenotimprisoned foundthemselves without same job opportunities in and perquisites whichtheyhad becomeaccustomed, large part beto in with causeoftheir relative aspiring groups disadvantage competing other of Pakistan.Not and individuals the changedconditions independent in onlywerethe majority the East PakistanCommunists of members the of Hindu community, therefore and as subject to the same discrimination
"8Hiren Mukerjee, India's Strugglefor Freedom (Calcutta: National Book Agency, ThirdRevisedEdition,1962), p. 285. "'The schemesfora "United Bengal" are spelled out in Sarat Chandra Bose, I warned my countrymen (Calcutta: Netaji Research Bureau, 1968), pp. 183-194.Included in thisvolumeare lettersfromboth Gandhi and Jinnahentertaining Bose proposal for the a unitedBengal, see pp. 254, 348-352.For the positionof varioussectionsof the Muslim community regardingthe question of a united Bengal see Hassan Suhrawardy,"The Indian Crisis: Muslim Viewpoints,"in S. L. Chopra (ed.) Hindustan or Pakistan (Lahore: Ilami Markaz, 1944), pp. 6-25; and Kamruddin Ahmad, op. cit., especially pp. 81-88. "0Quoted from interview an conductedin October1969. "1Basedon estimatesof partyleaders in both East Pakistan and West Bengal in Sep1969. tember-October,

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

595

classesand theHindureligion, loyalty Communists thenewnationthe to of statewas seriously withtheresult wereeasy thatPCP members questioned, targets angry for mobsand communal extremists. The turning-point the PakistanCommunist for Partywas the wave of communal that rioting tookplace in bothEast and WestBengalin theearly months 1950. Priorto 1950 there of had been a considerable movement of peoplesbetween WestBengal,Assam,and East Pakistan, but totalmigration figures duringtheyears 1947-50were small in comparison those to fortheyears following 1950 riots.23 mostauthoritative the The studies available indicatethatWhile therewereless thanone millionmigrants both in East and WestBengalpriorto the 1950 disturbances. morethana million migrants came from East Pakistan WestBengalalonein theyear1950.24 to Since 1950 theWestBengalgovernment estimates morethanfourmilthat lion Hindurefugees have cometo settle India from in East Pakistan, while theEast Pakistangovernment estimates morethana millionMuslims that have migrated fromthe northeastern portions India to East Bengal.25 of Despitethe factthatmovement across the borderhas now been severely restricted bothsides,exchange populations stillreachconsiderable by of can proportions whenever there an outbreak communal is of violenceand tenThe migration a largenumber Communist of of party members from East Pakistan WestBengalin 1950 was recognized theCPI in India when to by it decidedin February 1951 to establish Councilof East BengalRefugees a which could act as a front groupto organize refugee opposition againstthe Indianand WestBengalgovernments.27 whilerefugees But from East Pakistanhave sincehelpedto increasetheeffectiveness the Communist of and
22Thefeelingsof Hindus regardingdiscrimination East Pakistan have been traced in out in detail by a Hindu refugeewho is now active in leftistpolitics in Calcutta; see Samar Guha, Non-Muslims Behind the Curtainof East Pakistan (Calcutta: Gobardhan Press, 1951), especiallypp. 67-83.For a morethoughtful analysis of communalviolence and it's sources see the writings the late HumayunKabir, a prominent of Bengali Muslim who chose to remain in India; see especially his Minoritiesin a Democracy (Calcutta: FirmaK. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1968), pp. 39-70. 23Foran analysisof the 1950 riotssee Richard D. Lambert,"Religion,Economics and Violencein Bengal," Middle East Journal(July1950), pp. 307-328. 24Censusof India, 1961, Vol. XVI "West Bengal and Sikkim,"Part 1-A General Report, 368-371.See also The Statesman (Calcutta), July1, 1950. pp. 2"Indian studies of the migrationare summarizedin Influx: Infiltration fromEast Pakistan (Delhi: Ministry ExternalAffairs, of 1963). For a comparablePakistan summary see Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan PublishingHouse, 2nd edition,1963), pp. 226-230. 2"InJanuary1964,forexample,the mostseverecommunalriotssince 1950 took place in both East and West Bengal, with a resultingexchange of at least a half million people. See the review article by Kedar Ghosh in The Statesman (Calcutta), March 14, 1964. 27TheStatesman (Calcutta), February1, 1951 and February19, 1951.

pression against Muslims.22 In addition to being identified with the landed

other Hindusin East Pakistan, mostofthem werealso from wellrelatively established families who werenow accused of practicing of centuries op-

sion.26

596

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

the Marxist-left partyin WestBengal,28 moveopposition theCongress to proportionally. East PakistanCommentin East Pakistanhas suffered of munists now estimate thatmorethantwo-thirds the PCP wentover to India in theearly1950's,withtheresult thatthe strength thePakistan of at 3,000members.29 Communist movement nowestimated approximately is organizers it agreedthatthemosthighly-skilled Moreover, is also generally in ofthePakistan movement either jail or have goneoverto WestBenare of gal, witha corresponding declinein the effectiveness the diminished ranksof the PCP. UnliketheirCommunist colleaguesin WestBengal,mostof whomlist the of their as occupations "politicalworkers," majority theleadersof the PCP are clerks are in theprofessions.30Since Communist or partyactivity for it is bannedin East Pakistan has beenimpossible thePCP to raisefunds cadre of partyworkers, and a to in sufficient quantities support full-time for to have thoseindividuals whohave attempted be whole-timers theparty in usuallyendedup in jail. Thus, formostpartymembers Pakistan,emhas citizenship ployment a clerkor in a profession servedto legitimize as activities. and to providea coverforparty wantto work, In choosing professions which the in mostofthePakthey and education the primary, at istaniCommunists have optedforteaching not and the secondary, collegelevels.Teaching onlyaccordswith traditional are status Hindusin East Pakistan(and most of Communists stillHindus),3 which highly valuedbythePakistangovernment. it also is an occupation is in members East Pakistanwith Moreover, teachingprovidesCommunist and atmosphere easier access to books,literature, the kind of intellectual to whilesimultaneously furnecessary maintain ideologicalinformedness, ideas amongthestudents. resultis The nishing opportunities propogate to a Communist movement is confined that almostentirely thepetty-bourto and Those peoplewhoconsider geoisieor lowermiddle-classes, to students. do morefortheparty thanpay tokendues, themselves party members little
28Foran analysis of the votingpatternsof East Pakistan refugeesin Calcutta see MyronWeiner,Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 360 if. of 29Thisis the figure mentioned both Communists by and non-Communists East Pakin istan, and by leaders of the Communistparties in India. See also Robert Scalapino, "Communism Asia: Toward a Comparative in Analysis,"RobertScalapino (ed.), in the Communist Revolutionin Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,1965), p. 32. Scalapino estimatesPCP membershipat 3,000 (2,500 in East Pakistanand 500 or less in West Pakistan). 30Theoccupationsof membersof the Communist movement West Bengal are disin cussed in Myon Weiner,"Political Leadership in West Bengal, in Political Change in SouthAsia (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1963), pp. 189-194.Since comparable data is not available for membersof the Communist movement East Pakistan, in the generalizations made above are drawn fromthe impressionsof membersof the Communist movement East and West Bengal. in 81Thetraditional dominanceof Hindus in the educational systemof Bengal is elaboratelydocumented Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism (Cambridge: in Cambridge University Press,1968), pp. 59-64.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

597

keep themselves informed events theinternational of in moveCommunist and occasionally hold smallinformal discussions amongthemselves. ment, The "party," one can call it that,has not attempted hold nationalor if to regional meetings since 1953,nor has its leadership invested muchtimein coordinating activities its members the of withinPakistan. Because of theweakorganizational base of theCommunist movement in Pakistan, partymembers have made onlyminimal efforts influence to the major partiesin either East or WestWing,placingtheirhopes for a the future revolution eitherin the hands of the Soviet Union, China, or the Indian Communists, perhapsin the activities a new generation or of of Bengaliyouth. thewordsofan oldermember theparty, In of whohad been activein the Communist movement pre-partition in Bengal: dream suchmovements aretaking of We cannot [as placein India]. Politics Pakistan at a low ebb. Firstwe mustcreatesomeconin is sciousness among people, the then canthink thefuture we of course . . . when thatdaycomes mayfind we of thatthetactics Leninwillserve or us best, thetactics Mao,orthetactics Jyoti of of Basu [a prominent IndianCommunist], thoseare notimmediate but questions. Nowwe can onlyprepare way forthosewho comeafter the us.32 of Communist From the point-of-view the international the movement, within members Pakistanwouldalso appear activities Communist of party BoththeSovietUnionand Chinahave at to count little thispointin time. for pursuedan activistforeign policy towardPakistan duringthe last two Communst movement case does the domestic seem decades,but in neither As to figure foreign in policyconsiderations. is thecase withthemembers the of oftheCommunist within party Pakistan, position thetwoCommunist the revolugiantswouldappearto be one of "preparing way" fora future to of tionwhileadjusting therealities Pakistanipoliticsforthe present. in It maybe thattheSovietUnion,like theCzaristregimes Russia,will in water havea long-term interest gaining warm accessto Karachiand other communications the with portsof the Indian Ocean, in orderto facilitate oil richareas oftheMiddleEast. This was certainly factor a thatinfluenced British policydecisions theNorthwestern on territories theRaj, and the of American policyof extending BaghdadPact to Pakistanhas frequently the been justified a merecontinuation the British as of policy aimed at preventing Russan expansion.33 Duringthelast two decades,however, Soviet Pakistan beenmoredefensive nature, first policytowards has in at directed againstthe UnitedStates and later againstthe Chinese.Throughout the 1950's theSovietUnionadopteda hostilestancetowards Pakistan, vetoing severalSecurity Councilresolutions designed settle Kashmirdispute to the or through plebiscite bilateral negotiations, an effort penalizePakistan in to
conductedin East Pakistan in October1969. 82Based on an interview op. 83Sayeed, cit.,p. 281.

598

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

forallying itself withtheUnitedStates.In the1960's,however, Russia has increasingly adopted a more neutralattitudetowardthe Indo-Pakistan conflict Pakistani as relations withtheUnitedStateshave cooled and SinoPak relations have becomemore cordial. Professor Griffith's description of Sovietinterests duringthe Indo-Pakistan conflict. 1965 mightwell of serveas a description Russianpolicygoals in thelate 1960's. of Moscow's minimal objective was the containment bothPeking of andWashington; maximum wasto detach its aim Indiafrom Washingtonand Pakistan from Peking whilemoving bothcloserto Moscow, and finally, improve to relations between Indiansand Pakistanis the so that together might they devote their energies containing to China rather thanto fighting other.34 each of The importance theChinesein thedetermination Sovietpolicycan of be seen from factthatpoliciesin Moscowhave been evolvedin direct the response changes Chinese relations with Pakistan. to in diplomatic Throughout the 1950's Communist China pursuedrelations withPakistanwhich were"diplomatically correct" but cool, withthe Chinesebeingmuchless hostiletowardsPakistanthan the Sovietsin theircondemnation the of BaghdadPact; withPekingrefusing come out in favorof India on the to Kashmir question; and withChou En-lai even attempting mediatedisto putesbetween India, Pakistan, and theSovietUnion at theBandungCon-

ferencein April, 1955.35 In the 1960's these relationshave become increasinglyfriendly, with Pakistan votingto seat CommunistChina in the United Nations in 1961, a Sino-Pakistan border agreementbeing reached in 1963, air services being initiatedbetween Canton, Shanghai, Dacca and Karachi in 1964, and expressions of Chinese support for Pakistan being issued on a numberof occasions during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict.36 China's policy in South Asia stems from a number of complex sources, but in the short run it is probably designed to increase instabilityon the subcontinentand to involve both New Delhi and Rawalpindi in an armamentsrace thatwould detractfromeconomic developmentin both nations.37 Since Chinese attempts preventboth America and the Soviet Union from to promotingtheir objectives in South Asia have thus far failed, the Chinese have found it necessaryto maintain theirhostile stance toward the present Indian regime.On the one hand thishas involved a continuingconfrontation of troopson the Sino-Indian border,while on the other China is supporting and training rebels in the Naga Hills and in other parts of India where
3"Griffith, cit.,p. 117. op. 3"Sayeed, cit.,p. 274. op. "Cordial relationsbetweenChina and Pakistan have continuedto growsince 1965 as tradeagreements and culturalexchange has taken place. See the reportof LieutenantGeneral Hamid Khan, who led the Pakistan delegation to the 20th anniversary celebrations thePeople's Republic of China,Dawn (Karachi), October6, 1969. of 7China's foreign policyin South Asia is tracedout in Brines,op. cit.,pp. 160-213.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

599

potential guerilla movementsexist.38Consistentwith these policies are the cordial diplomatic exchanges which China has pursued with the Pakistan government, which have helped to gain support for China among Pakistani party and military leaders.39 In the long run the Soviet Union has a greater interestin West Pakistan, which is culturally and geographically linked to the Middle East, while China's principal interest lies in East Pakistan, which borders on India and Burma. So long as Pakistan manages to maintain friendlyrelations with both the Soviet Union and China it is unlikelythat either of the two Communistgiants will overtlysupportinternalCommunistrevolutionary groups (as China is presently doing in India, or as the Soviet Union did in the late 1940's). However, both India and Pakistan have at times been concerned with the possibilitythat eitherMoscow or Peking may some day find it in theirinterestto support internalinsurrectionist particularlyin movements, the northeastern regions of India and in East Pakistan. In 1959, for example, when Chinese probings beyond the McMahon Line were interpreted as a threatto East Pakistan, Field Marshall Ayub Khan stated in an interview with a British correspondentthat "A Russian-Chinese drive to the Indian Ocean is a major aim in the Communist drive for world domination."40 Again, in July,1960, President Ayub issued a series of statements fromEast Bengal, in which he argued that pro-PekingCommunists "operating out of Calcutta" were carrying on a campaign for "a weak federal structure,Parliamentary democracy, too many provinces, and an ineffective governmentfor Pakistan,"41 a conspiracy which was also reported (with slight alterations and additions) by the Indian Home Ministry in New Delhi in 1964.42 Because of the lack of interest on the part of both the Soviet Union and China in gettinginvolved in the domestic Communistmovement,and because of the repressionof the movementby the Pakistan government, the older Communisttrade union and peasant bases in East Bengal have been considerably weakened. The most successful Communistmembers and felstill active on the trade union fronthave found it possible to low-travellers
38InDecember 1968, the Indian Ministerof State forExternal Affairs, R. Bhagat, B. confirmed reportsthat at least 1,000 Naga rebels had been trained in China for purposes of guerilla warfare and were attempting infiltrate to back into India. Amrita Bazaar Patrika (Calcutta), December 24, 1968. Recently China has been supporting the Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (CPML), which is pursuingguerilla warfaretactics; see Sankar Ghosh, "Guerilla Warfare in Midnapur," Times of India (New Delhi), October 27, 1969. "9The Pakistan People's Party, which was founded by formerExternal Affairs MinisterZ. A. Bhutto,has as one of its principal tenets an even closer alliance with China than exists at present. See ZulfikarAli Bhutto, Pakistan and the 'Alliances, (Lahore: Pakistan People's Party,1969) and ZulfikarAli Bhutto,The Myth of Independence, (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 131-135. 40The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), November19, 1959. Quoted in Sayeed, op. cit., p. 273. 4"TheStatesman(Calcutta), July26, 1960. 4"TheHindusthanStandard (Calcutta), May 3, 1964.

600

COM

U NISM

I N EAST

PAKISTAN

continue theirorganizational thattheyhave been workonlyto the extent some of themeven able to divest of themselves their reputations leftists, as rather thanclass lines.43 goingto theextent organizing of alongcommunal havenotonlyweakened organizational oftheparty, base Suchactivities the buthave also intensified factional and the dispute amongPakistanileftists moreand moreof the leftist forced to leadership searchfor a theoretical position whichwouldjustify commitment Communism. a to In thesearchfortheoretical support a Communist of the ideology, factionsthat'havearisenin East Pakistanare roughly similarto thosethat in exist India. Onegroupoftheoreticians Moscow identifies thecurrent with lineofcollaborating thebourgeoisie a "topalliance,"expecting with in that through personal influence (and withthesupport Sovietforeign of policy) theruling groupsin Pakistancould be expected complete first-stage to the (anti-imperialist anti-feudal)bourgeois-democratic and revolution, later to be followed a socialistrevolution.44 is essentially strategy by This the of theCPI in India.45 A second groupof theoreticians muchcloser to is the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM), arguingfor a "modified Right"or "neo-Maoist" strategy, whichis similarin mostrespects the to Right strategy described above butwithone significant difference. the Like classical Right strategy the "modified Right" or "neo-Maoist"strategy calls fora two-stage revolution a "top-alliance" and withbourgeois forces, butitinsists themaintenance a power on of base separate from bourgeois the partiesin order to facilitate pressure"frombelow." The "neo-Maoist" strategy frequently is called a "unitedfront from below" as opposedto a "united front from above." boththe classical Rightand "modified In the Pakistancontext Right" and strategies have had littleappeal for Communists theirpotential supdo porters sincethe Communists nothave thekindof influence instituin to tionallifewhichis necessary createan effective alliance."Some of "top theCommunists presently to are attempting gain such influence peneby into trating theNationalAwamiParty (NAP) of Maulana Bhashani, hopto a ingeventually capture shareof political powerin East Pakistanand to
"3Hindu laborersin East Pakistan,regardlessof theirorigins,are frequently referred to as "Biharis," as opposed to Muslim "Bengalis" in the labor force.For a description of communalorganizations withinthe trade union movement East Bengal, described in in these terms,see A. F. A. Husain and A. Farouk, Social Integrationof Industrial Workers Khulna, (Dacca: University Dacca, 1963), pp. 46-50,58-63,77. in of "For an analysis of Communist strategiesin South Asia, which is still relevantto both India and Pakistan, see John H. Kautsky,Moscow and the Communist Party of India, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), pp. 8-14. A more recent analysis of Communist strategies whichis based on Kautsky'swork,is Donald S. Zagoria, "CommunistPolicy and the StruggleforDevelopingCountries," Proceedingsof the Academyof Political in Science,XXVIII (April 1965), pp. 69-73. "A recent historicalaccount of the evolutionof CP1 strategyin India appears in VictorM. Fic, Peaceful Transitionto Communism India, (Bombay: Nichiketa Pub.. in lications, 1969).

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

601

But of revolution.46 use this power base for the promotion a first-stage alliance withBhashani'sNAP, or withany of the Pakistan'sotherlegal Not of for parties, createsa number problems BengaliCommnmists. only of does a strategy alliancewithNAP assumean exteremely long-range posthat to withittheprobability Comof it sibility coming power, also carries munists will be used by NAP and otherpartiesfor theirown purposes, movement Pakistan.Most imporin without benefit theCommunist any to for tant,it does not providemuch of an opportunity the creationof an moveand base forthe Communists it makesthe Communist independent leadersfortheforeseeable ment of dependent thewhims non-Communist on future. For thesereasonsthemoremilitant Communist strategists East Pakin can istannow arguethatonlya leftCommunist strategy succeedin buildLike theNaxalities WestBengalthe in movement. ing a viableCommunist proponents a leftstrategy East Pakistan advocatean organization of in based on student activists, withdirectappeals to workers, poor peasants, and other and thelargenumber a clerks of thathave bepetty bourgeoisie comemoreand moredisenchanted recent in years.7 Onlythrough violent denunciations thetopleadersof all other of political parties and of theimperialistnations, Naxalitesargue,can the designsof the "vestedinthe terests" and "imperialists" exposedand supportwon forthe eventual be revolution. According thisstrategy Communist to the Partymustcooperate withothers organizerevolutionary protest to and movements designedto exposethe"imperialist United States," "socialimperialist the SovietUnion,"' and the "reactionary, feudal,and bourgeois"elements Pakistanitself. in WhiletheNaxalites viewarmed struggle an eventual as the necessity, present taskof thePCP (in theirview), is to raise thelevelof politicalconsciousness amongthemassesin preparation an armedstruggle.48 for
46MaulanaAbdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, the 85-year-old leader of NAP, has described the programof his partyas an attempt"to establishsocialism which does not interfere with religion but stops exploitationof religion." At the presenttime NAP is among the most active political parties demandingan electoral framework withinwhich party programscan be pursued. See Morning News (Dacca), October 6, 1969, p. 1. For a discussion of NAP's internalfactionalism and its relationshipswith the more popular Awami League in East Pakistan see Holiday (Dacca), October 5, 1969, pp. 1, 8. See also Tapan Das, Pakistan Politics, (Delhi: People's PublishingHouse, 1969), pp. 48-52. 47ThetermNaxalites has its originin the Naxalbari peasant agitationof 1967, which was led by a youthful of contingent the Communist movement West Bengal. Those in who organizedpeasants against the Communist-led United Front government West in Bengal in the village of Naxalbari in 1967 have since formeda thirdCommunist Party in India, the CommunistParty of India, Marxist-Leninist(CPML). The goal of the Naxalites is to resist Communistparticipationin electoral politics and to initiate a guerilla movementmodelled after Mao's long march. For a detailed analysis of the movement West Bengal see Marcus F. Franda, "India's Third CommunistParty," in Asian Survey IX:11 (November 1969), pp. 797-817. 48Published of statements Naxalite strategists East Pakistan are not available, but in the West Bengal press is saturatedwith Naxalite literature. For a recentstatement of Naxalite goals in India by the leading West Bengal Naxalite theoretician, see Charu Majumdar, "Develop Revolutionary War to Eliminate War of Aggression"Liberation, 11:12 (October 1969), pp. 5-9. Liberationis the semiofficial journal of the CPML, published from Calcutta.

602

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

in Whiletalk of revolutionary protest and movements East Pakistanis and naive dismissed the idle gossip of incurableromantics frequently as youth, influence such movements the East Winghas in the past the of in had a considerable and impact thepoliticsof Pakistan.Students protest on groups initiated movement the against government theMuslim the of League (the partythatformulated realizedthe demandforPakistan) in the and early1950's,and thesesame groupsprovided bulk of the workers for the theopposition parties that defeated Muslim the League in the1954 elections. During the Ayub Khan regime,when oppositionpoliticalpartieswere rendered ineffective severe governmental by repression, protestgroups (again led by students) organized massive political movements 1963-64, in campaigned actively Miss FatimaJinnah thepresidential for in election of January 1965, and eventually rallied oppositionpoliticians, dissatisfied middle-class groups, governmental clerks, and labor unionsbehinda series of widespread protest demonstrations lastedfromNovember that 1968 to March1969 and eventually toppled AyubKhan government.49 -the Certainly theCommunists not play a largepartin any of thesedemonstrations, did butstudents witha leftist orientation and Pakistani did, "Naxalites"simply arguethat possibility protest -the of movements beingwon overto a revolutionary Communist strategy muchless remotethan the possibility is of Communists gaining influence through topalliancewith"vested a interests" and "imperialists." of Fromthe point-of-view the Naxalitesin East Pakistanthereis conin of siderable discontent whichis deeply-rooted therealities Pakistani life, in and whichcould conceivably organized a Naxalite-type 'be by party the future. has Since:Independence Pakistan beendominated thebureaucracy by and themilitary, bothof whichhave in turnbeen dominated non-Benby on East Pakistanis galis.50 have effectively of charged a number Moreover, occasionsthatthey are being exploitedeconomically West Pakistan, by while in of beingdiscriminated against terms educational benefits, language

49Foran excellent analysis of Pakistani student politics, based on a questionnaire returnedby 563 studentsin both Wings, see Talukder Manirazzaman,"Perspectives and Political Orientations University of Studentsin Pakistan," unpublishedmanuscript available fromthe author,Head of the Political Science Department,Rajshahi University, Rajshahi, East Pakistan. 50Thedominanceof the military and bureaucracyin Pakistani politics is traced out in M. Rashiduzzaman,Pakistan: A Study of Government and Politics, (Dacca: Ideal Library, 1967), see especially pp. 261 ff.The extentto which the militaryand bureaucracy have been dominatedby non-Bengalisis indicated in D. Lambert,"Factors in Bengali Regionalismin Pakistan," Far Eastern Survey,XXVIII:4 (April 1959), p. 54, which showed that only 132 of the 2,816 civilian officials and militaryofficers were fromEast Pakistan. While there have been some attemptsto correct this disparity since 1955-56,recent available figureswould indicate that the gap is still as wide in 1969 as it was in the mid-fifties. late 1969, for example, East Pakistan had one In in major-general the armyand no representatives among the ten leading figures the in post-AyubMartial Law Administration;see Mohammed Ayoob, "Hopes Belied in Pakistan," The Citizenand WeekendReview (New Delhi), April 12, 1969, pp. 32-33.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

603

policy, and a host of other significant matters.51 While the major political parties in East Pakistan have now gained enormous support for their demands that disparitiesbetween the two wings be redressed throughthe reinstallationof electoral democracy (the Bengalis constitute54% of the total population of Pakistan) most observersagree that a parliamentarysystem, if it works at all in Pakistan, is not likely to correctthe disparities between the regions for a long time to come. In this atmosphereNaxalite theoreticiansargue that the demands of the Awami League (AL) and NAP for an electoral systemwhich would enable Bengalis to outvote West Pakistan will eventuallyresult in the disenchantmentof East Pakistanis with electoral systems.Moreover,the argumentsof the classical Right and "modified Right" Communist strategists, that support for electoral demands is merely a temporarytactical device designed to build bases for futurerevolutionarychange, is viewed by the Naxalites as mere rhetoricand revolutionary jargon. Because of their extremedisgust with the results of parliamentarydemocracy the Naxalites have refused to even temporarily support the demand for an electoral system,but have instead sought to conceptualize a non-electoralstrategythat could promote revolutionin the Eastern Wing. The attempt to devise a non-electoral strategyin Pakistan brings the Naxalites face to face with the twin dilemmas that have confrontedSouth Asian Communistssince they began organizing in the 1920's. The firstof thesedilemmas relates to the question of the stabilityof India and Pakistan as nation-statesand the second is related to the possibilities for guerilla warfare or insurrectionist strategies.At some points in the past the Communistshave decided thatneitherIndia nor Pakistan were viable as national entities,with the result that regional separatistmovementswere supported by Communistson the basis of the "nationality thesis."52But support for regional movementshas always hindered the Communistmovementin its attemptsto influencenational policy-making, with the result that the "nationalitythesis" has been increasinglyunderplayed or omittedfrom party considerationssince the early 1950's. The second dilemma has arisen whenever the Communistmovement has viewed the Indian and Pakistani national governments being essentiallyunstable, for in each case this has raised as the question of how best to take advantage of instability.There are a number of compelling reasons for adopting a guerilla strategyin certain parts of the subcontinent-and the case is probably strongest for such a strategy

"1Foran analysis of the economic,cultural,and social grievancesof East Bengalis see Lambert,"Factors in Bengali Regionalism," op. cit. A more recent statementis Mira Deb, "Neglected Grievances," The Citizen and Weekend Review (New Delhi), May 10, 1969,pp. 28-29. 5"The historyof the Indian Communistexperience with the "nationalitythesis" is traced out in Selig S. Harrison,"Communismin India: The Dilemma of the CPI," Problems of Communism, VIII (March-April1959), pp. 27-35.

604

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

in Bengal-53 but each attemptto initiate guerrilla or other insurrectionist activitieshas resultedin ignominious failure. The tragedyof the Bengali-speakingpeople in this centuryis intimately relatedto thesetwindilemmas.The Bengalis are the seventhlargestlanguage group in theworld,and yettheyhave been unable to translatetheirnumbers intopolitical power. At the time of partitiontheywere unable to bring about a unitedBengal, despitethe desire and the willingnessof the most prominent Hindu and Muslim Bengali leaders to do so, and since partition the principal political dynamic in both West Bengal and East Pakistan has been the feelingthatBengalis are being exploited by non-Bengalis.Many Bengali leftists-on both sides of the border-now argue that the only solution to the "Bengal problem" lies in the creation of a united Bengal,54 brought about by guerilla warfare and supported by the Chinese. But neither the Indian or Pakistani strategists who advocate this solution have yet devised a means for initiatinga guerilla movement,and Chinese support is by no means assured. Moreover,thereare considerable factionaldifferences among Communist and Marxist-left strategistson the question of linking a left Communist strategy withthe demand for a united Bengal, since the two need not necessarilybe linked together. Barring considerable change in the position of Bengalis relative to nonBengalis, however,support for millenarian movementsis likely to grow on both sides of the internationalborder that now separates West Bengal from East Pakistan. To many observers,and to many politicians in both India and Pakistan, the Naxalites are thereforeconsidered to be a force which
nations (East Pakistan and Nepal), two border 53West Bengal borderson two foreign kingdoms(Sikkim and Bhutan) that are nominally"independent"but tied by treaties Tibet. East and subsidies to India, and is less than 30 miles fromChinese-controlled Indian terPakistan borderson Burma, two Indian states, and the centrally-governed ritory Tripura; it is less than ten miles fromManipur, and less than 50 miles from of Nagaland and Tibet. At one point in Darjeeling districtthe "Siliguri corridor,"only states and 14 miles wide, connects the main portions of India with its northeastern territories(Assam, NEFA, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura). Much of Bengal consists of mountainousand hilly terrain,covered with jungles and interlaced with innumerablerivers,marshes and swamps,an area that becomes particularlydifficult to transverse duringthe monsoons.At least a quarterof the populationof both East and West Bengal are landless day-laborersand another large portion of the population (almost 17%oin West Bengal) lives in cities of 50,000 or more, all of which are overcrowded with international refugees. Consideringthe possibilities for insurrectionist movements this area, leftists both sides of the borderare fondof quotingStalin's in on statement three Bengalis in 1949, to the effectthat "Telengana is far from the to centerof revolution," statement a which the Bengalis at that time interpreted supas portiveof a Communist insurrectionist movement Bengal. in "Sentimentsfora united Bengal are seldom expressed openly by leftists, since they so easily lead to conspiracycharges on both sides of the border. The last Marxist-left partyin West Bengal to advocate a united Bengal in public was the Forward Bloc (Ruikar or Subhasist faction),whichin the 1952 electionscalled for"a Bengali Union of Socialist Republics . . . a people's state unifying shades of difference all and autonomyin a federalgovernment." See The Statesman (Calcutta), September9, 1951, p. 7. A recent discussion of the idea of a united Bengal is contained in Debendra Nath Banerjee,East Pakistan: A Case Study in Muslim Uolitics, (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1969), pp. 169-178.

MARCUS

F. FRANDA

605

of within thenextdecade.Buttheactivities those willhaveto be reckoned Bengalmustbe placed and/ora united movement whoadvocatea guerilla politicsof bothIndia and Pakistan,as of in theperspective the domestic concerned of interests thosenations of wellas thecontext theinternational Comfor based on thedemand a united movement with Bengal.A separatist of to munist Bengalwouldruncounter theinterests mostpartypoliticians be and presently activein bothIndia and Pakistan, wouldcertainly resisted at Moreover, and by boththeIndian and Pakistanimilitary bureaucracy. powers international appealforanyofthethree thepresent timeit has little with withinterests the sub-continent, the resultthat Bengali guerilla in bands would have to win over the populace,collectweapons,and secure of the whileat thesame timefighting resistance party guerilla experience, and networks, bureaucratic intelligence and trained two politicians, highly by training,55 supported international all twomobilized armies with guerilla powerblocs. of does not the In this atmosphere significance the Naxalitemovement that goals. For the stemfrom possibility it will achieveits long-range the because of the inimmediate future Naxalitesare of politicalinterest the fluence whichtheyare likelyto have on the course of Bengali regional in movement India and Pakistan. of politics and thefuture theCommunist in Duringthe last fewyearsthe Naxaliteshave been successful securing activestudent groupsin of the support a large portionof the politically West Bengal, and these groupshave had a significant impacton state of to Whileit is muchmoredifficult judge thesentiment students politics.56 by constrained governis in East Bengal,since politicalactivity severely in and activities students East Pakistanbear a of boththerhetoric ment, to Bengali resemblance thoseof theNaxalitesacrosstheborder.57 striking in of students bothIndia and Pakistanread thehistory Bengal'spast greatof are ness,and yetthevastmajority them now unableto obtainjobs comwiththeirstatusand educationbecause of what theyalmost mensurate
"5TheIndian armyhas receivedguerilla training actual combatwiththe separatist in Nagas and Mizos of the northeastern while Pakistani guerilla traininghas territories, yet to be extensively tested.For a discussionof guerilla warfarein South Asia and its relationshipto possible Chinese interests, writtenby a leading member of the Praja Socialist Partyof West Bengal, see Pradip Bose, Sino-Pak Collusion and East Pakistan, (Calcutta: Samajwadi Prakashani,1966), pp. 9 ff.;see also Brines,op. cit.,pp. 415-416, 419,427. "6Franda, "India's Third Communist Party,"op. cit.,pp. 810-817. "7In both West Bengal and East Pakistan the more militant student groups have soughtto 1) paralyze the educational systemin an effort create greater militancy to among Bengali students; 2) entice the militaryand police into open confrontation in an effort "expose" the repressivenature of government;3) ally with peasant and to trade union groups on an ad hoc basis in an effort induce such groups to resortto to violence; and 4) introducerevolutionary slogans based on analogies to China and Vietnam. For evidence,comparethe analysisIbid. withthe descriptions the East Pakistan of student movement The Pakistan Observer (Dacca), October 1, 1969, pp. 1, 12; in Eastern Tribune (Dacca), October 3, 1969, pp. 1, 8; and Holiday (Dacca), October 12,1969,pp. 1.2,8.

606

COMMUNISM

IN

EAST

PAKISTAN

of of portions believeto be thediscrimination thenon-Bengali universally have India and PakistanagainstBengal.Today's Bengalicollegestudents thattookplace beforeand communal killing the notwitnessed widespread of distrustful traditional havebecomeincreasingly and after partition, they ideas. On bothsides oftheborderstudents religious groupsand traditional to and attracted thoseolderBengaliterrorist activein politics are extremely withthe electoral, leaderswho in the past have refusedto compromise period. In regimesof the post-Independence and bureaucratic, military on is atmosphere one thatthrives revolutionary short, Bengalistudent the whichare builtaroundregionaldemands. strategies and protest of withinPakistan the strategy the party members For Communist The character. Naxalitesis especiallyappealing,despiteits millenarian on of lessensthe dependence the Communists of adoption such a strategy allied withthe politicalpartiesand the "vestedinterests" theestablished carrieswithit an appeal to the inwhile it simultaneously government, groupsin East Pakistan.At student revolutionary fluential potentially and with could align Communists thestrong thesame time, Naxalitestrategy a whichdoes notrun of feelings interests Bengalisin a manner and regional to on) theattachment Islam.In thechanged counter (butdoesnotdepend to and movement, in lightof the of Communist conditions the international that frustrations Bengal,it is conceivable theNaxalite of increasing political couldgrowin East Pakistanin muchthesamemanmovement Communist for werewaiting neras it has in WestBengal.Whilemanyof its followers Naxalite politicsof India and Pakistanto thrust changesin the domestic of the of intopositions politicalinfluence, leadership themoveleadership Parafollowing. Communist mentcould be buildinga more substantial moveof weakness theCommunist organizational it doxically, is thepresent moreappealingto strategy ment Pakistanthatmakesa leftCommunist in thanany of theiralternatives. Communists domestic

and is currently India as a Senior Research Fellow of the AmericanInin University of stitute Indian Studies.

at of MARCUSF. FRANDAis a member the PoliticalScienceDepartment Colgate