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Best Evidence Rule AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO 18 SCRA 155 SANCHEZ; Sep 28, 1966 (athe) NATURE: Review on certiorari FACTS Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued; plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane. After transferring to the tourist class seat, one flight attendant approached him and requested from him his ticket and said that she will note of his transfer. He refused because for him it is tantamount to accepting his transfer. Later, he went to the pantry that was next to him and the purser was there. He told him that he recorded the incident in his notebook. He read it and translated to him because it was recorded in French. "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene." Carrascoso, during trial, included this incident in his testimony. ISSUES 1. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims incompetent, therefore not admissible (because the defendant was saying that the best evidence in this case is the entry and not the testimony) HELD 1. YES. The testimony of the defendants witnesses that the issuance of first class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger would have a first class ride, but such would depend upon the availability of first class seat cannot hold water. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, in this case, the first class tickets of the plaintiff without any reservation whatever and even marked with OK, meaning confirmed. 2. NO. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae. Moreover, if it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter. DISPOSITION: Decision of CA affirmed. HERNAEZ v McGRATH TUASON; July 9, 1952 G.R. No. L-4044 (jojo) NATURE On action of ejectment and for damages commenced in the CFI of Manila by Pedro C. Hernaez and Asuncion de la Rama Vda. de Alunan, in her own behalf and as an administratix of the estate of her deceased husband, Rafael R. Alunan, against the Philippine Alien Property Administration (PAPA).
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WON the CA erred in finding that the purser madean entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence which is
FACTS Rafael Alunan and Pedro Hernaez formerly were registered owners in equal share of a land, 8 contiguous parcels with a combined area of 4,533.34 sqm covered by TCT Nos. 46872-46880 and situated in the corner of Cortabitarte and Dewey Boulevard, Manila. 8 residential houses were built on these lots but they were destroyed by war operations in the early part of 1945. In Feb. 1943, a deed of sale, on which Alunan's and Hernaez names were signed as sellers and the Hakodate Dock Co., Ltd., a Japanese commercial firm, as buyer, in consideration of P170,000, was presented for registration in the office of register of deeds, and on March 3, TCT Nos. 66832-66839 in the name of the purchaser were issued in lieu of the old CT Nos. 5393053938, which were totally cancelled. On the strength of this registration,the lots and all improvements still existing thereon were vested as property of an enemy national by the PAPA, a US Government instrumentality, In April 1947, under the authority of the US Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, the Philippine Property Act of 1946, and Executive Order No. 9818. - The RP as the transferee of the property in litigation came into the case as intervenor on the side of the defendant. Dr. Nicanor Jacinto also filed a complaint in intervention but in opposition to the defendant as well as the plaintiffs. The questioned property has been mortgaged to Jacinto before the outbreak of the war to secure a promissory note for P160,000, and although the mortgage had been paid and cancelled in 1943, Dr. Jacinto alleged that he had accepted the payment and agreed to the cancellation in fear of Japanese reprisal. The issue was complicated by the theft after liberation from the office of the register of deeds, of the deed of sale, the transfer certificates of title by virtue thereof, and other papers pertaining to the last registration. The plaitiffs representation made determined and repeated efforts to block the attempts of appellants any oral evidence touching on the alleged contents of the documents supposedly executed by Alunan and Hernaez in favor of the Hakodate, which efforts were futile. As maters stand, only one unsigned copy of the aforesaid deed, which had been secured from the file of the Hakodate home office in Hokaido, Japan, was introduced. Hakodate's signed copy is said to have
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sale and that after the registration he succeeded in getting the certificates of title in the name of the vendee and delivered them to the latter. He says he did not remember if his firm was the retained the counsel for the Hakodate Dock Co., nor is he sure where the transaction took place. He would not be able to identify the document if only a copy thereof was shown to him. He states that he does not remember if the transaction was a sale; all he remembers is that it was a transaction between Hernaez and Alunan and the Hakodate Doc Ltd., and the papers were signed at his office at the Soriano Building by alunan and Hernaez, as afar as he can recall. He recalls another transaction of Hakode in which the preparation of the document was more or less entrusted to him by the Hakodate Dock Co. He says that he was informed by Messrs. Hernaez and Alunan regarding the transaction that there had been an argument between them. The trial Judge did not make express findings on Watanabe's credibility, and referring to Garcia's and Recto's testimony, noting that the same are beclouded with the phrases "it could have been", "it must have been signed, in his presence". Moreover, the judge insinuated that Hakodate's signed copy existed at the time of the trial and had been suppressed, and acting on this belief, disregarded all parol evidence by which the defendant had attempted to establish the genuineness of the deal. Said the court: There is no sufficient evidence on record to show the loss of all the signed copies of the questioned document. Loss of the original and the signed copies must be satisfactorily established before secondary evidence can be admitted. Specially when the signatures on the document is claimed to have been forged, it becomes absolutely necessary and indispensable the production on original or a signed copy of the document. Thus, no secondary evidence can be entertained to prove the document of the lost document, especially if the supposed document is contested to be falsified of forged. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and dismissed the complaints in intervention. ISSUE WON the signatures of Alunan and Hernaez on the deed of sale are authentic HELD YES
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secured some information about what we became of their certificates. Yet Hernaez would have the court believe, as we gather from his testimony, that neither he nor his partner learned of the whereabouts of their titles until after the Japanese had been driven away from the Philippines and that for the two years they allowed themselves to be deprived of the use of their property without protest. Let it be remembered that the property had not been taken by the armed forces for war purposes but by a private concern if attached to and operating under the supervision of the Japanese Navy. Contrary to Hernaez' assertions, Watanabe did not hold any military rank or status, and the houses and lots were used as quarters for the firm's civilian employees and acquired in the firm's name with its own money. The charge suggested by the line of plaintiff's evidence that the Hakodate Dock Co. resorted to frauds and coercion so as not to pay for the plaintiffs' land and houses is discredited by the fact that it settled the mortgage, paying an amount which was only P10,000 short of the purchase price. This payment bears witness to Hakodate's good faith and willingness to spend for what it got. At the same time, and this is more important to the immediate issue, it is mute testimony to the due execution of the sale by Alunan and Hernaez; for it is not logical to suppose that the Hakodate would have parted with a huge amount of cash, huge at the time, if the owners had not executed a valid deed of conveyance. Another idea that suggests itself is that the officers of the Hakodate, of the Hahodate, if they had a mind to commit frauds, would not have been chosen Doctor Jacinto for the victim of its felony in preference to a senator-elect, which Mr. Hernaez was, and a member of the Cabinet. To forge a deed of cancellation held by a private citizen who wielded no official influence would have been undoubtedly the easier and the risks of failure, not to say punishment, the lesser. The premise of his ratiocination is wrong in that Hernaez testified that he and no the Hakodate Dock Co. paid off the mortgage. However, the clear weight of the evidence both as to quality and the number of witnesses is against the plaintiffs. - Against the plaintiffs' evidence there is the testimony of Watanabe and Jacinto who said the payment was affected by the former, and of Recto and Garcia who said that the cancellation was arranged and perfected
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In the matter of the value of the houses and lots registered by the Hakodate Dock Co., the trial court believed that the price stated in the deed was highly inadequate and regarded this alleged inadequate as supporting the contention that the sale was forged. The court seems to have overlooked the fact that the property sold to Hakodate Dock Co., was only eight parcels containing a total area of 4,533,34 square meters, whereas the property which the plaintiff had bought from Chuan & Sons for P185,000 and of which the property in questioned formed a part, measured 8,027.72 square meters. So that by selling the above portion of P170,000, they were able to recoup nearly all their investment, without counting the rents they had theretofore realized on the houses, and keep nearly one-half of their original acquisition as a clear profit. That was not a bad bargain. It is a matter of common knowledge that in February 1943 Japanese war notes were still about at par with the Commonwealth peso. The sale of the plaintiff's other land in Dewey Boulevard for a much higher price in proportion to its size took place in 1944, or in the latter part of 1943 at the earliest, when the Japanese war notes had been shipping down fast. At any rate, the proceeds of the sale were more than enough to liquidate their mortgage debt, the payment of which the purchaser took charge of attending to. As Hernaez said, "the thing is that when we paid him (Jacinto) he gave us the release." - For another thing, it is a mistake to take the alleged inadequacy of the price stated in the deed of evidence of forgery, for figures are easy to fabricate and a forger would endeavor to fix an amount in accord with the prevailing rates of real estate value precisely to forestall such suspicion as is put forward in this case. - The appealed decision says "another issue raised by the plaintiffs is the illegality of the alleged acquisition by the Hakodate Dock Co. Ltd., of the property under litigation, assuming that a contract was duly executed by Messrs. Alunan and Hernaez in favor of the said company," And citing Krivenco vs. Register of Deeds, the court concluded that the sale would be null and void any way. As the appellants have noted, nowhere in the pleadings did the plaintiffs impeach the validity of the sale to Hakodate Dock Co., on constitutional grounds. And even if they had, the present case would not be controlled by the doctrine laid down in the Krivenko case. The Philippine Constitution was not in force
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ARCEO v CA G.R. No. 142641 CORONA, July 17, 2006 (cha) NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS -Arceo obtained 2 consecutive loans from Cenizal: P100k then P50k. He then issued a BPI Check postdated August 4, 1991 for P150k at Cenizals house located at 70 Panay Ave., QC. -August 4, 1991, Cenizal did not deposit the check immediately because Arceo promised 7 times that he would replace the check with cash. But since Arceo failed to replace the check, Cenizal brought the check to the bank for encashment 120 days after the due date. The checked bounced because of insufficient funds. -Cenizal then went to Arceos house to inform him of the dishonor of the check. However, Arceo already left the place. Arceo was given a letter giving him 3 days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check but Arceo still failed to pay. -Cenizal then executed an affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint for estafa and violation of BP 221. -However, Cenizal lost the check in question and the return slip after a fire occurred near his residence on 1992. He executed an Affidavit of Loss instead. -TC: GUILTY
1 SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. ? Any person who makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
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NATURE Appeals were interposed by the defendants Bernardo Gregorio and Eustaquio Balistoy from the judgment rendered in the two causes prosecuted which were consolidated FACTS - This case concerns the falsity of a document alleged to have been written on a date prior to the one when it actually was prepared, which instrument simulates the sale of a parcel of land by its owner to a third party, with the intent to defraud the creditor, who, through proper judicial process, solicited and obtained the attachment and sale of the said property in order, with the proceeds of such sale, to recover the amount which the owner of the land owed him. - Prior case: In a suit instituted by Pedro Salazar, as a creditor, against Eustaquio Balistoy, in the justice of the peace court of Libog, for the payment of a certain sum of money, judgment was rendered wherein the debtor was sentenced to pay to the plaintiff P275.92. - For the execution of the said judgment, two rural properties belonging to the debtor were attached. May 27, 1908 was set as the date for the sale and adjudication of the said attached properties. A few days before such date, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy sheriff to exclude the said realty from the attachment, alleging that he was the owner of the land situated in Tambogon, one of the properties levied upon, for the reason that he had acquired it by purchase from the judgment debtor, Balistoy, in 1905, prior to the filing of the complaint. - By reason of this claim and petition, the judgment creditor, Salazar, had to give a bond, in view of which the sheriff proceeded with the sale of the said property, and of another, also attached for the sum of P300, and both were adjudicated to the judgment creditor. - In order that the claim of intervention presented to the sheriff might prosper, Bernardo Gregorio attached thereto the document Exhibit D, at the end of which and among other particulars appears the memorandum dated in Libog as of February 22, 1905, and signed by Eustaquio Balistoy, Lorenzo Gregorio, and Cirilo Valla, and in which Balistoy states that he bought the land referred to in the said document from Luis Balistoy and sold it to Bernardo Gregorio for P300, wherefore he signed as such vendor.
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containing the libelous article with the innuendo, another article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. -Counsel for the defendant objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by the court. Petitioner's Contention -The exhibits in question are the best evidence of the libel, the subject matter of the information, and should therefore be admitted Respondent's Argument Inasmuch as the libelous articles were not quoted in the information (what was quoted was not the actual article but its Spanish translation), said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the information. ISSUE 1.WON an information charging a libel published in an unofficial language, without including a copy of the libelous article, but only a translation into Spanish is valid 2. WON a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to admit Exhibits A, B, C, and D should issue HELD 1. Yes Gen rule: The complaint or information for libel must set out the particular defamatory words as published, and a statement of their substance and effect is insufficient Exception: If the libelous article had been published in an unofficial language, as in this case, it is sufficient to insert a Spanish or English translation in the information. 2.Yes. -The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. -This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. -Certainly, the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it. -The respondent judge undoubtedly has discretion to admit or reject the evidence offered by the fiscal; but in the instant case his refusal to admit such evidence
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-In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed parcel of land -The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956. -On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. -On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title was issued in his name. -The petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959. -On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe. -True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However, on March 31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case. -On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot.
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of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla. The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case. Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977. On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that: (1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and (2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills. Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979. The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said held that in view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will. Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence. On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal does not involve a question of fact. ISSUE WON a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy HELD YES. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at
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petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions. Lastly, the CA said that the information (in said exhibits) were not received, retrieved or produced electronically and that NAPOCOR had not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents. - Hence, the instant petition wherein NAPOCOR insists that the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Rather, "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any printout or output, readable by sight or other means". ISSUE: WON the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in RA No. 8792 or the IRR of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence/ WON said electronic documents qualify under the one of the exceptions of Best Evidence Rule so that those may be admitted as documentary evidence HELD: NO/NO. Reasoning: -A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. - According to the SC, the TC did not commit an error when it denied the admissibility of the photocopies as documentary evidence as Napocor failed to establish that its offer falls under the exceptions (as herein enumerated). Best Evidence Rule under Rule 130 (as discussed by the SC):
Nature: Certiorari under Rule 45 Facts: -M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by Bangpai allegedly bumped and damaged NAPOCORs Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. -NAPOCOR then filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against Bangpai for the alleged damages caused on the power barges.
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(R.A.) No. 26 which grants the court the authority to consider other documents which it finds sufficient and proper bases for the reconstitution prayed for. In this case, the documentary evidence presented by respondent Gertrudes B. Verzosa, coupled with the Report submitted by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) confirming the previous existence of TCT No. 140606, is sufficient basis to grant the reconstitution. - OSG argues respondent did not prove that she had exerted honest efforts to secure the documents enumerated in the law and had failed to find them. ISSUE WON TCT should be reconstituted HELD YES. - Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources upon which the reconstitution of transfer certificates of title shall be based. - Among the sources enumerated in Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 26, the owners duplicate of the transfer certificate of title is given primacy because such document is, by all accounts, an exact reproduction of the original copy of the transfer certificate of title. It is required, however, that the owners duplicate certificate itself, and not a mere photocopy thereof, be presented to the court. - In this case, only a photocopy of the owners duplicate was presented. - Photocopy of the owners certificate of title presented by respondent in support of her petition is still considered secondary evidence. As such, it is inadmissible unless respondent proves any of the exceptions provided in Sec. 3, Rule 130. - The Court explained the order of presentation of secondary evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case. - Ultimately, the Court reinstated the decision of the trial court because of the failure of the Spouses Mateo to satisfactorily show that the original of the transfer certificate of title sought to be reconstituted had been lost or is no longer available, as well as the illegibility of the photocopy presented.
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of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the pleadings. - Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company vs. Government of the Philippine Islands: (1) the courts of equity will reform a written contract where, owing to mutual mistake, the language used therein did not fully or accurately express the agreement and intent of the parties; (2) the relief by way of reformation will not be granted unless the proof of mutual mistake be "of the clearest and most satisfactory character;" (3) the evidence introduced by the appellant met these stringent requirements. - Centenera vs. Garcia Palicio; Mendozana vs. Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. and De Garay: the amount of evidence necessary to sustain a prayer for relief where it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is always more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. - An examination of the note and the guaranty discloses that in the notation to the note the word "hold" is interlined. This indicates that the VP (signatory) of the Fidelity and Surety Company had his particular attention called to the language of the note, and corrected the typewritten matter by inserting in ink the word quoted. That the writer of the notation fell into a further error in obligating the company to the Laguna Coconut Oil Co. may be possible. That the writer may have had in mind to use the words Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. may also be possible. The names of the two parties before the guarantor were Laguna Coconut Oil Co. and Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, Inc. The guaranteeing company could not very well have assumed that BPI at a later date was contemplating discounting the note. - It is also apparent on the face of the note that it was to draw interest at maturity. This would disprove discount of the note by BPI on or before the maturity date. In truth, it is not certain that BPI ever did discount the note. - The bookkeeping entries of the bank are hardly competent against a stranger to the transaction. Moreover, one entry at least in plaintiff's Exhibit E has been changed by erasing the words "y Fidelity and Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands" and substituting "Philippine Vegetable Oil Co. garatizado p. Fidelity & Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands." The book entries taken at their face value are not conclusive.
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LECHUGAS v. CA (LOZAs) G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 GUTIERREZ, JR; August 6, 1986 (ricky) NATURE Petition for review FACTS - Victoria Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the Lozas, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern portion of the property owned by her known as Lot No. 5456 which she allegedly bought from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds (Exhibit A). She alleged that they appropriated the produce for themselves, and refused to surrender the possession of the land despite demands. The complaint was dismissed. She appealed to the then CFI of Iloilo. While the above appeal was pending, she instituted another action before the CFI of Iloilo for recovery and possession of the same property against the Lozas. The two cases were tried jointly. Both cases were dismissed. The CA sustained the dismissal. - Leoncia Lasangue, testifying for defendants declared that she inherited 12 hectares from her parents, being the only child and heir and that on December 8, 1950, she sold 6 hectares of her inherited property to Victoria Lechugas under a public instrument (Exhibit A) which was prepared at the instance of Victoria Lechugas and thumb-marked by herself (the vendor was illiterate). Refuting Lechugas' contention that the land sold to her is the very land under question, vendor Leoncia Lasangue was able to specifically point out that the land which she sold to Lechugas was the lot in the south known as Lot No. 5522 and not Lot. No. 5456
which was to the north and which was sold by her father in 1941 to the predecessor-in-interest of the Lazos. [Read the original testimony to see how the defense lawyer, using a piece of paper and the sun's movement as a reference, skillfully obtained this fact from an illiterate witness.] - On the basis of the testimony of vendor Leoncia Lasangue, the CA upheld the CFI's decision but also declared Exhibit A as NOT null and void ab initio insofar as Lasangue was concerned because it could pass ownership of the lot in the south known as Lot No. 5522 which she intended to sell and actually sold to Lechugas. ISSUE WON the CA erred in considering parol evidence over the objection of the petitioner in order to vary the subject matter of the Deed of Definite Sale (Exhibit A) although the land therein is described and delimited by metes and bounds and indentified as Lot No. 5456 of the Lambunao Cadastre. HELD NO. Ratio The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. Reasoning The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between Lechugas and the Lazos. Through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner [walang hiyang pinsan ito ah. Tsk. ], she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead. [Note: Lechugas was also occupying Lot. No. 5522 and contended that she bought it from a certain Leonora Lasangue but couldnt
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Salonga to object, he is deemed to have waived benefit of parol evidence rule. - Court is satisfied that P35,000 was received by Cruz as payment for pakyaw and sublease agreements. INCIONG V CA 257 SCRA 578 Romero J; June 26, 1996 (mini) FACTS: -Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC), Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissory note was due on May 5, 1983 -Due date came and obligation was left unfulfilled. PBC sent telegrams to Inciong demanding payment. It also sent a letter to Nayde. Both obligors did not respond. Thus PBC filed a suit for the collection of 50,000. -Case was initially dismissed for failure of plaintiff to prosecute the case. However, the lower court reconsidered the dismissal order and required the sheriff to serve the summonses. Lower court also dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas as prayed for by the private respondent herein. Meanwhile, only the summons addressed to petitioner was served as the sheriff learned that defendant Naybe had gone to Saudi Arabia. -Inciong on his part stated that: he was approached by his friend Campos who claimed that he was a partner of the branch manager of PBC, in the falacata logs operation. Campos also told him that Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business and would contribute a chainsaw to the venture. Campos then persuaded petitioner to act as a "co-maker" in the said loan. Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the understanding that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of P5,000.00. -Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00.
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- With the 1997 Asian financial crisis sending the Phil economy into turmoil, Duvaz defaulted in the payment of its loan obligations with Urban Bank as they fell due. On record, petitioner and Urban Bank mutually agreed to the restructuring of the formers indebtedness. By virtue of said loan restructuring, Duvaz executed in favor of Urban Bank 12 promissory notes for P20M each and 1 for P23M (total= P263M) with a uniform interest rate of 18.75% per annum, and all to mature on Oct 31, 2000. - EIB took over the operations of Urban Bank sometime before maturity of the restructured loans. Eventually, the restructured loans matured and became due and demandable. Because the loans remained unpaid, however, EIB required Duvaz to submit a mutually acceptable plan for the payment of the loan which, as of June 30, 2002, already amounted to P562,157,530.02 inclusive of interest and penalty charges. But instead of submitting any proposal for a plan of payment, as required by EIB, Duvaz protested the total amount of obligation being demanded upon. - Aug 8, 2002: EIB sent a final demand letter to Duvaz to settle its debts. - Aug 29: On account of said demand letter, Duvaz filed in the Makati RTC against EIB a complaint for reformation of instrument with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin EIB, as defendant in the suit, from commencing any foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged properties of Duvaz as plaintiff. In its complaint, Duvaz alleged that its real agreement of dacion en pago with Urban Bank (EIBs predecessor-in-interest), w/c agreement was intended for the full and complete settlement of its entire obligation, was not reflected in the loanrestructuring agreement that was entered into in 1998, hence, the need to modify the terms thereof to reflect the parties true intention. - Pending determination of the merit of petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, the parties mutually agreed to maintain the status quo ante. TC, therefore, found no need to issue any TRO. - Eventually, however, via an Order dated Sep 25, 2002, the court granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by Duvaz, to wit: WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and equity, the Court GRANTS the injunction prayed for and accordingly orders defendant [to refrain] from initiating any foreclosure proceedings until further
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A2010
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. We are in full accord with the CA when it struck down, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, RTCs Order granting petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of the main case. The reason therefor is that the right sought to be protected by the petitioner in this case through the writ of preliminary injunction is merely contingent and not in esse. It bears stressing that the existing written contract between petitioner and respondent was admittedly one of loan restructuring; there is no mention whatsoever or even a slightest reference in that written contract to a supposed agreement of dacion en pago. In fine, it is still necessary for petitioner to establish in the main case its rights on the alleged dacion en pago before those rights become in esse or actual and existing. Only then can the injunctive writ be properly issued. It cannot be the other way around. Otherwise, it will be like putting the cart before the horse. Besides, conformably to the Parol Evidence Rule, which is the general rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. This poses another big obstacle to a favorable finding of petitioners right in esse under the alleged dacion en pago agreement. Again, petitioner must first establish that alleged agreement in the main case where it bears the burden of duly proving by competent evidence that the written loan restructuring agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties. Until and unless this has been successfully carried out, there is no right in esse to speak of. And with EIB denying petitioners allegation of a right arising from an alleged dacion en pago agreement supposedly entered into by it not with EIB itself, but with Urban Bank, petitioners burden becomes doubly cumbersome. We find no such actual and existing right in favor of the petitioner that demands protection by the office of preliminary injunction.
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accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse. Such is not the case at bar. 2 NO. Ratio: It can not be contended that the dying declaration testified to by the witness was a confidential communication made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently made in the furtherance of justice for the express purpose that it should be testified to in the prosecution of the defendant. (Arnett vs. Commonwealth, 114 Ky., 593, 596) Reasoning: Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death. - The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death, concerning the circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with killing the declarant. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530.) Such dying declarations are admissible in favor of the defendant as well as against him. (Mattox vs. U. S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly held in several jurisdictions in the United States that the widow of the deceased may testify regarding his dying declarations. Disposition: Judgment of the court below is hereby SET ASIDE and a new trial is granted at which the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted. ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ GR No. 143439; Sandoval-Gutierrez; 14 October 2005 (ice) NATURE Petition for review on certiorari
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Disqualification by Reason of Death and Insanity LICHAUCO VS ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC CO. (monch) GOI V CA (VICENTE) G.R. No. L-27434 FERNAN; September 23, 1986 (Anton) NATURE This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then CA, as well as from the resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. FACTS - The 3 haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria situated in the Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by TABACALERA. - Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, as he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price, Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. TABACALERA did not agree to the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas without a guaranty; thus Gaspar Vicente (herein respondent) stood as guarantor for Villegas in favor of TABACALERA. - Either because the amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to Vicente fields nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13,807.00. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by Genaro Goi (petitioner) as attorney-in-fact of Villanueva. - Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13,807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12,460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited from Vicentes account. The difference was supposedly paid by Vicente to Villanueva, but as no receipt evidencing such payment was presented in court, this fact was disputed by petitioners.
HELD/ RATIO Yes. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has an exception, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. This is in lieu of the justification for the rule which are 1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife; 2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury; 3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. In Ordoo vs. Daquigan, this Court held: The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
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- Under ordinary circumstances, respondent Vicente would be disqualified by reason of interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, such disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows: Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated: (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. - The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. The defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which the deceased might have been interested to establish, if living. - HOWEVER, such protection was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff
1.
YES (General Rule ay HINDI) Ratio The protection was waived. And the disadvantage sought to be prevented by the law does not exist in the said case. Reasoning
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ONG CHUA vs. CARR 53 PHIL 980 OSTRAND; Jan 17, 1929 (marge) NATURE Appeal by the defendants from a CFI Zamboanga decision FACTS -Lots Nos. 136 and 137 and the house on lot No. 132 originally belonged to one Henry E. Teck, and lot No. 135 was the property of Teck's wife, Magdalena Lim. Sometime prior to June 20, 1923, it seems that the spouses sold the property in question to plaintiff Ong Chua, and on June 17, 1923, the latter executed a public document granting to Lim the right to repurchase lot 135 for the sum of P6,500 within four years from that date, and on the 20th of the same month, he executed another public document in which he agreed to sell lots Nos. 136, 137, and the house on lot 132 to Teck for the sum of P13,500 at any time within four years from date. Neither one of the documents was placed on record with the register of deeds. -July, 1925: Edward Carr came to Zamboanga, went to the office of Moore and sought the advice and assistance of the latter in regard to purchasing coconut lands. After various interviews, Moore called Carr's
attention to the lots above-mentioned and told him that he could buy the lots for P20,000, the amount which Ong Chua paid for them to Teck and Lim. Carr entered into negotiations with Ong Chua and Moore, and many conversations took place in which Moore, among other things, informed Carr that Teck and his wife had the right to repurchase the property in question from Ong Chua and that such rights would expire in June, 1927. -Dec 14, 1925: Ong Chua and Carr went to the office of Moore, to whom they delivered copies of the documents under which Teck and Lim acquired their rights to repurchase the property involved, and requested him to draw the deed of sale of the property from Ong Chua to Carr. Before the drafting of the deed, Ong Chua stated to Moore that he consented to sell the properties to Carr on the condition that the sale should be subject to the rights of Teck and Lim to have the property reconveyed to them and that said rights were to be respected by the vendee. According to Moore's own testimony, Carr was fully aware of those rights even before the execution of the deed and that he consented to embody stipulations to that effect in said deed. -The purchase price of the property stipulated between vendor and vendee was P20,000. When the deed of sale was about to be drafted, Carr informed Moore that he had only P13,500 on hand and that he desired to obtain a loan of P6,500 from the Zamboanga Mutual Building and Loan Association of which Moore was the secretary. Moore told him in effect that the loan could not be made upon property the titles to which were not clear and that the right of Teck and Lim to repurchase were not entered upon the certificates of title to the property. Moore also told Carr that the deed of sale could be made in such a form that Carr's title to the property purchased would appear to be absolute but that Carr was to bear in mind that the rights of Teck and Lim still existed and that the deed and other documents must be left in his, Moore's, possession until the expiration of the term for the right of repurchase and that, if the deed were made in that form, the loan of P6,500 could be obtained. -Moore thereupon instructed his clerk to prepare and typewrite the deed of sale without including therein the condition that the sale was subject to Teck's and Lim's rights to repurchase. The deed was signed by Ong Chua in the presence of Darlucio and duly acknowledged before Moore as notary public. It may be noted that Ong Chua did not understand English and was therefore
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-Tongco vs. Vianzon: "The object and purpose of this statute is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party. An equally important rule is that the law was designed to aid in arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth." -A number of credible witnesses testified to facts which conclusively showed that Carr's conduct was tainted with fraud. Plaintiff did not take the witness stand until after the existence of fraud on the part of Carr had been established beyond a doubt and not by a mere preponderance of evidence. In these circumstances, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in not excluding the plaintiff's testimony. 2. YES. Reformation will be given "where there is a mistake on one side and fraud or unfair dealing on the other." -Counsel admits that the deed was left in escrow with Moore. It is well settled that the condition upon which a deed is delivered in escrow may be proved by parol evidence and that ordinarily the statute of frauds has no application to such an agreement, nor is it affected by the rule of evidence, which prohibits a written contract from being contradicted or varied by parol evidence. It is also well established that an escrow delivered without authority or obtained fraudulently passes no title. -That is what occurred here; Moore had no authority whatever to deliver the deed in escrow to Carr before the expiration of the time for redemption. It follows that the certificates of title issued to Carr were of no legal effect and that the suit for the rescission of the deed and the cancellation of the corresponding certificates of title would be in order (see the last two provisos in sec. 55 of Act No. 496). -The evidence is conclusive that the plaintiff had no clear conception of the contents of the deed. That he was anxious to protect the rights of redemption held by the parties who sold the land to him, is very obvious; indeed, if he had failed to do so, he would have laid himself open to an action for damages. But the deed was written in the English language, with which the plaintiff was unfamiliar, and he had to rely on the statements of Moore as to the contents and effect of the deed and was told that the document was sufficient. -Carr, on the other hand, knew the contents of the deed and fully agreed to Moore's plan to place it in escrow
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3. Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account Yes, several times by letter, but I never received an answer. ISSUE WON the appellees' depositions are admissible. HELD YES. The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the principals and their attorneyin-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to permit such a question, it would not be reversible error, for that very relationship is proved by the Exhibits . - As to the other two questions, it is to be noted that the deponents deny having received from the deceased Benigno Goitia any money on account of profits on their shares, since 1915. We are of opinion that the claimants' denial that a certain fact occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact Benigno Agoitia does not come within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure). - The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the death of the deceased. The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from fictitious claims. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the filing of just claims against the decedent's estate. - The facts in the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo differ from those in the case at bar. - Maxilom vs. Tabotabo: the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in his favor and against Tabotabo of P312.37, Mexican currency. The liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite of this, some years later, or in 1906, Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of Tabotabo for P1,062.37alleging that P750 which included the 1899 liquidation had not really been received, and that therefore instead of P312.37, Mexican currency, that liquidation should have shown a balance of P1,062.37 in favor of Maxilom. It is evident that in view of the prohibition of section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, Maxilom could not testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the balance of the liquidation made by and between himself and the decedent.
MENDEZONA V VIUDA DE GOITIA March 11, 1930; VILLAMOR, J. (lora) FACTS - Defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Benigno Goitia - Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorneyin-fact of the plaintiffs in the joint-account partnership known as the Tren de Aguadas, of which the plaintiff Leonor Mendezona, widow of Juan Bautista Goitia, owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200 - Prior to 1915, Benigno Goitia, at that time the manager of the co-partnership, collected the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year. That the usual dividends which Benigno Goitia forwarded to plaintiff Leonor Mendezona each year were P540, and to plaintiff Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal, P216 - From 1915 until his death in August, 1926, Benigno Goitia failed to remit the dividends - Some time before his death, more particularly, in July, 1926, Benigno Goitia, who was no longer the manager of the said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the amount of P90 as dividend upon plaintiff Leonor Mendezona's shares, and P36 upon Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal's stock - During the period from 1915 to 1926, Benigno Goitia collected and received certain sums as dividends and profits upon the plaintiffs's stock in the Tren de Aguadas in his capacity as representative and attorneyin-fact for both of them, which he has neither remitted nor accounted for to the said plaintiffs
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difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged. When admissible: - Conversation ( Letter): The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness. It is admissible because it relates to a conversation in which both spouses took part, and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. This cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter. - Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. - Wigmore: If they were obtained surreptiously or otherwise without the addressees consent, the privilege should cease. Since Exhibit L is inadmissible, Carlos should be convicted only with murder. Regarding prosecutions contention that the crime was murder because it was committed with aleviosa (because one of the wounds received by the deceased showed a downward direction, indicating that the deceased was sitting down when the wound was inflicted), theres no sufficient proof because the direction of the wound would depend largely upon the manner in which the knife was held. DISSENT (Villamor): Carlos should have been convicted of murder. An eyewitness testified that Dr. Sityar had his arms lowered and was about to fall down when Carlos stabbed him, which wound according to the doctor-examiner could have caused Dr. Sityars death. The case of US v. Baluyot states that [e]ven though a deadly attack may be begun under conditions not exhibiting the feature of aleviosa, yet if the assault is continued and the crime is consummated with
Disqualification by Reason of Privileged Communication PEOPLE V FAUSTO CARLOS Ostrand; (Mar 17 25) (mae m) FACTS
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