LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, Respondents.

complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanro bles virtual law library On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3 Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4 The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of nonshopping, but also for its lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts: . . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated. The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: xxx xxx xxx Art. 36. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

VITUG, J.: chanrobles virtual law library Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1and the Court of Appeal, 2Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity. It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United States of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read: "That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally." chanrobles virtual law library Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable

marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest." chanrobles virtual law library Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" - in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage. xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really

removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5 xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6 xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows: Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization. Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting: "On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of

understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chan robles virtual law library Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library The members voted as follows: chanrobles virtual law library (1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library (2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library (3) Prof. Baviera abstained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7 chanrobles virtual law library

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8 The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads: Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage: chanrobles virtual law library 1. who lack sufficient use of reason; chanrobles virtual law library 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; chanrobles virtual law library 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states: The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first: Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus); then a broader one followed: chanrobles virtual law library

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049); chanrobles virtual law library then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3); chanrobles virtual law library finally, a new version was promulgated: chanrobles virtual law library because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage. Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl es virtual law library In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears: This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties. Justice Sempio-Diy 11cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." chanrobles virtual law library The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions

of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.) Our Constitution is no less emphatic: Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution). The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrob les virtual law library SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl es virtual law library Feliciano, J., is on leave. chanrobles virtual law library

chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ: a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library

c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence. A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women

with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled? chanrobles virtual law library I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code. ROMERO, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code. During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl es virtual law library Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as -

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law." With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit: "(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." as well as the following implementing provisions: "Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34." chanrobles virtual law library "Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe." xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald

Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-tocase basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3 The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl es virtual law library Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is

addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

U.S.A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence. A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary ch anrobles virtual law library In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos has no intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not, in effect

Separate Opinions PADILLA, J., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But, after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate opinion in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ: a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her husband.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro bles virtual law library b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein petitioner) of her whereabouts in the

directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled? chanrobles virtual law library I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanr obles virtual law library I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code. ROMERO, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary cha nrobles virtual law library However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter 1dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code. During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl es virtual law library Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New

Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as "a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law." With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit: "(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." as well as the following implementing provisions: "Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34." chanrobles virtual law library "Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe." xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee

on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . . (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of nullity based on it should be treated on a case-tocase basis; hence, the absence of a definition and an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be manifested later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed." 2Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law." 3 The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family 4will remain the lodestar which our society will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl es virtual law library

Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows: 9 Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married. Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron. From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extramarital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage. Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement. While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E). 10 When petitioner

confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F). 11 According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12 Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) 13 with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) 14 was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) 15 was duly issued. According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter 16 to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney 17 and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their marriage. It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been unknown. Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioner's claim

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, Respondents. This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). 2 Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), 3 Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C), 4 and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D). 5 On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992. 6 On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties. 7 Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. 8

that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner. 18 On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision 19 dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: 20 The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated" to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows: Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; xxx xxx xxx (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; xxx xxx xxx (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; xxx xxx xxx (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. xxx xxx xxx If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation. In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3)

of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 21 the Court of Appeals held: 22 It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse. We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitionerappellant's declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband's character was on the "borderline between a responsible person and the happy-golucky," could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitionerappellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondenthusband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992). The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE. II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER. IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT

TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD. V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY. The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage. Art. 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. 23 In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
24

we held:

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. In the instant case, other than her selfserving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage. However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25 The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given

by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. 26 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 27 We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the nonexistence of private respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality. 28 Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned. The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled - exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration - Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Facts This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, Respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.: The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances. During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated: 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila; 2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986; 3. That the parties are separated-infact for more than three years; 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child; 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages; 6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife. Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse. The Issue In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture." In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting

personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that: As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates. In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made. Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply theneglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties." The Court's Ruling The petition is meritorious. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the

performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8 COURT Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage? A Yes, Your Honor. Q There is no hope for the marriage? A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman. Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties? A Yes, Your Honor. Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions? A Yes, Your Honor. The Court has no more questions. In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill prenuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and

applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial(Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda. From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the

illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14 Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion: I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still

maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. ROMERO, J., separate opinion: The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties. In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness." I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code. That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions. At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read: (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over: (7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge

the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration. Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage." 1 My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree. As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex." The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry. For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz: 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract; 2. reasons of public policy; 3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted. Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature. Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation. On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning. With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law. Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing. Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo - freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code - and classified the same as a ground

for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning. A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony. "Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent. The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriageare rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3 Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship: The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc. Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage: At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations. xxx xxx xxx The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category. As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise

proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4 In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting. However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null. The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. We declared: This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court. 1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring: I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained: (T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1 Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) 1. who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2 The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz:

(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. 4 In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz: First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature; Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support; Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable. It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any

such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus Section 2, Article XV: Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Section 12, Article II: Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . . Section 1, Article XV: Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution) The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

PADILLA, J., concuring opinion: I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties. In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness." I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code. That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions. At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read: (7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over: (7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration. Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to

mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage." 1 My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree. As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex." The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry. For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz: 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract; 2. reasons of public policy; 3. special cases and special situations. The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted. Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature. Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation. On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.

With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law. Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing. Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo - freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code - and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning. A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid.

Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony. "Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent. The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. 2 Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriageare rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the

capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3 Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship: The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc. Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage: At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations. xxx xxx xxx The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category. As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into. 4 In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more

then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting. However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null. The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity. We declared: This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court. 1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the spouses.

VITUG, J., concurring: I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if

such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained: (T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. 1 Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) 1. who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2 The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals; 3 viz: (T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe

love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. 4 In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz: First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature; Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support; Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable. It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus Section 2, Article XV: Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . . Section 1, Article XV: Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. (The 1987 Constitution) The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Endnotes: 1 Rollo pp. 25-33. 2 Sixteenth Division composed of J., Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman JJ., Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring. 3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. MallarePhillipps. 4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas. 5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision is follows: "To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the office of the Government Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986. leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family. Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitionermother and son except during the first few months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually renting the house with the respondent's parents responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this. respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at

present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child. which fact he does not deny. It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at the background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their relationship because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing that they know each other much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would seem. therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life. During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fighting's. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms. It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them can accept and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite in marriage. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code). The unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently) united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73). 6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988. 8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5. 9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines - PCP II held from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a Council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful discernments. 10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and the law practitioner. Article XV

governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. 13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994. 14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text used in Santos v. CA reads: "Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage: xxx xxx xxx 3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differentlyworded English translations. ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

THE FAMILY Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Sec. 3. The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious connections and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty. exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so through just programs of social security. Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA

B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration. Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus: "WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent. "Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision. "SO ORDERED."

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. "All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. "The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. "On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153). "Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver. "At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. "In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100). "The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not. "The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family

and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise: "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision. "In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4] Hence, this Petition.[5]

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: "It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F). "Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. "After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.

Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues: "I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to

psychological evaluation. II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]

The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests. In Republic v. CA and Molina, [8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows: "1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state. xxxxxxxxx 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the

complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own

children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxxxxxxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor

vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10] The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: [11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

grounds for legal separation, declaring a marriage void.

not

for

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs. SO ORDERED.

(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to

[1]

Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
[2]

CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39. CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33. CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 36-37.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000] FILIPINA Y. SY, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, Respondents. DECISION QUISUMBING, J.: For review is the decision1 dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition3 for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy. Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.4 Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively.5 The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.6 On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.7

[3]

[4]

[5]

This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
[6]

Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.

[7]

Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.

[8]

268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

[9] "Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration."
[10]

Supra, pp. 209-213.

[11]

240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J. "Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
[12]

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.8 Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.9 The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.10 In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her.11 The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision12 dated April 26, 1990, convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision13 dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent. On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition14 for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which ledto the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as

manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter.15 The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision16 dated December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the decision17 of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record.18 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,19 which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution dated November 21, 1996.20 Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following issues: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO; 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent]; 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND 5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.22 In sum, two issues are to be resolved: 1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and privaterespondent is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and 2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity. Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,23 in a number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated.24 Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.25 In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law. Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in herpetition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruityin the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial.26 The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November

15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.27 This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination,28 as follows: ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15,1973? FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir. November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial.29 These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.30 Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code31 is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-7932 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.33 The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no

longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.m is WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

ART. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this code shall govern. ART. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136. ART. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of property. ART. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code. ART. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto.
33

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character; xxx
32

ART. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief. ART. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The objection is proper, and (2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith. ART. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and (3) By the local customs.

See also Son v. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997); Quebral v. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).