Destabilizing websites

By Lokman Tsui. Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania

Last updated March 16, 2005

Websites have been a prominent locale for mobilization. Mobilization efforts are, at times,
considered destabilizing by a particular government. Here we are concerned primarily with two
categories of such websites: a) “destabilizing websites” (i.e. sites considered to be such) the
servers of which are located within the geographical of the government that perceives itself as
threatened and b) such websites that are within the jurisdiction of another government. The latter
category is particularly interesting because they lead to requests by the “threatened government”
for the host government. Internet sites of the Falun Gong movements, for example, fall within
both categories (located within and outside China). This paper will provide a comparative
analysis of the different methods employed by governments to counter in specific these
destabilizing websites.

Case Studies

We have identified a sample of websites that arguably fit the template. Some may not be
appropriately viewed as imminently destabilizing. Obviously, there are a great many non-visible
examples where Internet sites are closed down within authoritarian regimes. It is harder to
enumerate sites where one state requests another state to take action. Summed up, they concern:

Date: May 13, 1999

Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
UK
American-based internet website
US
top-secret details of British intelligence agents
requests to remove information, appeal to media not to
publish the address of website, or its contents

Date: August 30, 2000

Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Germany
US internet service providers
US
Nazi propaganda
request by Dusseldorf District Government President to
prevent access to websites. Migration to US servers is
mentioned as cause of fining German servers
DM500,000 for hosting Nazi propaganda.

Date: March 7, 2001

Government seeking stability: Japan
Party causing instability: Chinese hackers
Location of website: Saitama, Japan
Content of website: critical towards Japanese government, hacked website
showing Chinese tank, Chinese messages about Diaoyu
Islands
Countermeasure by government: website closed down

Date: September 1, 2001

Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Singapore
Foreign Political Websites
Outside Singapore
Political websites
Requirement to register, failure leads to blockade.
October 12, 2001
US
IRAradio.com
US
terrorist website
FBI closed it down
November 1, 2001
South Korea
North Korean website
China
offers e-mail exchange and e-commerce
approval of government required to subscribe to site
March 28, 2002
Bahrain
opposition groups, Freedom Movement
London, UK
inciting sectarianism, offensive content
blockades of London-based servers
April 24, 2002
China
ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corp)
Australia
political sensitive to Chinese viewers
Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman denied
government involvement
February 4, 2003
Kyrgyzstan
Opposition website (Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement
Party?)
Kyrgyzstan
critical of government, including shortcomings in the
official draft version of the constitution
website shutdown without explanation by ISP
September 17, 2003
Uzbekistan
Ozod Ovoz website
Uzbekistan
critical of Uzbek president, serves as public outlet for
online protests about lack of freedom of expression
blockade
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Update:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
Party causing instability:
Location of website:
Content of website:
Countermeasure by government:
Update:
Date:
Reaction to countermeasure:
Countermeasure by government:
Extra:
Date:
Government seeking stability:
September 23, 2003
India
Meghalaya’s Khasi tribe, militant group
India
espousing the cause of the tribe
blockade, to ensure “balanced flow of information”, not
censorship
December 21, 2003
Malaysia
opposition parties
UK
inflammatory material, support for former DP Minister
Anwar Ibrahim
complaints lodged, unknown by who
December 24, 2003 reopened?
May 14, 2004
Malaysia
website of Acme Commerce
Malaysia
links to terrorist groups, showing beheading of US
citizen in Iraq
ordered ISP to close down website
July 11, 2004
South Korea
(alleged) Supreme Headquarters of Armed Islamic
Warriors
Iraq
threat by militants to bomb South-Korean ships
delivering US military supplies to Middle East
security officials implemented “preventive measures”
September 14, 2004
Russia
kavkazcenter.com
Lithuania
support for radical field commander Shamil Basaev (his
personal website is already blocked)
Lithuanian ambassador summoned to Russian Foreign
Ministry to explain failure of closing down website
November 16, 2004
Relocation of server to Sweden
Swedish ambassador called to discuss website
Website previous on Finnish server (October 2004)
October 16, 2004
US (FBI)
Party causing instability: Indymedia
Location of website: London, UK
Content of website: independent media
Countermeasure by government: FBI seizure of servers

Date: February 2, 2005

Government seeking stability: US
Party causing instability: Iran blogs
Location of website: Dallas, US
Content of website: Iran’s dissenting and liberal voices
Countermeasure by government: shutdown

Discussion

When located inside the legal jurisdiction, it is generally easier to shutdown the website, as
opposed to blocking or filtering. In contrast, when outside the legal jurisdiction, the government
of the country hosting the server is sometimes requested to shutdown the website but more often
the government seeking stability will block or filter the website.

If “target” governments do not get the active participation of “server host”, then they resort to
more covert means to disable a foreign website. For example, the Chinese government has been
known to have launched Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks against servers hosting Falun Gong
websites located in the United States and Canada. These attacks were only by accident found to
be initiated by the Chinese government. Because of the illegality of the technique, covertness is a
likely characteristic.

Some resources are available for further research. Some general websites on regulation,
censorship and liability are at: : http://qlinks.net/quicklinks/, especially the sections concerning
“content regulation”, “liability, jurisdiction and applicable law”, “racism and xenophobia”. There
is an empty section on the website labelled “terrorism”. Terrorism, an ultimate description of a
destabilizing activity, is a keyword to look out for when thinking about destabilizing websites.
Since 9-11, government measures to act against opposite forces have gained more currency when
posed under the label of ‘terrorism’. Other websites include:

Caslon Analytics
http://www.caslon.com.au/censorshipguide.htm
This guide explores censorship, regulation of offensive material and free speech in the digital
environment. It includes discussion of freedom of information, archives and whistleblowing
legislation. Also see http://www.caslon.com.au/governanceguide5.htm

ICE: Internet Censorship Explorer

http://ice.citizenlab.org/
The Internet Censorship Explorer (ICE) is a blog maintained by the Citizen Lab's technical
research director, Nart Villeneuve. ICE is an incubator where Nart explores the politics of
technology (hacktivism, infowar/cyberterrorism and Internet filtering), develops ideas for future
Citizen Lab projects, posts proof of concept code and any other snippets of raw data that don't
really have a place anywhere else. ICE also contains bleeding edge Internet filtering and
censorship research related to the work of the Citizen Lab and the OpenNet Initiative including
the development of censorship circumvention technology.

Also see the OpenNet Initiative: Documenting Internet Content Filtering Worldwide
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/index.php
The ONI mission is to investigate and challenge state filtration and surveillance practices. “Our
approach applies methodological rigor to the study of filtration and surveillance blending
empirical case studies with sophisticated means for technical verification. Our aim is to generate
a credible picture of these practices at a national, regional and corporate level, and to excavate
their impact on state sovereignty, security, human rights, international law, and global
governance.”

http://www.citizenlab.org/index.php
The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International
Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at
the intersection of digital media and world civic politics.

Also http://www.infowar-monitor.net/index.php. The Information Warfare Monitor is a joint

project of the Advanced Network Research Group, part of the Cambridge Programme for
Security in International Society, University of Cambridge, and the Citizen Lab, an
interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of
Toronto. “The Information Warfare Monitor is an advanced research project examining how
states and non-state actors seek to exploit information and information systems to pursue political
objectives through non-political means. The project seeks to examine this emerging dimension of
global security on two levels:

• Operational Case Studies -- by building a repertoire of grounded, multi-dimensional

"case studies" of information warfare operations, and to do so by employing a cross-
disciplinary fusion of advanced network monitoring/visualization tools and qualitative
social science research methodologies.
• Consequences for Global Security -- by using the case study data to assess emerging
threats and consequences of information operations on global security in its military,
political, economic, legal and human rights dimensions.”