Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
447
40 750 30
500
20
10 250
+
0
0 1994 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 10
Source: Tremont Capital Management, Inc. (a) Sample does not cover the entire industry.
(1) Given at the HEDGE 2006 Conference on 17 October 2006. This speech can be found on the Banks website at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2006/speech285.pdf. (2) Note that Chart 1 does not cover the entire hedge fund industry.
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Part of the answer is the growing power of technology and financial theory to unpack traditional investment products, like equities and bonds, into their component parts and then sell them separately or in new bundles which may appeal to particular groups of investors. This has increased the opportunities for specialisation. So the growth of hedge funds is one aspect of the technological revolution which is also transforming the structure of other industries from manufacturing to entertainment. The technology has allowed a ferment of financial innovation and put a huge value on the relatively few people who can understand and handle the growing complexity of markets. It is no surprise therefore that some of those people have seized the opportunity to take the rewards of ownership by setting up on their own. This was perhaps encouraged in the early days by the fact that the expertise lay mainly on the trading sides of the banks on the other side of the Chinese walls from the investment managers. The hedge funds are something of an investment bank diaspora. Of course the banks are responding to the loss of key staff and expertise by establishing their own internal hedge funds or adding hedge funds to the range of investments offered by their asset management activities. They have the resources and breadth and depth of market penetration to be formidable competitors to the independent funds as asset managers. On the other side of course, in their role as prime brokers, the investment banks have benefited hugely in terms of fees, interest and the trading income generated by the active management of hedge fund portfolios. It will be interesting to see how the balance shifts in the coming years. I would be surprised not to see a rationalisation into a smaller number of large, independent funds with a shift of business back into the big institutions as the new markets and products become more familiar. This is what we have seen elsewhere in the financial sector and in other industries.
S&P 500
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0
50 1994 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06
Chart 2 seems to provide some support for this. It shows if you had placed money with a representative group of hedge funds in 1994, regularly switching your allocation across different hedge funds exactly to follow that of the sectoral composition, you would have matched the cumulative appreciation of the world equity index but in a way that largely avoided the collapse in equity prices in 200002. So the risk-adjusted rate of return, even net of the fees, may have been higher. I should caution that this analysis ignores the survivorship and other biases associated with the construction of hedge fund indices so getting this ideal result would have been much harder than it looks. More recently the emphasis has been on the ability of hedge funds to achieve alpha.(1) This is a braver claim and the record is less clear. The position of hedge funds may have been aided by the restrictions on the types of product that can be marketed to retail investors. In that sense, while the derivative markets are highly competitive they have not been completely free and there may have been a premium for hedge funds and their professional investors. But for the longer term, I must admit I am a sceptic. While a few investors or funds can consistently beat the markets, there seem reasons to doubt whether the whole sector can deliver superior risk-adjusted returns, especially as the rest of the market catches up with the financial innovations they have led and as they grow to become much more than marginal players. Indeed, this search for investors Holy Grail may go some way to account for the surge in births and closures among hedge funds with, according to Hedge Fund Research, over 2,600 new starts since the beginning of 2005 but with nearly 1,100 closures, double the rate of 2004.
(1) The abnormal rate of return in excess of what would be predicted by an equilibrium model like the Capital Asset Pricing Model.
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by those managed from London have become an important part of the risk transfer process, providing liquidity to evolving structured derivative markets. So hedge funds have been positive for market efficiency. And in recent episodes of market stress the autumn of 2003 and the spring of last year some have helped provide liquidity to markets, enabling large banks and other investors to adjust their positions. Of course at times of turbulence we have seen some hedge funds taking losses and facing liquidity difficulties, but we have also seen other funds stepping in to pick up the assets as prices fall and thus to provide liquidity to the market. If we face a financial crisis in the next few years we are almost bound to find some hedge funds at or near the centre of it; equally we should expect hedge funds to play a part in providing the solution. To complete the upside story, funds have not just been a source of financial innovation but some have been pioneers in risk management and have helped make the industry more resilient for example through participation in the Corrigan Group.
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I suspect the answer is a bit of both. I dont have full details of what went wrong or how much the funds several prime brokers knew about the funds overall exposure and leverage. But while Amaranth had leveraged up, it had not done so or been allowed to do so on the scale seen at LTCM and that lower leverage has been seen across the market (Chart 3). The fund was able to meet its margin obligations without dislocating markets and other players were willing to step in and liquidate its positions albeit on terms which shocked the Amaranth management.
times. The resilience of the valuations, the diversification of portfolios, the depth of liquidity, and firms risk management has not been tested by a severe shock. Our FSR identified the risk that the business pressure to maintain or establish market share in rapidly expanding markets might drive companies to take on more risk than they should. There is no reason to change that assessment now. Indeed, after a short pause in May and June, we have seen the return of aggressive risk-taking in many financial markets this autumn. There must be a danger that the search for yield is driving many investors into similar trades (or trades which would become closely correlated in a crisis) and that risk models are giving too much weight to the low volatility of recent times. For example, it is possible that positions are being built up, or only partially hedged, on the assumption that currently compressed corporate credit spreads will adjust moderately or smoothly. Chart 4 shows that corporate high-yield markets have not behaved in this benign way in the past.
Chart 4 Yield differentials with ten-year US Treasury bond
Emerging markets sovereign and corporate index(a) US high-yield bond index(b) US Corporate Baa US Corporate Aaa
Basis points
1,400 1,200
(a) Includes equity funds, market neutral funds, directional funds, fixed-income funds, and fund of funds.
Incidentally that shock at the way markets moved so aggressively against their positions was a common feature of LTCM and Amaranths experience and it is an example of a trend which is not peculiar to the financial sector. In the past a failing firm could hope to get its bankers into a room and persuade them to put in more money or allow time for recovery (as the saying went, if I lose thousands of pounds its a problem for me, if I lose billions of pounds its a problem for you). I suspect those times are going: firms often dont know now who holds their shares and debt and many investors are looking to take the hit and get out as quickly as possible. This is a more brutal world to fail in. But another key difference from LTCM was that the market event that appears to have undone Amaranth a fall in natural gas futures prices could otherwise be considered a benign one for growth and inflation. In that respect it was very different from 1998 when Russias default sent a shock through a wide range of markets. So while we can take some comfort from the fact that losses from Amaranth were limited by improvements in counterparty risk management, we should not conclude that it will be as smooth and easy next time and of course there will be a next time. The fact is the fantastic growth of derivative markets and hedge funds of the past few years has taken place in benign
+
0
1978 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000 02 04 06
Sources: Bloomberg, Merrill Lynch and Bank calculations. (a) Yield to maturity. (b) Monthly data until 1990, daily data thereafter. High-yield index shows the yield to maturity rather than the effective yield.
200
But I should not end on a gloomy note. Working closely together, the authorities which in the United Kingdom means the Financial Services Authority (FSA), Bank of England and HM Treasury are aware of these risks, as are the industry. And measures to address them are being taken. The second report of the Corrigan Group, unlike its predecessor, has been published to forestall, rather than as a reaction to, a crisis. The rating agencies are beginning to publish operational risk ratings for hedge funds and managers. Complementing these industry initiatives, the FSA has been developing its approach to the regulation of hedge fund managers. It has set up a special unit to supervise hedge fund managers and ensure they are subject to the same standards
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of market conduct, systems and controls as other asset managers and that potential conflicts of interest are addressed (for example in the area of asset valuations). It is encouraging further improvements in counterparty risk management practices by prime brokers. It has worked with the Fed in New York and the industry to significantly reduce backlogs in derivative confirmations and assignments. Its surveys of prime brokers exposures to hedge funds provide an important guide to any developing concentrations or an excessive build-up of leverage. And today Andrew Shrimpton of the FSA is also here leading a business showcase session on material side letters. In these ways the FSA is seeking to ensure that proportionate regulation complements the disciplines provided by Londons large and sophisticated market.
To sum up, the rapid growth of hedge funds is one aspect of a wider transformation in financial markets. In the long term there are good reasons to see this as welcome not just in widening the range of options for investors but in promoting the stability of the financial system. In the shorter term, there are bound to be risks while the funds, other market participants and the authorities gain experience of how the new products and markets behave in a full range of trading conditions. The FSA and other authorities, including the Bank, are alive to the dangers and are doing what they can to assess and mitigate those risks.