P 281513Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8234 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004384 SUBJECT: PRT DIYALA: IRAQI

ARMY GENERAL TARGETING DIYALA'S SUNNIS: MASS DETENTIONS, ABUSE ALLEGATIONS REF: A. BAGHDAD 04295 B. BAGHDAD 04271 C. BAGHDAD 04275 1. (S) SUMMARY: Credible evidence collected by Coalition forces (CF) working with Iraqi Army (IA) battalions and reported by senior Diyala government officials indicates that Diyala's IA Fifth Division Commander, Major General Hulail Husayn Shakir (Shi'a), is targeting Sunnis and abusing detainees (refs A and B). The provincial Police Chief, Ghassan Adnan al-Bawi (Shia), has been accused of a similar anti-Sunni campaign. Diyala's reconciliation and democracy building efforts, already severely challenged by increasing attacks by Sunni insurgents, have been further setback by the harsh and often indiscriminate retribution against Sunni carried out under these two individuals in control of the provincial security forces. END SUMMARY.

---------------------------------------------Shakir's Arrival: Positive Overtures, Negative Actions ---------------------------------------------2. (S) Shakir became the IA's Fifth Division Commander in Diyala on July 25, 2006 joining Ghassan and Provincial Governor, Ra'ad al Timimi as another Shi'a leader in a Sunni majority province. He quickly addressed concerns about Shi'a domination within the government and security forces by meeting with politicians and former Baathists. In one particularly encouraging development, he worked with a former Sunni General in a house to house weapons and terrorists search in the largely Sunni area of Buhriz. 3. (S) Despite initial overtures towards crosssectarian cooperation, CF -- working closely with the IA's 5th Division -- noticed that Shakir began transferring IA officers based on whether they were Shi'a, Sunni or Kurdish. In mid-September, Shakir led the IA in a series of mass sweeps and detentions against "terrorists." Hundreds of people, all Sunni, were detained including University professors and other professionals. Most did not have previously prepared (and legally required) detainee packets or formal evidence indicating links to terrorist or criminal acts. As a result, anxiety in the Province among both Sunnis and moderate Shi'a, increased. These events have been strongly debated in the Provincial Council and in protest Diyala's Sunnis began boycotting work and engagement within the political process.

----------------------------------------------Iraqi Army Officials Speak Out Against Shakir's Actions ----------------------------------------------4. (S) IA sources report that Shakir's actions extend beyond mass detentions to include operating anti-Sunni death squads and active involvement with Badr Corps. Most recently, the IA's Third Brigade Commander, General Rahman al-Janabi (Sunni) provided a sworn statement to CF about death squads in Diyala province, their operations, and their links to General Shakir. (Note. Shakir transferred al-Janabi from Diyala in late October. End Note) Furthermore, over the past month ten IA officers and enlisted men, evenly split between Sunni and Shi'a (and including Kurds) and representing different areas have provided sworn statements to CF about several specific incidents that support allegations that Shakir targets Sunnis and abuses detainees. 5.(S) Sheikh Atta al-Sadoun's arrest and detention exemplifies what appears to be Shakir's anti-Sunni agenda. Sheikh Atta, a powerful Sunni leader and an Army Lieutenant General from the former regime with many supporters throughout the province, had begun to discuss joining the political process. Upon hearing this information, Shakir invited Sheikh Atta to an iftar dinner. Immediately upon arriving at the iftar, Sheikh Atta and his nephew were taken to IA Headquarters. The IA maintained that Sheikh Atta had previously ordered multiple murders and committed other crimes. Because of Sheikh Atta's

position within the community, the CF investigated the charges against him and found no direct evidence justifying Sheikh Atta's detention. CF removed Sheikh Atta from IA custody and eventually released him on November 1. Sheikh Atta's nephew has remained in IA custody and has not been seen since his arrest. ----------------------------------------Provincial Police Pursuing Similar Agenda ----------------------------------------6. (S) CF working closely with Diyala's IA and IP units through Military Training Teams (MTTs) and Police Training Teams (PTTs) have heard reports that Diyala's Shi'a Provincial Police Chief, Brigadier General Ghassan Adnan al-Bawi, pursues a similar anti-Sunni agenda. According to various PTT reports, Ghassan padded the IP rolls with offthe-books "police" recruited from Sadr City, and has apparently authorized torture of detainees. (Note. The CF also has multiple statements and photos documenting IP and IA torture, refs A and B. End Note.) He has systematically transferred Sunni IP officers and marginalized his Sunni Deputy Police Chief. Al-Bawi is intensely disliked by Diyala's Governor, Ra'ad al Timimi, who raised problems within Diyala's police forces during a series of meetings in Baghdad with the Ministers of Interior and Defense. ------Comment -------

7. (S) Shakir's actions have further hardened Diyala's sectarian divide. While Sunni insurgent groups have increased their attacks within Diyala, the IA and IP under the stewardship of Shakir and Ghassan have overstepped their authority through documented detainee abuse and overzealous targeting of Diyala's Sunnis. Governor al-Tamimi told PRT that he had discussed problems within the IP during his recent trip to Baghdad. Post has been informed that the Minister of Defense has authorized an investigation of Shakir, his brigade and the detention facility in Diyala. The MoD/IG has been up their twice and the investigation is ongoing. During one visit, judges accompanied and found there was insufficient evidence to hold a number of the detainees and ordered their release. Post is examining further options to press the GOI to take action against the severe abuse and these two provincial security chiefs. As mentioned in ref A, MNF-I CG will further raise our concerns directly with the Minister of Defense in coming days. Post will provide a readout of that meeting septel. KHALILZAD (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of