Chaper three Fighting on the Mas Namaras electronic barrier Front.

Heavily defeated in the limited war in the South and in the destructive war by the US Air Forces and Naval Forces in the North, the American invading revolution is weavering. At the end of 1968, American imperialists are compelled to go down the war ladder, declare one-sidely to stop throwing down unconditionally bombs and shells on Northern Vietnam. Johnson withdrawns his candidature from the presidential elections for 19681972. Nixon becomes President of the U.S.A. He exposes Nixons doctrine, and changes the American strategy from quick-moving-flexible-reactions to realistic-detering. For the South, Nixon changes the policy of de-americanization of the war into Vietnamization of the war. His objectives are basically unchanged: to cling to Vietnam, to prevent the development of communism in Indochina, and in South-Eastern Asia, and reduce the intervention on land of the U.S.A. Infantery, to avoid a shameful final failure. The essence of this policy remains to use the Vietnamese to fight the Vietnamese, to use Indochinese men to fight Indochinese men, with American bombs and shells and under the American rules. This policy is a part of the global strategy full of ambition of the White House. The Nixons doctrine is tested first in Vietnam. With very great efforts, the enemy gathers their forces to implement three barbarous and Machiavellian forms of warfare that they calls: the war to monopolize the population; the war to strangulate it, the war to exterminate it. They coordinate dirty political, economical, and cultural stricks with spying war,

and psychological war, to erase our infrastructures and replace them by their own neo-colonialist ones. At the beginning of 1969, on the Northern Quang Tri front, they start to implement their strategy of of Vietnamization of the war. Concretely speaking, they try gradually to push forward and to outer ranks the puppet troops, with promises to come to rescure them whenever necessary. Besides, the Americans promise to cover at maximum every military action of the puppet troops with their artillery and aircrafts. On the Road 9 front, the American general Abram takes the decision to use the American motorized infantry to realize his plot. Arcording to the plan of Abram, the enemy open and enlarge many ways and corridors, to ensure the rapid moving of their motorized infantry. The colossal bulldozers of the American Engineering Corps are mobilized in hurry to Quang Tri, to construct the roads for tanks going from Cua Viet, Dong Ha, Doc Soi, Cam Lo to Fooler (Height 544). Several military roads are also speedily constructed to reach the important heights in the North of Road 9. The dwellings, gardens and rice fields of the local population are pity lessly ground under the carterpillars of American tanks . The Road 9 all day and night is violently shaked by the roar os diverse sorts of motor. At the end of 1968, exploiting some temporary difficulties of our forces on the front, the Americans and their puppet troops co-oporate their greatest efforts to repulse us from, important places. What is more, they push westward and attact our positions in the forests and on the mountains, making our forces unable to launch offensives on the plain and at the towns. So, at the end of 1968, the main units of our Regular Army must withdraw to the mountainous areas in the West, or Northward, beyond the demarcation line.

Only the Regiment 27, the provincial troops and guerilla fighters remain on the spot and go on fighting. The Regiment 27 is appointed mobile mai unit of the Front B5. Confronted with the new military policy of general Abram, the B5 Front Staff orders the Regiment B27 to make itself become the first flag in destroying American motorized vehicles and inflict defeat to the Wild Buffallo strategy. (appellation given to the strategy by the militarists in Sai Gon). The Wild Buffalloes strategy consists of the following activities: in the day, they send several groups of tanks and motorized car to carry out ratiss age operations in different directions. At night, they gather-in secrecy tanks and cars in groups around the important places of each area. Each group of tanks and cars is mixed with a group of American soldiers. If attacked, each tank (or group of tanks) becomes a firing force and a defense-work for the soldiers, to strike back. These mobile steel ambushes are scatlered everywhere, to protect the Mac Namaras electronic barrier in the North of Road 9, and to intercept any attack from the North, when comes the Dry season. Allow me to reserve some lines to speak of this Mac Namaras electronic barrier. It comes from an idea of the American Minister of National Defense Mac Namara, with the ambition to stop right any source of supply from the North to the South of Viet Nam. From March 1966, The American Government has organized a reseach group, including 47 out standing military scientists and technicians, to work out a means to stop the convoying Southward of Northern supplies and men. Mac Namara is appointed to supervise the reseach.

After three months of assiduous work, a project is born of construction of a defense line, a sort of electronic barrier, with all sorts of nicknames suggested by American journalists: Mac Namaras defense-line, Eastern Maginot-line, and so on. The projected investment reaches the colossal sum of nearly 2 milliard U.S. dollars. With the ambitious objective of intercepting whatever assistance from the North to the South, Mac Namaras electronic line together with the U.S. Air Forces is hoped to detect on the spot and throw at once bombs and shells to annihilate right whatever humen group, whatever car, whatever artillery piece, whatever packet (of foodstuff or ammunition) from the North to the South by Ho Chi Minh Track, either along the Eastern or Western slofe of the Long Ridge. The Americans estimate that this electronic barrier will eliminate any trial of the Northern Viet Nam Territory. Mac Namaras defence line, with its extremely dense system of obstacles, its modern electronic spying equipment, high-positioned as well as low-positioned, its system of defence works, consisting of 17 linked-in-chain bases, and forming a compact corridor about 100 km long, 10 - 20 km large and stretching from Cua Viet sea-port, through Road 9, to the Viet-Laos border, is considered by the American as impossible to storm! The enemy keeps ready there rather strong forces, to control well the electronic line day and night. These forces consist of 2 divisions, composed of one American Division and three puppet-regiments, not counting the provincial and district guards, the self-defence corps. Beside the infantry there are still very strong units of artillery and tanks, armored cars. Fighters-aircrafts and bombing aircrafts are all the time in the sky, ready to destroy any objective going through the electric line. Strategic bombers B52 are also ready to intervene and let drop bombs.

As systems of obstacles of the defense-line, the Americans stretch about 12km of barbed wire barriers, from Con Tien base to the Eastern Sea, the barriers are about to 10-20 km large, with densely scattered anti-tanks and anti-intruders mine-fields. From a spot a kilometer far from Con Tien in the West to the Viet-Laos border, the Americans spread profusely novice chemicals to annihilate the vegetation, then lie down and dispose innumerable anti-tanks and antiinfantrymen mine-fields, with countless sensors to detect any objective. Tele-spying devices used on the defense-line electronic barrier, to detect objectives, are of many sorts and categories. Many wireless sensors are thrown down on the earth by airplanes, as a cowboy, Adsid-1, Helosid-2, and Spikstd-1. They are sensible to sounds and to seism and are thrown from helicopters and F4 aircrafts and used to detect humans, sounds, at distances from 300m to 400m. Other Spying-devices as Areruoy-I/NBB, Gsid, Minisid are deposited with accuracy by hand or mechanical apparatus. There spyingdevices are very sensible and can detect any sound, even tenuous, from humans and cars, at distance from 100m to 300m. The spying devices flung from mortars as Moods, can detect human voice from 10m to 50m, vehicles noises from 200m to 400m. About 300 such detectors are provided to the Mac Namares defense-line. Besides, the Americans have iced wired-sensors, as RPS-signaling ones of type P, for watching-posts and blockhouses. These devices are buried along the defense-line, from 700m to 700m. There are 700 such sensors in all. The electronic sensors in the spying systems of the defense-line must amyl the sounds and noises, to differentiate humans from cars, determine with accuracy the co-ordinates and time of the sound or noise source; transmit the

information to the watching center of the battlefield to mobilize forces and destroy the discovered objective at once. As soon as the beginning of the construction of the electronic defense line. The local troops, Gio Linh district guards and guerillas, Battalion 47, Battalion 4 (provincial forces of Vinh Linh) and especially the guerilla-unit, led by the village armed forces head Truong Quang Tho, have engaged many battles to destroy lots of American supers and engineers and delay the work. Never the less, they succeeded to establish "Mac namara's electronic barrier" At the beginning of February, the Regiment 27 mobilizes its units to come and occupy successively the appointed places. Before launching battles, cadres and scouts try to get information on the enemy and prepare the plans of attack, though the battlefield is rather too large, each battalion has worked ready its own plan of action, when there is opportunity. The sticking to the enemy to launch a battle is quite difficult at the beginning. Some units have failed the occasion of attack from lack of information about the enemy activities. The American tanks and soldiers used to scatter for ratissage and patrolling operations by day, then to gather-up in hiding by nigh. A week has elapsed from the moment our regiment entering into the battlefield. Some of its smaller units have engaged combats, but with little efficiency. The cadres of companies and battalions become emaciated for trying to stick to the enemy, to discover its activities law. The whole battalion 1 has infiltrated deep into the enemy territory, but has not yet won decisive battles. The commanding staff of the battalion 1 orders to the whole unit to keep ready to attack by day as well as by night, we all willingly agreed with the decision. We fighters have become ourselves impatient to hunt the enemy from one to another height, day after day.

Cadres and fighters of every company seem to forget eating and sleeping for third of battles. When scooting, we frequently meet the enemy, but to organize a read attack is a rather complicated problem. At nightfall, the enemy slips away, like loaches, now on this hill, now on that mount. At dawn on February 28th in 1969, the watching unit informs the battalion commandment the enemy tanks and infomtry men from Da Bac mount is heading northward Ho Khe mount, about 500m far from the company 2 encampment, as the crow flies As soon as at the dawn of this day, the commanders of our Company 2 and Company 3 have received the orders of battalion: launch our troops to attack Ho Khe. The battalion gives also orders to the Company of firing forces to get ready to assist our infantry. After a lightning deliberation, the battalion commanders agree to let our companies use the Height 68 as launching point for the first attack, then as rallying point for further following attacks. The Company 2 and Company 3 cadres are these to receive the orders. Our troops set hurriedly in March to storm the Height 68. Liaison agents are dispatched to appointed places. The wireless sets stop temporarily their work. Broadcasted messages are for a short time replaced by manual signals to ensure secrecy. All hasten to execute orders in silence. The enemy and our men are now only some hundred meters far from each other. The American tanks and infantry men are advancing as in the American usual way. Our companies ask the permission to open the fire. The answer is at once Yes! Our 82 mm mortars roar in unison. The enemy has not yet recovered his wits when our men have rushed on, and use B40, B41 to fire at the tanks. Some set ablaze, like huge mushrooms.

Our fighters meeting tanks, fight tanks; meeting American infantry men, fight infantry men. Our 82 mm mortars and 60 mm mortars fire at the rear of the American column to lock the rear, I order the platoon head than Huu My (son of Pham Huu Dan, native of the hamlet 1, urban district 1, Vinh-city, Nghe An) to led his platoon back Southward, to fight the enemy from the rear, and form pincers jaw to lock it on the spot. The enemy disorderly discharges of musquetry extend gradually southward. They have received reforms. The battalion orders to stop the fighting. A part of us gets busy to solve the consequences of the battle, carry speedily back heavily wounded and dead fighters. Most of the remaining forces stay firmly here, to defend our Ho Khe commanding position. Our men hasten to complicate the positions. The enemy comes back! At the commanding post of Company 2, I hear distinctly the roar of engines In front of us, the enemy artillery fires down from Mieu Bai Son; fires Northward from Cam Lo, to support the counter-attacking fanks and infantry men. The Ho Khe Mountain is rapidly transformed into fire co-ordinates. Led by tanks, the American soldiers attack the Company 2. Our cadres and fighters boldly wait for their nearing and fire only when they are quite nearby. The column of attacking enemy bends and is replied back. The American troops call forth their Air-forces to bomb and lunch shells around Ho Khe Mountain. 30 minutes of fierce fighting have elapsed. The American forces have not yet pierce through our defense-positions but have nevertheless invaded a part of Company 2 positions. The squad head Tran Van Trinh, native of Cam Lai, Cam Yen, and Thach That, Ha Tay, is only 50km far from the burnt enemy tank. We can see clearly American soldiers, bar-backed,

dirty with dust and sweat, frantically gesticulating and shouting behind the tank carcass At another commanding-position, the squad-head Nguyen Huu He, native of Vinh Quang, Diem Tho, Diem Chau, Nghe An fire at intervals, short volleys of cartridges, to make the American soldiers bend in fright, to let the squad-deputy head Nguyen Cong Viet, native of Dam Trau, Bang Doan, Doan Hung, Phu Tho, change a B40 explosive to fire at another advancing tank. The platoon head Phan Huu My keeps running to-and-fro to different combatants groups to encourage and lead them. The fighting place of my is perched on a sell-shaped depression between two mountain-tops. The enemy goes on attacking. Their tanks stay prudently at a distance, and fire spasmodically at out positions to assist their troops advance. Their attacks this time are fiercer and more resolute. After each failure, the Americans call forwards their aircrafts and tanks in rescue, causing heavy losses to our troops. The Battalion decides to withdraw northward our forces to the Height 137, and stop there to go on fighting the enemy. Phan Huu Mys platoon suffers the heaviest losses in human lives and ammunitions. The Americans invades our positions What a great suffering and resentment anguish for us! In the following day, the enemy gives orders to the bulldozers to level the ground, in which there are the remains of 10 cadres and fighters of our company 2 and company 4, for the American tanks and asmoveried vehicles to gather- fur and rest after their daily ratissage operations Pen cadres and fighters of the company and 3 fighters of the company 4 , battalion 1, regiment 27 have heroically sacrificed themselves in the battles of February 28th , in 1969 on the mount Ho Khe :

- Comrade phan huu my , platoon head , B4 ,F 421, Block 5, Quang Trung quarter, Vinh- city, Nghe An - Comrade Phung Van Thiet, Squad deputy head, native of Vuc Giang , Ho Bang , Thach That , Ha Tay. - Comrade Ha Van Dan, squad head, native of Dan Thuong, Ho Hoa, Phu Tho. - Comrade Ngo Duc Hat ,squad head , native of vu ham let , Luong Nha , Thanh Son , Phu Tho - Comrade Cao Dang Bo, fighter, native of Tung Lam, Dien Tho, Dien Chau, Nghe An - Comrade Phan Van Long, squad head, native of My Hoa, Nghi My, Nghi Loc, Nghe An - Comrade Pham Van Kenh , fighter , native of Tan Hung , Dien Ky , Dien Chau , Nghe An . - Comrade Le Van Thuy , fighter , native of Dai Thanh , Dien Kim , Dien Chau , Nghe An . - Comrade Pham Van Hung, fighter native of Hung Phu, dien Hung, Dien Chau, Nghe An. - Comrade Tran Minh Duck, squad deputy head , native of Cao Kim , Dien Kim , Dien Chau , Nghe An . The three comrades of the company 4 , having sarificed themselves , are : - Comrade Nguyen Ngoc Canh , squad head , native of hamlet 3 , Vu Quy , Vu Thu , Thai Binh. - Comrade Nguyen Ngoc Nghi , fighter , Hoi Thinh , Hop Thinh , Tam Duong . Phu Tho. - Comrade Le Van Ngo , fighter , native of Thong Nhat , Hung Thong , Hung Nguyen , Nghe An , Nguyen Minh ky , head of Cam Lo distrit

armed forces , many times appoints liaison agents to guide us to battlefields, 1. He later becomer the deputy secretary of the partorg and presiclent of the peoples committee of Quang Tri province . And many times the local armed forces he leads have co on dinated theis efforts to fight by our side . Iremember once , after the won battle , and on the way back to the secure rear , we sharea pack of dried cake 701, from china supplies . Each of our imealls is composed only of two not fully filled bowls of rice , eaten with condensed maggy. Ky has vitnessed the battle of company 2 , battalion 1 , regiment 27 on February 28th in 1968 . some years ago , when sending bulldozers to lovel hillocks to grow rubber trees , he discover some remains of our cadens and fighters having sacrificed themseves on that unforgettable day, with their rubber-sandals, Chinese canteens, lighters and belts, He at once give order to construct
n d

there a memorial. The memorial is inaugurated on December 22

, 2005.

The stele reads: The fighters of the Regiment 27(The Heroic Trieu Hai Regiment) have fought and sacrificed themselves with fortitude on the Mount Ho Khe, Cam Tuyen Commune, Cam Lo district, Quang Tri province in 1969. This stele is built up by Comrade Nguyen Minh Ky, former DeputySecretary of the Partorg and President of the Peoples committee of Quang Tri province, his family and companion-of-arm. December 22
n d

, 2005

From this day, Nguyen Minh Ky and his companions-of-arm have a place to come to and burn joy-sticks to commemorate their mates, who have fallen in action on this piece of ground of Cam Tuyen, Cam Lo, former battlefield where have taken place fierce battles between our cadres and

fighters of the Regiment 27 with American Soldiers along Mac Namaras electronic barrier Suffering painful defeats in Northern Quang Tri, inside the Mac Namaras electronic defence-line, the Americans must use their last playing card, that is to mobilize their scare-crows B.52 aircrafts to launch a colossal carpet-bombing a vast are a stretching from Vinh Son, through Vinh Lam to Vinh Thuy (Vinh Linh). Only in one hour, 37 B52 aircrafts have thrown down on Vinh Thuy 700 tons of bombs. Smoke and dirt raise up in the sky, invade the East, and in a moment cover the totality of 12 communes of the basaltic land. To coordinate their actions, beside the B52, the enemy mobilizes their heavy artillery (of 400 mm) from the sea, their trapping-basket bombs, (exploding high over the ground), their digging bombs (that dig their way into the ground before exploding, to destroy underground ways), their phosphorus bombs (to burn wounded ones flesh), their steel pellet-bombs (that kill near the ground surface). These are deadly torturing devices, barbarous and inhumane weapons, used in masses by The USA, who always boasts shamelessly to be civilized! To stand firm and unabated on an extremely fiece battlefield as Northen Quang Tri and Vinh Linh, the appropriate means of preventing-andavoiding dangers are of first impotance. The tactics of militarization of the whole population and of war constructing of the whole territory of B5 Front commanding Staff are unasimously adopted by all civil and military units. The willingly accepted by all slogan is : The houses are to protect from the sun and the rains; Shelters are to protect ones bones and flesh. So the civil population and the armed forces of Vinh Linh, only with their bare hands and primitive tools, have patiently, months after years, constructed a whole system of underground ways and shelters thoroughly extending everywhere.

Till the beginning of 1969, Vinh Linh has excavated 2090 km of liaison trenches. On replacement of on ground ways, uniting hamlet with hamlet, home with home, cave with cave. Together with the communication systems of trenches, a gigtontic system of individual holes and collective underground shelters is constructed, with 65.000 air-raid. A shaped underground corridors, 31.000 square shelters. 84.000 individual sheltering from bomb and shell holes, over 96.000 underground collective shelters and tens of thousand underground shelters for the cattle and domestic animals. Specially constructed and reinforced are 30 000 meters of underground roads. However, through carefully consolidated, these systems of shelters can resist only ordinary bombs and shells and remain vulnerable to digging deep bombs and stepping backward shells. Painfully numerous are the cases of whole families killed in A-shaped underground shelters. So, to find out a new more rescure shelter is of vital importance. To my knowledge, Quang Tri provincial armed forces are appointed to study and guide Vinh Giang commune to dig experimental underground ways. After two months, our men succed to construct an underground way 7 meters deep, 80 meters long, able to rescure people from short-term bombings but unable to sustai familial daily life activities in case of prolonged bombing. So, some month laters, apper the newly updated design of underground long-lasting shelters, tens and tens meters deep, hundreds and hundreds meters long. The most impressive and realy grandioze example of such shelters is the underground way of Ving Moc homlet. Vinh Thanh commune. Exploviting the good and bad experiences of Vinh Giang, the population, militia men and armedforces located in Vinh Moc choose a red

basaltic hill at the skirt of the hamlet, close to the seaside, to build their underground village. After three months of determined and truly patient labour, the Vinh Moc underground village is fully constructed, with an underground main road and four bifurcations, 2008 meters long in all the underground village is composed of three storeys (on levels). The last one is 18m deep, under the ground surface, with two carefully hidden communicating gates facing the sea and 8 aerating smoking escaping well camouflaged holes. In the underground village, there are three wells, for drinking, cooking lessiving and bathing, an infirmary cave, a cave for childbirths, a cave for foodstuff storage, a cave for storing arms, caves for cooking, bathing-places for every household. In these hard war-time years, there are 17 children born and growing normally in the underground village.With such a design and organization, the Vinh Moc underground ways ressenbles a miniature Vinh Moc hamlet, they mobilize here quite great forces, reaching at peak 62 battalions of its Regular Army. They consist of 2 divisions of American marines, 1 brigade of motorized infantry, 2 brigades of puppet-soldiers, 10 battalions of artillerymen, 3 units of tanks and armoured cars, tens of companies of provincial and district guards, hundreds of puppet-self defence corps. Beside these standing forces, the enemy uses profusely therr Air forces and Navy to intensify at maximum thers attacks at whatever time and place well-hidden in the depths of the basaltic hill. Thanks to this inextricable complex underground caves and roads. Though everybody must receive on average 7 tons of USA bombs and shells in these extremely hard tims, Vinh Linh people and armed forces have stood firmly on the spot and limited at maximum their losses in human lives and material goods.

Because Quang Tri holds an important strategic position, the enemy has chosen Quang Tri as experimental field for the implenmentation of its strategy of Vietmanmization of the war. With its supremacy in armed forces and armament, the enemy madly launched attacks and ratissage operations on all three battlefields: mountains and forests, plains and even urban areas, aiming at supporting and reinforcing both puppet-government and puppet armed forces; safeguarding urban centers, rear areas and strategic communication ways. At the same time, they fiercely intensify attacks and bombing at our bases and rears to intercept from afar out offensive. They use whatever barbarous, ferocious and vindicative means. The fight between us and them at that time is extremely hard and arduous. In the plains, the enemy develops its plan of urgent pacifying their pacifying forces at moments reach 30 battalions. The puppet-battalions concentrate their efforts to raze away tombs-and-graves, villages-and-hamlets, gardens-and-fields; ransack houses-and thatch-roofed dwellings; perforateand dig into the earth to find out underground shelters; shovel and scoop up the population into their strategic hamlets. They set-up wave-after-wave of filtration-purification people, enticing recalcitrant persons, practice appeals-to-surrender and to come-back to the puppet-authorities bosom, lure people and ransack goods and riches; form civil-guards units; intensify the hunting for and entrapping of new conscripts for the puppet army. The enemy tries at the same time to destroy our revolution bases, making the guerilla-war lower-down, our guerilla-men and fighters suffer heavy losses. Many of our faithful bases get erased. Thuong Xa hamlet, Hai Thuong commune, Hai Lang district is a quite small hamlet, but the enemy sends there 1 American Company, 2 puppet-companies and 1 company of

policemen to launch a ratissage operation, lasting 28 consecutive days and nights. Hundreds of people are savagely tortured, with 11 ones to death. At the skirting areas, the enemy attacks, then establishes intercepting zones intensifies ratissages, posts ambushes, launches repeated attacks, sieges commanding positions, repairs and perfects Mar Namaras electronic barrier, aiming finally to establish a solid defence-line from Cua Viet, through Dong Ha, to Road 9. In the mountainous region, they launch repetitive great and mediumsized attacks, co-ordinated with no cive chemical spreading, carpet-bombing, fierce artillery canonnades, aimed at destroying our communication ways, rear-bases, offices, storage centers. In February 1969, they mobilize 7000 soldiers to effeetuate uninterrupted ratissages on Vietnam-Laos frontier and A Voc, Tam Thanh, A Doi, CoCaVa areas. At that time, on all the Puong Tri province, our armedforces are encountering very grievous difficulties, and submited to quite heavy losses. Material means, armament and ammunitions, especially foodstuff, are unsufferably lacking. Because of unending difficulties, sometimes and somewhere, our men are narrowly rationed to eat only a half-can of rice with self-collected with legumes. Months of salt-lacking make fighters get sick, in added medicines-lack conditions. Here and there, points the to dread hardship spirit In the years 1969-1970, the Americans and their puppets maddly fight the revolution-movement. They raze and level to the ground, then set-up denuded white zones on Ben Hai southern riverside as well as on both Road 9 skirts from Cua Viet to Hung Hoa, aiming at cutting through the communication ways linking the North to the South, the East to the West of our natal land. They have mobilized to Cam Lo anh Gio Linh many a

Pacifying Unions of our anemy-hired wicked thugs and ruggians for ratissing, squeezing with pliers the population, separate our party from our people, our cadres from the masses. Day after day, they make surprise-raids on our hamlets, villages, communes, townlets, to set on fire and break-up any/suspected objective; arrest, bully, torture as they please whatever individual, person, to force everybody to part with, to turn the back to our Revolution. At the other hand, they try to pacify the rural areas, by sending everywhere blue beret (blue tam o-shamter) soldiers to make a/fiendish misloading propaganda against our peoples holy anti-US agressors war. Their slogan is to sow enameled rice grains-to stain black the masses. Their wicked plot is to make a dirty mess to found good and bad, black and white, aiming at causing or sowing division, dissidence, doubtamong members of the society. They inscribe the names of people in their diverse parties and political factions. In fact, they have divided secretly the population into 3 categories: the pro-communism people, the pro-nationalism people, and the wavering, unstable or unsettling people. At the same time, the enemy concentrates their Air forces, Navy and Infantry to attack without interuption our positions, causing our revolutionary forces to suffer heavy losses and making our revolutionary movement meet lots of difficulties. Cam Lo is one of their main objectives. They establish there three military subzones and district centers to squeeze our people. Each of us must cope on average with 3 enemies. At the time, Nguyen Minh Ky is the deputy-secretary of Cam Lo district Partorg, alias Security Committee Head. Ky altogether with Quyet and Duong Tu Anh has passed many white (sleepless) nights ti deliberate on the

means to raise up the revolutionary movement. Ky estimates that our first task is to concentrate our forces to cope successfully with the quisling local lackeys and at the same time pierce through into the enemy occupied zone, to destroy the most cruel and tracherous quisling officials or commander. With the motto: Strike on the head of the snake; fire right at the enemy, the security service led by Ky has fulfilled hundreds of tasks and killer hundreds of enemy-hired thugs. The most typical feat-of-arm is the neat execution of the leading committee of the Pacifying Union, composed of 5 officers (of which the captain-leader of the Union in Cam Lo). Some of Kys exploits have brought good consequences, making the political fight in Cam Lo district become easier, compelling the Americans and their puppets regress in some cases. Duong Tu Anh is the commander of the famous combat on February 28th, 1968 on Hieu river. Later, this naval feat-of-arm is called with sympathy Hieu - Bach Dangs victory. In those arduous days, our unit is beneficiary of the care and service of guerilla liaism and medical women, as Tan, Sang, Ut When we are wounded, they affectionally take care of us and only sometime later, direct us to th rear. I personally and my companious-in-arm are always grateful to them. Also in the yoears 1969, 1970, the ethnic minorities Van Kieu, Paco have suffered a terrible prolonged famine, caused by the American nocive chemicals. However, when informed and encouraged about the current situation and tasks, most of them are nevertheless wevertheless willing to serve as conseripted lalurers olong the corridor and ways of the front. In the first battle, Hung Hoa district has been able to mobilize over three thousand conscripted labourerr, far above the appointed.

Beside the concripted labourers mobilized for the transport of diverse war supplies, Hung Hoa has mobilized in adoungsand ydition two thousand yuong men, to gether with a company of sapers and engineers to construct roads for Hue Front. ( a company of road- menders) As for the problem of food and foodstuff, beside thesupplies from the North, Quang Tri plain and mountainous areas are both willing to contribute in feeding our Army men. Food and foodstuff are mobilized at the higest level up to that time/ from the sea-side, the Trieu Phong and Hai Long rice areas, to be stored in the communes along the way going through Quang Tri: Hai Vinh, Hai Xuan, Hai Thuong, Hai Phong. At top times, each night, there are on awerage 500 700 people (at lowest time, there are 200n 300 people) including couscripted labourers, voluntary young men, cadres, army men from war-bases, going to storing bases. At top times, the reserved food provided by Hai Lang and Trieu Phong districts amount up to 1242 tons of rice. From Southern Hung Hoa, are mobilized two thosand tons of rice and tens of million manioc bags (Each manoic tree here can yield from 1.5 to 2 kg of tubers). At the beginning of Mach 1969, the Battalion 1 organifes successive en counters along the axial way 76 and the Road 9, to make the enemy get alarmed, From Mach 1st 1969, the Battalion 1 has fired successfully at 30 tanks tanks, armoured cars and even trains transporting the enemy troops. So, it is promoted by the Front B5 as the First Flag in the Movement of destroying American armoured

Page 59-62 cars ?

in this activity , comradele Le Nhat Tung , fighter of the company 4, battalion 2, native of vinh xuan hamlet , dong vinh quarter , vinh city , nghe an province , has destroyed 6 enemy tanks with his B41 . He becomes a famous " Valiant Solider in destroying armoured cars " of the Front B5 . In MAy 1969 , comrade Le Nhat Tung has had the homour to go with the " Delegahion of Valiant Soldiers of the south Liberating Army " to Ha Noi to wish Uncle Ho longerity . The photo of Le Nhat Tung and the Valiont Soldiers of the South , gathered around uncle Ho has become a token of pride for the soldiers of the Regiment 2 , on the Front B5. During these fighting days , the cadnes and fighters of the battahion1 have with courage , resourceful mind , and boldness infiltred themselves into the area occupied by the enemy , to destroy them , and prevent with success then impetuous invasion further into our territory . Through battles agasint american forces of the battalion 1 , the commandment of begiment 27 has gained some valuable experience in fighting the American and puppet forces .It's namely to penehate deep into the occupied by them areas , attack them stay on the spot , to attack and destroy them . With this tactic ,we use only small units but with higher efficiency . In this wave of activity , the fighter ViVanBe ( of thai ethnic group) with a wrestling pass , has fallen headlong an American commando. In March 1969 , the Company 17 is appointed the task to assist an infomtry unit in encircling and storming the enemy away to liberate the height 544 the cadnes and fighters of the company 17 have destroyed many enemy soliders . When the enemy helicopters fly lower to let down the supplies , we have fined at and make explode one helicopter . In the 11 days of fighting , the company 17 has destroyed four 105 mm cannons and 106,7 mm mortars ,

burnt seven military cars , knocked down an helicopter , killed and wounded tens of enemies . On May 20 th , 1969 , informed of the advance of a company of puppet soldiers against the Nameless Hill , the Battalion communicates with the company 2 . I exchang ideas with the company commanding board, agree with the plan of attack, then lead the platsons heads to approach the enemy. The political commissar organizes our men and prompts them to the combat. The platoon head Nguyen Anh Cu in heading the map, the compass and hasten toward the Nameless Hill, When nearing the hill- foot, we find out the foot- marks of the recently assing enemy. The have thrown a Robby cigarette packet envelop on the ground. I lead our men to cut through the way to go nearer the enemy. When reaching the eastern side of the hill, we see the enemy take a rest and lunc. I say to Cu: Send Platon 2 to stop the head and Platoon 3 to block the tail. The platoon 1 will fight abreast. It takes some twenty minutes for us to set in order our positions. The enemy has finished their head to swallow water, some others are smorking. Nobody keeps vigilant. Just the, I shout: Fire!. Taken by surprise, the enemy flights away disor derly .Some fire back. I order the 60 mm mortar to throw profusely exploding shells directly at them. The combat ends shortly. Our Company 2 has basically erased from the fight one company of the puppet Regiment 2,on the Nameless Hill. But alas! The Company 2 has had also its losses: 6 cadres and fighters have perished in action: the platoon head Nguyen Dinh Cu, native of Hamlet 2, Nhan Phu, Ly Nhan, Ha Nam; platoon deputy head Nguyen Van Vinh, native of Tam Son, Van Long, Ha Hoa, Phu Tho; Squad head Tran Hoan, native of Dai Ha, Son Ha, Huong Son, Ha Tinh; fighter Dinh Sy Huan, native of Hamlet 8, Duc Thanh, Duc Tho, Ha

Tinh; fighter Phung Anh Xuan, native of Dong Quyen, Nghi Thu, Nghi Loc, Nghe An. All our dead companious in arm are carried back by our unit to be buried at the foot of the Height 122, in the Cam Tuyen Commune, Cam Lo district. The requirement of the front is to increase the size of battles with days. So our units, from the companies to the battalions, strive hard to organize them better. First of all, with regard to the political and idealistic view point, we must educate our men the combative spirit, the resolution to fight the American agressors till a complete victory. At the same time. We must train them complementary war skills after each fighting periods. Thanks to these efforts, every companies rapidly grow-up and the efficiency of fighting improve aradually. At the time, though the rainy season has arrived, the Americans and theirs guisling allied forces fo on incading the North of Road 9. Their plot is to seize and hold fast the heights located between Con Tien area and the Height 544 (fooler), to stop our attacks on Road 9 when the dry season arrive. The Smerican spies come to investigate the Southern Ben Hai riverside, and discover our ways of imfiltration, they at once mobilize their troops to seize and hold fast the heights to oppose our advance Southward. At the sametime, they concentrate bombing and launching of shells on our ordnance warehouses in KheCau, height 33, height 402, causing lots of difficulties to us. Under the unending averses in mountainous and forestry areas of Northern Quang Tri, within Mac Nam areas electronic barrier, never cease the firing shots at the enemy of our commom. The company 3, the multi-unit Group 75 come to co-ordinate their fighting activities with the Regiment 27 and Quang Tri province local armed forces.

The recently occupied by the enemy heights 161, 322 are in turn stormed by our troops. To safeguard the electronic barrier West Con Tien and Mieu Bai Son baes and North Cam Lo district center. Despite the unending heavy averses, the floods and in undations, the enemy mofilize their troops in numerous and noisy operations there. The Regiment 27, together with other friendly units cling patiently to the vast battlefield and overcoming every heights, to guard steadily our positions. In the midst of continous and fierce battles, through the Voice of Vietnam, the codres and fighters of the Regiment 27, are painfully stunned and deeply moved by the broadcast heartbreaking information of our President Ho Chi Minhs passing-by for the Eternity. All weep, all burst in mournful, sorrowful,grievous, bitter sobbings.Arcording to the information, in the morning, on September 9th, 1969, at Ba Dinh Square, will take place the somlemn national commemorative Ceremony and State obsequies. My company organizes too at the appointed time in Hanoi the mourning ceremony respectfully consacrated to the memory of our venered by all supreme chief and leader of the Nation. On the altar, is Uncle Hos portrait, cut from a newspaper, with a mourning crown of wild flowers. The whole company is present, silent and with tears in the eyes of all. On be half of all the cadres and fighters of the Company2, I read aloud our Resolution letter, that will be sent to the Front B5 Commanding Staft. I still keep in memory the final paragraph of this deeply moving letter : From the Quang Tri ablaze battlefield, the cadres and fighters of the Company 2,(72) Battalion 1, Regiment 27 swear to the front Staft, the Party Central Coomittee, that we will change grief into revolutionary act and fight till the Americans must go home, the guisling authorities go down, and our fatherland become unified, to meet Uncle Hos sacred desire.

After that, the whole Front launches the Learn and act after Uncle Hos last will Movement. Realize feats_of_arm to express gratitude to Uncle Ho combat and battles are successively launched and won, causing improtant losses to the enemy. Opening the list is the attack destroying (74) a group of 11 tanks and 60 U.S.soldiers, performed by the Company1, Battalion1, in Khe Nuoc Zone (South-East area of Con Tien) in the night of October 1st . I engage myself in this first battle to express gratitude to Uncle Ho. We have written the Resolution letter with our red blood. So we have won the battle. A hundred fighters become a hundred sharp (74)piercing points, resolute to penetrate deep into the enemy pigsties In the whole Front B5 Cultural Exhibition and Performances in 1969, the song Feat_of_arm to express gratitude to Uncle Ho of the Regiment 27 cultural group is awarded the First Prize. After the victory of the Company1, Battaltion 1 on Khe Nuoc area, diverse units in the Regiment 27 go on organizing successive battles to guard our positions. All out units have taken the initiative of attack, we meet many difficulties in storing and convoying supplies. Our troops (75)are often short of food. Many men develop diseases, in particular, dermal ones. However, the Regiment 27 remains optimistic and searches itself the means to overcome any met abstacle As for the enemy, they go on concentrating important forces and launching frequent attacks at us enlager their positions with the constant hope to stop our advance Southward at the arrival of the dry season. At several places, the US forces and the quisling Division 3 coordinate activities to inrade more land. At that time, Battalion 1 and Batthalion 2 (76)are constantly present on the vast battlefield. The Battalion 3 constitutes their tactical

reserve, the Battalion 2 fights the enemy South_West Con Tien base. My Battalion 1 goes on infiltrating deeper to fight the enemy on Ho Khe and Da Bac mountainous areas, to prevent them from invading the Cu Dinh area and the Height 333, that are the corridor of our going to-and-fro at fighting seasons. This is a very important way of the Quang Tri front in the years of anti-US war. Its also the cherished way, linkaed with our Regiment 27 cadres and soldiers fighting life. In the morning of October 23rd 1969, together with the Company deputy-head Nguyen Minh Chau, the plantoon-head Nguyen Van Bot and a spying-group of the reinforced Batthalion, we venture South the height 161 for information. At noon, we detect a company of the Regiment 26, Division 3 of the quisling forces, having stopped therefor lunch, I say to Chau and Bot : This enemy company is eating lunch and seems out of vigilance. I think that it will be tasty to attack it. So dear Chau and Bot, please, speed back home to prepare our men for the battle. I anf out scouts will remain here to go on waching them. Chau hestates: -From here to our company, event if we hurry on, it will take 30 minutes. To prepare out men for the battle will take nearly an hour more. When we come back here, will the enemy be still here or departed? I analyze further: - You go back home and join our commissar To make our men hurry on. Im sure that after lunch they will leisure and relax a little time more. Besides, puppet-soldiers are no doubt tired of repeated r.. They simply obey their superiors, see? So Chau and Trung go back to our unit to hurry our men. I with the scouts go on watching the puppet

company. As I have guessed, after the lunch, some smoke, some sleep. We patiently wait for our men. From time to time, I glance at my watch. After 1 hour and 40 minutes, the Company deputy-head Chau comes with his men. The commissar too is arriving. We exchange some short words: You Bot lead your platoon forward to stop the head. All remaining men will launch the attack. The 60mm mortar will be positioned, and wait for orders. Hurry up! Twenty minutes lag slowly on. Estimating that Bots platoon has reached its intercepting the enemy position. I order the B40 to gunner Nguyen Van Nhung to fire at the enemy to give the signal of attack. After the B40 shot, the 60mm mortar immediately launches its shell. The first shell in fired a little too far. Dun gunners correct the direction and distance. When the second shell strikes right at the enemy ranks, I order the mortar to fire rapidly ten shells more. The infantry storms forward. The Company deputy=head Chau heads a squad and attacks the enemy side. He falls down two puppet soldiers. In the fire of the battle, he does not detect in time an enemy light machine-gun pointed at him. The machine-gun fires a long burst. Chau sacrifices himself in action. I raise my AK gun, fire back at the machine-gun soldier and kill him. The enemy is stopped short at the Northern and stormed at the South-East side. So they flee disorderly Westward. The battle lasts about 30 minutes. I order our men to withdraw from the recent battlefield, to avoid the enemy artillery. Our Company 2 has eliminated on the spot over 30 enemies. We ourselves have grievous losses. 5 men of the Company 2 have died in action; the Company deputy-head Nguyen Minh Chau, native of Quy Xa, Thieu Van, Thieu Hoa, Thanh Hoa; the platoon-head Nguyen Van Bot, native of Doai Hamlet, Me Linh, Tien Hai, Thai Binh; fighter Ha Van Lieng, native Tan Hoa, Nghia Long, Nghia Dan, Nghe An; fighter Nguyen Van Nhung,

native of Ba Dinh, Nam Long, Nam San, Nghe An and Squad-head Nguyen Dinh Ngu, native of Laixa, Thanh Tuyen, Thanh Liem, Ha Nam. The five cadres and fighters of the Company 2 are carried off and buried in the Cimetery of the soldies killed in action in Vinh Truong Commune, Vinh Linh, in the Bon Hai Northern riverside. IN the last days of the year, not only infantry units, but also sapers, spying, artillery units participate in battles against the enemy on this land. Beside their own appointed task (that is to serve the infantry to fight victoriously), all the remaining units strieve to attack and destroy the enemy. Among these supplementary fighting forces, there is the Company 17, that co-ordinates his actions with our Companys ones to go fighting on Tim Kim, Sap Da Mai areas. The company 17 companions-in-arms always go nearing the enemy, to dispose watching posts for adjusting the artillery firing. They say: The nearer battlefield, the better the firing efficiency. To my knowledge, early in the morning of November 10th 1969, the Company 17 is going across Tan Kim flat space, when hearing the enemy artillery fire from Cam Lo. The commander of the unit has had then an idea: to bring nearer our fire-arms to attack the enemy artillery fields and gathered-up (clotted) gun-men. The bold idea is exposed to the Company fighters to be deliberated democratically. Someone objects: Edging the way to such places is already difficult for infantry-men. How can then manage to do the same exploit for gunners with their heavy and encumbering mortars and shells?. Beside, the enemy there is densely crowded as ants. If we do not consider it thoroughly, then, please, beware the dropping of the charge to save the bearer! But many replies: If there is plenty of enemies, then there would be plenty of opportunities to destroy them. The essential thing is to stick to them and strike right at them, not to strike

mistakenly at us, or strike at nothing! We all weight in turn the for and the against. Finally, the whole unit adopts an unanimous decision: launch a really good battle for the Cam Lo population to get still more rejoiced still more confident whenever listening to the cannon roaring of our liberating army. Our spying corps is all the time busy disposing radio sets ans stick to the enemy. In CamLo district Center, there are all diverse variety and sort of American and quisling forces. Though still not in close contact with them, the company 17 men have tried nevertheless to alternate our 82mm mortars with theirs, to be able to fight them in time. When there are opprtunities. The projects to bring in and out artillery pieces is as difficult as battle projects. The company spying group is approaching Quat Xa village at nightfall. We would like to profit of the remaining daylight to go nearer the enemy. Then, we discover American soldiers entering the village with increasing number. We are asking ourselves will they pass through or stay in for some time, when from here and there, curl up smokes: they are of course doing some cooking there. So we know that they will stay and take their dinner in Quat Xa village for a while. The company commanding staff consults to gether then gives orders to the gunner units to position and make ready their pieces. The gunners gather up shells. A group points its gun at the enemy mortar group in the South of CamLo district Center, to get ready to destroy it when our men here open the fire. As a routine, at nightfall and at dawn, the enemy artillery unit sends some shell volley1 at Tan Kim, while in the night, it fires only spasmodically, at random, at some undeter mined objective. Namely in this night, the company 17- head Tran Duc He (native of Nhan Thinh, Ly Nhan, Ha Nam) and the Commissar Huynh Ngoc Dao (native of Phu Ha quarter,

Phan Rang- Thap Cham town, Ninh Thuan province) decide to open fire at the enemys own first volley. The enemy gun fires. Our company- head shout also at once: Fire! Our piece- gunners Le Xuan Cam, native of Quynh Do, Vinh Quynh, Thanh Tri, Ha Noi, Le Van Vo, native of Vong Ngoai, Vong Xuyen, Phuc Tho, Ha Tay, Nguyen Van Su, native of Southern hamlet, Phung Thuong, Phuc Tho, Ha Tay immediately fire. Our gun-men have taken the initiative . Our 82mm mortar barrels in to envelop coarse car- rubber-tyre ribbons, so the noise of the departing shells in greatly subdued and not easily perceived by the enemy soldiers, who are beside deafened by the shot of their own artillery. So, our first shell- volleys are not clearly differentiated by the enemy. Maddened and misled by these sudden and mortal blows, the enemy wildly dislocate and flee in every directions. Our company- head he shouts: emergency fast firing! The mortar- shells pour as a terrible shower at and on the enemy The watching post reports:Hurrah! Just at the objective! Order: Around it too! Fire! Shell- shorts flare still more abundomtly among the enemy ranks. The Camlo people pour out, to watch the gunners of the Liberating Army fire at the American mercenaries! Our surprise- attack by mortars has taken the enemy all of a sudden. The CamLo quisling forces fails to come to rescue intime. Two companies of American soldiers just coming from the near to reinforce their troops already biroiaquered in the Mac Namaras electronic defence- line, lose brutally about 120 soldiers. The enemy tanks and armoured cars gathered for the night in

Tan My village (near by Quat Xa) start engine to flee hurriedly away, in fear of our further attack Finally, the enemy artillery fires from Cam Lo and Tan Dinh at our Company 17 well-positioned field-bases. Most shells explode beyond the range, our gunners go on maintaining a sweeping fire, to destroy the surviving runnersaway enemy. The battle is at its end. The Company 17 men dis mount in silence their pieces, then edge the Cam Lo River sides to come back to the Height 85 and go on co ordinating their activities with my battalion 1. in Ho Khe and Da Bac mountainnous areas. The Cam Lo district center population, witness of the Company attack by mortars, go on a long time complimenting the ability and skill of our mortar-gunners. During the last days of November 1969, it goes on raining. Heavy and prolonged showers downpour water on the earth. Inundations spread over communication ways and shelters, in Con Tien and on the Height 544. Our mobile forces meet inumberable difficulties, in particular the deeply infiltrating units into the enemy rear. Food and good ware houses, ammunition depots encounter alo many, many dificulties in the rainy season. The enemy attacks, shells and bombs day and night, particularly our communication ways and suspected strorehouses The Cadres and fightens of the Regiment 27, infiltrated deep in the enemy rear, are strictly self-sufficient in eating stuff, for nearly the wholt war-time. In the dry season, in the morning, a squeezed by hand handful of rice is stell soft and sticky, but only an noon, is has been converted into a dry and hard ball! Though our units in the rear have strieved their best to convoy us the minimal necessary, it really cant help. Many, many times, our Battalion must

eat wild vegetables, alocasia, Indian taro wild banana tubers, Malabar nightshade and the nameless likes, in lack of rice, for weeks cousecutively. A real famine threatens our fightens What is worse, in the rainy season, the rain-water makes the trenches, shelters, fighting posts earth collapse. Our mens wearings all the time fully soaked with muddy water. Night after night, we must stay awake inturn, to (scoop and bale water out) of our living or fighting places. Fighting in such arduous conditions in the rainy season makes our health lower fast, but we encourage each other to suffer in silence, hold on firmly, and, at any price, fight the enemy, not to let our assigned battle field deprived of anti - U.S and quisling gum-shots On November 13rd, 1969, the Company 3, Rattalion 1, on its infiltrating way. Southward, unexpectly meets the enemy at the foot of the Height 84. The armoured American infantry unit has just arrived to seife the Height. Our Company takes rapidly position for fighting. After 15 minutes, it has succeeded in setting ablaze 13 tanks and armoured cars and eliminate over 80 American soldiers. The too rapid combat frightens the surriving enemy. Hearing the gun shots from the foot of the Height 84 and seeing fire and smoke curl violently up from the tanks and cars, the rear of the American comvoy hastens to withdraw Southward. No one rushes forward to rescue their war-mates. After this first successful engagement, the Company 3 readjusts its positions to welcome the U.S soldiers, if they come back to attack So are the battles here! After a combat, we stick to the spot to engage a new combat and to safeguard our positions.

From these first encounters with the amoured American infantry units, the fighters of the Regiment 27 have found out an intelligent tactic to cope with this category of soldiers There is a very strange tale about the original way of our men fighting against American helicopters. Our men were namely the cadres and fighters (sapers and engineers) of the Regiment 27. Many American helicopters have been fired down by our infantry-men. So, these aircrafts have adopted a tricky tactics: they used to fly very low and fast along narrow valleys, not to let our foot-soldiers have the time to aim at them and fire. Thinking carefully of their simple but efficient tactics, the head of the Regiment 27 Saper and Miner Corps Tran Huu My (native of 86/4 Trung Son quarter, Tam Diep City, Thanh Hoa province) has worked out a stratagem: he makes his men dispose an ambush on the passes/frequently used by the U.S helicopters. It consists of some DH-10 mines, directed upward, ready to explode and commanded by watching sapers. Early in 1970, two enemy helicopters fly queuing-up toward the Height 544. Waiting them to fly right into the best range, our men shut the electric circuit flowing to the mine. The mine explodes. The well-directed comflagration strikes down one of the two helicopters. From them on, no more American planes dares fly low along ravines 1970 is the second year of the American implementation of the strategy of Vietj Namization of the war. On Northern Quang Tri battlefield, inside the Mac Namaras electronic line area, they concentrate their efforts to consolidate Dong Toan, the Height 544 (Fooler), Con Tine and the Eastern area. They push the quisling forces forward, while the American troops remain cautiously in the rear, well

sheltered in secure bases and mainly using motorized infantry men to rescue the puppet forces whenever necessary The fighting area of the Regiment 27 in the first months of 1970 is from the Height 182 down to the Height 322 and from the Height 288 up to the Height 544. These heights arewell know to the cadres and fighters of the Regiment. Compared to the previous times, this time, we penetrate deeper, with greater forces. The deeper we go into the enemy rear, the more numerous of course are the difficulties. To ensure security, to organize march and sheltering, all requires more labour and decision At every New Year Day (Lunar Tet), we seize the occasion of traditional temporary stop-fire, to go scouting. On the Tet of 1469 stepping into 1970, my Company, keeps marching on day and night toget ready for the coming campaign. To insptirit our men, I wire a short poem:A Tet far from my mother. This Tet, Im busy implementing military tasks, so on the way home to you dear mother though in Spring time, will be lacking your sons step. My soldiers feet have travelled on a hundred mounts and across a thousand brooks, but, dear mother, are always longing for a short walk on our natal soil, when Spring blooms. The wind blows and my camouflage leaves flutters, making me dreamingly mistake them for some faithful butterflies, waving me back to my mothers village All my companys men cheerfully repeat aloud my verses, exactly as at our New Years Day festival time At that time, the enemy has begun to co-ordinate the actions of the Regiment 2, the Brigade 1, the Division 5 of the American armored infantry to stop our offensive. In one fighting direction of the Regiment 27,our Battalion 1 discovers that they are coming to attack the Height 182. Alas! All

the Battalion 1 Commanding Staff was unfortunately shot dead. Im the head of the Company 2, main force of the Battalion 1, and so know the fighting plan. In my opinion, to inform right now the Battalion 1 cadres and fighters about the death of the whole Battalion 1Commanding Staff is no wise act. So, I seize the telephone to order the three companies to go on implementing the previously concerted plan. With the assistance of our artillery, the Battalion 1 succeeds to fight the enemy in time from April 1st to April 4th, 1970. By co-ordinate attacks and marches, the Battalion 1 has broken down mad attack-after-attack of the American and quisling forces. Tanks and armored cars carcasses, together with the enemy corpses, lie scattered all over the Height 182. The battle ends in victory, and of course, some of our men blame me for my bold and dutiful act of assuming the battalions commandment. In holding firm the Height 182, we ensure the free disposal of battlefield and the infiltrating way of our troops from then on. While the Battalion 1fight in the Height 182 area, my own battalion in ordered to infiltrate oneself deeper into the area, stretching from the height 322 to the height 288. Out of badly organizing the adventurous march, the battalion 3 is discovered by the enemy. They fire profusely bombs and shells at us and cause us quite heavy losses. The Company 3 has 24 comrades killed: the Commisar Hoang Te, native of Nam Dong, Tam Ky, Hai Duong; the platoon deputy-head Hoang Kim Thanh, native of Phuc Trung, Cam Phuc, Cam Xuyen, Ha Tinh; the platoon deputy-head Nguyen Minh Hai, native of Kim Thanh, Thanh Kim, Thach Ha, Ha Tinh; the Squad deputy-head Pham Van Su, native of Dai Thang, Hop Thang, Trieu Son, Thanh Hoa; the Squad deputy-head Tran

Thanh Thuc, native of Trung Hoa, Thach Tan, Thach Ha, Ha Tinh; the Squad deputy-head Nguyen Van Huong, native of Ngon Dong, Hung Khanh, Tron Yen, Yen Bai; the Squad deputy-head Nguyen Quoc Dien, native of Song Linh, Huong Ha, Huong Khue, Ha Tinh; the Squad deputy-head Pham Xuan Vinh, native of Mieu Luong, Sai Gon, Quoc Oai, Ha Tay; the Squad deputyhead Nguyen Vinh Ngo, native of Hop Mot, Nghi Lien, Nghi Loc, Nghe An; the Squad deputy-head Le Trung Ho, native of Xuan Son, Dien Loi, Dien Chau, Nghe An; the medic Pham Hong Quang, native if Cong A, Bao Nguyen, Lam Thao, Phuc Tho; the fighters Hoang Van Ngan, native of Long Son, Thanh Long, Thanh Chuong, Nghe An; Nguyen Van Kien, native of My Hoa, Nghi My, Nghi Loc, Nghe An; Tran Thanh Binh, native of Minh Thanh, Quynh Long, Quynh Luu, Nghe An; Tran Xuan My, native of Duong Phong, Nam Phong, Nam Dan, Nghe An; Tran Xuan Nhu, native of Huong Tra, Huong Son, Ha Tinh; Doan Hong Khanh, native of My Son, Nghi Lam, Nghi Loc, Nghe An; Nguyen Tat Hien, native of Tan Truong, Hoi Son, Anh Son, Nghe An; Ha Thanh Reo, native of Doan Ham-let, Lai Dong, Thanh Son, Phu Thu; Nguyen Thanh Trung, native of Ai Quoc, Quynh Hau, Quynh Luu, Nghe An; Nguyen Thanh Chung, native of Quynh Thang, Quynh Chung, Nghe An; Dan Khac Hong, native of Kim Ha, Nghi Thien, Nghi Loc, Nghe An; Dang Van Vanh, native of Ai Quoc, Quynh Thuan, Quynh Luu, Nghe An. All the 24 deads-in-action of the Company 3, Battalion 1 are buried at the foot of the Height 544. From such heavy losses, our Unit is plunged in a mourn full and quite oppressing atmosphere. So the Battalion Comanding Staff decides to organize a really best combat, to raize up the units morale.

After

weighing

carefully

the

for-and-against,

the

Battalion

Commanding Staff calls me and Comissian Di in, to discuss with us the task. The Battalion head says: - The situation of the Battalion, you are fully aware of. Our mens spirit has sunk a little before the units losses. So, we ought to set up a new, really great, victirious battle for the Battalion, to put anew our fighters on theirfeet, and recover their previous. impetus and splended momentum. Comrade Hieu, your Company 2 is still intact and youre a really experimented Company-head. So, we congide this task to the Company. 2. Your objective is to attack the Brigade 1, Division 5, of the American armoured forces. You ought to destroy fight the equivalent in size and value of a company. Comrades, what do you think of it? Ireflect intensely a good while, then say: - Through my scouting missions for the preparation of battle fields, I see that the brigate 1, Dirision 5 of the American armoured Infantry is always adopting the Abrams General Wild Buffaloes tactics. By day, they use bombing and shelling, allied together with the armoured infantry, to scatter and rummage everywhere. At the arrival of the night, they huddle together at some place use bulltozers to the earth heap and pile into a circular defence samp, that they cover with anti-B40 nets externally. The tanks take shelter in these miniature temporary citadels, spend scouts to watch the surroundungs and keep ready to launch shells to fight any intruders coming in/from afar. If they detect us, they will at once use shells and bombs to kill and wound. So, to attack them now is really difficult. The Battalion commander looks scrutinizely at me, the enquires:

- But, accourding to you, what do we manage? - I propose not to do as usually, to divide the Company into 2 parts, send one to scout and stick to them, guard the other home to prepare and get ready gor eventual attacks with suck an organization, we are not able to attack them righ now. So, the Company will proceed to a selection and divide itself into 3 groups. Best of all, select members and sympathies of the Party to go together scouting, and if encountering the enemmy, then engage and launch at once an attack. We must grasp thoroughly the line of combat of our Generai Nguyen Thi Thanh: Hold tight the Americans belt to wrestle. - I agree with the viewpoint of the Company-head Hieu. You, comrades, come back to organize the attack. You must ensure strict secrecy before opening fire. If not, the enemy will use bombs and shells in your very act of scouting. Organize attacks the sooner, the better. We are waiting for victory news. - We promise to fulfil well the task. On the way home, I and the Commissar Dy, we are at the same time pleased and concerned. Pleased, because Battalion in difficulties. Concerned, because at present, the enemy is well sheltered in the are of our activities. I say to Commissar Dy: You set up a meeting of the cell and issue a decision, asking our troops to reinforce and maintain a good spirit for our unit. As for the plan of battle, we shall choose 21 men, divided into 3 points. We with you shall lead the first one; the deputy-commissar Le Dang Nhiem, will lead the second one; the deputy-head of the Company will lead the third one ( Nhiem is native of the Western Hamlet, Quynh Vinh, Quynh Luu, Nghe An).

The important thing is to grasp tight the enemys rules. What is their position? How will be their raids? At night, how will they gather up? Commissar Dy added: The difficult thing is to ensure the secrecy of our march. If there are wounded and deads, the problem will be very difficult to solve. Impossible to withdraw with them before the dawn. So, we must foresee the necessity to hide them till the following night. In consequence, we must be very lightly equiped. To ensure secrecy, according to me, our troops must marck along Cam Lo River. When going across the roads, we must cover the ground with nylon sheet. The man going last must step backward, and use branches with leaves to erase any trace of foot print. Chattering on the way, we with Dy arrived home. We set-up right to do preparations in men and armaments for the projected battles. Dy called a meeting of the Party Committee and informed the cell and our men on our task. I called a meeting with the platoon-cadnes to select the men, 21 in all. The company disposed of 6 B40, 3 B41. All our 9 guns will mobilized.. Each B40 or B41 will bring along with them 6 shells. Beside the AK with folding handle, each of us will bring- up 4 grenades, and wound-dressing materials. Looking at my mens visage, I could see high-spirit and firm resolution: in me swelled-up a deep emotion. Early in the morning on the following day, we departed as projected. From April 1st, 1970, attacked on the Height 182, the enemy kept moving and used artillery to stop our advance. We encouraged our men to persevere, seek the enemy and fight them at any cost.

On April 4th, 1969 we arrived to Tan Kim flat area, when ancountered the American spies, they called-up at once their airafts and artillery to bomb and shell us. I and two comrades were wounded. A shell fragment has hurt my left arm. The blood stained red my sleeve. The medic dressed the wound. I thought by myself: if I left now the battle field to go to the medical unit, it will no doubt influence badly the course of the battle. So, my duty was to stay here and go on commanding, I ordered my men to carry the two wounded comrades down to a dry brook, with the promise to come back after the combat to carry them to our sick-bay. The company went on sticking to the enemy, but was still unable to attack any motorized unit. In our group, began to ooze tiredness and doubt, because for four days and nights already, we have had no sleep, and must eat dry food, drink natural water, without any opportunity to stop the enemy. Some men thought that we shall lose force if the situation was not improved. So, we with Commissar Dy were seeking a solution to raise-up the unit spirit. We thought that only a victory could help our fightens to recover their spirit. The party cell executive took a resolution: In the night of April 4th, 1970, at any price, we must find and attack the enemy, we met our men one by one, analyzed the situation, encouraged them to be patient and to find out this very night the American group of motorized infantry. I led some cadres and scouts to go ahead in search of the enemy. The Commissar and the in following us. At 18 p.m, we reached Tan Kim flat area. I thought: if we proceeded in the old way, we shall fail. So we resolutely went further Southward, and boldly hunt down the enemy. I said: - " Where there are shots from personal mortals, there are too American motorized infantry? So we must listen to American mortar shots to find out the enemy."

So we tried to determine accurately the source of mortar shots to direct our pursuing. At 22pm, thanks to the light of flares and star-shells, we saw three American motorized units. I was overjoyed. Meeting out cadres, I said: - " According to the disposition of the enemy, there were chances that the commanding staff of the motorized infantry group was at present sheltered in Sap Da Mai. This group lies inside the place, so can be without vigilance. We better let alone the two Northern groups and concentrate our attack on this one at Sap Da Mai." Our men agreed with my view. When out Company was only 200m far from the American group, I Ordered it to stop and wait. I led the platoon-head Thuan, the platoon-head Hop and 4 scouts to crawe across the bomb-craters and a dry brook, and neared the enemy, at only 30m distant from us. Thanks to the flares light, we counter-up 16 tanks, disposed on an arc. The group of tanks protected many tents with antennas. We guessed that they were command-cars. I indicated every objective, every place to the platoon-heads. Then, we with Tuan crawl further, to check and mark once more the commanding posts of the enemy. The watching soldiers were walking to-and-fro. From time to time, they launched some mortar-shells around, probably to calm down their men's anxiety. We profited by tall along-grass to go further southward. We met a random an enemy tank, hidden in a bush. Thuan stroke lightly at the steel cover of the tank and said in a subdued voice:" How cold is the steel shell! We saw that the American soldiers were already sleeping in a canvas tent. Un another tent, we heard them talk in a raucous voice; they probably were (who know!) reporting to their superiors: All is OK!

After this brief scouting raid, I came back to the staff place. The company commanding staff and the platoons cadres were already there. I said: - Basing on the disposition of the enemy tanks,we must attack them in three directions to really win.Our B40,B41 gunners must go near the tanks(at distances from 5-m) to adjust their firing.We with commissar Dy and Thuans platoon,shall attack the main direction,with two B41 and two B40.when the main direction opens the fire,all will fire at the tanks our gunners have chosen.We shall use two B40 or B41 shell for each tank.Any objection or suggestion?All agreed.I asked every body to go speedily to the appointed position.I looked at my watch:it was just 12pm,just midnight. All have reached their respective positions.I checked everything and shook hand with the B40 and B41 gunners,encouraged them to keep calm and realize exploits.At three and a quarter am,all were ready.I checked everything for the last time,then wen back to the gathering point and led our main group to go nearer its objective. 3 oclock and 40 a.m.I led comrade xungs group to approach the enemys commanding post.At 7m from the objective,Xung inadvertently knocked against a plane,that set immediately ablage.I seised at once the opportunity to order Xung and the B41 gunner Phung Van Khoat to fire two shells right at the commanding tank.Two detonations exploded nearly simultaneously.An oange light issued violently upward,and helped Khoat to see another tank standing nearby.Khoat raised his B41 gun and fired a new.The shell swifted forward like lightening:the second tank bursted into flames.After that,shots after shots exploded.With thei first B40 and B41 shells,all our gunners shot a blaze their chosen tanks.Eight tanks were

destroyed as soon as the first B40 or B41 salves.I shouted loudly to the whole unit:Attack! Passing past the commanding in-fire tank,our men rushed forward against enemys positions.B40 and B41 gunners fired steadily at the enemy tanks,while our attacking fighters used their AK to sweep off the American infantrymen. Right at the moment ,Khoat saw ahead of him a tank,which fired furiously at our men.The US soldiers took refuge behind the tank and fired still more madly at us. Khoet refilled his B41 with a third shell and sprang forward. The enemy AR-15 cartridges flew above and past his head, but Khoet with calm directed his B41 at the tank and fired for the second time. The shell a new did not explode. Khoet ran to me and said breathlessly: - Sorry, dear company-head! The shell is spoilt! I asked the B41 gunner Nguyen Hai Ha to give Khoet a new shell. Khoet received the shell, recharged his gun, then rushed forward to pursuit the tank. We heard a deafening explosion and saw the tank set ablaze The battle was more and more fierce. The enemy stubbornly gathered behind the 3 remaining tanks in the Southern area and fired despairing at us. I mobilized against them the B41 kept in reserve and two B40. I ordered the B40 and B41 gunners to launch two shellseach at the American tanks group. The shells burst violently against the steel carapace of the tanks, that flared-up into tall ecarlate flames. From the South, a tank in the outer circle suddenly roared and spat fire at our men. Ordered two B41-gunners to reduce them into silence. Two B41

shells burst nearly simultaneously. The tank quaked, then stopped short and flared too into flames and fumes The day was drawing. I exchanged some words with Commissar Dy to withdraw our troops. The fighters broadcasted my orders :Speedily leave behind the battlefield!. Our men with drew in turn and in order, abandoning behind 16 tank carcasses and 95 American corpses, that went on burning The whole company moved to the secure area. The enemy artillery went on roaring around the conflagration field. L19 and OV10 airplanes came and sowed profusely down flares and star-shells. C130 launched 20 mm shells. I resigned myself to ask our men to carry our dead-in-action companions-in-arm to cam Lo River, fasten stones to their remains, sinks them into the water, to comeback the following night to carry them home. The 4 comrades who have sacrificed themselves in the attack of the American armoured cars group in the night of Apil 4th, 1970 were: squad head Ninh Van Dinh, native of Dai Tu, Tam Ky, Yen Lac, Vinh Phuc; squaddeputy-head Cao Chi Ngan, native of Son Phuc, Huwowng Son, Ha Tinh; fighter Bui Duy Can, native of Quynh Luong, Quynh Luu, Nghe An; fighter Tran Xuan Trach, native of Hamlet 5, HungDao, Hung Nguyen, Nghe An. They were carried back to and buried at Tan Kim area. I asked my men to throw also in Cam Lo River Whatever armaments, keeping back only B40, B41, Ak guns and grenades. The platoon-head Thuan reported then to me that his platoon lacked two men, of which Khoet, the Valiant Soldier who has destroued the 3 American tanks, I asked commissar Dy to lead our troops to the gathering point, while we, with a fighter, hurried back to the battlefield. At 1 km on the

way, I saw the two men helping each other to stagger painfully toward us. I recognized Khoes tall stature, with the head covered with blood stained wound-dress, and leaning helplessly on his comanion-in-arms. The day was already drawning. I asked our men to help Khoet West-Southwards to hide among low bushes, to wait for being carried back to the Unit at nightfall. At 9 am, the enemy sent the UH1A helicopter as well as an helicopter with an adapted crane, to-and-fro twenty-four times consecutively, to craneup the carcasses of the burnt tanks to Mieu Bai Son. After that, they sent bulldozers to raze-down the hill. At 5 p.m on the same day, they with drew from Sap Da Mai. Some days after, I was informed, with a deap sorrow, of the death of the co,rades Phung Van Khoet and Vi cong Doan at the surgery station D, in the South-Eastern area of the Height 402. Comrade Khoet was native of Tan Quyen, Kim Thuong, Thanh Son, Phu Tho. He was a member of the Muong ethnic minority. Comrade Doan was native of Bom Ma, Kim Tine, Tuong Duong, Nghe An. I mourned deeply Khoet, a bold fighter, a Valiant Soldier in destroying American motorized vehicles; as well as Doan, also a Valiant Soldier. After our victory of the Company 2, the American enemy formerly camping at Sap Da Mai got thoroughly frightened. They dare no longer expose their armoured vehicles and men to occupy this area. This combat has helped greatly in causing the Abrams Wild Buffaloes tactics to complete bankruptcy. The Company 2 victory has equally helped the whole unit to recover its vitality.

The battalion 3 was encountering many difficulties, but was now resolute to stand firmly on its appointed battlefield, to share with other units of the regiment the high spirit of fighting and winning over the enemy. The Company 2 was awarded the Feat-o Second Bank f-Arms Order. I myself was too awarded the Feat-o Second Bank f-Arms Order, and appointed Battalion-Head. The battalion Comissar was comrade Tran Xuan Gung. At the time, some reporters of the Newspaper Peoples Army, as comrade Doan Cong Tinh, comrade Cao Tine Le, Ngoc Dan,. Were following my Unit, to take photos, write articles, transmit news to do in time the propaganda of our people and armys exploits. On the day, I came to the Regiment, to a knowledge my nomination, the Regiment-Head Phan Minh Tam (1) shaked hands with me and congratulated me: - You are fairly good, my lad! Of determining character and good fighting. On the day, when the Company 2 was attacking the American tank group at Sap Da Mai, the Watching Tower reported that all the hill was set ablaze, I felt truly rejoiced The Commissar Nguyen Vo Hien, with his typical Ha Tinh accent, said: - After seeing you lead men to victory, I told Tam to appoint you Hieu right Battalion-Head. Now that the decision is taken, at your new position, strive to do better, see? Im convinced that you will do good. 1. Later, Tam became Major-General and retired in Da Nang. I replied: - With your confidence, my Regiment-Head and my Commissar, I shall strieve at utmost to command the Battlion to fulfil every task assigned by the Regiment. The Regiment-Head Tam said with pleasure:

- That is good! We believe in you. Let us come back to the situation of the Battalion 3. On April 18th , 1970, the Company-deputy head Ngo Thanh Cu, native of Dien Kim, Dien Chau, Nghe An, was mortally hit by a coordinate-bomb. Comrade Cu was intimately attached to me in many battles. He was buried in the Cimetery for Fallen-in-action soldiers of Vinh Thuong Commune. On April 23rd, 1970, the Commissar Nguyen Van Bao, on h way for scouting on the Height 182, encountered an enemy group spies. Bao engaged the combat. The called their artillery. Bao a mortally hit and a later buried in the Cimetery for Fallen-in-Action Soldiers Vinh thuong Commune, on the Northern ben hai riverside, in the Vinh Linh area. So, only in 5 days, the Battalion 3 has lost 2 outstanding cadres At the middle of May 1970, after hearing the Regiment 27s report on the fighting results of diverse Units, of which the feast-of-arms of the Company 2, Battalion 3, the Head Quarters of the Font B5 have praised the recent fighting exploits of the Regiment and gave it new instructions: Use the opportunities to reinforce the Unit and lead it dceper into the enemy-rear. Resolutely keep stble diverse bases around the Heights 322, 288, to ensure the control over the Height 544 from the South-East directions. At the reception of the directions from upper lavels, the Regiment-head Tam appointed the tasks: The battalion e, led by the battalion-head Nguyen Huy Hieu, will infiltrate deep into the southern part of the Height 322, and the Height 288. The battalion 2, led by the battalion-head Bui Xuan Cat, will stop the advance of the enemy toward Doc Tron (in the South of the Height 544). The battalion 1, led by the battalion-head Nguyen Van Ty, will enlarge its positios and

occupy the commanding-positions in the East and the North of the base 544. The artillery and 12,7 mm machine-gruns units will support with efficiency our infantry, especially the company of 12,7 mm machine-guns. After receiving the appointed tasks, we speedily prepared our units to start fighting. The enemy Regiment 2, of the Aivision 3 and some other units of the Brigade 1, of the American Aivision 5 must mobilize all their forces to oppose our Regiment 27. The enemy soldiers in the base 544, were frightened by the permanent encircling of our Battalion 2. The enemy base of mortars on the Height 544 was tightly controlled by our gunners, and cant assist in earnest their troops around the area 544. Though constantly and grievely defeated, the enemy stubbornly sticked to the base 544. Through our technical station, we were aware that at the current time, the enemy commanding staff must reinforce with artillery its Dau Mau base at the South of Road 9, to assist their base 544. The remaining forces of the Strategic Military Zone 1 of the Sai Gon quisling authorities must keep all the time ready to extend larger in the area 544 to protect thei surroundings. Not to llet alone the enemy but on the contrary, to destroy them in greater battles, our Regiment Commamder Hoang Minh Tam deceded to increase the watching ports to get information more intime and create more opportunities for our foot-soldiers to win. The fighters of the Spying Company 15 were present nearly everywhere all over the activities field of our Regiment. Our watching posts, scattered around the enemy base 544, were at the same time our scoutscommanding positions, coustantly ready to fight the enemy. On the activities area of the battalion 3, the tactics of the enemy have changed. Almost daily, they sent a spying platoon forth, to detect and destroy eventual

mines and to check secure the way. Only after these precautions, the cars transporting their men sarted going. Grasping the enemy new tactics. I asked our companies to slect the cadres and fighters well acknowledged with the ways and soil relief, to organize little communication ambushes. For the first combats, I led our men to go and choose for ambush-sites some tortuous, full of twists and turns section of road (namely a place 500 m far from Mieu Bai Son) on the Road 76. Because this road section was full of tight winding turns, the enemy cars must slow their course. Our men scattered there many Claymore auto directional mines collected from American origins (this sort of mine was very deadly, because ejecting when exploding hundreds of stell marbles). We waited for the spying group to pass by them to come back to lead the military convoy, transporting the American troops. The American soldies sitting on the cars, were carefree and relaxed, because believing that their scouts have inspected carefully the road. When the convoy was right into the ambush site, I shout to the B 41 gunner: Aim at the first car, fire!. The car set at once ablaze. The following cars, by inertia, collided violently against the stopped - dead first car. Other cars tried to avoid the car in flames and tumbled upside down, away the road-sides. Our B40, B41, grenades, Ak guns all hastened to fire right at the disorderly fleeing cars In this first ambush, we destroyed 7 cars. In another similar ambush, we destroyed 5 cars. In the case of a too long convoy, we stopped dead and destroyed the 5 last cars. In one ambush, it was raining. The quisling soldiers, wrapped in waterproof coats, with their head tightely covered, went on foot spying.

We destroyed them, then took their coats and AR-15 guns and camouflaged ourselves into quisling soldiers. Then we continued to swagger about on the road. Encountering an enemy convoy, we signaled them to stop. The enemy soldiers have not yet the time to understand what was happening, when our men in ambush began to shower them violently with salves of B40, B41. They have not had also the time to ripost! We withdrawed rather in security To fight in ambush brought-up high efficiency with reduced losser. After the combat, our men divided themselves into groups of three to with draw southward. We gathered-up at the appointed places, then went backs to our gathering base. In the months at the middle of the year 1970, we were fighting sometimes on the Road 76, sometimes on the Road 9. But we succeeded to organize only some combats on each battlefield, because the enemy drew needed conclusions and organized more spaced convoys, always under the protection of helicopters. The fighting of the Regiment 27 in these months inside the Mac Namaras electronic barrier remained nevertheless an ardous and fierce snatch between us and the enemy.They were attacked everywhere, from Con Tine Base to Sa Muu, Fooler, Dau Mau, Earthen 300, Rocky 300, Thien Xuan Bridge .. The Americans and their quisling allied forces were deeply embittered and continued stubbornly to try to enlarge their positions, and so, created new opportunities for us to destroy them. As for us, we always clung to our superior cadres order: If the enemy huddled together, then we pull them apart to destroy them. Combine the fighting of clustered with the fighting of

dispersed running around forces. On July 29th, 1970, our scouts reported: A quisling Company is heading toward the Height 182, near by the camping site of our Company 1. I ordered to this company to speed to stop the enemy advance. The cadres and fighters of the Company 1 quickly started to depart, realized the tactics of stopping the head, blocking the tail, them opened fire to attack. After nearly 30 minutes of fighting, our troops have heavily damaged the company of the enemy Regiment 3, Division 3. Our Company 1 have had 3 cadres and fighters dead-in-action: the platoon-head Nguyen Van Long, native of the Agri-collectivity Thong Nhat, Nam My, Nam Dan, Nghe An; the platoon-deputy head Luong Xim Doang, native of Thon Chien, Vo Lao, Van Ban, Yen Bai; the fighter Phan Huy Dat, native of Ban Thuc, Khuat Xa, Loc Binh, lang Son. They were buried at the foot of the Height 468. On August 2nd, 1970, my Battalion was victim of a disastrous carpetbombing by a B 52 American bomber causing very heavy losses. Many comrader were killed: The Company 3 head Nguyen Van Cuong, native of An Lac, Dong Tine, Khoai Chau, Hung Yen; 3 fighters of the Company 4: Ho Thuc Minh, native of Tho My, Dien Truong, Dien Chau, Nghe An; Nong Van Can, native of Da Tine, Long Hieu, Trung Khanh, Cao Bang; Nong Van Quang, native of Na Phai, Chi Vien, Trung Khanh; the Squad-deputy-head Dinh Van Sam in the Battalion Staff, native of Hung Linh, Hung Nguyen, Nghe An. All were buried at the foot of the Height 230. In the last months of 1970, my Battalion 3 was organizing all the time march attacks on the Height 182, Doi Da, D1, D2, D3, D4, and in the surroundings of Fooler Hill, causing many enemy losses. The year 1970 passed-by. The cadres and fighters of the Regiment 27 ingeneral and the Battalion 3 in particular were proud of their progresses.

We were particularly proud of our feats-of-arms inside the Mac Namaras electronic barrier. The battles of our unit in the year 1970 were of greater scale, compared to the two previous years. The strong points or forte in fighting of each unit in the Regiment were now clearly expressed: The Battalion 1 was specialized in occupying commanding positions; the battalion 2 was outstanding in encircling and extending; my Battalion 3 was heading in moving and attacking. In fighting, the quisling forces always relied passively on their powerful multi-fire, composed usually of the trapping shelling, the mail-shelling, and diverse forms of bomb as the steel pellet-bomb, the napalm-bomb, the clearing-bomb, the digging-bomb, the B 52 bomb, the coordinate, we must dig shelters with a vaulted entrance, to protect ourselves from trap-shells and nail-shells, clearing bombs and steel-pellets bombs To cope with carpet-bombing from B52 aircrafts, keeps in mind the following knowledge: when between two battles, there was a prolonged lap of time of silence and quietness, it meant that after an half-hour of silence, will be the carpet-bombing! When the B52 bomber threw down its bombs right on our ranks, we kept lying in a prone position, with the hands under the chest, to avoid being suffocated by the bombs deflagration. If the Americans threw down nocive chemicals bomb upon our place, we used our towel humectated with water to recover our mouth and nostrils. If there was no water available, we use in palce some urine. These emergency means were rather efficacious and used by our men for long years. With these feats-of-arms, the Regiment 27 has had the honour to be awarded by the Revolutionary Temporary Government of the Republic of Southern Viet Nam the Military Achievement Order. This was the first Military Achivement Order that the regiment was awarded. It marked the regiments growing-up step. This highly valuable reward was the result of an

uninterrupted process of efforts and trials, fearless of sacrifices, of all the cadres and fighters, of all the cadres and fighters of the Regiment 27, worth of the esteem and trust of the Party, People and brothers-in-arm.