Steven B.

Biasca 997469835 Professor Maoz- Section A03 10 November 2011 An Examination Of The Paradoxes Of Power Although it is uncommon, strong states throughout the course of history have indeed lost against much smaller or weaker states. In some cases, there may be a large disparity between each states capability or the larger may be highly militarized yet still lose in the end. Many scholars wonder over this paradox of power, in which the outcome does not entirely follow what one would expect. A superpower with a vast amount of resources and a variety of military assets would of course be expected to triumph easily, if not inevitably, over a weaker state. However, this ideology has not always remained true throughout the past and many wonder, Why do strong states sometimes lose wars against weak ones? To begin an analysis of this, one must consider the implications and characteristics of the measuring power in an ever-changing international system. Within this anarchic international system, states are presumed to be selfish in that they prioritize their goals and will pursue them despite changes within the system. With these changes come power-transitions and differing national interests, or even differing ideologies as to how government should be structured, coupled with new opportunities. Whether or not a state chooses to seize these opportunities depends on the key decision-makers willingness to pursue a particular action. However, this willingness may be primarily influenced by personal goals, traits, and characteristics. In regards to times of war, particular influences may cause a decision-maker, or a nation as a whole, to pursue a goal that has several unforeseen complications that may lead to its downfall and loss in the end.

Biasca 2 According to World Politics: The Menu For Choice, A challenger may start a war because it thinks that now, for the first time, it has a good chance to win, or the dominant power may see its own strength declining and calculate that it is better to fight now, while it still has some advantages, than to risk waiting (Russett, 2010, 270). The notion that, it is better to fight nowthan to risk waiting, is reflective in the case of preemptive war. When nations partake in preemptive strikes, it may oftentimes give even smaller states the upper hand in times of war. This is a key theory in examining the winner in war between two states with varying degrees of power. The theory of power-transitions remains relevant in analyzing the reasons as to why stronger states may lose in a war against smaller states because it accounts for, possibly, the decline of influence a superpower may have once had yet fails to maintain because absolute power is never static. Thus, when examining the paradox of power, in which a smaller state wins a war involving a substantially stronger nation, it is more important to focus on the period before the actual transition of power. In doing so, it can be inferred that the smaller nation could preemptively strike to setback the larger state. However, the power-transition theory does hold some faults to its accuracy. Particularly, the evidence of change and the measurement of power is rather ambiguous. Measuring power is an obscure practice. Power is not a real, tangible thing; it is perceived as more of an abstract idea than something a nation truly, physically holds. In addition, many decision makers can oftentimes miscalculate another states level of power, leading them to pursue some form of confrontation that may be more difficult than anticipated. This miscalculation may stem from reliance solely on the Correlates of War is not always

Biasca 3 a sufficient means of gauging a particular states power. It does not account for the secretive operations that may be brewing in a nation, nor does it account for measuring terrorist capabilities that are sometimes facilitated by a particular political regime. This miscalculation can lead to the escalation of wars to a new level that was not initially anticipated by a particular participant, whether it be the stronger or weaker nation. Furthermore, information during a time of crisis, or even pre-war time, can be over-filtered, misconstrued, misinterpreted, or even altered in favor of a particular agenda. Consequently, this can lead to rash or irrational actions that have devastating outcomes in the end, sometimes for the stronger nation. Interestingly, many political leaders may even decide to execute such actions in an attempt to maintain the publics approval in regards to foreign action, job performance, or both. In addition, a stronger state may have to deal with higher level threats, so a loss against the smaller state would be far less costly than losing to a much stronger state or larger threat. Furthermore, states that are in the sphere of influence or apart of a particular alliance of a large superpower may be readily supported, should another larger state demonstrate some act of aggression. When these principles of international relations are applied to cases throughout the course of history, it becomes easier to understand why stronger states sometimes lose against weak states. Consider Americas involvement in Iraq, which is more commonly referred to as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The two major actors primarily involved were the United States and Iraqi insurgencies, complemented by the Iraqi government and other key leadership that were also essential to the war aspects of the period, particularly Saddam Hussein and his

Biasca 4 nearly absolute control. A major problem was the confrontation between the two actors post September 11, 2001, marked by the terrorist attack on American soil, involving the hijacking of planes as a crusade for patriotic and religious ideals. This was seen as an act of aggression by a nation that appeared to knowingly facilitate terrorist regimes, thus justifying an external invasion. To make matter worse, Iraq was accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction from their previous nuclear armaments research in the early 1990s, though the United Nations inspection proved that Iraq possessed no threatening weapons of mass destruction, only remnants from their early research. However, the war was likely declared because it was imminent, hence the war on Iraq is not seen as preventive but instead preemptive. Furthermore, the U.S. faced such difficulty in their involvement because of such profound reliance on a reactive posture, which does not prevent attack from rogue or failed states. The Bush administration had continuously reminded Americans it would not be a swift military coup, and that the war on terror would be a long one (Russett, 2011, 157). However, even after declaring, mission accomplished aboard a military aircraft carrier, the war dragged on for years with thousands of American soldiers still stationed overseas on active duty. It can be inferred that the United States essentially lost in this struggle against Iraq because they failed to adapt to a changing system, a system where prevention and deterrence do not always work. Although the United States is heavily militarized, much of this strength comes from nuclear armaments. In most cases, nuclear options are simply used as a form of deterrence; thus in the case of Iraq and the war on terrorism, nuclear armaments are not practical.

Biasca 5 Another historical case where these international relations theories remain imperative is in the case of the Vietnam War, with a focus on the American involvement. The major actors in the Vietnam War included the United States and North and South Vietnam. The primary motive for the U.S. in Vietnam was the containment of communism in the North. Although the United States invested a substantial amount of resources, primarily in soldiers and monetary funding, they failed to successfully contain communism. In an attempt to contain the Red Tide that was seemingly spreading across the Pacific, the United States considered aiding the venture by pledging American troops to the cause. This decision was readily met by widespread public opposition. Moreover, this option proved to be too costly, in the case of money and lives. The United States lacked the physical assets and the resolve for the cause to continue their occupation in Vietnam, despite the United States high level of militarization. Since the bulk of the United States military power stems from nuclear arms, yet again, the nation was forced to face the confrontation in other means that evidently did not suffice. In the end, the removal of American troops overseas can be viewed as a loss for the global superpower, the United States. In the former case, that of the United States and their involvement in Iraq, there was a failure to accurately access the power that the Iraqi insurgencies held. Indeed it may have been a reactionary process on behalf of the Bush administration, after such a traumatic, unforeseen attack, however the decision to go to war with a country thousands of miles away have had several factors that were unseen on the way to victory. For one, the distance decay theory is prevalent in this case. States are typically more concerned with contiguous and bordering states, whereas Iraq is an

Biasca 6 overseas enemy in this case. As a result, war or confrontation in this case is indeed very difficult. In addition, this case applies the second axiom of the paradox of power in that the stronger state loses even though it is highly militarized. During a time of crisis, information does evidently become distorted or tailored to fit a specific agenda. In the latter case of American involvement with North and South Vietnam during the time of war, it becomes clear that the political risks outweighed the possible benefits of intervention. After early involvement, war began to escalate after U.S. involvement. The loss of public support at home lead to the overall opposition to war and was coupled with the high costs of war (and casualties). In the end, a negotiation was settled lead to the withdrawal of American troops and the conclusion of conflict during the Vietnam War. Despite the time period, the various theories regarding power remain fairly accurate despite the major actors involved. When a nation has reason to suspect that a threat from a specific nation is culminating, it is natural for some form of opposition. However, this opposition can sometimes be met by an underestimated power, which can result in a loss for the larger, stronger state that is threatened. Although ideals of the paradoxes of power seemingly apply to various cases throughout history, it is also important to note the major shortcomings of this theory. Primarily, the paradox of power fails to delineate what exactly defines the major superpower as the loser of a war. Determining the winner is rather ambiguous in that some historical cases have both nations suffering major losses, on behalf of the stronger and weaker nation. Thus, the parameters of the paradox of powers are not specifically definite in each case it applies to.