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Kyoto Protocol Durban preparation

UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (May 1992)

Article 2: is to achieve...stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system Article 4: Commitments 1) All parties taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities...shall: National inventories; National programmes to mitigate CC; tech transfer; sustainable management and conservation of sinks + reservoirs etc; adaptation; 2) A1 take lead national policies to mitigate CC, aim to return to 1990 levels anthropogenic emissions CO2 3) Developed shall provide new and additional finance and transfer of technology for poor to implement paragraph 1 above. Adequate (who decides this?!) and predictable flow of funds. 4) Rich assist poor meet costs of adaptation 5) Rich as appropriate transfer technology 7) The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology
Article 4.8 and 4.9 Adverse impacts of CC, the impact of measures taken to respond to CC, and compensation for these impacts. This issue is also addressed under Article 3.14 of KP. In the negotiations, discussion of Article 4.8 is of particular concern to small island countries and non-Annex 1 countries whose economies are highly dependent on exporting fossil fuels. Article 4.9 refers specifically to the special situation of LDCs - glossary

Basics
Adopted 1997. Enter into force 2005. 192 signatories. Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR reaffirmed in Bali 2007). Convention encourage rich stabilise GHG, KP commit them to do so. 37 rich and EC commit reduce emissions average 5% 2008-2012 based 1990 levels in line with what science demands. (Collective reduction 11%? I didnt see this in the Protocol). Kyoto Mechanisms: flexibility in meeting targets 1) Emissions Trading (the carbon market) 2) Clean Development Mechanism: projects reduce E in developing countries 3) Joint Implementation: rich and rich projects, usually EIT (eastern Europe)

2 Monitoring: international transaction log (ITL), CDM registry record who sell what carbon credits Adaptation Fund: finance concrete adaptation projects poor countries Parties to KP. Partly financed by CDM. KP is first step towards a truly global emissions reduction regime. It provides much of the essential architecture for an international agreement. (from UNFCCC intro!!!!) COP/MOP Conference of the Meeting of the Parties. Only Parties that ratify KP can participate in discussions ie. USA can be there as observer but cant vote. But obviously the influence via proxies and allies.

Key components of KP
Legally binding emissions reductions allocated per country based on a collective overall goal (I think this is an aggregate goal so all parties contribute to overall amount needed to reduce by in line with what science say). Quantified economy wide emissions reductions targets (I think this means calculating the target of entire economies compared to others) Comparability of effort between countries using common reference year 1990 and common accounting methods Long-term viability through multi-annual commitment periods within a consistent architecture (ie. 1CP and subsequence commitment periods). Monitoring, review and verification systems, and compliance mechanisms. Principle of CBDR (all from Trocaire report) Rules Kyoto mechanisms LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry Adaptation Fund Capacity Building - just for CDM?

Key articles of the Kyoto Protocol In pursuit of Article 2 Convention stabilisation of GHG. Article 3: 1) A1 reduce by at least 5% between 2008-2012 based on 1990 levels. 3) LULUCF can be used by A1 to reduce by 5%. 4) A1 give info on level of carbon stocks in 1990 and also rules for LULUCF need to be defined for 2CP. 9) Commitments for subsequent periods will be worked on/considered at least 7 years before end of 1CP 2012. !!!!!!! 14) A1 will strive to reduce by 5% in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic impacts on developing countries.

Article 3.9 Future commitments for Annex B Parties to KP are addressed in Article 3.9 which requires that negotiation of subsequent commitments (after 2012) by A1 should begin at least 7 years before the end of 1CP (2006). Implementation of this article led to the formation of the AWG at COP/MOP-1. - Glossary Articles 5, 7 and 8 Issues surrounding the preparation (methodologies), communication and review of national inventories under KP respectively. The main aspects of the discussions of these articles include establishing appropriate methods (or consequences for not having methods), how to account for sinks (LULUCF), how adjustments would be made to national inventories and monitoring of a countrys progress against its Kyoto commitment glossary. Article 6: 1) To meet commitment of 5% A1 can transfer/acquire emissions reductions units (basically carbon credits) from each other for projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions. These projects need to be additional to any projects that would have happened anyway. The acquisition of emissions reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions. Article 9 Under the KP the COP/MOP must periodically review the Protocol taking into account the best available information on CC. Based on the reviews findings the COP/MOP is expected to take appropriate actions. In the negotiations some Parties have attempted to use the review to argue that the ultimate objectives of the Convention are not being met necessitating deeper cuts or wider participation from Parties (major economies?). Other Parties believe the review should focus progress on A1 Parties in meeting their obligations on emissions, financing and technology transfer. The first review was undertaken at COP/MOP 2 with others following at regular intervals. Article 10: ALL PARTIES common but differentiated responsibilities shall: data; national programmes measures to mitigate CC and adaptations; cooperate on technology transfer; Article 11:

4 2) A1 will provide new and additional finance. Adequacy and

predictability of funds. Provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by developing country Parties to meet their commitments under Article 4 of the Convention (1) All parties taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities...shall: National inventories; National programmes to mitigate CC; tech transfer; sustainable management and conservation of sinks + reservoirs etc; adaptation;) Article 12: CDM 2) Purpose is to assist poor to sustainable development and stabilise GHG (article 2 Convention) AND CDM assist A1 to achieve reduction 5%. 3) Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs carbon credits). A1 can use these CERs to contribute to compliance with 5% reduction. 5) Criteria for a CDM project: Real measurable benefits, would not have happened anyway. 9) Private and public entities may be involved in participating in the acquisition of CERs. Article 13: COP/MOP structure 2) Parties to Convention can be observers but decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol. Article 17: Emissions Trading The COP shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines for emissions trading. A1 can use emissions trading to meet 5% reduction. But supplementary to domestic actions.

Emissions Reductions (this covers both KP and LCA)

2C max, better aim for 1.5C. Trocaire report: Lack of an agreed collective goal (aggregate) means existing emission reduction pledges are so low they will not adhere to 2dC limit to further warming that all states signed up to as recently as December 2010 (Cancun). To stand a chance of containing temp increases to 2dC or below as indicated by IPCC developed states need to reduce at least 40% by 2020 (but this is high end cos IPCC say between 25-40%). Based on current pledges by rich likely global temp rise between 2.6 and 4dC. The range of reductions (from -12 to -18%) exist because many Govs have low end pledges and conditions to go to high end dependent on actions of others. Prob less cos of accounting loopholes. ECO 8 June: For mitigation to be truly meaningful global efforts must be sufficient to keep global warming below 1.5dC above pre-industrial levels. Recent UNEP report (I think from early 2011) shows current emissions reductions commitments could equal rise 5C.

Kyoto Protocol: 37 rich and EC commit reduce emissions average 5% 2008-2012 based 1990 levels. Countries that will increase emissions when not meant to are: Canada, Spain. Stockholm Environmental Institute (Bonn brief 1): Current accounting rules (what is and is not an emission) could mean rich actually increase emissions by 2020 creative accounting. ECO 8 June: Rich need to commit to high end of their pledged ranges with strictest accounting rules. Currently estimates are that 65% reductions in South, 35% in rich countries. ECO 8 June: Stockholm Environment Institute study shows 11 out of 12 scenarios poor do more reductions. CMPCC and Bolivia position previously: Rich (incl USA) reduced 50% by 2017 on 1990 levels. Aim to reduce below 300ppm and back to 1C increase global temperature. ECO 7 June Bonn 2011: ECO encourages all developed countries to show under which conditions they will move to the high end of their pledges, and what part of these conditions have been met and what would be needed for the rest. This is really crucial. What will it take for rich countries to change their positions and be more ambitious, the million dollar question! Or is it just BASICs joining in? As Lim Li li said in November 2009 it is not just about the excuse of wanting the BASICs to also commit, the overall objectives is a pledge and review system of voluntary commitments = more climate chaos. ECO argument for why EU should reduce emissions: It would increase auctioning reserves to member states budget, it would boost innovation, create jobs, increase energy security. ECO 11 June: Current EU legislation allows for more and 50% of effort needed between 2013 and 2020 is to be covered by carbon offsets instead of domestic action. Gerardo Honty: Majority of emissions in Latin America are from deforestation. Historical responsibility not as clear cut as assumed. Between 1950 and 2000 annex majority but by 2000 to 2030 it will be 1,133 gigatonnes from non-Annex 1 compared to 572 for Annex 1. But Honty mate historical responsibility means the amount and per capita that rich have emitted since 1850. Not just 1950. Yes I agree poor have to do more but let us not forget history. These stats also dont account for the fact majority of products bought and sold by the West are produced in poor countries sometimes by rich countries companies. The carbon footprint of a Northern company more important than that of Northern country? Trocaire: From a justice perspective with their greater historical responsibility and superior financial and technological resources rich should lead the way.

6 Trocaire demands: Commit to legally binding agreement, CBDR Commit peak 2015. Reduce global emissions by at least 80% by 2050 on 1990 levels (am pretty sure CMPCC says 95% globally by 2050) Close loopholes in international accounting Agree equitable effort sharing approach on CBDR and Greenhouse Development Rights Framework (poor have the right to develop). Rich agree on 2CP asap and should reduce more than 40% by 2020 on 1990 levels. (pretty sure CMPCC says 50% by 2017 so these demands could be more ambitious) ECO 7 October 2011 Panama: The gigatonne gap, which negotiators have left largely untouched in Bangkok, Bonn and again in Panama, is now up to the ministers to pick up. First step is to acknowledge the gap and resolve to sort it out. Second move to higher end of pledges. E.g. USA and Canada pathetic pledges that neither of which is planning to reduce their emissions much below their 1990 levels. Ie not wanting to actually reduce emissions below 1990 levels which is the base year for everything!

Unlocking the negotiations

Finance flowing and long-term source through the Green Fund ECO 8 June: rich like to say US$100bn per year 2020 is conditional on meaningful mitigation by developed countries. Daw: Yeah but if you gave them the money then they could actually reduce, or do rich not want to give money to China etc? Innovative mechanisms for public climate finance (Trocaire report) Raising finance from shipping and aviation: Potentially US$24bn a year. Stop fossil fuels subsidies: Estimated US$60-100bn a year. Use for renewable and adaptation. Selling, auctioning emission allowances to pollute. Financial transaction tax (FTT): Poential US$650 bn a year.

Subsidiary bodies progress on Adaptation, REDD and MRV

Difference between KP legally binding commitments and pledge and review system

7 KP: Legally binding agreements, top-down science-based approach to emissions targets while respecting Convention principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Pledge and review: Voluntary commitments. No way to check if these pollution controls are in line with science and no way to check if implemented. Importance of aggregate commitments: I think this is crucial because it all has to be line with science. Otherwise each country can make individual targets but if they do not add up to what is demanded by science then it aint good enough. The other factor is to work out the aggregate reduction needed in line with science to work out equity of who should reduce by what.

Kyoto mechanisms
Carbon offsetting through Clean Development Mechanism Joint Implementation Emissions Trading

Clean Development Mechanism Trocaire report and CDM Africa: CDM is a market-based instrument under KP that allows countries and entities with emissions reduction targets to invest in emissions reductions projects or absorbtion of CO2 in developing countries and count there towards their own targets. The CDM is thus an offsetting mechanism. Could be called a responsibility avoidance mechanism. Supporters of CDM justify it by saying reductions are reductions regardless of where. But cos of low reductions commitments if rich use this for their domestic effort it shifts responsibility for global mitigation to poor. Also ineffective because will not be enough to reduce by IPCC goal of 25-40% by 2020. Yes poor need finance and technology but this must be within the context of a global emissions cap and scientifically good targets for rich. Human rights abuses in CDM projects e.g. Aguan Valley in Honduras. Security forces contracted by palm oil producer in Honduras murder 5 people. CDM Africa: Increasing pressure for CDM tree plantation projects and biofuels. Also proposals within negotiations to broaden CDM projects to include GM crops and biochar (new hype,being promoted as a means of geoengineering the climate by burying charcoal, could lead to more land grabs). This will all increase already high level of land grabs Reuters article: Another carbon instrument that can be bought and sold and counted towards meeting Kyoto targets is the Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credit. CERs can be earned via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows a country to implement an emissions reduction project in developing countries. China has been the biggest beneficiary of the CDMs.

Carbon markets

8 Trocaire report: Carbon markets created as a cost-effective way to act. Many actors who want to expand existing and create new markets under a new climate agreement. Trocaire partners says they are not a solution and instead want to profit from climate crisis. Like CDM finance flows via this or similar mechanisms are essentially proxies for emission reductions in developed countries. There is double-counting when a rich country includes this in their records of their reductions of emissions. NB/ Private investment flows much bigger than public investment. CDM Africa: Carbon offsets shift responsibility; affect local communities; do not lead to domestic reductions in the North; While cap and trade in theory limits the availability of pollution permits, offset projects are a license to print more.

Kyoto Protocol loopholes

Emissions reductions should be domestic LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry. Force Majeure Carry over (AAUs, hot air) Double counting CAN expectations for Durban (ECO 10 June): Close loopholes. Developed countries cannot pretend that their targets have meaning whilst they keep alive the loophole potential to almost completely wipeout any emissions reductions through dodgy LULUCF accounting and the hot air of surplus AAUs. ECO 13 June 2011: Close of the loopholes such as bogus LULUCF projections or rules to keep hot air (AAUs) in the system.

LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry

ECO 7 June: Not good enough for A1 to hide behind not having quality data on LULUCF as an excuse to not reveal how much emissions are from LULUCF. Under current LULUCF proposals countries can choose which land use activities under article 3.4 of KP they want to account for. WHAT??? How can they just choose so it looks like there are less emissions, what a crazy system! Instead it is essential we move to comprehensive accounting for emissions from land use. Parties say not able to manage and monitor = emissions from the land use sector remain hidden from Parties accounts = they can increase without anyone knowing and cant penalise them for this. Getting the data right is down to political will e.g. look at MRV in REDD+. Concerns over loopholes. What are they? Non-accounting of emissions. Definition in glossary of ARD activities is: afforestation, reforestation, deforestation. These are the three land-use change and forestry activities which are included in Article 3.3 of KP. On the agenda for Bonn June 2011 it says

9 The CMP, by its decision 2/CMP.6, requested the AWG-KP to continue its consideration of definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines relating to land use, land-use change and forestry activities under the KP for application in the 2CP So basically LULUCF is still to be defined. Is it being applied in the 1CP? Or is it only for the 2CP? In the glossary it says net changes resulting from these activities are allowed to be used by Parties to meet GHG obligations in 1CP (they are required in the 2CP). By the same decision, the CMP also requested the AWG-KP to consider, in time for the possible inclusion in the 2CP of the KP, if appropriate, whether a cap should be applied to emissions and removals from forest management and how extraordinary occurrences (so-called force majeure) whose severity is beyond the control of, and not materially influenced by, a Party can be addressed. ECO 11 June 2011 Bonn: The question remains; which LULUCF rules are we talking about? These rules for the 2CP have not yet been decided. There needs to be much greater transparency regarding assumptions Parties are using in their LULUCF accounting, there needs to be common methodologies. Colombia made suggestion that A1 should submit tables showing what their commitments would be under different accounting options. It is impossible to make informed decisions on targets until it is clear what rules underpin them. Definition of Force Majeure: An irresistible force or compulsion that will excuse a party from fulfilling his part of a contract. ENB 9 June: In KP discussions Vice Chair (Senegal) highlighted need for more clarity on LULUCF force majeure. Switzerland said his country supports the ability to leave force majeure events out of accounting, and clarified they should be defined as single large events that are outside the control of parties. He noted for improvement of force majeure methodology. Australia said force majeure is key to creating incentives to include in the land sector. What does this mean? Creating incentives for there not be to massive forest fires. ECO 17 June Bonn: Parties need to shift from talking about the role of LULUCF rules as a large loophole in the KP, to agreeing on a decision on an accounting system common across all developed countries that has environmental integrity (does this mean based on science?), and that captures the substantial missing emissions from bioenergy (??) in Durban.

ECO 1 October Panama demands:

10 Panama can and must reach agreements on closing the loopholes. The recent Review of proposals on forest management under LULUCF clarifies the size of the forestry loophole. Now, Parties must adopt forest management reference levels that are comparable and that dont significantly undermine Annex I Party targets. Overall, LULUCF rules should encourage Parties to achieve ambitious mitigation from land and forests. ECO 2 October Panama: Changing the language of Force Majeure: Parties dont want to have to account for forestry emissions not caused by humans, like wildfires, for example. Fair enough you might say, but this is being used as another attempt to hide emissions. Until recently, only events classified as force majeure - large-scale events beyond the control of Parties - would be excluded. However, the language of force majeure has now been dropped in favour of the less specific natural disturbance. Whether its called natural disturbance or force majeure, the CAN view is that any mechanism agreed in the LULUCF rules must transparently and conservatively factor out emissions and removals from extraordinary natural disturbances only. So what the heck does that mean? Extraordinary has to be defined. And its definition shouldnt be wildly at odds with a plain language meaning of, well, extraordinary. Common sense suggests that it should only be used for statistically extremely rare events and the same provisions for natural disturbance should be consistent for all Parties. It also means you cant hide just any (or all) of your debits. And it means you shouldnt hide emissions if they come from stuff you did (like harvesting, or salvage logging). Because its natural disturbance, remember? It means you need to really clearly say where, why, and how much you are calling natural disturbance (i.e. show your work!) It means that you have to treat natural disturbances in exactly the same way in your baseline as you do in the commitment period youre accounting emissions. Finally, it means you have to be able to measure them really well, and that requires high quality data. So in short, a natural disturbance mechanism for LULUCF has to retain the common sense meaning of force majeure. ECO 7 October 2011 Panama: LULUCF has been suffering from a variety of ailments but now it looks in danger of getting FLU. The Flexible Land Use proposal, being heavily marketed by New Zealand, allows countries to cut down trees and replant them somewhere else, but instead of counting this as deforestation and reforestation and counting the emissions accordingly, it brings this under forest management rules the ones that allow countries not to account for substantial increases in logging emissions compared to historical levels.

Carry over (AAUs, hot air) ECO 17 June Bonn: Rules are needed to minimise environmental damage from KP hot air. These emissions can only serve to increase warming and so are inherently in conflict with avoiding dangerous climate change. ECO 1 October Panama demands: On carry-forward of AAUs, Parties must eliminate the risk of hot air undermining the environmental integrity of future reduction commitments.

11 Double counting Trocaire report: Like CDM finance flows via this or similar mechanisms are essentially proxies for emission reductions in developed countries. There is double-counting when a rich country includes this in their records of their reductions of emissions. Reuters article: Last week, EU Commission officials in Brussels said Durban should focus on closing loopholes in such mechanisms that should not be carried over into a second commitment period. The EU ETS is the biggest carbon market, on which EU Allowances, or EUAs, are traded. Under the scheme, the amount of carbon utilities and heavy industry can produce is fixed. Companies that produce above the prescribed limit can buy extra carbon credits, while those who pump less carbon than their cap are allowed to trade their surplus. At government level, nations are entitled to produce a certain level of emissions, known as assigned amounts. Those who do not produce up to their limit have Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to spare, which they can sell to countries that have produced more carbon than their entitlement as a way of still meeting their Kyoto commitments. Following industrial collapse, some nations, such as Russia, have huge stockpiles of AAUs.

New market mechanisms

Trocaire report: Prevent the use of flexible mechanisms that shift responsibility for mitigation in agriculture to developing countries Concerns are being raised over moves to establish new means to link agriculture to carbon market mechanisms: sale of credits for carbon stored in soils. Large agribusiness most likely to attract this investment.

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Parties positions on future of Kyoto Protocol (mainly from start of Bonn June 2011 talks)
European Union: (Bonn) said committing to a 2CP was a very difficult decision and could only consider such a commitment if its conditions are met saying all major economies need to take ambitious actions. Wants to continue exploring political questions. Not enough to sort 2CP to prevent 2dC. It said spinoff groups are need to continue working on the rules without delay...and political questions for Ministers. So essentially this is pressure to work on the rules in parallel to solving the political questions whereas G77 etc say large political questions need to be dealt with (ie. Who rich countries will continue 2CP) first before talk rules. August: Ben Garside Point Carbon news: Officials from the bloc's member states will in the next few weeks discuss whether to formally back a plan to extend the life of the 1997 climate treaty, on condition it would expire in 2018 and be replaced with a single global pact that includes capping all major nations' emissions. "We see there are a lot of parties that want to maintain the Kyoto Protocol and its rules-based system: maybe it's possible to preserve the rules, but not ratify (a second period)," said one senior EU negotiator who requested anonymity. Umbrella Group (USA, Australia, Japan, Russia, Canada etc): Wants a new agreement to replace KP cos only cover 27% global emissions. KP alone will never be effective, so an agreement with all major economies is needed. Wants to keep elements: quantitative commitments, MRV and flexible mechanisms. Progress still possible to improve and enhance (what does this mean??!!!) KP rules to implement Cancun Agreements, and moving towards a new treaty. United States: Want it replaced by a system of voluntary pledges by developed countries, while developing countries are also pressed to take on more commitments (such as pledges and strict reporting on actions taken) than previously. Japan: Does not want to continue with a 2CP Canada: Does not want to continue with a 2CP Russia: Does not want to continue with a 2CP PNG on behalf of Coalition Rainforest Nations: REDD+ should be in KP. LULUCF and AAUs loopholes should be closed. Mexico for Environment Integrity Group: Strengthen A1 commitments. No gap. It urged for the inter-linkage between the two negotiating tracks to be duly accounted for in the negotiations. (Keep them separate!)

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G77+China: Remember there are tensions between big and small countries within G77. Concern slow progress of talks and attempt to undermine KP as key part of climate regime. Stressed need to avoid gap commitment periods AND overcome wide gap between A1 pledges and what is required. Historical responsibilities cannot be disregarded. Impacts being felt now in poor countries. Political will for a 2CP is key for technical issues (the rules) to go forward. A 2CP must be reached as part of a balanced and comprehensive outcome in Durban. So basically there has to be a 2CP for anything else to happen. ALBA: Individual and aggregate targets central to mitigation. Cancun a step backward. Climate regime cannot be a weaker, voluntary regime. Bolivia: CBDR and individual and aggregate targets must be starting point for any agreements on mitigation. Cancun step backwards. Durban last chance to avoid gap. Annex 1 must assume commitments to stabilize temperatures to 11.5dC. LDCs: 2CP must be decided in Durban. Disappointed in three Parties (Japan, Canada, Russia) and say 1.5degrees might have already been crossed so not time for delay. No room for a pledge and review system. Need to focus discussions with those Parties who actually want to be part of 2CP. There should be no conditionalities in order to advance with 2CP. Legal group should discuss to avoid gap. AOSIS: Finish work asap to avoid gap. Durban should finalise 2CP and lock in emissions reductions numbers. Position of limit temperature increase 1.5dC. No to pledge and review system. Base year legally of 1990 part of two track outcome. Need to close loopholes of LULUCF, surplus assigned amount units (AAUs), improve market mechanisms (how??!!!) and include new gases (I think this is methodological issues in KP. Check which articles).(I think this is a new proposal, see ECO 8 June) Grenada proposed working only with Parties who express willingness to enter 2CP; if conditions met for Parties to enter 2CP; agree on timetable and process for political decision up to Durban; progress as much as possible on technical issues so that outstanding political issues can be dealt with in Durban (yeah but if you start on rules then EU and Umbrella will push for markets all the time without making any other commitments??); establish a spinoff group on legal issues to see options available to avoid a gap. Check TWN update on this group number 15. Africa Group: Decried lack of political will. Unacceptable to have no legally binding instrument. Most visible obstacle is lack of political will Annex 1 to meet legal obligations under KP. Rich must reduce 40% by 2017 and 95% by 2050 based on 1990 levels. Two separate negotiating tracks. Should not use AWG-LCA

14 to delay progress in KP. Strongly opposed attempts to link technical and political decisions under AWG-KP in order to create a gap between 1CP and 2CP (this is different from AOSIS position who want to start work on rules. I dont understand what they mean though. How would linking political and technical decisions lead to a gap? Because Annex 1 just work on rules and not take political decision?) Arab Group: Must be 2CP in Durban to avoid gap. Criticised some Parties for attempt to avoid 2CP by imposing conditions. KP most important legal instrument that exists. Key to climate regime.

Progress on KP negotiations since Cancun

Cancun December 2010: Recalling Article 3.9 of KP Annex 1 commitments for subsequent periods. Initiate consideration of such commitments at least 7 years before end 1CP December 2012. Recognising Annex 1 should continue to take lead Recognising IPCC 2007 4assesReport indicates that to achieve lowest levels A1 as a group (aggregately) reduce emissions range of 25-40% by 2020 at 1990 levels through means that may be available (I think these is Kyoto mechanisms carbon markets and CDM). Decisions adopted: 1) Agrees AWG-KP shall aim to complete its work as early as possible to avoid gap 4) Urges A1 Parties to raise the level of ambition...to reduce aggregate GHG in line with IPCC 4AS (25-40% by 2020)...and taking into account the quantitative implications of LULUCF, emissions trading, project based mechanisms (CDM?) and carry-over of units from 1CP to 2CP (hot air from EIT?). 5) Agrees that further work is needed to convert emissions reductions targets to quantified economy-wide limitation or reductions commitments (QELROs these are in Annex B of KP. They are for rich countries and are 92% or above. I think 1990 baseline). 6) Also agrees that: a) In 2CP base year shall be 1990. In addition, a reference year may be used by a Party on an optional basis for its own purposes to express QELROs...that is not internationally binding under the KP (So 1990 is the base year but a Party can use other reference just for itself? Check Pablo Soln arguments on why Bolivia no sign Cancun agreements on CiF. b) Emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms (CDM?) under KP shall continue to be available to A1 Parties to meet their emissions reductions objectives (QELROs). c) LULUCF shall continue to be available to A1 to meet their emissions reductions objectives (QELROs).

15 e) Further work on the consideration of information on the potential environmental, economic and social consequences of policies and measures available to Annex 1. Decision 2/CMP.6 The Cancun Agreements: Land use, land-use change and forestry 2) Agrees the definition of forest, afforestation, reforestation, deforestation etc shall be the same as in 1CP. 3) Requests AWG-KP to consider, in time for possible inclusion in the 2CP, if appropriate whether a cap should be applied to emissions and removals from forest management and how extraordinary circumstances (called force majeure) whose severity is beyond the control of, and not materially influenced by, a Party can be addressed. 7) Also requests AWG-KP continue its consideration of definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines related to LULUCF by Annex 1 under KP for application in 2CP. Decision 5/CMP.6 Report of the Adaptation Fund Board 1) World Bank continue as interim trustee until CMP 9 (I think so, in about 3 years) 6) Encourage Annex 1 to provide funding which will be additional to the share of proceeds from CDM project activities Review of the Adaptation Fund will be presented in Durban. Decision 10/CMP.6 Supplementary information incorporated in national communications submitted in accordance with Article 7.2 of KP Secretariat will compile info from 5th Annex 1 national communications for consideration in Durban. Decision 11/CMP.6 Capacity Building Requests SBI hold 2nd comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity building framework in developing countries Annex Draft decision - /CMP.6 Capacity-building under the KP Role (and importance) of private sector; CDM in Africa; noting key needs remain for LDCs, Africa, small islands to effectively participate in CDM; consultations with stakeholders on CDM; http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/dec/21/bolivia-opposecancun-climate-agreement?INTCMP=SRCH Why Bolivia stood alone in opposing the Cancn climate agreement Diplomacy is traditionally a game of alliance and compromise. Yet in the early hours of Saturday 11 December, Bolivia found itself alone against the world: the only nation to oppose the outcome of the United Nations climate change summit in Cancn. We were accused of being obstructionist, obstinate and unrealistic. Yet in truth we did not feel alone, nor are we offended by the attacks. Instead, we feel an enormous obligation to set aside diplomacy and tell the truth. The "Cancn accord" was presented late Friday afternoon, and we were given two hours to read it. Despite pressure to sign something anything

16 immediately, Bolivia requested further deliberations. This text, we said, would be a sad conclusion to the negotiations. After we were denied any opportunity to discuss the text, despite a lack of consensus, the president banged her gavel to approve the document. Many commentators have called the Cancn accord a "step in the right direction." We disagree: it is a giant step backward. The text replaces binding mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions with voluntary pledges that are wholly insufficient. These pledges contradict the stated goal of capping the rise in temperature at 2C, instead guiding us to 4C or more. The text is full of loopholes for polluters, opportunities for expanding carbon markets and similar mechanisms like the forestry scheme Redd that reduce the obligation of developed countries to act. Bolivia may have been the only country to speak out against these failures, but several negotiators told us privately that they support us. Anyone who has seen the science on climate change knows that the Cancn agreement was irresponsible. In addition to having science on our side, another reason we did not feel alone in opposing an unbalanced text at Cancn is that we received thousands of messages of support from the women, men, and young people of the social movements that have stood by us and have helped inform our position. It is out of respect for them, and humanity as a whole, that we feel a deep responsibility not to sign off on any paper that threatens millions of lives. Some claim the best thing is to be realistic and recognise that at the very least the agreement saved the UN process from collapse. Unfortunately, a convenient realism has become all that powerful nations are willing to offer, while they ignore scientists' exhortations to act radically now. The UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has found that in order to have a 50% chance of keeping the rise in temperature below 1.5C, emissions must peak by 2015. The attempt in Cancn to delay critical decisions until next year could have catastrophic consequences. Bolivia is a small country. This means we are among the nations most vulnerable to climate change, but with the least responsibility for causing the problem. Studies indicate that our capital city of La Paz could become a desert within 30 years. What we do have is the privilege of being able to stand by our ideals, of not letting partisan agendas obscure our principal aim: defending life and Earth. We are not desperate for money. Last year, after we rejected the Copenhagen accord, the US cut our climate funding. We are not beholden to the World Bank, as so many of us in the south once were. We can act freely and do what is right. Bolivia may have acted unusually by upsetting the established way of dealing with things. But we face an unprecedented crisis, and false victories won't save the planet. False agreements will not guarantee a future for our children. We all must stand up and demand a climate agreement strong enough to match the crisis we confront. Pablo Solon is the ambassador of the Plurinational State of Bolivia to the United Nations.

Bangkok April 2011:

17 Parties focused on key policy issues hindering progress under the KP track. Main issues discussed: a) Recognition of the need for political clarity on the future of the KP and 2CP b) Better understanding of relationship between rules and targets c) Broad agreement that rules must ensure environmental integrity (what does this mean? That the rules ensure stop climate change?) d) General recognition that both rules and targets needed to finalise commitments annex 1 for 2CP e) Broad support for usefulness of analysis on how choices of rules could affect ambition levels of pledges by Parties (I think this is of all Parties ie. Annex 1 and non-annex 1). (23 May 2011: AWG-KP Chair scenario note)

Bonn June 2011: Most of the time spent on agenda item 3 Consideration of further commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. Was there a legal group discussed? legal options to address a possible gap between 1CP and 2CP Article by Institute for Security Studies: In essence, the debate on just the legal form of a new treaty may detract from the real issues of who should be taking responsibility for emission reductions and how best to make sure that these reductions are committed to. Rather, the debates focus on states shying away from their responsibilities by the increased use of market mechanisms. Dario: So just talking about legal form is an excuse to not look at historical responsibility. It is a distraction.

ECO 6 June. Expectations for Bonn Concrete steps to close gigatonne gap. Currently pledges of A1 are far below 25-40% (recommended by IPCC 4AS) Rich and poor clarify pledges, including assumptions on LULUCF, AAU carry over (hot air from EIT) and carbon offsets, so we know how much will really be reduced to know how many GHGs there will be in the atmosphere in 2020. Increase ambition on LULCF by incentivising reductions below historic levels. Address bioenergy/biofuels emissions accounting loopholes to ensure all bioenergy emissions are accounted for in either the energy or LULUCF sector. TWN 8 June: Developing countries form solid front to advance Kyoto Protocol See full opening positions in country positions above. G77+China, Africa Group, LDCs, ALBA, Arab countries insisted Durban finalise negotiations on 2CP. They warned that failure to agree 2CP in Durban would put

18 international climate regime at risk. Poor already suffering negative impacts CC, this would get worse. Poor also insist rich should stop putting conditions on committing to 2CP. And if this is what will happen then negotiations should only continue with those rich who will really commit to 2CP (show willingness, disposicin). ENB 9 June: Macey highlighted two areas for consideration 1) Clarification of conditionalities and linkages made by A1 with respect to 2CP under KP. So to fully understand what conditions A1 are putting on continuing with 2CP. But by making this an issue is this accepting that they are allowed to put conditions? They are not allowed to do so!!! The KP is a legally binding treaty ratified in their country, they cant now put conditions, or can they? What does it say in KP article 3.9? It just says consideration of commitments, not what kind they are. 2) Conversion of A1 pledges into QELROs. What is this? Making their pledges real and in line with science? Bolivia, DRC, China, Argentina etc proposed looking into conditions and if met of A1 who actually want to continue 2CP before making political decisions. Bolivia call increased ambition. European Union support discuss elements of balanced package for Durban incl. role of 2CP and what non-A1 do. New Zealand highlighted conditions including: comparability and coherence with AWG-LCA track; an accounting structure (LULUCF? Think so); road to a 2dC deal including all major emitters. New Zealand, Russia and Japan opposed excluding certain Parties from discussions. Bastards!!! It gets better! ENB Bonn Summary page 55 Japan and Canada underscored the value they contribute to discussions give their experience implementing the KP. Are you fucking kidding me?!! Canada is going to increase its emissions and there are the tar sands. What a bunch of fucking jokers. Norway wanted clarity on a global legally binding commitment under AWG-LCA, address surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) and clarity on LULUCF rules. Strong push for Cancun Agreements by Russia, Australia and Canada: propose formalizing pledges in Cancun Agreements. Russia said need to clarify rules on flexibility mechanisms (future of carbon markets? Must be) and LULUCF. Canada said will not commit to 2CP and wants One agreement building on Cancun Agreements. But said KP many valuable lessons market mechanisms and LULUCF for shaping climate regime. They want to keep market mechanisms and move to voluntary pledge and review. Tuvalu emphasised discussion in KP cannot lead to conclusions in other processes (what does this mean? In the AWG-LCA track? Is Tuvalu saying work in KP should not be held up or dependent on LCA?) Vice Chair Diouf Sarr (Senegal) then tries to influence the discussion by asking parties to discuss how to move forward on issues of transforming pledges into QELROs, surplus AAUs and environmental integrity (?)

19 Saint Lucia and Tuvalu said the political context is very important and that such technical (rules) discussion was premature. Pushing back discussion to political questions before rules. Switzerland said technical issues need to be addressed and political issues to the political level (Ministers?). Trying to do both at same time, is this a compromise position or supporting A1? New Zealand said ideal outcome would be one legally binding agreement with all major emitters. But an interim arrangement could be for a 2CP under Protocol and a parallel agreement with other major emitters (would this include the USA you fucking nob heads?) Bolivia said a level of ambition that would lead to a 4dC world is unacceptable. Vice Chair says more clarity needed on Force Majeure Saint Lucia with Tuvalu expressed concern about taking up technical issues without further political clarity Switzerland says force majeure should not be included in accounting EU with Norway and Switzerland says better to establish spin-off groups to start discussing rules while continuing political discussions. This is opposed by Colombia (interesting!), Saint Lucia, Tuvalu, Bolivia, Argentina and Saudi Arabia who say must sort out political questions first.

ENB 13 June:
Brazil for G77+China said importance of political clarity from A1 to know if will commit to 2CP. Tuvalu and EU agree no talk about legal matters bilaterally but in spin-off group. Tuvalu said good to have spin-off groups but on the condition that the technical decisions undertaken in these groups relate only to 2CP. Why did he say this? So that yes you can discuss the rules but only if it is for a 2CP ie, not for a new ONE agreement. South Africa said (and supported by many parties) that many A1 willing to discuss 2CP so there should be spin-off group but on understanding discussions strictly follow AWG-KP mandate. (is this a move to get negotiations going but at the same time to push just AWG-KP forward and no other type of ONE agreement?). Chair Macey says lets start spin-off groups on work programme of AWG-KP. And proposed covering various parts of the Chairs revised proposal: Numbers and protocol amendments (article 3); LULUCF; Flexibility mechanisms; basket of methodological issues (inclusion of current and new GHGs see below) potential consequences of response measures (Saudi Arabia was nutting on about in Bonn: ECO 17 June spoof memo from negotiations to Riyadh! Drop in oil prices. In discussion on loss and damage in Nairobi work programme include loss and damage to our oil reserves due to the adverse effects due to the implementation of response measures). For more info see page 45 of ENB Bonn summary document. ECO 13 June 2011 Bonn:

20 Success in Durban is securing a 2CP of KP. Intrinsically linked is the binding outcome under the LCA. Our ultimate objective must be a legally binding architecture which is fair and ambitious. Aim must be for emissions to peak in 2015 and global reduction of 80% by 2050. Three areas to address the gigatonne gap: clarifying assumptions on rich net domestic emissions reductions in 2020 resulting from current pledges this would clarify what A1 commitments really mean; closing loopholes; move beyond high end of current pledges...to really limit temp rise to 1.5 or 2dC. ENB 15 June 2011 Bonn: Numbers and amendments: Grenada (facilitator) said aggregate A1 emissions reductions and individual targets and their conversion into QELROs (what is this conversion business all about? EU says below is about defining the rules. ECO 17 June says update pledges free of loopholes ready to turn them into QELROs) are political issues (interesting he says this, does this mean a decision has to be made on these political questions before getting down to the nitty and gritty rules?). Flexibility mechanisms: Portugal (facilitator) said little success on agreeing on a text. Issue to be addressed is whether nuclear energy can be under CDM or Joint Implementation.

Also to consider the establishment of new

mechanisms (oh my god, not more carbon markets!!!!).

Basked of methodological issues: Vice Chair Diouf Sarr: noted differing views on the common metrics to calculate CO2 equivalence of greenhouse gases, including which global warming potential values should be used. On new GHGs she notes diverging views but growing convergence on including of nitrogen trifluoride, new hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs). Bolivia said discussions should focus on reducing the gap between pledges and what is required. Australia and Canada say regime should include all major emitters European Union reiterated that translation of pledges into QELROs depends on defining applicable rules. Said progress on market mechanisms vital (hhmmmm I wonder why EU so interested in this?!!) Said a decision on 2CP would be in a context (or is conditional on EU? What are you really saying bruv?) on progress on MRV, ICA and including all major emitters (is this AWG-LCA?) Tuvalu underscored the importance of discussing rules in the context of a 2CP rather than as an information base for negotiations in other tracks (so he said this because otherwise the rich will take what they like from the KP and whack it into the LCA for their lovely ONE agreement, this is the danger). ECO 15 June 2011 Bonn: Bridge the Gap bracketing doesnt work: On KP Parties have bracketed the reference to the fact that some countries will need to do more to fulfil their commitments, Parties are on track to meet the aggregate 5% target albeit with some hot air and creative accounting (e.g. Canada) So the aggregate goal, which is crucial, we are talking about all together A1, on target but proper aprovechando those Kyoto mechanisms!!!

21

ECO 17 June 2011. Last day in Bonn: Rich must acknowledge there is no alternative to a 2CP. Criticise Japan, Canada and Russia. European Union, Australia, NZ, Norway and Switzerland put conditions. They must go high end pledges. Rich (incl. USA) need decarbonize goal by 2050 and reduce more than 40% by 2020 based on common accounting rules and enhanced national communications and biennial reporting. Poor need to clarify more what they do to reduce gigatonne gap. Green Climate Fund. Durban must launch negotiations on a complementary legally binding agreement to Kyoto. Should include Bali Action Plan such as comparable mitigation commitments by USA, more finance for poor and poor action. European Union must move to a 2CP and not be scared that it is alone. It is not about waiting for others to act first. Remember 40 billion Euros of European Energy Consumers money used to purchase international carbon credits (!!!!! That is an incentive for the EU to continue with the carbon markets and CDM!!!). Earth Negotiations Bulletin summary of Bonn June 2011 p54-57: Kyoto Protocol On a Durban package, the EU said it would be useful to define elements of the package, the role of the second commitment period in that package and what contributions non-Annex I parties would make to the package. Saint Lucia called for confirmation that Annex I parties mitigation commitments will be taken in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. Protocol Amendments/Numbers: The spin-off group on Protocol amendments and numbers considered outstanding issues in Chapter I of the Chairs revised proposal (FCCC/KP/ AWG/2010/18/Add.1). During discussions, parties addressed the following issues: aggregate and individual emission reduction targets; carryover of surplus AAUs; and how to address consequential amendments to the Kyoto Protocol. On Annex I aggregate and individual targets, it was noted that this issue is primarily political in nature, but that technical issues, including the length of commitment period, remain unresolved. Divergent issues on the length of the commitment period remained and discussions on this issue will continue. On carryover of surplus AAUs, parties discussed various options, based on a presentation by the Secretariat, including: leaving provisions on carryover unchanged; capping carryover to a specific percentage, restricting use of surplus AAUs to domestic compliance, and/or using high-trend adjustment; and abolishing carryover. Discussions on this issue will continue. On addressing consequential amendments to the Kyoto Protocol (contained in option B of the text), widespread disagreement persisted on whether discussion of these issues is within the mandate of the AWG-KP. A

22 number of parties emphasized that a second commitment period is contingent on consideration of these issues. Dario: why so much beef on this? Surely it is the mandate of AWG-KP in accordance with article 3.9?? LULUCF: Issues related to LULUCF were addressed in four meetings of the spinoff group. Discussions were based on Chapter II of the revised proposal by the Chair (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/18/Add.1). On 17 June, the co-facilitators reported to the AWG-KP contact group that frank discussions have taken place on the treatment of emissions and removals from disturbances/force majeure, including criteria that have to be met to apply it. They noted that several parties suggested revising the definition of force majeure. They noted that while there are no proposals for revised text on this issue, some believe parties are closer to arriving at a common understanding. On the flexibility mechanisms, the EU and New Zealand emphasized that even in the absence of a second commitment period, demand for carbon credits will continue, with the EU highlighting its legislation to ensure the continuity of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme beyond 2012. The EU worried that if access to CDM credits is made conditional on second commitment period targets, parties will be forced to create their own rules through bilateral deals, while New Zealand emphasized the role of the CDM in promoting sustainable development and technology transfer in non-Annex I countries. Canada and Japan highlighted parallel discussions on market mechanisms under the AWG-LCA. Saint Lucia, Algeria, Tuvalu, Brazil, China, India and Bolivia underscored that access to the flexibility mechanisms, including Joint Implementation and the CDM, would be difficult to agree to in the absence of a second commitment period. Flexibility mechanisms: Discussions in the informal group on the flexibility mechanisms were based on Chapter III (emissions trading and the project-based mechanisms) of the Chairs revised proposal (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/18/Add.1). The discussions focused on three main issues: the essential things parties want to achieve; how work on the text should progress; and whether some of the existing proposals can be removed. Regarding the use of CERs from project activities in certain host countries and co-benefits of CDM projects, parties considered whether these issues could be transferred to the COP/MOP for its consideration under the agenda item on further guidance to the CDM Executive Board. Consultations were also undertaken to try to streamline the text on the use of CERs from project activities in certain host countries. Parties also addressed all other issues in Chapter III, including discount factors, the share of proceeds for the Adaptation Fund, Joint Implementation, emissions trading, new market mechanisms and supplementarity. Parties were unable to reach agreement on any of the issues or streamline the text, and as no consensus was reached, discussions will continue based on the Chairs revised proposal. Basket of methodological issues: The spin-off group on the basket of methodological issues considered outstanding technical issues in Chapter IV of the Chairs revised proposal (FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/18/Add.1). Following discussions on new GHGs and common metrics, a drafting group, facilitated by New Zealand, convened to streamline text on these issues. During the drafting group progress was made towards consensus on a proposed package, which could be reached if parties agree to include nitrogen trifluoride

23 as a new GHG during the second commitment period. Consensus was reached on inclusion of species of hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons listed in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) and on sulphur hexafluoride. Progress was also made in streamlining the text on common metrics. Discussions on these issues will continue at the resumed AWG-KP 16. Legal issues: This issue was addressed in informal consultations led by AWG-KP Vice-Chair Diouf Sarr and Gerhard Loibl (Austria), but no agreement was reached on whether to discuss consequential amendments under the Protocol in a legal options group. Response measures: The spin-off group on potential consequences considered outstanding technical issues remaining in Chapter V of the Chairs revised proposal (FCCC/KP/ AWG/2010/18/Add.1). Two options remain in the text on establishing a permanent forum or using existing channels to exchange information on potential consequences. CLOSING PLENARY: The AWG-KP closing plenary took place in the afternoon of 17 June. Chair Adrian Macey introduced the Chairs revised proposal (FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/ CRP.1). He reported: Chapter I (amendments and numbers) showed modest progress; Chapter II (LULUCF) made considerable progress, streamlining the text from 40 to 12 pages; Chapter III (flexibility mechanisms) showed little change; Chapter IV (basket of methodological issues) progressed with option A capturing constructive work on new GHGs and common metrics; and Chapter V (potential consequences) remains unchanged. Macey indicated that the format of having political discussions in a contact group with technical work in spin-off groups was successful. To achieve an outcome in Durban, he said clear progress must be made on: Annex I parties aggregate and individual emission reductions; the nature, content and applicability of rules for a second commitment period; aspects of the AWG-KPs relationship with the AWG-LCA; and resolution of wide disagreement on whether to address consequential amendments to the Kyoto Protocol. ENB analysis of Bonn meeting: There were agenda fights in SBI and SBSTA because this is what happened in Bangkok April 2011 cos of challenge of how to implement Cancun Agreements given Bolivia opposed them. Difficult to oversee sequential progress in each area of the negotiations so that outcomes in one area did not prejudge progress in others cos some Parties can put conditions on this. Will UNFCCC withstand the strain? 2CP fundamental in Durban otherwise it becomes a shell. Rich countries say progress in KP conditional on progress under LCA towards a legally binding framework that includes all major emitters. Japan, Canada and Russia do not want to participate, undermines KP. Poor say they should not be in discussions on 2CP if not interested.

24

Overall, expectations for the future of the Kyoto Protocol are low and some are wondering whether a Kyotinowith possible commitments from parties including the European Union, Norway, Switzerland and Icelandwould even make sense or whether it would be better to bury the Protocol in Durban. Most developing countries continue to stress its importance as a legal firewall that separates binding mitigation commitments by developed countries from voluntary mitigation ctions by developing countries. Those worried about the prominence of the bottom up pledge and review approach, advocated by the US, also see the value of preserving the topdown legal structure created by the Protocol during what they hope will be a transitional period. At this point, as one Kyoto proponent underscored, it is about saving the rules-based system and the institutions we have created over the past 14 years. The challenge faced by those who wish to see the Kyoto Protocol continue, albeit in a diminished form, is to move the debates far enough to meet two basic conditions. First, technical rules have to progress far enough to allow political decisions to be made in Durban. Second, in parallel, enough progress under the AWG-LCA, both on operationalizing the Cancun Agreements and on steps towards a legally-binding framework that includes all major emitters, to satisfy the conditions laid out by many Annex I parties. However, noting the recent press on the USs desire to have a legally-binding agreement within a decade, many wondered whether such statements would give enough reassurance to those interested in but not dedicated to a second commitment period. One seasoned observer, underscoring the enthusiasm displayed by the US for operationalizing the Cancun Agreements, worried that the US got the pledge and review system they desired and now there is little incentive to go any further. Will parties have made enough progress under both the AWGKP and AWG-LCA to agree to a second commitment period and make tangible steps towards a comprehensive global agreement? At this time, it must be said, considering the lack of real progress on mitigation and legal issues in Bonn, this appears to be very much in doubt.

Get this! Chairs new revised proposal (FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/CRP.1), got it. Print it!
FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/18/Add.1)

Conditions of A1 parties in Bonn: 8 June 2011 (ENB): Comparability and coherence with AWG-LCA track, clarity on a global legally binding commitment; Clarify rules on flexibility mechanisms (future of carbon markets?) An accounting structure (LULUCF? Must be); Address surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) Road to a 2dC deal including all major emitters. End of Bonn meeting ENB:

25 During discussions, parties (I think these are mainly from rich countries) highlighted various conditions, including: resolving technical rules, such as on LULUCF, market mechanisms, the basket of methodological issues and the carryover of surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs); comparability of efforts; deeper and broader access to international carbon markets; operationalizing the Cancun Agreements, including the MRV framework and international consultation and analysis (ICA); progress towards a global, comprehensive legally-binding agreement including all major emitters; and coherence with the AWG-LCA track. CAN expectations for Durban (ECO 10 June): On legal form Durban must ensure no gap in legally binding commitments. This means a 2CP of KP. Close gigatonne gap of between 5-9 gigatonnes. Rich must increase ambition. Move to top end pledges. More than 40% by 2020. Close loopholes. LULCUF accounting and AAUs. Poor countries need to also increase ambition and say how much more mitigation they can achieve if they receive support (ie. If they get the finance and technology as set out in the Convention from the rich). A delay or lack of ambition risks losing chance to keep global warming below 1.5dC. Without adequate mitigation, finance, technology and capacity building poor communities will suffer more from CC.

Panama October 2011: Point Carbon 8 October: Key political decisions, including the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, were left for environment ministers to tackle. Ministers are expected to sign off on the package at next month's U.N. climate summit in Durban, South Africa. Political issues (such as Kyoto Protocol) were unresolved, said Christiana Figueres. What is missing is the political questions that cannot be solved at this level of the negotiations, On Friday morning, the African Group, least developing countries and the antimarket ALBA bloc of eight Latin American countries joined forces to strengthen their calls for industrialized nations to agree to a second commitment period under Kyoto from 2013. The group said they would block the continuation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) - the U.N.-backed offset system that lets rich countries buy carbon credits from emission reduction projects in poorer countries - unless rich countries do not agree to a second round of cuts. The

26 group pointed specifically to the EU, whose member states rely on CDM credits to meet their domestic emission reduction targets. The EU will only consider the second commitment period because it wants the CDM, said Erika Duenas, head of Bolivias delegation. Bolivia said the bloc opposed the false solutions of the carbon market because they enable rich countries to evade their own obligations. Artur Runge-Metzger, head of the EU delegation, told journalists that he is confident the CDM will have a way forward after 2012 as part of the new legal framework, and that countries trying to block it will have the hard task of trying to convince other countries to do the same. On the CDM, negotiators will now present ministers with two options: either to allow the continuation of the mechanism or only permit countries that have signed up to Kyoto targets to use the credits. Earth Negotiations Bulletin Summary of Panama: Mind the emissions gap: still no clarity and plenty of disagreement Review adequacy of 2dC goal between 2013 and 2015. AOSIS say it should be on adequacy of long-term goal. Others say Cancun gives wider mandate to see implementation finance, technology etc. Rich want more MRV while poor say is it all about CBDR. Finance: G77 lobby hard for discussion on long term sources and EU finally offer olive branch. The reality is that without explicit agreement on finance that satisfies developing countries, it is going to be difficult to agree on anything else. TO MANDATE OR NOT As everybody knows, the Kyoto Protocols first commitment period is set to expire in 2012. Durban is supposed to be the last chance to agree on a second commitment period in order to avoid a gap, which would ensure that the package of rules developed under the Kyoto Protocol, including the implementation of flexibility mechanisms (CDM, Emissions Trading), will continue to operate seamlessly. However, agreement on a second commitment period appears to be more elusive than ever. Japan, Canada and the Russian Federation will not be on board for a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. The EUs position is that it wants a balanced deal that is going to put us on the road to a new global deal on climate action. The EU has said that it will agree to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, as long as delegates in Durban agree to a mandate for a path forward for a legally-binding instrument under the Convention, a position it sees as a major concession on its part since Bali. However, USA say time not ripe for mandate. At the same time, G-77/China members are also split on some of these fundamental issues. While all developing countries want to keep the Kyoto Protocol alive, they diverge regarding their views on a new agreement under the Convention. For example, AOSIS is very clear that it wants a legally-binding instrument and has presented a detailed proposal on possible elements for Protocol or other legally-binding agreement under the Convention. India and China, on the other hand, are not supportive of a mandate to negotiate a new agreement under the Convention. If there is no second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol this raises serious legal and institutional questions

27 concerning the continuity of the mechanisms under the Protocol, such as the CDM. FIGHT ABOUT WHETHER TO KEEP KYOTO MECHANISMS: There are those who maintain that the Kyoto mechanisms can continue because they have a double objective, namely to assist Annex I parties in meeting their emission reduction commitments as well as to assist developing countries in attaining sustainable development. However, others say that the raison dtre is to assist Annex I parties to meet their commitments and if there are no commitments under a second commitment period then the mechanisms cannot continue. In other words, there is no either/or: both conditions have to be satisfied. No one can predict the future or the outcome in Durban. Many elements that are intrinsically interwoven need to be addressed, such as the fate of a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. ECO 7 October 2011 Panama: ECO has been clear in its call for a three-part outcome in Durban: 1) adoption of a strong second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; 2) a mandate for negotiation of a more comprehensive and ambitious longerterm climate regime based on both scientific adequacy and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities; Dario: What does a mandate mean? Does it mean setting up a deal in the future or actually signing off on a deal? See part above where European Union says it wants a mandate. Think it means setting out how there would be ONE legally binding agreement in the future after the 2CP in 2018. 3) and a package of decisions facilitating near-term action on all four building blocks of the Bali Action Plan and implementation of the Cancun Agreements. International level agreement important but the best legally binding treaty instruments in the world dont amount to much without emission reduction ambition in line with the science and financial resources commensurate with the need. EU. Fair or not, the EU holds the key to the Durban outcome. If the EU does not come to Durban with the clear goal of adopting a second commitment period (not some fuzzy political commitment) the Kyoto Protocol will wither and die. On Thursday, the EU laid out a clear set of elements for negotiations over the longer-term treaty that would assure that a KP second commitment period is a bridge to a more comprehensive and ambitious legal framework. Dario: Hold on a sec, when you say a bridge do you mean to ONE agreement that is pledge and review? ECO truly appreciates that the European Union still supports the Kyoto Protocol (KP), and is heartened by the commitment of the EU to continue (what some might call) ranting about the importance of a legally binding regime. This week, ECO has been particularly pleased to see that the EU started to show some more readiness to accept a second commitment period of the KP. And ECO understands, from the EUs stated preference for a comprehensive legally binding outcome of the future framework, that the commitments under the Protocol are going to be kept legally binding.

28 Of particular concern to ECO is that some representatives from particular European countries favor other positions. Understandably it can be hard to make 28 mouths express the same, clear and coherent position but this is, indeed, urgently needed. ECO believes that the EU should fight harder to ensure that, in Durban, the KP will move into a legally binding second c ommi tme n t p e r i o d wi t h b r o a d participation and binding rules. How would anyone understand that the EU believes it would be easier to build a legally binding regime after abandoning the only legal building block we have? It is in the EUs, and the planets, own interest to ensure that its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol goes beyond a political declaration. Moreover, if the EU is really keen to get all countries to negotiate a legally binding outcome in the LCA, promoting a political commitment to the KP does not seem the best strategy. Increasing ambition means going up, not down. ECO 1 October Panama demands: Mitigation: Cancun Agreements, developed countries accepted aggregate level range of 25-40%. Even while this range does not guarantee that global temperature rise will stay below 2 degrees Celsius, current developed country emission reduction pledges will result in reductions of only 12-18% going down to -2% if currently existing and proposed loopholes are taken into account. ECO suggests four critical elements in the Durban mitigation package for developed countries: clarify what the net emissions would be based on current pledges and assumptions; close the loopholes; move to the high end of current pledges; and agree on a process to increase ambition beyond 40%, for adoption at COP18/CMP8. Kyoto Protocol: While some developed country Parties would prefer to overlook the KP or at best, make a 2CP conditional on what happens in the LCA over the next four years, it is essential that in Durban, we cement a second commitment period of the KP. The alternative a pledge and review world just wont cut it. Convention Mandate: Given the urgency of the climate catastrophe unfolding daily before our eyes, nothing less than the greatest level of commitment is needed from all parties. Therefore, in addition to preserving the Kyoto Protocol, Durban must agree that by 2015 at the latest, the commitments and actions of all Parties should be inscribed in legally binding instrument[s], whilst fully respecting the principles of the Convention. Dario: Yes but how does this demand affect the KP? You cant just demand all legally binding commitments by 2015 in parallel to the KP? The KP has to be the foundation surely? ECO 2 October Panama 2011: Global Emissions up by 5.8% in 2010 according to Netherlands Environmental Protection Agency. More coal. Also India and China growth. China also increase renewable. Kyoto Protocol: ECO has consistently reminded A1 that they committed to a second commitment period when they ratified Kyoto. Furthermore, ECO is dismayed that the countries that respectively put the Kyoto in the KP, brought it into force and started negotiations for its second commitment period Japan, Russia and Canada are behaving like petulant toddlers, hiding in the corner

29 rather than joining the Kyoto party. Meanwhile, other countries - the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and others - are expressing various degrees of lukewarmness about the KP second commitment period. Thus support from developing countries for a mandate for a legally binding agreement under the LCA, which ECO thinks needs to be in the form of a protocol or other appropriate legal instrument, is fundamental to the solution. Those that remain in the KP will at least maintain a solid legal framework with economy-wide targets and a strong common MRV and compliance system, even if their current targets are at woefully low levels. ECO 3 October Panama: The mandate Yesterday, ECO noted that there are three groups of countries in the legal form negotiations that each need to bring proposals to the table at Durban: the KP developed countries, the non-KP Annex I Parties and the developing countries. All the developed countries that have ratified their Annex B targets for the first commitment period should have their targets ready to plug and play for CP2. The non-KP Annex I Party[s] need to increase their ambition, be part of a common accounting system and MRV to bring forward the established KP systems - how else would the Bali Action Plans agreed comparability be achieved? Many are suggesting that we are facing a transitional period, where the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol keeps alive an architecture that, through Article 3.1 and other elements, keeps a science-based approach at the core of the global response to the climate threat. Through this post-2012 period, the elements of a new comprehensive legally binding agreement[s] needs to be developed. In ECOs view, this agreement needs to be in the form of a Protocol[s], or other such appropriate legal instrument, that respects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. However, we will not attain comprehensive legally binding agreement[s] equal to the challenge we face unless Parties find common cause that such an agreement is needed. Dario: There will be no way to finish the negotiations with a global deal if there is no agreement on what it should look like and contain. In ECOs view, in addition to KP Parties agreeing a second commitment period in Durban, all Parties must agree on a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument covering all Bali building blocks under the LCA. The necessary, vital and essential complement to agreeing the KP second commitment period in Durban will be Parties agreeing a mandate for a comprehensive legally binding agreement[s]. This mandate needs, at a minimum, to agree: - what the result of the negotiations will be, specifying that Parties are working towards a legally binding instrument with legally binding commitments - the end date (ECO would suggest 2015 would allow time for institution building and for experience of MRV to be enhanced) - the scope - the process, including forum - principles to guide the negotiations Without a mandate for the third period of the climate regime, we will again face a gap between commitments, but also in ambition, and the resulting sense of the world moving forward together to avoid the worst that an human-altered atmosphere can throw at us. Dario: I do not fully understand this mandate business but I think it is so that when the next CP of the KP ends in 2017 there is the start of work towards something. Because otherwise the discussions just continue and continue in

30 AWG LCA and there is no end result. I think calling for a mandate is pressuring for a result and the conclusion of the UNFCCC negotiations. This makes sense. The question is isnt this the mandate of AWG LCA anway? Which was meant to finish in Copenhagen and just gets extended. So why is it necessary for a mandate now? It is cos progress is stalling so much on this there has to be something to direct focus? ECO 4 October Panama: Accounting rules and level of ambition No lack of ideas to increase ambition. ECO cannot resist to line them up into four broad steps, as a service to the hurried negotiator and to help the upcoming next informal meeting today: Step 1 would seek full clarity on developed countries net domestic emissions in 2020 resulting from current pledges, based on assumptions on LULUCF accounting, AAU carry-over, or the use of carbon offsets. Step 2 would close the damn loopholes. For instance, LULUCF rules would use historic reference levels rather than some bogus projections into the future; AAU carry-over would be limited and no new hot air allowed to enter the system you get the picture. Step 3 would move developed countries to the high end of their pledges as a first step. Where needed, countries would clarify (a) what part of the conditions have been met so far and (b) what would fulfil l the remaining conditions. Step 4, developed countries would go beyond the high end of their current pledges to get them into the 25-40% IPCC range, and then (double-check with them if they are still up for 2C) to at least 40% cuts by 2020. Difficult? Ask Denmark. Accounting rules not just about transparency So what is the big deal around accounting? Cant Annex I countries just report what they are doing and be done with it? Well, while transparency and clarification are vital they just are not good enough to ensure a robust international climate regime. Common accounting rules will be necessary if emissions reductions are to be assessed in a comparable way a key objective of the Cancun Agreements. In addition, it will be very difficult to inform the periodic review if we do not have an accurate picture of emissions reductions. And last but not least, a lack of common accounting rules could lead to double counting of emissions reductions, confusion in the carbon market, incompleteness of coverage, and potential gaming. As the UNEP emissions gap report shows, accounting rules can directly affect the amount of emissions reductions achieved in the 2013-2020 period. We need to make sure that the IAR process is not only about clarification which is vitally important but also about the development of accounting rules. The environmental integrity of the regime depends upon it. There is so much we dont know about the pledges that have been put forward. What are the rules for LULUCF underlying pledges? What methodologies for offsets are being embraced? How is economy-wide being defined? What gases and sectors are included? How will double counting of emissions reductions be avoided? Without information on these and other issues, it will be difficult, if not entirely impossible, to accurately assess the targets in the International Assessment and Review (IAR) process. ECO 6 October Panama:

31 Difference between legal form and a political decision. While we recognize the often repeated line that form should follow function, we echo Colombias point that negotiators need some sense of where they are headed a political declaration is very different from a long-term binding regime. Terms of reference for the Review need to be finalised in Durban. ECO reminds Parties that the Review is not a technical paper, but a report on the adequacy of the 2C limit and the evidence base for possibly strengthening it to a 1.5C limit. Moreover, there is already little doubt that the Review will illuminate the unconscionable inadequacy of the current pledges. Opening plenary KP http://unfccc4.metafusion.com/kongresse/111001_AWG/templ/ovw_onDemand.php? id_kongressmain=191#

TWN update 5 on 2 October Panama 2011: Fight over whether KP continues with or without market mechanisms. Argentina for G77 and China: There must be a 2CP in Durban, there has to be political will for a 2CP to make progress on technical issues. Must overcome emissions gap between A1 pledges and what required by science. DRC for African Group: Negotiations should produce two outcomes in line with the Bali Action Plan on long term cooperative action and a 2CP. There should be separation between tracks. Rich must reduce by 40% by 2017 at 1990 levels and at least 95% by 2050.

Dario: I am pretty sure these figures are from the CMPCC. European Union: There is a strong link between both tracks. Needs to be a balance and substantive result. Said EU only represents 16% of emissions. There should be a post 2012 global and comprehensive framework based on coherent and stable rules, including all major economies. It supported a multilateral rules based approach based on the Kyoto Protocol, and said that the Kyoto Protocol should be reformed to preserve environmental integrity. Australia for Umbrella Group: There has to be an agreement with all major emitters but a new global agreement is not a prospect in Durban. KP only covers 27% of emissions. Progress on rules, and cross cutting issues that will promote a comprehensive outcome was important, it said. Grenada, speaking for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), said 2CP should be part of the two-track outcome that includes a legally binding outcome under the AWG-LCA. There should be provisional application of new and more ambitious commitments in the amendment for the second period pending its ratification and entry into force, in order to avoid a gap between the commitment periods.

32

Grenada rejected the idea of a political commitment period, and said that any outcome that is based on decisions only is a non starter, and would be a major step back for the regime Only a legally binding outcome can deliver emission reductions consistent with what science demands. Temperature rise limited to well below 1.5 degrees C from pre-industrial levels is a goal supported by over 100 countries, it said. Bolivia, speaking for the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) said that the work must meet the needs of all, and not just the interests of some. Rules must be complied with and not ignored as they were in Cancun. It said that a second commitment period is the key objective and must be adopted in Durban. A legal vacuum in the ratification of the second commitment period must be avoided. It is essential to discuss applying international legal mechanisms to address the failure of developed countries to comply with their obligations, and the negative impacts that this will have on the planet, it said. BOLIVIA DEMANDS COMPLIANCE AND CONSEQUENCES FOR RICH NO COMPLY WITH OBLIGATIONS. Chari Macey asks: To what extent is it possible to quantify the mitigation pledges as quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs)? On rules and commitments, he said that both need to happen together, but if Parties achieve the rules set they are seeking, would it be sufficient or are there other conditions as well? On increased mitigation efforts, how do we move from the lower to the higher end of the mitigation pledges? There is also the issue of the aggregate level of emission reductions, he said. On the gap between the commitment periods, he said that it was difficult, if not impossible to avoid a gap between the commitment periods, and there are a number of options to ensure continuity including provisional application. Is this viable, he asked, and are there other options? He also said that the spin-off group on numbers should resolve the current differences on Option B of the text on the amendment for the second commitment period. Brazil said that it was premature to discuss the gap between the commitment periods before Durban, as there is still time to avoid the gap A heated debate also took place on the future of the CDM in the absence of a second commitment period. Venezuela said that without a second commitment period, there would no longer be a CDM. There should not be selective application of the Kyoto Protocol. This was supported by Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and China.

33

European Union stressed that continuity of the CDM is important after 2012, and that predictability and certainty to the private sector is important. The mechanism should not be abandoned but improved. Venezuela said that the issue is a multilateral versus a bilateral approach. The Kyoto Protocol rules are multilateral, but a domestic approach for emission reductions is being proposed after 2012. NZ SAY YES TO 2CP BUT ONLY IF GLOBAL AGREEMENT WITH ALL MAJOR EMITTERS. New Zealand said that it was prepared to undertake a second commitment period in the context of a comprehensive global agreement by all major emitters. This cannot be concluded by Durban, either under that new agreement or the Kyoto Protocol. It said that the second commitment period will not be followed by a third, and that the agreements will merge.
NZ SAYS THERE WILL BE ON 3CP, THERE WILL JUST BE ONE AGREEMENT!!!

It appealed for not rejecting a political CMP (Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties) decision, and asked if a legally binding second commitment period is not possible, was it better to have nothing at all? One Parties perfection is anothers impossibility. This risks no agreement or only one that cannot be ratified. We should focus on what is achievable to protect the Kyoto Protocol that we value so highly. Dario: Yeah but how can you protect the KP at the same time as you destroy it?!!!
Vice Chair ok KP: The central issue is the resolution of the second

commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, she said, and this cannot be discussed in isolation, as it is inextricably linked with the legal status and form of the future climate regime.
TWN update 6 on 3 October Panama 2011: Developing countries stressed the importance of ensuring the continuity of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and emphasized the importance of ensuring the comparability of efforts among developed countries as regards their mitigation commitments in negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Developing countries led by Brazil and supported by Mali for the African Group, St. Lucia for the Alliance of Small Island States, China, India and Venezuela expressed these views on October 2 in Panama City, at the climate negotiations under the Ad-hoc Working Group on Longterm Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). Brazil said that it would be a mistake to engage in the technical items in the discussion without having the political dimension as the technical approach cannot be a way to park the political discussion on the continuity of the KP. (Developed countries such as Japan, Russia and Canada have declared in the KP working group that they will not commit to a second commitment period under the Protocol, while the European Union and other developed countries including Australia, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland have preconditioned their willingness to consider such commitments upon the emergence of a new mitigation regime that includes all major emitters,

34

including the United States who is not a party to the Protocol and advanced developing countries. Developing countries have expressed concern that developed countries are planning to jump ship and escape their Kyoto commitments to a new mitigation regime under the Convention). International Assessment and Review: Brazil said that one item to highlight was the need to address compliance (in meeting emission reduction targets). Mali, speaking for the African Group said that the objective of the biennial reports is ascertain progress in the performance of the commitments of developed countries. In this regard, progress as regards the provision of financial resources to development countries is also very key.
Closing plenary KP. 1 hour 22 minutes. http://unfccc4.metafusion.com/kongresse/111001_AWG/templ/ovw_onDemand.php? id_kongressmain=191#

TWN update 18 on 13 October Panama 2011: Poor say 2CP on KP in Durban crucial. Developed countries, meanwhile, stressed on a new climate change framework and on the continuity of the market mechanisms. At the start of the plenary, the AWG-KP Chair, Adrian Macey from New Zealand, summarized that over the week, the contact group had discussed policy issues including the nature of the second commitment period, that a number of Annex I (developed country) Kyoto Parties have indicated that they will not undertake quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) in a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, and the continuity of the market mechanisms after 2012. [In fact, developing counties have insisted that the Kyoto Protocols second commitment period must be adopted in Durban, through an amendment to its Annex B as mandated. Developing countries have also questioned why the Protocols market mechanisms should continue post 2012, in the absence of a second commitment period starting in 2013.] (interesting that they did it based on pledges from CPH and Cancun Accord??) The Secretariat produced a table of possible QELROs, through a technical exercise of converting the emission reduction pledges of Annex I Parties into QELROs as required under the Kyoto Protocol. Japan, Canada and Russia asked for their QELROs to be removed from that table, as they do not intend to undertake a second period of emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. The Chair concluded that it was the strong wish of Parties to complete the AWG-KP work in Durban, and that many parts of the text are complete technically and await a political decision, although there is still some technical work to be done, including on land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). (Dario: so even though Macey says Parties are keen to get the work of KP done in Durban and most of it done technically pending political decisions in actual fact the work of AWG KP could be delayed or fail depending on what happens in the LCA track).

35 Ambassador Diseko from South Africa said in Durban there should be balance between tracks and within tracks. The Cancun decisions must be operationalized, and there should be a focus on key political issues, of which the Kyoto Protocols second commitment period is central. Dario: Yeah but are you just giving lip service to the KP here? Cos the Cancun decisions are terrible. You cant do both surely?! Argentina for G77 and China said 2CP of KP in Durban fundamental and if not undermine rule based system. No gap. Increase ambition. Bali Action Plan says KP has to advance in parallel to LCA. Grenada for AOSIS say key to build on KP that is only legally binding agreement that puts quantified emissions reductions commitments. Calls on Canada, Japan and Russia to reconsider extreme positions. Wants increase ambition from A1, 2CP with 1990 baseline alongside legally binding agreement in LCA, close loopholes in LULUCF, AAUs, new mechanisms and new gases. Dario: Yes is demanding a legally binding outcome in LCA putting more pressure on the KP negotiations too? Is it realistic to demand an agreement on LCA in Durban when obviously this is what the urgency demands? Is it better to wait a bit longer for a better agreement? DRC for Africa Group say all Africa wants a 2CP of KP. The KP is the basis for the future climate change regime and future commitment periods (as in multiple, as in not like NZ saying after the 2CP the KP will merge with another agreement). Also expects strengthening of Annex I Party commitments in a manner consistent with their fair contribution towards limiting warming to below 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Gambia for LDCs say in Cancun it was agreed there would not be a gap in commitment periods (and as set out in Article 3.9 of KP that says to negotiate subsequent CP 6 years before end 2012). Environmental integrity should be ensued through limiting the carbon markets and closing loopholes. Agreement on 2CP in KP is crucial to progress in LCA. Cannot accept political decisions in AWG KP and AWG LCA. Bolivia, on behalf of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), said that it was shameless the way that more conditions and flexibilities are being required by Annex I Parties to comply with what they should be doing by law. It said that it was building alliances with all countries, particularly the LDCs, and that it could not accept making the African continent the tomb of the Kyoto Protocol. China said that developed countries have an unshakable legal, historical and moral obligation to renew the Kyoto Protocol through a second commitment period, and that the outcome of Durban must be based on the Bali Roadmap. South Africa said that the Kyoto Protocol is central to the multilateral rulesbased system. Failure to reach agreement on the second commitment period would send a negative signal to the process;

36 Papua New Guinea for the Coalition for Rainforest Nations propose REDD+ under KP. Australia for Umbrella Group said KP important but need to move to a new agreement including all major emitters. It stressed on the importance of the

continuity of the market-based approach, which is the keystone of new regime, and urged for political next steps, courage, and pragmatism. The European Union said that balance across and between both negotiating tracks is important. It said that it was encouraged with the discussions on a future legally binding framework and legal form (in the AWG-LCA), and this will require deeper political attention. It stressed on the need for market mechanisms post 2012 and that new mechanisms should be part of the Durban package. It advocated the establishment of a post 2012 rules based and comprehensive legally binding framework engaging all major economies, and said that it was willing to consider a second commitment period as part of a wider global and comprehensive outcome.
New group press conference: Africa Group, LDCs and ALBA http://unfccc4.metafusion.com/kongresse/111001_AWG/templ/ovw_onDemand.php? id_kongressmain=191# Current status November 2011: Article by Institute for Security Studies: "We dont want South Africa to be the death of Kyoto Protocol," Minister of Environment, Edwina Molewa. The best bet, Molewa finally concedes is to take key elements of the Protocol and build it into a single new agreement, with a comprehensive united approach. The key issue will be whether the positive or flawed elements of Kyoto will be retained. Daw: But this is dangerous, this is opening up Pandoras box because this single new agreement could just be pledge and review with plenty of existing and new carbon markets and no legally binding. The resulting effect of killing Kyoto would be consolidate two separate tracks of the negotiation process, which was agreed to at the COP13, Bali in 2007, one with binding targets, the other with comparable national efforts and a long-term vision. The main motivation for killing Kyoto is that developed countries want to lower their level of commitments or avoid taking responsibility for committing to international binding emission reduction commitments altogether. Initially it seemed that the main motivation for this position by some developed countries was to force advanced developing countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa to also take on internationally binding obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

37 Martin Khor of the South Centre also predicts that the deregulated system will disincentivize developing countries, "when they see those who are supposed to lead the process, falter instead. The negotiations are really meant to be about amending Kyoto to ensure stricter, more ambitious targets in line with science. There is also need for a more nuanced debate which includes seriously considering the failings of Kyoto. The targets set by Kyoto of 5.2% reductions from 1990 levels were far below what science required at the time of 50%-70% reductions from the same baseline. It has partly given rise to a situation in which emissions are actually increasing around the world. This is very creative accounting and will lead to a huge breach of trust. This may be due to the fact that although Kyoto set targets it also created loopholes to avoid meeting those targets. The cornerstone of Kyoto is carbon trading, a flexible, market-baesd system of pollution trading which has had the effect of shifting emissions around instead of reducing it. In essence, the debate on just the legal form of a new treaty may detract from the real issues of who should be taking responsibility for emission reductions and how best to make sure that these reductions are committed to. Rather, the debates focus on states shying away from their responsibilities by the increased use of market mechanisms. Dario: So just talking about legal form is an excuse to not look at historical responsibility. It is a distraction. Reuters article: Poorer nations want the Kyoto Protocol to be extended, but many rich nations say a broader pact is needed to include all the big polluters. Russia, Japan and Canada have said they will not sign up for a second commitment period unless the biggest emitters do too. At least until the next presidential election is over next year, it is politically impossible for the United States to sign up to a new Kyoto. Moreover, neither China nor the United States is willing to agree to a new deal unless the other does so first. The EU, which has taken a lead in adopting targets to cut carbon and increase the share of renewable energy, has said it is open to signing up for a second commitment period, but on condition the major emitters give evidence of a firm intention to join in. "It is clear a number of partners are moving away from the protocol and we would probably end up being the only one in the Kyoto club," EU person To achieve the target of 2 degrees of warming, emissions need to be cut by between 80 and 95 percent, scientists say. Pledges on the table from Cancun totalled a roughly 60 percent reduction, Last week, EU Commission officials in Brussels said Durban should focus on closing loopholes in such mechanisms that should not be carried over into a second commitment period. The EU ETS is the biggest carbon market, on which EU Allowances, or EUAs, are traded. Under the scheme, the amount of carbon utilities and heavy industry can produce is fixed.

38 Companies that produce above the prescribed limit can buy extra carbon credits, while those who pump less carbon than their cap are allowed to trade their surplus. At government level, nations are entitled to produce a certain level of emissions, known as assigned amounts. Those who do not produce up to their limit have Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to spare, which they can sell to countries that have produced more carbon than their entitlement as a way of still meeting their Kyoto commitments. Following industrial collapse, some nations, such as Russia, have huge stockpiles of AAUs.

Strategies in Durban on Kyoto Protocol

From TWN article November 2009: For developed countries, there are a number of possible scenarios (which are not mutually exclusive). One is to formally collapse the AWG-KP into the AWG-LCA track, thereby effectively ending the negotiations for a second commitment period for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol and continuing with negotiations under the AWG-LCA track. A second scenario is to fail to agree a further commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. This would be a breach by all Parties of their obligations under Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol to establish subsequent commitments periods for Annex I Parties. In this case, the Kyoto Protocol remains on the books but risks becoming an empty shell. A third scenario is to seek a legally binding outcome under the AWG-LCA with the goal of superceding the Kyoto Protocol. If the elements of the Kyoto Protocol are moved into the AWG-LCA, and are discussed and concluded as part of a legally binding instrument under the Bali Action Plan process, then the Kyoto Protocol may effectively be rendered dead or meaningless. The developed countries would have effectively cherry-picked the elements of the Kyoto Protocol that they like, such as the market mechanisms, and transposed them into a new legal instrument. Defend the existence of the KP to the hilt and block any attempt to kill it

39 Positive: It is the only legally binding agreement so it must be defended. We want a legally binding agreement, the KP is just that. It can be the basis for the global agreement on climate change. Build on it. Negative: Waste of time to put all your effort into something that is going to be destroyed anyway. Why not work on an agreement that covers more than 30% of emissions and the USA. Refuse to discuss rules until there is a political decision and commitment from rich countries to a 2CP. (position of G77+China in Bonn: Political will for a 2CP is key for technical issues (the rules) to go forward) Positive: Puts pressure on annex 1 to commit to a 2CP when they want to protect their carbon markets inside KP. Negative: Means there is probably no progress on anything because rich say want to discuss rules first. (from AWG-KP chair scenario note May 2011: General recognition that both rules and targets are needed to finalise Annex 1 commitments for 2CP. Remember the rules could affect ambition of pledges by all Parties to the KP. Only discuss conditions set by developed countries to commit to a 2CP with those who have signalled willingness to enter into second phase Positive: Negotiations are not delayed and sabotaged by rich who do not want a 2CP but want to still be in the room. Negative: This strategy could be too much pressure and rich countries just say they do not want to talk about KP at all as all other countries leaving it pronto. Lobby for there to be a 2CP even if this does not start in 2013. Accept the gap. Positive: The KP will still exist as an instrument which can be the basis for a future agreement Negative: There will be a gap of maybe up to 2 years (2013 and 2014) when all Annex 1 can emit as much as they want. Negotiate a Mini Protocol Positive: It would be legally binding Negative: Not all countries would be willing to negotiate it e.g. Japan, Russia, Canada. Could open up a Pandoras Box in relation to commitments and new market mechanisms. Start work on a new agreement to replace KP that is based on LCA and includes all major emitters Positive: It would include all countries including USA and cover more than 30% of global emissions Negative: Opening a Pandoras box with chance for voluntary commitments and more carbon markets. Demand all developed countries aggregate emissions reductions are 50% by 2017 based on 1990 levels (that is 6 years from now!)

40 Positive: This is the reduction as required by the science (CMPCC) Negative: There is no way rich countries will accept this. A failure to agree on subsequent commitment periods is a violation of international law. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Parties are clearly bound to establish second and subsequent commitment periods for Annex I Parties. Article 3.9 provides that, Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7 (emphasis added). These are existing treaty obligations. Failure to comply with these provisions by failing to agree a second commitment period would be a breach by all Parties to the Kyoto Protocol - not merely Annex I Parties of their legally binding obligations.

Expectations for Durban

Reuters article: Rather than a breakthrough, they have emphasised incremental progress and the improvement of existing mechanisms for monitoring and managing climate change. All observers agree time has run out to get a new version of Kyoto in place before the first commitment period expires at the end of next year. The European Union has said the world might not be able to agree on a binding climate deal until 2015. Dario: This is when they want the new mandate for, for the ONE international agreement. BEST CASE SCENARIO FROM TIM GORE: "If we get an EU commitment to continue Kyoto, a signal from the rest of the world that they will undertake legal commitments in the future and delivery in the meantime ... then we'll be making progress towards a sophisticated global architecture for fighting climate change," he added. General - Knowledge of the Convention Knowledge of the Kyoto Protocol Bali Action Plan and Bali Road Map Knowledge of negotiation structure and procedures Knowledge of history of UNFCCC Inside in interests and negotiation strategies of major players Overview over negotiation process

41 Understanding of interlinkages between different negotiation issues Understanding of the climate science and its relation to UNFCCC negotiations

Shared Vision - Experience in negotiating the topic Understanding of Carbon Budget implications of different options in the Shared Vision chapter Understanding of peaking, its options and its problems Knowledge and understanding of historical responsability issues Knowledge of trade issues Set of global climate goals

Mitigation - Experience in negotiating KP Experience in negotating 1bi (mitigation for deveoped countries) and 1bii (mitigation for developing countries) Understanding of issues at stake for developed countries in these chapters Understanding of key issues unattended in these chapters Understanding of main problems in the actual approach

Carbon markets - Experience in negotiating Market Mechanisms under KP Experience in negotiating 1bv under LCA Understanding of linkages with market mechanisms under other conventions Carbon markets in forrests (REDD), agriculture and bunkers Studied problems on existing market mechanisms Studied proposals of new marked mechanisms under 1bv, proposed by different countries Studied on negative impacts of carbon markets for developing countries Studied on incoherences between carbon markets in its different versions and real climate action

Other process - Understanding of interlinkages between several environmental negotiations: o UNFCCC, CBD, Desertification

42 o o o Rio+20 Process IPBES platform Environmental issues in WTO negotiations

Basic knowledge of the process of Rio+20 Understanding of main issues at stake in Rio+20

Specific issues - Climate debt Mother Earths Rights Warfare and Climate Change Human Rights and Climate Change Indigenous Peaples and Climate Change Environmental Justice International Climate Change Court Geoingeneering Critical views on Green Economy Critical views on decoupling

World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth - Responsible for Working group on climate debt In debt study of climate debt concepts Assistence in basic documents for Working groups on adaptation and on Agriculture and Food Sovereignity

Usefull Experience - Negotiating experiences: construction of texts, procedural negotiations, drafting groups, negotiating of final text Working with G77 Writing of submissions Lobbying Dictating classes on climate change issues

Multiple contacts with negotiators