Hitler's Image of the United States Author(s): Gerhard L.

Weinberg Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Jul., 1964), pp. 1006-1021 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1842933 . Accessed: 04/11/2011 03:52
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Hitler'sImageof the United States

GERHARDL. WEINBERG*

A SIGNIFICANT factor in the understanding of international relations is the perception of countries and issues by those in a position to make policy. The more policy formulation is restricted to one man or a small group, the more important this factor becomes. The conduct of foreign relations by a dictator can often be understood only by reference to his image of the outside world, an image that acts as a filter distorting the realities he sees. This is particularly true for Adolf Hitler whose views on most matters changed very little during his adult life, and who was little affected by experience which leads other men to adjust erroneous perceptions to facts. Because of its emphasis on the unearthing of new documentary evidence, the study of diplomatic history has often tended to attempt a reconstruction of events on the basis of knowledge subsequently attained by the scholar though contemporaneously unknown to the actors. Even when allowance for this factor has been made, the information known at any given time is frequently seen only through the eyes of the writer without regard to the perception of that information by the man making the decisions. This attempt to trace Hitler's image of the United States is designed to illustrate an avenue for examining the diplomatic history of the recent past. This essay, therefore, will be no survey of German-American relations, but an analysis of the particular and personal perspective of Adolf Hitler on the United States and the implications of his image of America for his policies. Hitler did not leave an extensive correspondence with friends, relatives, and officials,which might provide a basis for assessing his attitudes. Nor, to judge by available evidence, did he make marginal comments on papers submitted to him for information or decision. He left two books, a few memorandums, a small number of private documents. All the rest consists of public speeches and private talk, recorded by others; even the books are really speeches reduced to writing and provided with some continuity. Since Hitler never earned a reputation for excessive veracity, the scholar faces the question of the reliabilityof his evidence. There is a rule of thumb that can be used to good advantage. Before I933
* Mr. Weinberg, who wrote Germany and the Soviet Union, I939-I941 (Leiden, 1954), is a professor at the University of Michigan. He read a shorter version of this paper at the I962 meeting of the American Historical Association.

ioo6

Hitler's Image of the United States

I 007

Hitlertalkedandwroteto gain understanding support. and Blunt,outspoken, and revealingto an extent he laterregretted, evidenceof Hitler'sviews this can generallybe taken as accurate. After I933 he was confrontedwith the for concreteproblemsof a man in power and used his public utterances tacticalpurposes,mixing open expressions his views with deceptionto of suit the occasion. From I933 on, therefore, is saferto dependon his secret it directives confidential and talksto his friends,associates, officials. and Though at timesconcealing thoughtseven fromthoseclosestto him, he was,neverhis theless,an inveterate talkerwho continuedbehind closeddoorsthe practice of speakingratheropenly that he had once startedin the Vienna home for men. Where these sourcesfail us, the plans initiated in accordance with directives then secret, now known to us, can be usedto fill the remaining but gaps. During the First WorldWar and the yearsimmediately Hitler thereafter, appearsto have given little thought to the United States.Like many German youngsters had then and since,Hitler'syouthfulimagination once been fired by Karl May'snovels about AmericanIndians,1 Hitler'sworld in but the firstyearsof his politicalactivityhardlyextendedbeyondthe Atlantic.As one studentof the earliestNational Socialistconceptsof foreign policy has concluded:"The astoundingnarrowness his horizon is also evidencedby of the fact that Hitler hardlynoticeda world powerlike the United Statesof America."2 Interestedlike so many Germansin explainingthat Germany had reallywon the war, ratherthan trying to understand defeat,he paid its no particularattention to American mattersbeyond constantlyrepeating the condemnationsof President Wilson that were then fashionablein Germany.It is true that one of Hitler'stravelingfund raiserswent to Detroit in I924 to try to obtain money from Henry Ford, who had attracted NationalSocialistattentionby his anti-Semitic but publications, Ford turned him down.3Although dealing at length with questionsof foreign policy, Hitler's first book, Mein Kampf,publishedoriginallyin two volumes in containsonly some incidentalreferences the United Statesin I925-I926, to its 782 pages.Nevertheless, has to be said aboutthis book, since something Hitler'slater views of the United Stateswere, so to speak,graftedonto the schemes visionspropounded and therein. of Mixing a crude simplification social Darwinism with authoritarian
(entryfor Feb. I7,
1 Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944, ed. Hugh R. Trevor-Roper (London,
1942); 1953), 3I6-17

cf. ibid.,707 (JuneI5,

4I.

I943).

Years(London,I957), Hitler,The Missing

2 Giinter Schubert, Anfange nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik (Cologne, I963), 65. 3 Kurt G. W. Ludecke, Knew Hitler (New York, 1937), I92-20I; I ErnstHanfstaengl,

Io08

Gerhard L. Weinberg

views, a generalinversionof historical reality,and some fantasiesaboutthe Germansand other peoples,Hitler expoundeda world view basedon the assumption that Germanswere somehowsuperior all others.They would to maintain their superiorityfirst by eliminating the allegedly alien Jewish elementin their midst, and secondby assuringthemselves adequatespace of on which to live and proliferateas farmers.This meant the conquestof space in EasternEurope.The people in that spacewould be killed or expelled: the soil, not the people,was to be Germanized.Since this program would require war with Russia, the fact that the Communistshad taken over in that countrywas a strokeof good fortunein Hitler'seyes because they had removed the only element in Russian society, the allegedly Germanic state-formingupper class, that might have made for effective opposition.Before this war could be launched,however,it would be necessary to make war on the eternal enemy France, a venturein which Italy and possiblyGreat Britainwere expectedto participate. There was thus a threefoldprogram:first, an internaldivisionof Germanyinto those Hitler considered real Germansand thosewho couldnot qualify;second,a war the against France; and third, after that war had freed Germanyfrom the threatto its rear,a war againstRussia.This program, expoundedat length in MeinKampf, was also the main theme of Hitler'spublicspeeches the in With politics as his full-timeoccupation, preachedthis same set 1920'S. he of ideas in every town where he could find listeners-listeners,it may be added,who paidto hearthis nonsenseexpounded. A few yearslater,in the summerof I928 as is now known, Hitler dictated a secondbook. Since in that manuscript there are very extensivereferencesto the United States,one must first examinethe factorsthat seem to have drawnhis attentionto the subject.What evidencethere is suggests that his interestin economicand industrialdevelopment, and particularly the automobileindustry,was in large part responsible. The years since the writing of MeinKampfhad been good, economically. Germanproduction, and Hitler, whose poemployment,and income were rising substantially, litical chanceswere hardlyhelpedby this fact, gave the subjectsomecareful thought. In the first place, the availabilityof a large land area now appearedto him to have industrialas well as agricultural advantages the for people living there. This was illustratedby the second factor: the conspicuouspresenceof large numbersof Americanautomobiles Germany. in Hitler Alwaysintriguedby things connected with roadsand motorvehicles,4
4Ibid., 44; Paul Kluke, "Hitler und das Volkswagenprojekt," Vierteljahrsheftefur Zeitgeschichte, VIII (Oct. I96o), 34i-83.

Hitler's Image of the United States

I oo9

was greatlyimpressed the fact that in spite of its high wages and great by distance,the American automobileindustry was so obviously successful in the Europeanmarket.This was owing, he thought, to America'sgreat and space,resources, domesticmarket.5 Once the United States had caught his attention,the whole apparatus of Hitler'sracialdeterminism had to be appliedto explainingthat country. Somehowit had to be integratedinto his view of the universe.His analysis was as follows: The United States was the product of emigrationfrom Europe. Who had emigrated? Always the most restless,those with the greatestinitiative,and thereforethe best in each country.Who were the best in each country? Why, of course,the Nordic element. The United States was, therefore,the great meeting place of the Nordics, who were protectingtheir racialpurity by excludingAsiaticsand by other immigration legislation.This legislationhad previouslycaught Hitler'sattentionas shown by one of his earliestreported references the United Statesand in to Mein Kampf.6Far from being the melting pot Americansimaginedit to be, the United Stateswas in fact a homogeneous country,a gatheringin of the finest Nordic racial stock from each Europeancountry.This not only explainedwhy Americanshad made such good use of their living space;it also led to the conclusionthat they were exceedinglydangerouspeople. With a racial headstartover everyoneelse-especially the Europeancountriesdrainedof their best blood by the sameprocessthat had madeAmerica strong-and with a vast living spaceon which to proliferate, Americans the were the real threatto Germanpredominance the world. Hitler'sdeducin tion from this analysiswas simple: only a Eurasianempire under German dominationcould successfully cope with this menace.A third war was now added to the original two. After the first two wars had enabledit to constructa continentalempirefrom the Atlanticto the Urals,Germanywould take on the United States.One of the majortasks to be performedby the National Socialist movement, therefore,must be the preparation Gerof manyfor this conflict.7 In the years between I928 and I933 Hitler was engaged in the bitter
6 Hitlers Zweites Buch, Ein Dokument aus dem lahr 1928, ed. Gerhard L. Weinberg (Stuttgart, I96I), 123; Adolf Hitler in Franken, Reden aus der Kampizeit, ed. Heinz Preis (Nuremberg, I939), 96. For later references to the same subject, see Hitler's Table Talk, ed.

Trevor-Roper, 415 (entriesfor Feb. 2, Apr.9, I942). 279, 6 Hitlerspeech Dec. I0, I9I9, in "Hitler of als Parteiredner JahreI920," ed. Reginald im H.

Phelps, Vierteliahrsheftefur Zeitgeschichte, XI (July i963), 290; Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (2 vols.,Munich, II, I933 printing), 490. 7 Hitlers Zweites Buch, ed. Weinberg, I23-32. The discussion of Hitler's view of the United States in Konrad Heiden, Der Fuehrer, Hitler's Rise to Power (Boston, I944), is based 32I-25, on Hitler's speeches of this period, which contain many passages similar to those in the second book.

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Gerhard L. Weinberg

struggle for power in Germany,a struggle that he won, but that hardly to on allowedhim much time for reflection areasin any caseperipheral his major concerns.During the long and violent I929 campaignagainst the Young plan, for example,Hitler referredto the United States only once, from Germany repeating views aboutthe combinedeffectsof emigration his and the selectivityof Americanimmigrationpolicy.8All his attentionwas focusedon immediatedomesticproblems.The next periodfor which there is again evidenceon his thoughtsabout the United Statesis the time immediatelyfollowing his assumptionof power. Since in the years I933-1934 and during the subsequentdecadehis evaluationof the United Stateswas entirely negative, by contrast with the analysis just presented,an effort must be made to explain this reversal.Once again the evidenceindicates that the economicsituationaffectedHitler'sthinking.The world depression was on everyone'smind, and it was a prominentsubjectof international negotiations.Hitler himself was invited to go to Washingtonto discuss the forthcomingLondon World Economic Conference,but declined and sent Hjalmar Schacht instead.9It is clear, however, that Hitler was trein by mendouslyimpressed the fact and impactof economicdepression the United States.This came to be one of his favoritetopicsand a majortheme of National Socialistpropaganda. While it is true that the United States more slowly than other industrialcountries, recoveredfrom the depression Hitler was still talking about the supposedthirteen million unemployed in Americawell into the 1940's.10He saw the movie Grapesof Wrathsevthe eral times and assumedthat it represented whole United Statesfor all
time.

requireda new analysisin terms of Hitler'sracial This new perspective now concludedthat the United States was a racial mixture fantasies.He after all-a mixturefrom all over, includingNegroes and Jews, and what were undoubtedlythe inferiorexiles from every countryexcept Germany. floatedto the top, could This mongrelsociety,in which the scum naturally not possiblyconstructa sound economy,create an indigenousculture,or operate a successfulpolitical system. No wonder they were thrown into a panic by Orson Welles'sreportson the arrivalof invadersfrom Mars.11
8 Hitler's concluding speech at the Reichsparteitagon Aug. 5, I929, Volkischer Beobachter, Aug. 7, I929. 9 Gerhard L. Weinberg, "Schachts Besuch in den USA im Jahre I933," Vicrteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, XI (Apr. I963), I66-8o. 10 See Hitlers Tischgespracheim Fiihrerhauptquartier1941-1942, ed. Gerhard Ritter (Bonn, I95I), I63 (entry for June 3, I942). 11 Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, Die Protokollfragmenteseiner militlrischen Konferenzen 19421945, ed. Helmut Heiber (Stuttgart, I962), 548.

Hitler's Image of the United States

IO II

The only hope in America'spast had been smashedwhen the wrong side won the CivilWar.As Hitlerput it: system.... Sincethe Civil and of This is the lastdeath-rattle a corrupt outworn logic againstall historical Stateswere conquered War,in which the Southern and of have the andsoundsense, Americans beenin a condition political popular but States, the American [i.e.,racial]decay.In thatwar,it was not the Southern of blossoming economic In who themselves wereconquered. the spurious people has America ever sincebeen drawndeeperinto and prosperity powerpolitics, based of The the mireof self-destruction.... beginnings a greatnewsocialorder in weredestroyed thatwar,andwith and of on the principle slavery inequality that of themalsothe embryo a futuretrulygreatAmerica wouldnot havebeen that but casteof tradesmen, by a realHerren-class wouldhave ruledby a corrupt and of sweptawayall the falsities liberty equality.'2 past,the only hopefor its future to If this was what had happened America's lay in the Germanelementthat might somedaytake over.To quote Hitler once more: "The German componentof'the Americanpeople will be the source its politicaland mentalresurrection."13 of This analysisin turn led to different conclusions.The United States in weak and could not interfere any way with the realization was hopelessly of of Hitler'splans. Deprivedby its racialdecomposition the abilityto prowithin it would eventuallyfall naturally duce an effectivemilitaryforce,14 a Germanempire that would also include Mexico (in which Hitler was interestedbecause of the oil resources),'5and such portions of South as Americaas caughthis fancy.In this process,the German-Americans well role could play an important as those of Germandescentin Latin America if theywouldonly awaketo theirtruedestiny.'6 Thus Hitler went forward in the I930's unconcernedabout and genin erally uninterested the United States.'7In Hitler's secretmemorandum on the Four-YearPlan, written in the summer of I936, as in the famous on HossbachMemorandum Hitler's revelationof his aggressiveintentions to in NovemberI937, there are no references any possiblysignificantrole the United States might ever play. In the former,it is passedover as that
12
14

Hermann Rauschning, The Voice of Destruction (New York, I940),

68-69.

13 Ibid., 70.

Ibid., 7.I For a summary of German efforts to obtain oil concessions in Mexico, see Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, "A IV Nr. I8I3, Betr. 61versorgung der Kriegsmarine," Apr. 29, I940, Nuremberg Doc. 984-PS. 16 Rauschning, Voice of Destruction, 6I-64. 17 Louis P. Lochner, What about Germany? (New York, 1943), 47; see also Joachim Hitler later comRemak, "Hitlers Amerikapolitik," Aussenpolitik, VI (Feb. I955), 706-I4. mented disparagingly on Norman Davis, the only prominent emissary of Roosevelt whom he met during those years. (Hitlers Tischgesprache,ed. Ritter, 87 [entry for May I7, I942].)
15

IOI2

Gerhard L. Weinberg

impotent vis-a-visthe Soviet Union; in the latter,it is overlookedas any

factor at all.'8 In the spring of I938, when reminded of American influence in the Far East, Hitler contemptuously asserted that the United States was incapable of waging war and would not dare go beyond empty gestures in international affairs.19 These views were undoubtedly reinforced by the continuing underestimation of American military potential by Germany's military leaders in general, and by the German military attache in Washington in particular. General Friedrich von B16tticher was one of the very few men on whose reporting Hitler ever made a favorable comment,20doubtless because it conformed to Hitler's expectations. B6tticher's reports were not always entirely unreasonable, but they did show the United States in a false light, primarily for three reasons: first, his preoccupation with fantasies about the role of Jews in American life, which fitted perfectly with Hitler's own ideas; second, Botticher's being somewhat misled by the courtesy that Americans extend to an individual foreigner visiting the country regardless of their attitude toward the country from which he comes; and third, Botticher's contact with pro-German elements in the American army, and especially with General Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff, whom B6tticher reported as showing great sympathy for German policy in the
years I933-I936.21

Public opinion in the United States, and particularly the American press, which showed open disapproval of Germany's racial policies, merely confirmed Hitler's evaluation of American degeneracy. In his eyes, the Americans were not only too stupid to get in out of the rain; they even objected to anyone who did. Furthermore, by racial arithmetic Hitler concluded in November I937 that the United States was held together by fewer than twenty million Anglo-Saxons,22 and in November 1938 that there were fewer than sixty million persons of valuable racial stock in the United States.23 Thus even in regard to population Germany was far ahead, es18 The Four-Year Plan memorandum in Vierteliahrsheftefur Zeitgeschichte,III (Apr. I955), 204-IO; the Hossbach Memorandum in Trial of the Major War Criminals (42 vols., Nuremberg,

I946-48), XXV, 402-13. It should be noted that the German army chief of staff, General Ludwig Beck, in his comments on the Hossbach Memorandum, did call attention to the United States. (Wolfgang Foerster, Ein General kdmpft gegen den Krieg, Aus den nachgelassenen Papierendes Generalstabchefs Ludwig Beck [Munich, I949], 63.) 19 Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (2d ed., Stuttgart, 1948), 14I. 20 Hitler's Table Talk, ed. Trevor-Roper,489 (entry for May i8, 1942). 21 Reports of Botticher, I933-I936, in German Foreign Ministry microfilm, Ser. 5863, National Archives Microcopy T-I20, container 274I, frames E 4289I9-429450; see, e.g., his report on a talk with MacArthuron Aug. 6, I934 (frames E 429i84-87) and the report of May
I3,
22

I935 (frames E 429246-49). Hitler speech of Nov. 23, I937, in Hitlers Tischgesprdche,ed. Ritter, 443.

23

"Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse, io November I938," Vierteliahrsheftefur Zeit-

Hitler's Im age of the United States

1013

peciallyafter the annexationof Austriaand the Sudetenland. is not surIt prisingthat with such an outlookHitler was receptive reports to containing the wildestdistortions Americanreality.24 of Even impressions fromAmerica reportedby Fritz Wiedemann,his adjutantand long-timeassociate, could
not efface such nonsense.2 The negative assessment of America's power potential was further reinforced by the neutrality legislation. These laws, designed to remove what some people thought had been the causes of America's entry into World War I, only encouraged Hitler to start World War II by assuring him that none of his prospective European enemies would be able to secure supplies from across the Atlantic even by purchase. As Hitler was to put it in an expose for his military leaders: "Because of its neutrality laws, America is not dangerous to us."26Contemplating war at a gathering in March 1939, he envisaged a conquest of the United States following the defeat of Britain and France.27 His cavalier dimissal of Roosevelt's peace appeal of April I939 thus merely reflected his actual assessment of the power potential of the United States. His attempt to ridicule the United States in the public glare of a Reichstagsession was an echo of his private thoughts. The outbreak and early course of the war again confirmed Hitler's low assessment of American strength and potential. There is a symbolic coincidence in the fact that right after President Roosevelt's urgent appeal to the belligerents to refrain from bombing civilians, German bombs damaged the residence of the American ambassador to Poland. Confident that isolationist sentiment would keep the United States neutral for some time,
geschichte, VI (Apr. I958), 19I. For a sample of this type of arithmetic in the "scholarly" world, see Erwin Ziihlke and Erich Michaelsen, "Der Anteil der Deutschstimmigen im Offizierkorps der Vereinigten Staaten," Deutsches Archi far Landes- and Volksforschung, VI (Dec. 1942), 659-65. 24 Franz Willuhn (Reichs4anzlei official) to Joachim von Ribbentrop and Joseph Goebbels, Oct. I5, I937, Doct ments on German Foreign Policy, 1918-945, Ser. D (i9 vols., Washington, D. C., 1949- ), I, No. 4I6. This document refers to Hitler's great interest in a thirty-six-page report on the US that lists Senators William Borah, George Norris, and Gerald P. Nye as among the "Reds" allegedly close to Roosevelt, expresses alarm over the appointment of a Negro to the registry of deeds office in the District of Columbia, and warns about the Bolshevization of te American Indians! (German Foreign Ministry microfilm, Ser. 5264, National ArchivesMicrocopyT-ixo, container 2568, frames E 315836-72.) 25 Ernst von Weizsicker to Dieckhoff, Jan. I8, I938, Documents on German Foreign Policy, I9I8-i9453 Ser. D, I, No. 433. Hitler speechof Nov. 23, 1939, Trial Ofthe Major War Criminals, XXVI, 331. On the 265 neutrality laws, see Robert A. Divine, The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago, i962). Hitler's view of neutrality in Hitlers Zweites Bach, ed. Weinberg, Chap. x; also Gert Buchheit, Hitler der Feldherr (Rastatt, 1958), 526. 27 William Bullitt to Cordell Hull, telegram 565 Mar. 25, 1939 (State Department Decimal File 740.oo/684); Bullittto Hull, telegram2050, SePt, 19, I939, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939 (5 vols., Washington, D. C., 1955-57), 1, 672-74. This is the report of an alleged participant at the meeting. Internal evidence speaks for the credibility of the account,

I0I4

Gerhard L. Weinberg

Hitler determined to strike in the west quickly.28 By direct subsidy and special propaganda themes, Germany attempted to strengthen the isolationist element in America.29The pro-Allied sympathies and hopes of a large segment of the American public, on the other hand, had neither brought down any of his dive bombers nor stopped one of his tanks. Surveying the world in triumph after the fall of France in June 1940, Hitler and his associates were confident that they could cope with the United States easily enough. Looking beyond the surrender of Great Britain that appeared imminent to them, they planned to construct thereafter a large navy of battleships that would enable them to move effectively against the United States in the only sphere of power that might present a problem. Simultaneously, the defeat of France seemed also to open the way to German naval bases on and off the coast of Northwest Africa for appropriateuse by the prospective battle fleet.30 All these lovely prospects were replaced by other plans in the late summer and fall of I940, as Britain refused to give in. Trying to understand the reasons for such foolhardy unwillingness to acknowledge defeat, Hitler concluded that the British must expect others to fight for them in the future as replacements for the French. Assuming that the Russians and Americans provided this distant hope for England, he decided to take this opportunity to attack Russia. After the German victory in the west, this looked like a simple undertaking that could be accomplished in a few weeks. It would not only destroy Britain's hope of aid from that quarter, but it would immobilize the United States as well. As Hitler put it: "Britain'shope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East. Russia is the Far Eastern sword of Britain
28

Memo of Hitler, Oct. 9,

1939,

Trial of the Major War Criminals, XXXVII, 472. In ex-

plaining to his highest military leaders why Germany should strike in the west soon, rather than wait, Hitler said: "Der Versuch gewisser Kreise der U.S.A., den Kontinent in eine deutschfeindliche Richtung zu fiihren, ist im Augenblick sicher ergebnislos, kann aber in der Zukunft doch noch zu dem gewiinschten Erfolg fiihren. Auch hier ist die Zeit als gegen Deutschland arbeitend anzusehen."
29 Lothar Gruchmann, Nationalsozialistische Grossraumordnung, Die Konstruktion einer "deutschen Monroe-Doktrin" (Stuttgart, I962); Hans Louis Trefousse, Germany and American I33; Documents on German Foreign 44-45, 'I0, (New York, I951), Neutrality, 1939-1941 Ser. D, IX, Nos. 3I, I58, I95, I97, 427, 422, 44I, 455, 492, 493, X, Nos. 39, Policy, 19i8-i945, i86, 300, XI, NoS. 2, 72I, XII, Nos. 34, 4II, 563. II2, 3a Fuehrer Conferenceson Naval Affairs, July II, I940, Brassey's Naval Annual I948 (New

York,

I948),

II5;

Gerhard L. Weinberg, "German Colonial Plans and Policies 1938-i942,"

in

und Untersuchungen, Historische Betrachtungen Geschichte und Gegenwartsbewusstsein: Festschrift fur Hans Rothfels zum 70. Geburtstag, dargebracht von Kollegen, Freunden und Schulern, ed. Waldemar Besson and Friedrich Frhr. Hiller v. Gaertringen (G6ttingen, I963), 474 and n. 48. For a general survey of Hitler's world-wide interests and ambitions, see the

excellent contribution by Giinter Moltmann, "WeltherrschaftsideenHitlers," in Europa und Ubersee: Festschrift fur Egmont Zechlin, ed. Otto Brunner and Dietrich Gerhard (Hamburg,
I96I), I97-240.

Hitler's Image of the United States

Iois

and the United States,pointed at Japan." other words,once Japanwas In relievedof the Russianthreatat its back door,it would move ruthlessly forward in Asia, therebykeeping the United Statesoccupiedin the Pacific.3' If the first part of Hitler's speculation proved illusory,in that the war againstRussiaturnedout to be neitheras shortnor as simpleas he had expected,his anticipations about Far Easternevents proved at least partially correct. The collapseor weakeningof those Europeanpowerswith colonial possessions the Far East encouragedJapan to move southwardin the in summerand fall of 1940, while the Germanattackon the Soviet Union in the followingyearemboldened Japaneven more. It is true that in urging Japanto move forwardin Asia, Germanypreferred that the Japaneseconcentrateon Great Britain, while leaving the United States alone for the time being. The TripartitePact of September 1940 was in part designedto frightenthe United Statesfrom intervention in the conflict,but the hasty conclusionof the treatywithout regardto the detailsof the text32indicatesthat the propaganda publicityrole of the and pactwas moreimportant Germaneyes.33 were in While the pactnegotiations in progress,Hitler himself explainedto his generalsthat America'sarmament programwould not be effectiveuntil I945,34 that is, until long after he expected war to haveended. the The Japanese, however,did not wish to risk moving into Southeast Asia without removingthe dangerof a threatening Americanfleet on the flank of their route south.It was under these circumstances they askedtheir that Germanand Italianassociates the first daysof December1941 if they too in would declarewar on the United Statesif Japanbecameinvolvedin such a conflict.Although not bound to an affirmative answer by their treaties with Japan,both repliedthat they would; immediatelyafter Pearl Harbor they did so.35 The possibilitythat encouragement Japanto move south of
(Leiden, '954), II4The quotation is from the Franz Halder diary for July 3I, I940. 32 Johanna M. Menzel, "Der geheime deutsch-japanische Notenaustausch zum Dreimichtepakt," Vierteliahrshefte Zeitgeschichte,V (Apr. I957), I82-93. fuir 33 This is also the view of Theo Sommer's monograph, Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mdchten, Vom Antikominternpakt zum Dreimachtepakt, Eine Studie zur diplomatischen Vorgeschichtedes Zweiten Weltkriegs (Tiibingen, I962). 34 Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch, T2iglicheAufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabesdes ), II, 98 (entry for Heeres, 1939-5942, ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (3 vols., Stuttgart, I96217.

31 Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941

35 Statement by Ribbentrop, Aug. 2, I945, Files of the Foreign Studies Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History; Hans Louis Trefousse, "Germany and Pearl Harbor," Far Eastern Quarterly, XI (Nov. I95I), 35-50. The delay of a few days in the German answer, on which Trefousse and others have commented, is easily explained by Hitler's temporary absence from his East Prussian headquartersbecause of a crisis on the southern part of the eastern front. The moment Hitler returned, he instructed Ribbentropto give an affirmative answer. Since the Japanese had not told the Germans the date of the intended attack on Pearl

Sept.14,

I940).

ioi6

Gerhard L. Weinberg

might lead to drasticcomplications with the United States had been canvassedby Hitler and his associates least as early as January194I. Hitler at had then consideredthe risk worth taking, partlybecausehe believedthat the economic potential of a German dominatedEurope was in any case In greaterthan the "limitedpossibilities found in Britainand America."36 other words, the same step that would triggerJapan's move againstSingapore-namely the German invasion of Russia-would provide Germany with the industrial agricultural and prerequisites dealingwith the Amerifor can intervention that Japan's actionmight precipitate. December4, I94I, On the Chicago Tribune and WashingtonDailyHeraldpublishedmajor portionsof the American "Victory Program," planby whichthe UnitedStates the hoped to crush Germanyif the two countrieswere involvedin war under preciselythose circumstances Hitler had postulated. The only effect of this revelationon Hitler was that it providedhim with additionalmaterialfor his speechdeclaring on the United States.37 war It is truethatduringI94I Hitlerhadhopedto postpone with America. war In the springhe had canvassed with Schacht possibility the lattergoing the of on a propagandamission to the United States.38 Throughoutthe winter

of

1940-194i

ErichRaeder urgeddrastic had Admiral steps,at the riskof

war, againstAmericanshipping;Hitler had regularly him off, preferring put On to concentrate the preparations on againstRussia?9 June2I, 1941, the day thathe wantedno incidents beforethe attackon Russia,Hitler had explained with the United Statesfor a few weeks becausethe successof the invasion would have good effectson Japanand hence on the United States.40 Even Americanoccupationof Icelandearly in July did not shake Hitler'sbelief that imminent victoryin the east would change the whole situation.41 On
Harbor, the urgency of a reply was not as apparentto the latter as to the former. (See Galeazzo ed. Hugh Gibson[New York, I946], 4I4 [entry for Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, Dec. 3, 194I]; and Sekretdrdes Fiihrers, "Daten aus alten Notizbiichern," 8o, ManuscriptDivision, Library of Congress.) 36 Fuehrer Conferenceson Naval Affairs, Jan. 8-9, 1941, Brassey'sNaval Annual 1948, I7Ipact of April 194i as turning 72. It should be noted that Hitler welcomed the Russo-Japanese Japan from Vladivostok to Singapore. (Ibid., 193.) 37 Mark Skinner Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations(Washington, D. C., 1950), 359 and n. 77, 79; Hitler speech of Dec. II, I94I, in Der Grossdeutsche Freiheitskampf, Reden Adolf Hitlers, ed. Philipp Bouhler (3 vols., Munich, 1940-42), III, 145; see also Washington Post, Jan. 6, I963. 38 Ulrich von Hassell, Vom andern Deutschland, Aus den nachgelassenen Tagebiichern, in 1938-1944 (Zurich,1946), 225, 236 (entriesfor Sept. 3, Nov. 30, 1941). The reference Schacht's memoirs is characteristicallyinaccurate: he places the incident in February, but refers as reason for declining to go to the previous passage of the Lend-Lease Act, which took place in March. (Hjalmar Schacht, 76 lahre meines Lebens [Bad Worishofen, 1953], 520-21; see also Trefousse, Germanyand American Neutrality, 82.) 39 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, Dec. 27, 1940, Brassey'sNaval Annual 1948, I6i, 183-84 (Mar. I8, 1941), 192-93 (Apr. 20, 1941). As early as October io, 177 (Feb. 4, 1941), 1939, Raeder had been preparedto risk the US intervention he considered inevitable. (Ibid., 46.) 40 Ibid., 220. 41 Ibid., 221.

Hitler's Image of the United States

IOI7

July 25 he reiterated his desire to postpone incidents, adding that "after the Eastern Campaign he reserves the right to take severe action against the U.S.A. as well."42 The eastern campaign continued into the fall of 1941, and Raeder again pressured for drastic steps against American shipping, especially after Roosevelt's shoot on sight order of September ii. Hitler, however, was still convinced that Russia would collapse shortly and that incidents with the United States should, therefore, be avoided until the middle of October.43At the beginning of October, he thought that victory had indeed been attained,44but by late November, even before the fateful question came from Tokyo, Hitler had already recognized that the war in the east would continue at least into the following year and had informed Joachim von Ribbentrop of his willingness to go to war with the United States."5After all, most of Europe was in fact under his control, and as he had just explained to the party's faithful, the European area working for his side already included more than 350,000,ooo people compared with America's mere I25,000,000.46 Hitler's view was that the United States was really a feeble country with a loud mouth.47 The Americans were probably doing as much by aiding Britain as they would ever be able to do;48 thus there was no longer any point in waiting for the United States to intervene at its convenience. There was, furthermore, the danger that Japan might make a deal with the United States if not supported by its allies.49In any case, as the German Foreign Minister explained to one of his associates: "A great power does not allow itself to be declared war on; it declares war itself."50 All the evidence indicates that the outbreak of war between Germany and the United States left Hitler's view of America unchanged. One month
42

Ibid.,

222.

44 Hider speech of Oct. 3, I941, in Der GrossdeutscheFreiheitskampf, ed. Bouhler, III, 79; Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels-The IOI-I02; Otto Dietrich, 12 Jahre mit Hitler (Cologne, I955), Man Next to Hitler (London, I947), 54-56. 45 Hiroshi Oshimna the JapaneseForeign Ministry, Nov. 29, I94I, United States, Congress, to Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Hitler spent a few days Harbor Attack (39 vols., Washington, D. C., I946), XII, 200-202. in Berlin at the end of November in connection with the funeral of General Ernst Udet and a luncheon on November 27 commemorating renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact. He returned to East Prussia on November 28, following the funeral ceremonies for Colonel Werner M6lders. (Sekretdr des Fiihrers, "Daten aus alten Notizbiuchern," 8o.) Oshima was transmitting what Ribbentrophad told him about Hitler's views at that time. 46 Hitler speech of Nov. 8, 194I, in Der GrossdeutscheFreiheitskampf, ed. Bouhler, III,
101.

43 Ibid.,232-33

(Sept. 17,

194I).

47 See Hitler's comments to Yosuke Matsuoka, Apr. 4, Policy, I9I8-I 945, Ser. D, XII, No. 266.

1941,

Documents on German Foreign

48 The former German ambassador to the United States, Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, tried unsuccessfullyto counter this line of argument. (Ibid., XI, No. 633.) B6tticher'sviews, especially on lend-lease, were again more like Hitler's. (Ibid., XII, Nos. 88, I48, 2I2.) 49 Trefousse, Germany and American Neutrality, I 55. 328. 50Ernst von Weizsdcker,Erinnerungen (Munich, I950),

IOI8

Gerhard L. Weinberg

after Pearl Harborhe said: "I'll never believe that an Americancan fight like a hero."51 expressedhis "feelingsof hatredand deep repugnance" He for Americanismand added: "I don't see much future for the Americans. into the war That America's entrance In my view it's a decayedcountry."52 might seriouslyaffect its outcome does not seem to have occurredto him. On the contrary,he was overjoyedat Japan'sadvancesin the Pacific and the continuedsuccesses his U-boatsin the Atlantic.He was certainlynot of worriedabout Americanleadership:one could becomecolonel more easily in the Americanthan lieutenantin the GermanArmy;53 while America's Hitler civilianleaders werea groupof "nitwits" (Strohkapfe).5' Occasionally
gave vent to his deep hatred of Roosevelt;55 but convinced of America's

inherent inferiority,he refused to be daunted by the prospectof massive of The productivity American industry-once the Americanparticipation. a objectof his enviousadmiration-was now proclaimed figmentof Roosevelt'simagination." The first major clash betweenAmericanand Germantroopstook place in Tunisia in FebruaryI943. In an engagementnear KasserinePass, the justly or unjustly,two AmericangenAmericansinitiallysufferedreverses; eralswere dismissedfor the army'sfailureto do as well as had been hoped. This episode naturallyconfirmedHitler's convictionthat the GI was no The ultimate defeat of the veterans.57 match for his own battle-hardened Germansin Tunisia led to no revisionin Hitler'sevaluation.He similarly discounted impactof Americanaid to its Allies.SS the of The Sicilianand Italiancampaigns I943 broughtno changein Hitler's views. Looking forwardto a possibleAllied invasionof WesternEurope, Hitler was certainthat the Americantroops"arenot qualifiedto solve this problem.They can't do it. If they had troops with two years'combatexperience,one would say they might do it, but they are all new outfits."59
51 Hitler's Table Talk, ed. Trevor-Roper, i8i cf. Hitlers Tischgespriche, (Jan. 5, I942); ed. Ritter, II2 (July 2I, I942). 52 Hiler's Table Talk, ed. Trevor-Roper,i88 (Jan. 7, I942). 53 Hitlers Tischgesprache,ed. Ritter, 385 (Mar. 25, 1942). 541bid., 87 (May I7, I942). 55 Albert Zoller, Hitler privat, Erlebnisberichtseiner Geheimsekretdrin(Dusseldorf, 1949),

The diary of Goebbels contains 56 Hitlers Tischgespriche, ed. Ritter, I63 (July 2, 1942). many referencesof this kind. 5T Hitler conference of Mar. 3, 1943, in Hitler Directs His War, The Secret Records of His Daily Military Conferences,ed. Felix Gilbert (New York, I950), 24; Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, III, 1943, Kriegstagebuchdes Oberkommandosder Wehrmacht 1940-1945, ed. Heiber, I70-71; ed. Walther Hubatsch (Frankfurt a.M., i963), 15I2. 58 Hitler conference of Dec. 20, 1943 (?), Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,ed. Heiber, 433-44. In the same conference, Hitler expressed grave doubts about America's ability to finance its war
effort. (Ibid., 450.) 59 Ibid., 452; Hitler Directs His War, ed. Gilbert, 8o.

I58.

Hitler's Image of the United States

10I9

The Normandy invasion would have convinced any normal person that there was somethingwrong with the image of a weak America,unableto defend itself, incapable mobilizingproduction, of and unskilledin military affairs.The simultaneousrapid progressof American operationsin the Pacific-the offensives Biak and Saipanwere mountedat aboutthe same on time as the Normandy invasion-might also have impresseda thinking observer. Hitler was hardlya normalperson,and realitywas no longer But allowedto intrudeupon his world of dreamsand illusions.As Germany's militarysituation deteriorated, closedhis eyes and earsto new impressions. he He would no longer visit the front. He refusedto look at Germany's cities as they sank into rubbleand dust. He literallyburiedhimself in his East Prussianbunker,where he alternated between interferingin the minutiae of militaryaffairsand pontificating the natureof the universe. on Germany'sdesperateexertionsenabled it to survivethe defeats of the summerand fall of I944. Its last reserveswould make possibleone more blow. Hitler decided that nothing much could be accomplished the on easternfront, but the situationin the west looked differentto him. There he thought himself confrontedby the far weaker and more easily discouragedAmerican and British forces.A successfulblow at them might yet bring about a drasticchange in the situation.What a land victoryin the west had not accomplished I940 might still be attained.Thus Gerin many's last reserveswere thrown into the Ardennesoffensive,the Battle of the Bulge,60 and a subsequent smalleroffensive,only to be haltedby the Americansand soon after shiftedto the east to meet the Soviet winter offensive. If nothing else, this last attackin the west shows how persistently Hitler held to his negativeevaluation the United States.It is only fair to of add that these views were long sharedand reinforced many of his topby level military advisers.6'Certainlythe vast quantity of German military recordsmade availablesince the war containsfew signs of real awareness of Americanmilitarypotentialoutside the purely industrialone. The recently publishedvolumesof the war diary of the Germanhigh command's operationsstaff are most eloquenton this subjectby their very silence,in almosttwo thousand pagesfor the yearsI944-I45.62
60 Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D. C., 1954), Chap. xx; for a contemporary perspective, see Semmler, Goebbels, i68. 61 Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit, I42; comments by Alfred Jodl and others at the conference of Mar. 3, 1943, cited in note 57, above; see also the comments on the illusions of Germany's military leaders about American power being tied up in the Far East in the Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht I940-I945, III, ed. Hubatsch, 15I2-I3. 62 Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1940-I945, IV, 1944-45, ed. Percy E. Schramm (Frankfurt a.M., 196I).

1020

Gerhard L. Weinberg

In the last monthsof the war, Hitler'smind becameincreasingly clouded. How far his thoughtshad strayedfrom the realmof realityis illustrated by his reactionto the news of Roosevelt's death.Totally ignorantof the facts of Americanlife, he and his associatesneither knew nor cared about the realitiesof the Americansystemof succession. they could think of was All the deathof the RussianEmpressElizabethin 1762 that had savedFrederick the Greatfrom defeat and Prussiafrom disasterat the last momentin the SevenYears'War. Here, they thought,was anothersuch miracle-and there was no one to pointout thatit was a mirage.63 Hitler'sbeliefshad once demonstrated clearlythat the United Stateswas raciallystrong and a dangerousthreat.Soon after, these same murky doctrineshad revealed him with equalclaritythatthe UnitedStateswas weak to and degenerate. These contradictory visions assailedhim simultaneously in the last weeks of the war. On the one hand,facedby the streams Ameriof can bombersover Germany,he revertedto his earlierrecognitionof the potentialof Americanindustrialmight.64 now assertedthat it was the He dangerof this war potentialloomingin the distancethat had made an early attackon Russianecessary,65 concludedthat his war againstthe United and Stateswas a tragedy.66 the otherhand, he insistedthat the United States On was an artificialsociety without soul, culture,or civilization67 and maintained that "the fact that they [the Americans]combinethe possessionof such vast materialpowerwith so vast a lackof intelligence evokesthe image of some child strickenwith elephantiasis"; from which in turn he concluded that the United Stateswas "a giant with feet of clay."68 Even his evaluation of the German-Americans now swung between such extremes.Though they had allegedlylost their souls, these Germanswere at one momentdescribedas "the backboneof the country," retainingtheir characteristics of industry and hard work. Minutes later Hitler explained:"Transplanta Germanto Kiev, and he remainsa perfectGerman.But transplant him to Miami,and you make a degenerate him-in otherwords,an American."69 of Only the total dominationof Americanpolicyby Jewsremaineda constant
factor in his visions.

In those last macabredays in the Berlin bunker,Hitler could not make

613 Semmler, Goebbels, 190-93.
64

65 The Testament of Adolf Hitler, The Hitler-Bormann Documents, February-April 1945, ed. Fransois Genoud (London, I96i), 64 (Feb. 15, 1945). 66 Ibid., 87 (Feb. 2I, 1945). 67 Ibid., 43 (Feb. 7, 1945). f68Ibid., io8 (Apr. 2, I945). 69 Ibid., 45-46 (Feb. 7, 1945) .

Hitler conference of Jan. 10,

1945,

Hitlers Lagebesprechungen,ed. Heiber, 814-15.

Hitler's Image of the United States

I02I

up his mind which of the two imagesof Americawas right.We might conclude that the reasonfor this was that both were wrong, but that would involvesubstituting standard truthfor his. By his standards-towhich our of he clung as long as he lived-they were both right even though contradictory. In a totalitarian state,such standards imagesbecomethe framework and for policy formulationby the dictator.Since the negative assessmentof Americanstrength predominated the years when Hitler was in a poin sition to initiate events, and was supportedratherthan contradicted a by majorityof his advisers,the underestimation the United Statescan be of seen to have reducedGermancaution in the 1930's and distortedGerman

estimates the 1940's. in military

Hitler had wantedto divide Germany;he left it divided,though not the way he had intended. He had planned on three wars; he had them, all rolledinto one, but they did not come out as he anticipated. The doctrines by which he lived and fought deceivedhim in death as in life. He committedsuicidelest he be captured the Russians;his last will endedup on by in the United StatesNationalArchives.70 display
70

I963), supplementsbut does not alter the picture presentedhere.

The recent publication by Saul FriedlHnder, Hitler et les tats-Unis (Ix3-iq4I

) (Geneva,