Criminal Law cases Owens v. State Brief Fact Summary.

The Defendant Owens was convicted of driving while intoxicated after he was found unconscious in a vehicle with its motor running. Synopsis of Rule of Law. [A] conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Facts. A police officer responded to a complaint of a suspicious vehicle. When he arrived on the scene, he found the Defendant unconscious behind the wheel of his truck. The trucks engine was running, and its lights were on. Between the Defendants legs was an open can of beer. There were two other empty beer cans in the vehicle. The trooper stated that the Defendant smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, and could not recite the alphabet. No eyewitness actually saw the Defendant driving his vehicle. The judge, sitting without a jury, convicted the Defendant of driving while intoxicated, and this appeal followed. Issue. Is the Defendants conviction based on legally sufficient evidence? Held. Yes. Conviction affirmed. [A] conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. In other words, where the conviction is based solely on circumstantial evidence, without eyewitness testimony, the conviction cannot stand if the circumstances also can be explained by any reasonable means. Here, the Defendant was passed out behind the wheel of a vehicle with its motor running. Either he drove to the spot where he was found or he had just gotten into the vehicle, started it up, and passed out before he could drive. The latter proposition, however, is not a reasonable hypothesis. The presence of beer cans in the car leads one to conclude that he had been drinking in the car, and it is not reasonable for a person to leave his house, get in the car, start the engine, drink beer, and then pass out. Further, the car only contained three beers, which probably were not enough to induce unconsciousness, so the drinking is more likely to be at its end rather than the beginning. Discussion. A conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone must be scrutinized to determine whether the circumstances are consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of guilt. This case may have been decided differently if the Defendant was outside his vehicle at the time the police arrived.

State v. Ragland Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Ragland was convicted by jury of, among other things, armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial judge instructed the jury that it must convict of the possession charge if it found that the Defendant possessed a weapon during the robbery. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The jurys right to acquit despite overwhelming evidence of guilt is not a right of the accused but rather a power of the jury. Facts. The Defendant was charged with various offenses, including armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. At the conclusion of trial, the judge instructed the jury that it must convict of the possession charge if it found that the Defendant possessed a weapon during the commission of the robbery. The jury convicted the Defendant of, among other things, armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, and this appeal ensued on the issue of whether the judges use of the word must deprived the Defendant of the jurys nullification power, an essential attribute of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Issue. Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury that it must convict of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon if it finds that the defendant possessed a weapon during the robbery? Held. No, but the conviction for possession was reversed and a new trial ordered on other grounds not recounted in the opinion. A jury may acquit a defendant despite overwhelming proof of guilt. This practice, commonly referred to as jury nullification, is certainly a power the jury has. However, jury nullification is not desirable. The legislature has defined criminal conduct, and while twelve people picked as jurors may see a law as unjust or a particular application of a law as unfair, they are not in the best position to revise the law. The legislature is elected to perform such a duty. Therefore, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that jury nullification is not, as the defendant argues, a constitutionally protected attribute of the right to trial by jury. A jury simply has the power to nullify the law by acquitting a person believed to be guilty. Hence, it was not error for the judge to instruct the jury as he did. Discussion. The chance that the jury will nullify the law by acquitting a defendant the jury believes to be guilty is one benefit for the defendant of trial by jury. However, the jury has no more than the power to nullify. The Defendant does not have a right to have the judge advertise the power to the jury

The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens Brief Fact Summary. The Defendants, Thomas Dudley (Mr. Dudley) and Edwin Stephens (Mr. Stephens) (Defendants) and two other gentlemen, Mr. Brooks and the victim, Richard Parker (Mr. Parker), were stranded on a boat for several days. When it appeared that the whole party would likely die of thirst and starvation, the Defendants decided to sacrifice Mr. Parker for the good of the rest. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A person may not sacrifice another persons life to save his own. Facts. The defendants, Mr. Brooks and the victim Mr. Parker were English seamen. The group was cast away in a storm on the high seas and was compelled to put into an open boat that had no supply of food or water. After the group had been without food for seven days and without water for five days, the Defendants spoke to Mr. Brooks about sacrificing the victim Mr. Parker to save the rest. Mr. Brooks dissented and the victim was not consulted. Mr. Dudley suggested that if no vessel was in sight the next morning, they would kill the victim. No vessel appeared the next day, so Mr. Dudley with the assent of Mr. Stephens killed the victim. The three remaining castaways fed upon the victim Mr. Parker for four days at which time a passing vessel rescued them. Issue. Does the defense of necessity permit the killing of one person to save others? Held. No. At the time of this case the doctrine of necessity was still largely unexplored. Much of the prevailing authority at the time spoke of necessity in terms of what is now called self-defense, i.e. taking anothers life to safeguard ones own. Lord Bacon provided some authority for the existence of the defense of necessity to lesser crimes. For example, a hungry man is not guilty of larceny for stealing food. However, the Queens Bench acknowledged that no court has ever accepted necessity as a defense to murder and for good reason. Permitting such a defense to be asserted raises poignant questions such as how does one measure the comparative values of lives and who decides such things. Further, specific to the present case, Lord Coleridge asks, Was it more necessary to kill [Parker] than one of the grown men? While this murder was arguably not devilish and even though the men probably would not have survived otherwise, Lord Coleridge held that there is never any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve ones own life. Once such a defense is allowed, there is no telling what atrocious crimes may be justified by the excuse of necessity. Discussion. Necessity is never a defense to murder.

CHAPTER 3 PRINCIPLES OF LEGALITY Commonwealth v. Mochan Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Mochan placed several telephone calls to Louise Zivkovich during which he made comments portraying the victim as lewd, immoral, and lascivious. While the conduct was not specifically proscribed by statute, the Defendant was charged and convicted under the common law. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Common law crimes continue to be punishable under the law. Facts. Defendant Mochan was charged with intending to debauch and corrupt, and further devising and intending to harass, embarrass and vilify Louise Zivkovich. The Defendant was accused of calling the victims house and among other things, making indecent comments intending to injure the victim. No Pennsylvania statute specifically forbade the Defendants actions, but rather, he was convicted under the common law of outraging decency and injuring public morals. The Defendant thereafter appealed. Issue. Was the Defendant properly convicted for violating the common law crime of outraging decency and injuring public morals? Held. Yes. Conviction affirmed. The Pennsylvania Penal Code, at the time of this case, provided that common law crimes were still punishable. Under the common law, [w]hatever openly outrages decency and is injurious to public morals is a misdemeanor at common law. The defendants phone calls suggested sodomy and consisted of lewd, immoral, and filthy language. These acts, at least potentially, injured public morality. The defendants conviction was therefore justified. Dissent. By punishing under the common law, the judiciary is improperly invading a field that should be left to the legislature, namely deciding acts that injure the public. Discussion. Nearly all states, including Pennsylvania, have abolished common law offenses. BROUGHTON SAID THAT THIS DECISION MADE THIGNS WORSE. THEY SHOULD HAVE JUST NOT PROSECUTED THEM. JUST BECAUSE YOU ARE ENTITLED TO PROSECUTE DOESNT MEAN YOU SHOULD.

Keeler v. Superior Court Brief Fact Summary. Petitioner Keeler was charged with murder and appeals the denial of his motion to set aside the information on the ground that a fetus is not a human

being, as contemplated by the California law defining murder. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The term human being, as contemplated by the penal code of California, does not include an unborn fetus. Facts. Petitioner intercepted his ex-wife, who was in the advanced state of pregnancy, and shoved his knee into her abdomen following his exclamation that he was going to stomp the fetus out of her. As a result, the fetus was delivered stillborn with a fractured skull. Petitioner was charged with murder of the fetus under Californias Penal Code which provides that murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought. Petitioner moved to set aside the charge based on his contention that a fetus is not a human being as contemplated by the murder statute. The motion was denied and the petitioner seeds a writ of prohibition. Issue. Does the fetus which Petitioner is accused of killing constitute a human being within the meaning of the statute? Held. No. Writ of prohibition granted. The Supreme Court of California, in holding that the term human being does not include an unborn fetus, looked at the legislative history of the enactment of the provision and stated that the legislature intended for human being to mean person who had been born alive and therefore intended to excluded fetus from that definition. Furthermore, Penal Code section 6 states in essence that there are no common law crimes in California and that the power to define crimes is vested exclusively in the legislative branch. Therefore the Peoples argument that given the advances in science, a fetus can be independently viable does not stand. It is up to the legislature and not the courts to change the definition. The Court continues its rationale for not enlarging the definition of human being by stating that even if it did have the power to adopt a new construction of the term, the new construction would not reach the conduct of the petitioner because it could only operate prospectively under the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The court discusses the importance, under the principles of due process, of notice of what does and does not constitute criminal behavior. In this case, the court found no reported decisions in California that should have given the petitioner notice that the killing of an unborn but viable fetus was prohibited by statute. Dissent. The dissent suggests that the words of a statute must be interpreted by the courts to promote justice and should not be frozen in time. The majoritys suggestion that an interpretation of the murder statute to include the killing of an unborn fetus would deny the defendant fair warning that his act was criminal is wrong because, based on the existing statute, the defendant had adequate notice that it

could constitute murder. Due process precludes prosecution under a preexisting by means of an unforeseeable judicial enlargement thereof. The judicial determination of the meaning of human being is not an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of the murder statute. Discussion. This case addresses several aspects of legality and their limitations with regard to criminal law such as the fact that we do not allow judge-made law, however, laws are written in general terms which necessitates interpretation. The case also addresses the idea that we do not allow the imposition of retroactive lawmaking and that we must afford notice of what acts constitute criminal behavior such that individuals have the opportunity to avoid such behavior. THE VALUES OF STATUTORY CLARITY In re Banks Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant is challenging the North Carolina Peeping Tom statute as unconstitutional. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the act proscribed. Facts. The North Carolina Peeping Tom statute provides, Any person who shall peep secretly into any room occupied by a female person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined or imprisoned in the discretion of the court. The Defendant challenges the constitutionality of this statute, averring that it is vague because it does not inform men of common intelligence of its meaning and application. WHAT DOES PEEP MEAN OR EVEN SECRET PEEPING???

Issue. Is the North Carolina Peeping Tom statute unconstitutionally vague? Held. No. Definiteness is an essential element of due process of law. A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the act proscribed. The statute is presumed constitutional and must be so held unless it conflicts with some constitutional provision. Where the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, the courts must give the statute its plain meaning. However, where there is an ambiguity in the statute, the Court must look to the legislative intent.

In the present case, the North Carolina statute at issue is clear and unambiguous. The law makes it a crime to peep secretly. Citing precedent, the Supreme Court of North Carolina defines this phrase so that the statute can easily be read to prohibit the wrongful spying into a room upon a female with the intent of violating the females legitimate expectation of privacy. NC ALREADY DEFINED THIS FOOL. NO VAUGNESS PROBLEM. This reading is sufficient to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice of what activity constitutes a crime. Therefore, the North Carolina Peeping Tom statute is sufficiently definite to give an individual fair notice of the conduct prohibited. The statute does not violate the North Carolina State Constitution or the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution by reason of vagueness or uncertainty.

Discussion. In order to pass constitutional muster, a statute must inform the general public, in the simplest terms possible, of acts constituting a crime. A statute does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution if it fairly alerts an individual as to what conduct is prohibited. THREE RULES: I. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE II. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY III. RULE OF LENITY NOTE- THIS IS A SPECIFIC INTENT CRIME. It is big that there is a specific intent required to fall within this statues. Compare to note 6, about the optical intercourse "optical intercourse" staring too intently into the eyes of a member of the opposite sex There was no intent in this, so it would be no good. Q- WHEN YOU DRAFT CRIMINAL LAWS SHOULD YOU BE FOCUS OF LAGUAGE THAT GETS AT A SPECIFIC STATE OF MIND (INTENT) AS OPPOSED TO A GENERAL STATE THAT DOES NOT GET AT A SPECIFIC STATE OF MIND.

City of Chicago v. Morales | Brief Fact Summary. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Chicagos Gang Congregation Ordinance was unconstitutionally vague and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A law that directly prohibited gangs from loitering would not violate the due process clause, however, where an ordinance either fails to provide notice

as to what behavior is prohibited or authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, it may be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague. Facts. The Chicago City Council enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance which prohibits gang members from loitering with one another or with other persons in any public place. Commission of the offence involves four things: (1) The police officer must reasonably believe that at least one of the two or more loiterers is a gang member; (2) the persons must be loitering, which is defined as remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose; (3) the officer must order all of the persons to disperse; (4) a person must disobey the order. Any person who disobeys the order, regardless of whether he/she is a gang member, is guilty of violating the ordinance. The Illinois Supreme Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Issue. Is the gang loitering ordinance impermissibly vague such that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? Held. Yes. Judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States holds that the Gang Congregation Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it both fails to provide notice to the citizens and leaves too much discretion to the police. A law that directly prohibited gangs from loitering would not violate the due process clause. However, where an ordinance either fails to provide notice as to what behavior is prohibited or authorizes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, it may be invalidated as unconstitutionally vague. The purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law. The ordinance in question defines the term loiter as to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose. Apparent purpose does not have a common meaning such that the ordinary person would know whether he or she had an apparent purpose. The statute in effect is a catchall prohibition which would allow the courts to say who could and could not be rightfully detained. Furthermore, it provides absolute discretion to police officers to determine what activities constitute loitering. Dissent. The dissent construes the ordinance as penalizing a loiterers failure to obey a police officers order to move rather than penalizing the act of loitering. Therefore, as opposed to the majority view that the ordinance vests too much authority in the police, the dissent sees the ordinance as enabling police officers to carry out their authority to order groups of people who threaten the public peace to move. Furthermore, the dissent sees nothing vague about an order to disperse and therefore believes that the ordinance does afford notice consistent with the Due Process Clause.

Concurrence. The Illinois Supreme Court could have construed the gang ordinance more narrowly in order to avoid the vagueness problem and therefore, the concurring opinion points out the narrow application of the majority opinion. Discussion. This case addresses the two aspects of legality that are embodied in the Due Process Clause: (a) notice & opportunity and (b) abuse of law enforcement STATUTORY INTERPRETATION Muscarello v. United States Facts of the Case: 18 USC section 924(c)(1) subjects a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime" to a 5-year mandatory prison term. In 96-1654, police officers found a handgun locked in Frank J. Muscarello's truck's glove compartment. Muscarello was transporting marijuana for sale in his truck. Muscarello argued that his "carrying" of the gun in the glove compartment did not fall within the scope of the statutory word "carries." In 96-8837, federal agents found drugs and guns in Donald Cleveland and Enrique Gray-Santana's car at a drug-sale point. The Court of Appeals, in both cases, found that the defendants had violated section 924(c)(1). Question: Does the fact that guns were found in a locked glove compartment, or the trunk, of a car, preclude the application of 18 U section 924(c)(1), which imposes a 5-year mandatory prison term upon a person who "uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"? Conclusion: No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the Court held that the phrase "carries a firearm" applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Exploring the meaning of "carry," Justice Breyer concluded, among other things, that the statute's basic purpose to combat the dangerous combination of drugs and guns does not support limiting "carry" to an "on the person" application. In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and David H. Souter, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued that "carries a firearm" means bearing a firearm in a manner as to be ready to use it as a weapon. LEGISLATURE TAKES TERMS THAT WE THINK WE KNOW AND SHOWS HOW WE DONT REALLY KNOW WHAT THEY MEAN. CH.2 PRINCIPLES OF PUNISHEMENT

People v. Superior Court (DU)

Brief Fact Summary. This appeal follows the conviction of the Defendant, Soon Ja Du (Defendant), upon the charge of voluntary manslaughter following the death of Latasha Harlins (Harlins). The events giving rise to the Defendants conviction occurred after an altercation between the Defendant, an owner of a convenience store, and Harlins, a fifteen year old patron of the convenience store whom the Defendant thought was shoplifting. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Any self-defense claim will be heavily scrutinized and only applied in limited situations. Facts. On March 16, 1991, the Defendant was working at the Empire Liquor Market, one of two convenience stores owned and operated by the Defendant. On that day, the Defendant was working at Empire so that her son could work at the other store owned by the family because her son had recently been threatened by local gang members. The Defendant was waiting on two customers when Harlins entered the store. Harlins proceeded to the section of the store where juice was kept and she selected a bottle of orange juice, put it in her backpack and proceeded to the checkout. Although the orange juice was in Harlins backpack, it was partially visible. As Harlins approached the counter with two or three dollars in her hand, the Defendant called her a bitch and asked Harlins to pay for the juice. When Harlins responded what juice? the Defendant concluded that Harlins was attempting to shoplift. The Defendant began pulling on Harlans sweater in an attempt to retrieve the bottle of juice. As a result, the two women struggled and, eventually, Harlins ended up striking the Defendant twice in the eye with her fist. The Defendant fell to the ground and testified later that Harlins told her that she would be killed. Subsequently, the Defendant picked up a stool from behind the counter and threw it in the direction or Harlins, narrowly missing. After throwing the stool, the Defendant grabbed a .38 caliber revolver. Harlins put the juice back on the counter and proceeded to exit the store. However, as Harlins tried to exit the store, the Defendant shot her in the back of the head, killing her instantly. Issue. Should the Defendant be convicted on the charge of voluntary manslaughter despite her allegation that she acted in self-defense? Furthermore, if convicted, should the Defendant be given probation or sentenced to state prison? Held. The jury found the Defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter and rejected the Defendants defenses that the killing was unintentional and that the Defendant killed in self-defense. After the Defendants conviction, the case was referred to a Los Angeles County Probation Officer, who prepared a pre-sentence probation report. The probation officers ultimate conclusion and recommendation was that probation be denied and the

Defendant be sentenced to state prison. ULTIMATELY SHE WAS PUT ON PROBATION Discussion. Much of the decision focuses on the probation report compiled by the Los Angeles Probation Officer. In that report, the officer detailed the fact that the Defendant and her family had moved from Korea and, eventually, purchased the Empire store despite being told that it was in a bad area. Furthermore, the report stated that the Defendants family often had problems with harassment from gang members, including an incident in 1990 when gang members robbed their son at the store. Alternatively, the probation report revealed that Harlins had experienced an unusually hard life, including the violent death of her mother. The probation report concluded that, although the Defendant would most likely not repeat this crime in the future, she expressed very little remorse for the victim and her family. The recommendation that the Defendant be sentenced to prison rather than probation seemingly revolved around her lack of sympathy for the victim.

The jury found Du guilty of voluntary manslaughter with a 16-year prison sentence recommendation, believing that Du's shooting was fully within her control and she fired the gun voluntarily. The presiding judge, Joyce Karlin reduced the sentence to probation of five years, four hundred hours of community service, and a $500.00 fine

People v. DU Brief Fact Summary. Judge Karlin sentenced the Defendant, Du (Defendant), to ten years in state prison, but then suspended the sentence and placed her on probation. The portion of the case provided by the Dressler handbook includes the judges remarks at sentencing. Synopsis of Rule of Law. In imposing a sentence, a judge must first consider the objectives of sentencing a defendant, including: (1) to protect society; (2) to punish the defendant for committing a crime; (3) to encourage the defendant to lead a law-abiding life; (4) to deter others; (5) to isolate the defendant so she cannot commit other crimes; (6) to secure restitution for the victim and (7) to seek uniformity in sentencing. Facts. The Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter following the shooting of fifteen year old Latasha Harlins (Harlins) after an altercation in a convenience store owned by the Defendants family. The gun that the Defendant used to shoot Harlins with had previously been altered without the Defendants knowledge. Further, the Defendant had decided to work that particular shift at the convenience store in order to allow her son to work at another store that the family owned. The Defendant made this decision because her son had previously been the victim of threats by local gang members.

Issue. Can the objectives of sentencing be achieved through conviction of the Defendant to ten years of incarceration?

Held. Probation is a more appropriate form of sentence than incarceration in this case. Discussion. Judge Karlin discussed each particular sentencing objective. The following is a brief synopsis of her remarks: Because of the unique nature of each crime of voluntary manslaughter, uniformity in sentencing is virtually impossible to achieve. The Defendant does not need to be incarcerated in order to protect society. Society does not need the Defendant to be incarcerated in order to be protected. State prison is not needed in order to encourage the Defendant to lead a law-abiding life. State prison is not needed in order to isolate the Defendant so that she cannot commit other crimes. State prison is not necessary because this is an unusual case. There are three reasons for this result. First, the criminal statute in question is not aimed at shopkeepers who lawfully possess firearms for their own protection. Second, the Defendant had no record at the time of committing similar crimes or crimes of violence. Finally, the Defendant participated in this crime under great provocation, coercion and duress.

United States v. Gementera United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 379 F.3d 596 (2004) Procedural Posture: Defendant, Gementera, pled guilty to mail theft. Defendant has appealed the lower courts sentence. Issue: Was the courts decision of a supervised release condition that requires defendant to spend a day standing outside a post office wearing a signboard stating, I stole mail. This is my punishment legal? Holding: Yes. Rule: 18 U.S.C. Sec 3553 states that any condition must:

Be reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.

Be both reasonably related to and involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct Provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

Facts: Defendant stole letters from several mailboxes and pled guilty to mail theft. This was not defendants first criminal offense. He was previously convicted, among others, of misdemeanor criminal mischief, twice convicted of driving with a suspended license and misdemeanor battery. Defendant was sentenced to the lower bound of the Sentencing Guidelines of two months incarceration and three years supervised released along with imposed conditions of supervised release (standing in front of the post office for 8 hours with the sign). Disposition: Sentence held. Reasoning: First Argument: D argued that the sandwich board condition violated the Sentencing Reform Act (Condition must deter criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes and provide D with rehabilitation. Court had to determine: (1) Whether the sentencing judge imposed the conditions for permissible purposes, and then (2) whether the conditions are reasonably related to the purposes (1) Court imposed the condition for the purpose of rehabilitation, general deterrence and for the protection of the public court did not humiliate for humiliations sake (2) D also argued that humiliation is not reasonably related to rehabilitation court concluded that defendant did not fully understand the consequences of his continued criminal offenses. So, public acknowledgment of ones offense was necessary to his rehabilitation D contended that shaming cannot be rehabilitative because it would withdraw him from society or inflict psychological damage. Court said penalties that accompany criminal offenses, almost always cause shame and embarrassment such feelings generally signal the defendants acknowledgment of his wrongdoing. Second Argument:

D argued that the condition violated the Constitution under the Eighth Amendment, which forbids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments Court held that no evidence was offered for this argument there is no reason to conclude that the sanction exceeds the bounds of civilized standards. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

Coker v. Georgia
Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Coker escaped from prison where he was serving various sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. The Defendant committed another rape, along with kidnapping and armed robbery, among others, and a jury convicted him of his crimes. Under a Georgia statute, the Defendant was sentenced to death, and he appeals. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A punishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Facts. The Defendant had been serving sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault when he escaped from prison. Defendant entered the home of Allen and Elnita Carver, threatened the couple, and tied up Mr. Carver in the bathroom. The Defendant obtained a knife in the kitchen and took Mr. Carvers money and keys to the car. The Defendant raped Mrs. Carver and took her with him in the family car. Mr. Carver was able to free himself, and he called the police, who then apprehended the Defendant. Mrs. Carver was not harmed outside of the rape and kidnapping, that is, she was alive. The Defendant was charged with escape, armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping and rape. After he was convicted of all charges, the Defendant was sentenced to death under a Georgia statute permitting such a penalty if the jury finds certain aggravating factors. Issue. Is the imposition of the death penalty for rape unconstitutional? Held. Yes. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) forbids cruel and unusual punishment, i.e. punishments that are excessive in relation to the crime committed. A punishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. A sentence of death for rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment and is therefore unconstitutional.

Dissent. Justice Powell dissents in addition to concurring because he believes that the plurality has gone to far in holding that capital punishment is always a disproportionate penalty for rape. Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, dissents: In the Chief Justices view, the Eighth Amendment does not bar a state from taking into account ones welldemonstrated propensity for life-endangering behavior in punishing the defendant. Further, it is not irrational nor constitutionally impermissible to penalize the defendant more severely than the criminal act it punishes in order to deter wrongdoing. Concurrence. Justices Brennan and Marshall concur because they believe the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in all cases. Justice Powell concurs that the punishment of death for rape is wrong in this specific case. Discussion. Capital punishment for rape is unconstitutional.

Ewing v. California
Brief Fact Summary. A defendant with an extensive criminal past was sentenced 25 to life after stealing golf clubs. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A three strikes rule is constitutional if the sentence is not grossly disproportionate [with the crime] and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Facts. Petitioner Ewing had a substantial criminal history and was on parole when he was arrested for grand larceny after stealing three golf clubs from a sports store. He was tried under Californias three strikes law. The trial court took note of that substantial history, and sentenced him to 25 years to life under the law. Issue. [W]hether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the States Three Strikes and Youre Out law. Held. Yes. The Supreme Court first referenced Harmelin v. Michigan, and the principle that the Eighth Amendment has a narrow proportionality principle applied to noncapital crimes. There are four principles of proportionality review: the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors. The Court differed to the California legislature on the relevant point. On the last point, the Court compared the gravity of the offense to the harshness of the penalty, holding that the theft, in combination with petitioners long history of recidivism, justified the public safety interest aspect of the sentence. Dissent.

Justice Stevens found the Eighth Amendment had a board proportionality principle. Justice Breyer found that the triggering crime was not sufficient. Concurrence. Justice Scalia found that the Eighth Amendment was aimed at modes of punishment, but concurred on stare decisis principles. Justice Thomas found that there was not proportionality principal, but concurred on stare decisis. Discussion. The Eighth Amendment

Graham v Florida CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: While he was a juvenile, although charged as an adult, defendant pleaded guilty to armed burglary with assault and attempted robbery, was adjudicated guilty after violating conditions of probation, and received the maximum sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Upon the grant of a writ of certiorari, the defendant appealed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeal of Florida which affirmed the defendant's sentence. OVERVIEW: The defendant contended that, as a juvenile who did not commit or intend to commit homicide, the sentence of life imprisonment without parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The U.S. Supreme Court held that U.S. Const. amend. VIII prohibited the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on the juvenile offender who committed a nonhomicide crime and, while the defendant need not be guaranteed eventual release from the life sentence, he must have some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of the life term. The practice of sentencing a juvenile who did not commit a homicide offense to life without parole was exceedingly rare and a national community consensus developed against it, and none of the recognized goals of penal sanctions, i.e., retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, provided an adequate justification for the sentence. Further, it could not be conclusively determined at the time of sentencing that the juvenile defendant would be a danger to society for the rest of his life, and a sentence of life without parole improperly denied the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth, maturity, and rehabilitation. OUTCOME: The judgment affirming the defendant's sentence was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 6-3 Decision; 2 Concurrences; 2 Dissents.

Thomas- Separate opinion- Death is no longer different if he is right what are the consiquences. But remember it applied Roper and the Kennedy homicide / non-homicide. So the real cant put lifetime parole on a juvenile offender who commits a non homicidal crime.

State v. Utter
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant Utter stabbed and killed his son. He claims to have no recollection of the murder, as it was committed after the Defendant had consumed alcohol and allegedly killed by a conditioned response. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An act committed during unconsciousness is not voluntary, and therefore one cannot be held criminally culpable for said act. However, voluntarily induced unconsciousness, such as by drugs or alcohol, is not a complete defense. Facts. The Defendant and his son had been living together at the time of the killing. The son entered his fathers apartment on the date in question, and shortly thereafter, he was heard to say, Dad, dont. He was later seen stumbling into the hallway of the apartment building, and before he died, he said, Dad stabbed me. The Defendant had served in the armed forces and was honorably discharged. He testified that on the date in question, he began drinking in the morning. The Defendant remembers drinking with a friend of his and waking up in jail, but he does not remember anything in between. At trial, the Defendant sought to introduce evidence of conditioned response, which his expert defined as an act done automatically in response to a certain stimulus. The trial court ruled that this was no defense and instructed the jury to disregard the evidence. The jury convicted the Defendant of manslaughter, and he appealed to the court rendering this opinion, the Court of Appeals of Washington. Issue. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury to disregard evidence regarding the defendants conditioned response defense?

Held. Yes. Homicide is defined as the killing of a human being by the act NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT HIS CONDITION MADE HIM DO THIS.

HYPO- sleepwalker grabs knife and stabs knife. Can he be punished for homicide? Now the act of stabbing is a voluntary act, but if you do the act while in the state of unconsciousness its not an act. Therefore, this is not an act and we are not held accountable when we are unconscience. HYPO- D has epilepsy. He gets into car and crashes. What if he knew of his condition and took his medicine but it happened anyway? Well, maybe it depends on how we time frame

the question. If we time it when the action occurred, no act (bc of seizure). If we bring it back then it is voluntary ( he had the choice to get in car ). Courts are treating these conditions different. COMPARE TO SLEEPWALKING You can choose not to drive car, but you cannot choose not to sleep. So its obvious that a sleepwalker is not responsible for the homicide.

People v. Beardsley
Brief Fact Summary. While his wife was out of town, the Defendant spent the weekend with another woman, Blanche Burns. On Monday afternoon, Ms. Burns consumed morphine in an apparent suicide attempt. After she died, the Defendant was convicted for manslaughter for failing to render aid. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A person owes no legal obligation to another unless such person is within his custody or care as a dependent person. Facts. The Defendant was a married man. While his wife was out of town, he arranged to spend time with Ms. Burns, with whom he had been previously acquainted. The two spent the weekend together drinking liquor in the Defendants apartment. When they ran out of liquor, a young man from the Columbia Hotel brought more. The young man appeared on Monday afternoon to see if they wanted anything, and Ms. Burns sent him to the drugstore to get camphor and morphine. Ms. Burns concealed the morphine from the Defendant, but the Defendant and the young man noticed her putting something in her mouth. The Defendant knocked the box out of her hand and crushed several of the tablets. Nevertheless, she probably took about three to four grains of morphine. The young man then left, but the Defendant called him about an hour later and asked him to take Ms. Burns to the basement apartment so that his wife would not see her. By this time, she was in a stupor and did not respond when spoken to. The Defend ant was too intoxicated to help at this time. Ms. Burns died later that day, and the Defendant was charged with manslaughter for failing to render aid to her. Issue. Is the Defendants failure to act to save the life of another person manslaughter? Held. No. Under certain circumstances, namely when one is dependent on another, an omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where the omission results in the death of the person owed the duty, is considered manslaughter. However, the Defendant owed no such duty to the alleged victim here. Ms. Burns was over 30 years of age, and her conduct indicates that she had plenty of experience with carousing with men and consuming alcohol and drugs. Hence, while the defendant may have had a moral duty to protect Ms. Burns, the law imposes no such duty on him.

Discussion. A failure to act to save ones life is not a crime unless the person is in the care or custody of another.

Barber v. Superior Court

|More Citation. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 1983 Cal. App. 2256, 47 A.L.R.4th 1 click the citation to view the entire case on Brief Fact Summary. Two physicians were charged with murder and conspiracy charges after discontinuing treatment of a comatose patient at the request of the deceaseds family, where there was virtually no chance of recovery. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A physicians failure to continue treatment of a comatose patient at the request of the patients family is not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty and therefore is not punishable under the penal code. Facts. The deceased, Mr. Herbert, underwent surgery following a heart attack and suffered severe brain damage. He was subsequently placed on life support equipment and determined to be in a comatose state. Herberts family, after being told that there was virtually no chance of recovery, requested that he be taken off of life support. The two physicians discontinued treatment by removing the life support equipment and were subsequently charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the charges. However the superior court set aside the order and reinstated the complaint. The physicians petitioned the court of appeals for review of the decision of the superior court to dismiss the complaint. Issue. Is a physician under a duty to continue treatment of a comatose patient once such treatment has proven to be ineffective such that he/she can be held liable for murder? Held. No. Judgment reversed. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, to be distinguished from those killings which society has deemed justifiable. This court deems the cessation of life support as an omission of further treatment as opposed to an affirmative act and there is no criminal liability for an omission where no legal duty is owed. A physicians omission to continue treatment where such treatment has proven ineffective, regardless of the physicians knowledge that the patient would die, is not a failure to perform a legal duty and therefore the physician cannot be held liable for murder. Discussion. Note that the Supreme Court of the United States has endorsed the distinction between the situation where a physician lets a patient die as a result of discontinuing treatment and the situation where the physician administers a lethal injection. The first, as in

this case, is evaluated as an omission to act whereas the later is deemed an affirmative act and amounts to murder.

MENS REA

People v. Navarro
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant was convicted of petty theft for taking lumber he believed to belong to him. The Defendant appealed the conviction on the ground that the jury was improperly instructed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a person has a good faith belief that he has a right to certain property, he is not guilty of larceny, even if the belief is unreasonable. Facts. The Defendant was charged with stealing four wooden beams from a construction site. At trial, the Defendant requested jury instructions stating that if the Defendant believed the beams to be abandoned or that he had permission to take them, he must be acquitted, even if such belief was unreasonable. The trial court rejected the instructions and gave its own instructions stating that the good faith belief must be reasonable. Issue. Is a good faith, but unreasonable, belief that one has a right to property a defense to larceny? Held. Yes. In order to be convicted of larceny, the Defendant must take anothers property with the intent to permanently deprive him of the property. Where one sincerely believes that he has a right to property, he cannot possibly intend to steal the property. Therefore, so long as the belief is in good faith, the reasonableness of the belief does not matter since one cannot negligently steal property. Even though the Defendants belief of entitlement to the lumber may have been unreasonable, he cannot be guilty of larceny. Discussion. Good faith mistake of fact-regardless of whether reasonable or unreasonable-is a defense to specific intent crimes.

Regina v. Cunningham
Brief Fact Summary. In the process of stealing a gas meter, the gas pipes let out gas that exposed an individual to asphyxiation that was not fatal. Appellant contends he did not possess the mental state for the felony associated with the event. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Malice requires actual intention to do a particular kind of harm or recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not.

Facts. Appellant went to the cellar of a building and stole the gas meter. Appellant was charged with larceny. He plead guilty and was sentenced to 6 months in prison. As a consequence of this act by Appellant, a woman that lived in the house was endangered from the exposure to gas leaking after Appellant took the gas meter. The prosecution alleged that Appellant was guilty of a felony for malicious administering gas to an individual. Issue. Whether Appellants actions were also malicious and constituted the crime of felony for malicious administering of gas to an individual. Held. Appellants appeal is granted because the question of whether his actions were malicious was a question for the jury. In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general but requires actual intention to do a particular kind of harm or recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not. It is neither limited to nor does it indeed require any ill will toward the person injured. A foreseeable consequence of his actions could be sufficient to constitute maliciousness. Discussion. The Court ruled that malice did not require wickedness. Forseeability or recklessness would be sufficient to prove malice. The Court believed that Appellant should have foreseen the consequences of his actions and known that his actions would damage the gas pipeline and possibly expose someone to harmful gas. The Court ruled that is essentially had no choice but the grant Appellant a new trial because the jury had not been give instruction on the correct standard for malice. People v Conley

People v. Conley
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, William J. Conley, was convicted by jury of aggravated battery for striking the victim, Sean OConnell, with a wine bottle. He appealed the conviction, averring that there was no proof of an intent to cause permanent disability. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Intent can be inferred by the circumstances surrounding the crime. Facts. The victim attended a party with friends. During the evening his group was approached by about 20 boys who thought that someone in the victims group had said something derogatory. The group denied saying anything and left shortly thereafter. While walking to their car, the victim and a friend, Marty Carroll, were approached by a group of people who mentioned something about them being the guys from the party. A person, later determined to be the Defendant, emerged from the group and demanded a beer from the victims six-pack. When the victim refused, the Defendant stuck the victim in the face with a wine bottle. The victim sustained broken upper and lower jaws and four broken bones in the

area between the bridge of the nose and the lower left cheek. The Defendant challenges his conviction on the ground that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to inflict a permanent disability. Issue. Was the evidence sufficient to support a finding of intent to cause permanent disability beyond a reasonable doubt? Held. Yes. Aggravated battery requires the commission of a battery where the offender intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement. The intent to cause great bodily harm may be inferred by the circumstances surrounding the offense, such as the offenders words, the weapon used, and the force of the blow. Here, the Defendant struck the victim in the face with a bottle without warning. Hence, the jury could reasonably infer that the Defendant intended to cause permanent disability. Discussion. Intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of the crime.

MENS REA

State v. Nations
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Sandra Nations (Defendant) owns and operates the Main Street Disco, in which police officers found a scantily clad sixteen-year-old girl dancing for tips. Consequently, the Defendant was charged with endangering the welfare of a child less than seventeen years old. The Defendant was convicted and fined $1,000. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Missouri criminal code defines knowingly as actual knowledge. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware that those circumstances exist. Facts. When the police arrived at the disco, the police watched the child dance for five to seven minutes and recognized that she appeared to be young. As a result, the police questioned the Defendant about the girls age. The Defendant told the police that the girl was of legal age and that she had checked her identification when she was hired. When the police questioned the girl, she initially told them that she was eighteen but later admitted that she was only sixteen. She had no identification. At trial, the child testified that when the Defendant asked for identification, the child replied that she would show it to her in a minute. The child further testified that she was merely crossing the stage to retrieve her identification when police took her into custody.

Issue. Did the Defendant knowingly encourage a child less than seventeen years old to engage in conduct tending to injure the childs welfare? Held. The facts show that the Defendant could not have checked the childs age because the child did not have any identification on her person and the night in question was the childs first night dancing at the disco. However, at best, the facts show that the Defendant did not know or refused to learn the childs age. However, this is not knowledge as required for conviction under the statute, it is mere recklessness and nothing more. As a result, the Defendants conviction in the lower court is reversed. Discussion. The court focused on the statutory definition of knowingly and its distinctions from the lesser offense of recklessness. The court based its holding upon the fact that the Defendants refusal to learn the age of the young child simply proved that the Defendant was aware of a high probability that the child was under seventeen. Although the Defendant was reckless in that she was conscious of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, her actions did not rise to the level of knowledge.

Staples v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant Staples was convicted under the National Firearms Act, which criminalizes the possession of a weapon that is capable of automatically firing. Defendant argued that he did not know that the gun would fire automatically. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Absent a clear Congressional statement that mens rea is not required, the public welfare/strict liability rationale should not be applied to interpret any statute that fails to mention mental state as an element of the offense. Facts. Defendant possessed a rifle that originally had a piece that precluded the gun from automatically firing, however that piece had bee filed down and was no longer effective. Defendant was convicted of violating the National Firearms Act, which makes possession of an unregistered firearm a weapon capable of automatically firing more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger punishable for up to 10 years in prison. At trial Defendant requested that the jury be instructed that the government had to prove that Defendant knew that the gun would fire automatically. The trial judge refused to give that instruction and Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed and the conviction was affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted review. Issue. Did the Court err in dismissing with the intent requirement based on congressional silence in the statute with regard to the element of intent?

Held. Yes. Judgment reversed. Absent a clear Congressional statement that mens rea is not a required element of an offense, the Court should not dismiss with such requirement. Instead the Court should construe the statute in light of the rules embodied in the common law which require some mens rea as an element of an offense. The Court distinguishes this offense from the public welfare/strict liability offenses and reasons that there has been a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private persons in this country. Therefore the Court rests it opinion on the rationale that it is unthinkable that Congress intended to subject such law-abiding, well intentioned citizens to a possible 10 year term of imprisonment if what they genuinely and reasonably believed was a conventional semiautomatic turns out to have worn down into or modified into an automatic. Concurrence. The concurring opinion focuses on the question of what level of knowledge is to be inferred into the statute as opposed to the majoritys approach which questions whether knowledge is required at all. Discussion. This holding in this case reinforces the holding in Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), that the mere omission from a criminal statute of the element of intent will not be construed, but for in limited cases where public welfare and safety is at stake, as eliminated the intent requirement from the crime.

CAUSATION

Oxendine v. State
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant Oxendine, Sr., was convicted by jury of manslaughter for the death of his son, Jeffrey Oxendine, Jr., whom the Defendant had beaten or kicked in the abdomen. The Defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and he argued on appeal that since the Defendants girlfriend had already delivered a fatal blow to the victim, he did not actually cause the victims death. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Contribution to or aggravation of death without acceleration of death is insufficient to establish the causation of death required for a conviction of manslaughter. Facts. On the date in question, the Defendants girlfriend, Leotha Tyree, pushed the victim in the bathtub causing microscopic tears in his intestines, which led to peritonitis. The victim later complained of stomach pains, and upon seeing bruises on him, the Defendant knew that Tyree had beaten him. The next morning, the Defendant went into the victims bedroom and began shouting at him to get up. A neighbor reported hearing obscenities uttered by a male voice, sounds of blows being struck, and a child saying, Please stop, Daddy, it hurts. After hearing the sounds for five to ten minutes, the witness heard a final noise consisting of

a loud thump as if someone had been kicked or punched with a great blow. The victims abdomen became swollen, and Tyree told the Defendant of the victims condition and urged the Defendant to take him to a hospital. The Defendant, believing the victim to be exaggerating, went out to buy a newspaper and returned home to read it. When he returned, Tyree was preparing to take the victim to the hospital. The victim stopped breathing en route and was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the hospital. A jury convicted both the Defendant and Tyree of manslaughter. Issue. Did the Defendants conduct hasten death, thereby being deemed to have caused death? Held. No. To be liable for the death of another, ones conduct must cause death. Causation is defined as the antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred. In the case of two injuries, if a later nonlethal injury accelerates death, then the actor is liable for the death. However, where the injury merely adds to the victims pain without accelerating the death, the actor did not cause death. Here, the evidence shows that the defendant did not inflict a lethal injury. Neither of the expert medical witnesses of the prosecution could state with any degree of medical certainty that the injury inflicted by the defendant contributed to the death of the child. Hence, the Defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter. Discussion. To be criminally liable for the death of another, one must cause death. Causation is defined as the antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred. Where two injuries have been inflicted, the latter injury causes death only if it accelerates death.

MURDER How do we prove an intentional killing?

State v. Guthrie
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a co-worker. Appellant argued that due to several psychiatric problems and the heat of the moment, he killed in the heat of passion. Synopsis of Rule of Law. There must be some period between the formation of the intent to kill and the actual killing which indicates the killing is by prior design. Facts. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. Appellant killed his co-worker. Prior to the killing, Appellant and Victim had gotten along well. However on that night, Victim and a few others were making jokes about Appellants bad mood. Victim snapped Appellant with a towel, which precipitated the killing. Appellant had several psychiatric problems. Appellant

argued that the killing was in the heat of passion. Issue. Whether Appellant possessed the requisite intent for the crime he was convicted of. Held. Case is remanded on other grounds, but Appellant should be given use of the below proper definition of premeditation. To allow the State to prove premeditation and deliberation by demonstrating that the intention to kill was in existence only at time of the killing completely eliminated the distinction between the two degrees of murder. There must be some period between the formation of the intent to kill and the actual killing which indicates the killing is by prior design. Concurrence. The concurrence argues that the majoritys new definition of premeditation will introduce confusion. The jury may think that there needs to be some though out plan or scheme. The concurrence agreed with the majoritys view that intent to kill was equal to premeditation. Discussion. The Court first mentioned all the psychiatric evidence presented that Appellant had mental problems that were demonstrated. The Court ruled that although a reasonable jury could find Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, the instructions regarding first-degree murder were erroneous. The Court ruled that they could not retroactively apply the new definition of premeditation, because this case was being overruled on other grounds, Appellant would get the benefit of the new statute.
PREMEDITATION CAN EXISTS IN A TWINKLING OF AN EYE MajetteBig man beat little kid. People saw it. All kinds of bruises that were noticeable. I mean he really beat this kid. This is severe stuff. Kid dies. Did Majette at with premeditation? Arkansas found that evidence did not support willful, deliberate, premeditated. Court only found that there was only an intent to severely harm, but no deliberate, and premeditated. If it was the common law it would be enough, but here there is no. Prosecutor argued there is no way he didnt know it would kill him. Court rejected this argument this because all it shows is his intent was to beat the kid up. The childs death was not in his mind. Therefore, this is second degree murder. Forests Father and son. Son admitted father into hospital, he had all kinds of shit goin on. The condition was determined to be untreatable. Accordingly he was moved and no uncomfortable things would be used. Nurse thought he was better. Son said dont do anything he is dying. Nurses left, b/c son cursed him out. Son shot him three times. Son didnt deny, run or anything. He said he killed him to put him out of his suffering. Do we have willful, deliberation and premeditation? Yes, this is the clearest case.

Guthrie, Majette, Forest Forest is the most clear. Did we get the right guy?