Land reform (also agrarian reform, though that can have a broader meaning) involves the changing of laws,

regulations or customs regarding land ownership.[1] Land reform may consist of a government-initiated or government-backed property redistribution, generally of agricultural land. Land reform can, therefore, refer to transfer of ownership from the more powerful to the less powerful:such as from a relatively small number of wealthy (or noble) owners with extensive land holdings (e.g., plantations, large ranches, or agribusiness plots) to individual ownership by those who work the land.[2] Such transfers of ownership may be with or without compensation; compensation may vary from token amounts to the full value of the land.[3] Land reform may also entail the transfer of land from individual ownership even peasant ownership in smallholdings to government-owned collective farms; it has also, in other times and places, referred to the exact opposite: division of government-owned collective farms into smallholdings.[4] The common characteristic of all land reforms, however, is modification or replacement of existing institutional arrangements governing possession and use of land. Thus, while land reform may be radical in nature, such as through large-scale transfers of land from one group to another, it can also be less dramatic, such as regulatory reforms aimed at improving land administration.[5] Nonetheless, any revision or reform of a countrys land laws can still be an intensely political process, as reforming land policies serves to change relationships within and between communities, as well as between communities and the state. Thus even small-scale land reforms and legal modifications may be subject to intense debate or conflict.[6]

1. Introduction That sustained increases in national income that is, economic growth are required for poverty reduction is no longer debatable. Every country that has chalked up significant achievements in poverty reduction and human development has also done quite well in securing long-term economic growth. The association is not unexpected: economic growth is an essential condition for the generation of resources needed to sustain investment in, among other things, health, education, infrastructure, and good governance (law enforcement, regulation). The suggestion that achieving higher economic growth should be at the forefront of the policy agenda does not imply that there is nothing else that can be done to enhance the poverty-reducing effects of growth. Indeed, some countries have been more successful than others in generating poverty reduction, even after controlling for differences in rates of income growth. There is evidence to suggest that the response of poverty to economic growth is quite muted in the Philippines compared with its Asian neighbors, especially Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam (Balisacan 2003, 2007). This has been attributed to a number of factors, but most importantly to the highly unequal distribution in access to opportunities and wealth. This, in turn, has been an outcome of the countrys choices of development strategy, policy and investment regime, and national and local institutions governing economic transactions, including land relations (see

Balisacan, Hill, and Piza 2007 for an overview of recent development experience). A recent strand of the economic development literature posits that a countrys initial land distribution influences its subsequent economic growth and human development performance (see, e.g., Vollrath and Erickson 2007; Deininger and Squire 1998). The evidence suggests that, on the average, a developing country with an initially high land inequality is expected to have a lower long-term income growth rate and slower pace of poverty reduction than a country with a more favorable land distribution. Thus, apart from its direct effects on poverty, high land inequality also affects poverty indirectly through its downward effect on long-term income growth rate. Put differently, improvement in land inequality is not just about advancing equity goals; it is also about raising the trajectory of income growth by improving overall economic efficiency. In the Philippines, rural poverty and rural insurgency problems have often been linked to access to land and tenure relations. Poverty incidence is relatively high among landless agricultural workers and farmers cultivating small plots of land. Moreover, in regions where the concentration of land ownership is relatively high, the incidence of poverty is correspondingly high (Hayami, Quisumbing, and Adriano 1990; Balisacan 1993, 2003; ADB 2005). Rural unrest and insurgency in these regions have tended to be also more pronounced than in other regions. These associations do not, of course, imply that limited land access is, by itself, the only factor that has contributed to existing rural poverty, nor do they suggest that it is the sole factor that has spawned rural insurgency. The limited growth of productive employment opportunities outside of agriculture and the country's relatively high population growth may have been equally important determinants of rural poverty. Nonetheless, it remains true that institutional and policy changes concerning access to land resources have an important bearing on poverty reduction. Moreover, these changes demonstrate the government's resolve to address the issue of income and asset inequality. In fact, the various Government administrations since the Second World War have used land reform, albeit in various forms and intensity, as a key element of their poverty reduction strategies, as well as a tool to address social unrest in the rural areas. This paper distills the evidence on the impact of the agrarian reform programs in the Philippines, as well as the lessons learned from them, as seen from the lens of international experience. The next section briefly reviews the literature on the link between land inequality, on the one hand, and economic growth and poverty, on the other. The paper then describes the Philippine efforts in improving agrarian structure (land distribution and tenure relations) during the postwar period, but with focus on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), which has been the landmark agrarian initiative since the late 1980s. It next provides a synthesis of the results from recent assessments on the impact of CARP at the micro and macro levels. The paper concludes with a summary of the lessons learned and emerging agrarian challenges in the Philippines. 2. Land Inequality, Growth, and Poverty: Theory and Evidence There is now increasing recognition that poverty reduction requires no less than sustained economic growth. Invariably, in developing countries where growth

had been rapid and sustained for a considerably long period, the incidence of poverty has improved, as had other indicators of human development (Chen and Ravallion 2007; Cline 2004; Sachs 2005; Deininger and Squire 1998). In a number of East Asian countries, rapid growth was associated not only with rapid decline in absolute poverty, particularly in rural areas, but also with improvement in income distribution. Even in most countries where rising inequality accompanied rapid growth (such as China and Thailand since the 1990s), absolute improvement in command over basic goods and services in the entire range of the income distribution more than offset the negative effect of inequality on the poor. 4 One focus of the development literature has to do with the influence of initial distribution of income on subsequent economic growth (and, hence, poverty). Early empirical work making use of cross-section national data shows an inequality-growth link: initially high inequality tends to reduce subsequent growth, all other things being equal (see, e.g., Alesina and Perotti 1994; Bruno et al. 1995). However, later work involving a more nationally comparable and comprehensive data set than those used in earlier empirical studies suggests that it is not the inequality in income distribution per se that is systematically related with growth, but rather the inequality in the distribution of physical assets, particularly land. Using land distribution as a proxy for the distribution of physical assets, Deininger and Squire (1998) show that initial inequality of assets has a significant effect on subsequent growth both in the overall sample (of developed and developing countries) and for developing countries separately. More recent work confirms this association (Vollrath and Erickson 2007; Balisacan 2007). Theoretical explanations for the negative relationship between initial asset inequality and subsequent growth proceed through two channels. One channel has to do with political economy considerations: Concentration of assets leads to policies that protect sectarian interests and obstructs growth for the rest of the society. An individuals asset position may influence his/her ability to participate in political bargaining or generate political outcomes say, through voting mechanism reflecting his/her preferences. High inequality may also fuel social discontent, thereby increasing socio-political instability, which, in turn, reduces investment. Since investment is a primary engine of growth, asset inequality and growth are inversely correlated. The other channel (though not unrelated to the first one) has to do with imperfections in credit and insurance markets. To the extent that physical assets are commonly accepted as collateral, the poor, who do not have these assets, may be unable to access credit and hence take advantage of income-enhancing technologies and production processes. They may also not have the means to smooth household consumption especially food and health and education services for children in the event of downside risks, effectively preventing them from escaping the poverty trap from one generation to the next. Investment in human capital formation and economically profitable opportunities may thus be confined to owners of land assets. As noted earlier, there is increasing evidence to suggest that investing in equity (poverty reduction) has a high pay-off in terms of human capital accumulation

and economic growth (Bourguignon 2004; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004; Sachs 2005). In particular, improving access to land in developing countries with initially high land inequality has a positive effect on rates of both human capital formation and economic growth (Vollrath and Erickson 2007; Deininger and 5 Squire 1998). Evidence from micro-level (household) studies reveals a similar association: educational attainment, health status, and incomes of the poor in rural areas tend to improve with access to land (see Balisacan and Fuwa 2007 for a review of recent evidence on Asia). In short, land reform, to the extent that it succeeds in improving access to land, mediates both equity and efficiency goals. Interestingly, advocates of land reform--at least in the Philippines--tend to focus narrowly on equity, overlooking that the reform could be critical as well to raising the economys long-term growth path. As experience demonstrates, in the long term, sustained increases in per capita incomes are sine qua non to winning the war against poverty. How does the Philippines compare with other countries in terms of land inequality? Table 1 provides an indicative answer. 1 Broadly, land inequality, as gauged from estimates of Gini coefficient for operational landholding, appears to be much higher in the Philippines than the median for East Asia, roughly comparable with the medians for South Asia and OECD countries, but significantly lower than the median for Latin American countries. The comparative data also suggest that, except for Eastern Europe, the median Gini coefficients have changed little between the 1960s and the 1990s. Surprisingly, the estimates for the Philippines are also somewhat stable despite three decades of land reform programs (Table 2). The national inequality estimates mask wide provincial differences in land inequality. Though not shown here (but see Balisacan 2007), landholding distribution is generally less skewed for the provinces of Luzon, with the exception of Southern Tagalog and Bicol provinces, than that for the provinces of Mindanao and Visayas. For example, the Gini ratio of agricultural landholding in the Ilocos provinces (Luzon) falls below 0.5 (somewhat resembling the median for East Asian countries), while the figures for the Negros provinces (Visayas), and Bukidnon and Davao provinces (Mindanao) range from 0.57 to 0.76 (roughly comparable with the figures for Latin American countries). As is the case for the national estimates, regional landholding inequality during much of the second half of the past century did not change much, even though average farm sizes fell in all regions during the same period. 3. Overview of Postwar Philippine Land Reform Initiatives The government's land reform initiatives for the rural economy have involved mainly resettlement to public lands, regulation on tenancy relations (primarily 1 As is usual in international comparison, comparability problems could not be entirely avoided. Thus, the

figures in Table 1 must have to be interpreted as providing only indicative rather than precise estimates of the level of inequality in land distribution, as measured by the Gini index. The Gini index has a value ranging from zero (perfect equality) to unity (perfect inequality). 6 the prohibition of share tenancy and the protection of tenancy rights), and appropriation and distribution of private agricultural lands. Beginning with President Manuel L. Quezon's administration (1935-41), governments tended to rely more heavily on population resettlement and tenancy regulation rather than on the politically sensitive land redistribution. However, in recent decades, as land scarcity has become more pronounced owing to population pressure and the closure of frontier areas, and as peasant unrest has continued to threaten stability, redistributive land reform has become increasingly high in the political and social development agenda. Land Reform Initiatives Up to Mid-1980s: Some Lessons President Quezon's agrarian initiatives included mainly tenancy reforms, the purchase and subsequent divisions of large estates to tenant farmers, and resettlement on public lands. These reforms, however, suffered from low budgetary supportpartly arising from the dependence of his national political organization on local leaders (or the latter's protgs) who were usually landlordsas well as from the chaotic state of government records on landed estates. The subsequent administrations of Manuel Roxas (1946-48), Elpidio Quirino (1948-53), Ramon Magsaysay (1954-56), and Diosdado Macapagal (1961-65) generally had the same orientation, although each had its own policy initiatives. The Macapagal administration, for example, regarded its Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 as a turning point in agrarian legislation because it called for a full abolition of the share tenancy system. However, as with the preceding initiatives, it had low budgetary support and very weak administrative infrastructure. Moreover, it was much limited in scope: it excluded all farms other than those planted to rice and corn. President Marcos (1972-85) adopted land reform as the centerpiece program of his Martial Law Government through Operation Land Transfer (OLT). 2 Launched in 1972 through Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27), OLT sought to abolish share tenancy in lands primarily devoted to rice and corn and to transfer to tenants the ownership of the land they were tilling. Operation Leasehold (LHO), implemented in 1974, sought to complement OLT by providing for the fixing of leasehold status for share tenants of small landholders--those exempted from the OLT because they owned less than 7 hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands. 2 A response to the raucous demonstrations and peasant unrest, land reform became an instrument to create, at

least initially, mass support for the Martial Law regime from the rural areas as well as to weaken the opposition's political and economic base. The scope of the program (covering rice and corn but excluding large estates in sugar, coconut, and other export crops) and the pattern of its implementation bear out this point. 7 The exclusion of plantations and farms planted to export crops which, in 1971, comprised nearly 40 percent of all agricultural croplands, meant that the programs scope missed the larger source of land inequality. It was (and still is) in those farms where high concentration of both land ownership and operational holdings had persisted. At its promulgation in 1972, PD 27 could cover only 1.01 million hectares, representing about 12 percent of total farm area or 24 percent of the total rice and corn lands. 3 The effective scope could be even much lower considering that the program covered only farms that were actually used for rice and corn production at the time the program was launched. The beneficial impact of the program on the poorest of the poor was even more dubious. The program excluded landless agricultural workers who were among the poorest in rural areas and were, at least in rice and corn farming, even poorer than tenants (Balisacan 1993; Hayami et al. 1990). In 1971, this group numbered about 3.4 million people. Sixty-seven percent of them were engaged in rice and corn farming. Their number could have swelled following the program in view of the reported efforts of landlords to escape the scope of OLT and LHO by converting rice and corn lands into residential enclaves, or planting crops not covered by the land reform program, or evicting tenants and replacing them with hired workers. For landless workers on the way to becoming tenants (and eventually owners of the land they till) in the agricultural ladder, the program effectively shut them out. The Aquino Government (1986-1992) also adopted agrarian reform as the centerpiece of its development agenda. Considering the urgency of quelling the growth of peasant support to the insurgency movement, expectations were high that a comprehensive agrarian reform program would be put in place not only as a social program to, rightly or not, reduce rural income disparities, but, perhaps more so, also as part of the new government's counter-insurgency campaign. Thus, early in its tenure and prompted by the provision in the then newly ratified Constitution on the need for the state to promote rural development and agrarian reform, the Government sought Congressional enactment of what was to become the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act No. 6657), which governs the implementation of the current Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). 3 Based on figures in Quisumbing and Adriano (1987, p. 36). 8 The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: Features, Problems, and Issues

CARP departs from all previous land reform initiatives by: (i) its inclusion of all agricultural lands, regardless of the commodity produced, and (ii) going beyond tenancy arrangements to include other alternative production arrangements, such as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and distribution of shares of stock. RA 6657 prescribes the acquisition and distribution of lands covered by the program within a period of 10 years. The first phase of the program, spanning four years of implementation, covered rice and corn lands; all idle, foreclosed, and abandoned lands; and all private lands voluntarily offered by owners for land reform. The second phase, also to be completed within four years, encompassed all alienable and disposable (A&D) public agricultural lands, including agro-forest and pasture lands, and all private agricultural lands in excess of 50 hectares. Finally, the third phase covered all other private agricultural lands, commencing with landholdings above 24 hectares up to 50 hectares (to begin on the fourth year of the program and to be completed within three years). All lands below 24 hectares and above the retention limit of five hectares were to be distributed beginning on the sixth year of the program. At the beginning of its implementation, CARP expected to cover about 9.77 million hectares, of which nearly two-thirds were public A&D lands as well as forested lands. Subsequent re-assessments of potential areas led to an upward revision of program scope to about 10.3 million hectares, and then to a downward revision to 8.06 million hectares. The program phasing prescribed in Republic Act 6657 was not strictly observed; actual implementation was determined largely by the funds made available to the program and the technical capabilities of implementing agencies, mainly the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for private and government-owned agricultural lands and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for public A&D and forested lands. Thus, the distribution of public A&D lands, scheduled for implementation during the early stage of CARP, was delayed, while that of private agricultural lands outside the scope of Presidential Decree 27 was advanced. CARP was to be completed in 10 years, i.e., by 1998. Cognizant of the remaining tasks to be done, Congress extended the program implementation until 2008. Even then, a year prior to the end of the extension, the program is far from completed. As of end of December 2006, overall accomplishment in land distribution was only 84 percent of the revised target (scope) of 8.06 million hectares (Table 3). The largest lands distributed were settlement areas, landed estates, and government-owned lands, which altogether represent 45 percent of 9 the program scope. Acquisition of these lands was less contentious and required less funding. However, land distribution was particularly slow for private agricultural lands (other than rice and corn lands) under compulsory acquisition, which total to 1.5 million hectares or roughly one-fifth of the program scope. The accomplishment for this program component was only about 18 percent. The main problems were the slow process involved in land acquisition and distribution, insufficient technical capacity of implementing agencies, legal disputes relating to coverage and land valuation, landowners' resistance, harassment and unstable peace and order condition, and budget constraints. It is

in these lands (particularly lands planted to sugarcane, coconut and other tree crops, and nontraditional export crops) where most of the remaining problems with landholding inequality exist. In the case of public A&D lands, where accomplishment was only 69 percent of target after 20 years of CARP implementation, the bottlenecks were in delays in undertaking land surveys, slow reconstitution of land records, and sluggish resolution of land conflicts among competing claimants. It is to be noted that public A&D lands and forested lands are not vacant lands; they are being tilled by farmer "squatters" who only need to be given security of tenure. Program implementation in government-owned agricultural estates and other land properties has been unwieldy, as this involves the preparation and inventory of multitudinous land titles, the authentication and verification of titles, and answering the deluge of claims by private entities asserting ownerships of lands identified by the government as its own. In the case of agricultural lands, judicial/adjudication cases involving land valuation and compensation, as well as protests against coverage, classification, identification and qualification of beneficiaries, exemption from CARP, and land conversion issues, have tremendously slowed down the implementation. On land valuation, for example, the law requires the consideration of a number of factors, including the cost of land acquisition, the current value of similar properties, its nature, actual use and income, the owner's sworn valuation, tax declarations, and appraisal made by government assessors. The procedure is complicated, cumbersome, and ambiguous, creating opportunities for graft and corruption. Too frequent changes in the leadership of implementing agencies, especially DAR and DENR, have also constrained the programs smooth implementation. Financing the program has likewise become a major bottleneck. At the beginning of program implementation, funding requirement was estimated at PhP221 billion. The average annual budget represented about 30 percent of the national government's total appropriations for 1987, or 3 percent of (nominal) GDP in 1987. The total budget was subsequently pared down to about PhP153.07 billion. 10 Funds were to be drawn from proceeds of the government's sale of nonperforming assets. This was poorly realized. CARPs extension to 2008 came with an additional allocation of PhP50 billion. This was also poorly realized. The government's ability to accommodate the funding in the national government budget was severely limited owing to a combination of factors, including the government's reluctance to raise new taxes, its relatively low tax collection efficiency (particularly on business income and property taxes), and its high debt burden. The funding problem, together with the limited technical capacity of the agencies tasked to implement the program, has bred uncertainty on the effective scope of CARP. As noted below, invariably, successful land reform programs elsewhere, especially in East Asia, were implemented swiftly. The uncertainty is magnified by the continued efforts of certain sectors to lobby in Congress for exclusion from the program. Congress has granted in early 1995 such exemption to fishery and prawn farms. The uncertainty surrounding the program has discouraged the flow of investments into agriculture as well as encouraged non-planting and

premature conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Moreover, the program could have effectively weakened the private market for agricultural lands, thereby diminishing the collateral value of agricultural lands. The CARP is quite distinct from previous agrarian initiatives in another major respect: it provides a comprehensive program of beneficiary development, especially the delivery of basic services (capacity building, credit and marketing assistance, farm infrastructure, etc.) needed to transform the beneficiaries into efficient agricultural producers and entrepreneurs. However, because the funds available to support the program had been very limited, the Government, through DAR, launched in 1993 the Agrarian Reform Community (ARC) approach to beneficiary development. The approach involves the concentration of efforts in the delivery of support services in selected areas, rather than dispersing the delivery to all areas covered by CARP. It is also a mechanism to fast-track investment in basic social infrastructure, such as water, power supply, education, and health. As defined, an ARC is a barangay (the lowest political unit) or a cluster of contiguous barangays wherein a critical mass of farmers and farm workers are awaiting the full implementation of agrarian reform. About 1,800 ARCs have been established since the programs launch. 4 They cover roughly 47 percent of the total agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) nationwide. Foreign-assisted projects (FAPs) for the agrarian reform program have been concentrated in the ARCs. These projects have provided support to 58 percent of the ARCs, covering 62 percent of the ARBs in all ARCs, or roughly 30 percent of 4 Based on CARP Situationer, as of end of December 2006, Department of Agrarian Reform. 11 all ARBs nationwide. Owing to the fiscal constraint noted above, ARCs receiving support services through FAPs are expected to be better off than those without FAPs. Impact of CARP Assessing the impact of CARP vis--vis its objectives, i.e., equity and poverty reduction, is quite difficult because the observed household and communitylevel data are the outcomes of many factors that have influenced the evolution of the rural economy. The policy and institutional environment in the Philippines has changed quite significantly during the programs implementation period. Various policy reforms involving international trade and finance, local-national fiscal relations, and public investment and regulations, as well as the environment for global agricultural trade, have likely affected rural welfare and income distribution in ways that either enhance or diminish any effects that agrarian reform may have had on equity and poverty reduction. Put differently, the fact that rural poverty and income inequality have persisted, as shown in recent studies (see Balisacan 2003, ADB 2005), is not, by itself, evidence that CARP is a failure. A few studies have attempted to systematically identify the contribution of

CARP in the observed changes in rural welfare and overall economic outcomes. The most comprehensive one was the series of volumes that came out of the CARP Impact Assessment Studies (CARP-IA) supported by a number of multilateral and bilateral agencies, including the Philippine Government. The CARP-IA studies, covering the first 12 years of CARP implementation, examined the impact from different angles: micro (household-level), meso (communitylevel), and macro (sectoral and economy-wide level). Follow-up studies (CARP-IA Phase 2) are ongoing, aimed at re-examining the earlier findings in light of newly available national household surveys, agriculture and population censuses, updated panel data, and related data. While the first CARP-IA studies covered program implementation up to 2000, the Phase 2 studies focus on the period 1990-2006. Unfortunately, the results of the latter study are not yet available. The findings of the CARP-IA studies, as drawn from Lim (2003), are summarized as follows: Panel data survey in select provinces shows strong increase in ownercultivatorship and significant declines in share tenancy and leaseholding between 1989 and 1999. These results are consistent with the land-to-thetiller emphasis of CARP. 12 The macro study and the panel data survey indicate that ARBs and landowners who voluntarily complied with the CARP provision on land acquisition and distribution (LAD) tend to invest more on farm assets compared with non-ARBs and LAD-pending landowners. This suggests that a more secure land tenure and secure land ownership enhance the willingness of landowners and beneficiaries to invest. An ARB has lower chances of being poor than a non-ARB. Moreover, the length of time of being an ARB and being in an ARC reduces ones chances of being poor. The ARC approach to beneficiary development, if properly implemented, improves the economic conditions, social capital, and democratic participation of the communities. This result is supported by studies made by FAO-TSARRD (1998) and Edillon and Velarde (2004). In areas where social conflicts exist, the implementation of agrarian reform tends to reduce such conflicts and increase peace and order. A disturbing finding from the micro studies is that the real agricultural and rural incomes for both ARBs and non-ARBs between the 1990 survey and the 2000 survey actually fell. Lim (2003) noted, however, that this outcome conformed to the long-run fall in real per capita value added in agriculture, to the decline in agricultural investment, and to the deterioration of the overall investment climate in the Philippines, especially in the latter part of the 1990s. This finding demonstrates that the positive micro-level effects of the program could only be translated into higher long-term incomes and lower poverty if the general environment (macroeconomic policies, rural development strategies, trade policy regime, natural resource management, governance institutions) is conducive to development and growth in the rural economy.

In a related vein, using panel data of provincial aggregates for the period 19882003, Balisacan (2007) found that the effects of CARP on poverty reduction are felt mostly indirectly through the income growth process, not directly through improvement in equity. One interpretation of this result is that the CARP implementation has actually not been efficiently targeted to effect direct gains for the tiller beneficiaries. This insight finds similar evidence in many of the countrys direct anti-poverty programs: food subsidies, credit subsidies, irrigation subsidies, etc. (Balisacan and Edillon 2005).

5. Concluding Remarks High inequality in land distribution is bad for both equity and overall economic growth. Unfortunately, the policy discussions have tended to focus on the equity side of the benefits from a reduction in land inequality. Yet, it appears that the overall efficiency gains (economic growth) from an informed land reform program represent an enduring source of poverty reduction. Put differently, a policy advocacy for land reform has to highlight recent findings from growth empirics that high inequality in the distribution of land (or assets, generally) depresses the long-term potential of the economy to grow at a faster pace and hence to forego opportunities for the poor to get out of poverty traps. However, the road to the design and implementation of an effective land reform program is paved with dangers. Many land reform initiatives in developing countries, including the CARP in the Philippines, have had limited success only partly because they failed to realistically confront the budgetary requirements of the program and, more importantly, the political landscape and technical capacity of the implementing agencies. This failure has meant that land acquisition and the provision of support services could not be done as swiftly as in the East Asian experience. Consequently, the slow pace of the program had created uncertainties, adversely affecting output and investments in agriculture. Moreover, it has induced premature conversion of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses. It must be stressed that land reform is not a panacea for poverty and rural underdevelopment. Sustained reduction in rural poverty demands going beyond agricultural land reforms to include putting in place institutions and an economy-wide policy environment that nurture growth in employment and human development opportunities. In recent years, the Philippines public investments in basic social services--especially rural infrastructure, education, and health--have lagged behind the requirements of a rapidly growing population. Moreover, the country's trade, macroeconomic, and sector-specific pricing policies have given rise to strong incentive biases against small farms, small industrial enterprises, and labor-intensive exports. In failing to engender a neutral incentive structure that could have promoted a more efficient allocation of scarce resources, these policies have had an adverse effect not only on agricultural and rural performance but also on the economy as a whole, therefore

inhibiting the overall economic growth and poverty reduction.

BASIC OF LAND REFORM

Agrarian reform and land reform

In certain parts of the world, land reform is totally unacceptable, as it is often associated with communism. Agrarian reform is a more lenient concept and hence more acceptable as a strategy for alleviation of rural poverty. In contrast, some international organisations as well as scholars contend that land reform means abolition of landlordism and redistribution of land among the landless and land-poor. Agrarian reform would include land reform and other supportive measures to make land reform beneficiaries economically viable and self-reliant. To be sure, reform means a structural change and in any agrarian society, land is always, the most important factor of production. Moreover, land and its characteristics inevitably determine the agrarian structure and directly bear far-reaching implications upon the economy as a whole. Land characteristics are physical, social, economic and even political. They include the distributive pattern of landholdings and landownership, the size of farms, the man-land ratio, the production structure etc. In developing countries, where rural poverty is the rule of the game, structural change in land and its associated characteristics is basic and fundamental to successful rural development. Reform involves some kind of transfers, in our case, of land and other resources with or without compensation. But transfers themselves do not ensure a long-lasting solution of poverty eradication. They must be accompanied by supplementary programmes. This holds true, regardless of what it is called. In essence, agrarian reform and land reform are synonymous and in this paper they are used interchangeably. Land reform consists of three components : reform of the land tenurial structure, reform of the production structure and reform of the supporting services structure. The landtenurial structure deals with land rights and land ownership. Land rights can take several forms. The most preferred is ownercultivatorship. The production structure is illustrated by the way in which land and other resources enter into production. Decision making in resource allocation determines the choice of product and product mix. The supporting services structure describes the type of services which helps contribute to the production of agricultural commodities and, more generally, to the well-being of the farm households. These services include agricultural extension, agricultural credit, agricultural marketing, cooperative arrangements as well as basic needs etc. The fundamental issue facing

these supporting services is essentially one of availability and access. The ideal ex post land reform situation may be depicted as one in which the farmer cultivates his/her land which he/she owns or can exercise his/her right to use over a sufficiently long tenure. He/she can make his/her own decision on production planning. Agricultural production is achieved by optimal allocation of land and other resources, with supporting services available and accessible to his/her in due course. In the end, the farmer is better off economically and socially, as compared with the situation before land reform.

CARP Deceives Peasants, Benefits Landlords

Government repeatedly declares achievements by successive land and agrarian reform programs including the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). However, an analysis of relevant data would show that CARP cannot address peasant poverty and landlessness because it was never meant to. BY SONNY AFRICA IBON Features Posted by Bulatlat As the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) marks its 18th anniversary, rural poverty continues to be widespread and millions of peasants still remain landless. And this is not just after close to 20 years of CARP, but nearly half a decade of various agrarian reform programs. Major land reform legislation in the country started with the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954, the Land Reform Act of 1955 and the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963. Following the Agrarian Reform Code of 1971 and Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27) in 1972 under the regime of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, agrarian reform took organizational form with the creation of a Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Most recently, Republic Act (RA) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 initiated the CARP.

AGAINST DECEIT: Writings on Gate 1 of the Cojuangco-owned Central Azucarera de Tarlac assail CARPs unfulfilled promises BULATLAT FILE PHOTO

Yet, according to various Censuses of Agriculture, full land ownership has actually been on the decline since PD 27 was enacted. In 1971, 58% of all farms were fully owned but this fell to 47.5% in 2002; in terms of land area, fully owned farms accounted for 62.9% of total farm area in 1971 but fell to 50.6% in 2002. Although there was a decrease in the share of completely tenanted and leased lands, this did not translate into full ownership but only part ownership that implies a continuation of tenancy and lease arrangements. In fact, the Annual Poverty Indicators Survey (APIS) of 2002 reported that only 11% of all families owning land other than their residence had obtained land through CARP.

Yet the government repeatedly declares achievements by successive land and agrarian reform programs including, most recently, the CARP. How does this reconcile with decreasing land ownership according to agriculture census data? Pro-Landlord The DAR and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) reported a cumulative accomplishment of a seemingly impressive 6.4 million hectares or 79.4% of the target CARP scope of 8.1 million hectares with 3.8 million farmer beneficiaries from 1972 to June 2005. These figures seem to indicate that agrarian reform in the Philippines is well underway, albeit slowly. However, the current target scope represents a severe downward adjustment from CARP's original scope in 1988. Back then, the target for distribution was 10.3 million hectares, or some 85% of total agricultural land planted to crops and a third of the country's total land area. This was adjusted downwards by 21.7% in 1996 to the current scope of 8.1 million hectares following drastic cuts in coverage of both private and public lands. The reason behind these cuts may be rooted in CARPs pro-landlord orientation. CARP is not about free land distribution to the tiller which is the core of a genuine land reform program. Instead, CARP seeks to provide landlord compensation and require peasant beneficiaries to pay for land that they have been tilling for generations. Land reform under CARP is essentially a land transaction between landlords and peasants with the government acting as the middleman. The revised CARP scope represents a concession to big private landed interests. The target was adjusted downwards to accommodate CARP exemptions. CARP allows landlords to retain five hectares of land and an additional three hectares for each of the heirs. PD No. 27 had a retention limit of seven hectares each. Landlords used these as a loophole, hurriedly subdividing their landholdings and coming out with multiple titles within the limits. Yet the scope of exemptions even broadened far beyond just retention limits. At least 60,000 hectares of land in commercial farms and plantations were exempted from 1988 to 1998 and these remain undistributed even as the deferment period has already expired. The Supreme Court handed down a decision in 1990 sparing commercial livestock, poultry and swine operations from CARP coverage. Belated land use conversion is also another way out where agricultural lands that have already been distributed are suddenly found to be, according to local land use plans or zoning ordinances, for residential, commercial or industrial use and hence CARP-exempt. Further, landlords also had the option to forego land distribution altogether through non-land transfer schemes, such as the infamous stock distribution option (SDO). The SDO adopted corporate stock sharing instead of land distribution to peasants. Aside from other production and profit-sharing arrangements, the SDOs leasehold arrangements supposedly guaranteed that, in farms under five hectares, the split of net produce between landlord-tenant would be 25-75. In the end, the revised CARP scope in 1996 only covered 3.0 million hectares of private land. This implies that 43.7% of total potential private land for distribution around 5.3 million hectares was exempted outright from CARP. The reductions in the scope of public land in turn accommodated vast tracts of government land leased or otherwise controlled by big landlords as cattle ranches, export crop plantations and logging concessions. Trends in CARP implementation also confirm its pro-landlord bias. Compulsory acquisition (CA) covering the largest chunk of privately-owned land (including commercial farms and plantations) and the most resistant landlords has the largest balance remaining among all land types. This is both in terms of absolute land area (1.3 million hectares) and as a percentage of its target scope (83.8%). It also accounts for the majority of total balance remaining (76%).

The "over-performance" of voluntary land transfers (VLTs) by 82.8% is alarming. VLTs ostensibly provide for the direct transfer of land from landlords to the peasant beneficiaries, with the government no longer acting as the buyer (from the landlord) and the seller (to the peasant). Instead, government only becomes responsible for mediating the transfer and subsequent enforcement of the contract. The use of this particular CARP mode of land redistribution is alarming not only because the landlord is put in a strong position to dictate the terms of the contract with the peasant. More important, the landlord is put in a position to use VLT as a deception where there is only a bogus "contract" and no transfer of land at all. On top of all this, landlords have also profited immensely from CARP apart from what they had already accumulated through generations of land ownership. From 1972 to June 2005, total approved Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) compensation to 83,203 landowners for 1.3 million hectares has already reached P41.6 billion ($783.2 million, based on an exchange rate of P53.115 per US dollar) in cash and bonds, or an average of P500,463 ($9422.25) per landlord. An additional P4.5 billion ($84.7 million) is earmarked for 2006. Deceptive accomplishments The CARP's reported accomplishments are also dubious since various forms of bogus land distribution bloat the figures. The "accomplishments" include lands with registered certificates of land ownership award (CLOAs) but these have not been turned over to tenants who are still paying for their amortization. There is double counting where "mother" or collective CLOAs and the "individual" CLOAs under these are both tallied. In the most brazen cases, there are CLOA holders who still do not occupy the land because of outright landlord resistance. The numbers also include "encumbered" CLOAs prematurely released to beneficiaries for the sole purpose of padding reports. These CLOAs are stamped or otherwise annotated as "encumbered" because of unsettled payments and documentary requirements and do not yet give holders the same rights of ownership as regular CLOAs. Land has also been reported as distributed but in reality is inalienable or otherwise not suited for agricultural production. Apart from reporting dubious accomplishments, these reports also do not reflect cases of land being awarded but later taken away from beneficiaries. Landlords and rural elites exploit a legal defect of CLOAs and EPs that limits the security of beneficiaries' claim to the land covered. Torrens Titles have a one-year prescriptive period for bringing up cases against them as opposed to CLOAs and EPs that have no such limit. This gives landlords the legal opening to reclaim land by disputing the redistribution of land. CARP exemptions are used, albeit belatedly, as the basis for cancellations. They also maneuver decisions favorable to them through technicalities including supposed errors in data entries, in the change of documents from EPs to CLOAs and in the identification of legitimate farmer beneficiaries. These defects, loopholes, and outright corruption have resulted in thousands of cancellations through the years. Over 2,000 CLOAs and EPs covering over 380,000 hectares of land and thousands of peasant families had been cancelled by mid-2004, including EPs distributed over two decades ago. This is likely to be a gross underestimation though because DAR officials themselves admit that there is no nationwide mechanism in place to monitor reversals happening on the ground. Land conversion has also caused total farm area to fall to 9.7 million hectares in 2002, or 304,078 hectares less in 1991. This figure does not include land that has been "converted" only on paper for the landlords expediency. In addition, there are also land distribution reversals resulting from the economic pressures on peasant beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are hard-pressed to make the lands distributed to them productive because there are no support and extension services available to them. This comes on top of the generally unfavorable economic environment due to rapid agricultural sector liberalization in the 1990s and the dumping of cheap cereals, spices and vegetables from abroad. Falling farm incomes and mounting debt drive peasants to stop amortizing "their" land leading either to foreclosure, a sale of the land back to the landlord (who continues the payments), or out-and-out abandonment.

CARP accomplishment reports then do not reflect the hundreds of thousands of hectares of land that "beneficiaries" are losing back to landlords, commercial and real estate developers. In any case it seems that not all 2.1 million DAR CARP beneficiaries hold either EPs or CLOAs since there are only 1.7 million EP and CLOA holders as of December 2004. Poverty and landlessness The clear failure of land reform in the country has severe consequences for a predominantly agricultural country like the Philippines. The peasants who make up the largest part of the population continue to be exploited by rural land, credit, trading and marketing monopolies and are kept in miserable poverty. Rural poverty incidence is two-and-a-half times that in urban areas and 73% of the country's poor live in agriculture-dependent rural areas. Land rent is still common with tenants paying anywhere from 30% to, in some extreme cases, as much 90% of their produce to landlords. The tersyuhan arrangement of a two-thirds share to the landlord and one-third to the tenant, which happens in many coconut farms in the Bicol region, is among the most common. Farmworkers are doubly burdened with irregular work and even when there is work to be found low wages. Agricultural daily minimum wages ranged from P151-P212 ($2.84-$3.99) nationwide yet farmworker wages were found to go as low as P20 ($0.38) in Negros, P50 ($0.94) in Samar and P69 ($1.30) in Cagayan Valley. Peasants meanwhile have to contend with traders charging high prices for agricultural inputs like fertilizers and pesticides, while paying low prices for peasant produce. With peasant incomes perpetually falling far below their needs, usury's grip is deep with interest rates reaching the equivalent of 20% per month, 200% per harvest and 400% per year. In the province of Mindoro Oriental, P1,000 ($18.83) loans have been charged interest of four (4) sacks of rice, or equivalent to over four times the original loan amount. CARP cannot address peasant poverty and landlessness because it was never meant to. Thus, the only hope for genuine land reform in the country lies with the growing peasant movement. Organized peasant groups have directly confronted exploitation by landlords and traders. They have improved their livelihoods and welfare in ways that, unlike CARP, do not sidestep the issue of who should be benefiting from tilling and working the land. Posted by Bulatlat

LANDOWNERSHIP AND LAND REFORM PROBLEMS OF THE PHILIPPlNES by TSUTOMU TAKIGAWA* Introd uction To date, many economists have dealt with the agricultural structure, and in particular, the system of land tenure, of the Philippines. However, in spite of the considerable amount of literature now available on this subject, their studies leave much to be desired. I would like to point out that little attention has been given to such important matters as the development of land legislation in this country contrasted with that of other countries, either developed or underdeveloped, the history 0L the land tenure system before and during the Spanish administration, and the forms, functions and scope, etc. of the self-regulatory co-operatives in the rural areas, and so forth. Without these studies, it is hardly possible to define the historical character of

landownership and the related problems of the Philippines. I am afraid, however, that due to limitations of space, this article may fail to satisfy all my readers, since it will be impossible to cover all the shortcomings of the prior-mentioned studies. I shall first outline the important characteristics of the system of land holdings in the Philippines and also some features of the rural community. Next I shall deal with the relationship between the present-day land tenure system and the economic development there, then proceed to a definition of the meaning of land reform in general, and further to a factual study of Philippine land reforms and some relevant problems.

Obesity Term Paper

Added August 17, 2009 to Term Paper Examples category Obesity Prevalence in Children/Adolescents Abstract Obesity is a long-term complex condition in which having too much body fat increases ones risk for developing other health problems. It has been recognized as a major health problem by the Surgeon General, The World Health Organization (W.H.O.), The National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) and The Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Its over- all prevalence has increased by 33% in the last decade (Merck, 2003, pp. 685-687). Researchers have found that obesity is directly related to an increase in the mortality rate (Journal of American Medical Assoc., 2003, vol. 289, 2, pp.187-193). In many obese people, the root of their condition can be tracked back to their childhood years. Obesity tends to run throughout ones lifetime, meaning that its presence at any age will increase the risk of the condition at subsequent ages. For this reason it is important to address the prevalence of obesity in children and adolescents. In the past 30 years, obesity in American children has more than doubled resulting in an increase in chronic health problems. For children, these problems are especially profound. More children are being diagnosed with adult conditions such as sleep apnea, type II diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol, and most of these children will probably carry the burden of their weight into adulthood (American Obesity Assoc., 2002). Overweight children who mature into obese adults are at greater risk for the early development of these conditions that can include physical disabilities. For some children, the causes of obesity are genetically linked, but for many of them the causes are environmental and behavioral. Something has to be done for our children and for society in general. Interventions which concentrate on health education, weight control, physical activity and a well-balanced diet must be implemented to stem the epidemic of childhood/adolescent obesity. This will require the efforts of various parties in this society. It is important that they be made aware of the consequences of this disease and understands the dangers that long term obesity has on the general health of the child/adolescent. With this knowledge, they can take whatever steps are necessary in order to decrease the prevalence of obesity in this society. This term paper will investigate the impact that obesity has on children/adolescents in our society. 1. What is the prevalence of childhood/adolescents obesity? 2. What are the contributing factors, which lead to obesity? 3. What are the health complications of obesity?

4. How can we prevent/treat obesity? The prevalence and impact of obesity in children and adolescents between the ages of 6-19 will focus on these four questions. What is the prevalence of childhood and adolescent obesity? Rates of obesity have been climbing for decades. According to the CDC (2002c, Nutrition & Physical activity: obesity trends) in the year 2000, 19.8% of adults in the U.S. were obese, an increase of 61% since 1999 (38.8 million adults). By the year 2001, its prevalence rose to 20.9% and currently there are more than 44 million obese American adults, reflecting a 74% increase since 1991. This dramatic increase in obesity, which has reached an epidemic status, is not limited just to adults; the young are also affected by this condition (CDC, 2002, Physical Activity and Good Nutrition at a glance). Data collected by the American Obesity Association (2002b), shows alarming statistics, 15.5% of adolescents between the ages of 12-19 and 15.3% of children between the ages of 6-11 are obese. At present there are an estimated eight million young obese Americans aged 6 to19 in the U.S. (CDC, 2002 at a glance). Obesity in children and adolescents is now an epidemic. With the increase in the prevalence of obese children in the last three decades, currently one out of five children is diagnosed as obese (National Institute of Health, 2002, Word on Health). Researchers at the A.O.A (2002c, fact sheet) found that among female youths the highest prevalence was in black non- Hispanic girls, ages 6-11 (22.2%) and black non-Hispanic adolescent girls age 12-19 (26.6%). Looking at the statistics for male youths 27.3% of boys ages 6-11 and 27.5% of the male adolescents age 12-19 is diagnosed as obese. Although the increase is in both children and adolescents, in all ages, races and genders the highest prevalence has been found in African American females. What are the contributing factors of obesity? There are many causes of obesity. There is no doubt that genetics plays a role, but genes alone do not account for the dramatic increase in the prevalence of obesity in the past decades. The factors that contribute to childhood and adolescent obesity are the same as those for adults (World Book on line, 2003). The main causes of obesity are behavioral and environmental factors. Obesity occurs when one consumes more calories than he/she burns. In the United States, the changing environment has broadened food options and eating habits. Shelves in the supermarkets are stocked with a greater selection of foods. Soft drinks, fast food restaurants and pre-packaged foods are more accessible today. Although such foods are fast and convenient they tend to be very high in fat and calories contributing to an excess caloric intake, causing weight gain (National Institute of Digestive, Diabetes and Kidney Disease, 2001). Some foods are advertised as healthy, low fat or even fat free but many contain more calories than the fatty foods they are suppose to replace. These misguided notions are leading people to take in more calories from food than they use for energy. Portion sizes have also increased in both restaurants and homes encouraging eating more in one meal because of its larger portion size. (Time, 2003). This also holds true within the school system. School breakfast and lunch programs do not promote healthy eating habits in children and adolescents and do not meet the nutritional standards. The foods provided are high in fat, calories and sugars, leading to an increase in caloric intake. Vending machines are now available in schools, allowing for easy access to junk food (MSNBC, 2003). Our bodies need calories for daily normal functions and activities but weight gain occurs when the amount of calories consumed exceeds over its need (CDC, 2002a , Nutrition and Physical activity, contributing factors). Physical activity is good for overall health. Despite this, most Americans; both adults and children are sedentary. Technology has created labor and timesaving products such as elevators, cars, and computers,

TVs with remote controls devices. Instead of walking or riding a bike for short distance errands, people use their cars, decreasing the overall amount of energy used in their daily lives. (NIDDK, 2001). At the work place, employers do not provide opportunities for physical activities and most Americans hold jobs that involve minimal physical labor. Children and adolescents spend two to three hours daily watching TV or playing video games (sedentary activities) instead of engaging in physical activities, which burn up calories. Schools do not encourage physical activities nor do they provide an environment that promotes it either. (Surgeon General, 2001). This lack of physical activity and the consumption of too many calories leads to obesity and comes with consequences that have major impact in the health of the individual as well as on society. What are the consequences of obesity? Along with the increase in the prevalence of childhood obesity, there has also been an increase in other major medical problems among children and adolescents. Childhood obesity is associated with increased factors for heart disease, such as hypertension, elevated cholesterol levels and elevated blood sugar (diabetes). It is also associated with an increase in sleep apnea (interrupted breathing during sleep) asthma, some cancers and orthopedic problems especially of the lower limbs due to excess weight bearing to the joints. (AOA, 2002d, Health Risks). The most alarming finding and of great concern is the appearance of diabetes type II (adult onset) in adolescents. A condition which was rare among the young is now found in increasing numbers (NSW, 2002,). Recent research shows in 1990 fewer than 4% of children were diagnosed with diabetes. At present there is more than 20% and this number varies from 8-45% depending on the age group. Type II diabetes is the most frequent type found among the ages of 10-19 yrs. Of all the children diagnosed with diabetes, 85% are obese (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2003). Aside from the increased risk of major health problems that are associated with obesity, investigators have presented information on the impact of obesity on the health care cost and the mortality rate in the U.S. Health care cost in 1999 was estimated to be $102.2 billion; currently is estimated at $117 billion. In reference to the mortality rate in the U. S. alone, there are approximately 300,000 deaths a year have been attributed to obesity (AOA, 2002a, Advocacy Update). How can obesity be treated / prevented? According to the CDC, (2003, FAQ), AOA, (2002, Childhood Obesity), AAP, (2002), The Surgeon Generals call to action and the NIDDK, (2001), the treatment is the same. The emphasis is placed on prevention: the reduction of dietary fat, caloric intake and increase in physical activity. This includes minimizing sedentary behaviors such as watching television too much, reading nutrition labels supplied on the food containers/ packages and following the food guides recommended in the food pyramids to include fruits and vegetables. The changing of eating habits must also be implemented. The selection of proper portion sizes, eating slower, taking smaller bites and chewing the food thoroughly (longer). In reference to physical activity, it should be part of an individuals daily activity, whether it be walking, biking, jogging, garden work or moderate house work, it must be included in ones routine. Once obesity has already been identified, the primary concern is weight loss, and the weight loss must be gradual. The treatment is dependent on the severity of the condition, the overall health of the individual and the motivation to lose the weight. The treatment differs from person to person. It can be a combination of diet and exercise with the inclusion of environmental and behavioral modifications. With extreme cases and when the individual health is in jeopardy, medications and/or surgery are strongly recommended. The

treatment of medication and/or surgery must be under the continuous supervision of a physician and the involvement of a nutrition specialist (NIDDK, 2001). The evidence is over whelming that childhood and adolescent obesity has been on the rise for several decades, having major effects on health and longevity. There are approximately eight million young obese Americans in the United States between the ages of 6 and 9. Obesity is clearly associated with the increased prevalence of diabetes type II and sleep apnea along with the increase in other risk factors that lead to heart disease in children and adolescents. The contributing factors that lead to obesity are clearly evident and recognized by government agencies and health professionals alike, yet there are an estimated 300,000 deaths a year attributed to obesity. It is obvious that prevention is the long term answer. Prevention is the best hope for decreasing the prevalence of this condition, but an obesity prevention program does not exist. Emphasis must be placed on the development of such a program, a comprehensive preventive program that incorporates educational, behavioral and environmental components. Implementation of such a program will require the efforts from public health agencies, education professionals, media (food advertisements), industries (providing some means of physical activity) and health care providers. Health education should be widely available in all schools for the teaching and reinforcement of health behaviors which should begin at home. Healthy eating and physical activity are the cornerstones in the prevention of obesity especially in children and adolescents. Families and schools are major critical links in providing the foundation for these behaviors. They are role models in creating an active and healthy eating environment that promotes healthy nutrition and good physical activity habits. As a nation we need and must take action to assist in the reduction of obesity and the major health conditions associated with obesity. We must lobby and let our voices be heard demanding for the involvement of government agencies and politicians in allocating funds for continual research in the prevention of obesity. We should create programs that educate the public on nutrition and encourages physical activity. Controlling the cost of food, making nutritional foods more affordable for easier accessibility, and encouraging the media to promote healthier foods.