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Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization Author(s): Philip G. Roeder Reviewed work(s): Source: World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1991), pp. 196-232 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010471 . Accessed: 28/10/2011 09:04
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SOVIET FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

By PHILIP G. ROEDER*

creation of political institutions that expanded the controlof the regimeover the processesof social mobilizationassociatedwithmodernfor was noteworthy providinga considerablemeaization. This strategy sure of interethnic peace as the Soviet regime began the process of industrialization.And yet seven decades afterthe Soviet regime assumed of power, with the industrialization the economy and urbanization of instead fuelsa divisocietywell under way, thisdevelopmentalstrategy sive and destructive ethnopolitics. seems to turn around a pattern The Soviet developmental strategy familiar in the Western developmentalexperience. As Ernest Gellner to notes: "The age of transition industrialism was bound" also to be "an age of nationalism."' But the Soviet strategy delayed the political reckoning with the "age of nationalism"to a much laterstage of industrialization. In the shorttermthis was a prudentmeans to avoid the simultaneous crisesthatcan overtaxthe capabilitiesof a new polity:the Soviet a as regimedid not confront crisisof identity it soughtto build the founof dations of Soviet power and initiatethe economic transformation sononethelesscontained the roots of its own longerciety.2 This strategy and in the past threeand a half decades has given rise termdysfunction and protest.3 to new ethnicassertiveness The Western experience with peripheral nationalism has differed more significantly from the Soviet patternin a second respect.In the West-regardless of macroeconomicconditionsthatoccasion the rise of peripheralnationalisms-it has been most pronounced among the less
* For their comments earlierdrafts, thankmycolleaguesand good friends-Deborah on I Avant, AnthonyBrunello,Ellen Comisso, PatrickDrinan, Arend Lijphart,Richard Little, Debra Rosenthal, GershonShafir, Susan Shirk,Tracy Strong, and Michael Tierney. Gellner,Nationsand Nationalism (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University Press,I983), 40. 2 Sidney Verba, "Sequences and Development,"in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development(Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1971), 283-3i6; Dankwart A. Rustow,A World Nations(Washington, of D.C.: Brookings,i967), 12032. 3I make a parallel argument the concerning relationship betweenthe Sovietdevelopmental strategy and politicalparticipation; Philip G. Roeder,"Modernizationand Participasee tion in the LeninistDevelopmentalStrategy," American PoliticalScienceReview83 (September i989), 859-84.

of CENTRAL element theSoviet developmental strategy the was

World Politics (January i99i), 43

i96-232

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WesternEurope, accordingto Joseph advantaged. In nineteenth-century Rudolph and RobertThompson, "the mostcommon causal elementgiving rise to the urge forautonomy" was the aggravationof a peripheral ethnic group's "marginalityin, or exploitationby, the state systemto which it belongs."4During periods of economic prosperity the more in Peter Gourevitchhas found that recentrise of peripheralnationalisms, those most likely to support ethnic political movementsare disadvanor taged ethnicgroups drawn by the opportunity promise of expanded resources.5 In the Soviet Union the rise of ethnopolitics been most significant has in the Caucasian and Baltic republics.It is therethat local leaders have pressed the most ambitiouslegislativeagendas forchange (see Table i) and that citizens have mounted the largestand most frequentdemonstrations(Table 2). Yet, as Figure i shows, thesenationalities-particularly the Armenians, Georgians, and Estonians-are among the most ethnicgroups in termsof educationaland occupationalattainsuccessful rateseven higherthan those for the ment,in many instancesreporting numerically predominantRussian population.Even in the area of Party membership,Georgians reportfar higherrates among the adult population than do the Russians, and the Armenians reportrates above the Far less inclinedto mount this formof poaverage forall nationalities. liticalaction in recentyearshave been the least advantaged nationalities, withthe highest such as thosein CentralAsia. Thus, it is thenationalities levels of educational,occupational,and oftenpoliticalattainment, rather than the disadvantaged or marginal ones, that have advanced the most ambitiousagendas forchange and engaged in the mostextensiveprotest. is The new Soviet ethnopolitics structured the federalismof nomby the value of inallyautonomous ethnichomelands.Appreciating strategic and organizational weapons, political entrepreneurship, mobilizational of resources,the architects the Soviet regime came to understand that could expand theircontrolover the politicizationof federalinstitutions Withineach homeland the regimecreateda cadre of partyand ethnicity. state officialsdrawn from the indigenous ethnic group but dependent
4Rudolph and Thompson, "Ethnoterritorial Movementsand the Policy Process: Accommodating Nationalist Demands in the Developed World," Comparative Politics 17 (April i985), 292. See also Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: University Chicago of Press, i969), 147-78; Michael Hechter,Internal Colonialism: The CelticFringein British NationalDevelopment, 1536-1966 (London: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1975). of 5Gourevitch, "The Reemergence 'PeripheralNationalisms':Some ComparativeSpeculations on the Spatial Distribution Political Leadership and Economic Growth," Comof and History (JulyI979), 303-22, at 319-25. See also Donald L. 2i parativeStudiesin Society Horowitz, "Patternsof Ethnic Separatism,"Comparative Studiesin Societyand History23 (i98i), i65-95.

TABLE MAJOR UNION-REPUBLIC (SEPTEMBER

I ON ETHNIC 31, RELATIONS

LEGISLATION I, i985-DECEMBER

i989) Other Legislation' Republicaneconomic accountability (5/18/89) Votingresidence requirement

(8/8/89)d

Republic Estonian SSR

Sovereigntya

Languageb

Law Constitutional amendment(1 1/16/88)' (1/18/89)

Lithuanian SSR

Constitutional amendment(5/18/89)'

Law (11/18/88) Presidiumdecree (1/26/89) Supreme Soviet decree (5/18/89) Supreme Soviet resolution (10/6/88) Law (5/5/89)

Latvian SSR

Constitutional amendment(7/29/89)'

Deputy residence requirement (11/17/89) Republicaneconomic independence (5/18/89) Law on citizenship (1 1/3/89)' service Military (9/29/89)' In-migration restrictions (2/14/89) Votingresidence requirement (7/29/89)"

Azerbaidjan SSR Georgian SSR Armenian SSR

[Article731c Constitutional amendment(9/23/89)' Constitutional [Article751c amendment(1 1/19/89) [Article731c

Annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh

(12/1/89)

Tadjik SSR Moldavian SSR Uzbek SSR

Law

(7/22/89)
Law (9/1/89) Constitutional amendment(10/21/89)

SOURCES: Izvestiza,January20, 1989, July23, 1989, November 5, 1989,November 13, 1989,November 20, 1989; Kommunist[Erevan], December 3, 1989; Pravda, October 7, 1988, November 28, 1988, May 6, 1989,May 20, 1989, July30, i989, August io, i989, August 17, 1989, September i, 1989, September 3, 1989, October 6, 1989; SovetskaiaEstoniia, November I9, 1988; SovetskaiaLitva, November i9, 1988,January 1989; Sovetskaia 27, Lativia, February 17, 1989. a Declarations of sovereignty In and rightof nullification. parentheses:date of adoption. b Declaration of statelanguage. In parentheses:date of adoption. c Language provisionpreviously constitution. adopted with I978 union-republic d Portionssubsequentlydeclared unconstitutional all-union Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. by ' In parentheses:date of adoption.

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TABLE 2 MAJOR PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS 3I, i989) I, i985-AUGUST (SEPTEMBER

NumberofDemonstrations Estimated Ethnic Group Over 100,000 Participants 25 Over 10,000 Participantsa 30

Azeris Lithuanians Latvians Georgians Estonians Moldavians Uzbeks "Exclave"Russians Belorussians Ukrainians Kazakhs Kirgizes Tadjiks Turkmen

Armenians

9 4 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

19 9 7 4 4 6 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0

Research Bulletin;Report the USSR. on SOURCES: New YorkTimes;Radio Liberty a Number includesthoseover ioo,ooo.

upon Moscow for its members' positions.As this cadre was assigned a monopoly over the mobilizational resourceswithinthe ethnic commuit nity, determinedwhen the ethnicgroup would be mobilized to action. thatachieved interethnic peace not so much by removIt was a strategy mobilizational ing the root causes of ethnicgrievancesas by eliminating forindependentethnicprotest. opportunities to an It is therefore ironictwistthatafterthe transition industrialism of and indigenouscadres became instruments these federal institutions that were designed to expand Institutions the new ethnicassertiveness. Moscow's controlover ethnicgroups (and that were generallythought in the West to be moribundas federalguaranteesof ethnicrights)have taken on a new life.Autonomous homelandsprovideessentialresources and both federal for the collectivemobilizationof ethniccommunities, and indigenouscadres shape ethnicagendas. institutions Central to what we have witnessedin the Soviet Union is an expandThis is not a new public politicsof ethnofederalism. ing and increasingly phenomenoninitiatedby the policiesof Mikhail Gorbachevbut the continuationof a trendthat began to unfold as early as the rule of Nikita

200

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202

WORLD POLITICS

Khrushchev. As examples below will show, demands forexpanded autonomy,protestsover language policy,pressuresto reduce Russian miviolencehave surfacedin everydecade since gration,and intercommunal explanation the mid-I95os. Gorbachev'spoliciesare clearlynot sufficient of for a patternthat predates Gorbachev and the introduction his reforms. The key to three questions raised by the present ethnic crisis lies that created those homelands within the Soviet developmentalstrategy thatfostered interethnic and cadres. First,origins: Why have institutions laterbecome the vehicles to peace during the transition industrialization advantaged ethnic of protest?Second, incidence: Why have the relatively been the most assertive,whereas ethnic groups near the lower groups end of mostcomparativemeasuresof socioeconomicand politicalsuccess agendas: Why have the most quiescent? And third, have been relatively betweencenterand periphery focused to importantissues of contention such a large degree upon the detailsof the Soviet developmentalstrategy and upon federalismin particular?As is argued in the conclusion,the of answers to these questions point up the centrality Soviet political inof to stitutions the politicization ethnicity.
THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGY AND ETHNICITY

play a criticalrole in the mobilizationof protest, Political entrepreneurs and in many cases even the creation of the politicizationof ethnicity, for In ethnicidentities.6 the European experience, example, regional intellectualswho felttheiraspirationsto elitestatusfrustrated the status by quo were oftenthe pioneersof ethnicrevival.AnthonySmith contends distinct systhattheseintellectuals soughtto createa separate,ethnically and bureaucraticapwithinwhich the "professional tem of stratification the paratus would naturallysatisfy career aspirationsof a multitudeof excluded diploma-holders."7 hitherto orientedintellecThese regionally tuals were a necessary, ingredientin the rise of although not sufficient, peripheralnationalisms. in Political entrepreneurs ethniccommunitieshave available to them and instrumental. The primortwo mobilizational strategies: primordial
6 William Bernard,"New Directionsin Integration and Ethnicity," International Migration Review 5 (WinterI971), 464-73; Michael Hechter,Debra Friedman,and Malka Appelbaum, Review i6 (Summer i982), Migration "A Theory of Ethnic CollectiveAction,"International 4I12-34; Phillip M. Rawkins,"An Approachto the PoliticalSociologyof the Welsh NationRothchild, Ethnopolialist Movement,"PoliticalStudies27 (SeptemberI979), 440-57; Joseph Press,i98i), 27. Framework (New York: Columbia University tics:A Conceptual Press,i98i), 87, i26. 7Smith, The EthnicRevival(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

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dial strategy focuses on ethnic revival-in Smith's words, "communal and self-realization."8 The mobiliregenerationthroughself-discovery zation of the ethnic communityfor politicalaction oftencenterson an assertionof the ethnicgroup's identity, usuallyin the contextof issues of or from culture,identity, beliefand in reactionto threatsto the identity focuseson the pursuitof assimilativepolicies. The instrumental strategy The mobilizationof ethnicity, according social and economic interests. to Rothchild,is "a highlyconscious,political,and new mode of interest in articulation.'"The ethnic group itself, the words of Nathan Glazer as and Daniel Moynihan, is "defined in terms of interest, an interest group."lo Political entrepreneurs may also seek to mix thesestrategies. by The Soviet developmentalstrategy soughtto controlethnopolitics from mobilizing prohibitingall but sanctioned political entrepreneurs theseentrepreneurs frompursuing theircommunitiesand by deterring of and any but the regime'sinstrumental strategies plan fulfillment social The Soviet strategyachieved this control through a transformation. threefoldpolicy of (I) creatingwithineach ethnichomeland an indigenous cadre assigned a monopolyover the mobilizationalresourcesof the community,(2) constrainingthe behavior of this new ethnic cadre by that deterredthe expressionof unsanccreatingan incentivestructure tioned, particularlyprimordial ethnic agendas, and (3) assigning the for cadre the responsibility creatingan ethnicallydistinctstratification and for impeding the emergence of systemwithin officialinstitutions ethnicentrepreneurs outside these institutions. us examLet alternative ine each in turn.
CREATING AN ETHNIC CADRE

foundations their"nationalities of The Sovietshave labeled thestructural The sopolicies" socialist federalismand indigenization(korenizatsiia). of cialist federation,in the formulation the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, for "differs radicallyfromthe bourgeoisfederation," the formeris "the state formfor solving the nationalquestion... [and] is based on the naof tional-territorial principle."" Thus, at present fifty-three theterritorial administrationsof the Soviet Union are based on designated ethnic as homelands-fifteen as union republics, twenty autonomous republics,
8 Ibid., I05; JamesMcKay, "An Exploratory and Mobilizationalist of Synthesis Primordial at Approachesto Ethnic Phenomena,"Ethnicand Racial Studies5 (October i982), 395-420, 3999 Rothchild(fn.6), 30. 10 and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard UniverEthnicity: Theory Glazer and Moynihan, sityPress,I975), 7Bol'shaia Sovetskaia (Moscow: Sovetskaiaentsiklopediia, 27:255. I977), Entsiklopediia

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to zation has sought to tie the minorities the Soviet regime by drawing posts of Party and national cadres into the political and administrative In statein theseterritories. i920 thenPeople's Commissarof Nationality AffairsJosephStalin explained that to make Soviet power "near and would require dear" to the minorities in . be thatall Sovietorgans theborder regions . . shouldas faras possible of habits, from localpeopleacquainted the withthemanner life, recruited and languageof the nativepopulation; [and] thatall the best customs, institutions.'3 the peoplefrom localmassesshouldbe drawnintothese Federalism and indigenizationcame at the expense of simple economic The national-territorial and assimilation. principlehas not alrationality units.In some instances, particularly ways led to optimal administrative ethnic among less modernized groups, it perpetuatedor strengthened that might otherwisehave disappeared. In the case of the differences Ukraine, Alexander Motyl can ask, "Why ... did the Soviet state... discourage Little Russianization [i.e., assimilation]by pursuingkorenizatsiia?"'4 The answer would appear to be the primacythe Soviet regime and the placed on checking the mobilizationalsources of ethnopolitics criticalrole it assigned the ethniccadres in thisstrategy. These policies provided opportunitiesfor nationalitiesrepresenting over 93 percentof the non-Russianpopulation to create ethnicallydisautonomoushomelands.Grey Hodtinctpoliticaleliteswithinformally period (0955nett'sextensivedata show that by the early post-Stalinist in non-Russianrepublicsled to 72), indigenization eleven of the fourteen of in proportionate overrepresentation the titularnationality Party and state leadership posts at the republiclevel. By the i98os indigenization extendedwell beyondthemostvisibleposts,such as each republic'sParty chairmenof its Presidiumand Council of Ministers, first first secretary, of its Union of Writers,presidentof its Academy of Sciences, secretary and chair of its council of trade rectors of its principal universities, and Fred W. Grupp show that unions. The data compiled by Ellen Jones it also reached such sensitiveand less visible areas as internalsecurity, including each republic's Ministryof Internal Affairs,Committee on
A new (eleventh) in was createdfortheEven-Batagaidistrict Yakutia okrug autonomous in October i989; Pravda,October30, i989. Otherchangesare likelyto follow. 3 Stalin,"The Policy of the Soviet Government the National Question in Russia," in on Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages PublishingHouse, I953), 4:3707I. 14Motyl,WilltheNon-Russians Rebel? (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, i987), I04. See also Grey Hodnett,"The Debate over SovietFederalism,"SovietStudiesi8 (April i967), 458-8i; Daniel C. Matuszewski,"Nationalitiesin the Soviet Future: Trends under Gorand theSoviet bachev," in Lawrence C. Lerner and Donald W. Treadgold, eds., Gorbachev Future(Boulder,Colo.: WestviewPress,i988), 95-96.
12

eight as autonomous oblasts, and ten as autonomous okrugs.I2 Indigeni-

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Organs Department. It State Security,and the Party's Administrative In also touched lower levelsof administration. i988, forexample,in each held a greaterprounion republicwithoblaststhe indigenousnationality first than its proportion secretaryships portionof oblast Partycommittee of the republic'spopulation.'5 monopolyon the The indigenouscadre was given an institutionalized thatis, it definedthe ethnicmarkers public expressionof ethnicidentity, the These markerswere thencentralto comthatdistinguish nationality. municatingthe socialistmessage in national cultural formsand propagandizing populationsbeing broughtinto the modern sector.For many sustainedcontact Soviet citizensundergoingsocial mobilizationthe first of with the great traditions theirown ethnicgroup was in the formof this national-Soviethybrid.In the extreme,the markers identifiedby theseelites definednew ethnicgroups,such as the Tadjiks, thathad not withwhich elitesand the masses had idenbeen communities previously even these tified.Yet, as the recentpoliticalactivismby Tadjiks attests, markersbecame the basis forthe mobilizationof the populationin political action.'6 within each republic this cadre was assigned the More importantly, role of gatekeeper,to determinewhen the ethnicgroup would be mobilized politically.Insofaras anyone withinthe homeland had access, this cadre monopolized the mobilizational resourcesessential to sustained, particularly large-scale political action. The means of communications, the indigenous-languagepress and broadcastmedia, were monopolized controlledby this cadre.7 Access to throughthe republicaninstitutions meeting places, such as auditoriumsand public squares within the rein Hodnett,Leadership theSovietNationalRepublics(Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 377-78; Jonesand Grupp, "Modernisationand Ethnic Equalisation in the USSR," Soviet Studies36 (April I984), 159-84, at 174; Deputatyverkhovnogo sovetaSSSR, odinadtsatyi sozyv(Deputies of the SupremeSovietof theUSSR, eleventh convocation] (Mosof cow: Izvestiia, I984); Gavin Helf, comp.,A Biographical Directory SovietRegionalParty Leaders,2d ed. (Munich: Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty,I988). For long-term trendsin The Soviet Bureaucratic indigenizationwithin specificrepublics,see JohnA. Armstrong, Elite: A Case Studyof the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Praeger, 1959), 15-17; Ronald Grigor Suny, The Mating of the GeorgianNation (Bloomington:Indiana University Press, Calif.: Hoover Institutions i988), 209-3 i8; MarthaBrillOlcott,The Kazakhs(Stanford, Press, I987), 199-246. See also StevenL. Burg,"Russians,Natives,and Jewsin the Soviet Scientific Elite: Cadre Competitionin CentralAsia," Cahiers MondeRusseetSovietique (Januarydu 20 and Retention EthnicIdentity Uzbekof in March 1979), 43-59; Nancy Lubin, "Assimilation AsianAffairs (Octoberi98i), 277-85, at 283; J.W. R. Parsons,"National Integration i2 istan," in Soviet Georgia,"SovietStudies34 (October I982), 547-69,at 554. Russiaand Nationalism Central in Asia (Baltimore,Md.: ,6 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Johns Hopkins University Press,1970), 76; Izvestiia, July14, i989; Kommunist Tadzhikistana, June28, i989; Pravda,June25, I988. in Mass Persuasion ' Alex Inkeles,Public Opinionin SovietRussia:A Study (Cambridge: State:SovietMethHarvard University Press,1950); PeterKenez, TheBirth thePropaganda of odsofMass Mobilization, Press,I985). I9I7-I929 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
5

1978), 101-3,

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public, was at the discretionof this cadre. And public protestscould avoid violentsuppressiononly with the cadre's approval.
THE DETERRENCE OF PRIMORDIAL STRATEGIES

These cadres were encouragedto pursuethe regime'sinstrumental strategies and deterredfrom primordialstrategiesby the offerof material tied to the regime'sgoals.'8 Parrewards and status,which were tightly ticularlyafterStalin's purge of traditionalnative elites and the sovietithe zation of indigenous institutions, cadres enjoyed access to these reTheir privileged positions wards only by virtue of Soviet institutions. would not be improved in alternative(even independent) institutions. Indeed, the collapse of Soviet power withintheirhomeland would mean theirown fall frompower-or perhapsworse. Cadres thus had a strong incentiveto resistthe articulation agendas thatmightbe subversiveof of existingfederalinstitutions. tied to the normsand goals of the Soviet develRewards were tightly Soviet federalism embedded these cadres withinthe opmental strategy. all-union Soviet administrativehierarchy.Cadres could only succeed withinan incentivesystemthatdefinedindividualand collectivesuccess in instrumental and socioeconomicgrowth. termsof quota fulfillment the Soviet federBy integrating cadres into Partyand statehierarchies, alism made the "normal" politicsof competitiveappeals for resources the norm among ethnicelitesas well. Much of the politicsbetweenMoscow and the nationality-based territorial unitscame to involve the petitioningforfundsfromabove; beginningwiththe last yearsunder Khrushchev speeches by leaders of the republics appealing for funds and projects to benefittheir people came to be an increasingly prominent featureof meetingsof the PartyCongress,the Central Committee,and the Supreme Soviet.'9 Those who engaged in unsanctionedmobilizational strategiescould be punished with total deprivationof these rewards by being removed The monopoly of officialinstitutions fromtheirpositionsof authority. one's access to these remeant that a purge at the veryleast threatened wards; cadres could not returnto a prosperousprivatelife. Purges of ethnicleaders charged witharticulating particularistic, primordialagendas also deterredothers frommaking such appeals. Since i960 over a of dozen first secretaries union republicshave been removed under cirI8 SewerynBialer,Stalin's Press, i980), 2i6. Successors (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity See also Motyl(fn. 14), I04-5, 119-22. 9 Donna Bahry,Outside Policyin SovietRepublics and Budgetary Moscow: Power,Politics, F. Press,i987), I-5; Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod,How (New York: Columbia University Press),510-17. (Cambridge:Harvard University theSovietUnionIs Governed

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cumstancesthat suggestthe cause was eithertheirown endorsementof primordialagendas or theirunwillingnessto silence otherswho articulated such agendas. For example, afteran officialreceptionin i962 the chairman of the Council of Ministersof the Kazakh Republic was apremovedformaking unguarded commentswhile intoxicatedparently In secretary of commentsthat were just too nationalistic. i966 the first theArmenian Partywas removedforfailureto curbanti-Turkicprotests of anniversary themassacreof theArmenians.And in I972 on thefiftieth were bothremovedfor"national theUkrainian and Georgian secretaries and overzealous promotionof local interests.20 narrow-mindedness"
CREATING AN OFFICIAL INDIGENOUS ELITE

A major responsibility assigned this new cadre by Moscow's all-union authoritieswas to block the emergencewithinthe ethniccommunityof Within their authat might challenge Soviet institutions. counterelites tonomous homelands the cadres implementedpolicies thatextended the of and personnelstrategies the center.These policies sought institutional and intellito (i) create a new, open indigenous elite of professionals (2) gentsia within officialinstitutions, tie professionaland material rewards to membershipin thiselite,while denyingtheserewards to those outside the elite, and (3) limit access to the mobilizational resourcesof institutions. to the community theseofficial action policies during a period The ethniccadres enacted affirmative and modernizationin order to expand opporof rapid economic growth tunitiesfor mobilityfor those aspiring to positionswithin the profesExtensionof the policyof indigenization sional strataand intelligentsia. the apparatus of throughout administrative opened career opportunities and industrialization offered the homeland. Programsof collectivization for opportunities mobilityin management.And the creationof universitiesand academies of sciences in the republicsdramaticallyexpanded the numberof professional positionsreservedforthe minorities. action policies in the institutional contextof Soviet These affirmative to elevated titularnationalities privilegedpositionsin higher federalism education and professionalemploymentwithin their homelands. For 67 example, whereas Georgians constituted percentof their republic's population in I970 (and approximatelythe same proportion of the 83 college-age cohort),theyconstituted percentof the studentbody of of the republic'sinstitutions highereducation.21 Similarly, althoughMolPolicyin Practice(New York: Praeger,I967); TeRobertConquest, SovietNationalities of "The Dialecticsof Nationalismin the USSR," Problems Comresa Rakowska-Harmstone, munism (May-June1974), I-22, at 13. 23 Parsons (fn. '5), 558-59.
20 21

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davians constituted under two-thirds the total populationof theirreof public in themid-ig8os,theywere at least 8o percentof the studentbody the in the law and businessschools of Kishinev State University, republic's leading educational institution. Commentingon the rapid upward mobilityof the Uzbek population within theirrepublic,Nancy Lubin contendsthatthe Central Asians "tend to hire 'theirown' first."22 It is probablytrue-as criticshave charged-that theseopportunities have been opened by crudelyimplementedquota systems.These have and apparentlylowered standardsin highereducation and employment ethnicgroups livingwithinthe homediscriminated against "minority" lands of otherethnicgroups. Mark Popovskyalleges thatin the universitiesof Uzbekistan, forexample, withscarcely educayoungmen and womenfrom primitive villages any and and are assuredpassing tion... are givenscholarships freelodging, or markswhether study not.The philosophy behind strange this they proin of ceedingis thatall nations thebrotherly family theUSSR are equal, and thatall of them therefore and musthavetheir can own intelligentsia, writers, scholars.23 their own doctors, and engineers, in themselves have warned thatfavoritism appointAnd Soviet officials ments toward the titularnationalityof a republic often discriminates In againstothernationalities. i986, forexample,theall-unionPartyleadership chastised Kirgiz leaders for favoringKirgiz candidates among to new recruits the republic'sPartyorganizationsand fordiscriminating against other nationalities(notablyUzbeks) residingwithin the republic.24

for Nonetheless, these policies, to expand the opportunity mobility, a astuteaccommodationwithethnicity. represent particularly From I950 to I975, for example, among the fourteentitularnationalitiesof union republics (other than Russians) the annual growthin scientific workers with eithera candidate of science or a doctorof science degree was 9.6 While depercent-a rate 54 percent higher than among Russians.25 to manding politicalloyalty the Sovietregime,themobility opportunities did not require denial of ethnic identities.Indeed, ethnicity became a of conditionforsuccess,since the positions statuswithinhomelands were oftenreservedforspecificminorities. Soviet federalismofferedminoriLubin (fn. '5), 283Mark Popovsky, Science(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), i i8. Manipulated Research BulJohnSoper, "NationalityIssues under Review in Kirgizia,"Radio Liberty letinRL 49/88 (January I988). 29, 25 USSR Tsentral'noeStatisticheskoe Narodnoe nauka i kul'turav Upravlenie, obrazovanie, SSSR [Popular education,science,and culturein the USSR] (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), 3083922
23 24

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ties the opportunity realize theiraspirationsto create separate stratito fication systems-but withinthe Soviet Union. withinthis officialelite, the To block the emergenceof counterelites that concadres presided over a dense networkof parallel institutions Research of significanceto the trolled all aspects of professionallife.26 ethnicgroup and its homeland was controlledby indigenousacademies Creativeprofessionals such as writers, artists, of sciencesand universities. or architectswho sought to disseminatetheirwork under the cultural unions of the monopolyof the regimewere required to join the official professions. Membersof the new scientific homeland fortheirrespective and institutions, most and creativeelite were dependentupon theofficial ethnicelite created could not hope to improvetheirlot in an alternative This was particularly true outside and in oppositionto theseinstitutions. for those in positionsof power such as leaders of professionalunions, those with academic positionsin fieldsheavilyencumberedby ideology, and creativeartistswho depended upon the hegemonyof socialistrealdeprivationof both rewards ism fortheirsuccess.The purge threatened and the means to practiceone's profession. outsidethe new professional To block the emergenceof counterelites the institutions eliteand intelligentsia, cadre denied thoseoutsideofficial access to mobilizationalresources.The ethniccadre prohibitedindepenlines of communicationbetween the dent association,severed unofficial and the populace, and deprived incipientdissidentmoveintelligentsia ments of theirleadershipby "decapitating"them-that is, threatening, Those outside were limited or figures. imprisoning, executingexemplary means of illegal associations,samizdat, and underto the inefficient religioushierarground dissemination.Muslims opposed to the official chy in the mid-Ig8os, for example, still had to rely upon religious tracts-many of them handwritten-smuggled across the bordersfrom Afghan resistancegroups. And Muslims of the Sufi undergroundborrowed a technique fromdissidentsin the European partsof the Soviet theirreligioustextsbychain letters.27 Soviet polUnion: theydistributed icies punished severelythose who attemptedto articulate primordial For example, in an attack on agendas outside the officialinstitutions. labeled the "belching of debilitatednationalwhat KommunistUkrainy
26 See, forexample,DietrichA. Loeber, "Administration Culture in Soviet Latvia," in of Adolf Sprudz and Armin Rusis, eds., Res Baltica (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, I968), 133-45; Nicholas P. Vakar, Belorussia:The Mating of a Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 150-51. 27Timur Kocaoglu, "Muslim Chain Lettersin CentralAsia," Radio Liberty BulResearch letinRL 313/83 (August i8, I983); Alexandre Bennigsen,"Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims,"Problems Communism (November-Decemberi984), 28-4i, at 36-37. of 33

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ism," the KGB in August-SeptemberI965 arrestedover twenty intellectuals who had attemptedto lead a Ukrainian culturalrenaissance.28 In order to crack down on nonofficial Muslim preaching,a i982 decree of the Turkmen Supreme Soviet Presidium authorized sentencesof up to two years imprisonment and correctivelabor for the crime of "social vagabondage."29And in Armenia arrestsin late i988 and early i989 movementby targeting leaders (such sought to decapitatethe protest its as the Karabakh Committee).30
CONSEQUENCES FOR ETHNIC POLITICAL ACTION

As a consequence of the monopolyover mobilizationalresourcesheld by in the official institutions, mostcircumstances onlyinstrumental political action behind theobjectivesof the cadre could musterthe mobilizational requisitesfor sustained large-scaleaction. There were, of course, spontaneous incidents primordial of ethnicprotest. Tashkent in September In i969, forexample, an Uzbek crowd assaulted Russian bystanders aftera match between the local "Pakhtar" soccer team and visitorsfrom the Russian Republic.3'And many individualparticipants officially in sponsored politicalaction harboredprivateprimordialagendas. Nevertheless, were handicapped in theirattemptsto formand aspiring counterelites mobilize effective politicalaction in supportof primordialagendas; and when it occurred,primordialprotest was more likelyto be expressedin small-scaleevents. isolated,ineffective, Even in the period of perestroika, republicswhere thesecadres exin ercise decisive controlover mobilizationalresources, theycan determine whether protestwill be on a sustained large scale or simply sporadic. This is illustratedby the differing fortunesof popular frontsin the Ukraine and the Baltic republicsduring i988 and i989. In the Ukraine, "the hard line of the [unionaccording to an American correspondent, republic]Communistleadershiphere is one reason the riseof Ukrainian self-consciousness been slower than the surge of nationalismin the has Baltic republics."32 the Baltic republics,by contrast, In the cadre made
28 29

Ludmilla Alexeyeva,SovietDissent (Middletown,Conn.: Wesleyan University Press,

31-

Bennigsen(fn.27), 40. 3? New YorkTimes,November 25, i988, November26, i988, December 22, i988, January 2, i989. See also Pravda,January 26, i990. 3 Michael Rywkin, Moscow'sMuslimChallenge (Armonk,N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, I982), i2i; B. Brown, "Kazkhstan in I987: The Year afterAlma Ata," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 5/88 (December 23, I987), 2. See also Ronald Grigor Suny,Armeniain the Twentieth Century (Chico, Calif.: ScholarsPress,I983), 78-80. 32 New York Times,March 9, i989; see also June20, I988, August 24, I988, August 25, I988, October io, I988, November30, I988, December 2, I988, December 7, I988, February 5, i989, April 9, i989, April 14, i989, April 22, i989; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Baltic Echoes in the

I985),

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available to the popular fronts mobilizationalresourcesof the Party the and state.Thus, the foundingof theLatvian Popular Front was attended by the republic's Party leadership,which applauded its call for autonomy. Statementsby the national frontswere published by the official press. Their newspaperswere printedby the official publishinghouses. Their programsappeared on state-run television, includingtwo fulldays of live coverage of the Sajudis Conferencein i988. Their meetingswere sanctioned,includingtheassemblyof thethreeBaltic popular fronts held at the Estonian Central Committee'sHouse of Political Enlightenment. Their demonstrations receivedpermits.As the chairmanof the Sajudis Assembly,VytautusLandsbergis,stressedin a i989 interviewwith Tythe godnikPowszechny, abilityof his movementto conduct its activities depended upon its close relationship with the republic'sParty authorities.33 The importanceof these cadres is further illustratedby the republic's electionsof i990: the cadres in the Baltic republicspermitteda choice among candidates with alternativeethnic agendas, whereas in otherrepublics,such as Belorussia,cadres blocked this.34 The ethniccadres have actuallyinstigated many of the protests the of past few years.In the Baltic republicsdemonstrations have been orchestratedto supportlegislativeinitiatives statelanguages and republican on In sovereignty. November i988 the Estonian Partyleadershipreportedly pressedmembersof the republic'sSupreme Soviet fora unanimous vote and then orchestrated demonstrations behalf of legislationto grant on itselfthe power of nullification over all-union legislation.Similarly,in May i989 Lithuanian Partyleaders mobilized demonstrations Vilnius in to supportlegislationgivingthe republicpower of nullification and then In claiming exemptionfromthe new all-unionhighwaytax.35 Nagornyi Karabakh and Armenia demonstrations behalfof Armenian annexon ation of the Karabakh began in early i988 with the supportof the local Partyand stateleadership-including formallegislativeendorsement of theircause by local soviets.And apparently even much of the violence to forceAzeris fromArmenia (and ArmeniansfromAzerbaidjan) thatbegan in late November i988 took place with the supportof local Party and state officials.36 Where leaders of a republic take decisive action to
Ukraine," Report the USSR I (January 13, i989), i8-20; idem,"Confrontation on over Creationof Ukrainian 'Popular Front,'" Report theUSSR I (March 3, i989), 13-17. on 33Tygodnii Powszechny, February5, i989. See also Izvestiia, May 15, i989; Saulius Girnius, "UnofficialGroups in the Baltic Republics and Access to the Mass Media," Reporton the USSR I (May 5, i989), i6-i9. 34New YorkTimes,March 5, i990, March 6, i990, March 31, 1990. 35Moscow TASS, November20, I988, reported FBIS, Daily Report: in SovietUnion,November2i, I988, pp. 42-43; New YorkTimes,November 17, I988, November 27, 1988, December8, I988, May 19, i989, May 25, i989. 36 Kommunist (Baku), October 14, I988; Izvestiia, January i989. 5,

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block protests(as in the Ukraine until mid-ig8g) or to silence them (as in politicalaction in Georgia afterfivedays of protest April i989), future is usually sporadic and small-scale. ethnicgroups to mount large-scale,sustained The abilityof different political action has thus been closelytied to the resourcescontrolledby are theircadres. The mobilizationalopportunities greatestamong those cadres in controlof a union republicor even an autonomous republicor oblast. At the other extreme,ethnic groups without an autonomous a homeland or livingoutside it suffer major handicap,thoughtheymay stillfindlocal mobilizing cadres and elites,as the Gagauz found among town and village authoritiesin southernMoldavia. "Exclave" Russians manin Estonia and Moldavia have found these cadres among factory in Nationalities agers and subordinateParty officials those republics.37 the lacking even these resourcessuffer greatesthandicap in attempting in to expresstheirprotest any sortof sustainedlarge-scalemanner.Thus, the protestsby Jews have been sporadic and small-scale: in i988 and by i989, forexample, the largestdemonstrations Jewsdrew only several only two to threedozen.38 hundred,and most demonstrations,
ORIGINS: THE

RISE OF ETHNOFEDERALISM

Soviet deOver the past threedecades threechanges have transformed into a source of ethnofederalism. First, with the velopmental strategy trimmingof the terrorapparatus under Khrushchevand the policy of "respectforcadres" under Brezhnev,thatis, the relaxationof Moscow's thesecadres had greaterleeway in pressingtheirparticdeterrent threat, and ularisticagendas.39 Second, as thecadresbuiltinstitutional even poptheirdependenceupon the ular supportwithintheirethniccommunities, centerdeclined. These new power bases enabled the cadres to take more assertivepolicystandsagainst Moscow. Third, thesecadres encountered in mountingdifficulties securingresourcesto continuethe expansion of within theirhomelands. In response,theyoften mobilityopportunities of resortedto a strategy mobilizingtheirelitesbehindlegislativeagendas
37New YorkTimes,March I5, i989; VladimirSocor, "Politicsof the Language Question on Heating Up in Soviet Moldavia," Report the USSR I (September8, i989), 33-36; Pravda 29, July i989. 29, BulletinRL 43/88(January I988), 5, RL i67/ Research 38 See, forexample, Radio Liberty on 88 (April I5, I988), 9, RL 177/88 (April 22, I988), IO, RL 258/88 (June17, I988), 7; Report the USSR I (May i9, i989), 33. 39 H. Gordon Skilling, in "Group Conflict SovietPolitics:Some Conclusions,"in H. Gorin (Princeton:PrinceGroups SovietPolitics eds., don Skillingand FranklinGriffiths, Interest "Cadres Policy in the BrezhRobertE. Blackwell,Jr., Press, 1971), 399-405; ton University 28 of nev Era," Problems Communism (March-April1979), 29-42.

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and theirpopulationsin ethnicprotestin order to secure additional resources from Moscow and to maintain their hegemony within their homelands. Ironically,the last two of these factorsare natural consequences of the verymeans by which these cadres had previouslyconon trolledtheirethniccommunities behalfof the center. Policies of affirmative action permitted thesecadres to build more secure political bases within their ethnic communities,for these polices created a loyal clientele.The creationof this clientelewas also fostered As by the post-Stalinist decentralization. manyadministrative taskswere from all-union to union-republicor republican ministries transferred in and as thecadres' discretion personnelmatters was expanded, the cadres controlof patronageopportunities was enlarged. Efforts cement to loyaltieswith the indigenous elite were aided-particularly during the Brezhnev years-by the lengthening termof office theseelitesand by of the reductionin theamountof rotation personnelamong homelands.40 of threatof the purge, for they These power bases blunted the deterrent more costlyforMoscow. The made removalof a republic'sfirst secretary removal of Dinmukhamed Kunaev brought two days of riots to Kazakhstan,forexample. The ethnicconstituencies developed by theseethnic elites became resourcesin showdowns with the all-union leadership over key policychoices.4' The cadres' motivationto mobilize theirethnicconstituencies rose in recentdecades as theirmonopolisticleadership withinthe ethnic communitycame under increasingthreat.One threathas been the indigeelite and intelligentsia itself.The verysuccess of prenous professional action policies createda large group with the skills to vious affirmative A constitutethemselvesas independentpoliticalentrepreneurs. second between the increasingdemands for threathas come fromthe disparity rewards and mobilityopportunitiesand the diminished capability to meet those demands. Given the large size of this elite and its already
40

lian National University, Central IntelligenceAgency,Directory Soviet Officials: 1973); of D.C.: CentralIntelligence RepublicOrganizations (Washington, Agency,i980); Hodnett (fn.
4 Mark Beissinger,"Ethnicity, the Personnel Weapon, and Neo-Imperial Integration: Ukrainianand R.S.F.S.R. ProvincialPartyOfficials in Compared,"Studies Comparative Communism (Spring I988), 7i-85; PatrickCockburn,"Dateline USSR: EthnicTremors,"For2i eignPolicy 74 (Spring i989), 174-75; Suny (fn. I5), 301-5; Suny (fn.31), 73-75; JoelMoses, "Regionalismin Soviet Politics:Continuity a Source of Change, 1953-82," SovietStudies as 37 (April I985), i84-211; Martha Brill Olcott,"Gorbachev'sNationalitiesPolicy and Soviet Central Asia," in Rajan Menon and Daniel N. Nelson, eds.,Limitsto SovietPower (Lexington,Mass.: LexingtonBooks, i989), 77-8i.
15), 63-65-

4.5 yearson January i960, to 8.7 yearsten yearslater,it thenrose again to i2.0 yearsten I, yearsafterthat.GreyHodnett,LeadersoftheSovietRepublics, I955-I972 (Canberra: Austra-

For example,the average termof union-republic first secretaries nearlydoubled from

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high levels of materialrewards,it has become more difficult provide to the stilllargermaterialrewardsnecessary ensuretheircontinuingloyto enalty. And a thirdthreathas resultedfromthe increasingdifficulty countered in further expanding the ethnic elite to accommodate new aspirantsto thiselite. The rapid growthof a large professional elite and intelligentsia virtually has saturatedsome ethniccommunitieswith elite positions.Declining economic growthhas compounded these problems the over the past two decades. This threatened, first, cadres' capacityto continue expanding the rewards of the elite and the mobilityopportuand, second,theirabilityto offer nitiesfornew aspirantsto elitepositions the improved living standardsnecessaryto keep the population tied to leaders. In short,the last threedethemselvesratherthan to alternative to cades broughtincreasingthreats some of the verymeans by which the blocked the growthof counterelites and prevented cadre had previously the mobilization of the population behind primordialagendas. It is an thatsome of thesethreatsare ironyof the Soviet developmentalstrategy used to controlethproductsof the verysuccessof the means previously nic assertiveness. A crisisdeveloped over thepast decade as thenumberof ethnicgroups thisthreatincreased.Ethniccadres were forcedto intensify experiencing and consequently, theirpressureon Moscow to gain additionalresources, competitionfor the same scarce resourcesgrew among ethniccommunities.But declininggrowthratesleftMoscow witheven fewerresources to respond to risingdemands. Faced with thiscrisis,ethniccadres have found they must press Moscow still harder for investments and must devise strategiesthat are more clever yet to underscorethe urgencyof theiragendas. For example,in pressing Moscow forexpanded autonomy, Baltic Partyleaders have turnedto legislativeshowdowns and have moto bilized popular demonstrations supportthe positionof the republics' Ethnic cadres have found enthusiastic allies in these strategies elites.42 among their dependent elites and among aspirants to elite positions. Even aspiring independentpoliticalentrepreneurs pursuingprimordial oftenjoined the politicalactionmobilized by the cadres,viewstrategies ing it as the best or only vehicle to press theirown agendas in public. The cadres oftenhave a strongincentiveto make common cause with members of potentialcounterelites such as popular frontsin order to increase the pressureon Moscow. Thus, the late i98os witnessed both
See Bahry(fn. iq), 2-3, 25-31, 77-85; StevenL. Burg,"Muslim Cadres and Soviet Political Development: Reflections froma ComparativePerspective," World Politics37 (October i984), 24-47, at 33, 36.
42

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dominant elites and potentialcounterelites making common cause to mobilize the ethniccommunity.
INCIDENCE: FLASH POINTS OF ETHNOFEDERALISM

in The patternof ethnofederalism the Soviet Union containsyet a further ironic twist: the incentiveto mobilize theirethnic constituency is been most successful greatestforthoseethniccadres thathave previously at the Soviet developmentalstrategy-notablyin the Caucasus and the Baltic republics.The pressureof potentialcounterelites, difficulties the of further expanding elite positionsand material rewards, and so the for threatto theirpositionsare greatest thosecadres thatwere previously action and creatingan indigmost successfulat engineeringaffirmative enous elite. This pressureon thecadresof themore developed ethniccommunities has been piqued by the redistributive consequences of these affirmative conseaction policies. With declining growth rates, the redistributive quences of these policies have been transformed: policies that had once between titular nationalitiesand minoritieswithin involved transfers betweentheprincipal ethnichomelandscame to involveinsteadtransfers of are titularnationalities union republics.These transfers now adversely the affecting more modernized ethniccommunities In building an indigenouscadre and intelligentsia withineach ethnic had group,the Soviet developmentalstrategy a powerfullevelingimpact has on ethnicgroups.The growthof mobility opportunities been highest among the nationalitieswith the lowest levels of socioeconomicattainment.43 Thus, as Figure 2 shows, in the post-Stalinist years differences among nationalitiesin levels of elite occupational status (measured by as per capita employment specialistswith highereducation) narrowed.44 has This redistribution in part been a consequence of Moscow's allocation of resources among republics. For example, the Unified State Budget, which includes the budgets for each union republic,transfers fundsfrommore developed to less developed republics.In the i989 bud43USSR (fn.25),
308-9.

Trends in the Soviet Union: Jonesand Fred W. Grupp, "MeasuringNationality A ResearchNote," SlavicReview4I (Springi982), I12-22. This is notto say thatequalization has broughtequality or status reversal,see Rakowska-Harmstone(fn. 20), i2; Peter R. Zwick, "Soviet NationalityPolicy: Social, Economic, and Political Aspects,"in Gordon B. in Smith,ed., Public Policyand Administration theSovietUnion(New York: Praeger,i980), 159. Moreover,as Figure 2 shows, the slowdown in economicgrowthhas slowed (but not stopped)thislevelingprocess.
44 Ellen

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200

X aD
9

150

Georgians

>

~
.................

'

Armenians

........... ........... ---___~----

o.i .)

>% 0 (1'

_ Russians
- -

-~~~ Azeris

Estonians

E <)100_Lavas,.;;;,..,,,.,. 111W2 *Krriz LU Oaza~5. EL

.'~~~~~~~~--,,
,--^'-'______s

.q~:::-.: .......

...

A--

..Lithuanians

. ijzb;; 9 | 9 | 9 | | .| | @ '..' *' ' ' @' .

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Tadzhiks
Belorussians

50

Moldavians

1959

1970

1975

FIGURE EQUALIZATION EMPLOYMENT OF SPECIALISTS WITH

2 GROUPS, = I959-75 IOO)

:a

AMONG ETHNIC HIGHER

EDUCATION

PER Iooo

ADULTS

(AVERAGE FOR I5 NATIONALITIES

SOURCE:
a

and Calculated fromdata in Ellen Jonesand Fred W. Grupp, "Modernization EthnicEqualization in the USSR," SovietStudies36 (April i984), 159-84. in This figure trackseliteemployment the Sovieteconomyin thoseyearsforwhichdata of are available forall titularnationalities union republics.

get only the five Central Asian republicswere permittedto retain ioo and incometaxescollectedwithintheirborpercentof boththe turnover ders; theywere to receive,in addition,subsidies rangingfrom32I million rubles forthe Tadjik Republic to 2.7 billion rubles forthe Kazakh the Republic. Conversely, Latvian Republic was to retainthe lowest proportionof itsturnover (56.8 percent), tax and boththe ArmenianRepublic (with 76.7 percent) and the Estonian Republic (with 79.4 percent) were to retainonly slightly Althoughtheseofficial over three-quarters.45 statistics appear to overstatethe extentof this phenomenon,less develthan theirlevel oped republicshave receivedhigherratesof investment
45Pravda, October 29, I988.

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on of economic developmentwould predict.And per capita expenditures equal among rehealth and educational programshave been relatively publics even though revenueshave been farlower in the less developed republics.46 It is, indeed, inherentto a policyof promotingthe growthof indigeconof equalityunder circumstances tighter nous elitesand engineering on advantagedgroups will suffer straints resourcesthatsome previously relativestagnationin theirlifechances.One of the mostvisibleexamples on advantaged group has of this restriction life chances fora previously of admissionsto Sovietuniversities. been theimposition quotas on Jewish in of 2.3 Although in I970 Jewsrepresented percent thestudents instithatis above theirofficial protutionsof highereducation (a proportion reppercentin I970), this,nonetheless, portionof the population.89 decline since I935, when the figurestood at I3.3 resentsa significant percentof thesestudents.Against thegeneral trendtoward higherrates in of of educational attainment the Soviet population,the proportion Sowho attendcollege full-time reviet Jewsaged eighteento twenty-three mained constantat 30 percentor at mostincreasedonlymarginallyto 36 percentbetween I935 and i965. Thus, many have been blocked in their it aspirationsforhighereducationand theeliteemployment would make And as economicgrowthhas slowed,more ethnicgroups have possible.47 feltthispinch in lifechances.In CentralAsia, accordingto Lubin, "Russians are beginning to sense they are being denied access to jobs for which theyare equally if not more qualified than theirAsian counterAnd Popovsky complains that in Uzbekistan "it is almost imparts."48 possible fornon-Uzbeks with a highereducation to get jobs."49 In the geographicallysegmentedmultiethnic societyof Soviet federalism the redistributive consequences of these policies remained a less
46 MartinSpechler,"Regional Developmentin the USSR, 1958-1978," in SovietEconomy Economic Committee(Washington, D.C.: Governin a Timeof Change,U.S. CongressJoint mentPrinting Office,1979), 145. See also Donna Bahryand Carol Nechemias,"Half Full or SlavicReview40 (Fall i98i), 96; Half Empty?The Debate over SovietRegionalInequality," in Elizabeth Clayton,"Regional ConsumptionExpenditure theSoviet Union,"ACES Bulleof tin 17 (Winter 1975), 35-43; JamesW. Gillula, "The Economic Interdependence Soviet Republics,"in SovietEconomyin a Time of Change,629; GertrudeSchroeder,"Soviet Rein gional Policies in Perspective," The USSR in the tg80's(Brussels: NATO Directorateof Economic Affairs,1978), I3I; Brian Silver, "Levels of SocioculturalDevelopment among American PoliticalSciSoviet Nationalities:A PartialTest of the Equalization Hypothesis," enceReview68 (December 1974), I637. 47 William Korey,"The Legal Positionof Soviet Jewry: HistoricalEnquiry,"in Lionel A Press, 1972), Kochan, ed., The Jewsin SovietRussiasince 1917 (London: Oxford University 94-95; Alec Nove and J. A. Newth, "The JewishPopulation: Demographic Trends and in OccupationalPatterns," Kochan, 147. 48 Lubin (fn. I5), 228, 283-84. 49 Popovsky(fn.23), 138.

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contentiousissue in federalpoliticsas long as economic growthpermitted the continuedexpansion of mobility opportunities all titularnafor tionalitieswithintheirhomelands.With theirhigh growthratesthe titular nationalitiesof union republics could escape the consequence of interrepublic transfers shifting bruntof theirimpact to theirmithe by nority populations-that is, by discriminating againstthem.Under these the circumstances minorities withinthe homelandsof othernationalities (including the "exclave" minorities, such as Jewsor Russians) were the greatest losers from interrepublic redistribution. The economic slowdown, however, made it more difficult the titularnationalitiesto for of escape the effects interrepublic which made redistribution transfers, a highlycontentiousissue among the cadres. The effect the Soviet deof velopmental strategyin a period of tightconstraints resources has on been to limitthegrowthof mobility in opportunities the more developed ethniccommunitiesin orderto permitcontinuedexpansionin thosethat are less developed. As a consequence,cadres of ethniccommunities with higherlevels of socioeconomicattainment in (particularly the Baltic and Caucasus) have led the way in pressingtheirethniclegislativeagendas, while cadres in less advanced communities(notablyin Central Asia) have been less inclined to do so (see Table I). As continuing beneficiaries the developof mental strategy enforcedby the center, lattercadres have oftenbeen the harsh criticsof the decentralization proposed by theirpeers in the more for example, at the meeting of the all-union developed communities; Supreme Soviet Presidiumto veto Estonia's act of nullification, chairthe men of the Presidia of Uzbekistan (Khabibullaev) and Tadjikistan (Palof laev) voiced strongcriticism the Estonian move and supportforcentristpolicies.50 Also as a consequence,protest has been more common in the more developed communities.The rank-ordercorrelationbetween numberof demonstrations (Table 2) and levelsof educationalattainment (Figure ia) is o.67.5'
AGENDAS: THE FEDERAL POLITICS OF RESOURCES AND LIFE CHANCES

The policy concerns of the ethnic cadres shape the public agendas of the ethnofederalism controlling way dominantthemeswill be framed by in legislationand by determiningwhich issues are to be supported by sustained large-scalepolitical pressure.Cadres must definethe agendas
November 28, i988, p. 50. See also James Critchlow, "How Solid is Uzbekistan's Support for Moscow?" Report on the USSR i (February io, i989), 7.
5'

in 5?Moscow Television,November 26, I988, reported FBIS, Daily Report:Soviet Union, See also Philip G. Roeder,"Electoral Avoidance in the Soviet Union," SovietStudies4'

(July i989), 478-80.

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so of ethnopolitics as to permitas many as possible in theirethniccommunitiesto join the "official"ethnicbandwagon. Often thisrequires rewhere theyare pridefining dominantpopular concerns, the particularly and issues to potential mordial. The cadres must deny theseconstituents even as theyuse them to put pressureon Moscow. A test counterelites, of of the successof theentrepreneurship thecadres is theextentto which they can insertthe most importantmaterial and symbolicconcerns of intothepublic agendas in ways thatprotect promote or theirconstituents theirown power base. The dominantthemeson the cadres' agendas rethemwithintheirown communities:these thatconfront flectthe threats this politics of themes concern resourcesand life chances. Specifically, is expressedin a numberof recurring mobility opportunities policyissues of that thatgo to the veryfoundations the Soviet developmentalstrategy created and sustain these cadres: federalism, indigenization,language, and migration. economic development,
FEDERALISM

has been the balance of power beThe most volatile issue of federalism since at stake are the resourcescontrolled tween centerand periphery, withintheircommunities. by the cadres and the mobilityopportunities have used this issue to co-opt primordialconcernsfor inParty leaders demands for expanded republican autondependence to instrumental omy withinSoviet federalism.52 Expanded autonomyis one way forethnic cadres to enlarge the resources within their control. Autonomy increasestheirdiscretionin the allocation of positionsof power within of the republic and in the administration educational and occupational policies. And forcadres withinthe more developed republicsthat have feltmost severelypinched by affirmative action, autonomyis a way to retainresourcesat home. The cadres in the more developed union republicshave been particuin larlyquick to raise the bannersof autonomyand sovereignty order to blunt the redistributive consequencesof all-union policies.Thus, forexample, in i989 Lithuanian leaders soughtexemptionfromthe all-union highway tax since the tax was levied on vehicles(which are more common in the relatively wealthyBaltic region)but spentdisproportionately to build and repair roads in the less developed republics.53 all three In Baltic republicscalls for"regional economic accountability," "territorial
52 New York Times,September24, i989; see also March 25, I988; Pravda, November 2, I988; Sovetskaia Estoniia,November29, I988. 53 Moscow TASS, November20, I988, reported FBIS, Daily Report: in SovietUnion,November2i, i988, pp. 42-43; New YorkTimes,November 17, i988, November 27, i988, December8, I988, May 19, i989, May 25, i989.

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have supportedthe attemptson cost accounting,"and "self-financing" fromthe centhe part of republicancadres to wrestcontrolof industries These plans envision the isolation of theirmarkets tralized ministries. by fromthe larger economyof scarcity such mechanismsas exportbarcards to limitpurchasesby visitors identity riersto otherunion republics, fromotherrepublics,pricesdeterminedat the republiclevel to improve for and even separatecurrencies the termsof exchange among republics, some republics.54 For ethniccadres of "minorities"subordinateto the union republicof the another nationality, issue of autonomyhas oftentaken the formof demands over the "status" of theirhomelands withinthe federal hierarchy-that is, whethera homeland is a union republic,an autonomous The controlof resourcesby the cadres of republic,an oblast,or an okrug. increaseswith thishierarchy. Thus, in a i988 reporton the a nationality mounting pressureand public rallies on behalf of the elevation of the status,the writerRafail Tatar Autonomous Republic to union-republic Mustafinasked in the pages of Pravda:
After all, what prompted the proposals for the creation of a new union republic? The existinginequalityin social, political,and economic rights Tataria surpassessome union between union and autonomous formations. republicsin both population and industrialpotential.Yet, we don't have a studio of our own, we have only one publishinghouse (which feature-film is not very big), and there is an acute shortage of paper for publishing books, newspapers,and magazines.55

With similarobjectivesthe Partyleadershipin Abkhazia has sought elstatus,leaders of evation of theirautonomousrepublicto union-republic have demanded creationof theirown auMoldavia's Gagauz minority of tonomous republic,and Polish leaders in the Shalchinindistrict Lithuania have asked for autonomous status.In the last case, according to for Izvestiia,"perhaps the sorestpoint was the impossibility Poles to obtain highereducation in theirnativelanguage" withinLithuania.s6 tack, the cadres of other"subordinate"minorities Taking a different
September II, I988, August 3, i989, August I5, i989; SovetskaiaIndustriia, 54Izvestiia, May i9, i989; Sovetskaia Litva, October 7, I988. See also Izvestiia, March 2, i989; Sovetskaia Litva, May i9, i989; Pravda, July30, i989; Dzintra Bungs, "A Comparison of the Baltic on Report the USSR i (SeptemberI5, i989), 13-i6; Kestutis Declarations of Sovereignty," on Report theUSSR Girnius,"The LithuanianCommunistPartyand Calls forSovereignty," I (February17, I989), I8-20. 25, 55Pravda, January I 989. Gazeta, March 9, I988. 56 Izvestiia,September7, i989, November 14, i989; Literaturnaia See also New YorkTimes,April 8, i989, April 9, i989, April i6, i989, August 7, i989; and the interviewwith G. A. Pogosyan of the NagornyiKarabakh, ArmenPressInternational SovietUnion,August 23, I988, p. Service,August i6, I988, reportedin FBIS, Daily Report:
43-

SOVIET

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have mobilized theirpopulationsto demand changes in the lines of ausubordinateto the republicof a thority among homelands.A nationality titularnationality may findits resourcesand life chances limdifferent ited. In Nagornyi Karabakh, Armenians protestedthat even though industrialproduction their autonomous oblast had the second-highest per capita withinthe republic,the leadershipof the Azerbaidjan RepubG. lic allocated it lower than average per capita investments. A. Pogoof secretary the autonomousoblast,is reportedto have told syan,the first the all-union Supreme Soviet Presidium that as a consequence, "even today, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast does not have its plant, nor its own reinown flour mill, nor its own concentrate-feed comstructures nor its own housing-construction forced-concrete plant, in bine." These investments lagged particularly the social sphere. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenianscomplained thatinadequate investment of in institutions highereducation withinthe oblast and Baku's opposiin tion to lettingArmeniansattendinstitutions the Armenian Republic meant thatthe Armenianswithintheoblastwere denied access to higher Reassigning the Nagorno-Karaeducation and career advancement.57 bakh Autonomous Oblast to the Armenian Republic would put an end mobility to the discrimination Azeris and also open up union-republic by to its Armenian majority.58 (Similar complaints and deopportunities of mands forremoval fromthe jurisdiction the Georgian Republic have come from the leaders of the Adzhar Autonomous Republic and the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast.)59
INDIGENIZATION

have also mobilized politicalaction in orCadres of titularnationalities Cadres have foundthatthis der to preservethe resultsof indigenization. of interests those in their ethnic issue harnessesboth the instrumental who aspire to elite positionsand the primordialsentiments community as of those who see ethnicsimilarity a requisiteof legitimateauthority. At stake for union-republiccadres are the very means by which they
57Pravda, July20, I988. 58On December i, i989, the Supreme Sovietof the ArmenianRepublicand the National

annexingthe autonomousoblast Council of NagornyiKarabakh jointlypassed a resolution [Erevan],December 3, i989. to Armenia;Kommunist Novosti, March 20, I988; Roman Solchanykand Ann Sheehy,"Kapito28, i989; Moskovskie Research BulletinRL 125/78 (Junei, Problemsin Georgia,"Radio Liberty nov on Nationality Tensions in Georgia?" Ra1978), I-5; Elizabeth Fuller,"How Seriousare Inter-Nationality dio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 444/83 (November 25, i983), I-9; idem, "Abkhaz-Georgian on Report theUSSR I (March io, i989), 25-27; Rasma Karklins, RelationsRemain Strained," Politicsi6 "Ethnic Politicsand Access to Higher Education: The Soviet Case," Comparative
277-94,

59Bakinskii

Rabochii,

March

i i,

i988: Izvestiia,

March

25,

I988; Krasnaia

Zvezda,

February

(April I984),

at 278.

222

WORLD POLITICS

have built theirsupportingclienteleand popular constituencies. KaIn zakhstan the removal of First SecretaryKunaev and the purge of the republicpartyapparatusin i986 threatened clientelenetworkdrawn the fromthe first own tribalgroup; it threatdisproportionately secretary's ened the career prospectsof the indigenousnationalswho had tied their careersto the local leadership;and it broughta wave of violentprotest.6o More recently, to Georgian leaders have mobilized protesters challenge in the republic'spersonnelpolicy-particularly the Moscow's intrusion efforts challenge discrimination the Georgians againstminorities. to by "Minority"cadres within the national territories othershave moof bilized theirconstituencies the opposite end-to criticizeabuses of for indigenizationby the titularnationalities and to call forMoscow's interventionagainst the practice.The creationof an ethnicelite and intellioftendenies minoritieswithin its nagentsia by the titularnationality tional territory In comparable opportunities. a recent roundtable held under the auspices of the Research Council on NationalityProblems of the Academy of Science, E. V. Tadevosian complained that indigenization in some national republicshas "oftenled to an artificial overrepresentationof the indigenousnationalities the expense of other nationat alities residing in those areas in the state organs, the administrative apparatus, the studentsand facultiesof highereducational institutions, etc."'6' Gagauz in Moldavia and Nagorno-Karabakh Armeniansin Azerto discrimination politicalappointin baidjan have demonstrated protest ments and career opportunities. The chairman of the presidiumof the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet claims that such grievancesled to violent disturbancesin his republic not only in i989, but also in I957, i967, and I 978.62
LANGUAGE

To preservethe foundation which ethnicaffirmative on action was built, cadres have mobilized political action to raise or preservethe status of the language of theirrespective communities. Mobilityopportunities are tied up withthe statusof indigenouslanguages. At stake for inextricably the constituents theirinstrumental is interest privilegedaccess to ecoin nomic, social, and political power. For example, the language used in
Brown (fn.31), 1-4I. D. Koval'chenkoet al., "Natsional'nyeprotsessy SSSR-itogi, tendentsii, v problemy" [National processesin the USSR: Results,tendencies, IstoriiaSSSR (Novemberproblems], December I987), 5-120, at 63, 73, 74, 79-80. See also Erwin H. Epstein,"Ideological Factors in Soviet Educational PolicytowardsJews," Education and UrbanSocietyio (February1978), 227-28; Rasma Karklins, EthnicRelations theUSSR (Boston:Allen and Unwin, i986), I42, in
60

6,

146, 2i9.
62

V. Kobakhia, Pis'mo [Letter], Argumenty ifakty(October7-13,

i989),

8.

SOVIET

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universities influences admissionsas well as latercareeropportunities the of different ethnicgroups withina republic.But language is also one of the most important primordialmarkersdefining ethniccommunity. an Through legislationthattheirlanguages supplantRussian as the language of communicationwithin their republics,ethnic leaders in the union republicshave soughtto strengthen indigenouscontrolover politAn ical and economic institutions. articledeclaringthe language of the to titularnationality be the statelanguage of the republicwas included in the I978 constitutions Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Georgia. On of April I4, I978, an estimatedfivethousandGeorgian demonstrators took to the streetsto protestMoscow's attemptto amend this articlein their republic's constitution. Indigenous cultural,educational, and scientific elites were particularly eager to maintain Georgian as the language of discourse in theirprofessions. Georgian studentsjoined the protests, as Ronald Suny notes,since the language clause ensured that"highereducation in Georgia had become the prerogative Georgians, and other of nationalitiesfound it difficult enter schools of higherlearning."63 to In i988 and i989 six otherrepublicsadopted legislation a establishing state language. of Minoritycadres within national territories othershave mobilized for politicalaction to protest exactlythisformof preference the language At of the titularnationality. stake forthe leaders of theseminority communitiesis oftenthe controlof mobility the opportunities, futureof the on constituency which they have built theirpower, or even theirown positions.Protestsagainstnew language laws thatwould place themat a disadvantage have come from the Abkhazians in Georgia, "exclave" Russians and Poles in Lithuania, and both the Turkic Gagauz and the "exclave" Russians in Moldavia. Non-Estonian cadres in Estonia have called strikesto protesta law requiringthatthose who do not learn the language of the republicwithinfouryearsbe dismissedfromtheirjobs: on March I4, i989, as many as sixtythousand Russians and other "minorities"(according to Izvestiia'scount) took to the streets Tallinn to of protest"creeping counterrevolution endangeringsocialism in Estonia." Russian Partyofficials and factory managerswithinthe republicreportbecause theyfeared that the law of edly mobilized theirconstituencies Januaryi8, i989, would cost themtheirpositions.64
63 Suny,"Geogia and Soviet Nationality Policy,"in StephenF. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitz,and RobertSharlet,eds., The SovietUnionsinceStalin(Bloomington:Indiana UniverFebruary25, i989; Charles E. Ziegler,"NationsityPress, i980), 213, 219. See also Izvestiia, alism, Religion and Equality among Ethnic Minorities:Some Observationson the Soviet of Case," Journal EthnicStudiesI3 (Summer i985), 9-32, at 27. 64Izvestiia, March 17, i989. See also Izvestiia,March i0, i989, August 31, i989; Pravda,

224
DEVELOPMENT

WORLD POLITICS
AND MIGRATION

on To preservethe ethnicallyexclusive institutions which their power rests,ethnic cadres have mobilized political action to oppose all-union economic developmentand migrationpolicies. Although two different issues, they have become closely connected in public discussions since rapid industrialization has become the principalmagnet forworkersof other nationalities.For the population this threatensdissolutionof the for ethniccommunity, heightenedcompetition the leading politicaland economic positionsin the republic,and loss of theiraffirmative action advantage in life chances. For the cadres this migrationthreatensthe ethnic communityon which theirpolitical power is based. It increases these otherethnicgroups into the pressureon the cadres to incorporate the elite of the republic-pressure, thatis, to dilute the ethnichomogeneity of the elites on which the cadres base their power. Failure of a to titularnationality maintain its numericalpredominancewithina reof lead to the replacement the ethnically exclusivecadre by public might one of more diverseethniccomposition;it mightbringdemotion to the status of an autonomous republic (as happened to the Karelo-Finnish Republic) or even outrightdissolution of its autonomous homeland. Thus, in the early i96os Georgian and Latvian officials opposed Khruof heavy industry the republics in for further shchev's plans expansion because theyfearedit would bringstillmore Russian workers.65 precisely excluded Russian workers from permaArmenian officialsreportedly of nent housing during the construction the Erevan subway in order to in preventthem fromremaining.In the late i98os protesters the Baltic republicsand Armenia demanded that theirrepublicsbe given control of industrialand agricultural policyin orderto slow the influxof outsidto of ers. And Estonian cadres have attempted bluntthe effect migration in elections:legislationof the Estoon theirethnicconstituencies future those not residentin a districtfor two nian Republic disenfranchised years (or in the republicforfiveyears)and barred fromofficethose not residentin a district fiveyears(or in the republicforten years).66 for
Roman SolLitva, February14, i989; Karklins(fn.59), 290-9i; August I7, i989; Sovetskaia New 23-42; "Russian Language and SovietPolitics," Soviet Studies (January 34 I982), chanyk, 19, 2, 23, YorkTimes,June21, i988, June22, I988, July I988, September I988, January i989, July i989, July i989, August 7, I989. 27, 28, 65 Suny (fn. 63), 213; Juris Dreifelds,"Latvian National Demands and Group Consciousin ness since 1959," in George Simmonds,ed., Nationalism the USSR and EasternEurope in of the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin(Detroit: University Detroit Press, 1977), I36-56; Jaan in Pennar,"Nationalismin the SovietBaltics,"in Erich Goldhagen,ed., EthnicMinorities the SovietUnion(New York: Praeger,I968), 206. See also Pravda,March i, i989. 66 Pravda,July i989, August io, i989. See also New YorkTimes,June21, I988, June22, 29,

SOVIET
THE RISKS

FEDERALISM
OF ASSERTIVE

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FEDERALISM

MOBILIZATION
UNDER PERESTROIKA

225

With perestroikathe homeland cadres press theiragendas of ethnofedWithin theirhomelands they eralism in a more complex environment. called upon to controland balance threeverydifferent are increasingly of different of actorsbehind sets forms politicalactionthatdraw together threeoftendivergingagendas. Alongside the assertivefederalismof the and popular demoncadres is a second arena-the organizing activity of strations the popular fronts. Drawing particularly upon students, the and the professional elite,the programsof the fronts often intelligentsia, give expressionto many of the primordialconcernsof theseethniccommunities.In a thirdarena communal violence draws heavily from the unemployed and fromdisplaced refugees.Intercommunalviolence has pitted Armenians against Azeris, Georgians against Abkhazians, and Georgians against Osetians in the Caucasus; young Uzbeks have attacked Meskhetis in the Fergana region,and Kazakh youthshave atin tacked immigrants the Novyi Uzen regionof Central Asia (see Table 3).67 The ethniccadres in a number of republicshave sought to use the political pressureof the second set of actors to supportits showdowns with Moscow. Even withoutendorsingall the particularsof the fronts' their own agendas, the cadres have found that the frontsstrengthen
TABLE DEATHS (SEPTEMBER
I,

3 VIOLENCE 3I, I989)

FROM COMMUNAL
I985-AUGUST

Ethnic Groups Armenian-Azeri Uzbek-Meskheti Georgian-Abkhazian Kazakh-Non-Kazakh Tadjik-Meskheti

Estimated TotalDead >110 >100 14 5 2

SOURCE: New YorkTimes, June21, i989, June25, i989, June26, i989, July17, i989, September 5, i989, SeptemberI7, i989.

by the All-Union Supreme Soviet Presidium, I988, June23, I988. Afterthis was nullified Estonia adopted new legislationrequiringthatcandidatesforrepublicpositionsmust have of been residents Estonia forat leastten years;Pravda,November i8, i989. June9, i989, June io, i989, June20, i989, June23, i989, December i, i989; 67Izvestiia, Pravda,June5, i989, June6, i989, June7, i989, Juneio, i989, JuneI2, i989, June20, i989, on 17, June25, i989, January i990; AnnetteBohr,"Violence Erupts in Uzbekistan,"Report Disturbancesin WesternKathe USSR i (June i6, i989), 23-25; Ann Sheehy,"Interethnic on 7, zakhstan,"Report theUSSR I (July i989), 11-14.

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hands in negotiationswith Moscow by permitting them to argue convincingly thattheirhands are tiedat home. In some instances cadres have even encouraged the third formof political action in order to solidify theirhold within the homeland and to press Moscow. In Azerbaidjan, forexample, local Partyleaders reportedly encouragedthegrowthof the popular frontand helped found the more militantand violence-prone National Defense Committee.68 The ethniccadres run immenserisks,forthese strategies may undermine theirpositionsor even unleash forcestheycannotcontrol.Moscow, for example, could respond with coercion,as it did in i988 and i989, when the all-union leadershipremoved over twenty-five hundred officials (including the union-republicfirst accused of abetting secretaries) the intercommunal violencein Armeniaand Azerbaidjan.69 Cadres with strongethnicconstituencies may gamble thatMoscow will be unable to removethemor will hesitateto pay thecostsassociatedwithsuch actions. The extensive power base of Vladimir Shcherbitskiiin the Ukraine made his removalin i989 a slow and complicatedprocessrequiringelabin orate institutional maneuveringby Gorbachev.The protests Kazakhstan were the costly consequence of Kunaev's removal. Nonetheless, Moscow has been willing to pay these costs in many instances;in i988 in and i989 thefirst secretaries tenof thefourteen union-republic parties were replaced.And in at leasteightof theseinstances secretaries the were removedbecause of displeasurewith republicpolicies.70 The cadres run a second risk: thatthose threatened assertivefedby eralism will initiatecounteraction. Indeed, it was Moldavian pressures for new language legislationthat ignitedprotests the republic's Gaby but the agenda of the Gagauz went beyond language to gauz minority; in include complaintsof discrimination economicsand politics.The mobilization of Estonians,Latvians, Lithuanians,and Moldavians brought the countermobilizationof their "exclave" Russians behind Interdvizhenie, the Committee for Defense of Soviet Power in Lithuania, and Edinstvo(Unity).In the future, similarcounterprotests be mobilized may of theless developed republicsof CentralAsia in orderto blunt by cadres the political impact of mass demonstrations the Baltic and Caucasus in against the allocationdecisionsmade in MOSCOW.7'
68This is not to say, as some have alleged, that the motiveof the Party leaders was to instigate violenceas a pretext a military for crackdown;New YorkTimes,Februaryi9, i990. See also Izvestiia, January I990, January i990. i5, i6, 69Report on the USSR I (January i989), 29. 27, 7?Pravda, January i988, May 2i, i988, JuneI7, i988, October5, i988, October2i, i988, I3, April I5, i989, June23, i989, June24, i989, September i989, November I7, i989. 29, 71 Izvestiia, March I7 i989, May 25, i989, August 23, i989; Pravda,July29, i989, August

SOVIET

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A thirdrisk to cadres is thatpoliticalaction mobilized by them may and theirmobilizational actually facilitatethe creationof counterelites the apparent"bandwagoning" the cadres seek to proMuch of activities. for by mote may actuallybe used as opportunities "piggybacking" potential counterelites;that is, aspiring independentpolitical entrepreneurs maintain theirparticularagendas while using "official"political action as a cover for theirown mobilizationalactivitiesand as an opportunity Ratherthan deprivingthesepotentialcounto publicize theiragendas.72 of terelites support,the cadres' gambitmay providetheiropponentswith to the opportunity expand it. In some republicsthe politicalaction moand has slipped from bilized by the cadres has become self-sustaining then to provide countereliteswith a ready-made their control, only movement.In Armenia the cadres appear to have lost controlover the Karabakh protestby the late summer of i988. According to a TASS leaders of the cenreport:"Taking advantageof the factthatthe former slip tralcommitteeof the CommunistPartyof Armenia let the initiative membersof the [Karabakh] step-by-step, fromtheirhands and retreated In committeecreated ramified organizationaland politicalstructures."73 over the statusof Nagornyi Karai989 the initiativein Azeri protests withinthe popbakh apparentlypassed fromthe cadres to counterelites ular front.By early i990 the Azeri popular frontwas complainingthat in the initiative the communal violencehad even slipped fromitscontrol In and passed to radicals in the National Defense Committee.74 Lithuasurprised nia, PartyFirst Secretary Algirdas Brazauskas was reportedly when Sajudis deputies he had helped elect to the republic's Supreme Soviet rejectedhim as the republic'schiefof stateand elected theirown leader, Landsbergis.75 Finally,the cadres' gambit may encourage unwanted primordialvioin lence. The mass demonstrations Erevan and Baku in i988, i989, and were catalystsfor waves of violence across the republics. Small i990 in groups of Armenians and Azeris attacked minorities theirrepublics and by simplykillingothers. by intimidating many into emigration
I989, August 23, I989, August 25, I989, September5, I989; Sovetskaia IO, I989, August ii, Estoniia,March i, I989, March 7, I989. Litva, February Pravda,March3, I989; Sovetskaia I3, 72Izvestiia, July I989; Komsomol'skaia
25,

August 29, I989, August 30, I989, Septemberi, I989, SeptemberI7, I989; Saulius Girnius, "Sajudis' ParliamentStatementon Independence,"Reporton the USSR I (September I5,
I989), I7-I8. 75New YorkTimes,March I3,
I990.

74See Pravda,April 9, I989, August 23, I989, August 24, I989, Septemberio, I989, FebApril I12, I 989, April I 4, I 989; New YorkTimes,August28, I 989, ruary2, I 990; Zaria Vostoka,

73 Quoted

i 989.

in Cockburn(fn.41),

I78.

228
POLITICAL

WORLD POLITICS
INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICIZED ETHNICITY

The rise of assertiveethnofederalism the Soviet Union since the midin pointsup how politicalinstitutions shape the mobilizationof ethI950S nic communities. On the one hand, Soviet federalism delayed theorigins of politicized ethnicty, but on the other hand, it distributedmobilizational resourcessuch as entrepreneurial skills and means of communicationsin a manner thateventually shaped itsincidence and agendas. This emphasis on institutions offers amendment to those studies an that explain the rise of politicized ethnicity emphasizing attitudes by rather than the resources needed to mobilize an ethnic community. These studieshave introducedat least two alternative paradigmsforthe which are distinguished studyof ethnopolitics, fromone anotherby alternative views of the natureof ethnicidentity, sources of cohesion, the and the objectivesof politicizedethnicity and protest.The primordialist paradigm sees ethnic identitiesas one of the givens of social existence, and geographiccompactshaped by historic memory, language,religion, ness. The politicizationof ethnicity communal self-discovery; is protest, oftenan expressiveact affirming communal solidarity.76 instrumenThe talist paradigm sees ethnic identitiesas contingentand changing selfascribed roles. The politicization of ethnicityand protest are goalorientedbehaviors-often focusedon the pursuitof socioeconomicgain. Accordingto the instrumentalist becomes a paradigm,an ethnicidentity basis for collectiveaction when thereare comparativeadvantages to be ethnicidentity gained fromthatspecific over alternative ethnic,class, or otheridentities.77 The prevailingparadigmin Sovietology been primordialist. exhas In it plaining the originsof Soviet ethnopolitics, focuses our attentionon attitudessuch as assimilationratherthan on incentivesand constraints on action.78 Certainly these attitudesare importantingredientsof the
76 Smith (fn. 7), I05. See also Walker Connor,"Nation-Buildingor Nation-Destroying?" World Politics24 (April I 972), 3 I 9-55; MiltonEsman,ed.,EthnicConflict theWestern in World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,I977); Clifford Geertz,"The Integrative Revolution: PrimordialSentiments and Civil Politicsin the New States,"in Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press, I963), I05-57; Edward Shils, "Primordial,Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties," British Journal Sociology (JuneI957), I30-45. of 8 77 CrawfordYoung, The Politics Cultural of Pluralism(Madison: University Wisconsin of Press, I976), 43. See also FrederickBarth,ed., EthnicGroups and Boundaries (Boston: Little, Brown, i969); Glazer and Moynihan(fn. io); RobertMelson and Howard Wolpe, Nigeria: Modernization and the Politicsof Communalism (East Lansing: Michigan State University, I971); Ronald Rogowski,"Causes and Varietiesof Nationalism:A Rationalist Account,"in Edward A. Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski,eds., New Nationalisms theDeveloped West of (Boston: Allen and Unwin, i985), 87-i08. 78 Arend Lijphart,"PoliticalTheories and theExplanation of EthnicConflict the Westin ern World," in Esman (fn.76), 46-64.

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currentcrisis.Yet there is littleindicationthat these alone can account for the rise of ethnopolitics-little indicationthat assimilationhas become any less advanced, assimilativepressuresany more intense,or national consciousnessany higherin the decades since I955 than in those before.The failureof Soviet policies of ethnic fusion(sblizhenie)to reduce cultural barriers among ethnic groups and to bring about the merger(sliianie)of nationscannotaccountfortheriseof ethnicassertiveness over the past threedecades. the of In predicting incidence ethnicassertiveness, primordialparthe adigm argued that the most extensiveresistanceto the policies of the thatwere culturally Soviet regimewould be mountedbythoseminorities In it remotefromthe Russian majority.79 particular, focusedour attention on Islam, arguing that this providesa culturalbond among Soviet Muslims and, in thewords of Kemal Karpat,"createsan invisiblebarrier Moreover,as Alexandre Benseparatingthem fromthe rulingSlavs."80 the and S. Enders Wimbush argue,"the criticalissue determining nigsen of extentand degree of long-termcommitment Soviet Muslims to the Soviet Russian stateis not 'socio-economics'but identity."' Contraryto these expectations, however,those nationalitiesmost remote in culture fromthe Slavs have been among the most quiescent. There is littleeviof dence to suggestthatit is the relativestrength theirprimordialsentithe minorities that have engaged in sustained, ments that distinguishes effective political action from the more quiescent minorities.The pripoints.A2 mordial paradigm had not predictedthe patternofflash had also predictedthatprotestwould moThe primordialparadigm bilize behind agendasof culturalexpression.Yet Soviet ethnofederalism has raised many issues that are poorlyexplained by this paradigm. For example, the recommendationby leaders of the Nagorno-Karabakh over jurisdiction Armenians,Abkhazians, and South Osetians to transfer their homelands to the Russian Republic evinces an acceptance rather for and of its institutional protections than rejectionof Soviet federalism The termsin which they have cast their legislative minorityinterests.
"The Soviet Union," in RobertG. Wirsing,ed., Protec79Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Perspectives (New York: Pergamon Press, 198i), I27. Comparative tionof EthnicMinorities: Lapidus, "EthnonationFor a finecriticaldiscussionof thisapproach,see Gail Warshofsky The SovietCase," World Politics36 (Julyi984), 555-80. alism and PoliticalStability: 80 Karpat, "Moscow and the 'Muslim Question,'" Problems Communism (November32 of December i983), 79. of and Wimbush,Muslims theSovietEmpire(London: C. Hurst, i985), 3, 3I. 8, Bennigsen 82 The paradigm mightbe "saved" by claimingthatassertiveness ethnicleaders in the of in Baltic, followed by such assertiveness the Caucasus, is evidence of the relativelevels of ethnicawareness in these lands. But in this sense the conceptof relativelevels of national or of it is consciousness not a predictor politicizedethnicity partof a causal relationship; is, or rather, description definition. a

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agendas concerningautonomy,indigenization,language, development, and migrationsuggestthat the public agenda formost ethnic cadres is less a primordialassertionof culturalidentity than an instrumental pursuit of other interests. Thus, the predictions the prevailingparadigm of were inaccurate. concerningtheagendasof ethnopolitics an Alternatively, analysis that draws solely upon the instrumentalist paradigm would lead to significant as misprediction well. It would miss the constraint primordialist of in sentiments the populationthatmust be co-opted into the agendas of Soviet ethnicentrepreneurs. would disIt miss the possibility that cadres might switch to primordialagendas as incentivesand institutional constraints change. It would be unable to such as Landsbergis to sacexplain the willingnessof some counterelites rifice socioeconomicbenefits symbolicissues of self-expression. for These mispredictions point up the narrow or incompletenature of a or that paradigm, such as the primordialist instrumentalist, focuses on These paradigmsfailto take two factsintoconsideration. attitudes. First, the attitudesthatsustaineitherprimordial instrumental or agendas exist side by side in many Soviet ethnic communitiesand often within the same individual.83 They coexist among Soviet cadres as well as in the of general population.Second, the politicization eitherprimordialsentiand the mobilizationof ethniccommuments or instrumental interests nities in sustained, large-scale action has required the conjunction of these attitudeswith resourcesthat can mobilize an ethnic community. The attitudescited by one or the otherparadigm are necessary, but not for sufficient, the explanationof ethnopolitics. Political institutions like Soviet federalismplay a criticalrole in this conjunctionand so in shapingethniccommunities, politicizingethnicity, and mobilizing protest. They empower entrepreneurs and constrain theirchoice of eitherprimordialor instrumental strategies.84 politiThe
83 Suny (fn. 63), 220. This may also be true in many Western societies; see Anthony in Mughan, "Modernizationand EthnicConflict Belgium,"PoliticalStudies27 (March I979), 2I-37; Rogowski,"Conclusion,"in Tiryakianand Rogowski(fn.77), 374-76. 84 Karl W. Deutsch has notedthatpolitical in also differ the degreeto whichtheir systems assimilation); Deutsch,PoliticalComsee (particularly influence ethnicattitudes institutions and (Garden City,N.Y.: Level: Problems Definition Measurement of munity theInternational at argues a more generalcase forthe Doubleday, I954), 33, 39-40. The "new institutionalism" for "endogeneity"of preferences; example,JamesP. March and JohanP. Olsen argue that as ordering,or "political theoryhas treatedpoliticalinstitutions determining, traditionally The Institutions: Organiindividualmotives";see March and Olsen,Rediscovering modifying zational Basis of Politics(New York: Free Press, i989), 4-7, I54-56. For additional motives see conflict regulation, Eric A. Nordlinger, thatinclineethnicelitestowardintercommunity in CenterforInterna(Cambridge:Harvard University Conflict Regulation DividedSocieties tional Affairs, I972).

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has cization of ethnicity been the work of politicalentrepreneurs created In Soviet federalismn.85the threedecades beforei990 the most signifiby cant pressure on Moscow for ethnic interests was orchestratedby the Partyand stateleadershipof ethnichomelands.By assigninga monopoly over mobilizational resources,Soviet federalismdelayed the rise of ethbut at the same timemade it likelyand possiblethatethnic nofederalism cadres of more developed ethniccommunities would latermobilize their constituents. constraining theirchoice of strategies, By Soviet federalism made it likely that cadres would mobilize theirconstituents behind inratherthanprimordialagendas. Since January strumental i990 the magnitude,patterns, and agendas of ethnicassertiveness have evolved most in thoseareas in which institutional changeshave transformed incenthe tive structures cadres or empowered new elites (notablyin the Baltic of
republics).86

Where political institutions neitherestablishmonopolisticethnic ennor constraintheirchoice of strategies this way, political in trepreneurs institutions distribute mobilizational resourcesand shape ethnic strateThis gies differently.87 is illustrated poignantly the changes in Soviet by In political institutions. some republics the cadres' control over their communitieshas been weakened by the loss of theirmonopolyover the mobilizational resourcesof the ethnic community.The policies of deand have underminedthe abilityof cadres to conmokratizatsiia glasnost tain the protesttheyhave mobilized as well as to suppressautonomous Where threats theircontrolhave grown,theirstrategies to ethnopolitics. have oftenchanged.Cadres in some republicsnow engage in competitive to of efforts mobilize different segments elite and popular constituencies behind competing agendas reflecting different balances of primordial and instrumental concerns.88 early i990 competitionhad led to an By outrightsplit in the Communist partiesof the republicsof Latvia and
85 Illustrations thisapproach include Edward Allworth, of "Restatingthe Soviet NationProblems (New York: Columbia Univered., alityQuestion," in Allworth, SovietNationality sityPress, I971); Helene Carrered'Encausse,Decline ofan Empire(New York: Newsweek

Gorbachev's initial reponseto new elites such as Landsbergisand his Sajudis governthathas emphasized institutional with the Soviet ethnicstrategy ment has been consistent and compellentconstraints, has he to constraints shape ethnic agendas. Using deterrent to soughtto induce the Lithuanian government abandon its primordialagenda and pursue of withinthecontext Soviet federalism. the instrumental objectivesofperestroika 87 Sidney Tarrow describedhow in democratic of systems well the strategies regional as instituare leaders actingas brokersbetweencenterand periphery shaped by bureaucratic in and Periphery: Grassroots Politics Italyand France (New tions;see Tarrow, BetweenCenter
86

Books, I978);

Rakowska-Harmstone

(fn. 79).

Haven: Yale University Press,

88

Sovetskaia Latviia, March i9,

I977),

7-8, 43-44.

i989.

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Lithuania. Alternativeleaderships have articulated competing ethnic agendas, and Partyassetsincludingbuildingshave been divided.89 Lithuania before and afterJanuaryi990 provides an excellent diacan empower chronicstudyof how changesin theSovietelectoralsystem in new political entrepreneurs the homeland and shiftthe emphasis in to ethnic agendas frominstrumental primordialissues. The pragmatic of Brazauskas was replaced by that of Landsbergis, which leadership even if theydid immediatelyemphasized symbolicissues of sovereignty not impart real autonomy. Pressed by Moscow, the new leadership issues were negotiablebut not the quickly agreed that all instrumental declarationof independence.90 primordialones-that is,thesymbolic Behave not changed evenly in all republics,the cause Soviet institutions contrastbetween Lithuania and certainotherunion republicsafterJanuary i990 offersa cross-sectionalcomparison of the consequences of In changed institutions. Belorussia, for example, the elections of early did not offer open contestof elitesand failed to empower alteran i990 native political entrepreneurs.The Belorussian political agenda reand supportiveof Moscow, so that in mained much more instrumental with the Sajudis government, Moscow's confrontation the Belorussian of leadershipannounced it would demand renegotiation its borderswith Lithuania should the lattersecede fromthe Soviet Union.9' The Soviet experiencewithethnofederalism illustrates importance the back into the analysisof ethnopolitics-for Soof bringinginstitutions vietology,for comparisonsof Leninist with non-Leninistpolities,and possiblyforcomparisonsof Soviet politicsbeforeand afteri990. Within of the institutions Soviet federalismmay be keys to the futureof the Soviet system.In particular,the directionthe Soviet Union takes will depend on the abilityof ethniccadres to adapt to the role of entrepreneurs in a competitivearena as well as the abilityof Soviet institutions to to constrainthe cadres' choice of strategies those thatdo not threaten the unityof the Soviet polity.
89Pravda, February8, i990, February9, i990: New YorkTimes,March 24, i990. In Lithchanges fortheirpower,membersof uania, sensingthe consequencesof these institutional of have also begun such as theprimeminister theSajudis government, therepublicPolitburo, to resignfromthe CommunistParty. 90New YorkTimes,March 30, I990. 9' New YorkTimes,March 5, i990, March 6, i990, March 3I, I990.