CROSSROADS

CROSSROADS
The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal
LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

PREvENtivE DiPLOmACy, CONfLiCt mANAGEmENt & PEACE-buiLDiNG
January-August, 2011
From Independence to Ohrid Framework Agreement and After: Macedonian Conflict Management Experience
Biljana VankoVska, aleksandar MiTi, Zoran ilieVski & stefan WolFF, Petar aTanasoV
edvard MiTeVski, ramesh Thakur, david c. McgaFFey, sonja Biserko, Veton laTiFi
Preventive Diplomacy... Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies, Mechanisms, Actors & Stakeholders
ivan krasTeV, Markus Meckel, Mark leonard, casper hendrik claassen & edgar cizero nTasano, Jana loZanoska
Europe, EU & Outer World: European Affairs and Democratic Processes in the Age of Globalization
UDC: 2 7 ( 4 9 7 . 7 ) 3 32 7
Vol. II, No. 4
ISSN 1857-5404
CROSSROADS
January-August 2011, Vol. II, No. 4
Founded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia. Dame Gruev 6, 1000 Skopje, Republic of Macedonia www.mfa.gov.mk Previous Editors-in-Chief: Pajo Avirovik, December 2006-April 2008; Zvonimir Popovik, May 2008-December 2009
Editor-in-Chief Vladimir EfrEmoVski Editorial Board: Lina ognEnoVa Zuko riZVanski shaban Jashari aleksandar TraJkoski Edvard miTEVski maciej kacZorowski Elena gEorgiEVska Eli BoJadJiEska risToVski Advisers: Vasko naUmoVski, Ph.d. darko angELoV, ma Ljuben TEVdoVski, ma
Published by: macedonian information centre (mic) dragan anTonoV, Director n.n. Borce 73, 1000 skopje republic of macedonia
www.micnews.com.mk
CROSSROADS
THE MACEDONIAN FOREIGN POLICY JOURNAL
Skopje, January-August 2011
Vol. II, No.4
Contents
Biljana VANKOVSKA The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor? .....................................................................................5 Aleksandar MITI The Impact of the Media on Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Macedonia 1991-1993 ..................................................................................17 Zoran ILIEVSKI and Stefan WOLFF Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia .........................................................31 Petar ATANASOV The Ohrid Process: A Long-lasting Challenge ...............................................................45

Edvard MITEVSKI Democracy as a Peace-Building Tool Case Study: South Africa ....................................53 Ramesh THAKUR The United Nations and the Quest for World Peace .........................................................81 David C. McGAFFEY The Art of Negotiation Reaching a Mutually Satisfactory Solution ...............................95 Sonja BISERKO Kosovo: Dialogue Leads to a Turning-point ...................................................................105 Veton LATIFI The Interlinks of the Peace-building Strategies and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Lessons and Challenges for the Preventive Diplomacy Following the Dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia .............................................................................117
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Europe, EU & Outer World: European Affairs and Democratic Processes in the Age of Globalization
Ivan KRASTEV Democracy in the Age of Populism or the Self-Enmity of Democracy............................131 Markus MECKEL The European Union Twenty Years After the Fall of Communism: A Success Story Crisis and Challenge for Transatlantic Relations ................................137 Mark LEONARD Europe Now Has a Second Chance.................................................................................147 Casper Hendrik CLAASSEN and Edgar Cizero NTASANO Transnationalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Sustained Primacy of the State in a Transformed Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Arena (Transnationalism Contra Globalisation: The Myth, or Illusion, of Globalisation)........161 Jana LOZANOSKA Principle of Non-discrimination and Equitable Representation in Framework Agreement Ten Years After - Formal or Substantive Equality?! ....................183
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327.36
The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor?

Biljana VANKOVSKA
International academic and policy communities seem to be quite entangled into debates over concepts that were supposed to be clear and embraced as conventional wisdoms. It often looks as if their rhetoric is full of buzz-words and neologisms that can hardly be implemented into the reality. The list of such notions includes, among others, the concepts of human security, state-building, nation-building, peace-building, etc. The terms nation building and state building are used to describe international support for post-conflict reconstruction. It seems that peacebuilding covers a slightly broader agenda than state- or nation-building. Where state- or nation building mainly are concerned with security and the institutions of governance, peace-building holds a wider societal - and more civilian - approach. When comparing empirical case studies of concrete interventions, nevertheless the difference is negligible. Since recently the debate has refocused on the issue of national ownership; it seems as if everybody is for it although few would know what it really means and how can one promote it into post-conflict or failing states. According to the (ex-)UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, national ownership is the core principle of peace-building, and the restoration of national capacity to build peace must therefore be at the heart of the international efforts.1 This statement actually encapsulates the essence of both the peace-building and state-building strategies i.e. it proves that the global actors do not really find great difference between them. Furthermore, national ownership seems to be a desired end of both processes;
1
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annans remarks on the launch of the Peace-building Fund in New York, 11 October 2006, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10677.doc.htm Biljana Vankovska, Full Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute for Security, Defence and Peace Studies. Head of MA program in Peace and Development.
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Biljana Vankovska
they are supposed to restore peace and (re)establish capable state institutions that would be sustainable in the sense that they would be able to persist without further international assistance. The growing debate along with the increasing cases of state-building may be indicators that ultimate solutions are still far from the reach. One could also assume that the growing interest within the international community is due to its being overstretched across the globe with very few clearly successful and sustainable examples of post-conflict peace-building. About half of the peace agreements to end civil wars collapse within five years of signing. Of 18 countries that experienced a UN peacekeeping mission with a political institution-building component between 1988 and 2002, 13 were classified as authoritarian regimes in 2002.2 Peace-building process seems to be a long-term and also a reversible one. The paradox lies in the following fact: longer the international missions last, dependency syndrome is more likely. Furthermore, the roots and the essence of the initial violence/conflict tend to go through a mutation in the post-conflict environment. Therefore, the crucial aspect of external interventions is the one that concerns their successfulness. Yet the criteria for success or failure are difficult to be differentiated. The first question in the row is: who is to judge the existence of success or failure? What about objective and subjective aspects of security? Is success to be measured by absence of physical violence (even if it has been transformed into a criminal behaviour) or is presence of preconditions for positive peace necessary? In a way, the notion of national ownership serves as another name for the badly needed exit strategies and disentanglement from regions that do not show clear signs of recovery. If it had not been the case, then national ownership would have been redundant, especially in the context of the so popular liberal democratic thesis. What would be more natural than to make citizens and other societal actors responsible for their own government and political system? At the same time, the national power-holders have to be accountable to the ones who elect them and give legitimacy to the government. The very insisting on ownership issue and empowerment of the local stakeholders implies that peace and democracy may not always go hand in hand in post-conflict societies. Peace, at least, the negative one may be reached through peace agreements and imposition of various institutional arrangements but democracy (or even a bare state apparatus) can hardly be built without a broad participation and inclusion of the local stakeholders in the process. In other words, at first sight it seems as if (negative) peace can be imposed on the conflict parties, while many theorists would agree that contemporary state-building is a contradiction in terms in so far as states cannot be built from the outside: they are derived from society itself. If accepted this line of thinking it would mean that
2
Charles T. Call and Susan E Cook, On Democratization and Peacebuilding, Global Governance, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003.
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The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor
peace is not derived from society itself (sic). The elaboration of the Macedonian case of peace-building/state-building is meant to prove that it is a false presumption. In other words, both peace and democratic state have to grow from within, from society itself. The role of the international interventions is limited and its involvement may have dubious results despite the good intentions. The so-called international community may claim successful endeavours only if it limits itself on artificial and short-term results. In terms of peace, most it can achieve is negative peace - for transformation of negative into positive peace much more than a peace agreement is necessary. Unless state-building intervention is meant to create a soulless state3 or an empty shell4 it cannot be successful without local participative democracy that would not rely only on designated elites that internationals usually deal with. It goes without saying that ownership issue was the best defined in democratic states, where the sovereignty locus is precisely with the people. The well-known definition of democracy reads: power from the people, for the people, by the people. But what happens with post-conflict and/or weak states? The international community operates on the assumption that the national government speaks on behalf of the entire population and territory of the state. In a failed state, this assumption may be doubtful. The formal government has little authority and control - perhaps down to as little as daytime hours in the capital - and often its legitimacy is severely damaged. Who speaks on behalf of the people in such a situation? With whom should internationals engage? Where should national ownership rest? Part of the answer is often found in peace agreements. Studies show that the nature and quality of the peace agreements are important for the peacebuilding results.5 Studies also show that often the agreements are inconsistent, partly because the international actors - which were instrumental in negotiating the agreements - were unclear on whether the primary aim was to achieve peace or to create legitimate democratic institutions.6 Reaching peace agreements often involves giving the leaders of warring factions a central role in the future state or regional constellation. It is believed that such arrangements would provide them
3
Christopher J. Bickerton, States without Souls. Contradictions of state-building in the 21st century, Paper Prepared for SAID Conference Sovereignty in the 21st Century, Oxford, 29 October 2005, http://www.said-workshop.org/bickerton.oxford.paper.doc. David Chandler, How state-building weakens states, Spiked Essays, 24 October 2005, http://www. spiked-online.com/Printable/0000000CADDB.htm. Stephen J. Stedman, Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policy Makers, IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation, International Peace Academy, New York(2001). The Future of UN State-Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq, Policy Report. International Peace Academy, New York, 2003, p. 7.
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Biljana Vankovska
with incentives to mutate from warlords into peacelords.7 Eventually, the faade of national ownership is usually preserved carefully but it is the international community that formulates the strategies - more or less coordinated, and with more or less input from local voices. Ownership is defined pragmatically and there is application of something called a principle of dynamic ownership that allegedly increasingly broadens the circle of participation in, and support for, the reform agenda.8 For the current debate, however, another issue is of central importance. Namely, the question reads: is ownership issue significant (only) as a principal aspect of successful peace-building or it is made topical because of the obvious urge for an exit strategy for the international community? The time constraint is evident in the tension between the desire to withdraw international troops as soon as possible and the desire to leave in place stable national structures capable of providing security and upholding law and order. This means strengthening the police, the army, the judiciary - i.e. the branches of the state, which often have been involved in repression and violence in the previous regime. Instead of leaving behind democratic and peaceful structures, the internationals usually rely on constitutions and embedded institutions as well as on the allegedly reformed security sector. The problem here is that genuine security sector reform is usually a costly and time-demanding process, i.e. something that fragile societies do not have at hand. Thus the post-conflict states are made up quickly to look like real states with all prerogatives despite the obvious need to create a peaceful and demilitarized community that should learn how to heal the wounds and traumas inherited from the violent phase. Interestingly, having been enforced to deal with each other for more than a decade in the Balkan region, it seems that both sides (locals and internationals) are equally eager to divorce but there is still the open issue of ones success and credibility. The international community perceives itself as a principle stakeholder in the region, i.e. to be the actor who invested the most (both in human and material terms) for the peace and stability of the turbulent region. On the other hand, locals are often tired and unmotivated by the tutorial role of the internationals; yet the population is not very trustful into its own embedded political elites and is therefore hesitant in waving goodbye to the internationals. Chandler rightly raises another important aspect: what would happen if the invested peace-building and state-building processes fail as soon as the internationals leave the scene? Who is going to be responsible for the failure and who is going to take care of
7
Gordon Peake et al., From Warlords to Peacelords: Local Leadership Capacity in Peace Processes, INCORE Report, 2004, University of Ulster, Londonderry. An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices. Using results-based frameworks in fragile states, United Nations and the World Bank, New York/Washington, 2005.
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the new (possible) mess? He actually gives an explicit answer with the following argumentation: the international state-builders institutionalize weak states which have little relationship with their societies. The sterile governance is liberated from normal democratic politics. It pictures the international community as unbiased and disinterested in anything but peace and stability. The empire in denial (in Chandlers words) tries to avoid any investigation in its self-interest, while the justification for the interventions is easily found in the cry of their democratic public and moral imperatives. But as soon as the international actors undertake an action in a failing state the main concern is to shift responsibility and accountability on the recipient state itself. It is usually just repackaging of external coercion in the warm and fuzzy language of empowerment, partnership and capacitybuilding. The result is what Chandler calls a virtuous circle for Western states: The more intervention there is, the more the target state is held to be responsible and accountable for the consequences of those practices.9 The end logic of this redefinition of sovereignty is bizarre: Governments which resisted this external assistance could, in the Orwellian language of international state-builders, be accused of undermining their [own] sovereignty.10 The usual refrain of the proponents of the liberal peace from the international community is: there is a need for local communities to acknowledge their ownership of the peace process and the democracy-building. Having in mind that the driving force of many conflicts (for which ex-Yugoslavia can serve as a good example) is the ethno-political mobilization, then a logical question arises: who are the stakeholders in a post-conflict society? If the society is expected to heal through the liberal democratic remedies then most of the ethnic elites will have to lose their privileged positions. The internationals are wary with regard to the local crooks but they are also seen as more reliable and controllable than the masses and grass-root movements that may ask for more and better than ethnically divided societies and power-sharing institutional arrangements. Forging peace is supposed to go beyond the signing of agreements between rebel groups and government. It involves the crafting of policies and programs that will respond to the decades old problems of inequity, distrust, discrimination, or ethno-political manipulation. Stakeholders are those who have an interest in the outcome of a particular process. They are those affected by the problem and affected by the solution. Therefore it is of utmost importance to identify them during the peacebuilding process and to create new peace structures that are going to replace the old forms of structural violence. The new peace structures and actors inevitably meet a paramount challenge of desecuritizing the ethnicity, i.e. dismantling the ethnic security dilemma and maybe challenging the externally
9 10
David Chandler, Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building, (London: Pluto Press, 2006): 36. Ibidem, p. 37.
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Biljana Vankovska
imposed consensual democracy. The crucial goal in this process is to identify who benefited the most from the violent conflict and its aftermath - and who is the loser? On the list of stakeholders, one usually finds enumerated political parties, civil society organisations, societal groups, youth, etc. Some authors also include the international actors - both political and non-governmental ones. Actually, they are often considered to be thieves of the conflict during the process of conflict resolution. It seems like a rather complex picture of actors who have interests in the currents and reforms. Quite expectedly, some of them may have contradictory interests, viewpoints and strategies. Thus at the end of the day it is a power game that defines who is indeed an owner of the peace and democracy-building processes.
1. Macedonias path from conflict prevention to post-conflict peace-building

The violent dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 bypassed only one of the republics - the Republic of Macedonia. Indeed in the following ten years the country had been pictured a successful case of conflict prevention in the Balkans. Eventually it collapsed under the pressure of accumulated and unresolved regional conflicts, without ever having a real chance to benefit from the negative peace (i.e. absence of direct physical violence). The roots of the problem had already been within the country but everybody seemed to be happy there was no overt violence. The international community failed to figure out that Macedonia had been a small but yet a significant part of the three conflict triangles on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The most common and influential analyses advocated the simplification and vivisection of problems into small pieces (salami tactics), thereby obscuring the complexity of a picture that had never been black and white. The illusion of peace was thus grounded in a misconception that the impact of regional problems could have been prevented from spilling across the Macedonian states borders. Having avoided being drawn into the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, yet at the same time in the direct vicinity of the region torn apart by ethnic conflict, Macedonia received no special international attention in the first months and years of its independence. Whatever international attention Macedonia received appears to have resulted from two factors: (1) the horrific situation in Bosnia and the consequent CNN effect and (2) the vociferous Greek ethno-nationalist reaction to the appearance of a new state whose name was viewed as an undeniable part of Greek national history. The first factor enabled President Gligorovs call for the preventive deployment of international forces to be heard.11 Thus, the
11
Biljana Vankovska, UNPREDEP in Macedonia: Diplomacy-Security Nexus in the Balkans, Romanian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1998, pp. 146-158.
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image of an oasis of peace was created for the benefit of both domestic and international audiences. Local elites could claim de facto international recognition, while internationals provided a face-saving mission to compensate for all missed opportunities and mistakes in Croatia and Bosnia. The UNPREDEP mission became a paradigmatic case of preventive peacekeeping and a source of great pride for the internationals (let alone numberless scholarly works, PhD theses, political careers, etc.). The reality was a bit different. Macedonia had been far from an oasis of peace. An almost endless list of problems has accompanied Macedonias state-building efforts since 1991. These included, to mention just a few, an extremely weak economy, almost non-existent state and democratic traditions, underdeveloped political culture and a turbulent and not always friendly neighborhood. The strong impact of ethno-nationalist violent conflicts in the region played an important role in determining the conflict prevention efforts in Macedonia. These paid overwhelming attention to the countrys ethnic mix, which was frequently referred to as an explosive Macedonian salad. In sum, for a period of ten years, Macedonia witnessed and hosted an array of international organizations whose projects focused on conflict prevention and resolution, inter-ethnic dialogue and tolerance, etc., yet these projects paid far more attention to the classic clich of inter-ethnic relations and largely neglected more fundamental conflict.12 In late 1992, the country welcomed a unique UN mission of preventive peacekeeping (first as a part of UNPRPOFOR mission, and later as a separate UNPREDEP - UN Preventive Deployment mission). It served as an early-warning source for the UN Security Council. At the beginning the emphasis was on troop deployment (military component), which was supposed to serve as a minimal but psychologically significant deterrent force. Soon the accent of the mission was changed in accordance with the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General: It should, however, be stressed that UNPROFOR has no mandate in relation to the internal situation in the Republic of Macedonia, which could prove to be more detrimental to the stability of the country than external aggression. Although UNPROFOR stands ready to lend its good offices in appropriate circumstances, it has no mandate to intervene in the event that internal stability results in some form of civil conflict (...) It is UNPROFORs view that the more likely sources of violence and instability are internal and thus beyond the mandate of the Force.13 Consequently, the UN Security Council extended the repertoire of prevention techniques, so the mission focused more on other tasks such as
12
13
A fine analysis of the real essence of the inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia can be found in: Ahmetis Village. Political Economy of Interethnic Relations in Macedonia, ESI Macedonia Project, http://www.esiweb.org/docs/printdocument.php?document_ID=36. Secretary-Generals Report S/1994/300 of 16 March 1994.
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assistance in strengthening mutual dialogue among political parties and helping in monitoring human rights as well as inter-ethnic relations in the country. Thus, three main pillars of UNPREDEPs mandate were the following: political action and good offices (political dimension), troop deployment (military dimension), and the human (socio-economic) dimension. This is why some analysts began to pose the question whether the operation had turned into an internal mediative, peacebuilding/development role, rather than a defensive hedge against spillover effects from neighboring states.14 As said, UNPREDEP was supposed to assist the countrys social and economic development along with other agencies and organizations of the UN system. But the chief of the mission, Sokalski rightly pointed out that one of the causes for the precarious state of Macedonias economy as a source of internal tensions was the cost of the mandatory sanctions against the former Yugoslavia and the unilateral economic blockade by Greece. While part of history now, they nevertheless cost the economy some $4 billions US.15 In this respect one can say that the UN protected and punished the Macedonian society at the same time. Consequently, it was unable to contribute significantly in alleviating internal conflict potential. Macedonias peacefulness until 2001 was a result of a constellation of some internal and external factors: 1) the country was not a part of the core conflict structure in ex-Yugoslavia; 2) it had a wise state leadership that preferred negotiated settlement with the YPA; 3) the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia got more complicated than expected by the Serbian side, so Macedonia was not worth military efforts; at the same time, Ibrahim Rugovas peaceful resistance in Kosovo provided some regional stability, at least until the Dayton Agreement was signed in 1995; 4) the UNPREDEP mission managed to mitigate the conflict in and around Macedonia to some extent, and 5) there was a tradition of non-violence between the dominant ethnic groups in Macedonia (65% ethnic Macedonians, 25 % ethnic Albanians and 10% members of other ethnicities). They had always been living as separate worlds, but a deep trauma had not been a part of their common history. On the other hand, Macedonia had been doomed to a violent conflict because of the effect of some factors, such as: 1) ethnic security dilemma (ethnic Macedonians got their first ever nation-state, while Albanians sought for an all-Albanian state to be build in the region; 2) structural and inherited elements of inequality among the members of the various ethnic and social groups and intrinsically weak state; 3) lack of internal peaceful conflict management mechanisms or early warning system; 4) huge availability of arms, especially after the collapse of Albania in 1997, which discouraged
14
15
For instance, Shashi Tharoor, The Concept of Preventive Deployment in the 1990s, paper presented at the Workshop on An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Skopje, October 16, 1996, p. 12. Henryk J. Sokalski, Preventive Diplomacy: the Need for a Comprehensive Approach, Balkan Forum, No. 1, March 1997, p. 46.
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delicate political negotiations among ethnic leaderships; 5) the spilling over effect from other Yugoslav conflicts, and particularly the 1999 NATO intervention that shaken the inter-ethnic relations and hampered the economic and social development; and 6) the impact of the organized crime and corruption on the state-building process. The NATO intervention gave impetus to the negative factors, especially since UNPREDEP had been terminated in February 1999. The economic situation deteriorated, while the international community had never compensated the country for its losses due to the regional conflicts. The identity divisions got embedded more than ever, especially among Albanians in Macedonia who got stronger sense of solidarity with their ethnic brethren thanks to their joining the battles against Serbian forces in Kosovo. In 2001 this military experience would prove useful for the battles in Macedonia. The use of force was legitimized and got a heroic aura, while Kosovos prospects for gaining independence affected Albanians in Macedonia to become even more sensitive to the developments in the region.
2. The Characteristics of the 2001 Little War and the Peace Settlement
Despite the long experience in conflict prevention, the 2001 crisis took by surprise many international observers. It went through a few stages: what at first looked as a clash of a limited scope with a basically criminal background (cutting off the smuggling routes near a village on the Macedonia-Kosovo border), rapidly escalated into a violent conflict. The KFOR troops failed to protect the intrusion of armed groups from Kosovo, while the Macedonian security forces fell short of using the right tactics against initially small groups. The inappropriate response provoked more mass mobilization of the ethnic Albanians, which was hijacked by the already established but rather secretive army led by a Swiss migr, Ali Ahmeti. The hostilities lasted no more than six months, while the conflict appeared to have a surprisingly low death-toll, at least, seen through the official statistics (it was estimated that each side lost approximately 100 people, military and/or civilians). The geographic scope of the clashes was also limited to the mainly Albanian-populated areas and there was almost no inter-communal violent incidents that would involve the civilian population. Having seen the incapacity of the Macedonian authorities and security structures to quickly stop the violence, the international community quickly shifted its attitude: from the initial condemnation of the armed thugs who prefer bullets to ballots (in the words of then NATO Secretary General), it started appealing for a peace settlement between the government and the NLA rebels and freedom fighters. Prior to that, under the auspices of the international community, the four dominant political parties (two from the each ethnic block) formed a government of national unity. It manifested an alleged national consensus and unity but also
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blurred the responsibilities and created conditions for unprincipled policy-making and implementation. The peace negotiations involved the representatives of the four political parties, a small group of experts and two international (EU and US) facilitators. The paradox was that the peace agreement was to be settled among actors that comprised the legal government and never claimed to be in war with each other. The NLAs leadership was consulted but more importantly its political agenda had already been agreed among the Albanian negotiators. The Framework Agreement (FA) was signed on 13 August 2001 under a veil of secrecy and only later presented to the public. The FA outlined a package of political reforms to expand the rights of the Albanian minority while rebel forces were to be disarmed and disbanded under NATO supervision. In context of the Macedonian case one can talk about the so-called banality of the ethnic war16 or to paraphrase Mary Kaldor - in its haste to fix the problem the international community fell into the trap of the local conflicting parties and rushed to embrace the thesis of ancient ethnic hatred between the ethnic groups and even impossibility for them to live together.17 Thus, the simplest solution was to separate the hostile ethnic groups, to impose political power-sharing and territorial arrangements that would guarantee a sort of a negative peace (based on ethnicitisation of politics and ghettoisation of the citizens of different ethnic backgrounds). The simplest solution is not always the best solution, but it fulfils the criteria of a quick fix, at least, on a short-run. A quick fix is precisely what the international community is able to provide and what local elites are interested to preserve in order to govern the country as long as possible. The post-Ohrid Macedonia is already on a track very different from the one that was envisaged by the Framework Agreement. Obviously, the founding fathers did not have a clear idea when drafting the document full of compromises, controversies and double-speak. Today there is almost nothing left from the idea of the civic approach declared in the document; multi-ethnicity has been sacrificed and replaced by bi-nationality, while the power-sharing arrangement makes democracy a pipedream.
3. The Macedonias Paradox: Dealing with a Success Story or with a Security Problem?
Macedonias case is unique in terms of its being considered a success story both prior to the 2001 conflict and in its aftermath. Such evaluations by default come from the international and national elites. Even ten years later the expert/academic
16 17
John Mueller, Banality of Ethnic War, International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 42-70. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999).
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community is suspiciously silent and politically correct, while the public opinion polls display a different picture. The last decade has witnessed much more compliments for the miracle of the peace agreement known as Framework Agreement (FA) than cool-headed reality-check of its practical implementation. The wishful thinking that surrounds this case makes it impossible to draw a conclusion about the statebuilding and peace-building process, while the issue of national ownership has not been even tackled. For a long time (i.e. till the NATO Bucharest summit in 2008) Macedonia seemed to be doomed to be a success story no matter how imperfect it was/is.18 Prior to the 2001 armed conflict it had been known as an oasis of peace, mostly because everybody needed at least one peaceful actor and alleged success in the regional nightmare, especially since the Bosnian wars horrors became widely broadcasted. The very fact that there was no overt violence and hostility was highly praised - only because this achievement was so self-evident in comparison to all other cases in the region. And again, in 2001 there was no time to cry over the spilled milk or to analyze why the so much praised conflict prevention failed. Instead the focus swiftly moved onto other priorities: containment of the violence, imposition of a solution and affirmation of a renewed Macedonian success story - this time in terms of post-conflict peace-building. But since 2008, despite all alleged achievements, the Republic of Macedonia has been living in a rather dubious situation. On one hand she proved to be a successful story in post-conflict peace-building but given the Greek veto and the unresolved name dispute many speaks about the countrys being in a precarious limbo. The 2008 NATO Summit confirmed that Macedonia had fulfilled all necessary criteria for admission, yet there was no extension of an invitation. This was also true with regard to the EU integration: by the end of 2009, both the European Commission and the European Parliament agreed that the country met the Copenhagen (political) criteria and recommended setting a date for a start of the negotiation process. In both cases the main obstacle was the so-called name dispute. Thus, being stuck and with no clear prospects for the future, Macedonia resembles a modern Tantalus. A retrospective look at the developments displays a clear paradox: the closer Macedonia gets to the desired strategic goals, i.e. the membership of NATO and EU, the higher insecurity and risks of destabilization grow. It looks as if the NATO and Euro-integration has transformed a stimulating factor into a securitization tool, especially in the light of the ethnic Albanian claims that they will join NATO and EU with or without the ethnic Macedonians. Similarly, recently the international representatives have changed their rhetoric, speaking about an
18
Biljana Vankovska, Current Perspectives on Macedonia: The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Security, series I-IV, (Berlin: Hainrich Boell Stiftung, 2002), http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/1733. html.
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eventual need of bulldozer-like diplomacy, while the name issue and the deadlock in the negotiations seems to have transformed the Macedonian success story into a European security problem.
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327.56(4:497.7)1991/1993
The Impact of the Media on Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Macedonia 1991-1993
Aleksandar MITI
The Cold War had accustomed generations of reporters to analyze world events almost exclusively in terms of the bipolar confrontation, where good and evil were easily defined and identified. This mindset often proved unsuitable in trying to make sense of the disorder created by the collapse of Communism. And it was an easy prey for the highly sophisticated machines that have characterized the conflicts in former Yugoslavia1 From the outset of the post-Cold War era, the notion of impact of the media on foreign policy attracted considerable attention among policymakers, politicians and journalists alike. Many of them believed that the new, more cooperative international environment at the end of the Cold War, combined with the increasing democratization in many states, would lead to the empowerment of the media and their stronger impact on foreign policy. This interest was accompanied by new research on the subject in the academia. Of course, the impact of the media had been studied before, especially after the 1898 war between the United States and Spain, which was in part fuelled by sensationalist coverage of the Cuban crisis by the Hearst newspapers. The study of the impact of the media reached its height during and immediately following the Vietnam war most of the analyses showed the strengthening of the media independence and its power to influence foreign policy decisions.
1
Sylvia Poggioli, Scouts Without Compasses, Nieman Reports (Fall 1993), p.17. Aleksander Miti is Chairman of the Center for Strategic Alternatives in Belgrade. Previously, he served as an Agence France-Presse correspondent from 1999-2005 and he was the only journalist working for foreign media who covered the entire 1999 NATO bombings from Kosovo. He holds a M.A. in International Affairs/Conflict Analysis from Carleton University, and serves as a regular lecturer of the course "News Reporting in Crisis Situations" at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Belgrade.
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Aleksandar Miti
The technological advances of the 1980s, including the advance of real-time satellite television, substantially enhanced the ability of the media to acquire and disseminate information. When combined with the end of the Cold War and thus the loosening of the grip of government on the media in their countries for reasons of national security these advances led to further empowerment of the media.2 Media coverage of the Gulf War and the intervention in Somalia gave birth to the CNN factor hype. The extensive CNN coverage of the Gulf War including the exclusive reporting by CNN journalists from Baghdad led to the belief that CNN can be omnipresent and omnipotent. The widely-held belief that the U.S. decided to intervene in Somalia because of the TV images of starving children reinforced this perception, as did the belief that the withdrawal of U.S. troops came after the broadcasting of TV pictures of dead bodies of American soldiers being dragged on the streets of Mogadishu.3 The case of Yugoslavia created new examples: the TV images of the Vase Miskina street bread line massacre in Sarajevo on May 27, 1992 were believed to have had a decisive influence on the UN Security Council to impose harsh economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The complaint about the increasing pressure of the media on foreign policy stated by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was echoed by many other policymakers including UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and George F. Kennan. Many politicians, journalists and academics joined the band-wagon. For a while, everybody seemed to be talking about how CNN and its real-time coverage were changing centuriesold diplomatic traditions and were leading to the loss of policy control on the part of government policymakers. Soon, however, more in-depth analyses showed that the impact of the CNN factor had been exaggerated. Evidence showed that the media do not have much impact on conflict management and resolution after all. Nik Gowing, the Diplomatic Editor of the British Independent Television News, in an analysis for the Harvard Center on Press, Politics and Public Policy, downplayed the impact of real-time television on foreign policy decisions.4 Warren Strobel, the Washington Times White House Correspondent, showed in his analysis that television does not have much impact on U.S. policies towards intervention.5 Johanna Neuman found
2
4 5
See Nicholas Hopkinskon, The Media and International Affairs After the Cold War. (London: Wilton Park Paper 74, 1993), p.2. See Warren Strobel. The Media and U.S. Policies Toward Intervention: A Closer Look at the CNN Effect in Chester Crocker and Fen Osler Hamspon, Managing Global Chaos. (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1996); NikGowing.The One-Eyed King of the Real-Time News Coverage in New Perspectives Quarterly (Fall 1994) pp.45-54. See Gowing. See Strobel.
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that new technological advances will have the same impact as Johann Gutenbergs invention of the moveable-type press had in the 15th century or the invention of the telegraph, telephone, radio and television had a few centuries later they will empower the media but will never supplant good political leadership.6 In contrast to this surfeit of analyses, there has been little research on the possible impact of the media on conflict prevention or preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is another field which has received considerable attention in the post-Cold War era. Although the prevention of violent conflicts has existed in practice for centuries, the term preventive diplomacy was first used by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjord in 1960. Yet, it was another UN SecretaryGeneral, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who brought renewed prominence to the concept in his 1992 Agenda for Peace, in which he defined preventive diplomacy as an action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.7 Boutros-Ghalis interest in the concept was shared by government policymakers in North America and Europe, by regional security organizations, non-governmental organizations and prominent research institutes. The new postCold War environment fostered this interest. Among other reasons, the failure to prevent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda and the cost of dealing with their consequences precipitated a demand to formulate frameworks for effective preventive diplomacy strategies. Some researchers and policymakers accepted Boutros-Ghalis broad definition of preventive diplomacy, others viewed this definition as a wish list and tried to limit the scope of preventive diplomacy action to more realistic objectives. Among the latter, the clearest definition yet has been outlined by Michael Lund for whom preventive diplomacy is a deliberate action aimed at preventing groups from using violence as means of settling political disputes.8 Yet, despite all the research, no studies had been done on the possible impact of the media on preventive diplomacy. Can the media have an impact on preventive diplomacy? Since there is an attempt to formulate effective preventive diplomacy strategies, there ought to be an understanding of how the media can affect these strategies. In democratic societies, which historically are the ones for the most part involved in preventive diplomacy, the media are powerful forces which are most often independent from government control and thus do not always have the same interests in the governments efforts to prevent a conflict. The media are in addition highly restrained by their own nature, their ownership and other limitations of time, cognitive and financial nature. Thus, the media are a powerful force which can,
6
7 8
Johanna Neuman. Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics? (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996). Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Agenda for Peace. (New York: United Nations, 1992), pp. 11-19. Michael Lund. Preventing Violent Conflicts. (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1996), p. 37.
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Aleksandar Miti
because of their constraints, present a simplified, sensationalist, even distorted picture of the events covered.9 This can have a negative impact on preventive diplomacy efforts when the media influence decisions which are in line with the media coverage but run counter to effective preventive actions. Of course, the impact of the media does not have to be negative the media can play a positive role in defusing tensions and instilling confidence between different ethnic groups or states. But we will focus on the negative aspects of the media impact on preventive diplomacy. Based on extensive research, we can outline the following propositions on the impact of the media: 1. 2. The media can have an impact on policies in which the states strategic interest is not clearly defined and articulated. The media can have an impact on policies in areas of peripheral geostrategic interest to state policymakers.
On the side of the findings on preventive diplomacy, we can outline the following propositions: 1. 2. Preventive diplomacy efforts can be negatively affected by unclear strategic policies. Preventive diplomacy can be affected by strategic importance: the less important the potential conflict is to the leading actor in the preventive effort, the less likely it is that the effort will benefit from sufficient political will and commitment to success.
If the propositions derived from the discussion on the media impact on foreign policy are compared to those about preventive diplomacy, the following hypothesis can be outlined: The media can have an impact on preventive diplomacy when the preventive diplomacy strategy is not clearly defined and when it is aimed at preventing conflicts at the periphery of geostrategic interest of the actor leading the preventive effort. The author of this article has performed a content analysis on three cases of preventive diplomacy in the former Yugoslavia: in Croatia/Slovenia, in BosniaHerzegovina and in Macedonia. The research has shown that the media had a chance to impact on the European Community preventive diplomacy effort in Slovenia/Croatia because
9
The literature on the problems with media coverage is extensive. One of the most comprehensive works is Andreas Freunds Journalismeet Misinformation (Grenoble: PenseeSauvage, 1991), which explains why and how the media coverage is distorted.
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the EC strategy was not clearly defined and because it was aimed at preventing a conflict at the periphery of EC interest at the time of the effort. The analysis also suggests that the media had a chance to impact on the U.S. preventive diplomacy effort in Bosnia because the U.S. strategy was not clearly defined and was aimed at preventing a conflict at the periphery of U.S. interest at the time of the effort. Finally, the media did not have a chance to impact on the preventive diplomacy effort in Macedonia because the preventive diplomacy strategy in this case was clearly defined and was aimed at preventing a conflict of strategic importance to the actors leading the effort, namely the EU and the US.
1. The case of the preventive diplomacy effort in Macedonia (1991-1993)

A) Threats to Macedonia The proclamation of independence of Macedonia in November 1991 led to the fear that a conflict might erupt. The external threat was coming from the perception that Macedonias neighbors Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania have claims over Macedonian territory. Yet, not all of the threats were of the same intensity. Greece was fearful of the creation of an independent Macedonia state because of the potential claims that it could have over the Greek Macedonia. Thus, it was not interested in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia per se. Bulgaria recognized the existence of a Macedonian state, yet did not recognize the existence of a Macedonian nation. The Serbian threat was coming from the perception that Serbia might have territorial ambitions in Macedonia a claim which was constantly refuted by the Serbian government, but also by the situation in the ground as the Serb population in Macedonia was not large and was traditionally well-treated. The most obvious threat was coming from a potential internal ethnic conflict between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, a conflict which would have probably involved Kosovo Albanians and Albania proper. The mutual distrust between the two communities was at the time reinforced by events such as the Albanian boycott of the Macedonian referendum on sovereignty in September 1991, or the referendum organized by the Albanian community on territorial autonomy in January 1992 declared illegal and secessionist by the Macedonian government. The Albanians also refused to participate in the 1991 census. Finally, Macedonia was left defenseless after the negotiated withdrawal of the Yugoslav Peoples Army in April 1992, at the cost of removal of all weaponry, as well as all border monitoring equipment, including x-ray machines, electronic and radar sensors.10 This development, combined with the events in the other parts of the former
10
Janie Leatherman. Untying Macedonias Gordian Knot: Preventive Diplomacy in the Southern Balkans. Paper presented at the ISA Conference in San Diego, California, April 17, 1996.
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Aleksandar Miti
Yugoslavia and the perception of several threats to Macedonias stability led the international community to intensify its efforts at preventing a violent conflict in Macedonia. The common belief was that any conflict in Macedonia would involve all of Macedonias neighbors, as well as Turkey, which could then destabilize the whole region and create an intra-NATO conflict between Turkey and Greece, as well as perhaps allow for the return of Russian influence on the peninsula. B) The preventive diplomacy effort The preventive diplomacy effort in Macedonia was carried out by several actors. The first actor to be involved in the effort was the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY, mostly staffed by the EC at the time).11 It started its work in October 1991, when it pushed for negotiations between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians over the Albanian demands for territorial autonomy. Its intervention was successful, as it persuaded the Albanians not to seek territorial autonomy but rather opt for co-existence. Its work continued through frequent visits and shuttle diplomacy by the German Ambassador Geert Ahrens. The accomplishments include the pressure on the Macedonian government to recognize the Serbs as a minority in the constitution, which was the key Macedonian Serb demand. It also pressured for a new census, which ultimately occurred in 1994. The UN involvement started with the first ever preventive diplomacy deployment of UN peacekeepers. Under Security Council Resolution 795, UN peacekeepers were sent to Macedonias borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the mandate of monitoring and reporting on critical developments affecting Macedonias stability. The first troops were deployed a month after the resolution was passed. The tasks of the force included providing early warning, serving as a deterrent and mediator (in particular in border encounters). Its civilian mandate included monitoring political, economic and social conditions such as ethnic tensions. Originally, most of the focus was on preventing a spillover of a potential conflict in Kosovo, but by March 1995, the UN Secretary General declared that there was no current military threat to the country.12 Yet, a lot of work has been concentrated on defusing potential tensions within the country. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe participated in the effort through two mechanisms: the OSCE Spillover Mission and the factfinding missions of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The OSCE
11
12
Alice Ackermann. The Republic of Macedonia*: A Relatively Successful Case of Conflict Prevention in Europe, Security Dialogue (December 1996), p. 417. (* In the original footnote the author is using the United Nations provisional reference for addressing the Republic of Macedonia.) Barnett Rubin. Toward Comprehensive Peace in Southeast Europe: Conflict Prevention in the South Balkans. (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996).
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Spillover Mission was established in September 1992, and had two primary roles: to monitor and to mediate. Its monitoring mandate included assessing the internal and external threats to the country, including Kosovo, the ethnic and social tensions in the country, the impact of refugees, border security and the stability of political institutions13. The Spillover Mission also served as a multinational embassy or liaison for other third party initiatives in Macedonia.14 It served to mediate in the dispute between Albanians and the Macedonian government which paved the way for Albanian participation in the 1994 census. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel undertook several fact-finding missions. He concentrated on issues such as education and other issues of relevance to broader participation of Albanians in the Macedonian society.15 He also pressured the government to strengthen the role of the Council of Inter-ethnic Relations provided for in the constitution.16 The United States have also participated in the preventive diplomacy effort. Washington issued warnings to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania to refrain from any provocations aimed at destabilizing Macedonia.17 They have also participated extensively in the UN preventive deployment mission. Finally, their mediation through special envoy Matt Nimitz and Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke was instrumental in achieving the interim agreement between Macedonia and Greece. This agreement allowed Macedonia to become a member of the OSCE, to be admitted in the Council of Europe and to join NATOs Partnership for Peace.18 Finally, several non-governmental organizations were involved in the preventive diplomacy effort. The largest NGO involved in the conflict mitigation was Search for Common Ground, a Washington-based consortium of NGOs operating in Macedonia since 1993.19 Its work concentrated on changing ethnic prejudices by organizing training programs for journalists and editors which encouraged them to avoid using ethnic stereotypes and inflammatory language.20 Search for Common Ground and other NGOs have also supported the creation and strengthening of several indigenous organizations with the same aim of conflict prevention.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19
20
Ackermann, p.417. Leatherman, p.45. Leatherman, p.46. Rubin, p. 41. Misha Glenny. Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans, Foreign Affairs. May/June 1995. p. 106. Ackermann, p. 417. Mary Dimitriou. Search for Common Ground in Macedonia, Human Rights Monitor. Vol.1. No. 2. Winter 1995.p.2. Ackermann, p.419.
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Aleksandar Miti
C) Reasons for the success of the preventive effort in Macedonia The preventive diplomacy effort was a success. No external or internal conflict occurred at the time. External threats from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece were dismissed. An internal conflict between ethnic Albanian groups and the Macedonian government occurred years later, in 2001, but were largely due to the negative spillover effect following the war in Kosovo. The reasons for the success of the preventive effort included the good timing of the effort including a quick deployment of UN peacekeepers. There was also an extensive cooperation between the actors (joint tasks of monitoring factors of instability, mediating and facilitating). Furthermore, the OSCE Spillover Mission served as a liaison for the actors involved in the effort. There was an insistence on confidence-building measures: education rights for Albanians, Albanian commitment to the Macedonian state (for Macedonians), Macedonian renunciation of the controversial flag (for the Greeks), minority status for the Serbs. Pressure was applied to all of the disputants both external and internal. A broad network of organizations/actors was involved using various preventive diplomacy tools: UN (deterrence, monitoring, mediation), OSCE (mediation, monitoring, facilitation), EU (mediation, monitoring), NGOs (conflict mitigation), U.S. (deterrence and mediation). There was a correct assessment of the disputants and potential causes of conflict: there was an attempt to address the basic needs and demands of all of the potential disputants. Finally, there was a high level of commitment to the effort (perhaps due to the geopolitical interests: perception that a conflict might engulf the entire region and threaten Western interests). D) Why did the media have no impact? According to this essays hypothesis, the media can have an impact on preventive diplomacy when the preventive diplomacy strategy is not clearly defined and when it is aimed at preventing conflicts at the periphery of interest of the actor leading the preventive effort. In the case of Macedonia, the preventive diplomacy strategy was coherent and clearly defined. Furthermore, for the leading actors in the preventive effort the U.S. and the EU, the potential conflict in Macedonia presented a grave threat to national interests. In fact, a conflict in Macedonia would have surely had regional implications and could have involved two NATO members (Greece and Turkey) in opposite camps. Thus, avoiding the Macedonian conflict had great geostrategic importance for both the U.S. and the EU. The commitment to a clear, coherent and cooperative preventive strategy to a large extent stemmed from that assumption. Therefore, according to the hypothesis, the media could not have had an impact on the preventive effort of the international community in Macedonia. Nevertheless,
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a content analysis of the coverage of the Macedonian issue is necessary in order to assess the difference between the media portrayal and the actual preventive effort. E) Content analysis The content analysis will focus on all articles about the Macedonian issue in the New York Times and in the Economist in the period between November 1991 (proclamation of independence of Macedonia) and end of 1993 (recognition of Macedonia by almost all members of the EU and a time by which the preventive effort was already well set up). The terms Macedonia(n), Albania(n), Greece/ Greek and Serbia(n) will be analyzed. These terms are selected because they represented the main disputants in the Macedonian problem and were the objects of the preventive effort. 1) New York Times Content analysis was performed on a total of 53 articles in the New York Times in the period November 1991-December 1993. A) Independence: Most of the sources of the New York Times have been non-governmental (63) although there was a large presence of governmental sources as well (49). Analyses, commentaries and editorials predominated over regular news articles (27 and 26 respectively). The range of stories was wide: from stories about the Macedonian-Greek name dispute to the issue of containment of the Yugoslav conflict, the failure of Macedonia to enforce the embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, etc. Thus, the New York Times coverage of the Macedonian issue was independent of government control. B) Analysis Number of references in the New York Times
Negative Number of references to Macedonian Number of references to Greek Number of references to Albanian Number of references to Serbian 35 (10.1%) 46 (25.7%) 19 (21.3%) 128 (67%) Neutral 246 (70.7%) 115 (64.2%) 51 (57.3%) 62 (32.5%) Positive 67 (19.2%) 18 (10.1%) 19 (21.3%) 1 (0.5%)
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Aleksandar Miti
Examples of references in the New York Times

Negative Examples of references to Macedonian Usurping the name of Macedonia, its leaders tried to undermine, etc. leads its EC partners into a shameful diplomatic farce, etc. set up a Greater Albania, etc. contain further Serbian aggression, etc. Neutral silent on Macedonia, broke away, etc. Positive peacefully inclined Macedonia, etc.
Examples of references to Greek
northern part of Greece, etc.
Greece and the international community have been correct, etc. move against the Albanians, etc. agreed
Examples of references to Albanian Examples of references to Serbian
a third are of Muslim Albanian descent, etc. border with Serbia, etc.
The New York Times coverage of the Macedonian issue mainly focused on the Greek/Macedonian dispute over the name of Republic of Macedonia. While the presentation of the issue was relatively balanced on the whole, the New York Times editorials clearly sided with the Macedonians and against the position of Greece (April 5, 1992, May 12, 1992, etc). Yet, for the New York Times, the main threat for Macedonia was coming from Serbia (May 12, 1992, June 3, 1992, etc). The rationale was that a Serbian invasion of Macedonia might be the next step in the creation of a Greater Serbia. Ethnic tensions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians within Macedonia were largely omitted from reports. The slant of the coverage continued throughout 1992 and 1993. 2) The Economist Content analysis was performed on a total of 24 articles in The Economist in the period November 1991 December 1993. A) Independence: Sources are rarely acknowledged in The Economist, but those that were turned out to be mostly non-governmental. Furthermore, all of the Economist articles are news analyses. Finally, the range of stories was wide: from the Greek-Macedonian dispute to the UN embargo against Yugoslavia and
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threats to Macedonia. Thus, the Economist coverage of the Macedonian issue was independent of government control. B) Analysis Number of references in The Economist
Negative Number of references to Macedonian Number of references to Greek Number of references to Albanian Number of references to Serbian 4 (w2.5%) 37 (32.4%) 5 (11.6%) 17 (70.8%) Neutral 136 (86.1%) 72 (63.2%) 26 (60.4%) 7 (29.2%) Positive 18 (11.4%) 5 (4.4%) 12 (28%) 0 (0%)
Examples of references in The Economist

Negative Examples of references to Macedonian Examples of references to Greek Examples of references to Macedonian was created to fulfill ambitions for access in the Aegean sea, etc. Greek hysteria, feel passionately but wrongly, etc. Greater Albania, etc. Neutral new state of Macedonia, etc. Positive In Macedonia, ethnic tolerance prevails, etc. name implies territorial claim on Greece, etc. Albanians are second-class (a reference in favor of Albanian demands), etc.
want Macedonia to change its name, etc. demand, etc.
Examples of references to Macedonian
Serbia poses the greatest danger, etc.
tiny Serbian minority, etc.
The coverage of the Economist to a large extent reflected that of the New York Times. As suggested in the February 8, 1992 article, Macedonia faces a big problem because of the Greek opposition, but Serbia poses the biggest danger.
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Aleksandar Miti
The Economist too presented both sides of the Greek-Macedonian dispute, but it sided on the side of the Macedonians. The Serb threat was again emphasized in almost all articles, while the Albanian threat was de-emphasized. F) Findings According to the hypothesis, the media can have an impact on preventive diplomacy when the preventive effort is incoherent and is directed at a region which is at the periphery of geostrategic interest to the actor leading the effort. In the case of Macedonia, the preventive effort was coherent: no matter how complex, the effort was consistent with the strategy of finding solutions which would respect the territorial integrity of Macedonia, but which would address the needs of both internal and external actors. All the actors sent messages and acted in this direction so that the disputants were clear on what the position of the international community was what would be tolerated and what would not. Pressure was applied on all sides: Macedonians, Albanians, Greeks, Serbs. All of them had to make compromises. The confidence-building measures were used to instill trust of all the disputants in the need for a peaceful resolution of the disputes within the acceptable parameters. There were no abrupt decisions that could have negatively affected the effort. All the actions were part of a consistent strategy. There was close coordination among all the actors involved in the effort: UN, OSCE, ISFY, EU, United States and NGOs. A potential Macedonian conflict was also the only conflict in the former Yugoslavia which could have spilled over to other countries. In fact, the United States and the European Union were concerned about a potential clash between two NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as a potential role Russia would have played in the war-torn South Balkans divided in two opposite alliances (Greece and Serbia at the core of one, Turkey and Albania at the core of the other). Thus, preventing a conflict in Macedonia was at the core of U.S. and EU geostrategic interest. In sum, according to the hypothesis, the media could not impact on the preventive effort in Macedonia because the preventive effort was firm, coherent and at the core of the geostrategic interests of the actor leading the effort. The content analysis of the New York Times and the Economist supports the hypothesis. In fact, the media portrayal of the problem differed from the preventive diplomacy actions. The media focused on the Greek-Macedonian dispute (with a slight editorial slant in favor of Macedonia). They identified Serbia in negative terms and as the biggest threat to Macedonia. They did not pay much attention to the ethnic tensions within the country (the Albanian problem). On the other side, the preventive effort, while indeed multi-faceted, focused to a large extent on preventing an internal conflict between ethnic Macedonians and the Albanian community
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The impact of the Media on Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Macedonia 1991-1993
(through ICFY, OSCE and several NGOs). The Greek-Macedonian dispute over recognition was considered as an important component of the effort and it was approached in a very delicate manner, taking into consideration the objections of the Greeks. The Serb threat, while recognized, played a much smaller role than the media suggested. Furthermore, one of the results of the preventive effort was pressure on the Macedonian government to recognize Serbs as a minority. Thus, there is a case of displaced media focus: the media emphasized the Serb threat and downplayed the Albanian threat, while the preventive effort tackled for the most part the Albanian threat and dealt with the Serb threat on the side. While the media editorials suggested immediate recognition of Macedonia, the leaders of the preventive effort waited for a more ripe moment for the nationalist euphoria in Greece to calm down and to allow for a more compromising position. The media took a confrontational approach towards the Serbs, while the preventive effort accommodated their demands. Thus, the preventive effort was not consistent with the media perspective of the problem. Therefore, it could be said that the media did not have an impact on the preventive effort in Macedonia based on the hypothesis and the analysis.
schematic representation of the non-impact of media in the effort in Macedonia

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Aleksandar Miti
Conclusion
The content analysis of the Macedonian case supported the hypothesis of the essay that the media can have an impact on preventive diplomacy when the preventive diplomacy strategy is not clearly defined and when it is aimed at preventing conflicts at the periphery of geostrategic interests of the actor leading the preventive effort. We can further argue, based on the Macedonia case, but also on other cases analyzed by the author of this essay (Croatia/Slovenia and Bosnia), that when the media have an impact on a preventive diplomacy strategy, this impact is likely to be negative because the media perspective does not reflect the complexity and the delicacy needed for successful preventive diplomacy efforts. The hypothesis should be further tested using other case studies. The aim would be not only better understanding of the relationship between the media and preventive diplomacy, but also, policy-wise, an attempt to suggest better ways of cooperation between the media and policymakers involved in preventive diplomacy.
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321.7(497.7)2001
Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

Zoran ILIEVSKI and Stefan WOLFF
This article will explore the The Ohrid Framework Agreement, from 2001 in light of the academic debate between the so called consociational and centripetal school of conflict management theory. It aims to detect the theoretical background of the institutional solutions which were adopted and implemented. In addition it will point out how the system could be steered in the direction of centripetalism, relying mostly on the work done by the prominent American scholar Donald L. Horowitz.
1. The Ohrid Framework Agreement and the theory

The conflict in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001 between the Albanian guerilla (NLA) and the Macedonian security forces, spurred by the inadequate accommodation of the relations between the two biggest ethnic groups in the country during its troublesome democratic transition, has been a cornerstone of the political and academic interest in the past decade.The conflict was settled with tough and complex negotiations between the two main ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political parties. With strong international facilitation, the compromise reached, known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement, consisted of the following main points: 1. Basic Principles: rejection of the use of violence for political means, reaffirmation of the sovereignty, integrity and unitary character of the Macedonian state, preservation and reflection of the multiethnic character of the country in its public life, and commitment to enhancing local self-government;
Zoran Ilievski, PhD is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Head of the Political Science Department at the Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham, England, UK. He has extensive expertise in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union, and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including the Middle East, Africa, and Central, South and Southeast Asia.
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Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff
2. Cessation of hostilities and agreement for voluntary disarmament and disbandment of the ethnic Albanian armed groups under NATO supervision and with its assistance; 3. Development of a decentralized government; 4. Non-discrimination and equitable representation; 5. Special parliamentary procedures: these procedures, i.e. the Badinter majority, are to be used for adopting a number of constitutional amendments, the Law on Local Self-Government, as well as laws that directly affect culture, the use of language, education, personal documentation, the use of symbols, laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje and boundaries of municipalities; 6. Education and the use of languages: state funding for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20% of the population of Macedonia and the principle of positive discrimination in the enrolment at state universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. Regarding the use of languages: any language spoken by at least 20% of the population is also an official language in Macedonia, and it may be used in: 1. municipalities where at least 20% of the population speaks that language, 2. communication with a main office of the central government and 3. regional offices of the central government if they are located in a unit of local self-government in which at least 20 percent of the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian; 7. Expression of identity: next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local authorities will be free to place on the front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority in the municipality; The provisions of the OFA have now been fully incorporated into the Macedonian legal and political system in order to regulate the protection of (group) rights of the ethnic communities in Macedonia. A comparative analysis of the starting positions of the ethnic Albanian parties in the Ohrid negotiations with the provisions that were finally agreed upon, would reveal that agreement wasnt reached on the following proposals: Albanian as an official language on the entire territory of the country (including municipalities below the 20% threshold) Ethnic Albanian Vice-president of the Republic of Macedonia Local control of police forces (strong decentralization of the State Police)
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Second chamber of the Parliament comprised of representatives of the communities (with various proposals as to its composition.)1 The OFA established a new Committee for Inter-Community Relations, consisting of seven members each from the ranks of the Macedonians and Albanians within the Assembly, and five members from among the Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and two other communities. In the event of a dispute among members of the Assembly, regarding the application of the voting procedure specified in Art. 69(2) (the Badinter principle for laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, and use of symbols), the Committee decides by majority vote whether the procedure applies. The Albanian representatives in the Ohrid negotiations required that this committee should have an open competence to decide in any case of dispute whether the Badinter voting mechanism applies or not. This proposal was rejected. Instead, this Committee has such competence only for the laws that directly affect the areas noted in Art.69. Since the latter practice showed that the interpretation whether laws are directly or indirectly affecting Art.69, in the VMRO-DUI negotiations in May 2007 (see below) a list of 46 laws that are to be voted with the Badinter rule was agreed upon, and that list will become part of the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure. When the OFA entered parliamentary procedure, in autumn 2001, two issues came to the front as unacceptable to the ethnic Macedonian public and politicians. The first was the preamble, which in the initial proposal read: The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, taking over responsibility for the present and future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavors and struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and responsible to future generations to preserve and develop everything that is valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the common good -- the Republic of Macedonia, ... have decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia ...2 The vast majority of the ethnic Macedonian public, including intellectuals, politicians and media strongly opposed the wording of the proposed preamble, since it did not mention the Macedonian people, but only the ethnically indifferent term citizens of the Republic of Macedonia. The main argument was that ethnic Macedonians would lose their own country, the only country that recognizes them
1
Interview with Prof. Vlado Popovski, key expert in the drafting of the 1991 Constitution and the OFA in 2001. Prof. Popovski was present at the Ohrid negotiations as advisor to the President of Macedonia, Mr.Boris Trajkovski- personal interview, 22.06.2007, Skopje. Ibid., Annex A.
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as a people (especially having in mind the policies of the neighboring states). While the ethnic Albanian parties, rejected any re-negotiation, fearful of the possible implications, President Boris Trajkovski asked US-President George W. Bush to help find a new compromise. Finally, with the facilitation of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana a new Preamble was negotiated, which was eventually passed by parliament on 16 November 2001. It reads: Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as the citizens that live within its borders, who are part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serb people, Roma people, the Bosniak people, and others ... have decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign state. 3 Similar opposition as the one witnessed to the draft-preamble was voiced by the Macedonian Orthodox Church, especially regarding the new text of art. 19 of the constitution, which separates state and church and gives religious communities the right to establish schools. The draft proposal for art. 19(3) of the OFA read: The Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia, the Catholic Church, and other Religious communities and groups are separate from the state and equal before the law. The Macedonian Orthodox Church rejected the fact that it is mentioned on an equal footing with the Islamic Community, the Catholic Church and other denominations. It argued that it should be granted special status at least in Macedonia, since it was not recognized by the other Orthodox churches.4 Therefore an amendment was made with the words as well as between the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the other religious institutions, in order to make it stand out and address the concerns of the Church and an ethnic Macedonian majority of Orthodox confession. Taking into account the above mentioned, it could be concluded that the strategy of the OFA was to: Stop the violence, Preserve the unitary character of the Republic of Macedonia, Reflect the multi-ethnic character of society in public institutions (equitable representation) and public life without territorial division, Provide additional protection for five specific areas (language, culture, education, symbols and local self government) through the Badinter voting mechanism.
3 4
Framework Agreement, Annex A. 13.08.2001, http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf Ulf Brunnbauer, The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments, Center for the Study of Balkan Societies and Cultures (CSBSC), University of Graz, Austria, Issue 1/2002, p.11.
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When comparing the ideal-type classifications of civic state with guaranteed individual rights and anti-discrimination clauses, and the ethno-cultural state with group rights and ethnic quotas, the political system constructed with the OFA is leaning toward the latter category. However, Macedonia is not yet a consociational democracy, although it uses some power-sharing mechanisms, both on the formal/legalistic level, and more importantly, on the political level. The formal level being the constitutional system and legal system, the obligatory norms on power sharing stemming from the OFA. What we define as the political level however represents the unwritten traditions of inclusion of ethnic communities in central and local government and the voluntary power-sharing principles which was in place long before the OFA. These practices were common during the period of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, within Socialist Yugoslavia, as well as the period of independent Macedonia when ethnic Albanian, ethnic Turk, Vlach, Serb and Roma parties were part of governing coalitions, although the central Government could have been formed without their votes in Parliament. The Macedonian ruling elites knew that a sustainable government needed support from all ethnic communities and that support does not simply mean numbers in Parliament. This remains an unwritten political rule in Macedonia. Before analyzing the Macedonian model, a brief review of the difference between the consociational and the centripetal approach is appropriate. Both are part of the power-sharing principle as method of ethnic conflict management, which can operate on the level of the entire state or within region(s) of a state characterised by ethnic conflict. The two major normative models of conflict management are consociational theory and the centripetal model. These two approaches were later incorporated in the broader concept of power sharing (Sisk, 1996), which has become the theoretical umbrella for tackling conflict resolution in fragmented societies throughout the world.5 In the consociational approach, democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy.6 The four crucial characteristics of consociational democracy are: 1) grand coalition, 2) segmental autonomy, 3) proportionality, and 4) mutual veto (Lijphart, 1977). The central argument of consociationalism is that elite cooperation can successfully overcome the flaws of traditional decision-making by majority. Thus, elites seek to accommodate political conflicts through compromise or amicable agreement. Consociationalists argue that this can be achieved by: 1) the depoliticisation of the conflict (for example, by defining the conflict as technical [economic or legal] rather than an ideological conflict); or 2) by tacitly agreeing to
5
Carnegie Project on Complex Power-Sharing and Self-Determination, Conflict Theory: Classical Approaches, http://www.ecmi.de/cps/about_approaches.html. Ibid.
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remove it from the political agenda altogether.7 Some consociationalists argue that assigning their own sphere of influence to the elite of each group, either territorially or functionally, would be a mechanism of conflict resolution, while others fear that in such a case, segmental autonomy could become a strong incentive for secession, thereby threatening the very stability of the political system that consociationalism seeks to maintain. The scholarly literature on consociationalism distinguishes between corporate and liberal consociational power sharing, the latter now the more common policy prescription among consociationalists.8 The main difference between the two is that a corporate consociation accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, and rests on the assumption that group identities are fixed, and that groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded, while liberal consociation rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic groups, or on sub-group or trans-group identities.9 Territorial self-governance is a significant feature within the liberal consociational approach which, in this context, emphasizes that the self-governing territory should define itself from the bottom up, rather than be prescribed top-down.10 Liberal consociationalists consider arrangements in which there are more than two, and ideally even more than three, self-governing entities within a given state, as conducive to the chances of state survival. Liberal consociationalists equally support the principle of asymmetric devolution of powers, i.e., the possibility for some self-governing entities to enjoy more (or fewer) competences than others, depending on the preferences of their populations.11 The centripetalist approach developed as an alternative to consociationalism. While the latter relies on elite co-operation and guarantees to groups for protection of their interests (such as mutual or minority veto), the centripetalist approach relies
7 8
10
11
Ibid. Corporate consociationalism, however, is still evident to some extent in political practice: for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the original Dayton Accords, Northern Ireland under the 1998 Agreement, Lebanon under the National Pact and under the 1989 Taif Accord, Cyprus under the 1960 constitution and proposed (but rejected) Annan Plan display features of pre-determined arrangements based on ascriptive identities. Zoran Ilievski, Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict Regulation as Institutional Design: The Case of the Western Balkans, www.stefanwolff.com/.../Ethnic%20Conflict%20Regulation%20as%20Institutional%20Design.pdf In the context of Iraq, McGarry (2006: 6-7) explains how this process has been enshrined in the Iraqi constitution: Kirkuk can choose to join Kurdistan if its people want. Governorates in other parts of the country are permitted to amalgamate, forming regions, if there is democratic support in each governorate. In this case, a twin democratic threshold is proposed: a vote within a governorates assembly and a referendum. It is also possible for Shia dominated governorates that do not accept SCIRIs vision to remain separate, and, indeed for any governorate that may be, or may become, dominated by secularists to avoid inclusion in a sharia-ruled Shiastan or Sunnistan. Zoran Ilievski, Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict Regulation as Institutional Design: The Case of the Western Balkans, www.stefanwolff.com/.../Ethnic%20Conflict%20Regulation%20as%20Institutional%20Design.pdf
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on incentives for inter-group cooperation. Advocates of this approach consider that such incentives can be provided through electoral systems that encourage the formation of pre-election pacts among candidates or political parties across ethnic lines. The creation of pre-election coalitions between ethnic parties and, ideally, formation of larger multi-ethnic parties based on interests that transcend ethnic interests, such as regional or economic interests, is seen as desirable. The integrative approach further argues that economic interaction would help to create social cleavages that would crosscut ascriptive identities. Donald Horowitz, the most prominent advocate of the centripetalist approach, believes that conflict reduction, rather than conflict resolution, is a more practicable goal in ethnically diverse societies. While he recognizes the conflict reduction techniques of grand settlement, partition and international integration as possible solutions, he advocates for five basic mechanisms of conflict reduction: Creating proliferating points of power; Raising the saliency of intra-ethnic conflict; Creating incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation; Encouraging alignments based on interests other than ethnicity; and Reducing disparities between groups so that dissatisfaction declines. Horowitz proposes that nations should live with ethnic differences (rather than attempt to move beyond them) by engineering institutional structures and procedures based upon an understanding of how political incentives intensify or mitigate ethnic tensions. He asserts that structural techniques that change the political framework within which ethnic conflict occurs but do not necessarily make promises about outcomes, are most effective, and is sceptical about distributive policies, such as proportional allocation of government positions, which attempt to directly alter the ethnic balance of economic opportunities and rewards.12 It should be noted that the constitutional compromise in Macedonia was different from the Dayton Peace Agreement based on territorial power-sharing, since neither ethnic quotas were introduced for the composition of the highest state bodies, nor were Albanian Macedonians granted territorial autonomy in their settlement areas.13 Table 1 shows the comparative principal recommendations of both theories and the last column shows the Macedonian specifics.
12
13
Donald Horowitz, Ethnic groups in Conflict, (Updated Edition With a New Preface, University of California Press, 2000), p. 596. Josef Marko, European Integration and its Effects on Minority Protection in the Western Balkan Countries, Final Report (unpublished), Node Reserach, Austria, 2007, p. 10.
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Table 1: Main Institutional Arrangements Recommended by the Centripetal and Liberal Consociational Theories of Conflict Regulation, compared to the case of Macedonia14
Centripetalism Principal recommendation Interethnic cooperation and moderation induced by electoral system design encouraging vote pooling Liberal Consociational Power sharing Interethnic cooperation at elite level induced by institutional structure requiring jointness of executive decision making Preference for units based on self-determining communities Preference for units equal to numbers of groups Parliamentary or Collective/Rotating Presidential system Yes: guaranteed Yes: guaranteed Unitary state, with homogeneous local municipalities More units than groups Parliamentary Macedonia
State Construction
Heterogeneity vs. Preference for homogeneity of heterogeneous units federal units (if any) Number of units relative to number of groups Government system Preference for more units than groups Presidential
Executive power sharing The Institutions of Government Legislative power sharing
Yes: voluntary Yes: voluntary
Yes: voluntary Yes: guaranteed with a specific scope, double majority required Closed PR-List Independent Yes Individual and group rights guaranteed in constitution Yes
Electoral system (for parliament) Judicial branch Legal entrenchment
Plurality preferential /vote pooling Independent Yes
PR-List or PR preferential Independent and representative Yes Emphasis on combination of individual and group rights Yes, but as private and public matter
Rights and Identities
Individual vs. group Emphasis on rights individual rights
Recognition of distinct identities
Yes, but primarily as private matter
14
Zoran Ilievski, Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Conflict Regulation as Institutional Design: The Case of the Western Balkans, www.stefanwolff.com/.../Ethnic%20Conflict%20Regulation%20as%20Institutional%20Design.pdf
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Within this chapter, the case of Macedonia will be analyzed, first applying the civic/ethno-cultural dichotomy to both to the legal and political levels. Then, the consociational/centripetalist dichotomy will be similarly applied and analysed. An examination of the terminology used in the present constitution of Macedonia shows the results of complex negotiations that have produced a hybrid model. In the preamble, we have citizens of the republic, which are made of the Macedonian people and the citizens that live within its borders, who are part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serb people, Roma people, the Bosniak people, and others. This complex formulation was incorporated to avoid usage of the terms national minorities or nationalities.15 Then, in the ensuing normative part of the constitution, all ethnic groups are called communities. On the formal-legal level important civic state elements do exist. There is no strict ethnic veto system in place, but rather the double majority described above. The double majority principle does not apply to one of the most important elements of the political system, the election of the government and the president of the republic. However, although there are no legal provisions that require the obligatory inclusion of ethnic minorities in the government or in the process of election of the president of the republic, the political culture of the country, from its initial independence, has developed such that there have always been governing coalition members from the ranks of the ethnic minorities. Furthermore, presidents of the republic have always searched for support from the ethnic Albanian community, since their votes are crucial for presidential elections. Therefore, the theoretical and institutional solution, the settlement cocktail could be identified as: Consociational power sharing principle in: The minority sensitive areas where the Badinter majority is required (described in Chapter II.). With regards for equitable representation in the public administration and several public offices. Ongoing demands for guaranteed seats in Parliament for ethnic communities which are less than 20% of the total population. Centripetalist power sharing principle: Proliferating points of power through the decentralization process. The points of conflict multiply, but conflict intensity is reduced.
15
In the constitutional tradition of former Yugoslavia, this term was used precisely for citizens that live within the borders of the country, but have another kin state, whereas the term ethnic groups was used for the ones without a kin state.
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Incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation- if pre-election coalitions accros ethnic lines are to be introduced, the parties from both sides of the main ethnic divide will have to take into account the political agenda and the electorate of their traditional coalition partners in the other ethnic block. They could be formed either with joint list or separate lists, but with a public pre-election coalition agreement signed by the parties. Centripetalists argue for a AV system, but at present, this seems far fetched for Macedonia. The previous factor could then strengthen alignments based on interests other than ethnicity. The first and most difficult step would be the icebreaker, the first one to make a pre-electoral ethnic Macedonian- ethnic Albanian coalition and secure a better result than the competitors. The obstacle to this would be the principle of ethnic outbidding, i.e the greater the radicalism, the greater the win, a principle which could be seen as paying off for the parties on the short term, but it carries an immanent centrifugal tendency and it is a threat for an ethnically divided society.
Conclusion
Between 1991 and the OFA in 2001, at the level of legal institutional architecture, Macedonia was inspired by the model of the civic state. However, through a mix of multi-ethnic coalitions and cooperation, as well as isolated outbursts of violence (until 2001), the political process moved the country toward ethnic powersharing arrangements. After the armed conflict of 2001, some of those practices and arrangements were raised to the legal level, such as the double majority for minority sensitive areas related to culture, education, use of languages, symbols and local self-government, while other power-sharing mechanisms were left to political practice and political precedents, as they were before. The analysis of the case of Macedonia, using the civic/ethno-cultural dichotomy and the consociational/ centripetalist dichotomy, applied to both legal and political levels, has shown the specifics and the institutional mix that have made the OFA a success story. Essentially those specifics are the flexibility of the system, its openendedness and the absence of direct veto powers of ethnic groups. They are based on positive practices and a tradition of voluntary power-sharing from of the past, but also stem from the demographic composition of the state. The latter makes it questionable whether the case of Macedonia could be justifiably compared to the Bosnian case, or the case of Kosovo. To achieve sustainable ethno-political progress in Macedonia, what is needed now is political trust-building across the ethnic lines, at the level of the political
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elites. A first step in this direction would be pre-electoral coalition formation across the ethnic Macedonian-ethnic Albanian line. Further steps could be taken in the direction of altering the election system towards a preferential model suited for Macedonia. Indeed, elite level changes could only get to a certain distance. Shifting away from the predominance of ethnically defined interests to other areas such as ideology, economic policies or social policies will enable a stable and sustainable development for all. In addition, Macedonia needs to strengthen the functioning and efficiency of the rule of law, as a value that contributes to inter-ethnic peace and justice and as a prerequisite for the much-needed economic development. Nevertheless, the largest challenge to the prosperity and development of Macedonia and all of its citizens remains it Euro-Atlantic integration, and the blockade imposed by Macedonias southern neighbor. It carries certain consequences on the inter-ethnic scene in the country, and it touches upon the most emotional issue of our present times- that of individual and collective identity and its demand for recognition. However, this requires an entire new study.
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323.1(497.7)2001 327.5.008.1/.2(497.7)2001
The Ohrid Process: A Long-lasting Challenge

Petar ATANASOV
In the beginning of 2001, the Republic of Macedonia, from an international relations aspect, was not such an interesting country. It was one of the successors of Former Yugoslavia and a state that managed to stay outside crises that had spillover effect from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and finally to Kosovo. It seemed that the nationalisms represented by some federal republics had devastating influence and sprinkled ethnic conflicts all over the former federation except for Macedonia. When the Kosovo conflict was resolved in 1999, everybody thought that the Macedonian state will progress as soon as the state leaders manage to fulfill the criteria asked from Brussels and Washington. Macedonia was a country that had moderate approach towards the minorities, in theory more known as socio-cultural model unitary in public, diverse in private. The state has recognized most of its smaller communities and consequently had pursued many elements from this socio-cultural approach in its realistic forms. Not perfect but much more than other countries from our surrounding. On the political agenda Albanians were the only ones who were in the position to appoint ministers and other officials in the Government cabinets and state bodies. Of course, the power of these appointees had limited influence. Generally, Macedonia was perceived as a state that fulfils minority rights and was a positive example in the region. But suddenly (many of the colleagues from abroad were asking why we did not inform them beforehand), as early as February 2001, some events on the Macedonian-Kosovo border, showed that the Albanian guerilla had no plans to disarm its paramilitary that confronted the Serbian security forces. The spill-over effect was about to be confirmed as the last in a row. Exactly on the areas nearby the border, where the Kosovo immigrants live, on the Macedonian side, occasional clashes between Macedonian security forces and Albanian guerilla occurred. The rebels were consisted of Kosovo paramilitary, strengthened with the Albanians from Macedonia at first instance the exact ratio was never confirmed. It must be stressed
Dr. Petar Atanasov, Professor of Sociology and Communications, University Ss Cyril and Methodius Skopje.
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Petar Atanasov
that many Albanians from Macedonia that joined the rebel forces, ideologically are and were close to Kosovo politics and were involved in Kosovo clashes, too. How many, it was never confirmed. The whole conflict lasted couple of months and when some of the rebels reached physically the settlement of Arachinovo, nearby Skopje, the international community insisted on negotiation and peace solution in order to stop the conflict from becoming a bloody civil war and second Bosnia. Finally, with full support from USA and the EU, the agreement was reached on 13 August and the conflict was over and the solution was politically canalized. The Framework Agreement, more known as the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was implemented through complex processes that had couple of phases. As long as the arm problems were resolved and the 16 Amendments were enacted to the Constitution that should allow implementation of the most important elements of the agreement, the conflict was under control and the Republic of Macedonia went into the normal politics. So, looking from todays point of view, it is interesting to elaborate what were the main achievements and under achievements following the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement?
1. What was achieved?

The first important goal was that the OFA did succeed to stop the escalation of the ethnic conflict (many refuse to label it as an ethnic or even a conflict), or whatever it was, and opened the possibilities for bigger and better integration of the smaller ethnic communities into the mainstream of the society. Understandingly, the Albanians used it the most. Majority of Macedonians were not enthusiastic and did not freely embrace the Agreements provisions. It seemed that many concessions were overriding the unitary and national concept of the state that was already established. Albanians were satisfied but it was not the fulfillment of their more radical demands that were publicly announced in the first days of the conflict. It was a loose-win situation for both. Second, the Albanians as a community strengthened their position in the socio-political structures within the state on higher level. In many areas, as the OFA elaborated, Albanians were now armed with political means to proceed and fulfill their legitimate demands and needs as well. These processes were sometimes intertwined with more tensions sometimes went more smoothly, but they became an integral part of our political brand. It is functioning, it gets slow occasionally but it reaches the goal that was envisioned. Mostly in the areas of culture, identity, language, education, decentralization, political representation, personal documents and the more complex one as the Badinter majority mechanisms. The frustrations were more present in the issues such as the Law on territorial division of the municipalities, official usage of the Albanian language as the second language and
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the state symbols that represent only one community. Anyhow, new possibilities for institutional discrimination towards Albanians and other communities were significantly decreased. Third, the door towards the full integration of Macedonia in NATO and in the EU was widely open. With the Ohrid Agreement provisions Macedonia was classified among the states that have full-fledged democratic solutions concerning smaller communities which is not the case in many Balkan states and EU members. This was realized through the political transformation of the former rebels into political party which became an election winner in 2002 on Albanian side and together with the Social-Democratic Alliance formed a Government. The Coalition government managed to stabilize Macedonia very fast and begun a long-run with the EU requirements. The crown of this process was a candidate status that Macedonia earned in December 2005. That meant goodbye Macedonia 19912001 and welcome Macedonia 2001-2005. The former rebels (now Democratic Union for Integration, led by the same leader) proved that can be good Coalition partner also with the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE in 2008-2010. Still, in 2011 we have not yet started the negotiation process because of the objections of Greece and the name issue.
2. What was not achieved?

The first, basic acute problem between Macedonians and Albanians is the problem with the lack of confidence and the mistrust between the two ethnic communities, that not even the Ohrid Agreement resolved. Macedonians are prone to thinking that Albanians got more than they deserve as minority and that their final goal is the creation of Greater Albania. Albanians think that they are not equal as the Macedonians and that the Macedonians are to blame for their economic situation. Neither are the Albanians classical minority because of their size and number, nor are the Macedonians angels towards Albanians as smaller community. What could help for the sake of both is the equality of opportunities and open communication that should be strategic goals in this context. Open communication means higher political culture that shed more light on procedures and implementation of the legal provisions regarding overall citizens status. More important, through the educational process an individual approach (individualization) should be supported and build upon, which then would sustain liberal and democratic values in the society. The collectivistic approach does not sustain liberal values but it enhances paternalistic and obedient relations. The ethnic knots theory (Macedonians and Albanians answer completely different on important questions for the country) explains the difficulties in communications and the obstacles to build common civic public sphere and civic culture without using the ethnic lenses. Equality of
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Petar Atanasov
opportunity is also a principle to fulfill if you dont want to loose loyalty of the members of the citizens from different social groups. The Ohrid Agreement aim at this ideal but it will take much more efforts and policies to reach this goal. The second major non-achievement is the failure to produce necessary common values and common vision that should bind together both ethnic communities within the society. This should have been one of the achievements of the Framework Agreement and maybe its cornerstone. For instance, the vocabulary of Albanian ethnic community leaders is totally ignorant of the others. They speak only of their ethnic dreams. On the other side, the Macedonians generally speak of Macedonian nation and national state i.e. the Macedonian nation-state. Albanians are too often trying to remind their own ethnic members that the battle for the new political arrangements is under way and is one of their political goals. Neither all leaders of the Macedonians are drowned into national ideology, nor are all the Albanians against greater social integration of their fellow citizens within Macedonian state. Main obstacles for better communication of two communities are the language and the religion. Even bigger states than our own cannot always produce quality solutions for social integration. Ethnic identification as a process is on the rise. Albanians, but Turks also, are identifying themselves first of all as ethnic groups. The citizens besides their ethnic identification, as their second choice, are relying on their religious belonging. Intermarriages across religious lines are rarities. In one word, the politicization of ethnicity is a good business and it is not likely to disappear. The only solution is building a true multicultural society but with no violations of existing political order and social fabric. This goal requires honest dedication of the partners and participants. It does not always require changes in the political structures but mainly interventions in the civil sector, media, culture and education. This does not require a huge amount of finances too. The third problem is connected with the democratic processes that should eventually decrease various divisions in the state, something that is necessary for the social cohesion in any liberal society. The Agreement did not breed higher level of political unity among main political factors. Political, economic, cultural and social processes too often suffer from internal divisions within the society. As more divisions are emphasized, the bigger energy is needed that should overcome the problems. Macedonia is full of divisions: ethnic divide, digital divide, urban/rural divide, rich/poor divide, gender divide, and most recently the rude political divide was added which is used to disqualify your political competitor. The divisions that are irreconcilable can be analytically thought of as vertical and horizontal stratification. From the vertical divisions, the most visible is the ideological one, namely, the partization of the state institutions (massive employment of the party members). That is the inner struggle for the redistribution of the power among the groups that compete for the political power. Because the conditions are deteriorating, the
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system produces less but more rich people and more poor people with less resource. The conflict (animosity) between the right and the left wing parties weakens the state from inside because a lot of negative energy is present between political competitors. The most obvious horizontal division is the ethnic divide, but for that we spoke earlier. Ethnicity and nationalism are powerful tools for exclusionary policies, especially in developing democracies. Macedonia as a small state should learn that the best domestic policy towards cultural diversity is democracy and the best foreign policy is good wrapped nationalism, not the other way around.
3. What is the model?

Multiculturalism in Macedonia prescribed in the Ohrid Agreement is trying to be normative. It is also institutionalized. There is no other way towards prosperity than through respect and obedience to the provisions of the Constitution and the Laws regarding the Macedonian multicultural model. Todays model that is already in practice, also, resembles the theory of integrated multiculturalism. It means that the ethno-cultural and the socioeconomic aspects have to be resolved together and holistically. The cultural aspects must be linked to the economic sphere. They cannot be decoupled. It means that it is not enough to recognize some cultural group or different identities, you must support them financially in all aspects of their living. But there is a danger that more and more cultural groups will apply for such a status. And it is the case. This status provides that ethnicity pays off. If you are a member of a vibrant and politically active ethnic minority, you would have greater chances to find a proper job, to get more resources for development and to be part of a government coalition which can provide some of your major activists with many privileges. One of the characteristics of our model is surely the presence of ethnic pragmatism and much less multicultural richness. Multiculturalism as a theory is kind of political philosophy that should find more space for different cultures. On the contrary, the ethnicity is an instrumental principle and the struggle for more for us than them and something that sell exclusionary politics. The multiculturalism as a project must be strongly supported by the state and should be implemented through many policies and projects. Multiculturalism as a strategy is a state business. Not even the biggest group alone can produce it and nourish it. But multiculturalism in its essence is an integrative and inclusive practice. Elements of our multicultural model can be implanted in any of the Balkan states as examples of integrative policy towards ethnic and cultural minorities. Their implementation is also a matter of state will to do more in this direction. But the European states are egoistic and national by definition, no matter where they are from, west or east. Another characteristic of our model is the policy of final internal separation. This is the way of creation of ethnic spaces and parallel life ethnic municipalities,
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Petar Atanasov
exclusive languages of education, etc. Multiculturalism as a model requires public sphere and equal participation of different cultural groups. The groups should freely use their cultural arsenal especially language and other cultural markers. In the public sphere there should be communication strategy that shows to members of different cultures how much they are respected and appreciated in the society. The closest to this is the statement that multiculturalism is richness for the state. Civil sector can make up some of the gaps but cannot substitute the whole public sphere. Even for the economy it is sometimes difficult to overcome cultural barriers but somehow there are good examples of it. Cross-cultural projects should be encouraged and implemented. In Macedonia there are not enough activities in this direction. Anyway, the model of Switzerland and Belgium are regional multicultural models (more in multinational sense) where everything is separated and everybody lives happily in their cultural spaces cantons, municipalities, cities, schools, etc. What is the goal of the Macedonian model, the integrative or the exclusive one? This is the missing point by the international community when they intervene in our political and cultural management. Now, it seems that we are approaching the Belgium model (Macedonians would prefer the Canadian one), that is probably direct outcome of the Ohrid Agreement. We cannot value which model is better. But, the first paradigm it opens toward multiculturalism and the second one it is closing it down. Not being member of NATO and the EU thus far creates more spaces for some new and some old ideas backed up from the nationalist campuses on both sides the political mainstream is clear and the smaller communities have no political weight to impose ideas for changes in the model. Macedonian nationalists still speak of Macedonian state (nation-state), Macedonian nation (in which you can be accommodated as Macedonian citizen and enjoy your cultural rights) and Macedonian soil and deep-rooted ethno genesis. The Albanians speak of autochthonous Albanian lands, about federalization of Macedonia, new Ohrid Agreement, changes in the state symbols, and implementation of full consociation democracy as it was define in theory (Badinter double majority voting for every Law, which means ethnic veto for any decision, not just for certain areas and questions). Each political agenda is a legitimate one but not everyone is a realistic. Even worse, some nationalist ideas can simply harm the fragile Macedonian multicultural model in progress and not enhance it like some of the proponents of these ideas promise.
4. What are the lessons learnt?

The model that we have seen in the last 10 years is functional but also strokes up tensions when the two ethnic blocs (mostly Macedonians and Albanians) are
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confronted in the ethnic argument dialogue on any level, in the school courtyards, in the squares where new monuments are erected, in the strategy for the integrated education, in delivering of official positions after and between elections, in separated public discussions, and in many more occasions. The encounters are mostly verbal but sometimes physical violence occurs between children. Not that the crosscultural events do not happened or that there are no intercultural happenings at all. It is simple not enough for building it into a model. Macedonia as a cultural context has no problem with diversities. People here on the Balkans are used to have neighbor of different cultural material. Cultures here have co-existed for centuries. Nevertheless, it is strange to ask Macedonia to build functional multiethnic democracy when at the same time our neighbors are strengthening their nation-states, when the borders are made according to the ethnic composition of the population, when two of our neighbors blatantly negate and attack our identity, language origin and our cultural heritage. At the same time Bosnia, as the only multicultural state in surrounding, is facing bleak future and the European giants as Germany, France and Britain are claiming that multiculturalism in their countries is dead. Moreover, we can add many other big and small pieces that reflex the ambiguities of multicultural theories that do not offer stable categories and insights. As a conclusion one can stand for multicultural ideals in the Framework Agreement but one cannot support ethnicization of the state. The Ohrid Agreement stopped the war but also created ethnic divide and parallelism in the society and the education process. Macedonian from one became two, and can soon become more. Multiculturalism is about plurality but to a certain limit. The best support role in the Macedonian model can play if we create more democracy and less ethnicity. And the analysis will always be unclear if you ask different questions and the answers depend on who the respondents are Macedonians or Albanians. The model will be fully implemented when the answers do not differ. And it will take a while for this to happen. Still, the Ohrid Framework Agreement did well for Macedonia and it is more like guidance than final status. And it is still a challenge because the political power re-balancing is always far more heavy demand than cultural issues. At the end I would like to add one important suggestion. The reconciliation in Macedonia never happened among the communities and ordinary people, not just among political actors. We all went straightforward silently. But it would help and relax current and the future political partners. It is never too late for justice, on both sides. And better late than never.
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327.5.008.1/.2(6-13) 327.56(6-13)
Democracy as a Peace-Building Tool Case Study: South Africa

Edvard MITEVSKI Abstract:
The key questions that this paper addresses are Has democracy as a tool for post-conflict peace-building worked in the case of South Africa, and, if so, what factors account for this success? The paper represents a critical analysis that aims to examine whether democracy could serve as a tool for peace-building. It provides answers to these central questions by discussing whether democracy as a peacebuilding tool is successful in the case of South Africa. In order to focus solely on democracy as a peace-building mechanism, I distinguish and discuss democracy separately from the other important pillar of liberal peace: the market economy. Democracy is a political system of governance, which often goes hand in hand, but it is not necessarily dependant/related to economic marketization. Thus, within this paper I look only at this particular element of the liberal peace theory and examine its contribution to negative and positive peace.
Edvard Mitevski holds an M.A. in International Peace Studies from University of Notre Dame, USA and M.A. in European Studies from Karl Franzens University of Graz, Austria. He spent six months at the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) based in Cape Town, South Africa doing research on the subject matter and other related topics. He is a member of the Editorial Board of Crossroads, Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal. The core of this article has been completed by mid 2010.
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Edvard Mitevski
1. Introduction
Some say that (the liberation of the oppressed and the oppressor) has now been achieved. But I know that that is not the case. The truth is that we are not yet free: we have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed. We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not merely to cast off ones chains, but to live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others. 1 Nelson Mandela (Long Walk to Freedom). Todays South Africa experiences a different reality. In 1994, freedom replaced oppression, while democracy replaced exclusion and separateness. From the inauguration of apartheid in 1948 until the introduction of democracy in 1994, South Africas all-White regime institutionalized and enforced race-based exclusionary mechanisms and policies towards the people of color. The schemes of grand and petty apartheid were developed to exclude, divide and rule over the countrys overwhelming majority. These schemes manipulated democracy and denied fundamental human civil and political rights and freedoms of Blacks and Coloureds.2 Members of these communities were underrepresented and disadvantaged vis--vis the countrys White minority. The people of color3 rebelled against apartheids exclusionary policies as they were denied institutional mechanisms to express their grievances and claim their needs. Such rebellions included nonviolent, as well as violent, outbursts against the regime. This era of violence in South Africa resulted in thousands of deaths, millions of dislocated people and countless imprisonments. Peace came in South Africa in 1991 when the warring parties signed the National Peace Accord. There was a wide consensus between the signatories that future South Africa should be built upon the foundations of democracy. The establishment of democracy in South Africa coincided with the international peace-building efforts in establishing democracies in war-shattered societies. This tendency, which emerged in the early 1990s, frames democracy as an important element of peace-building. Bloomfield reaffirms this thesis by concluding that:
1 2
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela (Back Bay Books, 1995), 751. The 1950 Population Registration Act No.30 divides South African population in three racial groups: White, Black, and Coloured, (the last racial group encompasses subgroups such as, Indians, Cape Coloured, etc.) For more information visit: Nelson Mandela Foundation, The Heart of Hope: South Africas Transition from Apartheid to Democracy, Nelson Mandela Foundations Centre of Memory and Dialogue, http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv0 1829/06lv01838.htm Within the paper I use the term people of color, referring to all people who are not White. I decided to use this term because it carries positive and non-discriminatory connotation. For more information see: William Safire, On Language; People of Color, New York Times, November 20, 1988.
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[i]n what are nowadays termed post-conflict societies, the pattern is generally that the warring sides negotiate a settlement in the form of new structures for governance. Almost always, these structures are democratic.4 The new democratic society aims to repair the shortcomings of the former system that caused havoc and mass violence. Democracy in the South African context refers to the restoration of peoples human and political rights and freedoms denied by apartheid, as well as the establishment of representative political structures and inclusive nonracial institutions that promote peace and prevent conflict recurrence. After dismantling apartheid, South Africa managed to avoid another trap on its way to peace and stability. It successfully transitioned through the phase of democratization, which, as the paper subsequently suggests, dissolves many countries into mass violence. Today, the country is in the process of democratic consolidation and it is in the midst of its second decade of freedom and absence of direct political and race-based violence. Thus, South Africa represents a pertinent case study through which I will analyze democracys ability to promote peace and stability in conflict-shattered societies. The key questions that this paper addresses are: Has democracy as a tool for post-conflict peace-building worked in the case of South Africa, and, if so, what factors account for this success? The paper represents a critical analysis that aims to examine whether democracy could serve as a tool for peace-building. It provides answers to these central questions by discussing whether democracy as a peace-building tool is successful in the case of South Africa. The paper is divided into two broader sections. Within the first one, I present the idea of democracy as a framework for peace-building and I provide an overview of peace studies literature concerning democracys utility as a tool for peacebuilding. This section reveals the positive and negative aspects of democracy as a peace-building mechanism. Concurrently, it aims to explore democracys capacity to promote negative and positive peace. In the second section, I present and examine South Africa as a democratic peace-building case study. Initially, I discuss the historical context of apartheid and explore the factors that led to open violence. Then, I analyze the democratic peace-building pattern employed in post-apartheid South Africa. I look specifically at the importance of free and fair elections as facilitators of the peaceful transfer of power and a channel for political rather than violent interplay between former adversaries. At the same time, I look at the significance of strong representative institutions, which provide an outlet for expression of peoples grievances and articulation of their interests. I also reflect on the concept of checks and balances,
4
David Bloomfield, Reconciliation: An Introduction, in Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook, ed. David Bloomfield, Theresa Barnes and Luc Huyse (Stockholm: International Idea, 2003), 11.
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Edvard Mitevski
and the role of free media and vibrant civil society in this process. Finally, I present this studys findings and conclusions. Despite some constraints that may emerge, this paper summarizes and contributes to the ongoing debate on democracy as a peace-building mechanism and provides further understanding of the dynamics of democracy in post-apartheid South Africa.
2. Democracy as a Peace-building Tool: Peace Literature Review

The last decade of the 20th century featured the signing of numerous peace agreements and is seen as a decade of peace agreements.5 The real challenge coming from the formalization of these agreements is the prevention of their failure, which can lead to restoration of violence. Preventing conflict recurrence and securing durable peace are at the forefront of the concept of peace-building. In his seminal work, An Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali suggests that peace-building aims at: [...] rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war.6 Todays peace-building patterns envisage establishment of democratic models of governance as a source of peace and coexistence. The raison dtre behind this trend is rooted in the Kantian reasoning that, [] republican (democratic) states are more inclined toward peace than despotic ones7 Democracy has the capacity to prevent both intraand inter-state wars. Michael Doyle reinforces this claim asserting that, [g]lobally, overall and on average, every step toward more democracy within countries reduces the chances of both international and civil war.8 This understanding mirrors the very close link between democracy and peace-building. Boutros Bourtos Ghalis successor Kofi Annan adds weight to the interrelatedness between these notions. Democracy, Annan observes, [] or a lack thereofis central to the root causes of many of todays violent conflicts, the majority of which are internal. Democratization is central to a
5 6
Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2004), 323. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping Document A/47/277 - S/241111, 17 June 1992 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations). Pauline Kleingeld and David L. Colclasure, introduction to Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History (Rethinking the Western Tradition) by Immanuel Kant, ed. Pauline Kleingeld and David L. Colclasure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), xvi. Michael Doyle, Democratic Liberalization (paper presented at Global Governance Agenda Council of the World Economic Forum, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 7-9, 2008): 2.
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state-building and peace-building exercise if peace is to become sustainable and post-conflict reconstruction and development is to succeed.9 This latter remark speaks of the significance that democracy has as a peacebuilding tool. Today, democracys role as facilitator of disputes and promoter of peace is integrated into almost all contemporary macro peace-building strategies, as it provides podium for debate and constructive dialogue, promotes culture of understanding and tolerance, and creates institutions and structures for dispute management. Democracys capacity to mitigate conflicts and build peace is supported by a substantive body of literature. The bulk of contemporary peace studies scholarship support is clearly supportive of the thesis that democracy promotes peace and stability in societies emerging from violent conflict. Many peace scholars (Serwer and Thomson, 2007, Mansfield and Snyder, 2007, Ottaway, 2007, etc) promote the thesis that democracy helps societies recover from civil war and concurrently establishes the foundations for durable and sustainable peace. The same authors, however, have written about democracy as a possible generator of instability and cause of violence. Their criticisms mostly refer to the transitional phase of democracy, or democratization, which is the crucial challenge of democracy as a tool for peace-building. Boutros Boutros-Ghalli clearly differentiates between democracy and democratization. Democracy, he writes, [] is a system of government which embodies, in a variety of institutions and mechanisms, the ideal of political power based on the will of the people, [while] [d]emocratization is a process which leads to a more open, more participatory, less authoritarian society.10 In addition, Mansfield and Snyder identify two stages of the democratization process: [] the transition from autocracy to a partially democratic regime-which [they] refer to as incomplete democratization-and the shift to a fully institutionalized democracy-which [they] refer to as complete democratization.11 Ottaway offers similar distinction between democratization and democracy. Democratization, she writes is: [] the often conflictual, messy process of transformation from an authoritarian to a democratic system-and democracy-the stable political system
9
10 11
U.N General Assembly, 55th Session. Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies: Report of the Secretary-General (A/55/489). 13 October 2000: sec. 30. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (New York: United Nations, 1996), 1. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Turbulent Transitions: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War? in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 163.
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Edvard Mitevski
that is the end point of successful democratization-are not the same thing.12 Thus, democratization is the means to the end of complete or substantive democracy. As such, the process of democratization entails the plethora of processes on the road from authoritarianism to a substantive democratic regime. Peace studies literature contains numerous theoretical groundings of substantive democracy as an instrument for post-war stabilization and consolidation. Serwer and Thomson, for example, observe democracy as an end-state, to which all wartorn societies should aspire.13 However, extensive critique of substantive democracy is lacking. The bulk of academic criticism focuses on democracys transitional phasedemocratization rather than critique of democracyas a peace-building mechanism. In the sections bellow, I present and examine some of the theoretical arguments in support of the thesis of democracy as a peace-building tool. In addition, I offer the critique related to the process of democratization as a possible source of violence.
2.1. Democracy as a Source of Peace

The bulk of peace studies literature that addresses the correlation between democracy and peace-building tends not to separate democracy from the other important component of liberal peace-building: a market economy. However, there are some scholars who do analyze democracy as an independent entity and support the thesis that democracy produces peace after a violent conflict (See: Ottaway 2007, Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2007). Generally, the academia claims that democracy promotes peace after war. The majority of these claims reflect Ottaways broader definition of democracy as a [] political system able to heal the rifts of divided society and help countries settle after a civil war.14 Roland Paris labels this broad understanding of democracy and peace-building as Wilsonianism, based on Woodrow Wilsons reasoning of democracy as an avenue for peace.15 Democracy, [Woodrow Wilson wrote], promotes the ascendancy of reason over passion and promises the supreme and peaceful rule of counsel, or rational
12
13
14 15
Marina Ottaway, Is Democracy the Answer? in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 604. Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson, A Framework for Success: International Intervention in Societies Emerging for Conflict, in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 377-379. Ottaway 2007, 603. Roland Paris, At Wars End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 6.
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debate, which is a recipe for peace and progress in political life.16 The notion of democracy promotion, which utilizes this rationale for democracy, has become particularly compelling in peace academia since the end of the Cold War. It calls for the establishment of stable democracies that will prevent the reappearance of violence and nurtures various mechanisms and tools for political cohabitation between the former adversaries. Specifically, Serwer and Thomson underline the importance of democratic, free and fair elections, because, [e]ventually power, which during war comes from a barrel of a gun, needs to come from a ballot box.17 Democratic elections are not only expressions of citizens will, but also an avenue for political representation. The inability of underrepresented groups to express their grievances and claim their needs through legitimate political channels is one of the key deficiencies of authoritarian regimes. Societies that deny political participation and exclude particular groups amplify the probability of armed struggle. Oppressed groups in such societies are seeking alternative avenues to express their grievances. Armed struggle often emerges as a possible option. South Africa is a typical example of this claim. In his book Why Race Matters in South Africa, McDonald suggests that the inability of Blacks to engage politically inspired them to mobilize,18 and subsequently engage in violence. Democracy provides the necessary space for expression of citizens grievances, and, at the same time, enables a channel for articulation of their interests. Walter vindicates this claim when she utters, [o]ffering citizens a real outlet for their concerns and having a government that is open to democratic change considerably reduces the likelihood of a civil war.19 In addition, Benson and Kuglers study asserts that democratic societies in possession of inclusive and competitive institutions reduce the likelihood of violent unrest,20 and conclude that democratic and [p] olitically efficient governments are much more likely to avert internal challenges.21 Bloomfield adds additional weight to Benson and Kuglers claim, and concludes that democracy represents a [] system for managing difference without recourse to violence.22 In this way, democracy does not exclude certain groups
16
17 18 19
20
21 22
Woodrow Wilson, The Modern Democratic State, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Volume 5: 18851888, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), quoted in (Paris 2004, 6-7) Serwer and Thomson 2007, 377. Michael McDonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 60. Barbara F. Walter, Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War, Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 385. Michelle Benson and Jacek Kugler, Power Parity, Democracy and the Severity of Internal Violence, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 2 (1998): 196. Benson and Kugler 1998, 206. David Bloomfield, Reconciliation: An Introduction, in Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook, ed. David Bloomfield, Theresa Barnes and Luc Huyse (Stockholm: International Idea, 2003), 10.
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and simply mask existing differences, but instead offers mechanisms to identify and manage discrepancies without relapsing to violent unrest.23 This goes hand in hand with Duhrendorf s reasoning of democracy as a government by conflict.24 Democracy represents, [a] political system that recognizes there can never be unanimity of interests and views in a society and therefore creates mechanisms to institutionalize conflict and manage it.25 It provides an open space for expression of dissatisfaction. In addition, it brings such discontent within the realm of political inter-play, and thus prevents violent outcome. Given its capacity to alleviate discord and the existence of dispute resolution tools (institutions, rules and procedures), democracy manages to balance between the different citizens interests, which avert socio-political havoc. The strongest empirical vindication of democracy as a source for peace thesis comes from a comprehensive empirical study done by Hegre, Ellingsen and Gleditsch on the relationship between democracy and civil war, which confirms that stable democracies are the type of regime least prone to violence.26 Bearing in mind all these academic claims in support of democracy as a peace-building tool, I would say that the existing peace studies scholarship contains sufficient theoretical arguments to support the thesis that democracy produces peace. However, there are particular conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to make democracy peace-enhancing. Successful democratization process is the most important one. Democracy as a final outcome is simply unattainable without the completion of democratization as a process leading to substantive democracy. This process is very complex and difficult, and thus may prevent the establishment of substantive democratic governance and produce hostilities and havoc.
2.2. Democracy as a Generator of Conflict

Despite this seemingly widespread support, democracy has an ambivalent reputation. Doyle, while one of the biggest proponents of the democratic peace theory, also articulates reservations. Democracy, he says, [] is a vital source of transformation with enormous upside and downside potential.27 However, this negative potential generally refers not to substantive democracy itself, but to the
23 24
25 26
27
Bloomfield 2003, 10. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 147, quoted in Marina Ottaway 2007, 604. Ottaway 2007, 604. Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Towards a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992 American Political Science Review 95, no.1 (2001): 33-48. Doyle 2008, 3.
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process of democratization as a potential generator of violence. Thus, peace studies literature does not tend to criticize complete democracy as a generator of instability and conflict. Supporters of democracy as a source for peace claim that complete and substantive democracies are the least prone to civil strife,28 while unfinished democratization associated by evolving countries weak institutions increases the likelihood of war.29 Therefore, the peace studies critique focuses on the process of rocky transition that leads to complete democracy. One can understand such tendencies because autocracies cannot develop into consolidated democracies immediately. Mansfield and Snyder, in their article Prone to Violence: the Paradox of the Democratic Peace, assert, [] the beginning phase of democratization in unsettled circumstances has often spurred a rise in militant nationalism.30 In the initial stage, democratizing countries, [] usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way.31 Hegre, Ellingsen and Gleditschs study further underpins this stance concluding that political transition erodes state institutions and enhances the threat of civil strife.32 Ottaway opposes immediate democratization, claiming that, [d]emocracy can be developed only in well-established states, capable of exercising authority over their entire territory.33 Ward and Gleditschs findings, in addition, also imply that swift evolution to democracy augments the probability of war.34 Therefore, some scholars (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007, Serwer and Thomson, 2007, etc) suggest avoiding early elections and further argue that certain preconditions should precede the establishment of democracy, such as the establishment of solid institutions.35 Ottaway justifies this thesis confirming that powerful and stable institutions can protect minority groups from majoritariansm, a process that may put minority groups in a feeble position and expose them to rigid discrimination.36 Such state of affairs can perpetuate and even flare up the conflict. Electoral contests in fragile democracies with weak institutions increase the likelihood of strife.37 Polarized elections in Uganda, Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, etc,
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31 32 33 34
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Hegre, Ellingsen and Gleditsch 2001, 33. Mansfield and Snyder 2007, 166. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic Peace, The National Interest, no. 82 (2005/2006): 39. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and War, Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (1995): 79. Hegre, Ellingsen and Gleditsch 2001, 33. Ottaway 2007, 603. Michael D. Ward and Kristian S. Gleditsch, Democratizing for Peace, The American Political Science Review 92, no.1 (1998): 51-61. Mansfield and Snyder 2007, 161-62. Ottaway 2007, 604-605. Mansfield and Snyder 2007, 162.
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prevented establishment of democracy and incited mass violence.38 Serwer and Thomson are also against forcing early elections. They validate their argument by saying that, [] early national elections in a highly polarized society often empower hard-liners and criminals, who may quickly institutionalize politics as a zero-sum game.39 Gurr also brings the attention to the zero-sum game as a threat to democracy as a peace-building tool.40 Zero-sum games produce a situation of winners and losers. The win-lose effect creates group sectarianism and their political isolation, which may lead to violence. All these arguments correspond with Mansfield and Thomsons hypothesis that democratization is a steady process before an immediate change.41 The concept of democratization, itself, is a lengthy process, which cannot be accomplished instantly or simply exported from abroad. The establishment and practicing of democracy requires societys predisposition, fulfillment of certain prerequisites (adequate socio-economic, political and cultural developments) and preexistence of mechanisms, such as institutions, etc. Boutros Boutros Ghalis Agenda for Democratization suggests that, [...] democratization must have indigenous support if it is to take root within a society.42 Thus, democracy should develop as a bottom-up project, something that Falk refers to as spontaneous democracy or moreover, democratization-from-within.43 Referring to the phenomenon of forced democratization, which is the opposite of spontaneous, Doyle asserts, [s] elf-government should mean authentic self government, not laws and regulations imposed by foreigners, even if well-meaning.44 Thus, for democracy to surface and breathe, it has to grow first and foremost indigenously. Outside support of the process of democratization can be helpful, however the main drive for democratic transformation that leads to sustainable democracy should come from inside. Many challenges emerge on the road towards complete democracy. Some of those challenges, such as early elections or weak institutions, can lead to violence. Therefore, peace studies literature focuses its critique on the process of democratization
38
39 40
41 42 43
44
Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 97. Serwer and Thomson 2007, 377-78. Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities, Nationalists and Islamist: Managing Communal Conflict in the TwenthyFirst Century, in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 153. Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 79-81. Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (United Nations, 1996), 17. Richard Falk, Two Models of Democratization in the Middle East, The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (2007) http://www.transnational.org/Area_MiddleEast/2007/Falk_Two_ Democratizations.html (April 29, 2010). Michael Doyle, Democratic Liberalization (paper presented at Global Governance Agenda Council of the World Economic Forum, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 7-9, 2008): 3.
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as the mean, vis--vis democracy, as the end. However, the end is unattainable without the successful completion of the mean. They are interdependent and, thus, inseparable. A society must complete the democratization process if it is to utilize democratic programs for consolidation and stabilization. It is practically impossible to establish representative structures without completing peaceful, free and fair elections. This requires passing the Huntingtons two-turnover test, which suggests that countries can be observed as democratically consolidated only if regimes are changed at elections. The sole marker that the country is consolidated is that the regimes have been changed.45 Elections, therefore, are indispensible component of the democratization process, which, on the other hand, require constructive and lengthy negotiations in order to be free of violence. Democracy as a peacebuilding tool can be observed as a virtuous circle where each component matters. Omission of a certain element (eg creation of strong institutions) can transform the virtuous into a vicious circle, which leads to upheaval. Thus, democracy and democratization in the light of peace-building cannot be compartmentalized and discussed separately.
3. Contextualizing Democracy and Peace

This paper aims to establish a correlation between democracy and peace, and, for its purpose, views negative and positive peace through Galtungs health and peace metaphor. Galtung suggests that peace resembles health in that it needs curative (negative peace) and preventative therapy (positive peace). In health, the former provides absence of disease (violence), while the latter boosts the bodys immunity and potential for regeneration, making it resistant to diseases.46 Thus, examining the case of South Africa, I argue that democracy in peace-building has a curative, but also a preventive function. It stops open and direct group or political violence but also strengthens societys capacity for regeneration and prevents internal conflict from relapsing into mass violence. Democratizing South Africa contributed to the achievement of negative peace, which [] is found whenever war or other direct forms of organized state violence are absent.47 Today, sixteen years after the establishment of democracy, South Africa is free of open political violence. The state functions under democratic principles, which exclude any other methods of direct state violence. At the same time, I suggest that democratizing South Africa contributed to positive peace, but only in its quest for the establishment of a constructive net of relationships between former adversaries. This was
45 46
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Michael Bratton, The Alternation Effect in Africa Journal of Democracy 15, no. 4, (2004):154. Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (Sage Publications, 1996), 1. David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (Sage Publications, 2008), 7.
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achieved through democracys mechanisms, policies and values of cooperation and communication and dispute management, but also through democracys inborn inclination for mutual understanding and tolerance and peaceful resolving of disputes. Democracy embodies these mechanisms and values to prevent conflict recurrence, which is in line with Galtungs preventative therapy metaphor. In the light of these concepts it is pertinent to pose the question whether democracy is able to cope with both direct and structural violence when utilized for peacebuilding goals. Democracys contribution to a decrease in structural violence, which comprises a significant component of Galtungs definition of positive peace, is very hard to defend. Structural violence often, [] has the effect of denying people important rights, such as economic well-being; social, political, and sexual equality; a sense of personal fulfillment, and self-worth, and so on.48 Todays South Africa suffers from a structural form of violence, manifested through severe unemployment, petty crime, domestic violence and other social ills.49 The origins and the causes of such violence are, however, of different nature, and cannot be solely attributed to the democratic transformation of South Africa. In the case of South Africa, democracys capacity to decrease both types of violence is reduced by the long history of a very oppressive and exclusionary regime.
4. Democracy and Peace-Building: The Case of South Africa

The case-study of South Africa, discussed bellow, appears as a pertinent case for analysis of the theories in support of democracy as a peace-building instrument. It is peculiar because apartheids elites were not overthrown by violence, which they were practicing during their reign. Instead, their relinquishing was negotiated and carried out in a relatively peaceful manner. The country managed to successfully bypass the traps of a thorny transition. Now, it is in the midst of democratic consolidation, on the road to substantive democracy. Economists Intelligence Unit in its 2010 Democracy Index ranks South Africa at the high 30 place (31 in 2008), out of 167 countries ranked according to their democratic capacities and performance (Electoral process and pluralism, government functioning, political participation and culture, civil liberties, etc). Pursuant to this report, South Africa heads the flawed democracy category lagging behind Greece and Italy being placed 28 and 29, respectively; yet being one place ahead of France (31). Moreover, the country is far ahead of todays EU member states, such as Hungary (43), Poland
48 49
Barash and Webel 2008, 7. The figures related to certain forms of structural violence are disturbing. According to the statistics of the South African Police Service 2.1 million serious crimes occurred in South Africa in 2009. Sexual offences amount at 10.4 % of total crimes, while the 32.7% of all criminal acts constitute contact crime. For more information visit: http://www.saps.gov.za/statistics/reports/crimestats/2009/crime_stats.htm
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(48), Bulgaria (51) and Romania (56), which overthrew the yoke of communism almost at the same time when South Africa dissolved the Apartheid. 50 South Africas pattern of completing the democratization process represents a scholarly example, which reflects the theories suggesting how to overcome the traps of the transition that can lead to conflict reappearance. In particular instances, this case runs counter to some of these theories, as in the example of holding early elections. At the same time, the case of South Africa illuminates democracy as a peace-building scenario. Todays South African democratic model is grounded on the most important notions of democracy, such as free and fair elections, representative political structures and checks and balances, and fosters a culture of coexistence, understanding, dialogue and civic participation. These are democracys inherited components leading to peace and stability, which stand in stark contrast to apartheids logic and attitudes, producing mass atrocities. Finally, as George and Bennett suggest, exploring case studies is very useful for research and theory development. Examining certain case-study assist the researcher to provide answers to the papers central query and concomitantly form the empirical base, which can be used by the researcher in revealing papers research goals.51
4.1. Historical Context: Petty & Grand Apartheid as a Source of Violence

The era of apartheid was undemocratic, discriminatory and exclusionary. It featured all-White elections and political structures, banned political parties and segregated social and political life. Apartheids main objective was to achieve White supremacy, through, what Horowitz observes as a [] ideology of separate development.52 Under this ideology, White elites completely dominated the countrys majority through oppression and their deprivation of civil and political rights and freedoms. People of color were prevented from voting, and thus denied representation. In addition, they were stripped from South African citizenship while their movement was restricted and controlled. Apartheids masterminds institutionalized and employed this ideology through so called petty and grand apartheid schemes, which envisaged countless discriminatory laws and policies against the people of color. Beck offers a clear differentiation between the schemes of petty and grand apartheid,
50
51
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Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat (London: Economist, 2010). 3-4. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 89. Donald Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 11.
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[p]etty apartheid refers to the racist laws affecting ones daily routine, beginning with birth in a racially segregated hospital and ending with burial in a racially segregated cemetery, while, [g]rand apartheid relates to land and political rights [] where Whites, Africans, Coloureds and Indians could live by race, which required the uprooting and relocation of millions of South Africans.53 Petty apartheid fostered complete racial separation through exclusionary legislation, invented to keep people of color segregated from the Whites in all spheres of public and social life. The concept of grand apartheid enforced territorial segregation through the system of Bantustans.54 Under these policies Blacks, Coloureds and Indians were underrepresented, disadvantaged and stripped of their fundamental human or civil rights. This situation resulted in open conflict and direct violence. For example, the concept of Bantu Education55 was crafted as an important pillar of the petty apartheid to ensure White superiority. The Bantu Education concept centralized and polarized South Africas education system leaving people of color disadvantaged. They, therefore, boycotted this project, rebelling against it, which led to the famous Soweto uprising in 1976, which inspired similar protests across the country resulting in hundreds of deaths.56 The period that followed featured constant tension and violence between the different racial groups. The grand apartheid was masterminded to territorially segregate Africans and divest Africans, Coloureds and Indians from their rights to vote and hold
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55
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Roger B. Beck, The History of South Africa: The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations (Greenwood, 2000), 125. Michigan State Universitys South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy Project provides the following description of the Bantustans: Ethnically defined areas for Africans created on the basis of the Native Reserves (Land Act, 1913). [They] constituted only 13% of South African territory. Bantustans were to be given self-government and later independence in order to deny Africans citizenship rights in white South Africa. 3.5 million Africans were forcibly removed to Bantustans. Widespread poverty in these areas helped employers secure a supply of cheap black labor South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy, Glossary, Michigan State University, http://overcomingapartheid. msu.edu/terms.php Under the concept of Bantu Education only Whites could have sophisticated technical and professional education. In addition Whites were educated in their mother tongue, while the people of color were forced to study in English and Afrikaans as languages of instruction. In addition, the funding of nonWhite schools was dependent on the enforcement of the apartheid developed curriculum, which led to the closure of many black schools. See: Peter Kallaway, ed. The History of Education under Apartheid 1948-1994: The Doors of Learning and Culture Shall be Opened (Cape Town: Pearson Education South Africa, 2002), 2. The death toll by the end February, 1977 was estimated at 575, out of which 496 deceased were Black, 2 White, 2 Indian and 75 Coloured. Source: Phil Bonner, The Soweto Uprising of June 1976: A Turning Points Event. Turning Points in History: People Places and Apartheid. http://www.sahistory.org.za/ pages/library-resources/online%20books/turningpoints/bk5/chapter2.htm#3
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public office. The enforcement of the project was initiated with the adoption of the Bantu Authority Act of 1951,57 which laid legal grounds for the formation of the Bantustans. Through the grand apartheid policy, millions of Africans were forcibly dislocated to a designated Bantustan dependent on their record of origin. The Bantustans were provided nominal independence from South Africa, while the political and civil rights and freedoms of its citizens (including passive and active voting rights) were restricted to a respective Bantustan. Under this scheme, [w]hites were political subjects and blacks were in untenable position of being objects of political power.58 Africans were practically foreigners in South Africa, as according to apartheids legislation, they were citizens of these nominally independent homelands and needed passports to enter White South Africa. This spurred outrage among the Blacks, which culminated in the Sharpeville Massacre on April 21, 1960, when the police started shooting at a mass of protesters, killing and injuring many. The Sharpeville events further increased the opposition against the apartheids regime. Nevertheless, the regime continued its oppressive policies. Atav claims that this is not unexpected: [] since South Africa is a state adapted to secure the supremacy of the white minority. Its parliament is bicameral with all seats reserved for whites. The elections take place under a party system from which Africans, Coloureds and Asians are excluded. Apartheid operates as racial discrimination, economic exploitation and police terror. Racial discrimination does not only connote an attitude; it is an act which denies equality and sharpens stratification. 59 This evaluation reflects the divide and rule and exclude and rule ideals of the schemes of petty and grand apartheid. Apartheid aimed to establish longterm supremacy of the Whites in South Africa by manipulating democracy and stripping people of color of their political rights and freedoms. The enforcement of these schemes incited hostilities, animosities and violence among the different racial groups.
4.2. Quasi-Democracy: Divide and Rule & Exclude and Rule

Apartheids primary objectives were to divide, exclude and rule the people of color. The concept of Bantustans was envisioned to have a double effect over the intra and interracial group dynamics. First, Bantustans fragmentation augmented the rift among the Blacks over land, and concurrently defocused and diverted their anger
57 58 59
The Bantu Authorities Act (Act No. 68 of 1951). Michael McDonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa (Harvard University Press, 2006), 60. Atav 1978, 38.
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from the central authorities to the Bantustans chieftains.60 Second, the decision to introduce a Tricameral Parliament in 1984 and to declaratively include the Coloureds and Indians in the decision-making process, further increased the rift between Blacks and Whites, but in the same time incited long-lasting animosities between the Africans and the Coloureds.61 The exclude and rule policy was enforced through denying people of color the right to vote and representation. It was enforced through South Africas all-white, quasi-democratic national elections, which bestowed upon the Whites limitless mandate to govern the country. Morris and Padayachee observe this process as [] racially exclusive form of democracy.62 Power, they assert, [] remained structurally located within typical capitalist institutional structures eg parliamentary forms, election of political parties, separation of executive from legislative - from which the black popular classes were legislatively excluded.63 The system of grand apartheid is therefore the domination of an insignificant minority by the overwhelming majority.64 It is a clash between races, the enfranchised and empowered Whites and the disenfranchised and disempowered people of colour: political subjects entitled to political performance and political objects denied to political agency. This state of affairs created constant tension between the Whites and the Africans. McDonald argues that [b]lacks resented white supremacy, but effective recourse for their grievances through political institutions was denied to them.65 Left powerless to their own devices and without a legitimate political space within which to raise their voice, pursue their rights and claim their needs, they initiated an organized resistance. Such mobilization ranged from non-violent resistance movements against the regime, such as Steve Bikos Black Conscience Movement advocating for restoration of the pride of the Africans and their psychological freedom, to the ANCs armed wings Poqo and Umkhonto we Sizwe, which employed guerilla warfare tactics. This mobilization was a response to the undemocratic and oppressive spirit of apartheid, which incited animosities, hostility and direct violence. On
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Barbara Rogers, Divide & Rule: South Africas Bantustans (London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1976), 8. In 1994, the majority of Coloureds in the Western Cape voted for the National Party in South Africas first democratic elections. Their votes brought victory in this province to the party that masterminded and practiced apartheids policies since 1948. The effect of this policy is notable even today. The bulk of Coloureds voters in the Western Cape very rarely vote for the ANC. They vote for the DA, which rule the Western Cape and its ANCs official opposition at central level. Mike Morris and Vishnu Padayachee, State Reform Policy in South Africa, Transformation 7 (1988): 3. Morris and Padayachee 1988, 3. According to Back, South Africas Whites who ruled the country constituted only 13% of the overall population. Roger B. Beck, The History of South Africa: The Greenwood Histories of the Modern Nations (Greenwood, 2000), 125. Michael McDonald, Why Race Matters in South Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 60.
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its end, the regime responded by declaring a state of emergency across South Africa on two occasions in the 1980s, which resulted in mass incommunicado detentions. Following decades-long struggle against the regime, enhanced by international political and economic pressure, apartheid was finally dissolved in 1994. Abandoning the history of dominance, intolerance and separation, South Africa turned to democracy as a tool to promote peace, reconciliation and cohabitation between the former adversaries.
4.3. South Africas Democratic Scenario for Peace: Reflections and Analysis 4.3.1. The Road Less Traveled: From Apartheid to Democracy Via Democratization
I shall be telling this with a sigh, somewhere ages and ages hence: two roads diverged in a wood, and I - I took the one less traveled by, and that has made all the difference... 66 With Apartheid collapsing, South Africa reached a fork in the road, whether to follow the familiar track of violence or to go after the road less taken, leading to peace and coexistence. The countrys political elites decided to opt for the latter, abandoning the former road to turmoil and suffering. The road to peace and coexistence was an ideal denied to the majority of South Africans. This roads final destination was a democratic South Africa, united under the principles of freedom, non-racism, tolerance and dialogue. To reach that goal, the country had to pass through the road of democratization, which provided the long-awaited change. Robert Frosts inspirational verse perfectly captures the dilemma that South Africa was confronted with. Concurrently, it reveals the decision made; the one that has brought change in the country tormented by a ruthless regime for decades. The idea of democracy as an alternative to apartheid was not a novelty in South Africa. In 1979, in his paper prepared for the second UN World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination, Trkkaya Atav notes, [] peace, freedom and progress can be achieved in South Africa only if the system of institutionalized racial discrimination and oppression is replaced by a democratic state.67 To date, Atavs idea of democracy replacing apartheid and promoting peace and prosperity remains pertinent. However, in the 1990s, many challenges have arisen to threaten the establishment of democracy. The bulk of them were related to the
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Robert Frost, Mountain Interval (La Vergne: Lightning Source Inc, 2009), 9. Trkkaya Atav, Against Apartheid in South Africa, (Turkish Yearbook on International Relations, 1978), 54.
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democratization phase, in which incompletion led to violence in many African nations. Bratton and Van Der Walle assert that the process of democratization in Africa had either been, [] reversed as military forces have overthrown elected governments, or, democracies survive but elected rulers have lapsed back into manipulating political rules in order to consolidate their personal hold on power.68 Mottiar asserts that these phenomena are improbable to arise in South Africa,69 because the country managed to successfully go through the democratization process bypassing these traps. Shameela Seedat, a researcher with the Institute for Democracy in Africa, confirms this claim. South Africa, Seedat says, [] underwent a relatively peaceful transition notwithstanding specific episodes of violence which accompanied the transition to democracy (1990 to 1994). The relative peace of this period was a remarkable feature of transitionespecially following as it did, the harshness of the 1980including two states of emergencies imposed by the apartheid government. 70 Kearsley complements Seedats stance by recognizing South Africa as a success story, which effectively surpassed the dangers of democratic transition and is now in a process of democratic consolidation.71 Schedler asserts that democratic consolidation is a process, which suggests that democracy is secured from reverse to authoritarian rule, or at least its life span is extended.72 In todays South Africa, democracy as a system of governance is widely accepted in South Africa by all major political factors. The country held several free and fair democratic elections, and thus elected a democratic government, which is nonracial and representative. In addition, the country has a democratic nonracial constitution safeguarding South Africas democracy and civil, political and minority rights. Nonracial democratic institutions are in place along with vibrant civil society and free media. By safeguarding and further promoting these democratic components South Africa secures its status of liberal democracy.
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69 70 71
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Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van der Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 233-258, quoted in Shauna Mottiar, Democratic Consolidation in South Africa, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (2002): 3. Mottiar 2002, 3. Shameela Seedat, e-mail interview with the author, April 12, 2010. James Kearsey, A Study of Democratic Consolidation in South Africa: What Progress to Date? (MA diss., Stellenbosch University, 2007), 3. Andreas Schendler, What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy 9, no. 2, (1998): 91.
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4.3.2. From Democratization to Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from South Africa

South Africa entered the democratization process with launching the countrys first democratic elections in April 1994. Free and fair elections are central pillars of the idea of liberal democracy. They are of particular importance for strife-ridden societies as they have dual objectives, that is, cessation of war and initiation of the democratization process.73 Many scholars (Mansfield and Snyder 2007, Serwer and Thomson 2007, etc) suggest that early elections are the biggest threat to societies overcoming armed conflict. They can turn a country into conflict and reverse it to authoritarian rule, phenomena already discussed in the previous sections. Given elections complexities, Mansfield and Snyder argue that solid institutions should precede the establishment of democracy.74 Establishment of a government of national unity (GNU) is offered as one of the interim solutions to prevent conflict recurrence.75 Lyons suggests that the role of GNU as well the one of the democratic institutions is instrumental to the political and security matters related to the outcome of elections.76 South Africa represents a very interesting case for analysis of these observations. Unlike other African nations, where polarized elections prevented establishment of democracy and incited mass violence (Nigeria, Chad, etc),77 South Africa appears as an exception to this negative tendency. A few things account for this success: the preexistence of solid institutions, which definitely contributed to avoiding violence, and strong and stable institutions, which are vital ingredients for organizing peaceful elections. In the case of South Africa, they were important, yet not the most critical elements for the success of the elections of 1994. South Africas success, which made the elections violence-free, lies in the readiness of political elites to compromise. Oppressive regimes are almost always reluctant to give up power easily, or at least to renounce power without specific safeguards for their safety and security. On the other hand, the oppressed are not always ready to make difficult concessions. Political settlement and reconciliation of the opposing positions boosts chances of success, but also sustainability of the peace-project. In South Africa, the political settlement was reached through the so called sunset clause, which provided assurances for the safety and security of the White minority. The sunset clause foresaw gradual transfer of power from minority
73
74 75 76 77
Terrence Lyons, War Termination, Democratization, and Demilitarizing Politics, Institute for Conflict Analyses and Resolution George Mason University Working Paper No. 20 (2002): 5. Mansfield and Snyder 2007, 161-62. Ottaway 2007, 615. Lyons 2002, 5-6. Horowitz 1991, 97.
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to majority rule through the formation of a government of national unity after organizing democratic elections based on proportional representation. Maharaj argues that the sunset clause, [] was a form of power-sharing which at the same time ensured that South Africa would enjoy majority rule within no more than five years from the first democratic elections.78 Thus, the sunset clause agreement, along with the preexistence of solid institutions, contributed to the prevention of violence at the election. Mottiar observes South Africas first democratic elections as a primary victory and accredits this acknowledgement to the absence of direct violence.79 The elections gave birth to South African democracy and laid grounds for the formation of the GNU, providing peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. As it was envisaged, the GNU would include any party that obtained five percent of votes in the first democratic elections, which was seen as a compromise to include apartheids National Party in the executive. To this end, President Mandela, who was elected as chief of the executive, invited other political parties to assume ownership of the transition process. The establishment of the GNU led to swift de-escalation of violence and diminishment of radical fractions. This state of affairs facilitated complete transfer of power to majority rule and further stabilized the country. As the South African Constitution was adopted on May 8, 1996, the National Party (NP) announced its decision to pull out from the GNU. NPs decision to withdraw from the GNU was observed as a sign of South Africas democratic processes maturing. It signaled that the country successfully transitioned to majority rule based on democratic principles that will prevent conflict reoccurrence. The South African case runs counter to the claims made by a few scholars (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007, Serwer and Thomson, 2007, etc) who suggest that early elections could lead to violence. Moreover, it shows that early elections lead to peaceful transfer of power and reinforcement of the democratization process. However, this case does not discard these theories. It reinforces them by underlying the importance of strong institutions and political structures before unleashing mass elections. In addition, this case indicates that the transfer from authoritarian rule to democracy has two transitional phases, the period between peace agreement to elections and the democratization period leading to democratic consolidation and substantive democracy. The South African case indicates the importance of both transitional processes, which are interdependent and crucial for the successfulness of the democracy project. The sunset clause agreement and its democratic spirit manifested through compromises and concessions speak of the significance of political settlement before launching the democratization
78
79
Mac Maharaj, The ANC and South Africas Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace, Berghof Transitions Series No. 2 (2008): 26. Mottiar 2002, 3.
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process. Another peculiar component of South Africas democratization process is the local ownership component in negotiating the political settlement and the structures of the new society. South Africa did not experience heavy third-party intervention in the transfer of power and formation of future structures and institutions. Conducting this process without foreign interference provided the feeling of ownership and inclusion among the negotiating parties to shape the future of the country according to their own needs and terms. This concurrently helped avoid potential prevalence of one of the parties in the negotiation process. Furthermore, as Seedat argues, the decision to have a wide and inclusiveness negotiation process, and a very participatory constitutional drafting process gave legitimacy to the new form of the state.80 Thus, the local ownership of the process contributed to the sustainability of the project. Democracy as a system of governance was not imposed from outside, but on the contrary promoted and accepted by all negotiating parties. This tendency continues today as democracy is accepted by all key political actors. Bearing all these things in mind, some aspects of South Africans transition from apartheid to democracy could serve as a model, which may be considered elsewhere.
4.3.3. From Violence to Peace: Democratic South Africa

Contemporary South African history is marked by two diametrically opposing eras. The first and predominant one is the era of apartheid, which featured discrimination, exclusion and violence. The second one is the era of democracy, characterized by freedom, inclusion and peace. Apartheid and democracy are utterly contrasting concepts. The former fosters exclusionary rule of the minority, while the latter favors inclusionary rule of the majority. Post-1994, South Africas democracy was accepted as a system of governance to promote peace, integration and coexistence, values that apartheid denied for a long time. Under petty and grand apartheid schemes, people of color were excluded from social life and the decision-making process. They were stripped of voting rights, and thus representation in the national political structures. Things had been changed since the inauguration of democracy. Political representation is necessary if a strife-ridden society wants to repair the shortcomings of the former system that produced hostilities among the different groups. Democracy, I would say, is the avenue for fulfillment of this prerequisite. Peoples right to vote provides them with a sense of ownership of states affairs. Concomitantly, it allows their vote to be heard and motivate them to engage and participate in societal affairs. Elections are a legitimate mechanism, which provides the necessary space for expression of citizens grievances, and, at the same time,
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enables a channel for articulation of their interests. Todays South Africa differs significantly from apartheids South Africa, when the right to vote and be voted was restricted to skin color. According to Sylvester and Eshetu, [a]ny universal understanding of democracy should meet two requirements: the people must rule and they must rule equally. South Africa is a classic liberal constitutional democracy, where the electoral system satisfies both requirements.81 South African elections are democratic, free and fair and every adult citizen is free to vote.82 Each vote matters equally. Elections lead to representative political structures and to what Doyle observes as [] government by the people.83 Thus, they are in position to express themselves through the institutions of the system, which, as the apartheids era shows, leads to conflict and upheaval. The democratic elections in South Africa are triumph for democracy. Todays system of proportional representation, without threshold, promotes inclusiveness and fairness. This model, which was a product of the negotiation in the 1990s, enables accommodation of a wide spectrum of political platforms and voters interests. Most importantly, it enables multi-party democracy, unlike apartheids pattern of one-party democracy, which results and effects are well known. Elections in South Africa, [] seem to enjoy high levels of public trust and legitimacy more than most of South Africas democratic institutions.84 Since 1994, the country successfully organized several electoral contests featuring high voter turnout.85 Through elections, political parties engage in open competition for citizens votes through platforms and tangible policies rather than hostile confrontation and animosities. Another important aspect related to the South African election process is the ability of political actors to preserve the pace of electoral competition and to avoid the elections zero-sum trap. To date, major political parties are competing in elections regardless of ANCs overwhelming power. In the last four electoral cycles, none of the major political parties boycotted or delegitimized elections. ANC remains the major political force at the national level. However, certain political parties have significant power at the provincial level, which provides them with an additional source of motivation to compete at elections, besides their impetus to serve the society (coming from the sense of ownership and democratic responsibility). For example, the Democratic Alliance (DA) dominates over ANC in the Western
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Justin Sylvester and Paulos Eshetu, Elections and Democracy, in Testing Democracy: Which Way is South Africa Going?, ed. Neeta Misra-Dexter and Judith February (Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in Africa (Idasa), 2010), 170. Section 19 (3) (a) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Michael Doyle, Democratic Liberalization (paper presented at Global Governance Agenda Council of the World Economic Forum, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 7-9, 2008): 3. Sylvester and Eshetu 2010, 169. The voter turnout in 1994 elections was 86.87%, 89.3% in 1999, 76.73% in 2004 and 77.30 in 2009. Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.
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Cape. This state of affairs gears the DA to challenge ANCs overwhelming power and remain active in the democratic interplay. Having the political parties within the system, competing for their programs, ideals and voters interests, prevents sectarianism and outside mobilization, which leads to violent outbursts as the case of apartheids showed. Given that the contexts are different, in the case of todays South Africa, this situation may not escalate in violence. However, it does possibly bestow ANC unlimited power, which is a serious threat for the democratic processes in the country. Elections are the avenue to representative governance and institutions, which did not exist during apartheid. One of the key apartheid pillars was the concept of nominal democracy, which Morris and Padayachee defined as [] racially exclusive form of democracy.86 This concept provided a democratic rule for the White minority through racially exclusive, non-representative political structures, excluding the vast majority. Indeed, apartheids institutions existed and were solid. However, they were designed to serve a small portion of South Africas population. This state of affairs led to exclusion, segregation and sectarianism, which inflamed revolt and resistance. The inability of people of color to promote and articulate their needs and interests, motivated them to rebel against the regime. Todays South Africa is a democratic, nonracial society, where the democratic rule is enshrined with the Constitution and consensually acclaimed by all relevant socio-political actors. While power during apartheid was bestowed to the nominally democratic institutions and structures, present South Africa functions through under the principle of democratic representation. This is a significant shift in essence, rhetoric, attitudes and performance. Present South Africas institutions are, on the contrary, democratic and representative. They reflect the composition of South Africas populace and are nonracial and inclusive. Thus, they serve to the people of the country, not to a particular group. For example, todays South African Parliament (4th Democratic Parliament) is composed of representatives coming from thirteen political parties, which compete with policies and agendas in a democratic fashion. Although criticized for lacking human resources, the institutions are stable and able to perform their duties. The greatest criticism to South Africas democratic institutions relates to ANCs overwhelming power, which, is argued, leads to party dominance over South Africas political spectrum. Raenette Taljaard, a South African scholar and opposition politician, shares these concerns and asserts, [a]lthough elections are held and contested freely, South Africa is today a de facto one-party state ruled by the African National Congress (ANC).87 According to Johnston, ANCs power
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Mike Morris and Vishnu Padayachee, State Reform Policy in South Africa, Transformation 7 (1988): 3. Raenette Taljaard, Think Again: South Africa, Foreign Policy, April 14, 2009.
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and influence over South African politics opposes countrys concept of multi-party democracy.88 On the other hand, Steven Friedman, South Africas leading theorist of democracy, disagrees with the claims that South Africa is a one-party state and argues that it takes time for a political party to achieve overwhelming dominance.89 In addition, the 2008 Bertellsmann Stiftung South Africa Country Report asserts that, [s]o far, there is no evidence that the dominance of the ANC has affected democratic institutions.90 However, the report expresses concerns that ANCs power deteriorates the systems checks and balances, which are in part replaced by the strong civil society and media.91 The system of checks and balances is a vital ingredient for healthy democracy. The case of South Africa shows that even when the institutional oversight is weakened, democracy possesses additional instruments for supervision and accountability, such as vibrant civil society and robust media. South African civil society is rooted in the struggle against the apartheid. Noyoo argues that South Africas civil society [...] is inextricably bound up with the anti-apartheid struggle whose primary objective was to wrest power from an oppressive, racist and illegitimate minority regime.92 Media, on the other hand, was state-owned and served to regimes interests disseminating fear and propaganda, while todays press and media are free and independent in their activity.93 The nongovernmental sector and free media practically boomed with the dismantling of apartheid. The civil sector flourished and became very vibrant, serving not only as a watchdog to the performance of the executive, but also as a promoter of citizens interests and facilitator of interracial and inter-communal tensions. A myriad of nongovernmental organizations serve to the idea of peace, through different programs related to peace-building, reconciliation, transitional justice, democracy, etc. In some cases, civil society organization appear as a subsidiary to the governments effort to promote peace and co-existence, whereas in other cases they push the government to change certain policies.94
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91 92
93
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Alexander Johnston, The 1999 Election and the Prospects of Consolidating Democracy in South Africa, (paper presented at Konrad Adenauer Stiftungs conference Consolidating Democracy in South Africa, Umtata, South Africa, 18-20 August, 1999), 55. Steven Friedman, No Easy Stroll to Dominance: Party Dominance, Opposition and Civil Society in South Africa, in The Awkward Embrace: One-Party Domination and Democracy in Industrializing Countries, ed.Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, Inc, 1999), 99. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2008 South Africa Country Report. (Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007), 5. Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008, 5. Ndangwa Noyoo, Civil Society and Poverty Reduction in South Africa, (A research conducted for the Foundation Maison des Science de LHomme, 17 December, 2007), 21. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 South Africa Country Report. (Gtersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 8. For example, the Treatment Action Campaign served to push the government to change its HIV/AIDS policies.
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Friedman brings in another important dimension related to the civil sector in South Africa. He states that, [b]lack and predominantly black civil society organizations have not endorsed government action uncritically, despite overwhelming black support for the current government partya pattern in marked contrast with trends in white Afrikaner society in 1948.95 These tendencies contributed to a more responsive democracy,96 strengthened the countrys democratic capacities and further de-racialized South Africas society, which was foreseen as a recipe for peace after decades-long racially motivated violence. Now, as it is free, diversified, independent and widely accepted, media appears as one of the pillars of South Africas democracy. It keeps the government accountable and adds to the process of building relations among the races. Krabill emphasizes the role of media in promoting peace and refers to the role of media in spreading the idea of South Africas Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Without mass media, Krabill utters, [] particularly broadcast media - the TRCs much-heralded process of providing a public platform for victims of gross violations of human rights would have been severely limited by constraints of physical time and space only to those present to any given hearing.97 In addition, South African legislation forbids using and dissemination of programs that contain elements of hatred based on race, religion and gender.98 These examples reflect medias capacity in preserving democratic values and its importance in re-building trust and furthering peace. Another democratic creed, closely related to the freedom of expression, is the freedom of association. Denied for decades during apartheid, this fundamental right is now constitutionally guaranteed.99 Since 1994, thousands of street demonstrations against government economic or political policies took place. Certain NGOs (eg Freedom of Expression Institute) raised their concerns of excessive use of force to disperse protesters. Police authorities responded that physical force was used only in case when protests turned violent. Unlike during apartheid, when protests were forbidden and suffocated in bloodshed and detentions, democratic South Africa allows people to raise their voice when dissatisfied and provides institutional and nongovernmental protection to their rights. Providing people an outlet to express their grievances, which was denied during apartheid, reduces the chances for mass
95
96 97
98
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Stephen Friedman, Beneath the Surface: Civil Society and Democracy After Polokwane, in Testing Democracy: Which Way is South Africa Going?, ed. Neeta Misra-Dexter and Judith February (Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in Africa (Idasa), 2010), 121. Friedman 2010, 121. Ron Krabill, Symbiosis: Mass Media and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Media, Culture and Society 23, no. 5 (2001), 567-568. The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Section 16), contains three internal limitations: advocacy of hatred based on race, gender and religion, incitement of imminent violence, and propaganda for war. The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 (Section 17) enshrines the freedom to assembly and the right to demonstrate and picket.
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violence and strife. The fact that democracy opens the society for diverse views, robust media and vibrant civil society; permits protest activity and other related political rights to have a positive effect in South Africa. It allows for expression of discontents and tensions in political processes and social discourses, and preserves peoples faith in the democratic realm. From the democratic components discussed within this section (elections, representative governance, civil society and media), it can be concluded that democracy in the case of South Africa promotes peace and coexistence. For Shameela Seedat, [] the staging of credible and regular elections, the adoption of a progressive constitution, and the establishment of institutions to implement democratic provisions and process have been overarching victories.100 In the context of South Africa, democracy allowed for conflict institutionalization, regulation and its resolution through the existing legislation, rules and procedures. In todays South Africa, these processes recycle conflict into a more or less constructive cohabitation between the former adversaries. The conflict itself still exists, but is now manifested thorough political rhetoric and concrete policies, rather than bombs and shells. It is managed and resolved in the frames of the democratic realm.
5. In Lieu of Conclusion: Democracys Contribution

to Negative and Positive Peace
This paper has analyzed democracys promotion of negative and positive peace in the case of South Africa and has shown that democracy has contributed to the both components of the democratic peace theory. The story of democratic South Africa is miraculous. Overcoming almost 50 years of oppression, political havoc and strife, South Africa turned the page towards democracy, which promotes peace and coexistence. Since 1994, the country is free of organized state and other political violence. The conflict is resolved within the democratic institutions, given democracys capacity to resolute conflicts and disputes through various dispute management and resolution tools, such as relevant legislation and formal institutions. The case of South Africa provides rather clear evidence that allowing people to express their grievances and claim their needs (be it through a ballot box or protests), diffuses hostilities and avoids direct violence. These sixteen years of absence of direct political violence support the thesis that democracys peacebuilding mechanisms succeeded in their mission to bring and sustain negative peace in this strife-ridden society. The real power of democracy, however, is not in the institutional dispute resolution mechanisms that democracy has on its disposal. The real power of democracy lies within the values it embodies and promotes. Democracy, indeed,
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builds peace through these mechanisms and conflict could practically not be resolved without concrete institutions. However, democracys genuine strength lies in its in-born culture of tolerance, understanding and dialogue aimed at relationship restoration and coexistence. Wolpe and McDonald accurately capture this reasoning: [t]he principal challenge in building peace and democracy, [] lies not in abstract, sector-specific institutional fixes, but, rather, in bringing key leaders together in a long-term process designed to resolve the tensions and mistrust that are the inevitable by-product of conflict and war, and to build (or rebuild) their capacity to work effectively together across all of the countrys lines of ethnic and political division. Failing that, institutional transformation will have little substance and no sustainability. 101 Within the latter quotation one can locate the close link between democracy and positive peace. In the context of South Africa, democracy contributes to positive peace by bringing former adversaries under the same umbrella to share democratic values and ideals of peace, restoring shattered trust and rehabilitating bonds, as well as practicing nonviolent and democratic governance. In South Africa, democracy contributed to positive peace through restoring and realization of fundamental human and political rights and freedoms of the formerly oppressed. Rectifying the underlying causes of conflict, eg the denial of voting rights and representation, speak of the important role of democracy in positive peace. Finally, the enforcement of exclusively peaceful conflict resolution since 1994 could be directly credited to the democratic governance in South Africa. However, this does not mean that the situation in todays South Africa is completely rosy. Democratic South Africa appears to be not quite successful in addressing the structural component of positive peace. The country continues to struggle with a high level of unemployment, class differentiation, domestic violence, street crime, etc. The most serious threat to peace in South Africa has come in May and June 2008 when violence in the form of xenophobia rocked the country. A series of xenophobic attacks occurred across the country resulting in many deaths, injuries and displacements. Structural form of violence remains prevalent in South Africa, which is indeed a point of great concern. However, the root-causes of this violence are multi-layered and not necessarily attributive to democracys capacity to prevent conflict. Seedat argues that the root causes are [,,,] largely linked to the co-mingling of social, economic and cultural factors.102 The good
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Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, Democracy and Peace-building: Re-thinking the Conventional Wisdom, The Round Table 97, vol. 394 (2008): 138. 102 Seedat 2010.
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thing, as Seedat concludes, is that [] for the most part, racial discord is not a problem on its own.103 Democracy cannot provide solutions for diminishing all forms of violence per se. Introducing democracy is not a solution of all societal problems. If democracy is to work as a peace-building tool in promotion of positive and negative peace, it has to be supported by strong political will, government capacity and involvement of all layers of society in combating political, racial, ethnic or structural violence. When talking of promotion of positive and negative peace in South Africa, one cannot simply discard the disturbing legacy of apartheid. South African democracy is still young, fragile and incomplete, and thus cannot fully deliver its mission to bring peace in the country, however, these sixteen years of democratic governance has showed positive results in the eradication of state, political and race-based violence, stabilizing the country and setting the foundations for coexistence and collaboration.
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The United Nations and the Quest for World Peace

Ramesh THAKUR
A cynic comments that the United Nations exists so that nations, who are unable to do anything individually, can get together to decide that nothing can be done collectively. Someone famously said of Richard Wagner that his music is not as bad as it sounds. The same is true of the UN. It may not be a perfect organisation, yet there are many good people who are devoted to it, still. The reason for their faith in the world body is that it seeks to replace the balance of power with a community of power and represents the dream of a world ruled by reason. The world is a better place because it exists, because of what it does, and because of how it does them. Violence is endemic in nature and human society. Wars between states have been an enduring but far from an endearing feature. It is an affront to modern sensibility. Looking at the pervasive, ubiquitous reality of interstate and intergroup armed violence, the question arises: how do we impress on conflict-inflamed consciousness the gulf between the goals sought, the price paid and the results gained? Historically, peace was maintained by the great powers. The breakdown of the Concert of Europe system in 1914 and 1939 discredited the old balance-ofpower system and visionary leaders began to look for alternatives in international organisations. Both with the League of Nations and the United Nations, people horrified by the destructiveness of modern wars decided to create institutions for avoiding a repetition of such catastrophes. An important step in the development of the antiwar norm was the Pact of Paris of 1928 which declared war to be illegal.
Prof. Dr. Ramesh Thakur is Director of the Centre for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Australian National University, and Adjunct Professor in the Institute of Ethics, Governance and Law at Griffith University. He was formerly Senior Vice Rector of the United Nations University and a UN Assistant Secretary-General. He was a Responsibility to Protect Commissioner and the Principal Writer of Secretary-General Kofi Annans 2002 reform report. His books include The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press), Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey (Indiana University Press), The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics (Routledge), and The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (forthcoming).
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The UNs establishment was the next important milestone on the journey to tame the use of force as a means of settling international quarrels. The League began as the embodiment of humanitys aspirations for a better and safer world. The UN was closely modelled on the League, testimony to the fact that while the League had failed, people still had faith in the idea of an international organisation to oversee world peace and cooperation. The most important League legacy bequeathed to the UN was the concept, by now firmly entrenched but revolutionary one hundred years ago, that the community of nations has both the moral right and the legal competence to discuss and judge the use of force by states. A hundred years ago, war was an accepted institution with distinctive rules, etiquette, norms and stable patterns of practices. In that Hobbesian world, the only protection against aggression was countervailing power, which increased both the cost of victory and the risk of failure. Since 1945, the UN has spawned a corpus of law to stigmatise aggression and create a robust norm against it. Now there are significant restrictions on the authority of states to use force either domestically or internationally. The UN incorporated the League proscription on the use of force for national objectives, but inserted the additional prescription to use force in support of international, that is UN, authority. The nature of warfare has changed fundamentally since 1945. Instead of huge mechanised armies, todays wars are mostly fought with small arms and light weapons, between weak government forces and ill-trained rebels. In most contemporary conflicts, disease and malnutrition resulting from warfare kill far more people than missiles, bombs and bullets. There has also been a shift over time in where wars are being fought. More people are being killed in Africas wars today than in the rest of the world combined. Moreover, violent conflicts in Africa exacerbate the very conditions that gave rise to them in the first place, creating a classic conflict trap from which escape is difficult. This article disaggregates the UN role of maintaining international peace and security into the separate elements of pacific settlement, collective security, peace operations, arms control and disarmament, legal adjudication, and peacebuilding. An effort is made to analyse the historical record in order to connect the past to the future and to demonstrate changes that might be required in the institutional machinery in order to enhance the UNs peace maintenance role.
Pacific Settlement
The trend towards narrowing the permissible range of unilateral resort to force by states has been matched by efforts to broaden the international instruments available to settle interstate disputes by peaceful means. The 2005 Human Security Report
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challenged many widely-held myths. By 2003, there were 40 percent fewer conflicts than in 1992. The deadliest (those with more than 1000 battle-deaths) fell by 80 percent. Nearly 700,000 people were killed in battle in 1950 in total; in 2002 the figure was 20,000. The average number of those killed per battle in 1950 was 38,000, plummeting to 600 in 2002. Genocides, international crises and military coups were also dramatically down. Over the past 30 years, on average, fewer than 1000 people a year have been killed by international terrorists: a fraction of those killed in warfare. The UN has played a critical role in driving these positive changes. Its efforts increased between fourfold to tenfold to stop wars starting (preventive diplomacy), end ongoing conflicts (peacemaking), mount peace operations and impose sanctions (which can help pressure warring parties into peace negotiations). One of the most delicate forms of UN intervention is through the SecretaryGenerals good offices. This institutional point is likely to be the most active in pacific settlement in the foreseeable future. The political role of the Secretary-General was a novel phenomenon of post-1945 world politics. Article 99 of the Charter authorises him to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The carefully crafted language is instructive: any matter, without limitation; matter, not dispute or conflict; in his opinion, not in the judgment of others; may threaten, not actually threatening. Article 99 confers on the Secretary-General both a broad reservoir of authority and a wide margin of discretion requiring the exercise of political judgment, tact and integrity. The pacific settlement of disputes under chapter 6 is potentially among the Secretary-Generals most valuable political roles with respect both to conflict prevention and constructive collaboration. The Secretary-General is in regular contact with representatives of many governments, chief executives of international organisations and multinational corporations and civil society organisations. This multi-textured milieu of international relations provides the Secretary-General with many opportunities to probe and explain, test and tease, persuade and dissuade; to engage in diplomatic parlance but also to exercise ideational leadership. Quiet diplomacy within the confidential confines of the Secretary-Generals private office can be supplemented or substituted by the occasional public diplomacy of the UNs bully pulpit. But the Secretary-General cannot act in isolation from the shifting power structures of world politics. Rather, his exercise of international leadership is subject to the systemic and structural constraints of a unipolar world order whose bedrock organisational principle is state sovereignty. He must play a political role complementary to the Security Council and never in competition with it; respectful of the pivotal role of the Council in maintaining peace and security while mindful of the political temper in the General Assembly, which is the truer barometer of the sentiments of the international community. When the major
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powers and groups are bitterly divided, the Secretary-General must strive to forge a fragile agreement by identifying common elements, reminding member states of the Charter principles, nudging them towards face-saving formulations that can recreate a sense of common purpose and appealing for calm and unity. The most important requirement for the Secretary-General is to exercise the skills of soft leadership: the elusive ability to make others connect emotionally and intellectually to a larger cause that transcends their immediate self-interest. Leadership consists of articulating a bold and noble vision for a community, establishing standards of achievement and conduct, explaining why they matter, and inspiring or coaxing others to adopt the agreed goals and benchmarks as their personal goals. The method of selection and the terms of office undercut the prospects of those rare individuals who combine the qualities of inspirational, robust, effective and aspirational leadership. The Security Council vote on the Secretary-Generals election is subject to veto. This immediately changes the thrust from selecting someone who commands the widest following to someone who is least unacceptable to the major powers. The procedure places a premium on a non-activist, pliant Secretary-General. The General Assembly should reclaim an active, not merely a reactive, role in the selection of the Secretary-General. With the current crisis over the chief of the International Monetary Fund, we have a fresh opportunity to change the modus operandi of choosing the chief executives of international organisations. If Europe and the United States agreed to a genuinely open recruitment process whereby the best person in the world was chosen as the president of the IMF and the World Bank, then we may be able to apply the same criterion to the choice of the next Secretary-General. But the developing countries are never going to agree to the idea that the World Bank and IMF chiefs should be the discretionary choice of the US and the EU respectively but the UN Secretary-General should be chosen form a worldwide pool.
Collective Security
Collective security entails the imposition of binding diplomatic, economic and military sanctions against international outlaws under chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Efforts to devise an operational collective security system have been thwarted by a fundamental tension in the concept. War between lesser states, however deplorable and unhealthy for their nationals, cannot endanger world peace. Collective security understood as the maintenance of international peace and security is therefore superfluous in respect of small states. Equally, however, it is impossible to enforce against major powers, since any attempt to launch military measures against a great power would bring about the very calamity that the system is designed to avoid, namely a world war.
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The UN sought to avoid the latter eventuality by conferring permanent membership of the Security Council upon the great powers with the accompanying right of veto. The practical effect of the veto is that the virtually unlimited decisionmaking competence of the Council, necessary for the successful operation of a collective security system, is curtailed by the equally extensive decision-blocking competence of the P5. The closest that the UN has come to engaging in collective enforcement action was in Korea in 1950. Yet its collective security character was heavily qualified. Action in Korea was made possible by a temporary marriage of convenience between UN-centred collective security and US-centred collective defence. As in Korea in the 1950s, the advantage of action by an UN-authorised multinational coalition in the Persian Gulf in 199091 was that it allowed the UN to approximate the achievement of collective security within a clear chain of command necessary for large-scale military operations. The cost was that both wars became identified with American policy, over which the organisation exercised little real control. The decision by a US-led coalition to wage war on Iraq in 2003 without UN authorisation so split the international community that Secretary-General Kofi Annan assembled a group of 16 distinguished experts to forge a new consensus on the norms and laws governing the use of force in world affairs in relation to contemporary threats. Its report concluded that threats can come from state and nonstate actors and endanger human as well as national security. Collective security is necessary because todays threats cannot be contained within national boundaries, are interconnected and have to be addressed simultaneously at all levels. The panel endorsed UN-authorised but not unilateral preventive action. The UN will likely continue to remain engaged with a broad and broadening conception of security well beyond the traditional parameters of conventional military attack by uniformed soldiers across territorial borders. Created from the ashes of the Second World War with the allies determined to prevent a repeat of Hitlers horrors, for most of its existence the UN has focussed much more on external aggression than internal mass killings. Yet Nazi Germany was guilty of both. Unlike aggression against other countries, the systematic and large-scale extermination of Jews utilising industrial-scale efficiency was a new horror. The convergence of the interests of human rights and humanitarian communities with respect to protecting victims of atrocity crimes has been given expression as the responsibility to protect. The protection of civilians caught in the crossfire of deadly conflict is now a key criterion of success for peace operations. In 2005, world leaders unanimously agreed that every state has the responsibility to protect all people within its jurisdiction and that, where one was manifestly failing in its sovereign duty, the international community would take timely and decisive collective action to honour the international responsibility to protect
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people against atrocities. The international responsibility applies narrowly to just four crimes: ethnic cleansing, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. But there are no limits to what can be done in responding to these atrocity crimes. On 17 March 2011, Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised the use of all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas in Libya: the first UN-sanctioned combat operations since the 1991 Gulf War. Carefully crafted both to authorise and delimit the scope of intervention, it specified the purpose of military action as humanitarian protection but prohibited invading or occupying Libya. On 30 March, in Resolution 1975 the Security Council authorised the UN peace operation in Cte dIvoire to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The responsibility to protect and civilian protection agendas are complementary and mutually reinforcing. The first is mainly normative, the second is largely operational. The two share legal underpinnings, normative weight and Security Council commitments under human rights, international humanitarian and refugee laws. Civilian protection embraces all measures to protect the safety, dignity and integrity of all human beings, but only in times of war. The first part is thus considerably broader and less precise than the four specific acts under the responsibility to protect. But the latter is broader in being concerned with the prevention and protection of atrocity crimes in all circumstances, not merely during armed conflict. Protecting populations at risk of mass killings using coercive means in a non-permissive environment is its primary goal. For most peace operations, protecting civilians, in what has been negotiated to be a permissive environment but may have threatening components, is an implied or derivative goal, often a moral but not a mandated duty. The two agendas converge during the commission of atrocity crimes. In Libya and Cte dIvoire, regimes that had lost both domestic and international legitimacy declared war on their own people. Global political responses to both were shaped by universal values rather than strategic interests, with member states mirroring traditional UN policy and perspectives. Because the UN is taking the lead in redefining sovereignty by aligning state prerogatives with the will and consent of the people, the ruling class of any country must now fear the risk and threat of international economic, criminal justice and military action if they violate global standards of conduct and cross UN red lines of behaviour.
Peacekeeping
The instrument of choice by the UN for engaging with the characteristic types of contemporary conflicts is peacekeeping, which evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement. The number of operations increased
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dramatically after the end of the Cold War. Reflecting the changing nature of modern armed conflict, UN operations expanded also in the nature and scope of their missions. Many of the tenets of classical peacekeeping were realigned with the new political realities based on the Brahimi Report in 2000. The need for UN peacekeeping remains and will continue. Today there are around 120,000 personnel from 115 countries serving in 15 UN peace operations around the world, at an annual cost of almost eight billion dollars. UN peace operations have to undertake tasks like military disengagement, demobilisation and cantonment; policing; human rights monitoring and enforcement; observation, organisation and conduct of elections; rehabilitation and repatriation; and temporary administration. Sometimes the UN had to undertake peace-enforcement operations, at other times it authorised enforcement operations that were actually undertaken by a single power or ad hoc multilateral coalitions. In Kosovo and East Timor peace enforcement operations were preludes to transitional international administrations. Modern peacekeeping demands a broad range of skills and competence, including innovation, initiative and integrity. Peacekeepers have to determine the application of relevant domestic, international humanitarian and human rights law to their conduct and operation. Civilian, police and military elements have to cooperate willingly and coordinate effectively with one another and with NGOs. They have to be adaptable as the focus changes from security in one mission to humanitarian assistance in another and peacebuilding in yet a third. All this and more must be done in harmony with professional colleagues in a truly multinational, multicultural and multilingual effort operating in highly localised and particularised theatres. The Rand Corporation undertook a comparative assessment of UN and US experience in peace operations. The UN is better at low profile, small footprint operations where soft power assets of international legitimacy and local impartiality compensate for hard power deficit. The quality of UN peacekeeping troops, police officers and civilian administrators is more uneven and their arrival on the scene is often tardy. Multinational diversity can slow down the pace of decision-making in the UN system: its very strength, universality, is a major impediment to efficient and speedy action. But military reversals are less damaging for the UN because military force is not the source of its credibility, whereas they strike at the very heart of the basis of US influence. In order to overcome domestic scepticism for overseas missions, American policymakers define the mission grandly and make the operations hostage to their own rhetoric. UN missions are outcomes of highly negotiated, densely bureaucratic and much more circumspect documents. UN operations tend to be undermanned and under-resourced, deploying small and weak forces into post-conflict situations under best-case assumptions.
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If the assumptions prove false, the forces are reinforced, withdrawn or rescued. Washington deploys US troops under worst-case assumptions with overwhelming force to establish a secure environment quickly. The total number of UN peacekeepers may be modest by the standards of American expeditionary capability but is more than any other country or coalition can field. UN missions have been the more successful a higher proportion of local countries were left in peaceful and democratic conditions than with US operations. The UN needs an effective peacekeeping capacity commensurate with the demands placed on it. It needs strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly. The establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities would enable it to work with regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships. There is also renewed interest in the idea of a small but robust and rapidly deployable UN ready reaction force that could be rushed to trouble spots and in humanitarian emergencies.
Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament

With the Charter signed just weeks before the first use of atomic weapons, the UN has been engaged with nuclear arms control and disarmament from the start. The very first General Assembly resolution called for the newly established UN Atomic Energy Commission to make proposals for the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The goal of containing the spread and enlargement of weapons and arms stockpiles has rested on three pillars: norms, treaties, and coercion. The momentum generated by the historic and favourable changes after the end of the Cold War was allowed to lapse. More and more countries began to bump against the nuclear weapons ceiling at the same time as the world energy crisis encouraged a move to nuclear energy. Nuclear arms control is back on the international agenda with a vengeance. The fourfold crisis arises from non-compliance with obligations of the NPT by some states engaged in undeclared nuclear activities; other states that have failed to honour their disarmament obligations; nuclear armed states that are not party to the NPT; and nonstate actors seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, we face dangers of weaponisation of outer space. New momentum has been injected into the international nuclear debate over the last two years by agenda-setting statements and reports from the Obama administration, international panels and commissions including especially the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1887, the successful management of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and the
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signing and ratification of the New START Treaty. But there is a real risk that the momentum will stall. The NPT could be strengthened by making the IAEA Additional Protocol mandatory for all states parties, toughening up or even eliminating the exit clause and making clear that withdrawal from the NPT will be treated as a threat to peace and security. But these cannot be done without also addressing gaps on the disarmament side of the NPT and reform of the composition and procedures of the Security Council. The NPT contains a triangular linkage between verified nuclear nonproliferation, cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. The pursuit of nuclear nonproliferation is doomed without an accompanying duty to disarm. If nuclear weapons did not exist, they could not proliferate. Because they do exist, they will proliferate and be used again some day, whether by design, miscalculation, or accident. Although the prospect of a nuclear war between the five NPT nuclear weapons states has declined dramatically since the end of the Cold War, their chances of being used amidst the regional tensions in Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, as also by a terrorist group, have increased. Good luck is at least as responsible as sound stewardship for the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945. The UNs strengths and assets are research, advocacy, norm building and networking. It has established procedures and forums for sustaining annual debates and discourses, provides a rare channel for non-nuclear countries to network with one another and exert pressure on the nuclear holdouts, tries to coordinate global regimes and regional initiatives, and undertakes analytical, empirical and problemsolving research. Its weaknesses are cumbersome procedures easily captured by holdouts and recalcitrants to block any initiative, meagre resources devoted to what is said to be among the gravest threats to international security, and the most powerful enforcers of peace and security being the worst offenders in terms of military arsenals and sales.
Peacebuilding
I define peacebuilding as actions undertaken to consolidate peace and prevent violent conflicts from arising, intensifying (vertical proliferation), spreading to new theatres or actors (horizontal proliferation), persisting, or recurring. UN operations shifted over time from a linear sequence of transition from war to peace to an integrated approach to conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding. In parallel with this, the Security Council broadened its understanding of threats to international peace and security to include such subjects as children in armed conflict, small arms, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the role of natural resources in causing and prolonging conflict, pandemics like HIV/AIDS and, most recently, climate change.
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Peacebuilding addresses both proximate and root causes of conflicts through direct and structural measures. The new Peacebuilding Commission aims to fill a critical gap in the institutional architecture for maintaining international peace and security. Its efficacy and authority will rest on the prestige of its membership: representatives from the Security Council, donors, troop contributors, ECOSOC and the General Assembly. Its work will be executed by country-specific committees whose membership will include the country recovering from conflict, other regional countries, major donors and troop contributors, relevant regional organisations and international financial institutions, and senior UN officials.
International Law and International Criminal Accountability

The law of the Charter governs when force may be used; international humanitarian law governs how force may be used. While the World Court deals with justice among states, the increasing attention and sensitivity to human rights abuses and humanitarian atrocities raise questions of individual criminal accountability in a world of sovereign states. The world has made revolutionary advances in the criminalisation of domestic and international violence. The international community has responded to barbarism by drafting and adopting international legal instruments that ban it. Nuremberg and Tokyo were instances of victors justice. Yet by historical standards, both tribunals were remarkable for giving defeated leaders the opportunity to defend their actions in a court of law instead of being dispatched for summary execution. The ad hoc tribunals of the 1990s were neither unqualified successes nor total failures. They helped to bring hope and justice to some victims, combat the impunity of some perpetrators and greatly enrich the jurisprudence of international criminal and humanitarian law. But they proved to be expensive and time-consuming and contributed little to sustainable national capacities for justice administration. The International Criminal Court offers hope for a permanent reduction in the phenomenon of impunity. The landscape of international criminal justice has changed dramatically in a remarkably short period of time. In 1990, a tyrant could have been reasonably confident of the guarantee of sovereign impunity for his atrocities. Today, there is no guarantee of prosecution and accountability; but not a single brutish ruler can be confident of escaping international justice. The certainty of impunity is gone. The credit for the dramatic transformation of the international criminal landscape belongs mainly to the UN. Libyas Colonel Muammar Gadhafi is the latest but assuredly will not be the last head of state to feel the sting of ICC indictment.
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Legality, Legitimacy and the Rule of Law

Progress towards the good international society requires that force be harnessed to authority. A gulf between lawful and legitimate use of force is evidence of an erosion of the sense of international community. Those who would challenge and overthrow the existing order must indicate which is their preferred alternative system of rules, including dispute resolution; simply rejecting an existing rule or norm, no matter how unsatisfactory or unjust, in order to overthrow a particular ruler, no matter how odious, is not enough. Authority is the right to make policy and rules; power is the capacity to implement the policy and enforce the rules. Lack of enforcement capacity means that the UN remains an incomplete organisation, one that practices only parts of its Charter. Conversely, the US is global in reach and power but lacks international authority. To the extent that the material capacity to deploy and use force at various trouble spots around the world is concentrated in the US while the authority to do so is legally vested in the Security Council, the USUN relationship will be the central dynamic shaping the UN role in and contribution to conflict resolution and management in the foreseeable future. The thrust of the ongoing efforts to reform the UN is to make its structures and operations more efficient and legitimate in order to improve its performance and enhance its authority. The key executive decision-making body for underwriting international peace and security is the Security Council. If it remains essentially unreformed and unreconstructed, the rest of the reform effort will amount to mere tinkering and the UN will continue to suffer from a steady erosion of legitimacy and authority and gradually fade into irrelevance. Intriguingly, at a lecture at the UN University in Tokyo, Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of the World Court, even put forward a rule of law argument for reforming the structure and procedures of the Security Council in terms of equality before the law and law that is publicly promulgated, independently adjudicated and impartially enforced. A central challenge is how to combine the UNs unique legitimacy and international authority with US global reach and power. Some commentators pose the question as to why America should submit voluntarily to Gulliverisation, tied down by innumerable threads of international treaty and normative restraints, especially but not solely with respect to the use of force overseas. Have the structures and agreed procedures of multilateral forums become dangerously detached from the underlying distribution of power? Even if that were to be true to some extent, the Iraq War was a convincing demonstration that the diplomatic transaction costs of a complete withdrawal from multilateral forums, even for the United States, is a very high price to pay. At the same time, the volatility and turbulence that swept through the organisation in the wake of the AmericanBritish invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a
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sobering reminder that laws and norms and the institutions and organisations in which they are embedded are not ends in themselves, but instruments to a better ordering of the world. Should they fail in this overarching goal, their members will look to alternatives.
Conclusion
Many of the worlds most intractable problems are global in scope and will most likely require concerted multilateral action that is also global in its reach. But the policy authority for tackling them remains vested in states, and the competence to mobilise the resources needed for tackling them is also vested in states. This strategic disconnect goes some way to explaining the recurrent difficulties facing the UN and the fitful nature of many of its responses. Over time, the chief threats to international security have come from violent eruptions of crises within states, while the goals of promoting human rights and democratic governance, protecting civilian victims of humanitarian atrocities, and punishing governmental perpetrators of mass crimes have become more important. As a major consequence of the changing nature and victims of armed conflict from soldiers to civilians, including through excess deaths caused by conflict-related disease and starvation, the need for clarity, consistency and reliability in the use of armed force for civilian protection lies at the heart of the UNs credibility in the maintenance of peace and security. Some have argued that the UN Charter was written in another age for another world. Yet for many it is a living and breathing document that remains vitally relevant today. It is the framework within which the scattered and divided fragments of humanity come together to look for solutions without passports to problems that respect no passports. We must never fall victim to the soft bigotry of low expectations. Rather, we must always hold the organisation to the more exacting standards of exalted expectations. The record shows a surprising UN capacity for policy innovation, conceptual advances, institutional adaptation and organisational learning. We have seen this with respect to peace operations, human security and human rights, atrocity crimes and international criminal justice, sanctions and the use of force, and the responsibility to protect innocent civilians caught in the cross-fire and victims of atrocity crimes. The vocabulary of democracy, good governance and human rights has steadily advanced to become the language of choice in international discourse. Because human rights champion the rights and dignity of individual human beings, it is entirely fitting that the great champions of the human rights and international humanitarian law movements were such giants of individuals as Raphael Lemkin who helped to bring the Genocide Convention into being, Peter
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Benenson who founded Amnesty International, and Henri Dunant who started the Red Cross. Their examples demonstrate, very powerfully, that the chief impulse to human rights is the recognition that every human being is deserving of equal moral consideration. It is an acceptance of a duty of care by those ensconced in safety towards those in zones of danger. We are indeed our brothers keeper, all our brothers and sisters keepers around the world. The UNs normative mandates on security, development, human rights, civilian protection and the environment embody this powerful intuition. While the causes of war are many and complex, the call to end it is singleminded and simple. Like terrorism, a war of choice is an unacceptable tactic no matter how just the cause and deserves to be similarly criminalised. Cynics insist that war is an inherent part of human society. To end war would indeed be to end history. Maybe. But so too have crime and poverty always been part of human history. Should we give up then on the fight to end crime and poverty? Confronted with a world they cannot change, reasonable people adapt their behaviour to reality. But the turning points in human history have come from the efforts of those unreasonable people Gautama Buddha, Jesus Christ, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela among them who set out to change the world instead. The long walk to freedom from war draws inspiration from this thought.
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327.008.3
The Art of Negotiation Reaching a Mutually Satisfactory Solution

David C. McGAFFEY
The central issue of the art of negotiation is how to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. If we are talking about a formal negotiation, such as state to state or management to labor, a problem or issue which predisposes the various parties to distrust or even hostility almost always exists at the beginning of the negotiation. How do you move from that relationship to a solution which fully satisfies all parties? Why is this problem? If a solution exists which is better for all parties, all parties should naturally want it. If that is true, then negotiation should be easy. The Art of Negotiation would be no more than a set of methodologies which help all the parties find all the possible solutions which are better for everyone, and then a set of methods to help choose one of those. In reality, however, many, if not most formal negotiations fail. Even those which succeed are seen as difficult and may require multiple attempts. I suggest that the primary problem is one of mind-set. Many individuals involved in negotiations do not understand the essence of negotiations, and they approach the process with an attitude, a mind-set, which predisposes them to fail. In this paper, I will begin by explaining the necessary mind-set, noting the primary reasons why people involved in negotiations tend to have an inappropriate mind-set. I will then, through an extended metaphor, show how those individuals may be able to accept the necessary point of view. Finally, I will then explain some elements of the process by which those with the appropriate mind-set may be able to discover a solution which will be mutually satisfactory.
David C. McGaffey is an international consultant and professor of international relations. Currently teaches on an adjunct basis at Holy Names University, Oakland. He is associated with AUCS (Skopje), European University (Lisbon), Lesley University (Cambridge) and the University of Sierra Leone, where he developed that Universitys first MBA program and helped manage the Institute of Public Administration and Management. He is a specialist in negotiations, cultural analysis, organizational behavior, and strategic planning.
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Why Do People Approach Negotiations Poorly?

Consider that almost every negotiation occurs because there is seen to be a problem between the parties which requires a solution. When labor and management negotiate, each side perceives the other as wanting too much at the own expense. When suppliers and purchasers negotiate, it is because one side thinks the supplier is charging too much, and the other side thinks the buyer is unwilling to pay a fair price. When countries negotiate, it is often about a dispute which is long-standing. The individuals in all of these cases come to the table seeing the other side as an adversary, and their desire (and often their instruction from superiors) is to win to reach a solution which is favorable to their side at the expense of the other side. That attitude is perfectly understandable, but is almost guaranteed to make the negotiation fail, because it is contrary to the essence of negotiation. Anyone can reach a solution in any negotiation. All you have to do is lie a little, cross your fingers behind your back, and sign a piece of paper. But that solution is worth no more than the cost of the paper it is printed on. Unless you (and each party to the agreement) believe that the solution you have reached satisfies all your needs (and at least some of your wants), you will ignore it as soon as you leave the room and will likely abrogate it as soon as everyone gets home. At minimum, unless you (and each party) really believe it is fully satisfactory, you will be unable to persuade your bosses (political superiors, the electorate, the owners or union members) back home. Even if at first it appears good on the surface, either you or the other party will abandon it as soon as either of you realize you are better off without it. The only enforcement of the terms of a negotiated agreement is the mutual desire of the parties to maintain the new relationship reached through the negotiation. The solution you might reach is no solution at all unless all parties want it because they truly believe it is better for them than the previous relationship they had. That is the essence of negotiation, and that is why the word mutually is the most important word in any negotiation. Even the word solution is incorrect. Yes, almost every negotiation is about a specific issue or issues, which must be taken care of but those issues are not the core of the negotiation. Every negotiation, regardless of the issues presented, is a process which uses those issues to formulate a new relationship between the parties. The new relationship is the purpose, goal, and fundamentally important element of the negotiation the issues are merely the means by which you establish that new relationship. The word solution merely relates to the issues, and you do not want to solve a relationship, you want to establish it. Let us, therefore, restate the question.
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The Art of Negotiation Establishing a Mutually Satisfying New Relationship

The art of negotiation is the mutual process by which two or more parties find a new relationship which satisfies all their current needs (and at least some of their wants) -a relationship which for all parties is preferable to the old relationship -and agree to try it out. The essence of a relationship is that it is on-going and long term, rather than a one-time thing. The issues may be one-time issues, but they are, I repeat, merely the means of establishing, through negotiations, a new and preferable relationship. A preferable relationship does not, necessarily, mean a warm and friendly relationship. If you are currently in a state of war, a hostile truce may be the new relationship, and both sides may truly prefer that. If you currently have a hostile relationship, the new relationship may be one of serious dislike, but if that is preferable both to you and to all the other parties, the negotiation was a success. Ideally, you hope through negotiations to develop a positive relationship, but that may take both time and a number of stages each reached through a new negotiation. The better the relationship you achieve, the better the negotiations, but you often have to overcome a history of distrust which may make a strongly positive relationship impossible in a single step. All that is necessary in a successful negotiation is that the new relationship be preferred by all parties to the existing one.
What Is a Relationship?
I am using the word relationship to describe the basic pattern of behavior that each party expects from the other. That pattern may be of enemy, of rival, of competitor, of stranger, of limited or broad partnership, of friendship, of kinship, of alliance or even of love. For each of those types of relationships, we can picture how the other will act or react in a broad variety of situations. The purpose of a negotiation is, through discussion of and resolution of specific issues, to move from one relationship to another. This process is the same regardless of the setting. Businessmen negotiate a change from an arms-length relationship to partnership. Young men and young women negotiate a change from (attractive) strangers to friends and sometimes to marriage partners. Countries negotiate a change from neighbors to allies. All use the same process negotiating the outcome of specific issues in order to become closer to the other and move into a preferred relationship. But in every one of these cases, both parties (all parties) must agree that the new relationship is truly preferred. If anyone doesnt want to change, they are free to say no. One party cannot unilaterally change a relationship or at least not for the better. The other businessman may prefer to remain separate,
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and say no to a partnership. A young woman may say, Lets just remain friends. A country may say they like things just as they are, and say no to an alliance. A successful negotiation is one in which the process succeeds in convincing all parties that a change in relationship is preferable to what currently exists. This means that the primary job of a negotiator is to ensure that any offer (either on the specific issues or on the change in relationship) is both satisfactory to the other party and is seen, convincingly, by the other party as preferable to the status quo.
Negotiation and Bargaining

When asked, most people are likely to say that they are not negotiators, but to acknowledge that they are experienced bargainers. This perception is, in fact, false, but people see negotiation as a difficult, esoteric and specialized skill, while bargaining is a normal part of life. Thus, when these people participate in a negotiation, they tend to use the skills they have developed as bargainers, not realizing that the two processes, while outwardly similar, are very different, and largely opposed processes. Bargaining is about winning. You start bargaining knowing the maximum you are willing to pay. You want a kilo of cheese/ a repair job on your automobile/ a sale of your merchandise at the best possible price, knowing that any increase for you is a loss for the other person. That one-time action is satisfactory for both parties one obtains an item for an acceptable price, the other obtains an acceptable price for the product and each side competes with the other to win within those acceptable limits. Like negotiation, the parties involved are the only enforcers a buyer or a seller can always say no. But neither party is concerned about the needs or wants of the other. They are engaged in a competition, just as sports teams, courtroom lawyers and contestants are engaged in competition, and their pleasure or unhappiness relates to whether or not they won over the other party. In contrast, a negotiation while it may use an issue such as a purchase as the frame is basically little concerned with the specific issue, because the parties are trying to establish a better long-term relationship with each other, and have to be primarily concerned with persuading the other side that they will win if they accept the proposal. For example, a businessman seeking a long-term customer may make an initial sale at a loss (e.g., give a free sample) because the price of the sample is unimportant if he succeeds in winning a loyal customer. A bargainer wants to win for himself, to better the other; a negotiator wants the other side to win and to recognize that they have won so that they will want the new relationship (which is also a positive for the negotiator.) Therefore, a bargainer should be kept away from a negotiating table.
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This simple concept is essential to the art of negotiation, but for many people, it is difficult to accept. In negotiation, the primary task and the goal of the negotiator is to make the other party satisfied. Of course, the negotiator must work within the limits of the real needs of his side, but there is normally a substantial range of solutions which will meet those needs. The negotiators focus is and must be to find the solution or set of solutions which will make the other party happy (while meeting the needs of his party) and to use that solution to move the two parties into a mutually preferable relationship.
( 2011 David C. McGaffey, Skopje)
Negotiation as Courtship
I noted above that it is false to think that most people are not experienced in negotiation. People negotiate all the time they just do not think of it as negotiation. When a teenage daughter, brand new drivers license clutched her hands, asks her father for the keys to the car, what follows is a negotiation, with the daughter hoping to move toward a new, more adult, relationship, and the father trying, with love, to keep his daughter safe while she becomes an adult. When a housewife engages in friendly conversation with a market vendor, hoping to establish a new relationship as a favored customer, that is a negotiation. We are all expert negotiators, but we are not accustomed to using the skills we have learned in such experiences in a formal exchange with the name Negotiation. One type of negotiation that all of us have engaged in, often repeatedly, is courtship the process by which two people of the opposite sex move their relationship from strangers to acquaintances to friends to boy/girlfriends, and finally, for most of us, to marriage partners. The following extended metaphor will attempt to show how the skills we use in our interpersonal relationships can and should be applied to all levels of negotiation even to formal dispute negotiations between countries. Imagine a high school, filled with adolescents of both sexes, each one privately unsure and uncertain, but publicly trying to look strong and brave and boastful. There is a young man at the school, (let us call him Mac) recently transferred from elsewhere, whose fondest wish is to be accepted by the others, and in particular to become a member of a couple of the prestigious clubs at the school. Also at the school is a popular, beautiful girl named Helen. For reasons which are always inexplicable, Mac has come to feel that Helen must be a part of his future. He wants to get closer to her, and maybe in his daydreams imagines something even beyond friendship. Unfortunately, Mac and Helen have a history. When he arrived at the school, Mac did something the exact thing doesnt matter which angered Helen. She started to call him names, and got all of her friends to call him names.
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Since she is a popular girl, a member of all the clubs, it seems that Mac now seems to have little chance to join any of the clubs. Poor Mac! If he wants to be accepted, and if he hopes to become closer to Helen, he has to do something to change her perception of him, and to persuade her she wants to become closer to him. If she does that, she (and her friends) will stop calling Mac names, and his chances of being accepted by the clubs will become much greater. What is he to do? First, he needs to figure out what he really needs, as opposed to what he wants. This can be difficult for an adolescent, because his wants are urgent, confused, and endless. It is, however difficult, necessary. There is an old saying, If you dont know where you are going, chances are you will not get there. So we will leave Mac to his figuring for a moment, and then assume that he has successfully defined his needs, as membership in the clubs and a better relationship with Helen (not necessarily a warm one, though he can wish). The new relationship with Helen must be at minimum sufficient that she will stop blocking his membership in the clubs. If he directly approaches Helen and says, Lets be friends, she will probably laugh at him. She is perfectly satisfied with the current situation she has lots of friends, and is sure that she doesnt need Mac. Before he approaches her, he needs to figure what she needs, and find some need of hers that he can help supply. That is even more difficult because Helen is also an adolescent, probably has never taken the time to sort out her needs from her wants, and Mac cant read her mind. Mac needs to spend the time and effort finding something she needs that he can help supply. How does he do that? Probably he would start by approaching his and her acquaintances, asking them to tell him everything they know about her. Then he would speak to her enemies every popular girl in high school has enemies and again ask them to tell him everything they know about her. By this time, she will have been told that he is asking everyone about her, and that he obviously wants to get to know her better. At minimum, this might make here curious about him, which is a good beginning. This, if it is properly done, will take time and care. If, however, he really needs to become closer to her, he will take the time and only approach her when he has something to offer which she will be interested in. She might be terrible at math, for example, while he is an A student. He might offer to tutor some friend of hers, so that she hears from a trusted source that he is really good at this. She might even approach him, which would be an ideal beginning, but at minimum, if he approaches her with an offer of math tutoring, she would know it is an offer which would help her. Perhaps he would find that she has been borrowing from all her friends, and that they are beginning to become uncomfortable. If he could think of some enjoyable way she could start earning money, with his assistance, he could present it to her as a way she could build the confidence of her friends that she will eventually repay
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her debts. Whatever it is, if he finds a way to satisfy one or more of her real needs, he will be in a good position to begin the conversation which could lead to an improved relationship. There is nothing about this which guarantees success. Everyone who has been in high school has memories of failed attempts to attract a boyfriend/girlfriend. This method, however, increases the odds of a mutually satisfactory solution. I will end the metaphor here. I ask the readers to examine their own memories, and to think about whether this approach to a personal negotiation does or does not appear likelier to achieve success than, for example, showing off, or pretending to like someone else, or any of the other approaches common in high school. Finally, I assert that whatever is true about the high school romance is true at every level of negotiation, including disputes between countries. Obviously, I chose the names Mac & Helen to represent The Republic of Macedonia & Greece. I strongly suggest that the method I suggested for Mac is also the approach I suggest for Macedonia.
Negotiation Methodologies
If negotiators have the appropriate mind-set, then there are formal elements of negotiation methodology which will increase the chances of a successful conclusion. First, the negotiators (and their superiors) must understand the real negotiation time-line. A negotiation does not begin when two parties sit down at a table, and does not end when an agreement is reached. About 70% of the measurable time of a negotiation must be spent in preparation. Preparation includes determining your own real needs, and getting the various factions and power-centers on your own side to agree that these are the real needs. The most time, however, must be spent studying and coming to understand the other party. Like Mac and Helen, you must understand enough about the other party to know what at least some of their real needs are, and figure out how to present your knowledge in a way that makes them realize that, with your help, they can obtain something they really need. You need to have encyclopedic knowledge of your mutual history, focusing especially on points likely to cause tempers to flare, and other points which are likely to make the other party realize that cooperation is not only possible, but could be beneficial. You need to have similar knowledge of the economics of both sides, so that you can look for synergies which could benefit both parties. You need to know the personalities involved both political power centers and the likely negotiators for the other party. You have to understand the biases, thinking style, and personal history of each individual who has significant influence on the negotiations. You also need to understand the factions and power centers that do not now have a role in the negotiations, but could have such as the media, business interests,
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David C. McGaffey
religious centers, or regional groups with regional concerns. You need to know the specific history of every previous exchange on the specific issues you will be negotiating. There will have to come a point when you declare that you are ready, but in negotiations, surprises tend to be disastrous, so knowledge is power. Most importantly, you must build your team, ensuring that every member (to the extent possible) shares a desire for a successful outcome, and the understanding that this can be achieved only if you are able to propose something which the other side prefers to the status quo. Every member of the team must appreciate that it is only the desire of the parties involved to change their relationship that ensures a successful outcome, and that their job is to make the other side want the change. Given what I have said at the beginning of this paper, it will take time to build an integrated team with this kind of shared vision. With good preparation, the active negotiating phase should take a relatively short time. Some of that time will be spent identifying members of the other team with an inappropriate mind-set, and trying to educate them about the true nature of negotiation. Much or most of the active negotiation will take place away from the table at social occasions, in the halls, or through third parties. The formal talks will be filled with statements intended for outside audiences, and with the ratification of agreements already reached. A curious phenomenon will occur in a successful negotiation. The two teams, which began as almost opponents, will when they realize that they have built the basic framework of a successful agreement become a single team, dedicated to polishing the agreement into a form that each side can successfully defend to their political masters at home. One effect of this is that, having found a solution which satisfies needs, all participants will look for ways of adding elements which merely satisfy wants of a particular faction, or individual, or of the party as a whole. They do this because they realize that the only guarantee of success is that everyone on each side must want the agreement to work, and so adding a sweetener to ensure a potential critic will be happy is a small price to pay. When the agreement is reached, signed, and ratified, the longest phase of a negotiation begins implementation. A negotiated agreement is merely words on paper, and usually refers only to the issues. The new relationship which has been achieved through agreement on these issues is, like any new relationship, a fragile shoot, and requires cultivation, watering and continued care before it grows into a strong plant. If Helen agrees to go out with Mac, he must begin to work to ensure that she continues to enjoy his company, because she can always drop him. The need to ensure the other party is satisfied does not end with the agreement; it begins. If Mac gets Helen to agree to marry him, and decides he has no further reason to keep her happy, he will not have a successful marriage. The implementation phase stretches out to the unmeasured future. It includes the
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need to keep aware of new issues which might arise and require new negotiations to maintain the relationship, or to move it to a higher level. I am not in a position to state what kind of proposal Macedonia might make to Greece to make Greece want to move to a better relationship. I have not gone through the preparation phase to determine either Macedonias or Greeces real needs, nor to understand the history, economy, personalities or other necessary elements. As in my metaphor, however, I note that Greece is, apparently, bad at math as the disclosure of unexpected deficits makes clear. It is also true that Greece, like Helen, has borrowed a lot of money from her friends, who are now worried about repayment. Perhaps Macedonia could find, in such truths, the seed for a proposal which would show Greece a way out of its present uncomfortable circumstances. For example, a proposal for a shared tourism campaign, focused on new clients such as Russians and other Cyrillic-speaking people, bringing new tourists to enjoy Alexandrian and Cyrillic and Roman and Ottoman ruins (in both Greece and Macedonia), using Greek airports and the railway from Greece to Belgrade as the entry points, could be presented by Greece to debtors as evidence that Greece is actively seeking new revenue sources. If it has the added advantage of renewing rail links, bringing tourists to Macedonia (with perhaps decreased on no border formalities), it would go a long way toward establishing a new relationship. From my relative ignorance, I cannot say that this proposal would work, but it is an example of how Macedonia could use its knowledge of both Macedonia and Greece to craft a proposal designed to satisfy Greek needs while also satisfying Macedonian needs. If the negotiators start with an appropriate mind-set, learn enough of Greece to accurately identify Greek needs, then, starting with specific problems, work together to identify proposals which benefit both sides, there is no reason to doubt they can craft a mutually satisfactory solution, and thus develop a mutually satisfactory relationship.
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323.1(497.115)"1980- "
Kosovo: Dialogue Leads to a Turning-point

Sonja BISERKO
The Kosovo myth stayed in the conscious of the Serbian people as the central event in Serbias entire history. The Kosovo legend was based on the basic persuasion that in 1389, in the battle on Kosovo, the medieval Serbian state fell and that its independence was buried here and the five decade long slavery under the Turks began. The liberation of Kosovo and the Kosovo oath of allegiance became the central point of the Serb history, for the Serbs have never forgotten their banishment from the country representing a treasure trove of their most precious historic creations. For this reason, the liberation of Kosovo and Metohija in 1912-1913 meant the return to their previously wrested homeland.1 The Kosovo myth played a significant role in creating the modern Serbian state in the XIX Century and after the Balkan wars in 1913, the Vidovdan cult (the day on which the Kosovo battle was allegedly lost), that originates from the XIX century, is glorified as the day of a heroic feat and victory over the evil. I also became a symbol of a bloody and all-out retaliation against all things Turk and Muslim, in general. Vidovdan was officially introduced as a national, church holiday in 1913, following the absolute victory over the Turks. Such a position on the Kosovo myth was deftly exploited to engineer political homogenization of the Serb people in the early 80s when the reality in Kosovo had long been changed. The Kosovo myth, served to transpose the conflict from the sphere of politics, economy and history to an extra-temporal sphere of myth. Miodrag Popovi hinted at the misuse of the Kosovo myth even in the early 70s: The Vidovdan cult, which mixed historical reality with a mythical one, the real
1
Radomir Luki, Znaaj boja na Kosovu, kosovska epika i kosovski mit - simbol ouvanja srpske nacionalne svesti, Politika, 28 June 1989. Sonja Biserko is the founder and president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. Ms. Biserko is Senior Research Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington and a guest lecturer at the Human Rights Center, University of California at Berkeley. She is the founder of The Center for Anti-War Action in the Belgrade Forum for International Relations and member of the International Editorial Board of International Transitional Justice Journal.
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Sonja Biserko
struggle with pagan-style hallmarks (retaliation, blood tribute, slaughtering, victimization, revival of a heroic order), within itself has a destructive potential typical of milieus with unbridled mythical impulses. As a phase in development of the national thinking it was historically necessary but as a lasting spiritual state, that the Vidovdan cult may ultimately turn against those who are unable to free themselves from its pseudo-mythical and pseudo-historical tentacles. Inversely, by remaining in the grip of those tentacles, contemporary line of thinking, the mans spirit, may experience a new Kosovo, that is, an intellectual and ethnical rout.2 The awakening of the Serbian nationalism through the Kosovo myth was aimed at preparing the Serbian nation in the attempt to re-centralize SFRY or to create a new country. Belgrades attempts during the 20th century, first with the nationalization and colonization that turned Kosovo mostly into Serbian, were unsuccessful as well as the subsequent attempts to banish the Albanian to Turkey. The attempts to send the refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina toward Kosovo were unsuccessful as well. Due to the increase and biological expansion of the Albanian nation, especially after adopting the Constitution in 1974, the Serbian nationalists, in fear of demographic explosion, began looking for other solutions for Kosovo. The demonstrations of Albanian students in Kosovo served to open the Serbian issue in Yugoslavia and not for preserving Kosovo. Even then, there were talks about Kosovos partition as the most rational solution. The fact that Kosovo was the place of the longest state repression in modern history of the Balkans, as well as its complexity as a problem for the international community, seemed frustrating to the international actors and all their attempts to find a solution that would satisfy both sides. Still, Serbia, together with the international community, missed out on the chance to find a suitable solution for the Kosovo issue. The refusal to accept the treaty in Rambouillet, previously the agreement from the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia in 1991, showed that Serbia is uncooperative on the matter, namely that it followed its wrong perception of the international political constellation. The NATO intervention in 1999 put the Kosovo issue in a new political context and brought Kosovo in a process of gradual realization of the statehood. However, Belgrades aspirations toward Kosovo and its neighbors have not been significantly changed even after the change of Slobodan Milosevi in year 2000. The same program continued but with different methods. Meanwhile, the rhetoric changed but the pretensions remained the same. The adjusted strategy related to Kosovos northern part, the Republic of Srpska and Montenegro, whose independence was treated as a temporary situation. Serbias highest official representatives began more publically proposing solutions for partition of Kosovo and Bosnia. For instance,
2
Miodrag Popovi, Vidovdan i asni krst, ogled iz knjievne arheologije, Belgrade, p. 131-132.
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Vuk Jeremi in 2009, on the subject of Bosnia, told Washington Times that lets stop pretending that this is a country.3 Belgrade considered that by postponing the solving of Kosovos status, time would have an effect and that Belgrade will initiate Kosovos partition and formalize de facto Kosovos situation. Due to thus, Belgrade did not seriously participate in the negotiations led by Martti Ahtisaari. Still, the international community, following the violence in March 2004, defined its position to Kosovos status. In this way, the Contact-group adopted the principles that largely came down to the notion that there will be no partition of Kosovo or being under Belgrades authority, or unification with Albania. With Russias support, that took Belgrades side (for its own reasons) the Resolution of the Security Council was not unanimously adopted that would have replaced resolution 1244 and solve the Kosovo issue. Even after having declared independence, Kosovo still remains hostage of Belgrades strategy of insisted partition. Dobrica osi was the first to speak about the partition, who considers that this is the only fair decision. osi considers that Serbia must diplomatically and politically fight for revision of the decision on Kosovos independence which is so unjust that it establishes permanent enmity between the Albanian and Serbian people. This American victory, given to the Albanians, will neither make the present nor future generations of the Albanian people happy. Kosovos declaration of independence, after the fall of Yugoslavia, is the biggest political mistake of the United States of America and the European Union. It is an act that will permanently destabilize the Balkans and determine its re-composition. America conquered Kosovo with war, for its own strategic objectives, it built the military base Bondsteel and turned Albanians into its own dutiful vassals and guards of Bondsteel. Albanians will take advantage of this role for realization of their main national goal the creation of Great Albania.4
The partition as a constant of the Serbian politics

Kosovos partition has been constant of the Serbian politics in the last two decades. The Serbian team for dialogue with Pristina publically presented the proposal on partition. Borko Stefanovi stated that the Serbian negotiation team is not shying away from the possibility to discuss a partition of Kosovo.5 The fact that Belgrade has not given up on the partition of Kosovo questions the sincerity of the Serbian Government when it claims that it wishes for normalization of the relations in the region, especially with Kosovo. The early elections in Kosovo
3 4 5
Washington Times, 24 April 2009. Veernje Novosti, 20 March 2008. http://www.naslovi.net/2011-04-23/e-novine/srbija-sanja-podelu-kosova/2494497
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Sonja Biserko
(December 2010) also showed that Belgrade has a double agenda. Belgrade sent a clear message to the Serbian voters about the participation in elections: it supported them to vote in the enclaves in the south whereas it actively worked against the process of going out to vote in the north. This practically left Kosovo under the power of Belgrade. International Law Professor Radoslav Stojanovi also emphasizes that talks between Belgrade and Pristina cannot be discussions of technical issues because the conflict between Serbs and Albanians stretches back 150 years. Stojanovi believes that the direction of national reconciliation should be taken, a far more painful and longer process than a procedure before a court, but it is the only solution.6 Chief of the negotiation team, Borislav Stefanovi, says that it is a generic term that comprises solution of a series of piled up problems that exist in Kosovo and Metohija. Stefanovi stresses that by solving the issues that burden people in Kosovo and Metohija, major and difficult issues that will be put on the agenda, we can speak about a historical compromise between Serbs and Albanians which is a prerequisite for normalization of the situation in Western Balkans, stable development of the region and open road to the EU.7 For the Serbian elite gathered around Dobrica osi, a historical agreement between Serbs and Albanians is Kosovos partition. Serbian President Boris Tadi, in September 2008, stated that he is prepared to think about the partition of Kosovo and Metohija as an option for solving the regions status but only if the other solutions do not produce results. Tadi, in an interview with Radio-Television Serbia said that Kosovos partition, as an option at that time is not on the agenda but that Serbia continues wanting to seek for a solution within the frame of the concept for the biggest possible independence of Kosovo, within the frames of Serbia. Im ready to think about that option, if we exhaust all other options and there are plenty of them as there is still room for us to find a solution within the frames of the essential autonomy,8 Tadi said.
First signs of cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina

The first results have come from direct discussions between President Tadi and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton on Kosovo and the launch of dialogue. At the beginning of October, Serbia collaborated with EULEX for the first time to combat organized crime in northern Kosovo. Border controls between Serbia and the north of Kosovo were stepped up significantly and so, for the first time
6 7 8
Blic, 31 October 2010. Politika, 22 January 2011. Politika, 30 September 2008.
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in the past ten years, Serbia showed an interest in standing up to organized crime involving Serbs in Kosovska Mitrovica. Ten years of complete lawlessness had seen new criminal gangs being established among Kosovo Serbs. For years the Serbian media insisted that the Albanian community was the source of crime in the Balkans, despite data showing that both communities are involved in criminal activities. What must be emphasized is that Serbian criminal circles in the north have, to a large extent, been responsible for an increase in the lucrative business of human trafficking. The bulk of the business is smuggling (oil and oil derivatives in first place, along with cigarettes and alcohol), as well as arms, drugs and human trafficking. The joint operation of the Serbian police and EULEX resulted in the arrest of one of the leaders of the Serbian underworld in Mitrovica. On October 5, 2010, a man was arrested on suspicion of attempted murder, illegal possession of weapons and causing general danger. This kind of intervention by EULEX (in collaboration with Serbia) functions as a demonstration, a warning to the most extreme elements in northern Kosovo. And although this police and customs operation alone does not imply any long-term solution, it show that, following agreement at the highest political level (Ashton and Tadi), more concrete results in the field may be expected. Following the boost in border controls, smuggling in northern Kosovo dropped within weeks, as evidenced by the longer lines of trucks and semitrailers waiting to observe the law and customs regulations at authorized border checkpoints. During the same period, the Kosovo authorities continued to close down Telekom Serbias mobile telephony stations. This has made it more difficult for Serbs (especially those in the enclaves) to communicate with central Serbia. At the same time it has put Kosovos mobile telephony market on a legal footing. It should be noted that Telekom Serbia has not paid tax on its mobile telephony services in Kosovo for the past ten years, in the light of which the decision of the Kosovo authorities is within the law.
Shift after the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justices9 advisory opinion on the independence of Kosovo, followed by the submission of the joint resolution of the EU and Serbia to the UN General Assembly led to shift of Belgrades Kosovo policy. Serbian President Boris Tadis articulation of the new policy, was welcomed with strong support from the Serbian public. This implies, firstly, that Serbia must not be a country of just one issue Kosovo and, secondly, that we shall not be able
9
The International Court of Justice (2010) delivered an advisory opinion which reads that the Kosovo Independence Declaration is not in breach of international law.
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Sonja Biserko
to accede to the EU if we import new conflicts into it.10 This is underlined by the disappearance from public life of Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremi the standard bearer for the hard-line Kosovo policy. Before the end of last year, Minister Jeremi unexpectedly began promoting the idea of dialogue we solve problems in the region by dialogue and this is our greatest contribution to building democracy in the world.11 The shift of Belgrades Kosovo policy is also characterized by the change of the multi-decade radical rhetoric and politics toward Kosovo. At the insistence of the international community, a dialogue with Kosovo was launched and solution of the technical issues between Belgrade-Pristina. The formulation in the joint resolution of Serbia and the EU, where the dialogue between the sides is mentioned, does not exclude the imposition of topics for discussion and their content and development largely depend on the preparedness of Belgrade and Pristina in finding a compromise in the direct negotiations. The dialogue is also an important part of the new strategy whose ultimate goal is receiving EU candidature. High functionary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Borislav Borko Stefanovi was chosen as chief of the negotiation team. Stefanovi kicked off his new mandate, that is, the period from announcing his name and the first meeting between the negotiations teams, with skilful moves he organized series of meeting, not only with the political representatives but also with the civil sector as well as with the messages that one cannot enter the negotiations with stubborn positions. Belgrade put the constructive cooperation first and Serbias European perspective. It was also stressed that the negotiations with Pristina should start as soon as possible. The first subjects of discussion were the traffic, telecommunications, cadastre, air-traffic, and the missing persons. The daily agenda, according to the words of Borislav Stefanovi, will be harmonized with the EU The team will include professional people from different spheres who are not burdened by politics or party-affiliated, people who are to bring forward the best solutions from their sphere. The chiefs of the teams are political factors and they are those who, from the points of contact of the proposed solutions, are to seek what is politically acceptable for them.12 Boidar eli announced that Belgrade will make the effort to solve certain open issues in connection to the regional cooperation, such as the custom stamps of Kosovo and the presentation at regional forums.
10 11 12
Blic, 7 October 2010. Politika, 20 October 2010. Politika, 22 January 2011.
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We do not have the intention or interest to exclude Kosovo from the trade relations or regional cooperation. However, solutions that suggest directly or indirectly recognition of Kosovo, remain unacceptable for Serbia, said eli.13 Mainstream politicians admit that thorny topics are being set aside in favour of beginning with easier matters. President of the Democratic Partys Political Council, Dragoljub Miunovi, has said that, for now, Belgrade is primarily interested in talks on the status of human rights in Kosovo. We have our compatriots there and we cannot ignore or be indifferent to their situation. Miunovi believes that property issues, both private and state, are of vital importance: There are our monasteries there, and cultural monuments. As well as various economic issues that we should not neglect. We export more to Kosovo than we do to America and we have a surplus in this exchange. So were interested in trade and in investing.14 (Annually, goods in an amount of over 200 million euro are being exported from Serbia to Kosovo and only 3.5 million euro from Kosovo to Serbia).
The international community and Kosovos partition

Belgrade, despite the position of the international community (2004) that there will be no partition of Kosovo, is trying to reopen this topic. The international community, in all resolutions, is reiterating its stance, aware that any change of the borders on the Balkans in the present phase will be pernicious for the region. In that sense, the EU warned many times that the borders in the Balkans are a done job. Belgrade ignored the Resolution of the European Parliament from January, 2011, that indicates that the parallel institutions of Kosovo should be dissolved since they are destroying the decentralization process and hampering the full integration of the Serbian community in Kosovos institutions. Commenting the resolution, Deputy Prime Minister Boidar eli said that it would be better if this amendment was not adopted but the European Parliament cannot decide about the status. This does not oblige us and has no legal power.15 In the time when the international and diplomatic focus, due to the government crisis, was oriented toward Pristina, the Serbian radical forces used it and committed an international putsch and toppled the local authorities in northern Kosovo, that were formed at the parallel elections in May, 2010. In 2008, when Kosovos independence was declared, Milorad Dodik continuously raised the question of Republika Srpskas right to self-determination. He called on Serbians and Albanians to a historical agreement in the name of solving the mutual territorial disputes. Dodik said that the partition of Kosovo is the only
13 14 15
Statement given to Radio Television Serbia, 17 January 2011. Politika, 27 September 2010. http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.69.html:315698-Ratifikovan-SSP.
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Sonja Biserko
sustainable solution that could be acceptable to both Serbs and Albanians.16 In his view, Albanians can hardly govern North Kosovo and if he was in the position of Albanian leaders, North Kosovo should be offered in return for a lasting peace and border demarcation with Serbia. At the same time, Dodiks message to the Serbian leadership is that Serbia must not allow to be blocked for yet another 50 years for the sake of Kosovo. Following the same model, Dodik frequently presents options for greater independence of Republika Srpska in regard to Sarajevos central authorities. To that effect, these are exceptionally dangerous ideas as they not only open the possibility for attempt of new demarcations between the post-Yugoslav countries but also endanger the borders with other countries in the region. Following the same principle, the other border minorities in the region could be called on to demand change of the borders and exchange of territories. Essentially, the Serbian elite has long ago given up on Kosovo. However it has been skillfully manipulated in order to demand the secession of Republika Srpska. This has involved the entire Serbian elite, particularly the jurists, who have pushed the Kosovo issue through every possible international mechanism in order to lend legitimacy to the opening of the question of the partition of Bosnia. Academicians, the authors of the Memorandum, have been particularly active in this, using every opportunity to argue it in public. The most fierce attacks have been on the US and its key role in the Balkans in foiling Belgrades achievement of its historic goals in Bosnia. Thus Dobrica osi emphasises that the US has evolved from a democratic state into a monstrous police state,17 while Milorad Ekmei claims that it is a form of new fascism with a democratic tradition and under another name.18 Speaking about the Kosovo resolution, Ekmei says: Its a success, even though world is divided on it, even to our detriment... This is one of our great battles, for people and states to stand against the United States... The world must not allow America to strangle small states and nations in the dark. He holds the US responsible because the 1992-95 civil war in Yugoslavia was conducted within the framework of the American axiom that the Serbian nation may not rebuild the state it created over the past two centuries but must remain politically fragmented with no higher level of unity.19
Games surrounding the partition

In the midst of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, different theories surfaced on what needs to be done with Kosovo. One was the status quo and another a two
16 17 18 19
According to Danas, 15 March 2010. Veernje Novosti, 2 September 2010. Veernje Novosti, 28 August 2010. Veernje Novosti, 28 August 2010.
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Germanies model by which Belgrade would not recognize Kosovo and Pristina would not get United Nations membership. The last person who presented the idea of partition was Minister of Interior Ivica Dai, who, ahead of the fourth round of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina presented the idea of demarcation which appeared as a detonator and showed how greatly the issue with the status is still delicate. The international community, mostly USA and the EU, exclude every possibility for Kosovos partition as it opens a dangerous possibility for similar demands in the region, namely in Serbia (Presevo Valley, Sandzak). The greatest danger would be for Macedonia and Bosnia. Thomas Countryman, US Deputy Assistant Secretary, cautioned that the north of Kosovo is not a subject of territory partition, it is not, nor will it be part of this dialogue and both sides knew this before its beginning.20 Daniel Serwer, Balkan expert from the U.S. Institute of Peace, also publically presented his stance against the partition and warned that there will be no partition of Kosovo as it would occupy Serbia too, because whatever Serbia gets in northern Kosovo, the Albanians will demand the same in the Presevo Valley. Serwer particularly warned that the effect from the partition is to have a dominoeffect on Bosnia and Macedonia and that Serbia and Kosovo could not guarantee the territorial integrity of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.21 Yet, the Serbian elite believe that the partition is ruled out. All ideas on Kosovo, whether it is matter of the partition or recognition, became an issue of internal political outsmarting in Serbia. Some invoke the Constitution (Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia) while others are primarily trying to test the international community by putting out feelers (on the partition). Part of the political elite in Belgrade understood the international warnings because Serbian government Media Office Chief Milivoje Mihajlovi stressed that all statements about Kosovos partition should only be interpreted as private opinions The government of the Republic of Serbia has never had a partition of Kosovo on its agenda, nor has any other forum of the government discussed this issue. The government policy on Kosovo and Metohija remains unchanged, all statements can be interpreted as private opinion.22 Professor at the faculty of political sciences, Predrag Simi, considers that the statements on Kosovos partition can be interpreted as putting out feelers but that the idea of Kosovos partition now appears in the new generation of politicians which is not familiar with all its pluses and minuses.
20 21 22
http://www.naslovi.net/2011-04-23/mondo/kantrimen-podela-nije-niti-ce-biti-na-stolu/2494287 Radio Free Europe, 16 May 2011. http://www.b92.net, 16 May 2011.
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Sonja Biserko
Simi emphasizes The first consequence from this idea will be what is already being said in the public - that in part of the Albanian public opinion and political elite, there is a stance that the partition might mean exchange of territories. In other words that Pristina might be willing to give up on the north of Kosovo, of what is there being called eastern Kosovo and this is the Presevo Valley with the three municipalities Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja. The last few days we have seen that the president of the municipality of Presevo, Ragmi Mustafa, stressed this idea. Secondly, if Kosovos partition happens, what is to happen to Bosnia, Macedonia, what is to happen with Sandzak.23
The economic cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia

The cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo is officially non-existent because Serbia has not recognized Kosovo. However, the informal economic relations between Serbia and Kosovo are very dynamic but of course in the frame of objective possibilities. The majority of problems that make the economic cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo difficult are of political nature. Both Serbia and Kosovo are members of CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement), which means that there are no restrictive factors (customs) in trade between the two countries (except in certain cases as stressed in the CEFTA agreement). However, Serbias refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent country is manifested through the fact that Serbia does not accept Kosovos stamp on the customs documents (even when they are signed and validated by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Bosnia also does not accept their stamp). Therefore, Kosovo does not realize any income from the taxes and customs from the trade with Serbia. CEFTA is the true frame for getting past all barriers, which could be the starting point for future cooperation. Serbia could have the benefit from the use of the basic raw materials and Kosovos young labour force. The problem is that Serbias priority is the north of Kosovo even though the Serbian investments on the north can be profitable for Kosovo too. Agriculture is the sphere that could be an important boost for Kosovos economy. Bearing in mind the fertile ground, the effect could be exceptionally great with small investments and organization. The Trepca mining complex is a conglomerate of some 40 mines and factories, mostly but not all in Kosovo. At this moment, the Trepca facilities are located in the southern and northern Kosovoska Mitrovica, in the same way as the country. Also, the majority of the mining-smelter objects are closed. The objects are in a very poor state and require great investments to make the complex operational
23
Radio Free Europe,16 May 2011.
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and competitive. Some consider that the Trepca complex should be renovated with the help of foreign donations before being able to attract foreign investors. Some of the plants in Trepca and its property are outside Kosovo and it is a question whether Trepca should be divided between the two countries and Kosovo to keep everything that is on this territory. The swift solution of this conflict is very important when working out the future of Trepca because its efficient functioning cannot be restarted without solving the property issue. Kosovos biggest enclave Strpce is a lucrative real-estate market in the Weekend Zone (Sara National Park and Brezovica ski resort). The development of this resort could easily boost the economic growth in the region and open new working posts. However, the ownership disputes with Brezovica are also unsettled. Strpces main problem originates from the parallel municipal government (to 2009) a Kosovo government and the other, parallel, (supported by Serbia). Strpce has a great number of doctors and could become a regional medical centre. It also has the biggest economic potentials and all self-preservation conditions. The ethnic tensions are also at a low level compared to other parts of Kosovo. The Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK) is a publically owned company under Kosovo law and the only electrical energy supplier. Kosovos government plans to privatize the company but this has still not been carried out due to the many barriers. Kosovos electricity production (over 95 percent) comes from the thermal energy. This could be KEKs advantage for the simple reason that Kosovo has huge coal reserves. On the other hand, the use of these reserves depends on the effective functioning of the Trepca mine and at this moment, this issue is very complicated, as much as because of the bad situation of the installation and the mine equipment. Another problem is the poor infrastructure. Nearly 2000 Gwh of electricity are getting lost in the network, distribution and misuses. Some analysts say that the entire plan for reconstruction of Kosovos C power station is bad for the economy and environment. The dispute with the network ownership and the production capacities between Kosovo and Serbia (Elektrostopanstvo Serbia) is ongoing. Whatever the potential solution to this problem is, it requires the political engagement of Kosovo and Serbia, UNMIK too. KEK is also facing problems with the collection of money in the municipal enclaves. KEK tried to solve this problem by shutting them off from the network and some of the enclaves, after few weeks, were left without electricity due to the unsettled debts. Some municipalities reached an agreement with the company and were connected to the electricity supply while others tried to lean on Belgrade but were told that this is not a long-term solution because Serbia does not accept agreement on electricity supply which have the stamp The Republic of Kosovo.24
24
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=03&dd=22&nav_id=57996.
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Sonja Biserko
Challenges and real opportunities

The main challenge in the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations is truly the north of Kosovo that is under Belgrades control and the Serbian parallel structures. In order to establish stability on the Balkans, it is indispensable to dissolve the parallel structures of the north and this part to be integrated in Kosovos legal system. If not, this region will remain one of the main sources of crime on the Balkans. Kosovos partition, which is discussed in the Serbian political circles as the future strategy, is an unacceptable solution as it could destabilize the entire southern part of the Balkans. This precedent would represent a possibility for similar demands in the other countries that have large minority groups at the border territories which would lead to a entire series of new demands for change of borders. In the further negotiation process between Belgrade and Pristina, it is particularly important for the international community, mostly the USA and EU, to stay true to the stance that there will be no partition of Kosovo. Their firm position will gradually lead both sides to essential agreements for all issues. It is obvious that the international community, with the pressure exercised on Dodik to postpone the referendum, finally took a stance that eliminates every possibility for partition. The normalization of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo has its practical use for both sides as well. Serbia is one of the three major exporters to Kosovo (along with Macedonia and Germany). Serbia and Kosovo are CEFTA members, whose goal is free trade in the region. For this reason, the legalization of the current economic relations is the first step which implies that Belgrade will accept the implementation of the customs regulations between the two countries. Along with the official communication, which is in the beginning, the civic sector might play an important role in normalizing the relations. The civic sector has continuous cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina and it might be a useful ally in establishing new ties. The media might have a special role in the further normalization, in creating the new atmosphere and change of the public opinion toward Kosovo. Given that the Serbian public opinion is burdened with noticeable negative stereotypes about Albanians, which the Serbian media significantly contributed to over the past few decades, the change in this sphere would be revolutionary, mostly in portraying the reality in Kosovo and informing about the existing coexistence between Albanians and Serbs who live in Kosovo.
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327.56(497.1)
The Interlinks of the Peace-building Strategies and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms:

Lessons and Challenges for the Preventive Diplomacy Following the Dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia
Veton LATIFI Summary
Prior to the recent emerging expanding tandem role of the preventive diplomacy and the peace-building tools, in the past conflict transformation showed to be largely as a political problem across the world and as an emerging source of the new waves of the further violence. The last cases of the conflicts in Europe following the end of the Cold War proved that the preventive diplomacy can work in successfully when it is designed within a common set with the peace-building process. The paper will discuss the main beliefs and pillars of the philosophies of the two twinning growing disciplines. The paper will aim to identify what are the expectations and the promises of the peace-building from one side and what are the essential ingredients of the preventive diplomacy from another side in the contemporary conflicts in Europe following the end of the Cold War. Peacebuilding can take place at any stage of the eruption cycle. If preventive diplomacy does not take place at the first sign of the major tensions and problems remain still unaddressed, then the transformational processes, in the early stages of an evolving conflict, may take the form of the early warning and the application of appropriate preventive measures.
The Interlinks of the Peace-building Strategies and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Veton Latifi, PhD is a Political Analyst and Lecturer at the South East European University, Tetovo, Republic of Macedonia. In 2003, he published a book entitled Macedonian Challenges in the Process of Democratization and Stabilization.
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The post-conflict processes of the peace-building that followed end of the Cold War in Europe
The post-conflict processes of the peace-building that followed the end of Cold War in Europe showed that for the countries emerging from conflicts, peace-building provides an opportunity for establishment of new institutions (at all three levels: social, political, and judicial), which can give impulsion to development. Unless there is reconstruction and development in the upshot of the conflicts, there can be little expectation that peace will undergo. The process of the peace-building includes action to make out and maintain structures that will tend to strengthen and coagulate peace in order to avoid a reversion into the conflict. If we consider that preventive diplomacy aims to prevent the outbreak of the conflicts, then logically it is to be expected that the peace-building starts during the course of a conflict to prevent its recurrence. While the ending of the Cold War has eased confrontation between the superpowers, international stability has gnarled since 1991. There has been an outbreak of intra-state conflicts in many countries and regions of the world, to which the International Community appeared to have no adequate response initially. The costs of these conflicts in human, economic, social, and other, terms were enormous. In the first half of the 1990s it was obvious that a glance at the poor results of international efforts to prevent escalation of these conflicts makes it obvious that far more energy and finance should be devoted, in the first place, into prevention. In fact, such lesson for the International Community was accepted only when peace- building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the first post-Cold War conflict in Europe was shown as an unsuccessful story; and when Kosovo conflict appeared in 1999 in the international scene risking ruining all the efforts made for stabilizing the Balkans. The latter was going as well to bring an uncomfortable test for the capabilities of the international organizations. The vacillating responses of the International Community to the crises over disintegrating Yugoslavia and ethnic frights elsewhere in Europe have demonstrated a need for better tools to prevent or repair internal political and ethnic abrasion in Europe. Prior to the recent emerging expanding tandem role of the preventive diplomacy and the peace-building tools, in the past conflict transformation showed to be largely a political problem across the world and an emerging source of the new waves of the further violence. The last cases of the conflicts in Europe following the end of the Cold War: Kosovo (1999) and Macedonia (2001) proved that the preventive diplomacy can work successfully when it is designed and launched within a common set with the peace-building process. The acceptance of the so-called concept Prevention better than cure proved that the young discipline called conflict prevention has been spreading fast.
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However, the best practice and lessons learned from recent conflicts all over the world have yet to be brought together into a disciplined body of knowledge.1 The peace-building is also a relatively new concept that has risen to the scene and discussion in the 1990s. It arose in response to three factors: to the fears of the new forms of the conflicts following the end of the Cold War, to the spread of civil wars in the Third World; and as well as the attempt by the former SecretaryGeneral of the Organization of the United Nations (UN), Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to develop more inclusive measures than the traditional forms of UN peacekeeping for dealing with them.
Conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy

The main focus of preventive diplomacy is to identify and respond to looming conflicts in order to prevent the eruption of violence. In principle, the preventive diplomacy is based on the beliefs that conflicts are easier to resolve before they become fierce. And its main argument looks to the cost-benefits outcomes dimensions: once a vicious conflict has erupted, it is extremely difficult to bring it to an end. Before application of the preventive diplomacy tools, enormous damage has been inflicted including the human fact that many lives have been lost until the preventive diplomacy didnt applied in certain conflicts after the end of the Cold War when the emerging discipline started to prove being a successful mechanism in conflict prevention. Preventive diplomacy is defined by Michael Lund as a definite stage in the life-cycle of a conflict, characterized by, among other things, the exclusion of coercion or military-related instruments.2 Other interpretationslike that of Bruce W. Jentleson see preventive diplomacy as characterized by its function of excluding the occurrence of violence in opposition to war diplomacy which is supposed to be mainly directed at limiting or terminating violence.3 The conceptualization of preventive actions and measures is important in view of the differentiations in the stages and nature of conflicts which seem to prevail in the initial typologies of the conflicts. Preventive diplomacy may take many forms, such as diplomatic denunciations, imposing sanctions, providing good offers, peacekeeping, diplomatic protests, active monitoring, and other forms of third-party intervention. It offers the possibility
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Veton Latifi, International involvement and the role of prevention in post conflict peace- building- in L. Georgieva Conflicts Prevention: From the idea to the culture for prevention of conflicts, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Initiative for Peace building and Democracy, Skopje, December 2004. Michael Lunds definition in Roberto, Alliboni Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Perception, 1997-1998, Volume II, No.4. Ibid.
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of avoiding much of the pain and suffering associated with violent conflict. Since the preventive diplomacy showed to work, significant bloodshed has not occurred in many conflicts across the world and especially that was a case of the last two conflicts in Europe: Kosovo and Macedonia. In trying to adapt the preventive diplomacy conceptual approach to the Mediterranean reality through analysis of the Arab-Israeli experience, two Egyptians authors have proposed to define preventive diplomacy as all non-violent efforts that seek to pre-empt the eruption or escalation of violence inter-state conflicts ...4; they have noted that the successful mechanisms and structures of conflict prevention developed by the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty are part of a comprehensive endeavor to solve the conflict between the two countries and that the preventive measures included in the treaty work, at one and the same time, as both security arrangements and confidence building measures.5 In relation to conflict prevention, the concepts and ideas developed by the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) of the Middle East Peace Process6 have been of unambiguous significance. Among these ideas was that of setting up a Regional Conflict Prevention Centre. One of the tools for successful efforts in the field of the conflict prevention in the potential conflict zones or in the zones with incomplete peace-building is establishing exactly a Regional Conflict Prevention Center.7 Its basic tasks would include conflict prevention and conflict resolution. It would work as well as a centre for seminars and training in arms control and regional security, and other activities related to the implementation of specific confidence- security building measures. The primary mission of such a center would be information gathering on possible intra-and inter-state conflict: in the economic field, in the social field, in the political field (including lack or loss of legitimacy of current regimes and leaderships, large-scale violence and human rights violations). Some other objectives usually centers on conflict prevention aim as are for example: development of confidence- building measures and talks on disarmament;
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Abdel Monem Said Aly and Gamal A.G. Soltan in the paper presented at the EuroMeSCo meeting in Cairo, 15-16 February 1997. Ibid. Peters, J., Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1996, p.36. At the Paris summit of OSCE in 1990, a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) was created with the task of supporting the implementation of several CSBM included in the 1990 Vienna Document. Later on, in 1991, at the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers, which took place in Berlin, the CPC was designated the nominating institution for the peaceful settlement of disputes mechanism set out at the Valletta Meeting in January and February 1991. Subsequently, however, the CPC has been turned into a unit with logistical tasks.
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exchange of information on matters relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia; exchanges between leaders of political and civil societies, the cultural and religious world, universities, research communities, the media; exchanges between private associations, trade unions and public and private enterprises; thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts; exchanges of experience and information and by any other appropriate means; contacts between members of parliaments, regional authorities, local authorities and social partners, etc.8 There exist actually disputes in scientific quarters about the elusive concept of conflict prevention and its most suitable conceptual framework. The most important tendency today is to try to streamline the range of conflict prevention to make it as operational as possible.9 In this sense, there is an understanding to separate conflict prevention from short-term actions of preventive diplomacy specifically aimed at preventing the eruption of violent conflicts, i.e. before they must be managed or subjected to enforcement or other kinds of intervention. There can be identified three main disputes and concerns within the academic circles regarding the preventive diplomacy. First, the issue of a difficulty in applying preventive diplomacy as very often only a very narrow window of opportunity exists during which parties may launch legitimate intervention to prevent the outbreak of violence in accordance with the international law. The second high frequent concern of the scientist of the field is that the precipitate intervention may create a self-fulfilling divination and even eventually stimulate conflict in the minds of disputing parties, for instance if outside parties and international institutions with their diplomatic preventive intervention appear to legitimize nationalist claims for self-determination at the outset of a conflict, and undermine existing political authorities. But, in practice exactly that aspect seems to be the leading advantage and the heart of the preventive diplomacy in the process of the conflict prevention. And third, the timing of the engagement of preventive diplomacy is thus an extremely critical, yet elusive, factor in the process of conflict resolution. But, obviously if outside parties wait too long, the doorstep of violence may be crossed before preventive diplomacy can be engaged. Once that doorstep is crossed, any opportunity to resolve the conflict may be seriously delayed or lost altogether.10
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Mariquina, A. Conflict Prevention in Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A European Point of View, in Perception, Volume IV - Number 2, 1999, pp. 48-49. Roberto, Alliboni Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the EuroMediterranean Partnership, Perception, 1997-1998, Volume II, No. 4. For instance see the claim of Martin Griffiths, Terry OCallaghan and Steven C. Roach, in International Relations: The Key Concepts, (2008), p. 263.
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Peace-building and peace-builders

Peace-building is a complementary process to peacekeeping. While the peacekeeping involves military forces provided by third sides in an effort to control or prevent violence, from another hand the peace-building involves the social, physical and structural initiatives that can help make available the reconstruction and reconciliation. Since the end of the Cold War the most international peacekeeping operations entails peace-building to some extent. While the nature of conflict has shifted, we see fewer inter-state wars and more intra-state conflicts and civil wars. That means that the nature and the instruments set of the conflict prevention in the peace building should be re-discussed as well. There is growing the importance of non-state actors in the preventing conflict. Even within societies polarized through ethnic lines, there are always people working for peace on the ground. NGOs, womens organizations, religious leaders, the business community, media and other civil society actors, are all natural allies of the nations and agencies working for peace on the international stage. But mobilizing and coordinating such an alliance is not easy. Get it right, and your coalition may be powerful enough to indeed prevent conflict. Get it wrong, and the situation may get worse. In principle the peace-building philosophy is based on its two major pillars and beliefs. First, that the efforts should be channeling the energy generated by conflict in constructive, non-violent rather than destructive and violent directions. Its aim is not to eliminate conflict but to generate positive change. Second, the normal sociopolitical processes can transform conflicts by the parties acting alone, by expert third parties acting together and by judicious advocacy and political intervention. For instance, the researchers are discovering how complex and specific each conflict is. NGOs are finding out just what they can and cannot do to promote peace within divided communities. They are increasingly aware of the need to liaise with governments, which in turn are beginning to welcome cooperation with non-state actors. Non-governmental actors from civil society can make a significant contribution since they are often closer to conflict or potential conflict. As Strobel11 argues, the role of the media and their contribution as sources of information in conflict prevention and peace-building must also be stressed. Peace-building occurs at all levels in the community, nationally, and internationally. In the past decade the number of peace- builders working at all levels of society in places of conflicts around the world has raised significantly. The
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Strobel, W.P., The Media and US Policies toward Intervention, Croker, Ch. A. and Hampson, F.O., Managing Global Chaos, Washington DC, USIP, 1996.
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contribution of civilians, whether working from the bottom-up or top-down, to resolve the conflicts of our time can no longer be unnoticed. In February 1997, in a large public gathering on conflict prevention in Amsterdam was drawn up an Action Plan for European leaders known as the Amsterdam Appeal. This Appeal presents terms for an effective EU approach to preventing conflict, and outlines key advocacy issues for NGOs. It stresses the need for participation by a range of actors, including NGOs, and urges coalition-building among NGOs and with national governments and European institutions. Schools, arts, sports, churches- mosques, womens organizations, the media, and business have all demonstrated their potential for building peace. Their role is getting increasing recognition. Among other the post-conflict strategy of the peace-building includes: reintegration of displaced populations; demobilization and retraining of ex-warriors; repairing key transport and communications networks; recovering the rule of law and the national economy; decentralization; de-mining, etc. These tools and actions showed to be the top measures of the peace-building strategy in all the armed conflicts in Europe following the end of the Cold War: the three conflicts that followed the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
Institutions, mechanism and instruments for conflict prevention

Preventive diplomacy primarily requires attention to early warning to identify situations that might lead to violent conflict. However, that is not enough to prompt an appropriate response. There must also be a capability to distinguish warnings of real conflicts from false alarms. The problem for preventive diplomacy is often not the inability to identify potential trouble spots but, rather, one of understanding such situations well enough to forecast which ones are likely to explode and when.12 Once the early crisis has been recognized, the next and often more difficult problem is to get the parties to enter into direct negotiations like it happened with the last case of the lesson learned conflict resolution process following the disintegration of the former socialist Yugoslavia, in 2001 during the Macedonian conflict. Several international organizations have generated a set of important instruments of conflict prevention following the end of the Cold War in Europe. The most developed instruments available so far for preventing conflict are those of the
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Martin Griffiths, Terry OCallaghan and Steven C. Roach, in International Relations: The Key Concepts, (2008), p.263.
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OSCE.13 These instruments were created bearing in mind the possible types of conflict in the new European order, such as those deriving from the dissolution of the USSR, the transition from Communist regimes to democracies and market systems, and national minority troubles. An important OSCE institution in the field of conflict prevention is High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). His task of identifying and promoting an early resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace, stability or relations between OSCE participant states has been rapidly expanded. Visits, reports, on-site missions, recommendations, the encouragement of dialogue, confidence and co-operation have allowed the containment or early resolution of ethnic conflicts. The IC infrastructure for conflict prevention (including the instrument of the HCNM) has not proved very successful, however. The case of Yugoslavia was a clear example. But that doesnt mean that in the field of early warning,14 the OSCE hasnt tried to improve its capacity for gathering information. One of its instruments is the intensive use of regular, in-depth political consultations within the structures and institutions of the organization. The possibilities of dialogue and political consultation were expanded after the establishment in December 1993 of the Permanent Committeesubsequently, the Permanent Councilwhich meets at least once a week. Other instruments for early warning are the Moscow Mechanism on the human dimension, the Vienna Mechanism on unusual military activities and the Berlin Mechanism. Information gathering, as a central aspect in early warning, requires a different and broader approach. The crucial precondition for preventative diplomacy is early warning, and the latter cannot exist without appropriate information gathering. At the end of the Cold War, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)15 created new instruments and mechanisms to face the possible development of conflict in Central Europe. Uncontrolled inter-ethnic conflicts were an almost unknown phenomenon in Europe during the Cold War. As they began to re-emerge abruptly, international institutions were unprepared and lacked instruments to deal with this challenge. For this reason, the CSCE was little by little transformed from a forum for negotiation and dialogue into an active operational structure, i.e. the OSCE.
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According to the 1996 Lisbon Declaration, the OSCEs concept of co-operative security is based on democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, market economy and social justice. It excludes any quest for domination. It implies mutual confidence and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Leatherman and Vyrynen in their paper Structure, Culture and Territory: Three sets of early warning indicators presented at the 36th Annual Convention of International Studies Association (Chicago, 21-25 February, 1995) argue that early warning is a pre-condition for conflict prevention. Transformed later to the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).
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One of the instruments for achieving a successful prevention in both post and pre conflict peace building is through measures for confidence and security building. The overwhelming of the international organizations (mainly the organizations for collective security) has developed the Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) as are provisions for the exchange and verification of information regarding the participating states armed forces and military activities. At the Budapest summit in 1994, the CSCE became a primary instrument of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the region. At the OSCE summit in Lisbon in December 1996, it was decided to continue efforts to further the efficiency of the organization as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. These efforts came to action in Kosovo and Macedonian conflict. CSBMs of the OSCE include: an annual exchange of military information; risk reduction measures (i.e. mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities); provisions regarding military contacts and cooperation; prior notification of certain military activities; observation of certain military activities; exchange of annual calendars of military activities; constraining provisions on military activities; compliance and verification measures; a network of direct communications between the various capitals; Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings; a global exchange of military information; stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations; principles governing arms transfers.16 The aim of these measures is to promote mutual trust and dispel concern about military activities by encouraging openness and transparency.17 The current provisions evolved in three stages: the Helsinki Final Act regime (1975-1986), the Stockholm Document regime (1986-1990) and the Vienna Document regime (since 1990). Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) and Confidence and Security-Building Measures seem differentiated. The primary goal is to achieve mutual and common understanding on important issues of common interest, and to highlight shared values and common aspirations. For that to be done, as Mariquina18 stresses there are needed more: political initiatives, exchange of information, documentation, experiences and codes of conduct on issues such as tolerance, coexistence, the fight against racism, xenophobia and discrimination, co-ordination and mutual assistance on matters such as prevention, management and response to natural
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OSCE Handbook, Second edition, 2002. The cornerstone of the current CSBM regime was laid in basket I of the Helsinki Final Act (Section 2), where the participating States agreed to certain measures designed to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information. Mariquina, A. Conflict Prevention in Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A European Point of View, in Perception, Volume IV - Number 2, 1999, p. 46.
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and man-made disasters or air-sea search and rescue operations, the enhancement of understanding and tolerance among religions and civilizations, etc.
Comparative approaches of the preventive diplomacy and the process of the peace-building in case of the last three conflicts in Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia
International involvement in the countries of the region has been mostly directed at attaining military security in the conflicts and after. But it has evolved in few years following the growth of the discipline on preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding. It was different form of international intervention in Bosnia- when the IC military intervened during the conflict. Differ in Kosovo- when the IC was directly involved fighting with one of the sides in conflict (Serbian forcescharged for abuse of human rights). And Macedonia is another case in this view: international intervention through a military component happened only since it was signed a Framework Agreement which ended the armed conflict and only then did the International Community launch a NATO mission to collect the weapons from the Albanian rebels. The latter case brought on the scene among others, two things. First, that international intervention may not be necessary when the conflict prevention works properly. Second, the involvement of international community with its military component directly in the process of peace-building (only after the conflict finished), was a successful test for the international involvement in one conflict after the end of the Cold War and showed the twinning tandem of preventive diplomacy and peace-building as a possible way of intervention when they are designed and launched together within the same toolkit of the conflict resolution of the contemporary conflicts. In the case with Macedonia, the concept of those who were trying to implement the model of co-operative security with less dependent military components, as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was trying to develop for many years, worked out. In the latest European conflict in Macedonia in 2001, peace-building and preventive diplomacy seem to be done with a specific approach compared to the other previous cases in the Balkans covered with the conflicts (Kosovo and Bosnia). Seems that finally learnt lesson it comes from the fact that the international community was involved there since the very beginning phases of stopping and preventing the conflict and of peace- building. Without aiming to minimize the range of the Macedonian conflict in 2001 and the peaceful process that followed there is a significant difference, from other
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conflicts resolution in the region had experienced during the 1990s: This conflict closed in the beginning of its outbreak and this was achieved within the framework of the existing constitutional order.19 So, the conflict in Macedonia never reached the levels seen in the previous wars in the former Yugoslavia and by the standards of the fighting in Bosnia, Kosovo and Croatia, the 2001 conflict in Macedonia was not especially bloody.20 Intense international pressure was accordingly deployed to prevent the conflict reaching the levels seen in previous Balkan conflicts. International involvement in Macedonia was a specific compared to other conflicts in the Balkans. It was applied in the framework of the preventive diplomacy and peace-building efforts, rather than using its military component. The International Community responded with rapid and direct involvement when Macedonian conflict emerged on some of the focal zones and before it got wide-spread. In contrast to the Bosnian crisis of 1991-95, United States and European Union policy moved in tandem in Macedonian case combining the set of preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building measures. Despite continuing incidents, the violence was brought under control. The signing of the Ohrid Agreement in August 13, 2001, put forward a wide-ranging program of human rights reforms in favour of ethnic Albanians and ceased the conflict. The case of the latest European conflict in 2001 in Macedonia brought on the scene two things. First, that international military intervention may not be necessary when the conflict prevention works properly. Second, the involvement of international community with its military component directly in the process of peacebuilding (only after the conflict finished), was a successful test for the international involvement in the Balkans and showed it as a possible way of intervention.21 The conflict prevention set at the end was successfully completed as well as due to the more long- term approach of the international involvement after the conflict reached the end. The International Community kept on working its peace-building and conflict prevention mechanisms in continuity in Macedonia as well as few years after the end of the conflict within the set of the peace-building strategies.
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Democracy, Security and Economic Development in SEE, CKID and KAS, Skopje 2002, p.88. Official data from the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Ministry of Defense of Macedonia indicates that by the end of July 2001, a total of 38 members of the security forces (the army and police) had been killed and 220 wounded. The level of casualties among Albanian guerilla fighters killed was not made public as a final figure, but according to the IWPR book Ohrid and Beyond (eds. Skopje, 2003, p.35) that refer to the representatives of Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) party established after NLA disbanded, 74 guerrillas were killed and no more than 35 Albanian civilians perished. About 15 civilians were physically attacked and tortured and around 20 kidnapped. The fate of at least 12 kidnap victims is still unknown. International involvement and the role of prevention in post conflict peace- building, Veton Latifi in Conflicts Prevention: From the idea to the culture for prevention of conflicts, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & Initiative for Peace building and Democracy, Skopje, 2004, 107.
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Europe, EU & Outer World: European Affairs and Democratic Processes in the Age of Globalization Democracy in the Age of Populism or the Self-Enmity of Democracy
Ivan KRASTEV
321.7.071.2(4)
In February 2011, British newspapers carried nervous headlines. Opinion poll on identity and extremism had discovered that a huge number of Britons were ready to support an anti-immigration, nationalist party, so long it was not associated with violence and fascist imagery. France received its shock a month later when an opinion poll showed that if the elections were to be held that day the far right leader Marine le Pen would win the first round. And while the rise of the far right in Britain and France is still limited to opinion polls, in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Austria, it has already been expressed on the elections day. Anti-immigration sentiments are reshaping European politics. Contrary to the expectations of some political observers the economic crisis has not weakened but it strengthened the appeal of identity politics. In Central and Eastern Europe where immigration is still not the major issue, populist uprising take the form of anti-elite and anti-Roma rage. In Hungary, the center-right government of the former dissident Viktor Orban made many in Europe uneasy when it used its constitutional majority to curb the powers of independent watchdogs, to return a censorship in the media and to nationalize the private pension funds. In Bulgaria in the last decade twice an extra-parliamentary is winning parliamentary elections on an anti-elite ballot making the country the poster boy for the trend of making elections less of a choice between policy alternatives and more of public executions of parties in power.
Ivan Krastev is a Chairman of Board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies. He is a permanent fellow at the IWM, Vienna. Mr. Krastev is a founding member of the European Council on Foreign Relations and a Council member of the International Institute for Security Studies IISS - London. Krastev is the editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy Bulgaria and associated editor of Europe's World.
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Ivan Krastev
There is a feeling that we have reached what Gerschenkron called a nodal point, a point where in a relatively short period of time we will witness, experience and perhaps even participate in aesthetic, ideological, strategic and finally institutional redefinition of the meaning of democracy. Something more essential than the replaceable part of the democratic machine has worn out. Democracy meant to be the self-government of equals is now universally valued and no powerful alternative exists today to society governed by the will of the people, expressed in free and fair elections but at the same time democracy in crisis in Europe. At present European societies have vague hopes and clear fears. What we observe in Europe is the emergence of threatened majority as the major political force in European politics. In the 1990s many Europeans were shocked to realize how important role demographic fears played in the process of disintegration of former Yugoslavia. At present we can observe that demographic statistics is becoming a major factor in West European politics too. European political debates are pre-occupied with the birth rates of the different immigrant communities, the percent of immigrant kids who are school dropouts and the number of minority kids in the secondary schools. Ageing European publics are torn by the need to welcome immigrants in order to preserve their welfare state and the fear that the inflow of immigrants will destroy the cultural identity of European societies. The central political paradox of our times is that the factors that contributed to the success of democracy are the ones that threaten it today. The crisis of trust in democratic institutions in Europe is the outcome not of the failure of the democratization of our societies, but a result of the success of democratization. As I was browsing through The Open society and Its Enemies after many years, wrote Polish political philosopher Leszek Koakowski three decades ago, it struck me that when Popper attacks totalitarian ideologies and movements, he neglects the reverse side of the threat. By what I mean what could be called the self-enmity of open society not merely the inherent inability of democracy to defend itself effectively against internal enemies by democratic means alone, but more importantly, the process by which the extension and consistent application of liberal principles transforms them into their antithesis. Leszek Koakowskis emphasis on the self-poisoning nature of open societies is critically important to understanding the current troubles in the House of democracy. The crisis that European democracies are facing today is not a temporary phenomenon - result of the negative effect of the economic crisis or the failure of leadership in our societies. The crisis we face is rooted in the fact that our societies are more open and democratic than ever before but it is precisely this openness that leads to the ineffectiveness and lack of trust in democratic institutions. We probably have reached the moment when democracies of trust are replaced by
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Democracy in the Age of Populism or the Self-Enmity of Democracy
democracies of mistrust, as Rosanvallon has it. And the question is no longer how elites can restore the trust of the people, the question is how a liberal democracy can function in an environment in which the elites will be permanently mistrusted regardless of what they do or how transparent the mechanism of governing are. In the 1960s, many liberals feared that democratic institutions were hostage to the authoritarian culture in which they were immersed. Today the problem is the opposite one. The citizens rights are protected better than ever, people have access to more information than ever, they are free to travel and practice their life styles but there is a growing fear that the democratization of society that has taken place in the last 40 years has led to the paralysis of the democratic institutions. Democratic societies are becoming ungovernable and it seems that they have lost the idea of common life and public interest. The trust in politicians has hit rock bottom. The extension of citizens rights and freedoms has not produced a feeling of empowerment. Democratic institutions are more transparent than ever but they are least trusted than ever. Democratic elites are more meritocratic than ever but they are more hated than ever. Managing mistrust is what democracies are about today. The rise of populism and the mistrust in the elites have reduced European politics to clash between the anti-corruption rhetoric of the public and the antipopulist rhetoric of the establishment. There is no new collective utopia that has captured publics imagination. Simply majority of people tend to view all that governments do as corrupt, while governments tend to respond to any demand for policy change with accusation of populism. Instead of bringing new life to the political left or the political right, the current economic crisis challenged the very notion of the left-right structured democratic politics. Europe and the world have gone populist. But this is a strange version of populism people revolt not with the clear idea of what they want to change but with the idea of revenge and punishment. The rebels of today do not oppose the status quo of yesterday they try to preserve it. This pro-status quo radicalism can best be seen on the streets of Paris where last year students protested against the increase in the pension age even though the pension age in France was one of lowest in Europe. One has the feeling that Europe is populated only by immigrants and current or future pensioners. What most people fear is not the status quo what they fear is change. What we witness is 1968 in reverse. In 1968 students on the streets of Europe declared their desire to live in a world different than the world of their parents, now students are on the street to declare their desire to live in the world of their parents. In order to make sense of the current state of democracy we should rethink the unintended consequences of the five revolutions that have shattered our world since 1968. First, it is the cultural revolution of the 1960s that put the individual
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at the center of politics. Second, it is the market revolution of the 1980s that de-legitimized the state as an economic actor. Third, are the Central European revolutions of 1989 that reconciled the cultural revolution of the 1960s (resisted by the Right); and Regans market revolution of the 1980s (rejected by the Left) and made us believe that liberal democracy is the end of history and the natural state of humanity. Fourth is the revolution in communications brought by the spread of the Internet and the fifth is the revolution in the neurosciences that made political consultants believe that manipulation of the emotions and not rational discussion is at the heart of democratic politics. In its early stages all these five revolutions were critically important for deepening of our democratic experience. The cultural revolution of 1960s dismantled the authoritarian family and gave new meaning to the idea of free individual. The market revolution of 1980s contributed to the global spread of democratic regimes and the collapse of communism. The revolutions of 89 without being the end of history were a turning point in Europes experience with democracy. They did succeed in reconciling liberalism and democracy in Europe. The Internet revolution gave a new impulse to civic activism and radically changed the way we think and act. And the new science of the brain brought back emotions in our understanding of politics and political deliberation. It is these same five revolutions that are the center of the current crisis of democracy. The cultural revolution of the 1960s led to the decline of a shared sense of purpose. The politics of the 60s devolved into aggregation of individual claims upon society and state. Identity began to colonize public discourse: private identity, sexual identity cultural identity. The backlash against multiculturalism is a direct result of the failure of the 1960s to come with a shared view of society. The rise of anti-immigrant nationalism is a dangerous trend but it represents much more the desire for community and common life than simply resentment against foreigners. It also signals that the clashing demands in modern societies cannot be negotiated and resolved if we try to reduce politics to the politics of rights. The market revolution of 1980s made societies wealthier than ever but it broke the positive connection between the spread of democracy and the spread of equality. From the late 19th century until the 1970s, the advanced societies of the West were all becoming less unequal. Regans revolution of greed reversed this trend and led to obsession with wealth creation and cultivated anti-government passion that are at the core of the crisis of governability of Western democracies today. Peoples revolt against the elites that is at the core of the populist condition of today is a direct result of the fact that the majority of the citizens tend to perceive the political and social changes accompanying the neo-liberal decades as a time of emancipation but not emancipation of the masses but emancipation of the
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elites. In the new brave markets regulated world the elites broke free of ideological, national and community constrains. The rise of the off shore elites was the dark side of the success of the market revolution of the 1980s. By declaring democracy the normal state of society, the Central European revolutions of 89 dramatically raised our expectations about democracys deliverables thus sowing the seeds of the future dissatisfaction. It was common after 1989 to believe that the introduction of free elections and adoption of liberal constitutions are enough to secure peace, enhance economic growth, reduce violence and corruption. But reality turned out to be more complex. China demonstrated that authoritarian states have the capacity to deliver high levels of growth over a long period of time. The failure of democratization in many Third world countries has demonstrated that free elections are not enough to bring order and prosperity. And the experience of Eastern Europe signals that the border between democracy and authoritarianism is the least protected border in Europe. The euphoria, and afterwards the frustration, that the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space succeeded in generating is the best example that the utopia of normalcy that was at the heart of the revolutions of 1989 is ill-suited for the world of 21st century. The Internet revolution fragmented the public space and redrew the borders of the political communities we have chosen to belong to. The paradox of the Internet revolution is that while it guaranteed open flow of information, it stimulated the emergence of echo chambers that threaten to disintegrate the public space. While the Internet revolution empowered people to stand against those in power it did not contribute to strengthening the deliberative nature of the democratic process. Least noticed were the effects of the new studies of brain and new marketing technologies on reshaping our view of democracy. The new science of the brain helped us to better understand how people think but they also became an instrument to manipulate people. When mourning the decline of the public intellectual or the anti-intellectual nature of todays democratic politics, we should remember that one of the key discoveries of the new brain science in the words of Drew Westen is that the dispassionate mind of the 18th century philosophers allows us to predict between 0.5 and 3 percent of the most important political decisions people will make in their lives. The revolutionary discoveries in the brain sciences resulted in radical break from the tradition of ideas-based politics. Karl Rove (George Bushs political consultant) has replaced Karl Popper as the new prophet of democratic politics. In short, the world we live in is no longer structured around a clear-cut opposition between democracy and autocracy; it is the internal contradictions of democratic societies that should worry us. What we should fear is the self-enmity of democracy. So, it would be a major mistake to analyze the current rise of populism
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in Europe as a kind of pathology or as temporary phenomenon. Populism is here to stay (?). We live in the age of populism and the tensions between the directions of democratization of society and their impact on the effectiveness of democratic governance will be the principal tensions shaping the future of democracy.
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32-021.388(4)19
The European Union Twenty Years After the Fall of Communism:

A Success Story Crisis and Challenge for Transatlantic Relations
Markus MECKEL I. The legacy: Victory for peace and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe
In 2009/2010 I have listened to and delivered many speeches in commemoration of the upheavals of 20 years ago: the fall of the Wall, German reunification and the end of the Cold War. What is striking is that the memories people have of those events vary quite considerably, as does the language used to describe them. Poles remember that they were the first to shake the foundations of Communism, with Solidarnosc, with the Round Table that provided the model for a negotiated, peaceful revolution. The Hungarians call to mind that by opening Hungarys border with Austria, they knocked the first brick out of the Wall that had divided Germany and Europe. Gorbachev is thanked for first wanting to save Communism with the help of glasnost and perestroika, but then when things moved much faster did not in fact send any tanks but chose to take the bull by the horns and cooperate with the West. In Germany, we remember Helmut Kohl for being the architect of reunification, and thank George Bush senior for supporting German reunification. When people in the United States remember this period, they simply say: When we won the Cold War. To get the right angle on this period of upheaval in European history, it is important to be aware of other peoples perspective, the various ways of seeing these upheavals in a positive light. All of us here today will no doubt agree that it was all positive. But we also have to be clear about where it is not seen positively
Markus Meckel is a German politician and theologian. He was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic (April to August 1990) and a member of the German Bundestag from December 1990 to October 2009.
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namely in Russia. Only a few years ago the then President spoke about the collapse of the Soviet Union as the biggest catastrophe to befall Russia in the 20th century. When I look back after 20 years, the following insights are important to me: 1. Freedom and democracy cannot be imposed from the outside, but must be enforced from within a country. Support from outside is important, often vitally important. But first there have to be actors within the country itself. In 1989, the West did not win the Cold War, the West did not triumph over the East what happened was that freedom and democracy triumphed in these countries. Despite all the Wests efforts, Communism was not abolished by outsiders. It was swept away because people in those Communist countries often risked a very great deal for freedom and democracy and in the end came out triumphant. In the peaceful revolution in Central Europe, it was the people despite all the support they had from the outside who themselves fought to secure their own freedom. And they deserve to take credit for that. A distinction needs to be drawn between the regimes and the people. In Communist countries, those in power would never have won totally free elections (with public access to information and the media!). In every decade there were people who held on to their values, the values of humanism and the European Enlightenment, to human rights, to their belief in God and in human dignity. And they often paid dearly for that. The victory over Communism was a victory for these values, which the West rightly proclaimed as laying the foundations for the state and society. The legacy of these events is that respect for human dignity never is a matter of negotiation and must never be played down. The peaceful revolutions of 1989 were, to a certain extent, negotiated processes. The round tables that originated in Poland are symbolic of that. The fundamental change of system was wrought in the difficult negotiating processes and with the pressure of the peaceful masses on the streets. There was no bloody catastrophe because the categories of thinking associated with the zero-sum game, in which one side wins because the other side loses, were abandoned. Unification was made possible because people fought for freedom. That applies to both Germany and Europe. The Berlin Wall fell in the course of the peaceful revolution in the GDR. But this peaceful revolution is set in a larger context of what happened in Poland, Hungary and then in other
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2.
3.
4.
The European Union Twenty Years After the Fall of Communism
countries. The victory for freedom in Central Europe pushed open the door to unification, to German reunification and the growing together of Europe. Although this unification in each individual case meant accession through integration into the existing institution of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union the new citizens and new Members States are participants in their own right since they autonomously and of their own free will recognised the free, democratic foundations of the institutions in the West. 5. The support of the United States was extremely important when it came to superseding the Allies rights for Germany as a whole and recognising a united Germanys full sovereignty, in short for German reunification. The United States played a key role in moving the UK on the one hand and the Soviet Union under Gorbachev on the other to agree to that. The key condition imposed by the United States was Germanys future membership of NATO, bearing in mind that NATO was the most important bond in the transatlantic relationship and guaranteed US influence on the European continent. Gaining acceptance for that in the Soviet Union was, ultimately, the biggest success of 1990. And so over the next two decades NATO became a key anchor for stability and security in Europe although in a completely new way!
II. Reshaping Europe after the upheavals of 1989/90

1. Concerns about a Greater Germany
In 1990 many a neighbour and many a German too! once more feared that German reunification would place a Greater Germany at the heart of Europe, which would lead to uncertainty and instability in Europe. These concerns were amplified on account of the fact that Helmut Kohl took a long time to resolve the issue of Polands western border, especially since that was also a clear indication of his lack of solidarity with the new, democratically elected Polish government. We, in contrast, from the outset argued with him in favour of permanently recognising this border. Fortunately, the issue was resolved in the end.
2.
A European Germany
The agreement Kohl and Mitterrand reached in the context of German unification on launching a common European currency, the Euro, sent an important and positive signal, however. Particularly in view of French concerns about what direction a united German would take, it was to be made clear
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once and for all that a united Germany wanted to continue to press ahead with the process of European integration. The developments in the years that followed definitely backed that up. Germany remained the driving force behind the European process of deeper integration. You could even say it was more and more regarded as being in Germanys national interest to increase the level of integration, since it was becoming increasingly clear that principle government tasks, namely guaranteeing prosperity and security, can only be tackled at European level. Germany had a key role to play both when it came to the launch of the Common Market and the euro, in drafting the European constitution and after that fell through in getting the Lisbon Treaty signed. Since the end of the last decade when the Brits overcame resistance to the European defence and security policy at a meeting with France in Saint-Malo, Germany has become instrumental in driving the process forward since its EU Presidency in 1999 and despite quite some resistance from the United States.
3.
Germany is actively involved in shaping security within integrated structures

The EU not only provide Germany with the framework it needs for its own foreign and security policy. As a key player in foreign-policy and security-policy issues, Germany also plays a key role in further shaping the EU. Important changes in German politics after 1990 were decisive in that regard. Germany remained aware of its responsibility on account of the countrys past. The country has gained much recognition internationally since the late 1960s for having dealt with its own past under the National Socialist regime, and that was a key prerequisite for the former Allies and our European neighbours agreeing to German reunification. After 1990, however, this responsibility was re-interpreted after a long process and many internal conflicts. In the light of the wars on the Balkans in the 1990s, Germany was prepared to take on its international responsibility in terms of conflict prevention and crisis management by taking part in military interventions there and later on also at international level, for example in Afghanistan. Germany went from being a security consumer to a security producer. That was no easy feat domestically and necessitated a process of rethinking. The majority of people in Germany never again wanted to send German troops abroad after the Second World War and they believed that their cries of No more war meant they had learned their lesson from history! But now we had to learn that participating in integrated security structures, protecting international law, and conflict prevention and crisis management, a recurring necessity, also means bearing ones share of the burdens and risks associated with it. The public discussion
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process that was needed in order to get the public to accept this has by no means been concluded. Political parties still shy away from making it clear that these military deployments are not just humanitarian interventions like in the war in Kosovo, but, where necessary, may entail combat operations like the one in Afghanistan.
4.
Cooperation and integration

After 1989/90, both NATO and the EU had to be clear on what their attitude was going to be towards the former Communist states. In the early stages, the key terms for which structures were being sought were partnership and cooperation. At the beginning, both institutions found it hard to get used to the idea of their enlargement to the east and the accession of new member states. But the new democracies pressed for membership and both NATO and the EU had good reasons for acquiescing. It increased the level of security because it no longer had to be defined and shaped in national terms, but within integrated structures and based on NATO specifications. And it secured democratic and economic development in the transitional countries. And so the opening up and enlargement of the EU and NATO became a success story. Another aspect that must be seen as a huge success story that Germany played a key role in was that in 2004 not only many new members joined the EU, but also that there was a European constitution on the table even though it took until 2008 and quite a few concessions for the Lisbon Treaty to become a reality.
5.
The EU as a global player

How significant this simultaneity of deeper EU integration and enlargement is becomes clear when one calls to mind that the EU is a union of 27 sovereign states, each with their very own history and traditions. The EU is a huge work of peace and one has to look to history to grasp the full significance of that. With the freedom of movement of people and the Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU became a huge area of freedom, of respect for human rights and the rule of law. The EU had long before been an important factor for economic prosperity and solidarity for its Member States today symbolised by the Common Market and the Euro. Over the past two decades, more and more people have come to realise that the European Member States even the big ones! can only together play a global role if they find common ground for political action. The climate crisis is an important example. Another is the economic and financial crisis of 2008. Each individual country on its own and without the
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euro would have been unable to cope. The launch of the euro was a political tour de force that many in the United States would have believed Europe incapable of. But it did become a reality - although with the huge disadvantage that there is no European financial policy. And that has now come back to roost. Greece is a massive warning shot, as is the lack of rapid and decisive crisis management a fact that Germany is not least responsible for (suddenly the party political interests of a Land parliament election campaign became the Chancellors dangerous priority and she delayed the necessary decisionmaking!). But I am convinced that this crisis in particular will provide the impetus for making progress on issues concerning a more common fiscal and monetary policy! One big challenge that has not yet been met by a long shot is what form a common foreign and security policy will take. Here in particular the big countries in Europe have their very own, deeply rooted traditions and relations. The Lisbon Treaty paved the way for progress to be made on joint action. But we need concrete initiatives and action. Unfortunately, the way in which the big Member States are going about filling the most important posts gives little cause for hope that the declared need for a common European policy will actually be translated into action. Germany would have a key task to fulfil here and would have to take on a leadership role that many other European states would also like to assume. That is why it is all the more unfortunate that no such activities are discernible at present. Many questions that are of great significance to the EU remain unanswered or controversial. They include future policy on enlargement and relations with Russia. There is by and large no common energy or immigration policy, although both can no longer be shaped by nation-sates in Europe and are of existential importance for the EU.
III. Restructuring transatlantic relations

Following reunification, Germany regained its national sovereignty. At the same time, however, it has further integrated itself into the EU and NATO and moved that integration forward as I have already mentioned. Especially within NATO it was always clear in the past that the United States had the leadership role. Consequently, it came as a shock to many when Germany and France did not back the war in Iraq and refused to send troops. I personally believe that this criticism and non-involvement were entirely justified. This was the first time it became clear that mere allegiance was and is no longer an option in the transatlantic relationship. A new hand has been dealt
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since the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and Frances recent return to NATO military structures. NATO has enlarged its membership by letting in the new democracies in Europe and has become a unique international security-policy player that also cooperates with many other states. Although it is still the most important transatlantic institution, it has long since lost the ability to cope with the wide range of common interests and challenges. Today, at a time when the EU needs to define its new global role on the basis of the Lisbon Treaty and is increasingly also becoming a security-policy actor, NATO by its new Strategic Concept is in the process of re-defining its core tasks and structures, the United States under President Obama has reverted to cooperating at international level and strengthening legal structures in international relations, we have to think about how transatlantic relations can be strengthened in order to be better placed to jointly tackle the global challenges and threats we are facing, and which structures will best serve that purpose.
1.
Comprehensive security-policy approach

Security can no longer be provided by military means alone. We need a comprehensive approach that also incorporates political, civilian and economic instruments. NATO has neither its own instruments nor appropriate cooperative decision-making structures for such a civil-military approach. Capacitybuilding in that respect will require binding cooperation structures with member states (the US) on the one hand and with the UN, the EU and other regional institutions on the other. Relations with the EU have an especially important role to play here. A binding, institutional cooperation structure between NATO and the EU is also necessary in order to avoid duplication and to save resources. That could include the EUs High Representative, Catherine Ashton, regularly participating in NATO Council meetings as well as structured cooperation between the NATO Council and the PSC, the EUs Political and Security Committee.
2.
European caucus within NATO equal partners

The current security-policy structures place those states that are both members of NATO and the EU in an ambivalent position. On the one hand they are increasingly defining themselves, in foreign-policy and security-policy terms,
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as a common political subject in the EU, but as soon as they join NATO, they, on the other hand, need to act as atomised individual states that define their joint action within the Alliance. The stronger the EUs identity on securitypolicy issues becomes (and it is already strong in the civilian sphere!), the less viable this structure becomes. Europeans must also express their common positions within NATO. That poses a double challenge for the future. Firstly, the European states themselves will have to find a common position and more efficiently structure and jointly employ their resources. We Europeans are currently a long way from doing that. Secondly, that will mean that the United States will no longer be faced with a forum of member states within NATO that is, ultimately, only capable of allegiance, but rather will meet with equal partners that take on their common responsibility. That will be a multi-stage process, since the European Member States are still not quite ready (and the Brits, for instance, would also refuse to play along), whilst the United States still finds it hard to accept this fact. But I am convinced that this is the direction in which NATO must go in order to be able to guarantee a viable transatlantic security-policy partnership and cooperation in the future.
3.
EU US cooperation structures
Europeans and Americans today face global challenges that neither can tackle on their own on their side of the Atlantic. In order to be able to coordinate our actions on global issues, as well as in order to better deal with bilateral issues, the EU and the United States need to develop a much more intensive and better structured cooperation mechanism. That applies to climate change, as well as to energy, international finance and problems regarding information-sharing. Not least, the fight against international terrorism also raises questions that go beyond traditional security policy and await common action. The dispute over the passing-on of air passengers personal data is a most recent example of that.
It has become clear, especially over the past decade, that Europe has increasingly understood that it is itself responsible for its own security. That may not yet have got through to enough people, but the realisation is dawning. The United States should respect and support that without drawing the conclusion that Europe will thereby become less important for it. The opposite is the case. Both partners on either side of the Atlantic are and will for the foreseeable future be linked not only by way of their many shared values but also on account of a multifarious community of interests. The two are not only linked in diverse ways economically but also intellectually and culturally and are also required to take on a leadership role
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when it comes to solving global problems. Wherever we agreed common positions and common initiatives across the Atlantic, this creates a huge opportunity for us to solve upcoming problems. If we do not succeed in this, the risk is that those problems will not be solved at all, often with unforeseeable consequences for the whole of the globe. Many people in the United States believe that Europe is no longer important for them. The focus is on Asia, for example China, the up-and-coming world power. I, too, believe that Asia China and India are becoming increasingly important. But I also believe that in order to be able to solve important global issues we urgently need to acknowledge the transatlantic community of interests and to bring it to bear, through coordinated action, in decision-making processes within the international community. That is why it is important that we pay sufficient attention to the question of what form the transatlantic relationship should take. That does not appear to me to be happening enough and therefore needs to be explicitly highlighted once more. Anyone on either side of the Atlantic! who ignores that fact will weaken us when it comes to realising our shared values in this world (that we naturally have to observe ourselves!) and lessen the chances of our being able to solve our global problems. That does not mean that we cannot hold different opinions on various issues. But then we need to seek understanding on a level playing field. The times are gone when mere allegiance was commanded. We need to be conscious of the fact and always call to mind that we are and will remain dependent on one another and that our interest in one another must not wane. The united Europe has started to become of age and still faces the challenge of being a real partner. Let us continue to work on that for the sake of our future on this planet.
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327:341.171(4-672EU)2010/2011
Europe Now Has a Second Chance

Mark LEONARD Scorecard Introduction
European leaders were caught completely unaware by the unfolding of history in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011 because, for the past year, their focus has been elsewhere. These dramatic events and Europes slow and halting response to them illustrate once again the importance of the Lisbon Treaty, which for the first time created tools for the EU to develop a coherent, effective foreign policy. But in 2010 and so far in 2011 we have seen that the success of the Brussels institutions depends on the focused support and resources of national capitals to make a difference. When this is absent, Europe flounders. 2010 was supposed to be the year of European foreign policy, but it ended up being the year in which foreign policy was marginalized. A year that had started with the hope of a new beginning for the European Union on the world stage after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty was soon dominated by the euro crisis, which became an existential crisis for the EU and left little room for foreign policy on the front pages of newspapers or in the inboxes of Europes leaders. In 2010, the efforts of European leaders were focused almost exclusively on the rescue of Greece and Ireland in order to save the euro and the EU itself. As a result, the bandwidth available to them for foreign policy immediately shrank. It was not a great year for European foreign policy. However, the performance of member states, and EU institutions was not uniformly mediocre. Out of the 80 components of European foreign policy assessed in the scorecard, Europe got eight As, 29 Bs, 39 Cs and four Ds. Of the six issues examined in the scorecard, Europeans performed best on multilateral issues (where they scored an average of B+). They also performed reasonably well in crisis management (B-) and in relations with the United States (B-). But on relations with China, Russia and with the Wider
Mark Leonard is Co-Founder and Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Previously he worked as Director of Foreign Policy at the Centre for European Reform, and Director of the Foreign Policy Centre, a think-tank he founded under the patronage of Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair.
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Europe the EUs performance was insufficient. The EU got a C+ for all three but got the lowest score for China. There were, of course, even greater variations in performance on individual components, which ranged from A (e.g. component 37 Relations with the US on Iran and proliferation; component 43 Visa liberalization with the Western Balkans) to D+ (e.g. component 6 Rule of law and human rights in China; component 46 Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question). There were also more meaningful variations within sub-issues of each of these six large issues. For example, while in 2010 Europeans did poorly on the Wider Europe issue in general, there were strong contrasts among the three sub-issues that comprise it: performance was good on the Western Balkans (B), mediocre on the eastern neighbourhood countries (C+) and poor on Turkey (C-). Similarly, for relations with both Russia and China, the Human Rights and Governance sub-issue got very bad grades, which markedly lowered the average for these issues.
Most successful EU policies in 2010
Category 28 - Relations with the US on terrorism, information sharing and data protection 37 - Relations with the US on Iran and proliferation 43 - Visa liberalisation with the Western Balkans 80 - European policy in the World Trade Organization 76 - European policy on Iran and proliferation in the multilateral context 5 - Agreement with China on standards and norms, consumer protection 23 - Relations with Russia on Iran and proliferation 57 - Response to the earthquake in Haiti Unity 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 Resources Impact 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 8 8 9 8 7 7 8 8 Total 18 18 18 17 17 16 16 16 Grade A A A AAAAA-
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Least successful EU policies in 2010

Category 6 - Rule of law and human rights in China 7 - Relations with China and the Dalai Lama on Tibet 44 - Bilateral relations with Turkey 46 - Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question 17 - Media freedom in Russia 18 - Stability and human rights in the North Caucasus 26 - Relations with Russia at the G20 61 - Crisis management in Kyrgyzstan Unity 2 2 2 3 4 4 2 4 Resources Impact 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 Total 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 Grade D+ D+ D+ D+ CCCC-
Most united EU responses in 2010

Category 64 - Stabilisation and state building in Iraq 38 - Relations with the US on climate change 49 - Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood on trade and energy 9 - Relations with China on Iran and proliferation 60 - Stabilisation of the Georgian border 5 - Agreement with intro on standards and norms, consumer protection 80 - European policy in the World Trade Organization 76 - European policy on Iran and proliferation in the multilateral context 28 - Relations with the US on terrorism, information sharing and data protection 37 - Relations with the US on Iran and proliferation Unity 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Most divisive issues in 2010

Category 7 - Relations with China and the Dalai Lama on Tibet 6 - Rule of law and human rights in China 44 - Bilateral relations with Turkey 26 - Relations with Russia at the G20 12 - Relations with China on currency exchange rates Unity 2 2 2 2 2
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Category 32 - Relations with the US on NATO and NATO reform 33 - Relations with the US on arms control and Russia 39 - Relations with the US on global economic and financial reform 1 - Formats of the Europe-China dialogue 8 - General openness of China on civil society exchanges 47 - Relations with Turkey on regional issues 68 - European policy in the G20 and G8 79 - European policy on the Millennium Development Goals 54 - Crisis management in the Republic of Macedonia 63 - Stabilisation and state building in Afghanistan 22 - Diversification of gas supply routes to Europe 74 - European policy in the international humanitarian system
*
Unity 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
*
In the original text the author is using the united Nations provisional reference for addressing the Republic of Macedonia
The Birth of the Crisis Generation

Where previous cohorts of European leaders were defined by geopolitical events such as 1989, Kosovo, 9/11 or Iraq, the formative event for many of the leaders who were in power in Europe in 2010 was the Great Recession. They have been more focused on geo-economics and the global shift of economic power than geopolitics and the balance of military power. They are less wedded to traditional geopolitical alliances (for example, with the US) or enmities (for example, against Russia) than their predecessors. They have taken the world as it is rather than as they hoped it would be. They are willing to reset relations with authoritarian governments in countries such as China and Russia and are suspicious of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion. They want to scale down their involvement in missions in far-off places such as Afghanistan and return the problem of order to local leaders. This shrinking ambition for foreign adventures was manifested in the declining budgets for aid and defence in Europes austerity obsessed capitals. The economic crisis has accelerated a triple transition that is changing the balance of power in the world, the European neighbourhood and finally the EU itself. In 2010, the EU started repositioning itself for this world by developing positive new approaches to the United States, and China and Russia. It also fought back on multilateral issues with a more muscular approach after the debacle of Copenhagen in 2009. However, because European leaders were preoccupied with local economic difficulties and focused on global challenges, they tended to neglect
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their own region: enlargement stagnated, bilateral relations with Turkey worsened and the EU struggled to find a response to authoritarian retrenchment in the eastern neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the EU launched no new crisis management missions and shifted its attention to geo-economic priorities such as piracy rather than humanitarian interventions. The findings of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010 can best be understood in the context of the EUs responses to these three power shifts: Europes response to the change in the global balance of power, its response to the changes in the regional balance of power and its response to the radical changes within the EU.
Europe as a Global Power

At a global level, European leaders finally woke up to the fact that they inhabit a post-American world. The relationship with the US is still the densest one that the EU enjoys, but it no longer has the powerful emotional significance it had over the last few decades. This normalisation reflects the fact that the US is no longer such an obvious provider of public goods to the EU in the security realm or the economic sphere: for example, whereas in the 1990s Europe needed American help to save the Balkans, much of Europe now blames the US for the financial crisis. As a result, Europeans have shown themselves more willing to stand up to the US on key issues and in some cases have been remarkably successful in getting US cooperation. In the past, the leaders of member states tended to coordinate policy with the US before they did so with each other and often acted in order to preserve their bilateral special relationships with the US rather than their own collective interests for example, on Afghanistan. In 2010, on the other hand, the EU had significant successes when it identified its common interests and pursued them with the US in a single-minded way. For example, the EU managed to get the US to commit to a multilateral route on Iran and to accept a renegotiated deal on the availability of SWIFT financial data that better preserves the rights and privacy of Europeans. In this new approach with the US, the surprise heroes were the European Parliament, which blocked the SWIFT deal, and High Representative Catherine Ashton, who managed to use her burgeoning relationship with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to steer the Iran process through the UN. The EU scored a B- for its performance in relations with the US. Worryingly, however, this new success in securing American cooperation had less impact on the wider world for example, although the EU was successful in securing US cooperation, this was not yet enough to deter Iran from continuing to develop nuclear weapons. The change in relations with China was more dramatic. For years, western powers had a faith-based approach to China: they believed that as China and
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other emerging economies became richer and more developed they would become responsible stakeholders that would play their part in maintaining the global multilateral system. However, this assumption was challenged by Chinas willingness to free ride and by its increasingly assertive approach to international relations in the last few years. In 2010, European leaders seemed to face up to this new reality and reassessed its strategic partnership with China. High Representative Catherine Ashton organised the first debate among foreign ministers on the topic since 2005; European Council President Herman Van Rompuy convened a Council meeting on the same topic. Germany published a promising paper on EU policy towards China and, in December, the Council signed up to a strategy based on reciprocity, leverage and trade-offs. But although there has been a change in approach particularly in trade policy it risks being undermined by ongoing tendencies of member states, particularly ones that were vulnerable to Chinese bond diplomacy such as Spain, to pursue their own bilateral relationships with China that undermined the embryonic European coherence. As a result, despite its positive new approach, the EU scored only a C+ on China. The EU also mounted an impressive fight-back in multilateral issues after a disastrous year in 2009, and performed remarkably well, scoring a B+ its best grade in any of the six issues assessed in the scorecard. The Copenhagen summit on climate change in December 2009 was a major defeat for the EU and had left serious doubts about international efforts to address global warming a key EU objective. The failure of the international community to stop Irans nuclear programme had also eroded faith in multilateral efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Emerging powers such as China and India also created increasing pressure to reform the governance structure of bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although the EU did not achieve its ultimate objectives on issues such as climate change and Iran, it did score some defensive successes in 2010 for example, at the Cancn conference, which restored confidence in UN-led negotiations on climate change. The UK, Germany and Denmark played important roles in these negotiations. By the end of the year, the outlook for the multilateral system and for the EUs role in it had significantly improved. The danger for the EU is the increasing importance of the G20, in which the EU, for various reasons, performs badly: it scored an average of only C in the six components in the scorecard involving the G20. The most obvious villains were European finance ministers, who failed to cohere on IMF reform until the US forced them to do so. However, as a result of the economic crisis and the focus on global challenges, there was little enthusiasm within the EU for crisis management. As a result, the EU got a B- in an area that was an EU priority in the past. Moreover, there were indications that this grade may drop in the future. Member states continued to be involved in a range of crisis management missions around the world under the
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auspices of the EU itself, NATO and other agencies such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Successes included the monitoring mission in Georgia and the response to the earthquake in Haiti. But as they announced big defence cuts, cash-strapped European governments launched no new EU-flagged missions and are increasingly looking towards indirect engagement in future crises. Although some MEPs focused on branding rather than effectiveness, the EU deployed quickly in response to the earthquake in Haiti in January and made a major contribution to the UN operation. But the few other cases in which the EU expanded crisis management operations tended to be in geo-economic missions such as the naval patrols in the Indian Ocean to contain Somali pirates, rather than classic humanitarian ones.
Europe as a Regional Power

There was a big positive step in the EUs role as a regional power: the European reset with Russia, which was made possible by a remarkable Polish-German rapprochement. The rapprochement illustrates the way that geopolitical enmities matter less for the crisis generation than they did for their predecessors. At the same time, the economic crisis which affected Russia more than any other member of the G20 means that Russia is seen as less of a threat than it used to be just a few years ago. In fact, some European leaders now fear a weak Russia as much as a strong Russia. In theory, this should make it easier to have a united policy on the east. However, because they were so preoccupied with economic difficulties and global challenges, European leaders were not yet able to build a confident new approach on this promising foundation and scored C+ on both Russia and the Wider Europe. Unfortunately, this inward-looking focus also took place at a time when other powers above all Turkey and Russia were recalibrating their own policies to have more of an impact in the region. This meant that, as the environment in the region worsened in 2010, the EU was in general unable to respond and so lost influence. However, although this was a year in which the EU in general lost ground in the Wider Europe, there were strong variations in the performance of the EU in the three constituent parts of the region, as mentioned above. On the Western Balkans, there has been good progress, including a big step forward on visa liberalisation and a modest step forward on Kosovo, although this was as much through inertia as through political leadership. But as public opinion on enlargement in many member states, including France and Germany, hardened, the accession process stagnated. In particular, accession negotiations with Turkey went nowhere. In fact, only one new chapter was opened (although Spain deserves some credit for opening it). The EU did particularly badly in bilateral relations with Turkey which opposed new sanctions against Iran and on relations with Turkey on the
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Cyprus question. Cyprus is the perpetual villain on Turkey: in 2010 it provided Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan with a way to avoid implementing the 2004 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. The EU also struggled to find a response to the authoritarian retrenchment in the eastern neighbourhood that culminated in the crackdown after the election in Belarus in December. However, Germany showed leadership by probing ways for the EU to get involved in protracted conflicts (and using the summits at Meseberg and Deauville to test out Russian willingness for a move). Perhaps even more disastrous than the EUs lack of interest in the eastern neighbourhood, however, was its complete neglect of the southern neighbourhood. Again, this was a symptom of a shift among European leaders from geopolitics to geo-economics. For example, the Union for the Mediterranean the EUs main tool for engaging the southern neighbourhood as a whole was launched with fanfare before the economic crisis began but has since stalled as a result of neglect by the EU and political differences between non-EU members. The revolutions in North Africa in 2011 which left the EU scrambling to find an adequate response illustrated the dangers of this approach.
The New EU
The expectation in many circles was that, with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, there would be a major shift of power from national capitals to Brussels. What made the creation of the new post of high representative in effect, a European foreign minister exciting was that its occupant would have both the political legitimacy of the member states and the financial resources of the European Commission. Equally importantly, the high representative would be supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS) an 8,000-strong diplomatic service that could help the EU to turn its resources into leverage in places such as Cairo and Kyiv. However, perhaps inevitably in retrospect, 2010 was a year of transition in which the big task was the creation of an operational diplomatic service from nothing. Much of the year was taken up with interinstitutional battles as elements within the European Commission and some member states tried to renegotiate the terms of Lisbon and exclude elements of the European Commission from the EEAS. Catherine Ashton deserves a lot of credit for setting up the service during 2010, but inevitably her focus was on the challenge of institution-building rather than policy development. Instead of the expected shift of power from member states to Brussels, the euro crisis led to a different power shift among member states themselves in 2010. The creation of the euro was meant to bind Germany more tightly to Europe. However, as Germany has emerged as a superpower within the EU, it has disrupted many of the
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traditional structures that underpinned European integration, such as the community method and the role of the European Commission, and has prompted Europes other players to develop strategies for taming and channeling German power. In 2010, Germany emerged as a hegemon but one that was in denial about its power. While Germany gradually moved towards showing leadership in the economic realm during 2010, it was more reluctant to take the lead on foreign policy. It has launched a few important foreign-policy initiatives for example, at the Meseberg and Deauville summits but its voice in foreign policy still does not reflect its economic weight. Over the last few years, as the EU has become bigger, with a more diverse range of competing interests, progress in foreign policy has often been made by minilateral coalitions small groups of member states cooperating to develop new initiatives. Examples include the way that the EU3 led on sanctions against Iran, cooperation between Poland and Lithuania at the time of the Orange Revolution, and the Polish and Swedish initiative to create the Eastern Partnership (EaP). In 2010, as Germany increasingly emerged as the dominant power within the EU, minilateral coalitions tended to form around it. For example, Germany and France cooperated on various issues including the competitiveness pact at the Deauville summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron cooperated on the EU budget, and the German and Polish foreign ministers intervened in Belarus before the election in December. At the same time, however, other coalitions were formed that could become ways of balancing German power. For example, France and the UK cooperated to save money on defence at a time of austerity, and the Nordic and Baltic countries cooperated to exchange advice about competitiveness.
Europes Hidden Power: The Acquis Diplomatique

Since the onset of the Great Recession, politics has followed economics and foreign policymakers have tended to look not at the traditional stocks of geopolitical power the size of GDPs, military spending, technology, or human capital but rather at Wall Street-style metrics such as flows, especially growth rates. In their tendency to be captivated by states with high growth rates, policymakers outside Europe and too often in Europe tend to underestimate the clout of established powers such as the EU. In terms of the classical indicators of power, the EU is still a force to be reckoned with. Europe has a market larger than Americas or Chinas. It represents 17 percent of world trade, compared to 12 percent for the US. It has an extensive global network of development agencies that dispense half of the worlds foreign assistance, compared to 20 percent for the US. Europe also has considerable military assets its 27 member states account for 20 percent of the worlds military spending, compared to 43 percent for the US, 7 percent
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for China, 4 percent for Russia, 2 percent for India, and 2 percent for Brazil. Yet despite these assets, the EU continues to punch below its weight on the global stage because its power is fragmented. The EUs ongoing failure to translate its resources into actual power leads to pessimism. However, as the findings of the European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010 show, there are also reasons why EU leaders could be more optimistic about the future. Although 2010 was in a sense year zero in institutional terms, the EU is not starting from zero. Rather, there is already a substantial acquis diplomatique in other words, a collection of areas where Europeans foreign policy interests are collectively and successfully defended by Europeans.
European performance on issues in 2010
Issue Multilateral issues Crisis management Relations with the United States Relations with Russia Relations with Wider Europe Relations with China Score out of 20 14 11 11 10 9 9 Grade B+ BBC+ C+ C+
European performance on cross-cutting themes in 2010

Cross-cutting theme Iran and non-proliferation Trade liberalisation, standards and norms low politics Balkans Climate change Visa policy Issues of war and peace high politics Energy policy Afghanistan Protracted conflicts Israel-Palestine G20 Human rights Score out of 20 16 13 12 12 12 11 10 10 10 9 8 8 Grade AB BBBBC+ C+ C+ C+ C C
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[The cross-cutting themes are the following (go to the component list at http://www.ecfr.eu/ scorecard/2010/list or navigate through the site to read them): Iran and non-proliferation amalgamates components 9, 23, 37, 76, 77. Trade liberalisation, standards and norms policy amalgamates components 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 29, 30, 49, 80. Balkans amalgamates components 34, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 54, 65, 66. Climate change amalgamates 13, 25, 38, 75. Issues of war and peace amalgamates components 9, 20, 23, 24, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 76, 77. Visa policy amalgamates components 15, 27, 43, 50. Energy policy amalgamates components 21, 22, 47, 49. Afghanistan amalgamates components 24, 36, 63. Protracted conflicts amalgamates components 20, 51, 52, 53, 60. Israel-Palestine amalgamates components 35, 59. G20 amalgamates components 11, 12, 26, 39, 68, 69. Human rights amalgamates components 6, 7 8, 16, 17, 18, 31, 40, 45, 48, 72.]
The profile of European foreign policy which appears in the scorecard is sometimes surprising. For example, the EU is not just a herbivorous power, as is sometimes assumed. The scorecard confirms the assumption that the EU is particularly active and competent in low politics (i.e. trade liberalisation, standards and norms, where it gets an average grade of B, as well as on climate change in general (B-), and that it is not a great power in the mould of the US or Russia. But it also suggests that the EU is not absent from high politics (i.e. issues of war and peace), as is sometimes assumed, and that it is actually sometimes good at it, such as on Iran. Its average score on these hard power issues, from Somalia to Afghanistan and non-proliferation, is B-, largely above the average grade, even though issues related to protracted conflicts and European security where the EU is still divided tend to drag that grade down, as exemplified by the score on relations with the US or Russia on European security issues. For the same reason, performance on energy policy is disappointing (C+). While the best performances of Europeans are to be found in non-proliferation, multilateral issues and other areas of strength such as the Western Balkans or humanitarian action, the worst-performing sub-issues are human rights with Russia, China and Turkey (all C-). Moreover, while Europeans did well on multilateral issues in general, they performed poorly in the G20 (including relations with the main partners on G20 issues), with an average grade of only C. The scorecard also offers some suggestions about when and how the EU performs well and when it performs badly. While successes are always due to a variety of factors interacting in a virtuous circle, three reasons stood out. In 2010, the EU tended to perform well when:
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it was united (for example, on agreement with China on standards and norms (component 5), European policy on the International Criminal Court and ad hoc tribunals (component 73), and climate change). In general, Europeans tend to be united on issues of trade and development, climate change, and war and peace from Iran to peacekeeping operations. it faced a crisis in the past, was humiliated, and reacted (for example, the Balkans, Iran after Iraq, Cancn after Copenhagen). it had a forceful leader either a member state or group of member states or an EU institution who is able to bring the rest of the EU with it (for example, the EU3 on Iran, the European Parliament on SWIFT, France on Somalia). Conversely, the EU tended to perform badly when: it was divided the scorecard shows that policies with a low grade on unity like 2/5 or 3/5 get an average outcome lower than 4/10, whereas policies with the highest grade in unity (5/5), get an average outcome of 7.3/10. In other words, when Europeans fail to stick together, they are certain that their preferences will not prevail. Unsurprisingly, in 2010, Europeans were divided on human rights, Turkey, European security issues and the G20. it was united but did not devote sufficient resources for example, in the crisis in Kyrgyzstan, where Europeans decided to simply support a very small and ineffective OSCE police mission. the environment became less favourable than when policies were devised. In some instances, Europeans had substantial policies in place, but had very little impact because their leverage shrank due to events beyond their control. For example, with President Barack Obamas political difficulties, it is very hard to influence the US Congress on an issue such as climate change. In a number of components, there also seems to be a vicious circle taking hold between a non-permissive environment and the lack of resources. This is typically the case on human rights issues, where Europeans know their leverage is limited and therefore do not commit significant resources.
2011: Europes Second Chance

Looking forward to 2011 in the context laid out in the beginning of the introduction, Europe has a unique opportunity to develop the acquis diplomatique but it also faces a real danger of losing it. The success of EU foreign policy in 2011 will depend on how it responds to three big crises one internal, one regional and one global that it must turn into opportunities.
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The fundamental challenge is the crisis of the euro zone, which has subsided but not yet ended. The EUs member states led by Germany have surprised sceptics by showing in 2010 that they will do whatever it takes to save the euro. However, there are two major challenges associated with their response. On the one hand, there is the danger that by taking the wrong decisions to save the euro they could end up fracturing the EU. In particular, if they are not careful, they could create one of two structural divisions within Europe: either a two-speed Europe divided between eurozone members and the rest of the EU; or a eurozone that is itself divided between creditor countries and debtor countries. On the other hand, the economic crisis has led to defence budget cuts that could either strengthen or weaken the EUs crisis management capability. If all goes well, the need to save money could lead to greater pooling and sharing of EU resources and the translation of the EUs impressive military spending into real capabilities as France and the UK hoped when they signed a defence pact last year. However, the impulse for Europeans collectively to contribute more actively to global security seems to be evaporating and European appetites for liberal interventionism have been blunted by the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, as the slowness of member states to intervene in Libya illustrates. In 2011, the EU may struggle to maintain the appearance of a credible security actor at all. Second, the dramatic events in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 have created a historic opportunity for the EU to develop a values-based foreign policy in its neighbourhood (as well as resetting dysfunctional relationships with Turkey and Israel). In many ways, this is a crisis made for the EEAS and High Representative Catherine Ashton, as it is in a part of the world where the EU has real interests and influence, and where diplomacy, trade, development spending and crisis management could be brought together to make a real difference. In the past, European foreign policy in North Africa and the Middle East was paralysed by an apparently straightforward choice between dictators and Islamists. In Egypt, for example, it seemed to be a choice between former president Hosni Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood. The revolutions of 2011 have demonstrated that this apparent choice was a false one. We are now witnessing the rebirth of politics in the Arab world, which, though it will not necessarily produce anti-western governments, will make the pursuit of western interests more complicated. The EU will need to develop new tools: it cannot rely on the promise of enlargement to the countries of North Africa. There is, however, a real danger that, as Europe struggles to deal with the euro crisis, it will miss a historic opportunity to support the transformation of the Middle East and North Africa. Although they support democracy, member states still have important interests in North Africa: they rely on North African states for energy and they worry about immigration. An introspective Europe
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would also have a negative impact on the eastern neighbourhood, parts of which are in danger of slipping into a state of peaceful disorder. Although Turkey will continue to depend on Europe (for example, for foreign investment), it is becoming increasingly relaxed about the stalling of accession talks as it develops its own neighbourhood policy. As European leverage decreases and Turkish self-confidence increases, the EU will increasingly need to engage Turkey in a strategic dialogue on foreign policy alongside accession talks. Third, Europe faces dangers but also has an opportunity at a global level. On the one hand, the economic crisis has made it clearer than ever that the world needs to re-invigorate the institutions of global governance to deal with problems that cut across borders. On the other hand as the scorecard shows the EU has developed a more muscular approach to the great powers, normalising relations with the US and narrowing the differences between member states on China and Russia. However, there is a danger that the EU could find itself lost in a G-world: The G20 had a brilliant start in response to the economic crisis, but it is fast becoming a big problem for the EU. The G20 has a structural majority of states that are opposed to interference in states internal affairs, behind which China is able to hide, and embodies an informal world of cooperation and balance-of-power politics rather than the rule of law and institutionalised responses. In 2010, G20 discussions were material in reducing Europes weight in the IMF. In 2011, as the G20 further displaces other multilateral institutions such as the UN, it may become a mechanism for marginalising the EU. In short, Europe now has a second chance. 2010 the first year after Lisbon was meant to be the year that European foreign policy emerged, but instead the euro crisis meant it was marginalised. However, just as 1989 forced the EU to enlarge, so 2011 could force the EU to develop a coherent and effective foreign policy.
The text has been used with the ECFR Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010.
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327.56-027.511
Transnationalism and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Sustained Primacy of the State in a Transformed Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Arena
(Transnationalism Contra Globalisation: The Myth, or Illusion, of Globalisation)
Casper Hendrik CLAASSEN and Edgar Cizero NTASANO
The impact that the phenomenon of transnationalism has had on the nature and content of international relations as a field of study and practice is undeniable. Foreign policy and foreign policy analysis are no exception as they are not exempt from the need to adapt to the changes introduced by transnationalism to the international system. Transnational relations can be said to consist of contacts, coalitions and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government.1 It is within such developments that claims have been advanced that transnationalism in the post-Cold War era has signalled the gradual vanishing of the centricity of the state as the primary actor in the international system and that Non-State Actors (NSAs), such as transnational corporations (TNCs) and other transnational actors (TNAs), in addition to deterritorialised centres of authority, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and United Nations (UN), and transnational legitimacy-providers, such as global civil society, will supplant the state as the primary actor in a globalised as opposed to international system.2 This assertion has invariably presented a radical challenge to the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) which is the manifestation of Aristotles concept
1 2
J.S. Nye & R. Keohane (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge 1971), xi. J.P. Muldoon, The Diplomacy of Business, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16 (2005), 341. Casper Hendrik Claassen, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. Edgar Cizero Ntasano, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.
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Casper Hendrik Claassen and Edgar Cizero Ntasano
of Phronesis3,4 in the sphere of foreign policy since traditional FPA has always departed from assumptions based on the primacy of the state and its legitimacy as the sole entity which can formulate and implement a foreign policy. As such, the purpose of this paper will be to evaluate this challenge to FPA and in doing so to determine what impression this challenge has had on FPA. This will be done in part by examining what exactly foreign policy is and who and what can make it. Accordingly, this study will also investigate the future of foreign policy in a world being constantly transformed by the phenomenon of transnationalism. More precisely, it will focus on the impact of transnationalism on decision-making as a process of foreign policy (with implementation being the other), looking specifically at how foreign policy making, in general terms, might adapt to the changes, if not challenges, posed by transnationalism. Two options, in terms of the possible responses, will be examined; most notably whether the most prominent foreign policy making agent, the foreign ministry,5 will decide to engage the changed foreign policy arena through specialisation and greater expertise or whether it will step back and delegate to the other increasingly relevant and international-minded departments that are being brought into the fore by the new transnational actors and issues, effectively adopting a co-ordinating and co-operating role. Reconciling the concepts of transnationalism and foreign policy therefore seems like a useful endeavour, as well as an important exercise in the analysis of international relations and foreign policy because of the apparent inherent tensions present within the concepts traditional logics. In the post-Cold War era the perception has emerged that NSAs such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and TNCs can possess a foreign policy.6 This perception is somewhat misleading, particularly when the notion of foreign policy is cemented into and considered inextricable from conceptions of statehood and government by virtue of its evolution being dependent on the evolution of
3
A word which is found in Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, Phronesis celebrates the virtue of practical thought, or practical wisdom. Alexis Tabenskys (2007) Realistic Idealism: An Aristotelian Alternative to Machiavellian International Relations, published in Theoria 54(113), is another example of how Aristotelian thought may influence our understanding of the domains of international relations and foreign policy. It is recognised that the executive has traditionally been the chief foreign policy maker and foreign ministry, or the ministry of foreign affairs (MFA), the chief foreign policy implementer and, at times, advisor. Obamas recent visit to India has shown this since he stated that the alliance between the United States and India will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century (Sky News, Obama hails world power India, 8 November 2010, http://www.skynews.com.au/world/article. aspx?id=536674&vId=, accessed 19 November 2010.). However, in the context of this paper, due to its theoretical aim, it will be assumed that when referring to the foreign ministry as the chief foreign policy maker that it is acknowledged that the executive is the entity which actually makes foreign policy and that the foreign ministry merely serves to advise the executive and to implement foreign policy. Ibid.
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Transnationalism and Foreign Policy Analysis
centralised political communities, such as states.7 Having a foreign policy implies that there exists some sort of universal understanding of an internal/external dichotomy through which humans define themselves as belonging to one group or another. The modern community of states has formalised this internal/external dichotomy through the institutionalisation and legalisation of the Westphalian sovereign state system.8 Indeed, foreign policy can be defined as the goals sought, values set, decisions made and actions taken by states and national governments acting on their behalf, in the context of external relations of national societies. This constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies.9 But before elaborating on the statist nature of foreign policy, Oakeshotts definition of the modern state should be considered due to its complementary value for any understanding of foreign policys ontology. Oakeshott writes that a modern European state a model of geopolitical organisation that has become universal can be recognised as being: an association of legally free human beings, among whom a certain sentiment of solidarity had emerged; occupying a territory with defined and settled frontiers; organised by a single system of law exclusively its own, and a single hierarchy of courts, which allowed no independent jurisdictions; rules by its own exclusive, centralised, sovereign government, which disposes of very great executive power; a member of a manifold of states which has come to be recognised as Europe, and having territorial possessions (sometimes called colonies) outside Europe; normally preparing for war, fighting a war, or recovering from a war, designed to maintain a balance of power in this system of European states.10 Oakeshotts definition of the governments of these states is also helpful. He defines the government of such a state as being a:
9 10
M. Webber & M. Smith, Introduction, in M. Webber & M. Smith (eds), Foreign Policy in a Transformed World (Harlow 2002), 3. S. Keukeleire & S. Schunz, Foreign policy, globalization and global governance: the European Unions structural foreign policy, paper presented to the European Consortium for Political Research Standing Group on the European Union Fourth Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Riga 25-27 September 2008, 3. Webber & Smith, op. cit., 9-10. M. Oakeshott, Lectures in the History of Political Thought, in T. Nardin & L. OSullivan (eds), (Exeter 2006), 373.
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single, centralised, ruling authority, operating by means of its own appointed agents, sovereign, independent of all external authority, proof against prescription, and exceedingly powerful.11 that: On the primary activities of a European states government, Oakeshott writes its main activities appeared as lawmaking, the administration of the law, and the pursuit of policy both in respect of its own subjects and in respect of neighbouring European states.12 What is implied is that the essence of a state (due to its supreme procedural sovereignty) and the authority derived by governments is dependent on the perception that a modern state is a type of association that can only exist if the members of this association recognise their obligation to recognise the authority of government.13 States, as opposed to NSAs, are thus entities which have supreme legal authority which was gradually institutionalised and thus it is not surprising that foreign policy has traditionally been seen as falling within the realm of interstate relations. Oakeshotts description of the nature of the modern state as being a fusion between both telocratic and nomocratic characteristics should be recalled. The foreign policy prerogative of states is primarily manifested due to, as Oakeshott perceived it, the telocratic nature, in part, of states.14 Therefore, not only do states possess the legal authority to formulate a foreign policy, but it is also within their inherent being to formulate a foreign policy due to the existence of the Other, to put it in Levinasian terms, and this necessity to have a foreign policy is due to the inevitability of and need for inter-state interaction, which, to complete the circle, legitimises the states authority to formulate a foreign policy. Thus, the existence of other states necessitates that states formulate a foreign policy. Hence, NSAs such as NGOs and TNCs cannot craft foreign policy because they do not possess the required authority or recognition to do so. This is why entities such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and Coca-Cola do not have foreign policies. In essence, the manifestation and legitimisation of foreign policy does not merely depend on inner recognition, but also the recognition of others. NSAs do not possess this recognition as supreme legal entities, such as states do. Arguing that NSAs can possess a foreign policy is an attempt to ascribe statist characteristics to NSAs, and in doing so attempt to understand NSAs in statist
11 12 13 14
Ibid., 380. Ibid., 381. Ibid., 468. Ibid., 481.
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terms. Via this endeavour it is implicitly conceded that foreign policy is inherently a manifestation associated with states and hence intimately tied to the ontology and raison dtre of both the notions of statehood and government. NSAs need to become state-like in order to possess a foreign policy, which is a contradiction in terms since NSAs such as NGOs and TNCs cannot become state-like without absolving themselves from their non-state nature or status. Although NSAs such as TNCs have emerged as pivotal players in the world(as opposed to global) economy by virtue of their immense financial resources and their numerous employees throughout the globe, TNCs can still not be considered to possess foreign policy.15 TNCs are certainly active participants in economic and world political affairs and, due to this status, are afforded the opportunity to advance their interests in international conferences and meetings in an effort to administer local, national, and international interests, sometimes vis--vis states and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs). They manage a myriad of relationships via the development of their own representative mechanisms, which allow for the management of the complex relationships which define the contemporary world economy.16 However, TNCs remain subject to the authority of states, and are thus required to express their interests and implement them via the instruments and frameworks that states provide, otherwise these interests lack the necessary legitimacy to be implemented.17 This is primarily because TNCs do not share the ontology and raison dtre of states, with states being a telocratic-nomocratic fusion while TNCs are almost entirely telocratic in nature, which removes any consideration for humaneness and its manifestation in the forms of representation and constitutionalism concepts which have led to the legitimisation of states as the supreme authority. Thus, TNCs, for the sake of conceptual clarity, have a business policy, not a foreign policy, and can only implement their business policy via the structures provided by states; similarly, NGOs have an agenda, not a foreign policy. The phenomenon of transnationalism has, however, been accompanied by supra-nationalism via the manifestation of IGOs, which are not states in themselves, but possess a foreign policy.18 However, the ability of IGOs to possess a foreign policy can be easily reconciled with the notion that foreign policy is solely the preserve of states.19 IGOs are composed of states and by virtue of this composition possess the necessary authority to possess a foreign policy, since the foreign policy
15 16 17
18
19
Muldoon, op. cit., 341-342. Ibid. E. Leaver & J. Cavanagh, Controlling Transnational Corporations, in T. Barry & M. Honey (eds), Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium (Basingstoke 2000), 77-78. B. White, The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis, European Journal of International Relations, 5, 1(1999), 42-43. The premier example of this is the European Union (EU). Ibid., 43.
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of IGOs is the result of concurrence by states to allow IGOs to possess a foreign policy.20 In order to gain an understanding of what exactly transnationalism refers to, it is necessary to first define the terms international and globalisation. The international is essentially a state-centric concept in that it refers to the relationship between states and the agents and representatives of states, such as their governments.21 To extend the definition, the international implies that all interactions between states, even if such interactions are purely financial and performed by an NSA, are subject to the state by virtue of such interaction having to occur via state structures.22 For example, during the Cold War the matrix of cultural exchange, whether publicly- or privately-funded, between states, as conceived in realist doctrine, implied mutual recognition in addition to the ability to control the identity and value of the culture thereby exchanged.23 The Cold War era world tours of the Bolshoi Ballet are a famous example of this.24 The UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO), international treaties and international customs and tariff regulations are all examples of phenomena associated with the notion of the international. The concept of globalisation (popularised in the 1980s) is, in a sense, built upon the notion of the international.25 To elaborate, globalisation refers to the growing trans-border integration of economies and political and social systems or societies and cultures and the concomitant rise in the mobility of people, products, capital and ideas.26 Globalisation, taken to its developmental extreme, suggests that eventually total integration will occur, which will see the international disappear and the emergence of a global village a world system that covers the entire globe.27 Transnationalism is the most recent manifestation in this evolution of the terms.28 Transnationalism essentially refers to the growing multiplicity of ties and interactions encapsulated by the word integration which link people, institutions, and NSAs in general across the borders of states.29 Transnational
20 21
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
Ibid., 46-47. C. DeVeraux, & M. Griffin, International, global, transnational? Just a matter of words?, paper presented to the Fourth International Conference of Cultural Policy Research, Vienna 12-16 July 2006, 1-2. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 2. Ibid. Ibid., 3. Ibid. Ibid.
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activities can be manifested, inter alia, socially, by contacting citizens of foreign states; culturally, by celebrating the ethnic, religious, or national holidays associated with another state; religiously, such as manifested in faith-based projects and organisations; economically, such as investment and remittances; and, finally, politically, via social movements and the lobbying of either foreign governments or the citizens of foreign states.30 Transnationalism should thus be situated within the concept of globalisation.31 Over the past twenty years, there has been a proliferation of new forms of international organisations whose operation has detracted from the competencies of states. These non-state actors have effectively challenged one of the key claims made by states in order to dominate international affairs. States claim that they are better organised, on the whole, and are able to achieve the requirements of their citizens for order, prosperity and development. Indeed, a variety of non-state actors are increasingly involved in the crucial issues of world politics. These actors form an important part of the global environment, affecting the possibilities and probabilities of state actions.32 NSAs in the contemporary global system include international organisations. These mainly consist of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs), which are composed of states, and NGOs, which are private international actors. As such, NGOs are organisations that cut across national boundaries; making them transnational. They are made up of private individuals or groups that exist below the level of the state; that is, while they require physical facilities inside states, they do not need governments in order to conduct international relations. As they deal with a great variety of matters, NGOs most often perform rather low-level, specifically functional tasks, promoting contact across state boundaries on matters of common interests and providing non-governmental means of communication among individuals of many nations. NGOs help knit the global society together in much the same way that private groups do within a country. As such, NGOs can function as pressure groups affecting national governments or IGOs, and a great many are also often formally consulted on matters of concern in which they specialise in.33 Conversely, some of the most powerful transnational actors are multinational corporations (MNCs), especially as their numbers and importance have grown enormously in recent years. In 2001, there were about 65,000 firms conducting
30
31 32 33
L. Goldring, S.J Henders & P. Vandergeest, The Politics of Transnational Ties: Implications for Policy, Research, and Communities, York Centre for Asia Research-Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean Workshop Report, York University, 7-8 March 2003, 4. DeVeraux & Griffin, op. cit., 3. B. Russett, H. Star & D. Kinsella, World Politics: The Menu for Choice. (8th edn, Australia 2006), 65. Ibid., 69.
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business in foreign countries a six-fold increase since the early 1990s with over 85,000 affiliates. The top 100 industrial (not including financial) MNCs controlled almost $6 trillion in assets, had $4.4 trillion in sales, and employed more than 14 million people worldwide.34 Giant corporations like these cannot help but affect the policies of many governments and the welfare of many people. For instance, oil companies would still have a tremendous impact with their pricing and marketing policies even if they did not try to change the policy or personnel of national governments. MNCs possess their spheres of influence through the division of world markets. In fact, they often engage in diplomacy and espionage, which are the traditional tools of state interaction. Most importantly, MNCs have very large economic resources at their disposal, which gives them an advantage over not only many of the newer and smaller states, but also some of the established ones. For example, in 2001, the US discount store Wal-Mart had gross sales equal to the gross national product (GNP) of Sweden ($218 billion) and exceeded the GNPs of all but twenty-one nations.35 It seems, then, that transnationalism implies a lesser role for the governments of states as it emphasises trans-border interaction and cooperation between NSAs, and, like globalisation, shares the popular vision of a global village and world governments.36 That said, some would argue that such a view should be taken with much moderation, if not disputed outright, particularly the latter point of the formation of a world government by far the most prevalent since it can be argued that transnationalism is not opposed to a state system but rather functions within it. As such, transnationalism, unlike globalisation, does not necessarily suggest nor desire a world government, a point that will be argued throughout this paper. NSAs such as NGOs like Greenpeace and Amnesty International, global research networks, global environmental concerns, and global financial activities (such as international capital movements and international trade) are all phenomena associated with transnationalism. These, in turn, invariably require the existence of a state system, or any kind of political community where territorialised entities are strictly distinguished from each other. The EU, which is often used as an example of the success of transnationalism or as being the jewel of successful transnational integration, perfectly underlines the argument. Transnationalism can also be distinguished from globalisation in another significant way. Globalisation is often associated with cultural imperialism and homogenisation, while transnationalism attempts to circumvent this accusation via the virtue of co-operation. There is an attempt to argue that globalisation and
34
35 36
United Nations, World Investment Report 2003. FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (New York 2003), 187-188. Russet et al., op. cit., 71. DeVeraux & Griffin, op.cit., 3-4.
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transnationalism seek different forms of integration.37 Transnationalism should hence not be confused with globalisation and the connotations of it. Furthermore, another, albeit minor, distinction is the fact that globalisation refers to a phenomenon which affects all states, while transnationalism refers to a phenomenon which affects multiple states, but which is not necessarily global. The EU along with the now defunct Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) stands as the archetypical manifestation of transnationalism by virtue of being a supranational union during the Cold War. Although the EU was only established in November 1993 (post-Cold War) by the Treaty of Maastricht, it has its roots within the Cold War era and is very much a product of the zeitgeist of the Cold War era. The EU is the current manifestation of the vision of the evolution of a democratic transnational European community first founded upon the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which later evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC). Hence, the EU is a child of the Cold War era38 and can legitimately be portrayed as being an example of the role of transnationalism during the Cold War era. Cold War transnationalism was a type of transnationalism which did not stand in opposition to the state and its authority and foreign policy. Rather, it worked in conjunction with the state and even complemented its foreign policy and authority. Essentially, the member states of entities such as the ECSC and ECC allowed controlled transnational integration to occur due to the strategic benefit of transnational integration. In discussing pre-Cold War transnationalism, emphasis is given to preWestphalian Medieval Europe. It should be noted for the purposes of this argument that Medieval Europe, as opposed to the modern state system, did not possess strictly defined borders and authority was not based on territory; it was deterritorialised and jurisdiction was not based on geographical considerations.39 For instance, the authority of the Catholic Church and the pope, or papal office, by extension, and Hugh Capet, the Count of Paris and in 987 elected king of the West Franks, was not based on the ownership of territory, but rather Dei gratia, in the case of the former, and by virtue of election to a sanctified office, in the case of the latter.40 Moreover, populations were free to migrate without an excessive regard for borders, since borders in Medieval Europe were diffuse, shifting, and permeable,
37 38
39
40
Ibid. It could similarly be argued that the UN is also a child of the Cold War era and that in some ways its ontology and the manner in which it functions and structured should be understood within this context, which is probably a contributing reason to calls for reform given certain perceived anachronisms associated with the UN, such as, say, the composition of the UN Security Council (UNSC). S.J. Kobrin, Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Postmodern Digital World Economy. Journal of International Affairs, 51, 2(1998), 368. Oakeshott, op. cit., 261-262.
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and hence could not be seen as containing strict jurisdictional limits, as is the case in a contemporary state system.41 Relationships and allegiances were scattered the king of France could, hypothetically-speaking, include the count of Flanders as his vassal, the count of Luxembourg as a prince of France, and the king of Sicily as a prince of the French royal house.42 Similarly, an Italian noble might swear fealty to an English king, or a Norman duke declare himself a vassal of a German prince and a fief might swear allegiance to multiple kings.43 Strictly speaking, transnationalism only existed during the pre-Westphalian system in a very loosely-defined manner, since transnationalism is in essence associated with a state system where borders are rigidly defined. However, it is possible to draw certain parallels between Medieval transnationalism and post-Cold War transnationalism, or at least its vision, and this is the value of a discussion of Medieval transnationalism it allows for the conceptualisation of deterritorialised authority through which transnationalism can, possibly, exist without the strict requirement of the existence of a state system where states are the supreme actors,44 although the existence of states is still required, and through this a possible detachment from its basis on the concept of the international, state-centric system. The post-Cold War era witnessed the emergence of a variety of NSAs in world politics and the world economy, leading to increasingly complex political realities.45 Transnationalism in the modern context has increasingly come to refer to the growing number of people who have the freedom, legally and economically, to move across borders and between cultures, doing business their own way.46 Keohane and Nyes definition of transnationalism should also be considered. Keohane and Nye define transnationalism, in its contemporary form, as being: ...the movement of tangible and intangible items (including ideas) across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or inter-governmental organisation.47
41 42 43 44 45
46
47
Kobrin, op. cit., 363-364. Ibid., 364. Ibid., 366. Ibid., 368. A. Chong, Review: The Post-International Challenge to Foreign Policy: Signposting Plus Non-State Politics, Review of International Studies, 28, 4 (2002), 783. The emergence of, among other things, a global civil society and TNCs is an example of the contemporary form of transnationalism. S. Westwood & A. Phizacklea, Introduction, in S. Westwood & A. Phizacklea (eds), Trans-nationalism and the Politics of Belonging (London 2000), 2. Cited in J.F. Stack, The Ethnic Challenge to International Relations Theory, in D. Carment & P. James, War in the Midst of Peace: The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict (Pittsburgh 1997), 21.
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Although this definition seemingly greatly correlates with the previous definitions it can, firstly, be distinguished from Medieval transnationalism in that the legality of movement was a non-existent requirement during the Medieval era, which implies that modern transnationalism is tied to a well-defined legal character, and hence to the state. Secondly, it can be distinguished from Cold War era transnationalism by the extensive freedom of movement (both physical, such as travelling, and non-physical, such as information exchange) which exists now, as opposed to the restricted freedom of movement which existed during the Cold War era. The character of contemporary transnationalism has led to the changing of the role of the UN and the establishment of entities such as the ICC both of which are deterritorialised entities of authority and has placed these deterritorialised entities of authority alongside states. This does not, however, necessarily imply a relationship of opposition between deterritorialised and territorialised entities of authority. Contemporary transnationalism, taken to its extreme, has rather envisioned a world where authority is based on both deterritorialised entities and states which work in unison, as attested to by the legal character of post-Cold War era transnationalism. To elaborate on and substantiate this latter point, the ethics of contemporary transnationalism should be considered. Before elaborating on the ethics of transnationalism, it will be reiterated that the spirit of transnationalism still stays the same; it is merely manifested in different manners during different periods. Moreover, it should also be noted that it has been the case for centuries that some states are less powerful than transnational economic and religious organisations and other TNAs. However, this does not undermine the legitimacy of states since it is incorrect to equate foreign policy legitimacy with power when, actually, foreign policy legitimacy must be equated with the legitimacy that statehood provides. Although transnationalism is merely a phenomenon, or occurrence, and should thus not be linked to any normative or ideological stance, such as has occurred with the concept of globalisation, it can be argued that transnationalism is a neutral concept. For transnationalism to occur, a certain transnational character must exist to perform the phenomenon of transnationalism. Hence, transnationalism cannot be entirely de-linked from the character which is performing it and, also, the type of transnational character that the phenomenon of transnationalism is bound to proliferate. Thus, transnationalism can be indirectly linked to an ethical stance. The emergence of powerful deterritorial TNCs and global civil society hint to what kind of ethics should be associated with contemporary transnationalism. Transnationalism is primarily founded upon the notion that states should act in an inclusive and tolerant manner towards the Other and in accordance with the spirit of the minimalist state conception, which implies a very thin ethics.
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Transnational ethics would thus condemn North Koreas Juche ideology. However, this is not to say that the ethics of contemporary transnationalism is cosmopolitan since it would not, for example, necessarily condemn the exploitation of humans by TNCs eager to employ cheap labour with minimal to no regard for labour rights. Rather, cosmopolitan ethics can be derived from transnational ethics, such as certain NGOs have done. The ethics of contemporary transnationalism hence does not intrinsically provide an ethics for the progress of humanity; rather it provides a foundation from which such an ethics can be built by virtue of its call for inclusiveness, tolerance, and a minimalist state. Notions such as capitalism48 and liberal democracy49 can hence be constructed upon these values. This implies that contemporary transnationalism is very much a product of capitalism due to the huge technological contribution made by this idea which allowed for greater freedom of movement and liberal democracy. However, this does not imply that transnationalism shares the values of liberal democracy and capitalism despite the potential of the ethics of transnationalism to aid the development of, among other things, capitalism, liberal democracy, and cosmopolitan ethics. Although contemporary (or post-Cold War) transnationalism has doubtlessly had an impact on the function and perception of foreign policy, as made by states, it has not allowed for the possession of a foreign policy by NSAs such as TNCs and NGOs and other TNAs since the nature of foreign policy has remained unaltered its nature is still state-centric.50 That said the foreign policy of states has increasingly had to adapt to issues raised by NSAs and TNAs.51 Transnational technical and welfare issues, such as finance, trade, environmentalism and labour standards, and the diminution of political boundaries due to the expansion of communications networks, social protest and environmental concerns, the spread of neo-liberal capitalism, the globalised media, and conventional52 and unconventional wars, with transnational terrorism being a potent example of the latter, have presented novel challenges to the way in which foreign policy is perceived, conducted, and implemented by establishing adapted boundaries of policy consideration.53 Put differently, states in the post-Cold War era find themselves between the reality of expansive transnational networks and the ideal of sovereign control.
48
49
50 51 52 53
A notion which came into being due to calls for a minimalist state and a notion whereupon the world economy is based and within which the spirit of TNCs functions. Liberal democracy allows for the proper functioning of markets through the maintenance of the rule of law based on the values of inclusiveness and tolerance. S.D. Krasner, Sovereignty. Foreign Policy, 122 (January/February 2001), 21-24. Ibid., 24-25. Something which is becoming increasingly anachronistic. V.M. Hudson, & C.S. Vore, Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, And Tomorrow, Mershon International Studies Review, 39, 2 (1995), 226-227.
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The emergence and proliferation of transnationalism and transnational actors has had an effect on the foreign policy arena. The foreign policy arena can be broadly described as the terrain in which foreign policy decisions are made and actions taken. It is occupied by a range of significant actors, issues and interests, all of which give it a dynamism and life. Accordingly, one of the key tests of an effective foreign policy is the way in which the foreign policy makers can appraise the shifting array of forces in the arena, respond to those forces, and use the opportunities they create. More negatively, though, it might be argued that withstanding the challenges and insecurities of the arena, such as those presented by the phenomenon of transnationalism, is the minimum requirement of an effective foreign policy.54 In terms of the actors of the foreign policy arena, participation in foreign policy has traditionally been seen as a hierarchical and relatively restricted community of designated political and bureaucratic elites, who have a continuous responsibility to pursue foreign policy objectives, and who are specially qualified for the task. Transnationalism, however, has brought changes that create much wider participation by a broader array of actors from the international, the governmental and the domestic contexts. Furthermore, although participation in such a (now more) diffused system still, to some extent, remains within the boundaries of government, it is complicated by the fact that government has become a more elastic concept. Beyond government, we must also register the fact that influence upon foreign policy has diffused much more broadly through societies. This has much to do with the changing subject matter of foreign policy itself, as it also reflects the widening awareness of international issues.55 Similarly, the strongly hierarchical view of the issues on the foreign policy agenda, especially in the form of its strong link to national security, has come under attack from the phenomenon of transnationalism. Indeed, the nature of national security itself has come under pressure, as there has been a broadening of the national security agenda to new areas of activity; leaving security being defined in terms that range across economic, environmental and societal concerns.56 The agenda of foreign policy has become increasingly congested as processes of regionalisation and transnationalism have accelerated. Hence, the traditional preoccupation with security however defined now has to compete with a multiplicity of other, more everyday issues relating to economic management, environmental degradation, trans-border communication and cultural interaction.57 The new issues of the foreign policy agenda came, during the 1970s, to be termed intermestic, since
54 55 56 57
Webber & Smith, op. cit., 29-30. Ibid., 41. B. Buzan, O. Waever, & J. de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, (London 1998), 1. B. White, R. Little & M. Smith (eds), Issues in World Politics (3rd edn, Basingstoke 2005), 274-293
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they engaged the domestic and the foreign policy processes of societies, and created new types of political and organisational challenges.58 With regards to the interests around which foreign policy centres, the historically close link between foreign policy and national security has traditionally meant that the idea of national interest is fundamental to traditional notions of foreign policy. However, the concept of a monolithic national interest expressed by the foreign policy makers is increasingly difficult to relate to the untidiness of actual foreign policy making today. For one, it has been argued that the growing transnationalisation of interests has domesticated the previously unruly setting of world politics; the implications of which are that there is a growing emphasis in foreign policy on the satisfaction of sectional interests at the same time as there is an increasing incentive to respond to international interests and governance structures.59 Contemporary transnationalism can be said, then, to have effected an intellectual shift from the notion of bounded rationality, where national interests are defined based on domestic preferences, to one where it is recognised that foreign policy should display more varied interests which should be less egotistic, targeted at structures, consider global public goods and be, at times, issue specific; It has, moreover, forced a shift in the manner in which decision-formulation is perceived.60 According to realists, decision-formulation was traditionally perceived as being either the product of competition of social forces within a territorially delimited space, according to utilitarian-liberals, or the anarchical system which states find themselves within.61 The emergence of contemporary transnationalism has, however, led to the recognition that, following constructivist reasoning, decision-formulation is now the product of pluralistic competition of a multitude of internal and external forces.62 The foreign ministry and those under its control, such as its diplomats, represent a formidable engine in the making of foreign policy especially because of the vital functions they have traditionally performed, such as information-gathering and policy-making.63 Politicians rely heavily on the experts in the foreign ministry to sift through the vast quantities of incoming information, to interpret and predict the actions of other states and to formulate policy options on the multiple detailed questions which never come to public attention. Another vital function performed by foreign ministries is that of acting as a bureaucratic memory. As every system
58
59 60 61 62 63
B. Manning, The Congress, the Executive, and Intermestic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, 55, 2 (1997), 306-324. Webber & Smith, op. cit., 44. Keukeleire & Schunz, op. cit. 14. Ibid. Ibid. C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (London 2003), 77.
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needs continuity in its external relations, career diplomats institutionalise them by serving as the systems collective memory with the help of its record-keeping system. Without the capacity to relate myriad past commitments and treaties to the present, and to each other, decision-makers would be left floundering in chaos, given the complexity of the contemporary international system.64 As such, foreign ministries have had a considerable degree of autonomy; virtually constituting a sub-elite within the machinery of government. Their control over external representations, their privileged contacts with foreigners and the continued mystique of international affairs has traditionally given them a certain carapace which protects against interference by other parts of the domestic administration. However, as a result of the phenomenon of post-Cold War transnationalism, many states are now facing what has been termed the horizontal decentralisation of their foreign relations in the form of their foreign ministries loss of control over many external issues to other parts of the state bureaucracy.65 The past fifty years have seen the emergence of many rivals to conventional diplomats from within the bureaucracy because of their greater expertise and specialisation at dealing with these new and more specific issues. The propagation in numbers and importance of transnational actors and their issues and subsequent interests has meant that foreign ministries are more and more stretched thin in the attempt to cater for this range of knowledge. This has, inevitably, started to challenge the traditional conception of foreign policy analysis where foreign ministries and their employees, as the main foreign policy makers and implementers in unified government action, are being supplanted by home-based experts and non-governmental para-diplomats. For one, foreign ministries are more and more being seen as technically inadequate, if not incompetent, as diplomats are perceived as over-generalist and over-stretched; incapable of discussion on equal terms with economists, scientists and businessmen. Even the specialism in abroad counts for less now that travel is much easier and more common. Furthermore, most domestic departments now engage directly in international relations by sending their own experts out to meet their equivalents in another state or to participate in specialised international organisations and conferences. These trans-governmental relations, that are in effect transnational in nature, represent the growth and diffusion of government that has occurred in the governmental context of foreign policy making in response to the new demands of international life created by the impacts of globalisation, transnationalism, regionalisation and the proliferation of new states and organisations.66
64 65 66
Ibid. Ibid., 82. D.H. Davis, How the Bureaucracy Makes Foreign Policy: An Exchange Analysis. (Washington D.C. 1972), 59-66.
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It is therefore clear that the foreign ministry will have to adapt to the changes in dynamics and challenges posed by transnationalism. In light of the expanding foreign policy arena, where other governmental departments become more and more involved with, if not influential in, foreign policy making, the foreign ministry will have to redefine its role if it is to keep its relevance and pre-eminence as the dominant foreign policy maker. As such, it is faced with two options on opposite ends of a spectrum of possible responses. The most obvious option would be to adapt to the expanding foreign policy arena by expanding itself, meaning that the foreign ministry would have to increase the training and specialisation of its staff in order to make them more technically competent to deal with the growing numbers and importance of issues and actors in the arena. This would invariably entail an expansion of the ministry, in budget and size, as specialised sub-departments within the ministry which deal with specific sectors such as economics or the environment within context of foreign affairs would emerge. The logic behind such an option resides in the fact that diplomats continue to be valued by the members of a network of national and international influential figures, politicians and journalists, who lean on their skills in daily life, and who have seen at close hand how the profession has become more stressful, demanding and often physically dangerous since 1945. The other option consists of focusing on the new needs for coordination in foreign relations within the government created by the greater diversification of external relations brought about by trans-governmentalism and transnationalism. That said, adopting such an option would effectively mean reducing the size and capacity of the foreign ministry as it would opt to delegate the business of foreign affairs on specific issues such as financial and environmental ones to the relevant government departments that deal with them professionally, not only because of their expertise on the matter but also because of the fact that most domestic departments already have their own mini-foreign sub-departments in which they engage directly in international relations.67 The foreign ministrys purpose would, thus, focus more on effectively synthesising and coordinating the actions and behaviour of all these other departments foreign relations, ultimately encouraging cooperation and providing leadership in the conduct of the states aggregate foreign relations. Accordingly, such a role would seem to fall closer in line to the broad definition of foreign policy provided by Christopher Hill, where foreign policy is seen as the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations.68 To be sure, these options depend on available financial resources and capabilities and/or political/institutional culture. Either way, it would seem
67 68
Ibid. Hill, op. cit., 3.
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then as if the ultimate effect of transnationalism on foreign policy making is a general expansion of the governmental context of foreign policy making; whether it is through expanding and specialising the foreign ministry or through the comprehensive inclusion of other departments within the realm of foreign affairs, and in the conduct of foreign policy and foreign policy making. Contemporary transnationalism has altered the perception of which actors should be the target of foreign policy implementation.69 Traditionally, the target of foreign policy was merely other states, however, contemporary transnationalism has forced a reconsideration of this stance and has called for the consideration of multiple actors at multiple levels and also of governance structures, such as those entailed by the notion of global governance.70 Contemporary transnationalism has hence altered the scope of state foreign policy by calling for the recognition of the internal-external nexus and the inclusion of a multitude of novel considerations, and has neither undermined the authority of the state nor the legitimacy of the state and supranational entities by extension as the only entity which can possess a foreign policy. With regard to the capacities and instruments of foreign policy making and implementation, contemporary transnationalism has led to an emphasis on relational and structural power and communicative action in the form of arguing and deliberation and also the introduction of public diplomacy71. Traditionally, the capacities and instruments of foreign policy were merely thought of in terms of relational power and the diplomacy of coercion and bargaining72. Contemporary transnationalism has, also, altered the perception of the structure of the external sphere by pressing for an expansion of the Weltanschauung of those responsible for the making and formalisation of foreign policy by pressing for the recognition that the structure of the external sphere is not merely composed of international institutions and international law, but rather formal and informal institutions, networks, and rules and norms.73 Still, although contemporary transnationalism has had a significant influence on the way in which foreign policy is perceived and the functions associated with it, it has not challenged the centrality of the state as the primary actor of the international system. The case of the EU as a prime example helps to appreciate why this is so. Even the EU fails to present a legitimate challenge to the conception of the state as the primary actor of the international system by acting as an alternative for state centrality by virtue of being a supranational entity with the
69 70 71 72 73
Keukeleire & Schunz, op. cit., 9. Ibid., 9-10. Ibid., 14. Ibid. Ibid.
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capacity to garner the authority and legitimacy associated with states, by virtue of being composed of states. Even though the EU is, arguably, the most powerful contemporary example of transnationalism, since within its supra-nationalism it contains an almost borderless internal sphere where goods, people, capital, and ideas are allowed close to complete freedom of movement between member states and where member states are expected to display a certain degree of congruence by virtue of being a member of the EU,74 it does not threaten the primacy of states and their authority to form a foreign policy which is dissimilar to those of other member states and which is not necessarily in agreement with EU foreign policy. States such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (UK), often engage in bilateral diplomacy with non-EU states and other EU states and express their national interest in an egotistical way in a manner which is not always consistent with the foreign policy of other EU members or even EU foreign policy.75 A testimony of this is the insistence of major EU member states like Germany, France, and the UK to maintain separate embassies and consulates.76 Essentially, engaging in transnational activities, or allowing them to occur, within the EU is of enormous benefit to member states. This indicates how transnationalism can be utilised by states to their advantage. As such, transnationalism allows states the potential of effective economic statecraft but also, moreover, allows states to formulate foreign policy in such a way as to take advantage of the zeitgeist of, for instance, global civil society. Thus, transnationalism opens up a new world of possibilities for states when making foreign policy, which is the essence of practical foreign policy making simply consider the development opportunities entry into the EU has provided Poland with and the reform incentives that non-EU member states often passionately engage in, in order to gain entry into the EU. Transnationalism has led to the introduction and consolidation of certain ethical concerns largely due to the globalised media. This highlights that transnationalism has forced states to adapt, but has not undermined the centrality of states. The globalised media has allowed the notion of Homo Sociologicus social man to be adapted globally and, via this adaptation, transnationalism has led to a greater concern for human rights, as is evident with, for instance, the growing concern for Jus in Bello, or, the law of how states should conduct themselves during war, both externally and internally. The 9/11 attacks (and the imposition of stringent security measures as a response to Jihadism) and the
74 75
76
A notion which is not dissimilar to the notion of deterritorialised authority. D. Dinan, External Relations, in D. Dinan (ed). Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder, CO, 2005), 520-523; W. Horsley, Why Germany is now happy to punch its weight, BBC News, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11436595, accessed 19 November 2010. Dinan, op. cit., 520-523.
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recent global financial crisis77 have further served to illustrate the primacy of states even in a transnational world.78 This highlighted that states remain the only legitimate makers of foreign policy. Even if the aforementioned events did not occur, it is unlikely that contemporary transnationalism would have altered the reality of state primacy. State primacy would merely have been concealed. The reality remains that it is only through the support and consent of states that contemporary transnationalism is allowed to flourish. It is unlikely that transnationalism will induce the end of the state system or the end of a world which consists of various political communities since different ideas of community are likely to always exist. As indicated previously, transnationalism has always existed alongside states and political communities, which alludes to the notion that the phenomenon of transnationalism has been manifested in different ways at different times due to a certain zeitgeist and stage of technological development and that states have had to adapt to these manifestations, by, for instance, embracing soft power and economic power over military action and placing less emphasis on territory with reference to economic development. Currently, transnationalism has led to the notion, in the constructivist sense, that peace is within the interests of all states and hence that states should desire to cooperate via, for instance, institution-building, summits, and the creation and consolidations of norms for the sake of international order and global responsibility. The combating of transnational crime, global poverty, and environmental degradation are examples of this notion. This is the essence of Aristotles concept of Phronesis, and also as later employed by Gadamer. To conclude, while transnationalism has caused a shift in the perception and function of foreign policy, it has not challenged the position of the state as the sole entity with the legitimacy to formulate a foreign policy. Transnationalism has not been able to supplant the state as the primary actor within the international system because the logic of transnationalism be it Medieval, Cold War era, or contemporary does not stand in opposition to the centrality of state. Transnationalism has essentially led to new issues being considered in the formulation of foreign policy and in FPA and has altered the way in which foreign policy is implemented and through which implementation is analysed in FPA and in doing so has introduced new concerns in the field of FPA. To that effect, it has expanded the foreign policy arena leaving the (traditionally) chief foreign policy maker, the foreign ministry, with the options of either expanding to cope with the changing arena, or adopting a coordinating and synthesizing role of the
77
78
And the London Consensus which followed it, which encouraged a departure from the laissez-faire economic orthodoxy and signalled the temporary demise of the Washington Consensus. M. Lind, The future of US foreign policy: a reply, OpenDemocracy, 12 April 2007, http://www. opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/future_reply_4426.jsp, accessed 15 September 2009, 2.
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states foreign affairs with regards to the increasingly growing number of other governmental departments that now increasingly participate in foreign relations. These options depend on certain factors, however, such as financial resources/ capabilities or political/institutional culture. Expanding the foreign ministry by hiring and training a greater number of field-specific civil servants and diplomats is not only bound to be a costly exercise but also an intricate, if not problematic, one in terms of political and bureaucratic negotiations.79 The political/institutional culture of government also matters when deciding which option to choose. For instance, if the foreign ministry has traditionally been a weak institution within government in terms of influence on policy making, adopting the option of focusing on coordinating the increasing foreign affairs and relations of other departments might not just be ineffective, but might also lead to further loss in influence in governmental power and influence. More specifically, though, such configurations can come down to the type of relationship between the head of government and the foreign minister in terms of power and influence in policy making. Indeed, while the nominal chief of foreign policy operations in most states is the foreign minister, heads of government often have a natural tendency to get drawn into foreign policy. Therefore, using Hills three models of head of government-foreign minister relations, we can suggest that only certain types of relationships are viable for the successful adoption of the foreign ministrys option of focusing on the entire governments foreign affairs coordination.80 These include one that encompasses the culture of an established foreign minister, in which there is a clear division of labour and excellent communications, and one of equality consisting of trust, ability and matching reputations. Conversely, a relationship that is made of a subordinate foreign minister would probably not be the best condition for the adoption of the option. In any case, it must be understood and acknowledged that the possible responses to the effects of transnationalism on the foreign policy arena highlighted above only depict the extreme paths available to the foreign ministry as it adapts to the growth of transnationalism. As such, any practical courses of action taken by foreign ministries around the world are more likely to fall somewhere within the spectrum, encompassing aspects from both ends to some extent, i.e. some expertise and specialisation with regards to the new actors and issues in the arena, as well as more of a coordinating role amongst the emerging governmental departments involved in foreign affairs. Regardless of the course of action undertaken, however, the importance and significance of the foreign ministry
79
80
P. Riddel, Blair as Prime Minister, in A. Seldon (ed.), The Blair Effect: The Blair Government 1997-2001, (London, 2001), 37. Hill, op. cit., 61.
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as the key player in foreign policy making is ultimately maintained validating the idea that a foreign policy still remains within the exclusive purview of the state as the primary actor of the international system. Foreign policy is exclusive to states by virtue of states being the only entities with the necessary legitimacy to make foreign policy with authority.
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- 182 -
341.231.14-021.23/24(4)
Principle of Non-discrimination and Equitable Representation in Framework Agreement Ten Years After - Formal or Substantive Equality?!
Jana LOZANOSKA International and Regional Legal Framework on NonDiscrimination and Equality
On the onset it is relevant to briefly examine the international and regional framework, and as well substance relating to the concepts of equality and nondiscrimination before going to the substance of the discussion. In the next chapter the focus will be placed on the interpretation and comments on the Framework Agreement.1 The principle of non-discrimination is a basic concept deriving from the human rights law. Non-discrimination is both a human right on its own and a part of the human right law.2 This principle which is corollary to the principle of equality is included in international and regional instruments, to which Republic of Macedonia is a State Party. This principle is also to be found at supranational (EU) level. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948, which was in that time non-binding but now considered customary law contains several equality and non-discrimination provisions. Article 2 which is broad in scope and reads: Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status
1 2
Framework Agreement, 13.08.2001. Martin Scheinin and Catarina Krause, The Rights not to be Discriminated Against: The Case of Social Security in T. Orlin and M. Scheinin, The Jurispudence of Human Rights Law: A Comparative Approach, Gummerus, Jyvskyl, 2000: 255. Jana Lozanoska LL.M, PhD Candidate and former Director of the Center for Democracy and Security in Euro-Balkan Institute. Currently works as an independent consultant.
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Jana Lozanoska
Article 2(1) and 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressly deals with non-discrimination and are considered as one of the most important provisions. The scope of Article 26 is mainly delimited by the concepts of equality before the law and equal protection of the law. This double-faceted formulation provides that the equal treatment obligation is binding both in the lawmaking (equal protection of the law) and in the application of law (equality before the law). Thus, when legislation is adopted by a state party, it must comply with the requirement of Article 26 in that its content should not be discriminatory. And when that law is applied in courts or by administrative bodies, it must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. The Covenant talks about the protection against discrimination and inequality, but it does not discuss its characteristics. Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination and Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women contains explication what constitutes discrimination but they deal with specific issues of women and race respectively. The Committee on Human Rights gives insight in the General Comment 18 that for the purpose of the Covenant discrimination is: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. However, the Committee stressed that enjoyment of rights and freedoms on equal footing does not mean identical treatment in every instance.3 At some instance neutral laws and policies can be found to be discriminatory, and this goes in lines with the debate formal and substantive equality which will be elaborated in second part of the paper. The notion of non-discrimination further has been discussed through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. As the Court has stated, for example, in the judgment in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom: a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.4 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has article on non-discrimination but this is not stand-alone and has to be related to the other substantive rights in the Convention in order discrimination to be claimed. Protocol 12 to the ECHR in Article 1 contains general prohibition on
3 4
CCPR General Comment No. 18 Non-discrimination 11/10/1989. Judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A, No. 94, paragraph 72.
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Principle of Non-discrimination and Equitable Representation in Framework Agreement
discrimination a propos the provision in the Convention. The problem with this treaty is that has not been ratified by many states parties to the ECHR.5 Positive discrimination or temporary special measures may sometimes be needed, and this is different, therefore cannot be considered as discrimination as such, in order to bring disadvantaged or marginalized persons or groups of persons to the same substantive level as others. The fact that there are certain groups or categories of persons who are disadvantaged, or the existence of de facto inequalities, may constitute justifications for adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to promote equality, provided that the proportionality principle is respected. Indeed, there are several international instruments obliging or encouraging states to adopt positive measures (see, for example, Article 1 (4) and 2(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 4 of Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Recommendation No. R (85) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on legal protection against sex discrimination.
Principle of non-discrimination and equitable representation in Framework Agreement an answer to address inequalities?!
Through the Framework Agreement the country from national state with minorities is transposed to multi-ethnic society with communities who have equal rights. And this is in terms of collective rights. By some commentators the constitutional amendments introduced to preamble are quite regressive comparing to the previous one in terms of the smaller communities like Vlavs and other.6 The recognition of the multi-ethnic society by the Framework Agreement is not something which is problematic.7 On the contrary discrimination towards smaller communities exists since the 20% rule8 although this is mentioned in specific areas such as local selfgovernment and use of language, makes equality and non-discrimination workable for ethnic-Macedonians and ethnic-Albanians. The constitution of the Republic of Macedonia from 1991 and with latter amendments contained a non-discrimination and equality provision.9 Obviously
5
6 7 8
Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Rome. 4.XI 1950, as amended by Protocols Nos.11 and 14, Registry of the European Court of Human Rights June 2010. , , , 18 September 2001. Census of the Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia 2002. Percentage of population speaking a language other than Macedonian and percentage of population other than Macedonian living in local self-government units. Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991.
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Jana Lozanoska
this has not been enough and the country required stronger affirmation of the non-discrimination and equality principle, first and foremost because of the greater need to promote and protect human rights in the country, and not only formally but also in substantive terms. And second, since Republic of Macedonia has obligations to observe the commitments undertaken by becoming a State Party to international and regional human rights instruments. Recently, due to the developments and requirements by the EU, the country has adopted systematic law on non-discrimination.10 The Framework Agreement contains specific provision (4) which talks about non-discrimination and equitable representation. It appears that both terms as included in the Agreement should be examined by taking into consideration the treaty rules on interpretation since the agreement per se is sui generis one, that does not necessarily mean that is a complex one but that has specifities which cannot be find in some other agreements. First, this provision, particularly paragraph one stresses: the principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under the law will be respected completely. Analysis of this wording gives impression that the law should be equal for all in at least formal sense i.e. the laws should not discriminate against nobody. This is a problem because neutral laws would not resolve any discrimination whatsoever existing in the country, and as previously discussed sometimes in case of disadvantaged groups there is a possibility of positive discrimination or introduction of temporary special measures. Another part that should have been included in this paragraph is actually missing and is relevant to the substantive equality. Notably, the requirement as existing in international and regional instruments of equality before law (a segment of substantive equality) which is the other side of the coin of the equality and non-discrimination, notably the one related to enforcement of non-discrimination. Further, the meaning of all in this quotation refers to all people living in the Republic of Macedonia regardless of their racial, ethnic, social and any other status. But is it so in substantive terms?! Further, 4 (1) mentions the areas where the principle on non-discrimination would be applied and that is in particular: public administration, public enterprises and access to public financing for business development. This is quite restrictive first to the areas where it applies and second to the actors responsible, since mostly it refers to the public or State actors whereas discrimination occurs and is committed by Non-state actors. Article 4 (2) opens the door to the positive discrimination for all communities who are under-represented in public administration on both central and local level and public enterprises due to long-lasting disadvantageous status in the
10
( . . 50/2010).
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society, or with the terminology of the human rights law this paragraph deals with the temporary special measures. The modality chosen to achieve this is through equitable representation. Without entering into semantics of the equitable representation, it is obvious that this is technical term and has nothing to do with the substantive meaning of the principle of equality and non-discrimination, but more to the formal since the latter is quite restrictive in its scope. This article does not determine according to which criteria this equitable representation will be implemented. Having in mind the overall formula that exists in the Agreement and that is 20% rule, one assumes that this is the modality through which equitable representation should be achieved. In simple words, more public administration and public job openings for the ethnic Albanians and little for the communities which are under 20% rule. On the other hand, this positive discrimination measure should not be regarded as a tool for job openings in the public administration in situation when unemployment in the country is around 30% of total population.11 Something which is striking is the fact that this technical modality of equitable representation is included in the Constitution as part of fundamental values along with other substantive requirements. One can understand such motivation namely to make the legislative changes, but could not see it as completely necessary since: 1. Equitable representation is a temporary special measure to address previous inequality and when achieved will become oblivious; 2. Commitments of the state for such modification already exist in Framework Agreement which is binding for its organs and bodies and this is the assurance which is just enough to press the state to make such changes and implement equitable representation principle. Moreover, article 4(2) stresses that equitable representation in the police should be -implemented as soon as possible. Article 4 (3) deals with the equitable representation in the judicial system and at the Office of the Ombudsman. Furthermore, non-discrimination and equitable representation modality is contained in Article 6 Education and Use of Languages. Paragraph 3 of the said Article reveals the true nature of the equitable representation technical modality, as opposite to the Article 4. Article 6 paragraph 3 reads: The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition of the population of Macedonia. Several issues can be identified, that this is first and foremost positive discrimination or temporary special measure, is to be used for the candidates belonging to communities not in majority in the population and most importantly with limited time-scope until it reflects equitably the composition of the countrys population. As stated this is the real nature of the equitable representation and
11
See: www.mtsp.gov.mk; www.avrm.gov.mk.
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Jana Lozanoska
therefore found appealing that this criteria has been included in the fundamental values section of the Constitution. In terms of figures and actual implementation of this principle some comparative data although dating back to 2004 can be found in the Venice Commission Report, which portray the equitable representations through percentage and sectors.12 The highest percentage of employment in public administration and court system after ethnic Macedonians hold ethnic Albanians, and the smaller communities hold only few or the small percentage of the positions. However, there is a need for conducting a comparative assessment of the progress of implementation of the equitable representation, although recent data can be found at the central registry of civil servants. The office of the Ombudsman in its annual report of provides statistical data of the progress of implementation of principle of equitable representation since it is the body responsible for this.13 The 0.4 percent of complaints relate to the observance of the principle of non-discrimination and equitable representation.
Conclusion
The conclusion suggests as the critics since the beginning of adoption are, that the Framework Agreement promotes on one hand formal equality namely for certain groups, placing the collective rights higher than individual, the latter is a concept of the global human rights framework. And on the other endorses non-majority community vis a vis other smaller communities. It is evident that the Agreement discriminates against smaller communities and this mechanism does not allow for overall protection against discrimination. Additionally, there have been critics for the ethnization of the public administration, which is certainly due to the solutions included in OFA.14 Moreover, the Copenhagen criteria -prescribe protection of minorities to be first jointly with stable institutions guaranteeing democracy and rule of law condition for accession of candidate countries to EU.15 In our context minorities does not mean only Albanians but also all other communities living in the Republic Macedonia. Therefore, the Republic of Macedonia should consider and implement systematic measures deriving from existing international and legal human rights law
12
13 14
15
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Positive discrimination and access to civil services Report, Constitutional, Legal and Other Measures Aimed at promoting Equitable Representation of Communities in Civil Services and the Experience from the Ombudsman Office by Snezana Teodosievska Jordanoska. Trieste, Italy, 2005. Republic of Macedonia Ombudsman, Annual Repport 2010, Skopje March 2011. Gordana Siljanovska, One Decade After OFA Lessons to be Learned from the Macedonian Experience, Conference Organized by Center for Research and Policy Making, June 2011. European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, 21-22 June, 1993.
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to constantly fight inequalities. Prompt implementation of the solutions included in the law against discrimination is also necessary. The principle of equitable representation according to the data and conclusions by authoritative bodies has been achieved in terms of ethnic Albanians in public administration representation. In addition, this principle as mentioned above according to the terminology of human rights law is a temporary special measure addressed particularly to a certain groups. In simple words, the country needs substantive equality to be in place by addressing in comprehensive and systematic manner the inequalities of individuals and not only promotion of one ethnic group vis a vis other but measures to really create and function as a multi-ethnic society.
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CROSSROADS
January-August 2011, Vol. II, No. 4
The articles published in CROSSROADS do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the publisher. The publisher is not liable for errors. All rights reserved. No parts of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission from CROSSROADS.
Design: MIC & Simco Sandulovski Print: Arcuss Design, Skopje Circulation: 1,500
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January-August, 2011
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The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal

LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

Preventive Diplomacy... Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies, Mechanisms, Actors & Stakeholders

Vol. II, No. 4

The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal

January-August 2011, Vol. II, No. 4

Skopje, January-August 2011

Vol. II, No.4

Preventive Diplomacy... Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies, Mechanisms, Actors & Stakeholders

The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor?

The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor

The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor

1. Macedonias path from conflict prevention to post-conflict peace-building

The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor

The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor

The Republic of Macedonias Paradoxes in Peacebuilding: Being an Object and/or an Actor

1. The case of the preventive diplomacy effort in Macedonia (1991-1993)

Examples of references in the New York Times

Examples of references to Greek

northern part of Greece, etc.

Examples of references to Albanian Examples of references to Serbian

Examples of references in The Economist

want Macedonia to change its name, etc. demand, etc.

Examples of references to Macedonian

Serbia poses the greatest danger, etc.

tiny Serbian minority, etc.

schematic representation of the non-impact of media in the effort in Macedonia

Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

1. The Ohrid Framework Agreement and the theory

Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff

Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff

Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff

Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff

Executive power sharing The Institutions of Government Legislative power sharing

Yes: voluntary Yes: voluntary

Electoral system (for parliament) Judicial branch Legal entrenchment

Plurality preferential /vote pooling Independent Yes

Rights and Identities

Individual vs. group Emphasis on rights individual rights

Recognition of distinct identities

Yes, but primarily as private matter

Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff

Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff

Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia

Zoran Ilievski and Stefan Wolff

The Ohrid Process: A Long-lasting Challenge

1. What was achieved?

The Ohrid Process: A Long-lasting Challenge

2. What was not achieved?

The Ohrid Process: A Long-lasting Challenge

3. What is the model?

4. What are the lessons learnt?

The Ohrid Process: A Long-lasting Challenge

Preventive Diplomacy... Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies, Mechanisms, Actors & Stakeholders

Democracy as a Peace-Building Tool Case Study: South Africa

Democracy as a Peace-Building Tool Case Study: South Africa

2. Democracy as a Peace-building Tool: Peace Literature Review