1

8atipatthna and the lvolution ol the uhamma 1heory

lhikkhu 8ujato


1his essay is a response and partial critique ol kupert oethin's valuable article, 'le who 8ees uhamma 8ees
uhammas: uhamma in larly luddhism'
1
. lt is not a lull analysis, but does two things: lirstly, questions some ol
the methodology used by oethin, and secondly considers some possible implications this may have lor our
understanding ol the evolution ol the concept ol 'dhamma'.

oethin's primary sources lor early luddhism are ol course the lali Nikyas. le says in a lootnote that '.it would
seem that any account ol early luddhist thought based on the chinese gamas would be essentially similar to
an account based on the lali Nikyas. As ltienne lamotte has observed, the doctrinal basis common to the
chinese gamas and lali Nikyas is remarkably unilorm, such variations as exist allect only the mode ol
expression or the arrangement ol topics.' while this is generally true, as we shall see, sometimes a
rearrangement ol topics, though seemingly innocuous, has unexpected implications. ln any case, it is not really
good enough to rely on a generalization like that when conducting an inquiry into a specilic lield or text.

lor example, one ol the key controversial attributes ol a 'dhamma' according to the 8arvstivdins was that
dhammas exist in the past, luture, and present. lt has been noticed that the 8arvstivdin gamas - specilically,
the 8amyukta and madhyama preserved in chinese translation
2
- lrequently say that various things have
existed in the past, will exist in the luture, and do exist in the present. l do not know ol a passage where such a
lormula is applied to the term 'dhamma' specilically, although it is certainly used ol things that are 'dhammas',
such as the lour noble truths. A number ol researchers, including 1hich minh chau and Yin 8hun, have
concluded that such statements are sectarian, implying a nascent tendency towards the 8arvstivdin
perspective even within the gamas. 1here is, accordingly, good reason to suspect that sectarian dillerence on
this particular question may be discerned between the gamas and Nikyas, and hence it is unwise to rely on
either one source lor conclusions about 'early luddhism'. ln lact, oethin's work is about 'lali luddhism', and it
should portray itsell as such.

ulAmmA8 lN 8A1llA11lNA

lerhaps a more important example is in the consideration ol the meaning ol 'dhamma' within the lourth
satipatthna, 'contemplation ol dhammas'. Almost every scholar who has studied satipatthna has committed
the unlorgivable heresy ol regarding 'the' 8atipatthna 8utta as the be-all and end-all ol satipatthna. lere
oethin lollows suit, and uses the presentation ol 'dhammas' in the 'contemplation ol dhammas' section ol 'the'
8atipatthna 8utta to draw important conclusions lor his work. le should really have known better, lor a series
ol scholars (warder, 8chmithausen, lronkhorst, and others) have noticed important dillerences in the various
versions ol the 8atipatthna 8utta, including the section under consideration here.

1here are a lew questions about the contemplation ol dhammas in satipatthna that we can clear up
immediately. 1he lirst is: has there been historical change in the text7 1he answer is yes. 1he lurmese version
ol the lali canon has displaced the 8atipatthna 8utta (m10) with the mahsatipatthna 8utta (u22). 1he
8atipatthna 8utta no longer exists in the lurmese canon. 1his dillerence is mentioned in the l18 lali, so stems

1
Journal of !ndian Philosophy 32: 513-5+2, 200+
2
The Sarvastivada Dirgha has been recently discovered in ancient Sanskrit manuscript, but has been little studied as yet.
2
lrom the 19
th
century at least, perhaps the change was made at the lurmese so-called 'lilth council'. 1he
second question is this: has the change any sectarian agenda7 Again, the answer is unequivocally, yes. As is well
known, those who have presided over the revision and distribution ol the lurmese version ol the lali canon are
enthusiastic advocates ol a meditation technique called 'vipassan', which claims the (mah) 8atipatthna 8utta
as its primary source text. clearly, the insertion ol the mahsatipatthna 8utta into the majjhima Nikya was
intended to bolster the prestige ol this school by making its text the longest in the majjhima.

wllcl 8A1llA11lNA 8L11A7

1hese rather disturbing considerations make it imperative that we should clarily exactly what we are talking
about when we reler to 'the' 8atipatthna 8utta. 1he lirst point to be clear about is that there are several
versions ol 'the' 8atipatthna 8utta, and there is no a pricri reason why any one should be more reliable than any
other. 1hey can be summed up as lollows.

1itle 1itle 1itle 1itle 8chool 8chool 8chool 8chool language language language language kelerence kelerence kelerence kelerence
8atipatthna 8utta 1heravda lali m 10 (except lurmese 1ripitaka)
mahsatipatthna 8utta 1heravda lali u 22
8mrtyupasthna 8tra 8arvstivda chinese mA 98
lkyana 8tra mahsanghika7 chinese lA 12.1
Vibhanga 1heravda lali chapter
uharmaskandha 8arvstivda chinese 1 1! (p4c24)
8riptrbhidharma uharmaguptaka chinese 1 148 (p612b26-612b20)
lrajnpramta 8tra mahyna chinese, 1ibetan, 8kt ch 16 (pp1!-, conze's trans.)

lach ol these contains recognizable leatures that enable them to be clearly recognized as a version ol the
'8atipatthna 8utta material'. while some, such as the lrajnpramta, come lrom later works, the satipatthna
material has clearly been 'cut-&-pasted' with a minimum ol alteration, so there is no reason why it should not
preserve genuine early leatures. lowever, the lrajnpramita only treats body contemplation in detail, so lor
the purpose ol this essay it may be lelt aside.

we are then lelt with seven sources. lere are the lists ol contents ol contemplation ol dhammas in each version.
lere we treat the 1heravdin medium length 8atipatthna 8utta and long mahsatipatthna 8utta together, as
the list ol contents in dhamma-contemplation is identical, the only dillerence being that the long version
greatly expands the description ol the lour noble truths.



1herav 1herav 1herav 1heravda da da da
Abhidhamma Abhidhamma Abhidhamma Abhidhamma
Vibha Vibha Vibha Vibhan nn nga ga ga ga
8ar 8ar 8ar 8arv vv vstivda stivda stivda stivda
Abhidharma Abhidharma Abhidharma Abhidharma
uharmaskandha uharmaskandha uharmaskandha uharmaskandha
uharmaguptaka uharmaguptaka uharmaguptaka uharmaguptaka
Abhidharma Abhidharma Abhidharma Abhidharma
8riptrbhidharma 8riptrbhidharma 8riptrbhidharma 8riptrbhidharma
1herav 1herav 1herav 1heravda da da da
(mah (mah (mah (mah - -- -) ) ) )
8atipa 8atipa 8atipa 8atipatt tt tt tth hh hna na na na
8utta 8utta 8utta 8utta
8arv 8arv 8arv 8arvstivda stivda stivda stivda
8m 8m 8m 8mr rr rtyupasth tyupasth tyupasth tyupasthna na na na
8 88 8tra tra tra tra
mah mah mah mah sa sa sa san nn nghika ghika ghika ghika
lk lk lk lkyana 8tra yana 8tra yana 8tra yana 8tra

hindrances


awakening-
lactors

hindrances

6 sense lields
awakening-
lactors

hindrances

6 sense lields
awakening-lactors



4 noble truths

hindrances
aggregates
6 sense lields
awakening-
lactors

4 noble
truths
6 sense lields
hindrances


awakening-
lactors

( hindrances
in
intro & conc.)
awakening-
lactors
4 jhanas
3

lach ol these contains several items under 'contemplation ol dhammas', and these items share much in
common. clearly, the sects were talking about the same kinds ol things in this context. Yet each version has its
own peculiarities. 1here are two possible explanations. One is that there is simply some llexibility as to what
this section includes. 1here is every reason to suppose that the luddha in his long career taught satipatthna
lrom several perspectives and the traditions lrom the earliest times may have recorded dillerent lists ol
specilics in this context, without implying that one or other was linal and delinitive. 1he alternative hypothesis
is that there was one version that was the 'real', 'original' version ol contemplation ol dhammas, and that the
other versions represent developments by the schools. while it is never possible in such cases to come to an
absolute decision between these alternatives, l believe there are a number ol considerations that, taken
together, make it very likely that in this case the second alternative is correct, and moreover, that we can
reconstruct the original lorm with a reasonable degree ol certainty.

wlA1 uOl8 'cON1lmllA1lON Ol ulAmmA8' mlAN7

we should lirst get some idea ol what is at stake. oethin takes lor granted the 1heravda 8atipatthna 8utta in
presenting dhammas as including the live hindrances, the live aggregates, the six sense lields, the seven
awakening-lactors, and the lour noble truths. Now, in the 1heravda 8atipatthna 8utta, each ol the meditation
practices is lollowed by a 'vipassan relrain', which urges us to contemplate each object in terms ol its
'dhamma' (nature) to arise and cease. oethin connects this meaning ol -dhamma as the second element ol a
uanuvrini compound in the sense ol 'a particular nature or quality' with the meaning in the contemplation ol
dhammas. le argues that dhammas in satipatthna cannot mean 'teachings', 'practices', 'truths', or 'laws'. lt can
only mean 'basic qualities, both mental and physical'. And it is on this basis that he suggests that this is the most
prevalent usage in the Nikyas, closely anticipating the similar though more technical usage in the
Abhidhamma.

ll my textual arguments have any lorce, then this conclusion is deprived ol its key support (which ol course
does not mean it is wrong). One ol oethin's assumptions seems to be that 'dhammas' in the contemplation ol
dhammas has essentially a unilorm meaning. 1his is by no means necessarily the case - the term dhamma
might have been chosen specilically lor its ambiguity. 1he list ol lactors we are given in lact seems to lall into
two rather dillerent categories. 1he hindrances and awakening-lactors are qualities ol mind, good and bad, the
aggregates, sense lields, and truths are alternative descriptions ol reality. 1he hindrances and awakening-
lactors pertain to the lourth noble truth, the aggregates and sense lields pertain to the lirst, the truths
themselves, ol course, are all encompassing. Now which, il any, is more intrinsic to this context7 consider the
lollowing points.

wlA1 l8 1ll cON1lN1 Ol cON1lmllA1lON Ol ulAmmA87

1. while all the versions diller to some degree, they all contain the hindrances and awakening-lactors.
moreover, while the other items vary in their positions, these two always occur in the same sequence. 1here is
one exception to this: the lkyana 8tra has the lour jhanas instead ol the hindrances. lut this version places
the hindrances at the beginning and the end ol the sutta, and l believe that this represents a later, independent
development, emphasizing the importance ol eradicating the hindrances as the 'alpha and omega' ol
satipatthna practice.

2. One version, the 1heravda Abhidhamma Vibhanga, contains only the hindrances and awakening lactors.
1his is in lact the simplest ol all the versions in its basic specilication. lor example, it omits the introductory
and closing questions: 'And how does bhikkhu dwell contemplating a dhamma in the dhammas in terms ol the
live hindrances7' 1he specilication ol body contemplation is similarly simple and primitive. Ol course, this
simplicity only applies to the basic specilication stripped ol the developed abhidhamma analysis.

4
!. 1he hindrances and awakening-lactors are lound together with satipatthna in many places, including the
8atipatthna 8amyutta. lut a survey ol the relevant 8amyuttas reveals that there is no close relationship
between satipatthna and the aggregates, sense lields, and truths.

4. 1he 8amudaya 8utta (8N 4.42J8A 609) ol the 8atipatthna 8amyutta (both lali and chinese) says that the
origin ol dhammas in satipatthna is attention (manasikra). while this could apply to the truths, it obviously
cannot apply to the aggregates and sense lields. On the other hand, the lojjhanga 8amyutta contains many
suttas that say that unwise attention gives rise to the hindrances, and wise attention gives rise to the
awakening-lactors. clearly, this is exactly what the 8amudaya 8utta is implying. ln case we have any doubt on
this point, the commentary explains it in just this way.

1his last point is really the clincher. 1he other considerations carry weight, though they might also be
interpreted dillerently, but l don't see how anyone could reasonably object to the commentarial interpretation
here. l can only conclude that the original specilication ol contemplation ol dhammas was the hindrances and
awakening-lactors.

Notice that these lall together under the lirst meaning ol 'dhamma' l mentioned above: good and bad qualities
ol mind. 1his is, in lact, another reason lor thinking they belong together here. Another meaning ol 'dhamma',
however, also emerges lrom the manner in which these lactors are treated: each is considered in terms ol how
it comes to arise and pass away. 1his implies that 'dhamma' here might also encompass the meaning ol 'natural
principle', the 'laws' ol cause and ellect. lt would seem to be quite clear, then, that the other meaning ol
dhamma - the constituents ol reality, as exemplilied especially by the aggregates and sense lields - is secondary
and probably a later interpolation. 1his leads to a number ol conclusions.

1ll llAcl Ol 1ll 8A1llA11lNA 8L11A

ln terms ol textual interpretation, we have lound that the key to this majjhima sutta is to be lound in the
8amyutta. On the basis ol other research, l believe that many, perhaps all, ol the majjhima suttas that deal with
samyutta-style topics were originally included in the (proto) 8amyutta and were later moved out. 1here are
some specilic textual reasons lor believing this has happened in the case ol the 8atipatthna 8utta. 1he clearest
is that the basic satipatthna lormula in the 8arvstivda 8mrtyupasthna 8tra is abbreviated. 1he explanation
lor this is lound in the 8mrytupasthna 8amyukta ol the same school. 1here, the lormula is olten abbreviated,
as one could expect in a collection that has dozens ol suttas repeating the same lormula. lut some suttas give
the lormula in lull, and in one ol these (8A 612) there is a note saying that all the suttas on satipatthna should
be spelt out in the same way. 1his makes perlect sense in the 8amyukta, but in the majjhima version there is no
reason why the lormula should be abridged, and no guidance as to how to expand it. 1his anomaly is easily
explained il we assume that the 8mrtyupasthna 8tra originally belonged in the 8amyukta, but was later
moved and 'padded out' lor inclusion in the majjhima. At the very least, this suggests we should look in the
8amyutta lor other clues lor interpretating satipatthna. 1his approach has proven lruitlul in other areas ol
satipatthna, such as the contested meaning ol the phrase 'ckyana maa', though l cannot go into details here.
(we should note that one version is in the lkottara (=Anguttara), which anyway conlirms that it need not
necessarily belong to the majjhima.)

8A1llA11lNA ANu AlllulAmmA

ln terms ol doctrinal evolution, we have discovered that the original meaning ol 'dhammas' in satipatthna was
good and bad qualities or principles. 1his later moved towards the meaning ol 'elements ol reality', in other
words, it tended towards the Abhidhamma meaning. 1he Abhidhamma connection is, in lact, quite explicit. 1he
mahsatipatthna 8utta is distinguished lrom its shorter majjhima brother by the inclusion ol a long
explanation ol the lour noble truths. 1his explanation is derived lrom the 8accavibhanga 8utta, but the
treatment ol the second and third noble truths is considerably expanded. 1here is no exact version ol this
5
passage in the Nikyas, and lor parallels, we must look to the Abhidhamma Vibhanga. 1here the exposition ol
the truths is essentially identical with that in the mahsatipatthna 8utta. 1his makes it certain that the
contemplation ol dhammas in satipatthna was, lrom early times, tied up with the evolving Abhidhamma
conception ol dhammas.

Now, to appreciate what this means we must lirst consider what kind ol text the mahsatipatthna 8utta really
is. ls it, as so olten claimed, the most important ol all discourses, the greatest ol the luddha's authentic
meditation teachings, the 'heart ol luddhist meditation'7 8adly, the answer must be no. ln lact, we must
question whether it is an authentic discourse at all. 1he uharmaguptaka version ol the ugha, preserved in
chinese translation, has no equivalent lor the mahsatipatthna 8utta. 1hey certainly had a '8atipatthna 8utta',
lor as we have seen their Abhidharma preserves a version ol the satipatthna material (which is close to the
lali). 1he newly discovered 8arvstivda urgha also lacks a mahsatipatthna 8utta. 1he absence lrom these
two collections, ol schools quite close to the 1heravda, strongly suggests that the mahsatipatthna 8utta is an
independent 1heravda development, a compilation ol the 8atipatthna 8utta with proto-abhidhamma material.
1he extra material is entirely included in the contemplation ol dhammas. 1hus to use this text, as oethin does,
to argue lor the similarity between the Nikya and Abhidhamma usage ol 'dhamma', is llawed.

1ll ckl1lQLl Ol 1ll AlllulAmmA

ln lact, our historical analysis leads us to exactly the opposite conclusion. while not denying oethin's
conclusion that the NikyasJgamas lrequently use 'dhamma' to mean something like an element or aspect ol
reality, the usage in satipatthna reveals an increasing tendency lor this meaning to override what, in this
context, is the earlier and more important meaning. 1his gets to the heart ol what the 'dhamma-controversy' is
all about. 1he original specilication ol contemplation ol dhammas, according to us, was an ethical injunction: it
was a practice, an ought-to-do, based on an understanding ol how things work, the principles ol causality. later
a more ontological emphasis emerged: a highly detailed and technical listing ol what there is. 1his is precisely
where the argument about dhammas raged in ancient lndia. 1he critics alleged that the luddha's original
injunction to seek lreedom through meditation and examining one's own mind had been usurped by a nit-
picking, pedantic obsession with categorizing and sorting out the details ol the elements ol so-called 'ultimate
reality'. And, in embryonic lorm, this is exactly the kind ol movement we have seen in the contemplation ol
dhammas. lere is a key passage lrom the 8amdhinirmocana 8tra, a central source work lor the Yogacra
school ol mahyna probably composed in the 8econd century cl:

'1he Venerable 8ubhti addressed the llessed One and said: world-honored One, in the world ol sentient
beings l know a lew who state their understanding without pride, but l know innumerable, untold sentient
beings who cherish their pride and state their understanding in a pridelul manner. world-honored One, once l
was dwelling in a grove in a lorest. A large number ol monks lived nearby. l saw them assemble alter sunrise to
discuss various issues and to propose their own understandings, each according to his insight.

8ome proposed their understanding ol the aggregates, their descriptive marks, their arising, their exhaustion,
their destruction, and the realization ol their destruction. Other, in like lashion, proposed their understanding
ol the sense lields.dependent origination.sustenance.truth.realms [Jntus].the stations ol recollection
[satipatthnas], their descriptive marks, the states they are able to control, their cultivation, their arising lrom a
state ol being non-arisen, their assured non-lorgetlulness alter arising, and their increase lrom repeated
practice. [also the right ellorts, etc.].

'.lach one ol them cherished their pride.and were unable to comprehend the one universal taste ol the truth
ol ultimate meaning.'
!


3
The Scripture on the Explication of the Underlying Neaning (translation of T 676 Samdhinirmocana Stra), pg. 22, John P.
Keenan, Numata Center, 2000
6

As with many mahyna stras, this makes little sense considered as an authentic teaching ol the luddha
(because some ol the terminology is clearly later and derived lrom the Abhidhamma), but makes complete sense
il considered as a critique ol the academic luddhist scene that dominated around the time ol christ. whether
coincidence or not, the phrasing ol this passage closely rellects the phrasing ol the contemplation ol dhammas
in the 8atipatthna 8utta. As l have shown elsewhere, the list ol topics here is clearly derived lrom the
8arvstivda 8amyukta gama, but the manner ol phrasing may well be inlluenced by the 8atipatthna 8utta. ll
it is meant as a critique ol the developed conception ol satipatthna as represented by the existing texts, this
raises the question whether the 8atipatthna 8utta may be considered a meditation text at all, or il it is really a
doctrinal compilation.

1ll uA1l Ol 1ll mAl8A1llA11lNA 8L11A

1he dillicult question ol dates may oller some clarilication here. we have noticed that the ughas ol the
uharmaguptakas and the 8arvstivdins lack a mahsatipatthna 8utta. 1he uharmaguptaka schism, in
particular, was relatively late, it seems that they split lrom the 8ri lankan mahvihravsins (or 1heravdins)
during the missionary period, probably under Asoka, as mahinda and 8anghamitt were sent to the 8outheast,
while Yonaka uhammarakkhita went to the North-west and lounded the uharmaguptaka school. 1his suggests
that substantive dillerences between the texts ol the two schools may be post-Asokan, and in the case ol the
mahvihravsins, may be 8ri lankan in origin. ln lact, the 8inhalese commentaries openly admit that some ol
the latest additions to the ugha were made in 8ri lanka, specilically the closing verses ol the mahparinibbna
8utta. while the details are too complex to go into here, l think there is some reason to believe that the linal
redaction ol the mahsatipatthna 8utta was as late as 20 lcl, when the canon was written down in the loka
Vihra. lt was there, ol course, that the mahvihravsins made the momentous decision, never since reversed,
that their main emphasis would be on preservation, study, and teaching ol texts, rather than the practice ol
their contents. 1hus lrom the mahvihravsin's own assertion we lind conlirmation ol the accusations leveled
by such texts as the 8amdhinirmocana 8tra. And il l am correct in deducing that the mahsatipatthna 8utta
dates lrom the same period and the same group ol monks, it seems that here we are dealing with an essentially
scholastic exposition ol meditation.

ulAkmA8lANulA: ulAmmA8 = 8ANN - 8ANllkA

Now it is clear that the contemplation ol dhammas has been an important part ol the development ol the
conception ol 'dhamma', lor ancient luddhists as well as modern scholars. l cannot trace this in detail here, but
will just mention some key points. ln the early 8arvstivda Abhidhamma period the uharmaskandha correlates
the lour satipatthnas with the live aggregates: body = lorm, leeling = leeling, mind = consciousness, and
dhammas = perception and activities (sa, sanknr). lt should be plain that this last equation is incongruous
to say the least, il considered as a genuine description ol contemplation ol dhammas as lound in the existing
suttas. low can, say, the 'eye', or the lour noble truths, be construed as perception and activities7 Obviously
they can't, and this suggests an early conlusion as to what exactly is going on. lt would seem that the
correlation ol the aggregates with the satipatthnas is not really intended to explain the satipatthnas, but as
part ol the Abhidhamma project ol mapping the various teaching lrameworks on top ol one another.

what is odd here is that the live aggregates pertain to the lirst noble truth, sullering, while the satipatthnas
pertain to the lourth noble truth, the path. lut here the satipatthnas are being gradually subsumed under the
lirst noble truth, that is, moving lrom a description ol how to practice to a description ol what really exists.

1his delinition was later adopted across the traditions, including the 1heravda, which caused a lurther
problem. lor the 1heravda, alone among the existing versions, the contemplation ol dhammas itsell includes
the live aggregates: how then can it be said to be just two ol them7

7
1he whole situation seems odd, and we might wonder how it arose. Again, the history ol the texts provides a
good answer. 1he delinition lirst occurs in the uharmaskandha, which lists under dhamma-contemplation just
the hindrances, sense lields, and awakening-lactors. 1hus it does not include the aggregates within the
contemplation ol dhammas, escaping at least some incongruity. 1he uharmaskandha exposition is very similar
to the Vibhanga, which has just the hindrances and awakening-lactors. we may suspect that dhammas were
lirst delined as perception and activities when the content ol the section was just the hindrances and
awakening-lactors. while this is not obviously 'correct' as an interpretation, at least it is less incongruous.

A lurther signilicance ol this passage in the uharmaskandha is this: the uharmaskandha lollows each exercise in
satipatthna with a 'vipassan relrain', seeing each object as impermanent, sullering, a disease, etc. we have
noted that the 1heravda 8atipatthna 8utta includes a vipassan relrain, contemplating the 'origination-
dhamma', 'cessation-dhamma', etc., lollowing each exercise. 1his vipassan relrain is not lound in all versions,
and we conclude that it is a later insertion, lormed by splicing in a passage lrom a dillerent sutta in the
8atipatthna 8amyutta (8N 4.40, which has no chinese counterpart). 1here is no vipassan relrain in the
8arvstivda 8mrtyupasthna 8tra, and the vipassan relrain in the Abhidhamma ol the same school is clearly
later, having probably been imported lrom the lhandha 8amyutta. lt is quite dillerent to the vipassan relrain
in the 1heravda and cannot have come lrom the same source. Nevertheless, we see an increasing tendency to
see satipatthna in terms ol vipassan, this parallels the change in meaning ol 'dhamma'. As the objective, 'what
there is' meaning ol dhamma gains in importance, the sutta becomes more and more oriented towards
vipassan. (1he major theme ol A uistcry cj VinJju|ncss is that the primary context ol satipatthna in the
NikyasJgamas is samatha rather than vipassan.)

ulAmmA8 ANu lllNo

oethin wishes to counteract the lamous Nagarjunian critique ol the developed Abhidhamma conception ol
dhammas, especially in the 1heravdin context, and possibly generally. le quotes the commentarial delinition
that dhammas are so-called because 'they maintain (Jnrcnti) their own particular natures (saunva), or because
they are maintained (Jnriyanti) by causal conditions'. oethin says that this delinition should be understood as a
'direct and deliberate counter to the idea ol Jnammas as particular natures" that are maintained" by an
underlying substance (Jnarmin) distinct lrom themselves: it is not intended to deline dhammas as ontologically
irreducible entities.'
4
le also says that this delinition 'is not a statement about their ontological status'.

oethin's position cannot be sustained in light ol how the commentarial tradition itsell describes saunva. lasic
inlormation on this can be gleaned most easily lrom Nnamoli's lootnote 68, chapter 8 ol the lath ol
lurilication. 1he 1heravda considers both saunvaJnammas and asaunvaJnammas. 1he saunvaJnammas are the
lamiliar dhammas ol 1heravdin theory, the mental and physical elements. ln other words, the saunvaJnammas
exist in the 'ultimate' (paramattna) sense. 1he asaunvaJnammas include space, and especially concepts,
including all objects ol meditation that can produce jhana, generally, then, these equate with those things that
are considered to exist only 'conventionally' (sammuti). 5aunva itsell is glossed with such terms as unavana,
vijjamnat, |auunamnarupa, and especially: 'A dhamma's own essence or existing essence' (sakc v unvc samnc
v unvc). 1hese terms all have an ontological import, and none ol the delinitions quoted by Nnamoli describe
saunva as merely characteristics or qualities (nimitta, |ina, etc.).

1he saunvas are lrequently mentioned in meditation contexts, and sometimes this reinlorces our impression
that they are primarily ontological. lor example, the Visuddhimagga discusses which meditation signs can be
'extended', that is, consciously enlarged due to the manipulative power ol the yogi's concentration. lut 'it is not
possible to extend a saunvaJnamma'

. why might that be7 ln philosophical understanding ol the relation

between the mind and its objects, there are three basic positions. 1he mind exists 'in here' and the objects exist

+
Gethin, pg 53+
5
PP 3.115
8
independently 'out there' (nave realism), the mind is all there is and objects are an illusion (idealism), and the
mind and its objects exist interdependently. ln the second and third cases there would seem to be no problem in
extending the object ol meditation, since one is alter all only altering the mode ol perception. Only il the object
has an independent, inherent existence 'out there' would it be the case that one could not extend the object.
1his is, ol course, the basic ontological presupposition ol 'nave' science, that the object measured is
independent ol the measuring apparatus (here, the mind ol the yogi). 1hus, such contexts clearly seem to
assume some kind ol 'nave realism' in their ontology.

NlllANA A8 A 8AllVAulAmmA

1here is a serious problem with the saunva theory when we come to consider the status ol Nibbana. lt is a
saunvaJnamma, that is, it really exists in the ultimate sense. ln lact, Nibbana could hardly be excluded lrom
those things that exists 'ultimately', lor in the 8uttas it is the only thing described as ultimate truth (paramattna
sacca), although there the meaning is rather 'highest goal', or else it is true in the sense ol the ending ol delusion.
le that as it may, the commentaries are in the unenviable position ol putting Nibbana on essentially the same
ontological looting as conditioned dhammas. 1he sub-commentary addresses this issue by appealing to the
prolundity ol Nibbana, which explains nothing, merely draping the problem in a mystical shroud.

lut the idea ol Nibbana as saunvaJnamma directly contradicts the basic delinition ol dhamma we started with.
1o repeat: dhammas are so-called because 'they maintain (Jnrcnti) their own particular natures (saunva), or
because they are maintained (Jnriyanti) by causal conditions'. 1he second part ol this explanation appeals to
the conditioned nature ol dhammas, which ol course, cannot apply to Nibbana. 1hus this delinition cannot be
consistently applied to those things that are regarded by the commentary as saunvaJnammas. 1he second part
ol the delinition is dispensable and hence not intrinsic to the delinition itsell.

lrom a Nagarjunian perspective one would simply scoll and say, ol course! 1he delinition was utterly
incoherent lrom the beginning. low can we, on the one hand, assert the individual maintenance ol the saunvas,
and on the other, say they are conditioned7 1he two notions are essentially incompatible, and the notion ol
saunva is irrelevant to a sullicient description ol the lour noble truths and dependent origination.

oethin lurther supports his non-ontological interpretation ol saunva by pointing out the lunctional delinition
ol many dhammas in the commentaries. lt is contact (pnassa) because it contacts (pnusati), it is will (cctan)
because it wills (cctyati), etc. 1his mode ol delinition is, ol course, derived lrom the 8uttas, and in using it the
commentaries are doing what they should: taking the luddha's mode ol exposition and applying it in contexts
not literally spelt out in the existing texts. lut this does not lree them lrom the charge ol ontological
essentialism, in lact, it conlirms the charge. lor the commentarial tradition worked out a scheme that grades
the various kinds ol delinitions that it uses. (Lnlortunately, l don't have the exact details or relerences to hand).
1he above kind ol delinition, which explains a noun with a verb, is clearly stated to be provisional, the only
ultimately valid delinition is the delinition in terms ol saunva, that is, not lunctional, but ontological.

1hus we must accept that ol the two aspects ol the basic delinition ol a saunva, the second, being inapplicable
to Nibbana, is superlluous. ln lact, it was probably a later addition, tacked on to the original conception in order
to escape the Nagarjunian critique, but without really understanding or addressing the problem. lt was the
abhidhamma schools that lirst placed Nibbana and conditioned dhammas (=samsara) on the same ontological
looting. when Nagarjuna and lollowers with their 'emptiness' critique tended to equate both Nibbana and
samsara as empty, they merely mirror the position they are critiquing.

1lkll 8AllVA8

1o lind an elegant approach to this question we must look outside the 1heravda. Vasubandhu with his 'three
saunvas' has articulated a clever solution. Vasubandhu is a post-Nagarjuna 8unnatvdin ol the Yogacra
9
school. Lnlike your typical abhidhammika, he is actually possessed ol a sense ol humor, and his use ol saunva
alter Nagarjuna is downright cheeky. kather than dividing reality into 'really real' and 'not really real', as
proposed by the abhidhammikas and reluted by Nagarjuna, he suggested a threelold division: the conceived or
constructed or imagined (parika|pita), the interdependent (paratantrika), and the consummated (parinispanna).
Vasubandhu's work is dillicult and subtle, and l don't necessarily wish to accept all ol Vasubandhu's conceptual
apparatus, such as the |yavijna. lut as l understand it, put simply the three mean something like this. 1he
'conceived' relers to the normal world ol conceptually liltered experience. (1his is what the abhidhammikas call
'conventional reality', the remaining two would both be classed by the abhidhammikas as 'ultimate reality'.)
1he interdependent relers to the conditioned phenomena as experienced by the insight yogi, which are real but
still tainted by ignorance and so not seen with complete clarity. And the consummated is Nibbana, or the
experience ol enlightenment, which is ultimately true due to the ending ol ignorance. 1hus there is a vital
distinction preserved between Nibbana and conditioned phenomena, a distinction that is intrinsic to the
conception, not tacked on as an alterthought. ln his own words lrom the beginning ol the 1risvabhvanirdesa:

'1hat which appears is the interdependent [paratantrika]
how it appears" is the conceived [parika|pita]
1hrough the lormer's state ol developing subject to conditions
And the latter's being mere conception.

1he constant state-ol-not-being-lound
ol how it appears" in that which appears
can be known as the consummated [parinispanna] saunva
lecause ol its state ol non-otherness'

cONclL8lON

8o in this essay l have criticized some ol the methods and conclusions used by oethin in his exposition ol
dhammas. Obviously, my little essay is no attempt at a comprehensive solution, just a lew pointers. l do think it
is counterproductive to marginalize the importance ol historical evolution in luddhist thinking. while it is true
- and l think this is where oethin is coming lrom - that some modern interpreters have been too rash and
sweeping in their dismissal ol traditional interpretations, there is nevertheless much to learn lrom historical
analysis. Not least, we can lree ourselves lrom the simplistic idea that there ever was a unilorm interpretation
ol all aspects ol uhamma adhered to and consistently expounded throughout the lile ol a school ol luddhism.

ll you talk with any 1heravdin today, he will insist that there are 'dhammas' that exist 'ultimately', that are
'really real', as opposed to the merely conventionally existing things we take lor the truth. And the program ol
study in most Abhidhamma courses in 1heravda countries consists precisely ol memorizing, analyzing, and
classilying these dhammas. 1here is little consideration ol the philosophical problems with this approach, and
no meaninglul response to the Nagarjunian critique. 8urely, this situation, observable today, must have arisen
lrom somewhere: il not lrom the texts, that is, the commentarial abhidhamma works, then lrom where7 while
it is true that the texts do at times exhibit a degree ol philosophical sophistication, lor the most part they
assume this rather simplistic ontology, an ontology that, we should not need reminding, cannot be traced to the
8uttas.

1hese philosophical suppositions, inherited lrom the traditions and largely unexamined, underlie and inlorm
the major schools ol meditation that have emerged lrom this tradition. meditators practice precisely in order to
see the elements ol 'ultimate reality': that's all that matters. 1he prime source text lor this approach is the
'mahsatipatthna 8utta', which we suggest would be better called the 'liltdown 8utta'. ls it too much to hope
that the revelation that this is one ol the latest and least authentic ol all the texts in the Nikyas will cause such
meditation schools to question their own assumptions and methods7