Lecture 7 STATEMENTS TO THE POLICE

- Most evid is by way of statements and accused confessions very impt, usually
challenged, very impt in crim trials

Types of statements
a. FIR – s115 CPC: statement recorded by poclie at police station when informant lodges
police report
b. statements taken during interview/examination - s121
c. statements taken from accused after being charged - s122(6) eg confessions/ admissions
of certain facts/ mixed statements eg exculpatory statements altogether

Power to record statements arises under ss 121 & 122 CPC

- Power to record statements exercisable upon receipt of FIR disclosing
o a. seizable offence – can ex power to record long and caution statement
o b. If non-seizable offence, order of Magistrate / PP required – cannot
straightaway ex power under 121 and 122, req ordr of magistrate or public
prosecutor (s116(2))
- see NP299 form –
o police station whee statement recorded; date and time; name of informant –
informant to give report of what happened; then signed by officer and
informant; then IO assigned to investigate offence
o usually very short, though can also be in some detail.

Relevant provisions :
a. sections 17-32 EA
b. sections 121-123 CPC

Statements under s 121 CPC (long statements)

Section 121 CPC :

(1)A police officer (for all other types, this does not apply unless in their parent
legislation this section is referred to) making a police investigation … may examine
orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case
and shall reduce into writing any statement made by the person so examined.
(2)Such person shall be bound to state truly the facts and circumstances with which he is
acquainted concerning the case except only that he may decline to make with regard any
fact or circumstances a statement which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal
charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.
: - right against self incrimination – when police records statement, suspect has this right
(3)A statement made … under this section shall be read over to him and shall, after
correction if necessary, be signed by him. – the procedural reqts of recording of long
statement

A. Who can a section 121 statement be taken from?

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- ‘any person’ would include an accused person PP v Tan Huang Hiang [1990] 2 MLJ
24 (HC Ipoh) – in this case challenge that accused cannot be compelled –
o “There was not the slightest doubt that the statement of the accused while under
interrogation was not reduced into writing. Section 121(i) of the CPC [our
Section 121(1)] applied equally to both accused persons and witnesses as the
reading of the proviso to sub-s (iii) made it more applicable to accused persons
than witnesses”
- Mohamed Bachu Miah v PP [1993] 1 SLR 249
o Facts: The accused persons were convicted by the High Court on a charge of
murder under the Penal Code. The convictions rested primarily on the
statements of the accused. Three statements of each accused were admitted
during the trial. The first statement was recorded in the field diary of the
investigating officer after the arrest of both accused. The second was a
statement under Section 122(6) CPC and the third a long statement. On appeal it
was alleged that the statements were incorrectly admitted. The accused persons
contended that since the statements amounted to a confession and as they were
made whilst the accused were in police custody, Section 26 of the Evidence Act
should be complied with and any non-compliance would render the statements
inadmissible. The point was also raised that the trial judges had misdirected
themselves on the defence of sudden fight
o Held: dismissing the appeal,
 (1) The Section 122(6) and long statements of each accused were rightly
admitted. The trial judges were satisfied with the truth of the facts
contained in the statements. The statements constituted overwhelming
evidence against the appellants, and the court was satisfied that even if
the field diary statements were disregarded, the trial judges would still
have come to the finding that the charges against the appellants had been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
 2) Section 122(5) of the CPC is an “express provision” within the
meaning of the introductory words of s 26 of the Act. What is meant by
“express provision” was elucidated by the Privy Council in
Shanmugam v Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani
Residents [1962] AC 515 which the court adopts. In so far as a
statement, including a confession, is recorded under Section 121, and
provided there is no inducement, threat or promise, it is admissible under
Section 122(5) irrespective of whether the person giving the
statement is in police custody or not.
 (3) Section 121(1) empowers a police officer who is making an
investigation into a crime to examine any person supposed to be
acquainted with the facts of the case. There is nothing in that
provision, which suggests that such a power of the police, will not
apply where the person who is being examined is a person who is
under arrest and against whom a reasonable suspicion exists for
being involved in the crime.
 (4) Under s 122(6) of the CPC, the notice in writing is only required to
be served after the person is charged with an offence or officially

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 informed that he may be prosecuted. The duty to serve the notice does
not arise immediately after arrest.
 (6) An accused person can be convicted on his own confession even
when it is retracted, if the court is satisfied of its truth. Corroborative
evidence is not necessary to support it.
- Lim Young Sien v PP [1994] 2 SLR 257
o 10 Before the learned trial judge, counsel for the appellant argued that the
CPC gave no power to the police to record statements, whether written or oral,
from accused persons. Section 121 of the CPC only conferred on the police the
power to record statements from witnesses. Any statement taken from the
appellant after he had been accused was therefore, so counsel argued, in breach
of art 9(1) of the Constitution. After hearing counsel’s extensive submission, the
trial judge held that the police had the power to record statements from the
appellant under s 121(1) of the CPC. The appellant did not, however, appeal on
this point.
o 11 Neither, in our opinion, was it appealable. The trial judge rightly pointed
out that the point had been decided by this court in Mohamed Bachu Miah &
Anor v PP.

B. When can a section 121 statement be taken ?

- Must you record before he is charged or after given 122(6)? Ideally shld be before he is
charged because he is mere suspect and still investigating, after that IO shld then weigh
all facts and then charge accused.
- However stimes obvious that accused is guilty, so permitted that record after 122(6) and
after charged. Has been ruled that this is permissible
- s121(1) statement can be recorded from an accused before or after he is charged or
after a s122(6) cautioned statement is taken from him - Mohamed Bachu Miah v
PP [1993] 1 SLR 249
o held: (5) Section 122(1) nowhere provides that the police may not take a
statement from a person after he is charged or after a s 122(6) statement
has been obtained from him.
- • obligation to reduce into writing does not arise until ‘investigations’ have begun - Loh
Kim Cheng v PP [1998] 2 SLR 31
o Facts: The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death on a charge of
trafficking by having in his possession for the purpose of trafficking not less
than 32.31g of diamorphine. The appellant and one Lee were arrested. The
appellant was then escorted to his flat where the drugs were found. At the void
deck, ASP Chew had asked the appellant some questions. Before leaving the
flat, ASP Chew wrote down on a sheet of paper the questions he had asked the
appellant as well as the answers the appellant gave. This piece of paper (P74)
was signed by both the appellant and ASP Chew. The prosecution sought to
admit in evidence the oral statements made by the appellant and P74. After a
voir dire, the learned judge admitted the oral statements in evidence. P74 was
also admitted as corroborative evidence of the oral statements being made.

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 o On appeal, it was argued that P74 was a statement recorded under Section
122(1) of the CPC and was inadmissible since it was not tendered at the
preliminary inquiry. It was also submitted that the learned judge had wrongly
called on the appellant to make his defence.
o Held: dismissing the appeal (there were other issues decided but the more
important ones are as follows)
 P74 was plainly and simply a contemporaneous note of the oral
statements made by the appellant immediately following his arrest. It
was not a statement recorded under s 122(1) of the CPC as
“investigation” in the context of the CPC or otherwise could hardly
have begun so immediately following the arrest. The oral statements
were relevant under Section 6 and admissible under Section 5 of the
Evidence Act as they went to prove knowledge of the nature of the
substances in the possession of the appellant and formed part of the
transaction of being in possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.
 Statements made to a narcotics officer like ASP Chew was not subject to
s 122(1) of the CPC. Furthermore, P74 was in fact tendered at the
preliminary inquiry but through an oversight was not included with the
preliminary inquiry papers. It would undoubtedly have been produced to
defence counsel had he called for it. The transcript of the proceedings
showed that defence counsel was not prejudiced by the non-production
of P74 as he had an inkling from the statement what the contents were

- admissibility of oral statements made immediately upon arrest before investigations

have begun :
o made in circumstances of spontaneity / relevant under section 6 Evidence Act /
admissible under section 5 Evidence Act - Chi Tin Hui v PP [1994] 1 SLR 778
o => police officer may have seen certain incident and witnesses tell him
certain things, investigations not yet begun, officer no duty to record and
ask witness to sign.
o Such statements are NOT 121 statements because investigations have not
begun, made immed upon arrest only, but if relevant under EA they are
admissible under section 5.
- For the signed statements – 122(5). The oral ones – admissible under s5-15 of EA (just
slot into one of the relevant provisions for admissibility)

Chi Tin Hui v PP [1994] 1 SLR 778

- Facts: The appellant was convicted in the High Court of trafficking by transporting not
less than 60.13g of diamorphine
- Held: The trial judge was correct in discarding any possibility of concoction by ANO
Chua of the damaging oral statements made by the appellant. These statements were
clearly made by him in circumstances of spontaneity and went to show his knowledge
of what he was carrying when he was arrested and formed part of the transaction of
transporting the drugs. They would, therefore, be relevant under Section 6 of the
Evidence Act as facts so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same

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 transaction and, by being relevant, were admissible under Section 5 of the Evidence
Act.
- (3) The appellant’s explanation of the contents of his cautioned statement that it was Ah
Lee and not Tee Kia who had telephoned him to bring the packet to the latter was
unconvincing. His explanation of how Ah Lee had wrapped the packet of drugs also
lacked credibility.
- (4) The defence of agent provocateur and entrapment do not exist in Singapore as
defences simpliciter

C. Effect of a failure to comply with requirements under section 121?

- generally does not affect the admissibility of statements

For statement to be admitted in court:

1. is it relevant?
2. is it admissible? – see admissibility provisions eg 122(5) – admissible so long as no
threat induced
3. what weight shld be attached to the statement?

- procedural improprieties affect only the weight to be attached to the statement -

Vasavan Sathiadew v PP (1994) 4 CLAS 28
 Facts: Contravention of Section 121(3) CPC as statements were read back to A
but were not signed
 Held: Non-compliance does not render the statement inadmissible under
Section 122(5) CPC. “It only affects the weight to be given to such statement in
that it may give rise to questions whether such statement was in fact made, and
if it had been made why it was not signed by the accused…”
 Comments: Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code - murder with
common intention - Oral statement recorded in breach of Section 121(3) CPC
does not render it inadmissible under Section 122(5) of the CPC. Only its
evidential weight is affected.

- non-compliance with s 121(3) CPC recording procedure: but statement admissible

 omission to state at end of statement that it had been read over to the subject
and an opportunity offered to him to make corrections – s 121(3) CPC : Foong
Seow Ngui v PP [1995] 3 SLR 785 - this procedure not done, so challenged in
court. But court stated that still admissible only that this affected the weight.
• Facts: One objection raised by appellant P to admissibility of statement
was that IO did not state at the end of the statement that the statement
had been read over to A and that A had been offered the opportunity to
make corrections
• Held: (LP Thean JA): This omission ≠ serious irregularity, what’s
important is not whether the clause was included at end of statement but
whether statement was actually read to A and, after correction, if any,
signed by him (i.e. requirements in Section 121(3) CPC have been
fulfilled).
- subject failed to sign statement but still admissible: Vasavan Sathiadew v PP

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- subject refuses to sign statement --> statement is still admissible : PP v Lim Young
Sien (CC 63 of 1993)
 Held: (Rajendran J):
 Same holding as Vasavan Sathieadew.
 Section 121 CPC provisions of reduced into writing, read over to W and signed
by W are directory and not mandatory. Surely it can’t be said that if W refused
to sign a statement, the police would not have power to take the statement?
- see also Seow Choon Meng v PP [1994] 2 SLR 853I
 rape case; mde two long statements then oral statement when brought to the
scene then brought back to statement and recorded long statement, pros sought
to adduce all statements – 3 written and 1 oral. Oral statement not recorded
down. Investigations had begun (brought to scene etc, so under 121(1), officer
has duty to reduce into writing and ask accused to sign) but in this case poclie
officer failed to do so – whether this oral statement was admissible. Trial court
ruled that admissible and tt no need for trial within trial to be held to admnit the
statement because accused defence was that he did not make it at all and htat he
was not author of the statement ie denied totally.
o On appeal, held that oral statement wrongly admitted because THERE SHLD be
trial within trial. He challenged long statements as invol, and oral statement
made within these – prudent for court to hold voir dire to admit the oral statemtn
and since this not held, wrongly admitted.
o Note – inadmissible not because not recorded down, only because there was no
trial within a trial held
o Held: (Karthigesu JA):
 No statutory requirement to record that the first statement was read back
and explained to A. Merely good practice for this to be done.
 CCA ruled in Vasavan Sathiadew that non-compliance with Section
121(3) CPC does not render statement inadmissible…a fortiori,
departure from a rule of practice should not affect admissibility, though
it has a bearing on its weight.

– Caution : statements admissible despite procedural irregularities does not mean police
have a licence to flout Police General Orders and the statutory requirements –
– see Rajendran J’s caveat to this broad principle in PP v Dahalan bin Ladaewa [1996]
1 SLR 783 (High Court affirmed on appeal)
o in this case accused made oral statement in malay, officer recorded down on
paper and days later transferred to pocket bk and then paraphrased it in English
and then threw away the paper. So gross injustice in this case – judge threw out
the so called oral confession of the accused.
o Facts: Police sergeant with 16 years’ experience noted down A’s answers on a
piece of paper and later ‘expanded’ these answers into his pocket book, before
destroying the piece of paper. No statement was read back to A and neither was
A asked to confirm accuracy of statement and sign it. Further, in expanding the
answers, police sergeant used words not uttered by A.
o Held: (Rajendran J):

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  The words “shall be admissible” in Section 122(5) CPC indicate that in
situations not covered by the proviso (i.e. statement made of
inducement, threat or promise), the Ct is vested with a discretion to
admit or reject statements.
 The police sergeant here had ample time to comply with Section 121
CPC. By not doing so, he “flagrantly disregarded” the provisions of
Section 121 CPC.
 Although an oral statement will not be inadmissible because of non-
compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 121 CPC, the fact
that oral statements are admissible under Section 122(5) CPC should not
be treated as licence for police officers to ignore the provisions of
Section 121 CPC.

– Instances where non-compliance with s 121(3) CPC : statement inadmissible

o guiding principle – if court thinks that there is some prejudice against the
accused – judicial discretion will be exercised ie gross injustice caused by
the irregularity

– statement not reduced into writing until 6 weeks later : Kong Weng Cheong v PP
[1994] 1 SLR 34 – drug case.
o Facts: In 1989, officers of the Central Narcotics Bureau mounted a surveillance
of the three appellants. The car driven by the second appellant was searched.
Inside its fuel tank were found 39 packets of compressed white substance,
which on analysis were found to contain not less than 8.25kg of diamorphine.
o Held: In relation to the oral statement said to have been made by the first
appellant to SNO Peter Lim and NO Ng, the evidence of these two narcotics
officers relating to the alleged statement was highly unsatisfactory in several
material respects which were not brought to the attention of the trial judge.
Accordingly, such statements ought not to have been accepted and was rejected.
o In the present case, the evidence of the second and third appellants, in so far as
material to the finding against the first appellant, was substantially corroborated
by other evidence. In any event, Section 135 of the Evidence Act provided that
the evidence of an accomplice did not require corroboration and that the court
was not required to warn itself about convicting an accused on the
uncorroborated evidence of his accomplice.

– failure to inform Accused of the charge before statement recorded :Jamaludin v PP

[1992] 1 SLR 911 – drug case.
o 1 wk before arrest, test buy and accused sold drugs to undercover officer. CNB
officers did not arrest him at that time. 1 wk later, they tried another operation
but this time accused did not bite – he did not sell. CNB officers arrested him
during the second test buy. Statement recorded and he was not told why he was
arrested. He was charged for the first test buy one wk before. Whatever he said
after arrest was rled inadmissible because whole integrity of recording was
called into question. Gross injustice – he was not told why he was arrested
since he had not sold any drugs this time round.

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 o Facts: A was not informed of particulars of the charge against him before
statement was recorded. Subsequently convicted and appeal vs. conviction.
o Held: (Kan J):
 Appeal allowed. If A not informed of the particulars of the charge, there
was a question whether A really made the statement of an event without
even being told that that was the event under investigation.
 Integrity of the recording exercise comes into question. Now doubtful
whether the statement was recorded in the manner described by P. It
should not have been admitted.
– PP v Low Kok Wai (CC 59 of 1992) : ‘...at the very least, an accused person who is
asked to make a statement ought to know the true purpose of the statement that he is
making, and ought also to know the charges to which he is answering in giving the
statement’
o Facts: There were allegations in trial for drug offences that A had been misled
to the nature and purposes of Section 121 CPC statement taken from him. There
was evidence that A interviewed by several officers before recording statement
and had been led to believe that he was actually helping CNB in their pursuit of
his ‘Malaysian boss’. There were further allegations that he was led to believe
that the interviews were purely between himself and the particular CNB officer
in each case and not for any other purpose. Also evidence that recorded did not
warn A before taking Section 121 CPC statement. Neither did he inform A that
statement taken for the purposes of the charges he was facing.
o Held: (Goh Phai Cheng JC):
 Statement inadmissible. Not satisfied that statement made voluntarily.
 True that in PP v. Tan Ho Teck, held that no caution necessary prior to
taking Section 121 CPC statement but nonetheless, at the very least, A
who is asked to make a statement ought to know the true purpose of the
statement he is making and ought also to know the charges to which he
is answering in giving the statement.
 While I am not prescribing some formal caution similar to that for
Section 122(6) CPC, its important that there is this minimal requirement
before a statement is safely admissible in a case against A. Particularly
so where A held in custody for some 10 days after arrest and interviewed
several times for different purposes. Clearly he ought to have been
notified that taking of actual statement not the same as those he had
given in earlier sessions.

D. Role of interpreters ?
- If they intervene, statement may be thrown out

- IO can act as recording offier and interpreter so long as can prove in court that not
biased when interpreted statement ->> IO can be interpreter, no prejudice with his role
as investigator : Kong Weng Cheong v PP [1994] 1 SLR 34
o Facts: A contended on appeal that oral statement made to CNB officer in which
confession made should be inadmissible. Arresting officer had acted as
Mandarin interpreter. Defence counsel contended that a wholly independent

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 person against whom no allegation of bias could be made should have acted as
interpreter, relying on UK case of R v. Mitchell and PP v. Cheong See Leong
(in which detective sergeant who was part of investigation team had acted as
interpreter. Held that use of detective sergeant who was fully conversant with
the material facts and was subsequently called by P offended vs. the elementary
ideas of justice and therefore no reliance could be placed on the accuracy of the
statement).
o Held: Argument has no merit.
 Clearly in order for investigating officer investigating a serious offence
to use arresting officer as interpreter. There’s no principle of law which
requires that on such occasions, an interpreter not involved in the
investigation be called to interpret. No allegation of bias vs. either IO or
interpreter and there can be no objection to AO acting as interpreter.
 R v. Mitchell distinguished – case involved waiter in restaurant whose
pptor had complained vs. A acting as the interpreter. Held that this was
so irregular that conviction unsafe. This case is irrelevant here.
 As for Cheong See Leong, this case was reported in note form, which is
not adequate and this Court is unable to ascertain precisely the reasoning
for the decision.

- • if IO is the interpreter, he must be sufficiently competent to interpret : Foong Seow

Ngui v PP [1993] 3 SLR 785 – IO was Cantonese while Accused was Hokkien
o Facts: Objection raised to the voluntariness of s.121 statement AP was Hokkien
and IO interpreter was a Cantonese. Argued that on this basis, an interpreter was
indispensable.
o Held: (LP Thean JA): Mere fact that IO is Cantonese doesn’t mean he cannot
understand Hokkien. Only issue is competence of IO in Hokkien. TJ accepted
evidence that IO passed Hokkien test in 1970s and used Hokkien in his work;
found that he was competent in Hokkien

- : - question of fact for the judge to decide – no precise test. Judge will ask qns as to his
backgrds etc. in this case, judge asked court interpreter to test the IO of his proficiency.
Some things difficult to interpret in hokkien eg trafficking, aggravated

- • where interpreter behaves extraordinarily, statement may be excluded : PP v Syed

Abdul Aziz (CC 32 of 1990)
o interpreter told Accused before starting to interpret his statement ‘to be
religious, to pray and to visit mosques and not to do bad deeds’
o High Court found this ‘not only strange but was irregular and out of keeping
with the procedure when taking statements’

- • where presence of interpreter during recording of statement in doubt, statement may

be excluded : PP v Hanafiah bin Bedullah (CC 35 of 1992) –
o in this case statement recorded for 2 hrs, then break, then 1 hr later, resumed
recording, during 1 hr break, when interpreter cross examined, cld not acct for
whereabouts in the 1 hr, accused then said that things happened within the 1 hr

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 and interpreter cld not confirm or deny what happened and so statement thrown
out. Need to ensure that diary kept etc when interpreters act.
o Facts: During trial, application made by P to impeach A’s credit with statement.
A disputed voluntariness of statement and VD conducted. P claimed statement
made to NO with interpretation done by another NO. But there were several
problems with this account…50 minute gap between end of recording and time
A sent back to lockup and entry in the pocketbook of the NO who supposedly
acted as interpreter was irregular. A gave different version – no interpreter when
statement taken.
o Held: (Kan Ting Chiu JC):
 Statement ≠ proved of doubts whether statement recorded in manner
alleged by P.
 2 aspects of recording procedure unsatisfactory – omission of
‘interpreter’ to make proper record that he had so acted AND 50 minute
interval between end of recording and A’s return to lockup. Hard to
believe recording NO’s explanation that A was in room all the time
while he was doing something else, when another NO was supposedly
there as well.
 These gave credence to A’s assertion that there was no interpreter present
at the recording. This created a doubt as to whether the statement was
properly recorded.

E. Necessity of medical examination before recording of section 121 statement?

– not a formal requirement under s121
– usually when accused suffering fr drug withdrawal. Police officer o exercise common
sense whether to send for med exam first – depend on facts of case
– does not make statement inadmissible
– whether a medical examination should have been conducted will have to depend on the
facts of the case e.g. whether Accused was suffering from drug withdrawal at the
material time
– In capital cases, the practice of the Police or drug enforcement officer is to send the
accused for a medical examination both before and after the recording if his statement.
May wish to request for copies of the client’s medical reports from the Police or the
hospital. However, the failure to send an accused for a medical examination does not in
itself raises any doubt as to the voluntariness of the statement. (See Lim Swee Thong v
PP1 [1994] 1 SLR 713 & Goh Soon Huat v PP2 [1995] 1 SLR 634)

Goh Soon Huat v PP [1995] 1 SLR 634

– Facts: The appellant was arrested at Thomson Plaza with 48 sachets of diamorphine,
with a net diamorphine content of not less than 69.34g, by CNB officers.
– After his arrest, the appellant gave a statement under Section 122(6) of the CPC, stating
that the drugs were for his own consumption and not for trafficking. The same evening,
a CNB team led by CNB Sgt Lio interrogated the appellant. In the early hours of the
next morning, the appellant suffered from drug withdrawal and was rushed to Changi
1
Whether medical examination should have been conducted will have to depend on the facts of the case.
2
Please refer to Crim Pro Lecture 7 – Statements to the Police for a full discourse of this case.

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 Prison Hospital. After his discharge, Sgt Lio again interrogated the appellant. Three
days after his last interrogation, the investigating officer W/Insp Chong through a CNB
interpreter took the first of two statements under Section 121(1) of the CPC from him.
The second statement was taken three days after that.
– The appellant challenged the voluntariness of the Section 121 statements. He alleged,
inter alia, that he was suffering from the effects of drug withdrawal at the time he gave
the Section 121 statements and that they were concocted by W/Insp Chong and the
interpreter. The appellant argued that he should have been sent for medical
examinations before and after the taking of the Section 121 statements. The trial judge
rejected the contentions and admitted the Section 121 statements. In the Section 121
statements, the appellant described how he had purchased the drugs in Woodlands on
the day of his arrest and then gone to Thomson Plaza from Woodlands.
– The appellant admitted to being in possession of the drugs. His defence was that he was
at Thomson Plaza to deliver only ten sachets to Azman. The remaining 38 sachets were
for his own consumption. He was consuming drugs at home in Serangoon Gardens that
day when Azman paged him. In his hurry to get to Thomson Plaza, the appellant had
forgotten to remove the 38 sachets from his briefcase. In the trial, the appellant called
expert evidence to show that he was capable of consuming 38 sachets of heroin in 38 to
90 days. Azman also testified for the defence. The trial judge held that even accepting
that the appellant was a heavy user of heroin, this did not mean that he could not also
traffic in heroin. The trial judge was satisfied that the defence was fabricated by the
appellant and Azman, and accordingly convicted the appellant.
– On appeal, it was argued that the trial judge erred in admitting the statements and that
in any event the trial judge ought to have accepted the appellant’s defence as it was
supported by Azman’s evidence.
– Held: dismissing the appeal:
o In the circumstances of the case, there was no need to send the appellant for
a medical examination before and after the taking of the statements under
Section 121(1) of the CPC. In order for the effects of withdrawal from drugs
to affect the drug user’s medical and psychological condition to render any
statement he makes to be involuntary, he must be in a state of near delirium.
The appellant was nowhere near such a state. Further, there were no
allegations that the appellant had been assaulted either before or during the
recording of the statements under s 121 and the appellant had not asked to
be sent to a doctor.
o After reviewing the evidence, the court was also satisfied that the statements
under Section 121 were not given as a result of threats or inducement.
Further, the appellant fabricated the allegations of concoction made against
the recording inspector and the interpreter.
– Comments: It was not necessary for the appellant to minutely detail all his defences in
his Section 122(6) statement. However, this did not mean that the court must accept
what the appellant said as true. This must still be weighed against the other evidence. It
may not always be clear when an omission to state details becomes an omission to state
material particulars. This was a matter for the trial judge on an evaluation of all the
evidence at the trial.

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:Lim Swee Thong v PP [1994] 1 SLR 713
- Facts: The appellant was convicted for trafficking drugs. The appellant had argued that
he had not been sent for a medical examination before giving an inculpatory Section
121 statement.
- Held: Although the appellant had not been subjected to pre- and post-statement
medical examinations, there was nothing to suggest that the trial judge’s finding that the
statement had been made voluntarily had been in error. The trial judge had considered
the totality of the evidence and had been entitled to reject the appellant’s allegations of
fabrication and assault
- Aside from challenging the voluntariness of the statement, you can also challenge the
statement on the grounds that the statement was not recorded in the manner that the
accused intended it to be recorded. E.g. that the recorder attempted to summarise what
the accused said and in doing so did not capture the meaning of what the accused
intended to say.
- When recording client’s instructions on his statements to the police, should also pay
particular attention to the manner in which the statement was recorded. IO cannot
cross-examine the accused when recording his Section 122(6) statement.

– see Standard Operating Procedure of police force

– only for capital cases – waste of resources to do med exam for trivial cases. Only for
serious cases.
– 122(6) statement is when accused supposed to answer to the charge – tell IO his
defence. Very impt, that sdtatement treated differently – officer will subject him to
pre and post med treatment BUT for 121 depends on the facts!!!!

F. Privilege against self-incrimination - section 121(2)

– • ‘bound to state truly the facts and circumstances … except that he may decline to
make … a statement which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge
or to a penalty or to forfeiture’

– 3 salient questions:
o a. Is privilege a fundamental rule of natural justice?
o b. Does accused have right to be informed of this right to silence? Does
recording officer have duty to inform accused of such a right?
o b. Does failure to administer caution make statement recorded inadmissible?
– ans to all three qns – no

PP v Mazlan [1993] 1 SLR 512

– important pronouncements of CA with regards to nature of privilege in s121(2)
o note however the Court’s ratio that stating only one part of the s121(2) right
may amount to an inducement which may influence the admissibility of the
statement under s122(5) : i.e. stating only that one is bound to tell the truth
without stating that one has a right to remain silent
 ie accused person shld know their rights. Ignorance of law no excuse.
 When statement recorded fr them, IO no duty to tel person that he has
right. Accused also no right to be informed.

12
– But if recording officer tells accused caution under 121, he must tell him the whole
thing. Cannot just say ‘you are bound to tell the truth’, in some circumstances this
may amount to a threat. l
– a suspect or accused need not be expressly informed of his right to remain silent.
Failure to inform not breach of constitutional right. Statement can be admitted even if
no caution read to accused – this will go to weight, not admissibility. But ct also held
that where accused was told that he may remain silent, but is also told that he is
bound to tell all the truth, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether he would have said
the same things if he had been informed he was entitled to refrain. May be
inducement w/in s 122(5).
– Facts: During trial of the accused for murder, Ct ruled s.121 statements were
inadmissible as the interpreter had not informed the accused that he was entitled to
refrain from stating anything which might expose him to a criminal charge.
– Held: (Yong CJ):
o No duty on police to expressly inform suspect/ accused of the right to remain
silent when statement is recorded pursuant to s.121…No mention of such duty
in s.121 for use of the power of investigation therein. Repeal of Schedule E
means that statements are admissible as long as they are not tainted by
inducement, threat or promise.
o Further, failure to inform accused of right ≠ breach of constitutional rights in
Art. 9(1). Art. 9(1) does not refer to right of silence/ PASI. Though ‘law’ in Art.
9(1) includes FRNJ (as held in Ong Ah Chuan v. PP and Haw Tua Tau v. PP),
the right of silence has never been subsumed under the FRNJ...its merely an
evidential, not a constitutional, rule.
o Also, since the days of the Star Chamber, many rules of criminal procedure and
evidence have been developed to reduce/ remove the risk of unreliable
confessions being extracted by force and used against their makers, e.g. s.122(5)
CPC (police statement must not be obtained by inducement, threat or promise),
s.24 EA (confession requirements)…thus, little remains of the dangers of self-
incrimination to justify giving right of silence constitutional status. The rule
would also have been specifically enacted this if Parliament intended to
guarantee full protection for it, just as it has guaranteed the right of an arrested
person to be informed of the grounds of arrest as soon as may be.
o As s.121 does not concern admissibility, technically a s.121 statement has to be
admitted under s.122(5) but nonetheless the admissibility of such statement is
not affected if the accused is not told beforehand of the right to silence…no
evidential penalty prescribed for failure to so notify the accused.
o However, failure to notify the accused may affect the issue of voluntariness
which goes towards the s.122(5) test of admissibility – the failure to inform a
person of his rights in circumstances where there is a positive duty to do so may
amount to an inducement its reasonable to assume that such omission might
have caused person to say what he’d otherwise might not have said.
o Here, interpreter only read to accused the 1st ½ of s.121(2) (i.e. that he must tell
the truth) and left out the2nd ½ (i.e. can decline to say anything which would
incriminate self). Thus, not only was accused’s right not mentioned, but he was

13
 also actually told that he was bound to tell all the truth. From these facts, there
could be said to be inducement.
o : - (Therefore, either tell the Accused everything or nothing.)

Ong Seng Hwee v PP [1999] 4 SLR 181

- Facts: The police raided the premises of Scan link Woodcraft, a sole proprietorship, on
21 April 1998 and three Indian nationals were found on the premises. They were
subsequently charged and convicted for offences under the Immigration Act (Cap 68).
The appellant was charged with harboring and employing these immigration offenders.
The appellant challenged the voluntariness of this statement on several grounds. First,
he was told that he was bound to state the facts truthfully but not his right to refrain
from saying anything that might incriminate him. Second, that threats, inducements or
promises were made during its recording. Finally, he was given little to eat and
laboured under illness and medication at the time.
- Held: The circumstances surrounding the recording of the statement did not come
close to establishing the requisite weakening of the appellant’s free will to render
the confession involuntary
- Comments: First, what was in substance an allegation of oppression. The relevant
inquiry here was whether the circumstances prevailing at the time of the recording of
the statement were such that the appellant’s free will was sapped and he could not resist
making the statement: R v Priestly (1967) 51 Cr App R 1, PP v Tan Boon Tat [1990]
SLR 375; [1990] 2MLJ 466. The Judge noted that the length of questioning was only
two hours. The appellant alleged that he only had a cup of tea during the whole
morning, but the station lock-up diary contradicted this. He was offered medical
attention but refused this and was allowed to take his medication. The note from his
doctor only suggested that this medication caused drowsiness. His conduct prior to and
after the recording of the statement, however, did not suggest that he was seriously ill at
all. He violently struggled with the arresting officers.
- On his return from the station, he set about immediately to draft the two letters to SSgt
Lim and delivered them that same night at about midnight. The evidence as a whole
suggested that the appellant was perfectly alert and lucid, albeit tired. The
circumstances here hardly came close to establishing the requisite weakening of the
appellant’s free will that would render the statement involuntary.

- in practice, when polce record statement under 121 fr witnesses, will tell the that he is
recording statement etc… A form.
- For B form (accused person) no caution warning. Police do not tell accused persons
caution under 121(2). Because
1. this is traditional
2. fear that IO don’t read or if half only then this may amt to a threat. Position is that
every citizen shld know their rights.
- Ie accused and witnesses treated differently.

Lim Choon Chye v PP [1994] 2 SLR 517

– unsuccessful reliance on Mazlan

14
– Accused was interrogated by intelligence officers who assured him that whatever he
revealed about other drug activities unconnected with the charge would not be used
against him
– s121 statement was recorded from him a week later. s121(2) caution not administered
to him.
– Held: a representation to the accused in relation to drug activities unconnected with the
charge against him was too far removed, on facts here, from the subsequent recording
of s121 statements to constitute an inducement to make them

- it is not the law that an adverse inference must be drawn whenever an accused elected
not to say anything: PP v Azman bin Abdullah
- PP v Abdul Naser bin Amer Hamsah:
• Court expressed that no adverse inference ought to be drawn from the fact that the
accused did not disclose his defence in his s. 122(6) statement because he did
disclose it in a previous investigation statement, albeit in connection with some
other offence
- Yap Giau Beng Terence v PP:
• appellant contended that the trial judge should not have drawn an adverse
inference from his failure to raise the material aspects of his defence because he
had wished to consult a lawyer first and did not want to say the ‘wrong things’
• court rejected this contention because it was of the view that s. 123 CPC, which
purpose is to compel the accused to outline the main aspects of his defence
immediately upon being charged, so as to guard against the accused raising
defences at trial that are merely afterthoughts, would be rendered otiose, if the
accused were allowed to escape the consequences simply by explaining that he
had wished to consult a lawyer first before saying anything
• must have been evident to the appellant, even without the benefit of consultation
with a lawyer, that the facts, which he had failed to mention in his statements,
would have afforded a legitimate explanation for his conduct, and it would have
been in his interest to mention them
- PP v Azman bin Abdullah:
• accused’s explanation for his silence was that he was afraid that he would be
accused of lying and be charged a second time
• in light of the fact that the investigation officer has also recorded a previous
investigation statement from him where he had persistently refused to believe the
accused
• it was therefore reasonable for the accused to think it useless to say anything, and
for him to expect the same treatment from other investigation officers

Statements under s 122(6) CPC (cautioned statements)

Section 122(6) CPC :
‘Where any person is charged with an offence or officially informed that he may be
prosecuted for it, he shall be served with a notice in writing, which shall be explained to
him, to the following effect:
“You have been charged with/informed that you may be prosecuted for — (set out the
charge). Do you wish to say anything in answer to the charge? If there is any fact on which

15
you intend to rely in your defence in court, you are advised to mention it now. If you hold it
back till you go to court, your evidence may be less likely to be believed and this may have
a bad effect on your case in general. If you wish to mention any fact now, and you would
like it written down, this will be done.’
-->chance to state his defence.

Admissibility sections:
- Section to admit 122(6) – if police officer – then admitted under 122(5) whether
confession or not as long as no threat, inducement or promise.
- But for 122(6) recorded by non police officers, admissibility section is section 24 of
Evidence Act – has to be a confession first

A. Purpose of section 122(6) CPC statement?

– • Accused should mention his defence immediately upon being charged or informed he
may be prosecuted
– • no difficulty in doing this, if an Accused is innocent
– • an adverse inference may be drawn against an Accused if he fails to mention facts
which in the circumstances it can be reasonably expected of him to mention
o not in all cases –if can give reasonable explanation as to why did not
mention particular fact eg afraid that wife wld find out abt affair – then court
may not draw adverse inference. Will look at circumstances and see whether
expected of accussed to mention it
o => cautioned statements
– s123(1) allows the court to draw such adverse inferences when deciding (Adverse
inference can be drawn at 3 stages):
o whether to commit accused for trial in High Court (preliminary inquiry)
o whether to call for his defence at close of prosecution’s case
o in the finding of guilt

Section 123(1) CPC :

‘Where … evidence is given that the accused, on being charged with the offence or
officially informed that he might be prosecuted for it, failed to mention any such fact,
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time he could reasonably have been
expected to mention… the court, in determining whether to commit the accused for trial
or whether there is a case to answer, and the court, in determining whether the accused
is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences from the failure as appear
proper; and the failure may, on the basis of those inferences, be treated as, or as capable of
amounting to, corroboration of any evidence given against the accused in relation to which
the failure is material.’

B. Notice in writing / Shall be explained

- Two notices - 122(1) and 122(6); don’t confuse
- 121 – police officer can record statement only
- 122(6) – any enforcement agency can record statement. Ie CPIB/ CNB/MOM
investigators because specific persons charged… this power comes fr 122(8).

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- • recording officer to prefer and read charge to accused
- • notice served on accused only after he is charged/officially informed he may be
prosecuted; not upon arrest
- MOM officers cannot record statements under this Section. The statement taken from
them would be admissible under Section 24 of the EA.
- • ‘officially informed’ means informed by a police officer or any other person
charged with duty of investigating offences or charging offenders - s122(8) CPC
- • a technical defect in the notice or a deviation therefrom is a mere irregularity and will
not per se affect admissibility of the cautioned statement

1. Notice to be Served
- Tsang Yuk Chung:
• “non-material typographical error” in the notice in writing is a trivial non-
compliance
• this suggests that a material error in the notice in writing may be such a defect
so as to prevent the court from drawing any inferences as appear proper
- only required to be served after the person is charged with an offence or officially
informed that he may be prosecuted for it
- duty to serve the notice does not arise immediately after arrest: Mohamed Bachu
Miah v PP

2. Notice to be Explained
- word “explain” should be construed in a broad common sense manner
- to ‘explain’ is to make one understand
- if an accused is made to understand the substance of the charge, and the adverse
implication of not stating any fact, which might assist his case, then the
requirement would have been complied with
- clearly not intended by that section that the recording officer should explain the
ingredients of the charge
- such attempt may convey a wrong meaning or implication to the accused
- Lau Lee Peng v PP:
• defence did not challenge that both the charge and the notice of warning were
read out, explained and interpreted to the accused by the investigation officer
in the Teochew dialect
• defence argued that the accused, being a fishmonger of low intellect, could
have failed to mention the crucial allegations in his statements because he did
not understand the importance of doing so at the relevant time
• Court of Appeal rejected that argument because the caution administered was
simple enough
• accused would have understood from the interpreter the substance of the
charge and the implication of the warning, if they were both accurately
interpreted to him in a language that he understands
- Lee Kwang Peng v PP:
• accused alleged that his s. 122(6) statements were not translated

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 • Singapore High Court did not regard this as material as even given the
accused’s limited knowledge of English, he would have understood the
statements, which were very simple
- how notice should be explained to a person with a physical disability
- Abdul Rahim bin Syed v PP:
• appellant was a deaf mute since birth
• statement was recorded from him under s. 122(6) through the interpretation by
sign language
• court was of view that since the appellant had no formal training in sign
language, it was not clear that the appellant was able to comprehend what was
interpreted to him by means of the sign language used

3. Warning to be Administered
- Tan Boon Tat:
• Held that warning was “couched in very simple language which is easily
comprehensible by those who read English”
• Unsafe to simplify, or on the other hand, to elaborate or amplify it

PP v Chia Chee Yeen [1991] 3 MLJ 397

- Facts: The appellant was convicted of the murder of one Daniel De Rozario. At his trial
the appellant relied solely on the defence that, at the material time, he was suffering
from an “abnormality of mind”. The trial judges rejected the defence and convicted the
appellant, who appealed. (This was the army LCP who shot his PC for giving him too
many confinements. He was acting as the super hero from “The Bund”)
- Held: Dismissing the appeal:
o In law, the burden of proving diminished responsibility, which was on a balance
of probability, rested on the appellant. This was a question of fact, which must
be decided in the light of all the evidence before the court, including medical
opinion. The trial judges gave a full and proper consideration to all the
evidence, including the medical evidence and there was nothing to indicate that
they had erred in law or in fact in arriving at the conclusion that the appellant
was not suffering from any `abnormality of mind` at the material time.
o Comments: Please also see PP v Dom Promphhinit (1995) 1 CLAS News 67 –
addition of rider ‘I now invite you to state your defence’ did not offend spirit or
letter of Section 122(6) of the CPC’. John’s dad was the expert psychiatrist in
this case.

PP v Dom Promphhinit (1995) 1 CLAS News 67

- addition of rider `I now invite you to state your defence’ did not offend spirit or letter of
s122(6)
- => did not make statement inadmissible

Extent of explanation of the notice?

– Previously, a word for word translation of the charge and notice was insufficient and the
recorder had to explain so that accused fully appreciated the caution

18
– Currently, it is sufficient if the Accused is told in general terms what the charge and
warning mean; since accused persons differ in background, what form the explanation
takes must ultimately depend on the facts of each case – open for interpretation, eg if
have well educated person just read word for word enough. But if educationally
subnormal person, must explain charge to him.
– • ‘explain’ construed in broad common sense manner – for accused to understand the
substance of the charge and the adverse implication of not stating facts in his defence
– • a failure to sufficiently explain charge/notice does not affect admissibility but may
affect the court’s decision whether or not to draw any inferences from accused’s failure
to mention relevant facts in his defence
- stimes for educationally subnormal person, court may not draw adverse inference even
though statement may be admitted

PP v Chan Sway Beng [1988] 2 MLJ 405

Tsang Yuk Chung v PP [1990] 3 MLJ 264

- Facts: The accused was convicted of murder under the third limb of Section 300 of the
Penal Code. His cautioned statement was admitted at his trial. On appeal it was alleged
that the cautioned statement should not have been admitted and that the accused should
not have been convicted as it was shown that he had no intention of causing injury to
the deceased. Counsel for the appellant conceded that the statement was made
voluntarily, and without any inducement, threat or promise. However, he argued that
the provisions of Section 122(6) of the CPC had not been complied with by the
investigating officer who recorded the statement hereunder in that the investigating
officer did not explain the charge nor the prescribed warning to the appellant.
- Held:
- (1) Section 122(6) of the Code did not provide for the admissibility of statements
recorded thereunder. This was found in s 122(5) of the Code, and a statement whether
or not it was purported to have been made under s 122(5) was admissible so long as s
122(5) was satisfied.
- (2) An inculpatory statement was evidence of the facts stated therein.
- (3) A statement recorded under s 122(6) was also admissible in evidence for the
purpose stated in s 123(1) of the Code. Non-compliance with s 122(6) resulted not
in a statement being inadmissible, but in enabling the court having to take such
non-compliance into consideration when deciding what inferences, if any at all,
should be drawn from the failure of the accused to mention certain facts.
- (4) The test was whether it could be said that the circumstances existing at the time the
accused was charged were such that he could be reasonably have been expected to
mention certain facts on which he was relying in his defence.
- (5) The accused conceded that the statement was made voluntarily. Section 122(5) of
the Code had therefore been satisfied, and in the absence of any reliance by the
prosecution on Section 123(1), it could not be argued that non-compliance with s
122(6) should affect the admissibility of the statement.
- (6) The requirement that the notice in s 122(6) “shall be explained” would be
satisfied if an accused person was told in general terms what the charge and

19
 warning meant. Since accused persons differed in background, what form the
explanation took must ultimately depend on the facts of each case.

Tan Boon Tat v PP [1992] 2 SLR 1

- Facts: The appellant was convicted of the offence of trafficking in 1,120.81g of
diamorphine under the Misuse of Drugs Act. The appellant’s statement under Section
122(6) of the CPC was recorded with the assistance of a certified interpreter. The
statement was admitted after a trial-within-a-trial. The trial judges convicted the
appellant on the grounds that he had failed to rebut the presumptions that arose against
him under Sections 18 and 21 of the Act.
- One of the issues was whether the Sections 122(6) statement of the appellant was made
voluntarily and it was argued that the trial judges erred in holding that a mere reading of
the notice in writing and the charge was sufficient compliance of Section 122(6) - some
form of explanation was required.
- Held: A confession made to a narcotics officer is admissible in evidence provided the
provisions of Section 24 of the Evidence Act are complied with. The court is required,
inter alia, to consider if the confession appears to have been caused by any inducement,
threat or promise proceeding from a person in authority and to approach the matter
from the viewpoint of the accused, and consider whether the circumstances were such
that it could give reasonable grounds for the accused to suppose that by making it he
would gain an advantage or avoid any evil of the kind referred to in Section 24. The
trial judges approached their task in a common sense way to all the facts in the case and
have not made a wrong assessment of the evidence before them, nor in any way failed
to apply the correct principles. The trial judges rightly considered the matter from the
point of view of the accused.
- The admissibility of a statement recorded under Section 122(6) of the CPC is dependent
on Section 122(5) of the CPC or the Evidence Act. Non-compliance with the provisions
of Section 122(6) may put into jeopardy the possibility of the court drawing an adverse
inference under Section 123(1) of the CPC but has little or no bearing on the question
of admissibility.

PP v Sugianto (CC 25 of 1993)

- Facts: A charged with importing cannabis. Defence counsel objected to admissibility of
s.122(6) statement. VD held and interpreter testified that he had explained the meaning
of ‘import’ to A as bringing something into Singapore. Legal elements of charge not
explained (e.g. that to be guilty, must have assumed responsibility for drugs overseas,
arranged for it to come to Singapore as part of baggage AND if someone else had
arranged for it to come to Singapore and A only picked up luggage at baggage claim, ≠
guilty) and Defence contended there was a misrepresentation of law to A and any
statement obtained was a statement obtained by an inducement as A had acted under a
belief that he was guilty of the offence in the charge.
- Held: (Goh Phai Cheng JC):
o Statement admissible (but A acquitted on other grounds).
o Here, no evidence that supposed misrepresentation was such as to have caused
A to suppose he’d gain advantage or avoid evil in reference to charge.

20
 o Sufficient from Tsang Yuk Chang that A be told in general terms about meaning
of charge and warning. Form of explanation would depend on facts of the case
since As differ in background.
o Here, explanation of interpreter as to meaning of ‘import’ is sufficient
explanation in general terms. To require more would be to require a legal
interpretation of the ‘import’, including all steps required to satisfy the legal
definition of the term. This is untenable.
o Further, meaning of word in accordance with definition in Interpretation Act.
Nothing more reasonably to be expected in an explanation of the meaning of the
charge

PP v Oh Teh Hwa [1994] 2 CLAS 1993

- Facts: Indian IO who was not fluent in Hokkien, Hokkien-speaking A. Interpreter only
mentioned 3 of 7 definitions of trafficking to A. IO did not have MDA with him when
recording statement but explained relevant sections to interpreter to translate to A but
did not explain very consistently (different words used). Also did not tell A how he
could rebut presumption of trafficking, i.e. by giving evidence that he was not
- Held:
o No AI drawn from A’s response of “nothing to say”.
o Charge and notice not properly explained, A did not avail himself of the
opportunity to speak.

C. How much of defence is to be stated? Drawing of adverse inferences?

- Is mere denial sufficient? – can prosecutor say that he did not mention in 122(6)?
- Test - what is reasonably expected of him to say on an objective view

Sim Ah Cheoh v PP:

- S. 122(6) CPC if to inform the accused of the charge he is facing and to give him an
opportunity of stating any fact
- his silence may give rise to an adverse inference against him

Roshdi v PP [1994] 3 SLR 282

- •murder of CNB officer with mortar by his friend
- • defence of sudden fight and private defence
- Held :
o • s122(6) statement does not require the accused to minutely detail the defence
he will be relying on at the trial
o • all that is required is that a material fact which will be relied on is stated
o • here, accused had, in his s122(6) statement, laid the foundation for his
defences at trial
o court – accused did not state in his 122(6) that CNB officer assaulted him first
and caused him to fall and that he struck officer for first time with mortar –
prosecutor said that lacked detail and his defence shd not beelived. But court
held that what he said in 122(6) was sufficient and not inconsistent with
evidence in chief. Material facts all there – that he did not intend to kill, that

21
 deceased used his hands to press against his neck, that he hit deceased till he ws
motionless.
o According to court, immaterial inconsistencies do not matter, accused already
stated defence

Govindarajulu v PP [1994] 2 SLR 838

- • drug trafficking, accused claimed he did not know he was delivering heroin as he had
tasted the substance and concluded it was not heroin – evid in chief in court
- Held :
o • ‘tasting’ episode was most material part of defence yet accused failed to
mention it at all in his s122(6) statements or in his very detailed statements to
the CNB
o • this failure dented accused’s credibility severely
o • trial judge entitled to rely on this material omission to disbelieve accused over
the ‘tasting’ episode
o tastin very impt because shows knowledge/ mens rea he says that he has no
mens rea and very impt – reasonable to expect him to mention it in 122(6).
Adverse inference drawn against him

Ng Chong Teck v PP [1992] 1 SLR 863

- • drug trafficking, accused claimed for his own consumption
- • no less than 5 opportunities to give his explanation for being in possession of the
drugs but he remained silent, even in his s122(6)
- in court said for first time – own consumption and no intention to traffic
- • right to reject his defence

Thongbai Naklangdon v PP [1996] 1 SLR 497

- Facts: A was convicted of murdering co-worker. In Ct, A did not deny hitting the
deceased but claimed that it arose out of an incident in which the deceased had first
kicked the appellant in the groin and then advanced menacingly, whereupon the
appellant hit the deceased with a pipe. Appellant claimed that he had only caused
grievous hurt. JC found that the appellant’s evidence was doubtful as no mention was
made in any statements, including the s.122(6) statement of any fight between him and
the deceased and concluded that the omission was to create the impression the deceased
had died from other injuries inflicted during an earlier fight between the deceased and
some other co-workers. CA dismissed appeal.
- Held (Yong CJ):
o The fight between appellant and deceased was part of an entirely different
narration of events from what was contained in the statements

Chou Kooi Pang v PP [1998] 3 SLR 593

- Facts: The first appellant was charged with trafficking by delivering ten packets of
drugs containing not less than 290.4g of diamorphine to the second appellant in a car.
The second appellant was charged with having the said drugs in his possession for the
purpose of trafficking.
- Held:

22
 o The first appellant had failed to rebut this presumption. Ignorance could only
have been a defence where there was no reason for suspicion. Here, the
circumstances were such that he should have been alerted to the fact that he was
carrying something illegal. His failure to inspect the contents of the bag
amounted to wilful blindness to the obvious truth of the matter.
o Further, the first appellant here chose to remain silent, relying only on the
evidence of the defence expert witness that he was of low intellect. However, in
view of the surrounding circumstances, it was imperative and vital that the first
appellant provided an explanation. Since he failed to provide any explanation,
the trial judge was entitled to draw the inference that the first appellant had
failed to rebut the presumption.
o The second appellant’s defence was that he did not know that the bag contained
more than half a pound of heroin. This seemed far-fetched considering that the
bag contained several times the weight, which he claimed that he was expecting
to receive. Further, after collecting the bag, he had gone back to his flat and kept
the bag in his custody for an hour and ten minutes. There had been more than
enough time and opportunity for him to examine the contents of the bag.
o Further, the defence was only raised at trial. The second appellant’s failure to
mention a material part of his defence at an earlier stage meant that it was less
likely to be believed. As such, the trial judge did not err in disbelieving the
second appellant’s defence that he thought that the bag contained only half a
pound of heroin: Thongbai Naklangdon v PP [1996] 1 CLAS News 235
followed.
- cf : cases where although defence is not disclosed in s122(6), accused mentions it in
previous/other statements eg long statements => no adverse inference can be drawn.
These statements can be looked at.

- accused only expected to mention facts in answer to charge against him, not some
supposed or speculative charge which prosecution could but did not bring

Ronnie Tay Kok Poh v PP [1996] 1 SLR 185

- Held:
o It was unfair to draw an adverse inference against the appellant for not denying
the charge in his Section 122(6) statement when he had already made the denial
in his Section 121 statement.
o An accused is only expected to say things in his Section 122(6) statement in
answer to the charge. He is not expected to say anything in answer to some
supposed or speculative charge, which the prosecution could bring but did not.
In the present case, none of the allegations involving the 2nd Defendant were
mentioned in the charge. That being the case, the prosecution could hardly say
that the appellant ought to have realized beforehand that 2nd Defendant would be
giving evidence against the appellant on these allegations. There was thus no
reason to expect the appellant to say anything about the 2nd Defendant in his
Section 122(6) statement.

Abdul Naseer Bin Amer [1997] 1 SLR 73

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- Facts: A charged with murder. P case was that in the course of robbery, A stepped on
the face of Japanese tourist, causing her death. A’s defence was that he stepped on her
face accidentally. This was not mentioned in CS but disclosed this in investigation
statement taken after CS, about 1 month after arrest. TJ refused to draw AI vs. A for not
stating in CS that he’d stepped on deceased’s face accidentally as he’d stated this in his
last investigation statement such that, in TJ’s words, “he had not sprung the fact that he
relied on his defence only at trial”. A eventually acquitted of murder but convicted of
robbery and P appealed.
- Held (Yong CJ):
o Agreement with TJ. Sole issue is whether TJ had erred in finding that RD raised
as to whether fatal injuries caused intentionally.

- • Where omission is immaterial / irrelevant, no reason to expect accused to disclose it

in s122(6) statement
- • improper to draw adverse inference in such cases

Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR 767

- accusd said that consoling victim and may have accidentally touched victim when
consoling her, in 122(6) he merely said that he did not molest her. did not go into the
accidental, consolation thing. Pros invited court to draw adverse inference.
- Held that no adverse inference to be drawn. He had already denied molesting her. mere
details of consoling incident – no reason to expect accused to mention in 122(6).
- Facts: The appellant was charged and convicted in the district court on two counts of
aggravated outraging of modesty under s 354A(1) of the Penal Code. The appellant was
a supervisor in a restaurant. The complainant was a waitress there. The complainant
alleged that the appellant molested her and that in doing so, the appellant had
wrongfully restrained her.
- In convicting the appellant, the district judge held that the complainant’s testimony was
corroborated by the testimony of her sister and the making of the police report, and that
the court could convict without corroboration if it was totally convinced of the truth of
the complainant’s testimony. He drew an adverse inference against the appellant for not
disclosing his defence in his statements to the police. The district judge held that the
appellant had lied because the complainant did not have a boyfriend, basing the finding
on Zaiton’s evidence that to her knowledge, the complainant had no boyfriend. The
district judge was of the view that the appellant’s lies corroborated the complainant’s
testimony. He also declined to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution for not
calling `aunty` as a witness. In reaching his conclusion, the district judge was of the
view that the complainant had no reason to bring false evidence against the appellant.
- The appellant appealed.
- Held:
o Whether the complainant did or did not have a boyfriend was immaterial and of
little relevance. Similarly, whether the appellant did or did not console the
complainant and tapped her on the shoulders had no bearing to the relevant
issue, which remained whether the appellant molested the complainant as
alleged.

24
 o As the alleged incident about consoling the complainant was immaterial and
irrelevant, there was no reason to expect the appellant to disclose this when
making his Section 122(6) statement. That being the case, it would be improper
to draw an adverse inference against the appellant for failing to mention it
- Comments:
o Four criteria had to be satisfied before a lie could amount to corroboration.
 The lie must first of all be deliberate.
 Secondly, it must relate to a material issue.
 Thirdly, the motive for the lie must be a realization of guilt and a fear of
truth.
 Fourthly, the statement must be clearly shown to be a lie by independent
evidence.
o As the alleged lies related to immaterial issues, they could not amount to
corroboration. In any event, there was no clear independent proof that what the
appellant had told the court were lies.

– fact that it was accused’s first encounter with police will not exempt him from giving
an explanation

Teoh Kah Lin v PP [1995] 1 SLR 213

– Facts: The Appellant was charged with trafficking a controlled drug. He had submitted,
amongst his grounds of appeal, that it was wrong for the learned trial judge to have
drawn an adverse inference against the appellant under s 123(1) of the CPC, because it
was the appellant’s first encounter with the authorities in Singapore. In particular, he
argued that the trial judge was wrong in also drawing an adverse inference for his
failure to make a request for a further statement to be taken.
– Held: First, it is for the trial judge to decide whether an adverse inference ought to be
drawn under Section 123(1) of the CPC in all the circumstances of the case. Although
we agree with counsel that an accused has no right to request for further statements to
be taken after he has made his statement under Section 122(6) of the CPC, in view of
the fact that the appellant stated that he had nothing to say “at the moment”, the trial
judge was not wrong to take his failure to explain subsequently his situation as a
circumstance in determining whether or not to draw an adverse inference under Section
123(1).

D. Effect of failure to follow s122(6) procedure

– • s122(5) CPC (or s24 EA), and not s122(6), governs admissibility
– • non-compliance with s122(6) procedure is, however, relevant in considering what
inference, if any, should be drawn
– • such failure may also affect the weight to be accorded to the statement

Tsang Yuk Chung [1990] 3 MLJ 264

- Held (Wee CJ):
- s.122(6) itself does not provide for the admissibility of statements recorded there under.
The admissibility of such statements must still be founded upon s.122(5) as one of the

25
 exceptions to s.122(1) which prima facie prohibits the use in evidence of any statement
made by any person to a PO in the course of a police investigation.

Tan Boon Tat [1990] 2 MLJ 466

- Held (LP Thean J):
- Admissibility of s.122(6) statement not governed by that section but by either s.122(5)
or s.24 EA. A failure to explain the charge and warning to A cannot afford a reason for
excluding the statement made by A which is otherwise admissible.
- However, failure to comply with s.122(6) may affect the weight to be attached to that
statement. A statement admitted in evidence has yet to be tested as to its probative value
– whether its inherently credible or consistent with the facts and circumstances. In such
an exercise, a failure to observe the s.122(6) procedure is a relevant factor.
- If, on the other hand, no statement is made by A, the Court in determining whether A is
guilty of the offence may by reason of such failure and depending on the circumstances,
decline to invoke s.123(1) and draw AI vs. A.

Chan Chi Pun v PP [1994] 2 SLR 6

- Facts: Point for determination was whether CS could be used as part of the
prosecution’s case. TJ only admitted CS after defence had been called and A had
decided to testify in his own defence. This conclusion was reached based on the
wording of the s.122(6) of the effect of failing to mention any fact sought to be relied
on in defence – it was argued that if A decided to make CS, this’d be in response to
warning…hence, any statement made would be for the specifically for purpose of
preventing diminution of defence should he testify. Thus, statement should be
inadmissible until defence is called.
- Held (Yong CJ):
o CS can be made part of P case.
o Settled law that admissibility governed solely by s.122(5) which lays down only
2 conditions for admissibility of any statement – (1) statement to be made to
officer of specified rank; (2) proviso complied with ie must be no threat,
inducement or promise. Further, s.122(5) makes provision for the special case
where A does in fact testify in his own defence. The clear implication is that
the statement is admissible whether A gives evidence or not.

Sim Ah Cheoh v PP [1991] 1 SLR 150

- Held (LP Thean J):
o [Applying Tsang Yuk Chang and Tan Boon Tat]
o s.122(5) governs the admissibility of s.122(6) statements so s.122(6) statement
is admissible so long as s.122(5) is satisfied
o Cross-x of W during recording of CS is no part of the recording officer’s duty
under s.122(6) and is improper. Nonetheless, this does not render statement
inadmissible unless cross-x amounts to oppression.

Admissibility Of Statements

26
ADMISSIBILITY & USE OF STATEMENTS MADE TO POLICE OFFICERS BY
ACCUSED PERSONS – PG 219
- before 1960  one cardinal rule, statement made in the course of police
investigations NOT admissible
- 1960 (Act 1960)  s. 122(5):
o Before Arrest  voluntary statement made to Inspector admissible as
Evidence and to Impeach Credit (judicial discretion to admit voluntary
statement)
o After Arrest  voluntary statement under caution and in substantial
compliance with Schedule E to CPC admissible as Evidence and to Impeach
Credit
- 1973 (Act 21/73)  only minimum rank charged to Sergeant
- 1977 (Act 10/76):
- s. 122(5)  voluntary statement to Police Sergeant admissible. Discretion to
admit involuntary statement removed. Caution abolished.
- New s. 122(6)  requirements for enforcement officer to explain and serve notice
of warning on person charged or officially informed of Prosecution  Adverse
Inference from silence or non-disclosure. Corroboration s. 123(1).

Admissibility Of Section 122(6) Statements

- s. 122(5) CPC is the governing provision, by virtue of s. 122(7) CPC: voluntary

STATEMENTS MADE TO NON POLICE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS

- s. 122(1) – 122(5) does not apply
- statement under Notice of Warning  s. 122(6) CPC  statement not admissible
under CPC but EA
- OMMISSIONS  relevant to draw adverse inference, to corroborate

STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
- admissible. Only need to show that made statement. See EA. What proof is
admnitted.
- So long as proved, can be used. Also see cases where witneses turned hostile, because
change their mind, etc so speak in favour of accused.
- To counter this, see s147.3 and 147.5 – witneses statement or evid in court may be
contradicted by his previous statement given to investigating authorities and
prosecution may apply to subst his evid in court with his earlier statement given to the
investigating officers
- no of cases where statements givn to officers although they later turn hostile

- Oral stmt made by accused whether before or after he is charged is admissible as

evidence so long as it is made to or in the hearing of a police officer of or above
rank of sergeant. See 122(5).
- But s 122(5) doesn’t cover stmts made by other to the police other than accused.
Oral stmts made by anyone other than accused would be hearsay and not

27
 admissible unless it came w/in parameters of s 378 (admissibility of out-of-court
statements to be evidence of facts stated). See Rosli bin Othman.

Thiruselvam S/O Nagaratnam V Pp [2001] 2 Slr 125

- Admissibility of witness’ statement
- Issue here pertains to admissibility of witness statement.
- Held:
- Read with s 17(2) of the EA, s 24 must be confined to confessions made by an
accused person in the criminal proceedings in which he was charged. It did
not apply to confessions made by a person who was at the time he made it, not
an accused person but merely a witness.
- Where s 147 EA was invoked and a previous statement of a witness – who
was not the accused in the proceedings before the court – was used to cross-
examine him and to prove the existence of certain facts stated therein, it had to
be proved that the statement was made by the witness.
- There was no requirement under s 147 to prove further that the witness made
the statement voluntarily. This view was reinforced by a reading of s 147(6).
However where the witness was himself the accused, the application under
s 147 was subject to s 24 of the EA and also s 122(5) of the CPC, it was
necessary to show that it was made voluntarily. If the statement was
involuntary, it was relevant to determine what weight should be accorded to it.

- *******Note: Saving for exceptions to rule against hearsay in Evidence Act.

384. Nothing in this Chapter shall prejudice the admissibility in any criminal proceedings
of any statement which would by virtue of the Evidence Act be admissible as evidence of
any fact stated therein.

VOLUNTARINESS

Rationale for Voluntariness test?

• Reliability principle
• Disciplinary principle
• Privilege against self-incrimination
• Protective principle
• Judicial Integrity principle

– Do other legislative provisions or judicial developments in Singapore cast light on

which is the true basis for the voluntariness test?
– See UK position in s76 PACE

1. Two limbs for voluntariness test :

(a) objective - whether there is a TIP – look at acts of police officer etc objectively and see
whether amts to TIP.

28
(b) subjective - whether TIP operated on mind of accused through hope of escape or fear of
punishment connected with the charge - Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25.
Put urself in shoes of accused and see whether induced.

- Facts: The appellant and one Bryan Yeo (the first accused) were jointly tried in the
High Court. The first accused was charged with attempting to export not less than
2,109g of diamorphine (the drugs) from Singapore to Taipei. The charge against the
appellant was that he had abetted the first accused by conspiring with him to export the
drugs from Singapore to Taipei and that he had in pursuance of the conspiracy
transported the drugs into Singapore and strapped them onto the body of the first
accused, an offence under Section 7 read with Section 12 and punishable under Section
33 of the Misuse of Drugs Act. The first accused made a cautioned statement under
Section 122(6) of the CPC. He also made a much longer statement under Section 121
CPC, which was recorded in two parts. Both of the first accused’s statements were
admitted after a voir dire. In his Section 122(6) statement the first accused pleaded for
leniency and said that he did not know the consequences were so serious. Goh gave a
Section 121 statement. Leave was granted for his evidence to be given orally, but when
Goh turned hostile in court the deputy public prosecutor applied to have his previous
written statement admitted under Section 147 of the EA. The trial judge was satisfied
that the statement was given voluntarily.
- The trial judge held that a prima facie case had been made out against both the first
accused and the appellant who were called to enter upon their defence. In relation to the
appellant, the trial judge found that there was evidence of conspiracy from the
statements of the first accused and of Goh. In the event both elected to remain silent
and offered no evidence in their defence. At the end of the trial, the trial judge
convicted both the first accused and the appellant of the respective charges against them
and passed the mandatory sentence of death.
- On appeal it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the statements of the first
accused and of Goh considered together with the other evidence adduced by the
prosecution did not establish the essential elements of the charge against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The main plank of the attack on the decision of the trial judge
was that he ought not to have relied on the statements of the first accused and of Goh
when they were inconsistent with the other evidence. In relation to the statements of the
first accused, in particular, there were discrepancies inter se sufficient to nullify their
evidential value so that they should be given little or no weight at all. They were also
accomplice evidence and thus had to be treated with caution. Further the admissibility
of the statements was challenged on the ground of involuntariness.
- Held: Dismissing the appeal:
- (1) The test whether a statement was a confession was an objective one, whether to the
mind of a reasonable person reading the statement at the time and in the circumstance
in which it was made it could be said to amount to a statement that the accused
committed the offence or which suggested the inference that he committed the offence;
Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] MLJ 289 and Chin Seow Noi v PP [1994] 1 SLR 135
followed.
- (2) The test of voluntariness was applied in a manner, which was partly objective
and partly subjective. The objective limb was satisfied if there was a threat,

29
 inducement or promise, and the subjective limb when the threat, inducement or
promise operated on the mind of the particular accused through hope of escape or
fear of punishment connected with the charge. Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim v PP
[1983] 2 MLJ 232 and Mohd Desa bin Hashim v PP [1995] 3 MLJ 350 followed.
- (3) Where voluntariness was challenged, the burden was on the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made voluntarily and not for the
defence to prove on a balance of probabilities that the confession was not made
voluntarily; Koh Aik Siew v PP [1993] 2 SLR 599 followed. It was only necessary for
the prosecution to remove a reasonable doubt of the existence of the threat, inducement
or promise, and not every lurking shadow of influence or remnants of fear Panya
Martmontree v PP [1995] 3 SLR 341followed.

2. Legislation - 2 governing provisions :

A. s24 EA
Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise when irrelevant in criminal
proceeding
24. A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the
making of the confession appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement,
threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding
from a person in authority and sufficient in the opinion of the court to give the accused
person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he
would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the
proceeding against him

B. s122(5) CPC
Admissibility of statements to police.
122. (5) Where any person is charged with an offence any statement, whether it amounts to
a confession or not or is oral or in writing, made at any time, whether before or after that
person is charged and whether in the course of a police investigation or not, by that person
to or in the hearing of any police officer of or above the rank of sergeant shall be
admissible at his trial in evidence and, if that person tenders himself as a witness, any such
statement may be used in cross-examination and for the purpose of impeaching his credit:

 similar operative words in both provisions

 Statements/confessions are admissible unless making of it appears to the court:
(a) to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise
(b) having reference to the charge against the maker of the statement/confession
(c) proceeding from a person in authority and
(d) sufficient in the Court’s opinion to give the maker reasonable grounds for supposing
that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal
nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

3. Differences between s24 EA and s122(5) CPC

30
1. S122(5) applies only to police officers and has a rank requirement – ie sergeant and
above:

- Are CNB, CAD, Customs or CPIB officers classified as ‘police officers’ for purposes of
s 122(5) CPC ?
- CNB –
o only investigate drug offences – parent legislation is Misuse of Drugs Act.
o In this act, provision saying that if CNB officers investigating offences under
MDA, they wld have power of a police officer under s121, 122, 125 and 126.
o (121 – powers to record statement/ 122(6) and (8)/ 125 – sign bond to appear in
court) When record long statement, therefore, exercising powers under 121
given to poclie offier.
o But when want to admnit this statement in evid, this is not under 122(5) which
is not section that gives powers. It is merely an admissibility section. Needs to
be recorded by police officer which CNB is not. So admissible only under
section 24.
o And before they can be admitted, they have to be confessions. If not, if long
statement is recorded fr acused by CNB, then not admissible, contrast to police
offier statement – recorded during police investigations admissible under
s122(5) which x oconfine statement to be confession only – prov tt any
statement whether confession or not, oral or writing, made at any time before or
after charge – admissible
- Customs officers –
o customs act has sn giving them power to record statement. Act x refer to CPC. It
has specific provision which says that can record statement. Powers come fr
customs act itself. Admissbility section s24
- CPIB same.
o Corruption offences – special investigators have power to record statement fr
accused and witnesses under s27 POCA, specifically provide for the powers. It
does not refer to s121 unlike MDA. Ie some acts refer to s121 others provide for
such pwers under the act itself. Admistted under s24 EA
- CAD –
o police officers, admissible under 122(5)
- egs of statements:
o e.g. Section 27 Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 91 Customs Act, Section
104 of the Income Tax Act:

Section 27 Prevention of Corruption Act

Legal obligation to give information.
27. Every person required by the Director or any officer to give any information on any
subject which it is the duty of the Director or that officer to inquire into under this Act and
which it is in his power to give, shall be legally bound to give that information.

Section 91 Customs Act

Persons bound to give information or produce documents
91. —(1) Every person required by the proper officer of customs to give information or to

31
produce any travel document or any document on any subject into which it is the officer’s
duty to inquire under this Act and which it is in that person’s power to give or produce shall
be bound to give such information or to produce such document for inspection.
(2) The proper officer of customs may specify the customs office or station or other place at
which that person is required to give information or to produce any document.

Section 104 Income Tax Act

Admissibility of certain statements and documents as evidence
104. —(1) Statements made or documents produced by or on behalf of any person shall not
be inadmissible in evidence against him in any proceedings to which this section applies by
reason only that he was or may have been induced to make the statements or produce the
documents by any inducement or promise lawfully given or made by a person having any
official duty under, or being employed in the administration of, this Act.
(2) This section shall apply to any proceedings against the person in question —
(a) under section 95, 96 or 96A; or
(b) for the recovery of any sum due from him, whether by way of tax or penalty.s

Sim Ah Cheoh v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 353

o Admissibility of s.122(6) statement is governed by s.122(5) where its made to a police
officer and by the EA where its made to a narcotics officer.

Tan Boon Tat v PP [1990] 2 MLJ 466

o Confession made to a narcotics officer (of ANY rank) is admissible in evidence
provided that the provisions of s.24 EA are complied with.

Tan Siew Chay v PP [1993 ] 2 SLR 14

o Facts: AP argued that LS made to SNO inadmissible as it’d not been made to a PO
above the rank of sergeant as required by s.122(5).
o Held: (LP Thean J):
o Statement admissible.
o CNB officers empowered under s.32 MDA with powers of PO under, inter alia,
s.121 CPC – can’t have been legislative intent to empower CNB officers to record
statements and yet render such a statement inadmissible in evidence.
o Admissibility of the LS is governed by the EA. Settled beyond doubt that CNB
officers are not POs and that statements made to CNB officers are not subject to
s.122(1) CPC or ss. 25, 26 EA.

Choo Pit Hong v PP [1995] 2 SLR 255

o Facts: The appellant was charged with two counts of intentionally giving false
evidence to officers from the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) while being
legally bound by an express provision of law to state the truth. During the trial, it was
alleged that the statements given to the CAD officers were not given voluntarily but
were made as a result of threats and inducements. A voir dire was held, at the end of
which the district judge held that the statements were voluntarily made. The statements
were admitted

32
o Held: The statements made to the CAD officers were not evidence for the purpose of
proving the charges of giving false evidence. They were an essential ingredient of the
offence under Section 193 of the Penal Code and were facts in issue. They could not be
excluded even if they were made as a result of threats, inducements or promises. If that
was indeed the case, the proper course was to rely on one of the general defences, if any
were available, in the Penal Code.

Goh Yin Guan v PP [1967] 1 MLJ 113

o Statement made to customs officer only inadmissible if it amounts to a confession made
in breach of s.24 EA.

Chua Beow Huat v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 29

o Whether a person is, for the purposes of EA, a police officer depends on the nature of
his functions and powers.
o In the case of customs officers, they have specialised duties and powers to deal
specifically with customs offences. More limited than those which the police have and
the powers are different in character.
o While the Courts have always been suspicious of the methods employed by the police
in obtaining confessions, its too much to suppose the Legislature intended to tar all
officers with the same brush irrespective of whether they were conducting
investigations under a special enactment or the CPC. Thus, customs officers are not
police officers for the purposes of the EA.

Chan Chi Pun v PP [1994] 2 SLR 61

o Facts:
o The appellant arrived at Changi International Airport on transit from Phuket,
Thailand. Customs officers approached him and carried out a check on him.
A vest discovered beneath the appellant’s T-shirt had sewn-in pouches each
with a slab of substance. In total there were 16 slabs. After a brief
conversation with the customs officers, the appellant was arrested. Upon
analysis, the slabs were found to contain not less than 464g of diamorphine.
The appellant was charged and convicted under Section 7 of the Misuse of
Drugs Act with the offence of importing the said drugs into Singapore. On
appeal, he raised four grounds. First, the trial judge erred in deciding at the
halfway stage that the prosecution had established a prima facie case.
Second, the exchange between the customs officers and the appellant was
inadmissible as the customs officers did not possess the power to question
suspects, and, in any event, the officers` account of the exchange was
unreliable. Third, the trial judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s account of
events. Lastly, the trial judge’s finding that the appellant possessed sufficient
mental element for the offence charged was erroneous.
o Held: Dismissing the appeal:
 On the evidence before the court, the trial judge had not erred when he
decided to call for the defence at the end of the prosecution case.
 Evidence unlawfully obtained, once proved to be relevant, is in law
admissible, and the court would only exercise its judicial discretion to

33
 exclude it if its reception would operate unfairly against the accused. In any
event, on the construction of Section 25 and 26 of the Act, the customs
officers did possess the power to question the appellant as it is not only
natural, but also necessary, for an officer to question a suspect before
arresting or searching him. To interpret Section 25 and 26 otherwise
would risk logicality.
o Comments: A cautioned statement can and should be adduced as part of the
prosecution’s case. Admissibility is governed by Section 122(5), which permits the
adduction of any statement whether or not an accused gives evidence, once the two
conditions specified by the section have been fulfilled. The warning in Section 122(6)
merely warns the accused of the power given to the court by Section 123(1) to draw
such inferences as appear proper.

Ong Hock v. R [1939] MLJ 232

- Admissibility of statements to customs officers determined under EA.

Tang Tuck Wah v. PP [1991] 2 MLJ 404 (HC)

- CPIB officers ≠ restricted to investigation of corruption offences under PCA. Like POs,
they can investigate any seizable offence under any written law which comes to light in
the course of their investigations.
- As far as PC offences are concerned, investigation deemed to be police investigation
and s.122 CPC applies as if they were POs.
- This, statements made to CPIB officers must satisfy voluntariness test (admissibility
provision is s.122(5))

Chai Chien Wei Kelvin V Pp [1999] 1 Slr 25

- Section 122 of the CPC was not applicable to narcotics officers. The admissibility
of the first accused’s statements fall to be tested under s 24 of EA. The test of
voluntariness under s 24 of EA was partly objective and partly subjective. The
objective limb was satisfied if there was a threat, inducement or promise, and the
subjective limb when the threat inducement or promise operated on the mind of the
accused through hope of escape or fear of punishment connected with the charge.

2. Confession (s 24EA) v Statement (s122(5) CPC)

- Section 24 EA deals with CONFESSION only, while Section 122(5) CPC deals with
ANY STATEMENT, WHETHER IT AMOUNTS TO A CONFESSION OR NOT
- Meaning of confession ?
o Under EA:
 s17(1) EA : admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which
suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact…
 s17(2) EA : `confession is an admission made at any time by a person
accused of an offence, stating or suggesting the inference that he
committed that offence.’ (// anandagoda)

34
 o • Objective test : whether a reasonable person reading the statement at the time
and in the circumstances in which it was made will conclude that the accused
committed the offence, or suggested that the accused committed it.
o • Statement is to be looked at as a whole, considered on its own terms without
reference to extrinsic facts
 see Anandagoda v The Queen [1962] MLJ 289 (PC) – adopted in many
local cases
 for Singapore’s adoption and expansion of Anandagoda :

Abdul Rashid v PP [1994] 1 SLR 119

- Facts: 2 As convicted of trafficking. 2nd A convicted on basis of statements given by 1st
A which taken together, said that 2nd A been asked to transport drugs over Causeway by
1st A. On appeal, 2nd A contended these statements were not confessions.
- Held: (Yong CJ):
o Appeal dismissed. Statements were confessions.
o Indian decisions are unhelpful in determining the definition of a confession as
the equivalent provision does not contain the words ‘suggesting the inference
that he committed the offence’ found in s.17(2) EA.
o Correct definition found in Anandagoda. TJ had considered that case and held
that as long as statement connects A in some way with offence, statement =
confession, whether admission of involvement is major or minor, direct or
indirect, explicit or inferential, whether in exculpation or in earnest, irrespective
of its object.
o Here, admission of 1st A that he was in possession of package containing drugs
unequivocally connected him with the offence and the statements taken together
therefore amounted to confessions.

Tong Chee Kong v PP [1998] 2 SLR 843

- Facts: The appellants, Tong and Tay, were tried in the High Court on a charge that, in
furtherance of a common intention, they had in their possession, for the purpose of
trafficking, a packet of substance containing not less than 42.12g of diamorphine and
had thereby committed an offence under Section 5(1)(a) read with Section 5(2) of the
Misuse of Drugs Act and Section 34 of the PC.
- Held: For a statement to amount to a confession it did not need to be of a plenary or
unqualified nature; it could also be of a non-plenary nature so long as the statement
connected the accused in some way with the offence. Tay in his statements had
admitted that he had taken delivery of the drugs and was in possession of the drugs and
this unequivocally connected him with the offence with which he was charged.
Accordingly his statements amounted to confessions. Abdul Rashid & Anor v PP
[1994] 1 SLR 119 and PP v Tan Aik Hen [1995] 2 SLR 244 followed.

Chai Chien Wen Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25

- Facts: A convicted of abetting 1st A in trafficking drugs. 1st A gave LS which described
how A had passed him bundles of heroin to carry to Taiwan in the shower of the Transit
Lounge at Changi Airport. Statement also contained exculpatory material, as later in
statement, 1st A said that he had no knowledge of the contents of the bundles and

35
 thought they were ecstasy tablets. On appeal vs. sentence, contended by defence
counsel that 1st A’s statement was not a confession and thus could not be used vs. A
under s.30 EA.
- Held: (Yong CJ):
o Defence counsel’s argument rejected; no doubt that statement was a confession.
o Applying Anandagoda, if the facts in the statement added together suggest the
inference that A is guilty of the offence, then statement is nonetheless a
confession although A at the same time protests his innocence.
o Thus, immaterial that 1st A’s statement contained exculpatory material. Recently
held by CA in Tong Chee Kong that for a statement to be a confession, it need
not be plenary or unqualified. Sufficient that the statement connected A in some
way with the offence.

- If statement is exculpatory, can it still be considered a confession if it satisfies the

Anandagoda test ?

Lau Song Seng v PP [1998] 1 SLR 663

- can be considered confession if it satisfies 17.2 and anandagoda test. So long as it
connects accused in some way to offence charged – it will be deemed a confession. As
long as it shows his involvement in the offence charged.
- Facts: The three appellants (Lim, Lau & Foo) were charged together with a fourth
person on drug-related charges in the court below.
- Held: Lau intentions that Foo’s statements did not amount to confessions did not bear
up. The mere fact that the statements might have been partially exculpatory did not
detract from the fact that there were vital elements suggesting guilt present in the
statements. They could therefore be used against Lim and Lau.
- Given that they were admissible but retracted, how the statements should have been
treated depended on Foo’s explanation of the inconsistencies between his evidence at
trial and his earlier statements. As Foo had done no more than to repeat his allegations
that the statements had been given involuntarily, an assertion, which had already been
rejected, the starting point was that the evidence-in-chief should be treated as less
reliable than the investigation statements.
- However, as parts of the statements had been proven false, it was necessary to examine
them carefully before relying on them. They were not only accomplice statements to be
treated with caution under Section 116 illustration (b) of the Evidence Act, but also
recanted confessions the veracity of which the court was under a stringent duty to
examine before relying on them to convict a co-accused. In particular, it was extremely
unsafe to rely on an allegation, which incriminated one of the co-accused persons if it
had been proved false or inaccurate.
- Comments: The fact that a statement was a confession did not render it
unimpeachable, even if given voluntarily. If elements of the confession were proved
inaccurate, then they must be treated with caution accordingly, especially if they were
to be used against a co-accused person

Took Leng How Case

36
- ‘huang na died after hide and seek game she played… I did not cause her dEath.. I diD
not know ht I was doing after her dEath.. I realized my mistake now…’ => this IS a
confession! A mixed statement. Under 17.2 and anandagoda test, this is deemed a
confession and is admissible
- => Where accused says – I plead for leniency/ I am sorry/ I did not mean to do it – this
is a confession! He has admitted to his involvement.

• One of the greatest difficulties is dealing with the admissions or confessions or mixed
statements (see Chan Kin Choi v PP [1991] 1 MLJ 34) made by the accused to the
police or other investigating authorities.
- Chan Kim Choi v PP:
• the method most likely to produce a just result, is for the jury to be told that
the whole statement, both the incriminating parts and the excuses or
explanations, must be considered by them in deciding where the truth lies
• court (as trier of fact in Singapore) is permissible to proceed upon the basis
that the incriminating parts are likely to be true, whereas the excuses might
not have the same weight

Chan Kin Choi v PP [1991] 1 MLJ 34

- The appellant was charged with the murder of one Lee Mui Kee. In his statement to the
police the appellant claimed that he was approached by the deceased`s gang and he
stabbed the deceased only after a punch had been thrown at him. The statement was
admitted in evidence and the appellant was convicted of murder. He appealed against
the conviction.
- Held , allowing the appeal and convicting the accused of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder:
- (1).There was no rule of law that exculpatory statements in a confession
used by the prosecution as part of its evidence were admissible as evidence
of the truth of the contents thereof.
- (2).Once the defence was called, the trial judges who were performing the
role of deciders of fact must consider the whole statement, both the
incriminating parts and excuses or explanations, in deciding where the truth
lies.
- (3).From the evidence it was plain that the appellant found himself in a
dangerous situation. The deceased was at the material time joined by his
gang. It was probable that the appellant had armed himself for his own
protection. A fight broke out and there was no reason to disbelieve the
appellant when he said the deceased started it. The court came to the
conclusion that the appellant had stabbed the deceased without
premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.
The case fell squarely within exception 4 of s 300 of the Penal Code (Cap
224).

- The question of voluntariness of a confession is but one aspect of its admissibility.

Where the identity of the officer who recorded the statement is in dispute, and this

37
 dispute affects the admissibility of the statement, a voir dire to determine the
admissibility of the statement is essential, and cannot be dispensed with.
- (Beh Chai Hock v PP [1996] 3 SLR 495)
• Comments: It was held in this case that the true position was that the
procedural safeguard of a voir dire was necessary whenever the admissibility of
a confession was challenged, provided that the dispute over the admissibility
was not confined to a pure point of law, but was one which required the calling
of evidence of the accused person and other witnesses in support of or against
the admissibility of the confession.

4. Proof of statement - ‘appears to have been caused’

- • `appears’ : slightest doubt sufficient to exclude statement - PP v Law Say Teck [1971]
1 MLJ 199 – rejected –
o • burden on prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that statement was
voluntarily made, and not on defence to prove on a balance of probabilities that
confession was not made voluntarily. Ie crim std of proof
o Use of the word ‘appears’ is significant. A confession can be rejected on a valid
ground or conjecture but there must be something before the Court on which
such a valid conjecture can rest.
o If A can point to some circumstances which arouse suspicion, the confession
cannot be admitted. A mere possibility that the confession was not voluntary is
insufficient to warrant its rejection but a probability would suffice to dictate its
rejection in evidence.
- Accused need only raise reasonable doubt
- must prosecution remove every lurking shadow of influence or remnants of fear ?
o no. just beyond reasonable doubt.

Koh Aik Siew v PP [1993] 2 SLR 599

- Facts: A alleged that s.122(6) statement was wrongly admitted as it was involuntary. At
voir dire, trial J held that it was for the A to prove on balance of probabilities that
statement was involuntary and since he failed to discharge this burden, statements were
admitted.
- Held: (Yong CJ):
o Trial J misdirected himself in considering the evidence during the voir dire and
applied the wrong BOP. It is still for the prosecution to prove beyond RD that
the statement was made voluntarily.

Panya Martmontree v PP [1995] 3 SLR 341

- Facts: The four appellants were found guilty under s 396 of the Penal Code (Cap 224)
of committing the murder of two persons in the course of gang robbery. The robbery
occurred on 17 September 1993 at a construction site in Tampines. Two persons were
murdered and a third person was attacked and injured. The four appellants were
subsequently arrested. The only material evidence against them comprised the
statements of the first, second and fourth appellants.
- Held: The burden was on the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of statements
beyond a reasonable doubt but it was not sufficient for the appellants to raise only the

38
 slightest doubt. The use of the word `appears` in the proviso to s 122(5) CPC did not
lead to the conclusion that the prosecution had any higher burden than the normal one
in criminal trials.
- (Karthigesu JA):
o Following Koh Aik Siew, burden of proving voluntariness of a statement lies on
the prosecution which must be proved beyond RD.
o Test is whether the evidence of the A at the voir dire taken together with
prosecution’s evidence has raised RD in trial J’s mind that was A forced into
making the statement.
o Prosecution not required to remove all doubt…the police work in difficult
circumstances. If they were required to remove all doubt of influence or fear,
they would never achieve anything

Gulam bin Notan v PP [1999] 2 SLR 181

- Facts: The first and second appellants were originally tried with one Nor Azman bin
Mustaffa (Nor Azman) for having in their possession 392.66g of diamorphine for the
purpose of trafficking. The charge against Nor Azman was subsequently amended and
he was charged with abetting the two appellants by conspiring with them to traffic in
not less than 14.99g of diamorphine. The prosecution sought to rely on two statements
recorded from the first appellant. The admissibility of which were challenged by the
first appellant. The judicial commissioner found that both statements had been properly
recorded from the first appellant. They were voluntary statements free from any
inducement, threat or promise and were admitted in evidence accordingly. He also
rejected the contention that an investigating officer could never be the recording officer
as being unduly restrictive and impractical.
- Held: Dismissing the appeal:
o (1) The admissibility of the first appellant’s statements was governed by s 24 of
the Evidence Act (Cap 97) (`the Evidence Act`). Whether a statement was
voluntary was a question of fact; Tan Boon Tat v PP [1992] 2 SLR 1 and DPP v
Ping Lin [1975] 3 All ER 175 followed. It was also well established that the
common law concept of involuntariness by oppression in R v Prager [1972] 56
Cr App R 51 had been subsumed under Section 24 of the EA.
o (2) The test for determining admissibility under s 24 was first, whether the
confession was made as a consequence of any inducement, threat or promise,
and second, whether in making that confession, the accused did so in
circumstances which, in the opinion of the court, would have led him
reasonably to suppose that he would gain some advantage for himself or would
avoid some evil of a temporal nature to himself. Both were questions of fact and
were matters of judicial evaluation. Seow Choon Meng v PP [1994] 2 SLR 853
and Tan Boon Tat v PP [1992] 2 SLR 1 followed.
o (3) The test was applied in a manner, which was partly objective and partly
subjective. The objective limb was satisfied if there was a threat, inducement or
promise, and the subjective limb when the threat, inducement or promise
operated on the mind of the particular accused through hope of escape or fear of
punishment connected with the charge Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim v PP [1983]
2 MLJ 232 and Mohd Desa bin Hashim v PP [1995] 3 MLJ 350 followed.

39
 o (4) Where voluntariness was challenged, the burden was on the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made voluntarily and
not on the defence to prove on a balance of probabilities that the confession was
not made voluntarily; Koh Aik Siew v PP [1993] 2 SLR 599 followed. The
accused need only raise a reasonable doubt or, in other words, it was only
necessary for the prosecution to remove a reasonable doubt of the existence of
the threat, inducement or promise, and not every lurking shadow of influence or
remnants of fear. Panya Martmontree v PP [1995] 3 SLR 341 followed.

Chai Chien Wen Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25

- Application of Panya Martmontree.
- While the burden is on P to prove beyond RD that a confession was made voluntarily
when its voluntariness is challenged, P only needs to remove a RD of the existence of
the TIP and NOT every lurking shadow of influence or remnants of fear.

5. Threat, inducement or promise

- 1. obj and 2. subj; common-sense approach, question of fact

Tan Boon Tat v PP [1990] 2 MLJ 466 citing DPP v Ping Lin [1975] 3 All ER 175
- Facts: The appellant was convicted of the offence of trafficking in 1,120.81g of
diamorphine under the Misuse of Drugs Act. The appellant’s statement under Section
122(6) of the CPC was recorded with the assistance of a certified interpreter.
- Held:
o The admissibility of a statement recorded under Section 122(6) of the CPC is
dependent on s 122(5) of the CPC or the Evidence Act. Non-compliance with
the provisions of s 122(6) may put into jeopardy the possibility of the court
drawing an adverse inference under s 123(1) of the CPC but has little or no
bearing on the question of admissibility.
o Whether the appellant had or had not rebutted the presumptions against him is
entirely a question of fact. The burden on the accused is on a preponderance of
evidence or on the balance of probabilities. The trial judges had the benefit of
observing the appellant and forming a view on his credibility. The appellant’s
evidence as it appeared in the record was difficult to accept. Bearing in mind the
burden was on the appellant to rebut the presumptions on a balance of
probabilities; it was not unreasonable or irregular in the circumstances of this
case for the learned trial judges to comment adversely on the appellant’s failure
to call any witnesses to testify.

Seow Choon Meng v PP [1994] 2 SLR 853

- Held: (Karthigesu JA)
o Sole criterion for admissibility of statement made by A during course of
investigation is:
- 1. was statement made as a consequence of TIP; and

40
 - 2. in making statement, did A do so in circumstances which, in Court’s
opinion, would have led him reasonably to suppose he’d gain some
advantage or avoid some evil of a temporal nature to himself.
o Whether in making that statement, the accused person did so in circumstances
which, in the opinion of the court, would have led him reasonably to suppose
that he would gain some advantage to himself or would avoid some evil of a
temporal nature to himself. Both are questions of fact and are matters of judicial
evaluation.
o Depends on factual matrix, precedents of little value here.

- is there a difference between admissibility and voluntariness ? ie : can a voluntary

statement nonetheless be inadmissible under s122(5) CPC or s24 EA ?
o ie if pros can prove beyond reasonable doubt that statement given voluntarily ie
no TIP, according to 122.5 and 24, admissible.
o Can it still be excluded?
o Answer – local case beh chai hock – yes. Some judicial discretion to exclude
statement evne though proven to be given voluntarily.

- Must TIP have proceeded from the recorder of the statement? what if threat fr arresting
officer/ interpreter?

Beh Chai Hock v PP [1996] 3 SLR 495 –

- Facts: The appellant was convicted by a district judge on a charge under Section 182 of
the PC of knowingly furnishing false information to a police officer, in that he
fabricated a story that he had been a victim of an armed robbery. The prosecution’s case
was based entirely on two confessions made by the appellant. The first confession (the
oral confession) was made by the appellant to Cpl Lee at the scene of the purported
robbery. The second confession (the statement) was recorded by one SSgt Goh at the
Bedok Police Station shortly after the oral confession. The appellant claimed that he
had made the oral confession as a result of an inducement by Cpl Lee that he would get
off with only a warning from the police. The appellant claimed that he had made the
statement to Cpl Lee and not SSgt Goh; he further alleged that he had made the
statement because of Cpl Lee’s inducement.
- The trial judge held the oral confession to be inadmissible on the ground that it was not
made to a police officer of the rank of sergeant or above as required by Section 25 of
the EA. As for the statement, the trial judge held that it was unnecessary to conduct a
voir dire because the only question to be decided was whether the recorder of the
statement was Cpl Lee or SSgt Goh. There was no issue of the voluntariness of the
statement. If it were Cpl Lee who recorded the statement, it would have been
inadmissible for the same reason that the oral confession was held inadmissible. If it
were SSgt Goh who recorded the statement, it would have been admissible because the
appellant had made no allegations of impropriety against SSgt Goh. At the close of the
prosecution’s case, the trial judge called for the appellant to enter his defence. At the
conclusion of the trial, the trial judge found that it was SSgt Goh who recorded the
statement. Based on the confession of guilt in the statement, the trial judge found that

41
 the charge against the appellant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
appellant appealed.
- Held: allowing the appeal and ordering a retrial:
o (1) The trial judge made a serious error of law when he failed to hold a voir dire
to resolve the issue of the identity of the recorder of the statement. The trial
judge’s mistake was in thinking that a voir dire had to be conducted only when
the question of the voluntariness of a confession was raised. The true position
was that the procedural safeguard of a voir dire was necessary whenever the
admissibility of a confession was challenged, provided that the dispute over the
admissibility was not confined to a pure point of law, but was one which
required the calling of evidence of the accused person and other witnesses in
support of or against the admissibility of the confession. The question of the
voluntariness of a confession was but one aspect of its admissibility. In this
case, since the question of the identity of the recorder of the statement was
effectively a challenge to its admissibility, the trial judge should have held a voir
dire to resolve the question of admissibility. Seeraj Ajodha v State [1982] AC
204 distinguished.
o (2) In any event, the trial judge also erred in failing to realise that there was a
subsidiary issue of the voluntariness of the statement. This was because, even if
SSgt Goh was the recorder of the statement, the appellant had raised the
possibility that the statement might have been made as a result of the
inducement by Cpl Lee. There was no requirement for the inducement to
have proceeded from the person to whom the statement is given; the
proviso to Section 122(5) of the CPC provided that a statement would be
inadmissible if the making of the statement appeared to have been caused
by an inducement, threat or promise proceeding from a person in
authority. There was no doubt that Cpl Lee was such a person. Consequently,
the trial judge should have conducted a voir dire to determine who had recorded
the statement, and if it was SSgt Goh, to determine as well if the statement had
been voluntarily made.
- Comments: There is no requirement for the inducement to have proceeded from the
person to whom the statement is given. All proviso to s.122(5) says that TIP to proceed
from a person in authority for statement to be inadmissible. There is no doubt CPL was
such a person.

- category of cases of TIP cannot be closed and is to be decided on facts of each case.
 Previously, words such as ‘You had better tell the truth’ or equivalent
expressions were usually held to import a threat or inducement and hence, made
the statement inadmissible –
 • nowadays, no blanket rule
 Court examines facts in the context of each case..
 see mazlan case, officer no duty to inform duty of accused person tt he has right
against self incrim. But if do tell accused, then must read whole 121 caution to
him. If only say first part, then will amt to threat (reference to lim kim tjok)
o => net effect – depends on facts of case – this is current trend of judicial thinking

42
- Fung Yuk Shing v PP:
• Unrealistic to take the sweeping stand that every failure to offer an accused
sustenance necessarily constituted a ‘threat’ or ‘inducement’ of such gravity as to
automatically render any statement made by the accused involuntary
• Various factors had to be considered: for e.g., whether the omission was
deliberate, how long the accused had gone without sustenance, etc
- Panya Martmontree:
• There is no necessity to remove all discomfort
• Some discomfort is to be expected – the issue is whether such discomfort is of
such great extent that it causes the making of an involuntary statement
- Ong Seng Hwee v PP:
• Appellant’s account of the threats, inducements or promises made were inherently
improbable

Osman bin Din v PP [1995] 2 SLR 129

- Facts: The appellant was convicted on a charge of trafficking 9,504g of cannabis. At
trial the prosecution sought to admit the appellant’s statement made under Section
122 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The appellant challenged the voluntariness of
the statement. At a trial within a trial, the statement was found to be voluntarily made
and was admitted into evidence
- Held: Words to the effect of `you had better tell the truth` or its equivalent could not,
in the circumstances, amount to a threat or inducement. Each case had to be looked at
individually. Although the words were coupled with further statements that the
appellant would be beaten up and sent to the gallows, they were not sufficient to give
the appellant any reasonable grounds for supposing that he would gain any advantage
or avoid any evil of a temporal nature by giving the statements. In any event the trial
judge’s finding that the appellant was lying and that there were no such threats or
inducements would not be disturbed

Lim Kim Tjok v PP [1978] 2 MLJ 94

- Facts: The appellant was convicted on a charge of trafficking 9,504g of cannabis.
- Held: dismissing the appeal:
o (1) Words to the effect of “you had better tell the truth” or its equivalent could
not, in the circumstances, amount to a threat or inducement. Each case had to be
looked at individually. Although the words were coupled with further statements
that the appellant would be beaten up and sent to the gallows, they were not
sufficient to give the appellant any reasonable grounds for supposing that he
would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature by giving the
statements. In any event the trial judge’s finding that the appellant was lying and
that there were no such threats or inducements would not be disturbed.

PP v Ramasamy a/l Sebastian [1991] 1 MLJ 75

- Held: (Chao Hick Tin JC):
- Not a TIP where PO reminded W that he should tell the truth and not tell lies

43
- Words uttered in the course of the recording of the statement and not prior to the giving.
A could not have been induced by that utterance to think that by giving the statement he
would receive any advantage of a temporal nature.

Chai Chien Wen Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25

- Facts: 1st A. Contended on appeal that 1st A’s confession in which he implicated himself
and 2nd A was involuntary as 1st A said he was told to ‘tell the truth’ because DSP could
tell if he was lying by looking into his eyes. Also allegedly told that his face would be
damaged if he did not tell the truth; alleged he was knocked on the head by DSP when
he gave unsatisfactory answer. Also allegedly told that ‘rope was round his neck’ and
testified that he thought the officers would help take the rope off his neck, by which he
thought he would face a lesser charge.
- Held: (Yong CJ):
o 1st A failed to raise RD of the existence of TIP.
o Osman bin Din applied. Court looked at the evidence
o To begin with, TJ not satisfied that 1st A had been told by officers that they’d
help to take the rope off his neck or that 1st A had been knocked on the head –
these were findings of fact. Thus, purported inducement self-perceived and on
the authority of Lu Lai Heng v. PP, this could not amount in law to an
inducement.
o In any event, a knock on the head in the manner described did not constitute
sufficient duress, nor could a call to co-operate be regarded as a threat or
inducement even if, as in this case, it was accompanied by a remark that A
would be allowed to call his wife if he co-operated.

Vadugaiah Mahendran v PP:

- Singapore High Court was of the view that showing the accused the positive results of
his urine sample for drugs before his statement was recorded under s. 122(6) CPC and
nothing more could not be construed as an inducement, threat or promise to make that
statement
- in fact, results would have allowed him to better make his decision as to what to say

- similarly, the act of showing the accused the results of his polygraph test per se prior
to recording his statement would also not render his statement inadmissible: Siew Yit
Beng v PP
o accused’s s. 122(6) statement can therefore be admitted as evidence of his
failure to mention a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time he
could reasonably have been expected to mention when so charged or informed
and thereby enabling the court to draw such inferences as appear proper:
Tsang Yuk Chung

a) Self-perceived inducements

- Sufficient inducement?
- Subj and obj. here subjectively thought that induced or threatened but conduct may not
be objectively TIP. Therefore fail 1st limbs.

44
- Lu Lai Heng v PP [1994] 2 SLR 251
o TJ held that A’s statement was inadmissible as he had made it to keep his mother
from being charged for an offence. Prosecution appealed
o Held: From the evidence, no one in authority had held out to A that his mother
would not be arrested or would be set free if he made the statement and the
threat was really A’s self-perceived impression which could not operate as an
inducement.
- Chai Chien Wen Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25
o Held: Lu Lai Heng applied – self perceived inducement cannot in law amount
to an inducement.
o Here, it was that A thought that he’d been told that officers would help ‘take the
rope off his neck’ if he co-operated in giving statement.
- Loh Kim Cheng v PP [1998] 2 SLR 315
o • put in fear when saw co-accused being manhandled, assaulted and handcuffed
during arrest; so scared had urinated in his pants
o but nth happened to him – treated nicely. Condct of officers handling him do not
amt to threat to HIM, even though he self perceived such.
o Not sufficient to amt to TIP
o Facts: The appellant was convicted and sentenced to death on a charge of
trafficking by having in his possession for the purpose of trafficking not less
than 32.31g of diamorphine.
o Held: Turning now to the admission of the oral statements the appellant’s
evidence was that neither ASP Chew nor any of the narcotics officers involved
in his arrest had treated him violently or had offered any inducement; or made
any threat or promise as a consequence of which he had given the answers he
did give to ASP Chew’s questions.
o His evidence was that he was put in fear when he witnessed Lee being arrested.
The arresting officers, and there was several of them, had manhandled Lee,
assaulted Lee, some had even kicked Lee when he was down before he was
handcuffed. If this was what the arresting officers would do to Lee in the full
glare of public view, he wondered what they would do to him when they had got
him to the solitude of his flat where they were going to take him. The mere
thought had frightened him to such an extent that he had urinated in his pants.
His fear was so great that his will collapsed and he meekly answered the
questions put to him by ASP Chew. In fact no visible bruises were found on
Lee. It was a case of restraining a person fleeing from arrest and resisting it
violently.
o Based on this evidence defence counsel made an esoteric but specious
argument, which he also repeated before us. The learned judge saw no merit in
this argument and duly admitted the oral statements in evidence. As this court
said in Lu Lai Heng v PP [1994] 2 SLR 251 a self-perceived inducement
cannot in law amount to an inducement, threat or promise within the meaning of
Section 24 of the EA or Section 122(5) of the CPC.
o The words in both provisions are clear; the inducement, threat or promise must
move from a person in authority. Accordingly the learned judge rightly admitted
the oral statements in evidence pursuant to Section 24 of the Evidence Act.

45
- Gulam v PP [1999] 2 SLR 185
o proximity of the arresting team officers; officers looked fierce and threatening
o self perceived to accused; obj no TIP therefore stataement admissible
o Facts: As one of the grounds on which statement was said to be involuntary, A
claimed that he had been threatened by the close proximity of the CNB arresting
team. In relation to another s.121 statement relied on by P, A claimed that his
previous CS, charge and notice of warning were first read to him. A contended
this made statement involuntary as he was under mistaken belief that he had to
co-operate to avoid AI being drawn vs. him.
o Held (Yong CJ):
o This could not amount to a threat within the meaning of s.24 EA. If all the
officers did was to look fierce and threatening, that was obviously insufficient to
amount to a threat or threats which would render any subsequent confession
involuntary.
o Any purported inducement that A perceived was thus self-perceived and its trite
law that this cannot in law amount to an inducement – Lu Lai Heng,
o In relation to the second statement, reading it would have helped refresh A’s
memory and assisted him in making a decision as to what to say. A may have
thought that the warning for the CS made the day previously continued to
operate in relation to the s.121 statement but if there was any such
misapprehension, it was self-induced and would be insufficient to amount to an
inducement rendering the statement involuntary.
o Fear caused by the overhanging thought of the death penalty also did not render
statement involuntary as it had been caused by the legitimate explanation of a
charge to A.

b) effect of drug influence/withdrawal ?

 •yes but accused must show that he was in state of near-delirium, such that mind did
not go with the making of the statement
 difficult threshold for accused to prove

Garnam Singh v PP [1994] 2 SLR 243

 Facts: A claimed that withdrawal symptoms from use of drugs after his arrest affected
his medical and physiological condition to an extent that the statements he made were
involuntary.
 Held (Karthigesu JA):
- Statements ≠ involuntary.
- In order for the effects of drug withdrawal to affect the drug user’s medical and
psychological condition to render any statement he makes involuntary, “he must
be in a state of near delirium, that is to say, that his mind did not go with the
statements he was making.” This was not the case here.
- Trial J was correct in concluding that A was not suffering from any drug
withdrawal symptoms which sapped his free will when he made the statements.

46
PP v Dahalan bin Ladaewa [1996] 1 SLR 783
- Facts: The accused was charged with the trafficking of more than 15g of diamorphine.
It was the testimony of the arresting officer that the accused looked as if he was under
the influence of drugs at the time of arrest.
- Held: acquitting the accused of the original charge and convicting him on an amended
charge of trafficking in less than 15g but more than 10g of diamorphine:
o An oral statement of an accused person was not inadmissible merely because of
non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 121 of the CPC.
There was, however, good reason why the legislature had, in Section 121, spelt
out the manner in which statements were to be recorded. Similarly, there was
good reason why the Commissioner of Police under powers given to him under
Section 55 of the Police Force Act issued PGO specifying in lucid detail the
manner in which pocket books were to be kept. The fact that Section 122(5)
provided that oral statements were admissible in evidence should not be treated
as licence for police officers to ignore the PGO and the provisions of Section
121 and render these safeguards meaningless. PP v Mazlan bin Maidun &
Anor [1993] 1 SLR 512 followed.
o In the light of all the evidence, the accused was a drug addict and had in fact
consumed heroin and erimin the morning of the interview. The accused’s
evidence that he had little or no recall of what transpired between him and Sgt
Lai was, therefore, accepted. Since the statement was recorded at a time when
the effect of the erimin was at peak, there was more than a reasonable doubt that
the accused’s mind did not go with the statements he was making when he was
interviewed by Sgt Lai. Garnam Singh v PP [1994] 2 SLR 243 and R v Miller
[1986] 1 WLR 1191 distinguished.
o The fact that the accused, at the time that Sgt Lai interviewed him, was not in a
fit state to be interviewed was by itself sufficient for the court to rule the
statement inadmissible. The absence of a Malay interpreter and the irregularities
in the way Sgt Lai kept a record of what the accused said, in addition, made it
unsafe to admit in evidence what the accused had allegedly told Sgt Lai. In the
exercise of the court’s discretion, therefore, the alleged statement was not
admitted. Kong Weng Chong & Ors v PP [1994] 1 SLR 34 followed; Fung
Yuk Shing v PP [1993] 3 SLR 421 distinguished.

Gulam v PP [1999] 2 SLR 181

- Facts: A claimed that that he had been under the influence of ‘Ice’ when he made the
confession, as shown by the positive traces from the urine samples provided by him
after being arrested.
- Held (Yong CJ):
o Mere fact that A was suffering from drug withdrawal symptoms when statement
made does not render it involuntary unless he was in a state of near delirium,
such that his mind did not go with the statement he was making (Garnam
Singh, Dahalan bin Ladaewa)
o On the facts, there was no evidence that A was anywhere in a state of near
delirium. In fact, the evidence of the officers was that A appeared to understand
the questions asked.

47
Chua Poh Kiat Anthony v PP [1998] 2 SLR 713
- Facts: P claimed he was high on drugs when he gave statement and could not
remember what he had said.
- Held (Yong CJ):
o This claim was unfounded. Although AP’s urine sample showed traces of
amphetamine, no evidence to suggest that he was so drugged or intoxicated to
be incoherent.
o Recording officer testified that when statement recorded, AP appeared normal
and his sentences were coherent. He thus could not have been in such a state
that his mind did not go with the statement made. Issue was whther will sapped
as result of addicton and withdrawl fr drugs such tt statement was involuntary.

c) Interrogation and cross-examination

- earlier cases were more critical of cross-examination techniques being used in

recording of statements

R v Lim Ah Seng [1932] MLJ 12

R v Santokh Singh [1933] MLJ 178

- Facts: The accused when taken before a magistrate was asked, "Do you want to make a
statement yourself?" He answered, "No, I will answer any questions". Thereafter the
magistrate took a statement from him. It was a murder case. Some idiot stabbed some
idiot. It’s about time someone got whacked as so far, only got drug cases.
- Held:
o That the character of the statement as a voluntary statement was not lost because
it was made in the process of question and answer.
o Held also, that in taking a confession questions may be asked by the Confessor
so long as there is no pressure threat or inducement.
o Held further, that questions asked by way of cross-examination are
inadmissible.
o On the first two points Rex v Limb Ah Seng 1931 SSLR 178 not followed. On
the third point Rex v Lim Ah Seng followed.
o The ruling in Rex v Lim Ah Seng that "a statement or confession is not made
voluntarily unless it is volunteered" disapproved of, following Barindra Kumar
Ghose v Emperor , 1909-37 Calcutta at p 514 and The King v Best , [1909] 1
KB 692.

Ong Hock v R [1939] MLJ 232

 modern view is that robust interrogation, within reasonable limits, is an essential and
integral part of police investigation
o : - common sense.
 But within limits. – eg tactics used on ex criminal shld not be the same as that for 12 yr
old shoplifter! Look at facts

48
Sim Ah Cheoh v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 353 – recording of 122.6 statement
- usually for recording of 122.6 statement no qns will be asked – will let accusd say
whatever he wnts to say in defence to charge, unlike long statement – need to qn him
and confront his illogicities etc.
- ‘It was no part of the duty of the recorder of a s 122(6) statement to ask the accused any
question in relation to what he said. Any cross-examination conducted by a recording
officer was improper. Any other form of questioning, unless it was absolutely
necessary, was wholly inadvisable and was to be discouraged.
- However, cross-examination per se did not render the statement inadmissible, if it was
otherwise admissible.
- There are certain qns that HAVE to be asked.- as long as u write down the qn and
answer. Eg who was Ah Tan? NOT ‘who was around?’ can only ask qns to clarify what
he said in the 122.6 statement. Purpose of statement is for accused to state defence, so
must let him have freehand. If stop him, may have effect on s123 later – drawing on
adverse inference. Don’t want to compromise that. But must clarify in order to let
statement make sense.)
- The admissibility of a statement recorded under s 122(6) was not governed by that
section but, in the case where a statement was made to a police officer, was governed
by s 122(5) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68), and in the case of a statement
made to a narcotics officer, by the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1990 Ed).
- Cross-examination could in certain circumstances render the statement or answers to
the question inadmissible, if the questioning was so vigorous or prolonged that it
became oppressive.’

Lau Song Seng v PP [1998] 1 SLR 663

- Facts: As charged and convicted of trafficking and criminal conspiracy to convict. DPP
relied on statements of 2nd A made to CNB that incriminated the rest. At trial, 2nd A
claimed statements involuntary but found to be voluntary after VD. On appeal, one
contention was that TJ erred in admitting statements interviewing officer had adopted
a cross-x style of interrogation rather than allowing 2nd A to speak freely (said he was
interrupted repeatedly when giving evidence, interviewing officer threw pen on table,
offered 2nd P his own version of events and asked if it was correct.) 2nd A asserted that
certain incriminating parts of statements not his own but those of interviewing officer.
- Held (Karthigesu JA):
o Essence of 2nd A’s complaint was that style of interview was not that he was
given free reign to say what he wished but that he was cross-x by PO (thus the
allegation that the statement consisted of PO’s words but not his).
o However, mere fact that interviewing officer elicits statement by cross-x ≠
sufficient grounds to render the statement involuntary under s.24 EA.
o This has been considered in a number of cases – Sim Ah Cheoh v. PP affirmed.
This principle affirmed in Seow Choon Meng v. PP where it was held that it’s a
question of fact whether questioning was oppressive and whether person’s will
crumbled such that he speaks when he’d otherwise have remained silent.

Yeo See How v PP [1997] 2 SLR 390

49
- Facts: The appellant was convicted for trafficking in diamorphine. The appellant
contended that the statement was involuntary, as inducements in the form of offers of
cigarettes, family visits and leniency were held out; there was also oppression for the
appellant had felt cold, had gastric pain and was hungry. It was contended that the
inducements were shown by the fact that his requests for cigarettes and family visits
were granted after the statement had been made. Furthermore, the recording of the
statement ought not have been done in a question and answer style, without the
questions being recorded. Such questioning amounted to cross-examination.
- Held: dismissing the appeal:
o The appellant failed to raise a reasonable doubt that the statement was
involuntary. The judge was correct in finding that he did not make the statement
in order to obtain cigarettes or a family visit, that the investigating officer gave
no indication that he could have obtained leniency for the appellant and that the
accedence to the appellant’s requests was not made pursuant to any inducement
or promise.
o There was no oppression. The appellant had only suffered some minor
discomfort. There was no necessity for interrogators to remove all discomfort
and what discomfort there was did not render the statement involuntary. The
recording of the statement in a question and answer format without the
questions being recorded did not affect its admissibility. Nor did the pace of
questioning amount to a form of cross-examination, which, although improper,
would not have been inadmissible unless it amounted to oppression, which it did
not in this case; Panya Martmontree v PP [1995] 3 SLR 341 followed.

Seow Choon Meng v PP [1994] 2 SLR 853

- robust interrogation is an essential and integral aspect of the police investigation.
Whether or not the questioning amounts to oppressive conduct is a question of fact to
be decided in the circumstances, including the character of the accused.
- Facts: The appellant was convicted of rape. A voir dire was held for the admissibility
of 3 written statement but not the oral statements (which was made at about the same
time).
- Held: The learned judicial commissioner was wrong in holding that the voluntariness
of the oral statements was not in issue just because there was a denial that the oral
statements had in fact been made. The oral statements had allegedly been made during
the same time frame as the three written statements, which admissibility was objected
to, and it could not be said that the oral statements, in these circumstances, were not
subject to the same objections.
- (Karthigesu JA):
o Court’s approach to determining whether there is oppression should not clog the
proper exercise of the police’s investigative function (DPP v. Ping Lin).
o In our view, robust interrogation is an essential and integral aspect of police
investigation.
o “Whether the questioning of the person interrogated has been oppressive and
whether his will has crumbled such that he speaks when he would have
otherwise remained silent is basically a question of fact.” As was said by Sachs
J in R v Priestly: What may be oppressive as regards a child, an invalid or an

50
 old man or somebody inexperienced in the ways of this world may turn out not
to be oppressive when one finds that the accused person is of a tough character
and an experienced man of the world”.
- Comments: Although the admission of the appellant’s oral statements was irregular,
the proceedings were not vitiated because the correct and proper admission in evidence
of the three written statements, together with the appellant’s election to remain silent
when he was called upon to enter his defence, justified his conviction.

Chua Beow Huat v PP [1970] 2 MLJ 329

6. TIP having reference to the charge

 is there any justification for distinguishing between TIPs which have reference to the
charge and TIPs which do not?
o eg : if you co-operate, we will reduce the charge as opposed to if you co-
operate, we will let you call your wife
 reduce charge – refernce to charge
 call wife – not reference to charge
 Arguably, both forms of TIPs may render the confession obtained unreliable and hence,
both TIPs should make the confession inadmissible.
 In UK, Harz and Powers [1967] 1 AC 760 held that this requirement was unnecessary
and irrelevant at common law
 for local position, see :
o Poh Kay Keong v PP [1996] 1 SLR 209 – “I will charge ur sister and brother in
law for drugs found in ur house if u don’t admit.” Held tt this ws an inducement
having ref to charge because made to obtain confession relevant to charge in qn
– want him to admit to charge so this was reference ot the charge
 Facts: Admissibility of s.121 statement made by A charged for drug
consumption challenged on the basis of involuntariness. Allegedly told
by IO that if he was `still like that`, he had no choice but to charge A’s
brother and sister-in-law as the owners of the flat (in which drugs
found), and recommend that the flat be confiscated. The investigating
officer was also alleged to have said: `your key cannot open the door
why you scared? Won’t get hanged. You give me a good statement. I
know what to do.` TJ held that s.24 N/A. where confession made to save
3P as this was not a TIP having reference to the charge. Appeal vs.
conviction.
 Held (Yong CJ): Appeal allowed.
• Since purpose of s.24 EA is to ensure reliability of a confession,
s.24 should be given a purposive interpretation. A TIP thus has
reference to a charge if it was made to obtain a confession
relevant or relating to the charge. (e.g threat to beat up A or A’s
brother unless ‘good statement’ given)
• Any ‘advantage’…or ‘evil’ had ‘reference to the proceedings’ if
it was gained/ avoided by making of a statement relevant or
relating to the charge vs. A. (Example: If A threatened with

51
 physical assault (evil) and told that he can avoid assault if he
confesses)
• Thus, police comments about charging brother and sister-in-law
were TIP having reference to the charge on purposive
interpretation.
• 2nd part of comments fell squarely within s.24 as inducement
itself had reference to the charge.
 Comments: Very wide approach taken, so in most cases, practically the
same result is reached as UK position.
o Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25
 The trial judge was not convinced that DSP Vijakumar and SS/Sgt Wong
had told the first accused that they would help take the rope off his neck.
As this was a finding of fact, which would not be disturbed, it followed
that the purported inducement was self-perceived, and a self-perceived
inducement cannot in law amount to an inducement; Lu Lai Heng v PP
[1994] 2 SLR 251 followed.
 In any event a knock on the head in the manner described by the first
accused did not constitute sufficient duress, nor could a call to co-
operate be regarded as a threat or inducement even if it was
accompanied, as in this case, by a remark that the first accused would be
allowed to call his wife if he cooperated.
 This was not a ‘promise having reference to the charge’ against the first
accused even if a liberal interpretation was given to the notion of
‘having reference to the charge’

7. TIP proceeding from ‘person in authority’

• no statutory definition of `person in authority’
• Rationale for such requirement? Disciplinary principle? Reliability principle?

Deokinanan v The Queen [1969] 1 AC 20

• Facts: A suspected to be connected with the deaths of several people and stealing some
money. Police sent informant, whom A regarded as his good friend, to talk to A when he
was in the lockup. A told informant how to find the money as well as how it was to be
used. He also confessed he had killed the various deceased and was charged.
Prosecution relied on the confession made to his friend but A contended that it was not
voluntary and that he’d been induced to confess by a promise held out by a person in
authority.
• Held: Confession was admissible.
- Per Viscount Dilhorne: Evidence showed that A treated informant as a friend
and there was no compulsion to reveal how the deceased met their deaths. The
confession was thus free and voluntary. (Pro-reliability principle)
- Further, even if a promise by the informant had induced the confession, the
informant could not have been regarded by A as a person in authority.
- The informant was only a possible PW and this did not make him a person in
authority. From the evidence, A clearly did not regard informant as someone

52
 close to the police and informant could not have been, to A, someone who could
influence police investigation by the course of his position – otherwise, he
would not have asked informant to commit a felony by instructing him how to
use the stolen money.
- Neither is a person who can fulfil the promise made necessarily a person in
authority…the fact that a person can fulfil the promise may show the promise
was a real inducement but its not a definition of ‘person in authority’.
- Cited Bain J in R v. Todd…a person in authority is “anyone who has authority
or control over the accused, or over the proceedings or the prosecution against
him.”
- However, there is a similar risk the confession may not be true if induced by a
promise held out by a person not in authority, e.g. if such person offers A a
bribe. (Pro-disciplinary principle).

Re Lee Kim Ching [1974] 2 MLJ 44

- Facts: One Lee Kim Ching a juvenile was charged under Section 380 of the Penal
Code with committing theft of two gold rings. In the court of the trial one of the
prosecution witnesses was going to rectify about an admission made to her by the
offender. The President of the Juvenile Court ruled that the admission by the offender to
prosecution witness was inadmissible. The offender was acquitted and discharged
without defence being called. The President of the Juvenile Court subsequently
forwarded the case record to the High Court with a view to revision.
- Held:
o (1) Under Section 24 of the Evidence Act a confession is irrelevant only if it had
been caused in inducement, threat or promise proceeding from a person in
authority and since the prosecution witness in question was not a person in
authority in relation to the offender Section 24 did not apply in this case;
o (2) Under Section 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code no finding or order made
by a lower court is to be reversed or altered on account of improper rejection of
evidence unless such improper rejection has occasioned a failure of justice. In
the present case the rejection of the offender’s admission had occasioned a
failure of justice in that if the admission had been admitted the court would
probably have found the offender guilty instead of acquitting her;
o (3) In this case the offender should be discharged, such discharge not amounting
to an acquittal, so that the prosecution can bring fresh proceedings against the
offender if it wishes to do so.

Persons in authority:
 Person in authority could be a person at work, security personnel at buildings or even a
psychiatrist on duty.
 Investigating Officer is one such person.
 Psychiatrists who will assess mental state of accused person alkso person with authority
– if threatens, then x admissible
 Superiors in employment context
 Lay persons entitled to enforce law

53
 o If from person with no power to interfere with matter then not reasonable for
accused to suppose that he will benefit fr the confession. Ie must see whether
person was in power to influence the charge
o : - facts of case
 interpreter – as far as accused concerned, he is also part of the ‘govt’ so accusd may
also feel threatened. Therefore person in authority

 Can a person be ostensibly clothed with such authority? If so, under what
circumstances ?

See R v Cleary (1963) 48 Cr. App Rep 116

Aziz bin Mohamad Din v PP [1996] 5 MLJ 473

- Facts: The accused was charged and convicted under s 376 of the Penal Code (FMS
Cap 45) for rape of an under aged girl on 31 January 1995 at a flat in Malacca.
- Held:
o In order to attract the prohibition contained in Section 113 of CPC the threat,
inducement or promise must have been made by a person in authority, giving
rise to a decision by the accused actuated by fear of prejudice or hope of reward.
o The accused person’s cautioned statement in this case was not given under
oppressive circumstances and it was properly recorded, not as a result of cross-
examination by the recording officer.
o However the advice to admit, made by the accused person’s father to the
accused, was in the presence of the arresting officers. In such a situation, a
person not in authority can be considered as the agent of the person in authority
or said to be clothed with that authority.
o The fact that the words used were advisory in nature does not weaken their
effect, as even the gentlest threat would taint a confession. The cautioned
statement was thus not voluntarily made and it should be excluded. Re Lee Kim
Ching [1974] 2 MLJ 44 , R v Cleary (1963) 48 Cr App R 116 and R v AB
(1986) 26 CCC (3d) 17 followed.

8. Statutory obligation to answer

- Will telling the witness that he has a statutory obligation to answer questions amount to
TIP?
- Section 27 PCA – witness bound to tell truth when asked qns by special investigators.
So this does not amt to threat when officers say he is bound to tell the truth
- In See Harz and Powers [1967] 1 AC 760, Lord Reid held that if statute imposed such
a duty, suspect would be bound to answer whether the answer would incriminate him
and could be prosecuted for failing to comply with the demand. Some statutes would
provide for admissibility of incriminating statements but if this was not provided for,
the question of admissibility must depend on the proper construction of the particular
statute.
- Tang Tuck Wah v PP [1990] SLR 412 - s.26 Prevention of Corruption Act
o Facts: A was investigated by CPIB on a suspicion of corruption and convicted.
On appeal, A contended that statement recorded by CPIB officer should not

54
 have been admitted in evidence at trial, inter alia, A’s attention had been
drawn to s.26 Prevention of Corruption Act (which specified that A was
“legally bound to give such information” as required under the section) and this
made the statement given involuntary.
o Held (Sinnathuray J):
o Having regard to the express wording of s.26 PCA, the mere fact that it was
brought to A’s attention by showing it to him does not import a threat or
inducement rendering A’s statement inadmissible. R v. Harz & Power
approved.

EFFECT OF AMENDED CHARGES ON SECTION 122(6) STATEMENT

- PP v Theo Teo Leng:
• original charge involved one of trafficking with common intention, whereas the
final charge the accused faced before the court was trafficking alone
• High Court was of the view that the argument that the accused might had been
misled would not be as strong, since in both instances, the charge against him was
essentially the same
• Where the differences would be far more material, care must be taken before such
statements were taken as evidence
- Yeo Choon Huat v PP:
• Charge notified to appellant when he made the statement was different from
which he faced at trial
• Main differences lay in that the charge notified to the appellant when he made the
statement referred to the gross weight of granular substances found (6,882g)
whereas the charge he faced all the trial referred to the nett weight of (81.89g)
• Also the charge was one of “trafficking” whereas the charge notified to the
appellant has been one of “trafficking by transporting”
• Court of Appeal was of the view that it was irrelevant, because the cautioned
statement was admitted so that the statements contained therein could be used to
impeach the credit of the appellant under s. 147 and 157 EA, and not for the
purpose of drawing an adverse inference under s. 123(1) CPC from the appellant’s
failure to mention particular facts in response to the charge
• Court also thought that there was no material differences between the two
charges; the charge the appellant faced at trial was in substance the same as that
notified to him when the cautioned statement was taken

OPPRESSION

 TIP – does not include oppression

o This is a common law concept under section 76(8) police and criminal act –
defn of oppression here 0 torture, inhumane or degradg treatment and use of
threat or violence whether amtg to torture nor not
 • Oppression developed in UK in 1960s and 1970s to deal with subtler forms and less
direct influences which did not amount to threats, inducement or promises

55
 o • sapping of free will, exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh or
wrong manner, unjust or cruel treatment, or the imposition of unreasonable or
unjust burdens
o eg recording when waking accused up fr sleep.

Must there be impropriety in the circumstances ?

 R v Prager [1972] 1 WLR 260
o Oppressive questioning may be described as questioning which by its nature,
duration or other attendant circumstances, including the fact of custody, excites
hopes or fears or so affects the mind of the person being interrogated that his
will crumbles and he speaks when otherwise he would have remained silent. –
questioning in circumstances which tended to sap and did sap the free will of
the person interrogated (Edmund-Davies LJ).
 R v Priestly (1965) 51 Cr.App.R.1
o Oppression is conduct of interrogators which “tends to sap and has sapped, that
free will which must exist before a confession is voluntary”.
o Whether there is oppression depends on many elements…includes things like
length of time of individual periods of questioning, whether proper refreshment
given, characteristics of maker of statement (Sachs J).
 R v Fulling [1987] Q.B. 426
o “Oppression” under the PACE Act should be given its ordinary dictionary
meaning – exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh, or wrongful
manner; unjust or cruel treatment of subjects, inferiors etc.; the imposition of
unreasonable or unjust burdens.
o Most likely that such oppression would entail some impropriety on the part of
the interrogator (Lord Lane CJ)

How does oppression tie with the rubric of the voluntariness rule?
- Beh Chai Hock v PP [1996] 3 SLR 495
o Held (Yong CJ): A confession may be inadmissible it was obtained under
oppression, a development of the CL, which strictly speaking, does not fall
under the rubric of voluntariness.
- Gulam v PP [1999] 2 SLR 181
o Held (Yong CJ): Well settled that the CL concept of involuntariness by
oppression in R v. Prager has been subsumed under s.24 EA.
- PP v Law Say Teck [1971] 1 MLJ 199
- PP v Dahalan bin Ladaewa [1996] 1 SLR 783:
o Agreement with DPP that oppression is an instance of inducement/ threat –
deprivation of food, prolonged interrogation – attempts to induce person to
confess.

Conduct Of A Recording Officer

- R v Beales:
• Accused was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm
• Alleged victim was a two-year old child

56
 • Accused eventually admitted inter alia swinging the child upside down by the
ankles
• However he maintained throughout that he had no recollection of so doing
• Recording officer’s evidence was that he had not spoken to the child’s mother nor
anyone else involved in the investigations and therefore the interview was
considered solely on the basis of what was contained in the mother’s statement
• Was submitted that the Crown were unable to discharge the burden as generally
the demeanor of the interviewing officer and the whole tenor of the interview was
to compel the accused to make a confession by distorting the state of evidence
against him
• officer falsely told the accused in forceful terms on more than one occasion that in
addition to the mother, the child himself was saying that the accused had swung
him by his ankles;
• told accused that a yellow bruise on the child’s shoulder was caused “last night”
although the officer had no information to that effect;
• officer repeatedly misrepresented in his questioning that the accused had drunk
five pints of lager although the accused had clearly stated that at least two of those
were shandies
• was held that the interview would be excluded on the grounds that it “stepped into
the realm” of oppression and albeit that the oppression was not so serious, the
officer here had deliberately misstated the evidence in order to bring pressure to
bear on the accused
- PP v Metassan:
• Prolonged and unlawful detention of the appellant coupled with the rigours of the
‘special procedure’ and his isolation for many weeks from family or other friendly
contacts was oppressive
- Lu Lai Heng v PP:
• Self-perceived inducement cannot in law amount to an inducement or promise
- PP v Vathumalai a/l Mahalingam:
• was highly undesirable for a recording officer to be aware of the background of
the accused lest it might affect his objectivity
• knowledge and interest in the case would mitigate any objectivity he had as a
recording officer
- R v Galloway:
• before the statement was recorded on videotape the accused was interviewed for
approximately an hour and a half by the investigating officer, at the end of which
the accused was formally cautioned and advised of her rights
• officer kept no record or notes of what was said in the preliminary discussion
before the videotaped interview began, and his recollection of what was said was
uncertain
• accused complained that the officer had been intimidating, overbearing
• held that the issue was whether the treatment of the accused was oppressive or
unfair in all the circumstances

57
 • she should have been cautioned and given New Zealand Bill of Rights Act advice
at the outset
• Crown fell well short of discharging the onus on it to show that the conduct of the
officer was not unfair
• Court concluded that the evidence should be excluded
• Accused was vulnerable and had been taken advantage of by a prolonged wearing
down process until she made a series of admissions

Systematic Interrogation

Dato Mokhtar v PP [1983] 2 MLJ 232

- Facts: A was charged with murder of Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly along
with several others. A was convicted but successfully appealed on the ground that it
would be wholly unsafe to treat his cautioned statement (in which he implicated himself
and which was the only evidence against him) as voluntary. A contended, inter alia,
that he was subjected to generally inhuman/ degrading treatment, was deprived of
regular sleep + nourishment and prevented from performing his prayers.
- Held (Abdoolcader FJ):
o Long hours and odd hours of interrogation stated in the police station diaries
would appear to be suggestive of oppression within Sach J’s definition in R v.
Priestly.
o Deprivation of prayer time was also a factor to be considered.
o “as to long hours and odd hours of interrogation … need hardly remind those
involved in the interrogation of witnesses and accused persons that any
methods adopted in the process outside accepted norms and standards must be
able to withstand the test of strict crucial scrutiny”

Seow Choon Meng [1994] 2 SLR 853

- Held (Karthigesu JA): Oppression in relation to the admissibility of statements made
by A during police investigation relates to methods and manner of interrogation
preparatory to and during the making of statements.
- Whether the questioning of a person interrogated has been oppressive or whether his
will has crumbled such that he speaks when he would not have done so otherwise is
basically a question of fact.
- As contemplated in R v. Priestley, what may be oppressive to a child, invalid or old
man might not be oppressive when the accused is a tough character and an experienced
man of the world. (Character of A is relevant in considering whether oppression
operative).

Yusof bin A Samad v PP:

- Persistent questioning, or even robust interrogation was necessary to the police
process as well as for investigations by CPIB and did not, without more, amount
objectively to oppression
- ‘persistent questioning in a rough voice’ did not constitute a threat or oppression

Cross-Examination Conducted By Recording Officers

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- Sim Ah Cheoh & others v PP:
• Cross-examination conducted by a recording officer in the statement taken from
the accused under s. 122(6) CPC was ‘improper’
- Yeo See How v PP:
• Pace of questioning could not be described as cross-examination as the
questioning was not at a frantic pace, since there were pauses because of
interpretation

Concept of oppression as an exclusionary rule adopted in Singapore

 BUT question of fact in every case
 judicial discretion to exclude relevant evidence if the reception would operate
unfairly against an accused has been acknowledged in Singapore: Cheng Swee Tiang
v PP

Sim Ah Cheoh [1991] 1 SLR 150

- Court looked at the facts to decide that the cross-x by officer recording CS was not so
vigorous or prolonged as to amount to oppression.

Tan Boon Tan [1990] 2 MLJ 466

- Facts: A not given food/ drink from the time of his arrest at 3.40 pm to about 1 am
the following morning (about 9 hours). He was ∴ very tired and hungry and was in a
daze when the statement was given. No food or drink was given to the accused who
sought to show the circumstances in which he made the statement were so oppressive
that his will was sapped or broken with the result that the statement was not one made
on his own free will. His arrest at about 3:30 to 4 o’clock in the afternoon to about
1:00 am in the following morning, he was not given any food or drink at all
- He was tired, hungry, in a daze and in a state of confusion
- It was not disputed that no food or drink was given
- Held (LP Thean J):
o Officers were highly inconsiderate not to provide A with food and drink and it is
accepted that A was, at the material time, tired, hungry and thirsty. He was also
under great stress he was in custody and confronted with a charge of drug
trafficking.
- They saw no reason why the accused should not have been provided
with food or drink
- Officers’ explanation was that if food was offered, he accused might
say that an inducement was offered
- Court was not impressed with that answer
- They accepted that the accused was tired, hungry and thirsty
- He was also under great stress having regard to the fact that he was in
custody and confronted with a charge
o However, A was not in such a state of shock, exhaustion or fatigue that he had
no will to resist making any statement he did not wish to make.
o Doctor who saw A after statement made said that A was alert and interpreter
said A looked normal. Statement voluntary. (Hence, medical expert evidence
very useful!) This conclusion was supported by medical evidence

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PP v Ramasamy a/l Sebastian:
- Allegations were made by the Accused that the interpreter had told him “you better
tell the truth”
- Though the court was aware that there were dome cases which held that (above)
utterances could amount to a threat or inducement, it observed that this utterance was
made in the course of recording the statement from the Accused
- Court did not think that such words used in the circumstances of the case were
sufficient to suggest to the Accused that he was going to gain any advantage by giving
that statement

PP v Lim Kian Tat [1990] 3 MLJ 154

- Facts: A faced murder charge and prosecution sought to rely on several statements
taken from A. One of the statements had been taken during 18 hour interrogation (only
1 hour break given). Statement was also taken during 4th successive night in which A
did not have sufficient sleep.
- Held:
o Ct was satisfied that statement made in circumstances where there was
oppression and accordingly did not admit the statement.

Fung Yuk Shing [1993] 3 SLR 421

- accused arrested when landed in sg fr HK with drugs strapped on his body. Arrested at
checkpt at change. CNB officers swung into action and by time finished investigating,
eleven at night, nt givn lunch. Ounsel argd tt oppressive because denied lunch. Court
held that he was given lunch on the plane. Also, IO did not have lunch! A lot of work to
do. He was given lunch at 11pm. This was not oppression
- Facts: The appellant was charged with importing into Singapore on 21 November 1990
2,718g of diamorphine, an offence under Section 7 and punishable under Section 33 of
the Misuse of Drugs Act. Following his arrest at Changi International Airport, the
customs officer who had arrested him questioned him and took down his answers on a
piece of paper. The officer transcribed these notes into his pocket book the next day.
Certified copies of the pocket book entries were subsequently admitted in evidence at
the trial of the appellant, but the original piece of paper on which the officer had first
made his notes was not produced. On appeal the appellant contended that the omission
to produce the original notes had deprived him of a fair trial in the court below.
- Held: Dismissing the appeal:
o The omission to produce at trial the original piece of paper on which the
customs officer had made his notes did not in any way deprive the appellant of a
fair trial. Production of the original piece of paper would have served no real
purpose since the appellant had never seen the paper nor had he signed it.
o Moreover, the officer was available at trial for cross-examination as regards his
interrogation of the appellant and the results of that interrogation, whilst the
appellant also gave evidence on these matters contradicting the officer’s
evidence.

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 o Only after observing both the appellant and the customs officer in the witness
stand did the judicial commissioner pronounce himself satisfied as to the
veracity and credibility of the officer’s testimony as regards his interrogation of
the appellant. In any event, the judicial commissioner had not relied on the
evidence of the officer’s pocket book entries in coming to his decision.
o The decision to reject the defence of duress advanced by the appellant was made
on the basis that the appellant’s own evidence was insufficient to found the
defence.
- Comments:
o In commenting on the decision in the court below to disallow the admission of
the appellant’s Section 122(6) statement recorded by the narcotics officer in
charge of investigations, the Court of Appeal stated the view that it would be
unrealistic to take the sweeping stand that every failure to offer an accused
sustenance necessarily constituted a `threat` or `inducement` of such gravity as
to automatically render any statement made by the accused involuntary within
the terms of Section 122(6) of the CPC.
o Various factors must be considered: for example, whether the omission was
deliberate, how long the accused had gone without sustenance, etc. In the
present case, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, it did not appear
that the omission to offer the appellant sustenance was so serious as to have
caused his will to be completely overborne when he gave his statement. The
court also expressed its concern that while judges must be vigilant as to any
irregularity committed in the recording of statements from accused persons
which might render such statements involuntary, it should not be assumed that
every instance of conflicting evidence pointed ineluctably to an irregularity
suggesting involuntariness.

Kelvin Chai
- Oppression might render a confession involuntary and thus inadmissible, and
whether the accused had been subjected to oppression was a question of fact.
Whether or not there was oppression in an individual case depended upon many
elements including the length of time of any individual period of questioning, the
length of time intervening between periods of questioning, whether the accused was
given proper refreshment, and the characteristics of the person making the statement.
In this case, the allegation of oppression in respect of the first accused’s confession
failed.

Ong Seng Hwee v PP [1999] 4 SLR 181

VOIR DIRE

• Conducted when statement sought to be admitted into evidence is objected to by the

accused.
• trial-within-a trial is held and evidence is tendered by the prosecution to establish that
the statement is admissible

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• evidence usually pertains to recording procedure, medical evidence (for eg : if assault is
alleged)
• accused entitled to cross-examine prosecution witnesses
• accused can testify and call witnesses in his defence
• separate voir dires for statements of separate accused persons
• not relevant for witness statement; see tutorial muthusamy case
• voir dire is often used to determine the voluntariness of a statement made by an
accused to the police
• proper procedure for the conduct of a voir dire was laid down in Fun Seong Cheng v
PP
• prosecution must call its witnesses after which the accused may himself give evidence
and be cross-examined by the prosecution and the accused may also call other
witnesses to be examined and cross-examined
• if this procedure is not followed, then the statement sought to be admitted by the
prosecution is not proved and cannot be used to impeach the credit of the witness nor
be admitted into evidence

a) When is a voir dire necessary ?

• Ajodha v The State (1982) AC 204 – impt case.
- • note 4 categories discussed by the Privy Council
 1. when accused admits that he makes statement but raises issue tt
not vol, then trial within trial
 2. accusd claims that whatever in statement not his but he admits that
he signed – recording officer prepared statement – vd will be held
 3. accused person did not challenge vol of statement but in course of
trial court finds some evid tt there was TIP – court will hold trial
within trail
 4. accused himself categorically denies making statement, oral or
written – statement will go in here and it will merely go to weight.
No need for trail within trial
• Fun Seong Cheng v PP [1997] 3 SLR 523
- • Statement was an incomplete or inaccurate record
- inaccurate or incomplete recording does not concern whether the accused
gave the statement voluntarily
- contention did not concern whether the accused gave the statement
voluntarily
- however, if it is shown that there are inaccuracies or omissions in the
record that are material, then there should be little or no weight attached to
the statement
• cf : Beh Chai Hock v PP [1996] 3 SLR 495
- • note the distinction between admissibility and voluntariness highlighted in
Beh Chai Hock
- in all sitn where there are challenges to admiss, prudent to hold twt unless
the challenge is pure qn of law
- -> deviation fr ajodha

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 - any other type of challenge depending on facts – shld be trial within trial
- so fourth category above – currently, MAY hold trial within trial for
prudence!!!!
- Facts: TJ decided it was unnecessary to hold VD when only issue in
question was identity of the recorder of the statement.
- Held (Yong CJ):
 VD should be held whenever the admissibility of a confession was
challenged, provided the dispute over admissibility was not confined
to a pure point of law but was one which required the calling of
evidence of A and other Ws in support of or against the admissibility
of the confession.
 Voluntariness of a confession was only one aspect of admissibility.
 In this case, identity of recorder would in turn determine
admissibility and TJ should have held VD to resolve the question of
admissibility.
 Here, Ct cannot exercise curative power under s.396 CPC in respect
of improperly admitted evidence improperly admitted statement
has occasioned failure of justice. Test is whether conviction can be
sustained without that evidence. Here, statement = only substantive
piece of evidence supporting P’s case and if its excluded, nothing
else to prove A had committed offence at the close of P’s case. A
should therefore not have been called to enter defence but should
have been acquitted.
• Seow Choon Meng v PP [1994] 2 SLR 853
- • Note court’s treatment of oral and written statements when involuntariness
was alleged only in respect of some of them
- oral statement not recorded down by IO, then brought back to station and
made another statement
- judge held that since he denied making these – according to ajodha’s case,
shld not be twt for oral statement
- trial judge - voir dier held for first, second and third written statements but
not for oral statement. Admitted it.
- CA said no – all four statements given given in cont period of time,
whatever TIP subsisted for first 3 statmeants stil in operation when
fourth sttsement given. So shld be twt for all the statements.
- Facts: A convicted of rape. Evidence before trial Court consisted of oral
statements and 3 written statements. P had made oral statements to IO after
1st 2 written statements taken but before 3rd one was made. Evidence of oral
statements given by IO. A claimed that written statements involuntary and
denied making oral statements. TJ held VD in respect of written statements
and admitted them. In respect of oral statements, TJ felt VD unnecessary
because, applying categories in Ajodha, there was no question as to
voluntariness but only a question as to whether the statements were made.
On appeal, one point contended was that there should have been VD for oral
statements.
- Held (Karthigesu JA):

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 - Appeal dismissed. What had happened was that the contents of the written
statements, which had been objected to under s.122(5),were admitted in
evidence through IO’s oral testimony even before the Court had considered
the admissibility of the written statements. Clear that IO was paraphrasing
from the statements recorded before the purported date on which the oral
statements were made.
- TJ took wrong approach with regards to oral statements as these statements
allegedly made during the same time frame as the written statements which
were being objected to and it could not be said that in the same
circumstances, the oral statements were not subject to the same objections.
- This situation only arose because of the application of Ajodha – its
undesirable to lay down guidelines in that manner when all those involved
in the conduct of criminal proceedings should be always vigilant to ensure
that all kinds of statements of the nature of admissions and confessions are
not admitted in evidence without going through the tried and tested
procedures that are part of our criminal justice system – Thus, all
statements, whether written or oral, made in the course of a police
investigation must satisfy s.122(5) to be admissible.
- Thus, IO’s evidence irregular but even if its expunged, there’s still written
statements which are admissible.
• Thiruselvam s/o Nagaratnam v Public Prosecutor (2001) 2 SLR 125 - no need to
hold voir dire if witness statement – proseuciton may rcall rebuttal evid to rebut
defence tt it was under threat
- Where s 147 Evidence Act was invoked and a previous statement of a
witness – who was not the accused in the proceedings before the court –
was used to cross-examine him and to prove the existence of certain facts
stated therein, it had to be proved that the statement was made by the
witness. There was no requirement under s 147 to prove further that the
witness made the statement voluntarily. This view was reinforced by a
reading of s 147(6). However where the witness was himself the accused,
the application under s 147 was subject to s 24 of the Evidence Act and
also s 122(5) of the Criminal Prodcedure Code (Cap 68), it was necessary
to show that it was made voluntarily. If the statement was involuntary, it
was relevant to determine what weight should be accorded to it.
- current position is that a voir dire is unnecessary and procedurally incorrect when
determining the admissibility of witness’ statement( s) – Sim Bok Huat Royston v
PP [2001] 2 SLR 348

Facts

The accused police officer Sim was charged with corruptly accepting an unspecified sum
of money from Chua (an infamous moneylender) in return for using his position as an
officer to assist the latter in his affairs, under s 6(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The only issue was that of the acceptance of the gratification itself. The prosecution’s
case hinged on one Tan, who gave 2 statements to the CPIB stating that he assisted Chua

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to hand over an envelope containing cash to the accused. During the trial, Tan denied that
the events described in his statement ever took place. He allegedly concocted his
statements because one of the recording officers had conducted oppressive acts on him.
The judge then ordered a voir dire to ascertain the voluntariness of his 2 statements. The
accused was not allowed to cross-examine the recording officers during the voir dire.
After the voir dire, the judge ruled that the statements were voluntarily made and
admissible. When the main trial continued, Tan maintained that the statements were false
and made involuntarily. The recording officers also testified during the main trial. The
accused’s defence was a bare denial of the receipt of the money.

The judge convicted the accused (primarily on Tan’s previous inconsistent CPIB
statements) and sentenced him to 9 months’ imprisonment. At the appeal, the accused
argued first, that he had been prejudiced because he was not allowed to cross-examine the
recording officers during the voir dire; and secondly, that one of the statements raised
serious doubts whether the envelope in question contained cash.

Held, dismissing the appeal and enhancing the sentence:

(1) There was no statutory provision requiring that a witness’ statement to be voluntary
before it became admissible. It was thus unnecessary and procedurally incorrect for the
judge to have ordered a voir dire to determine the voluntariness of Tan’s statements. To
be admissible under s 147 of the Evidence Act, all that was required was for the
prosecution to prove that the 2 previous inconsistent statements had been made by Tan.
While the weight of a witness’ involuntary statement might be significantly reduced, it
remained admissible under s 147 which did not stipulate a requirement of voluntariness.

(2) As the prosecution’s case hinged on Tan’s statement, it was in the accused’s interest
that he be permitted to cross-examine the recorders of those statements on the
circumstances in which the recordings were made. Although the accused was not allowed
to cross-examine the recorders during the voir dire, he was not prejudiced since the
defence was subsequently allowed to cross-examine them when the main trial resumed.

(3) As to the weight to be given to the statements, the evidence revealed that the
accusation of oppressive acts could not have been anything more than Tan’s imagination.
Although the statements were only given about a year after the event and thus lacked
contemporaneity, it was unlikely that Tan’s recollection of the event in his statement
could have been eroded by the passage of time as the passing of the envelope of money
from Tan to the accused was a one-off concrete event. It was difficult to see why or how
Tan could have spun those stories concerning the passing of money together with all their
specifics and details if these events had not taken place. Tan had fully implicated himself
and there was no reason or motive for him to misrepresent the facts in his statements.
The incriminatory portions of one of the statements were clear and unambiguous for they
identified the accused as the person to whom Tan had passed the envelope of money.
Nitty-gritty details such as his knowledge of the denomination of the currency or the
exact amount contained in the envelope did not affect the main purport of the statement

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which clearly incriminated the appellant. Substantial and considerable weight should be
given to the statements for these reasons.

(4) Numerous factors contributed to the irresistible inference that the envelope
contained money. Additionally, the defence did not say that Tan had passed something
else in the envelope to the accused but had always been a complete denial of the accused
having received anything at all. Any attempt to impugn the evidence of what was
contained in the envelope did not assist the accused in his defence.

(5) The accused’s testimony was riddled with too many loopholes and ludicrous
explanations to retain any measure of credibility. The accused had clearly failed in
casting a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case.
(6) The sentence imposed by the judge was manifestly inadequate, considering the fact
that the offence in question was one which by its nature was extremely difficult to detect;
and the accused was a police inspector who should be held to higher standards.

- all witness’ statement(s) are now admissible and voluntariness of such

statement(s) goes to their weight

Yusof bin A Samad v PP [2000] 4 SLR 58

The accused (appellant) was a police corporal who was charged and convicted of 14
charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) for supplying information on the
next-of-kin of deceased persons to an undertaker. On appeal, he raised four issues. First,
he argued that the pre-trial statements he had given were not given voluntarily and should
not have been admitted. Second, even if the statements were correctly admitted, the judge
erred in his assessment of their inherent reliability and accuracy. Third, the judge erred in
his assessment of the veracity of the witnesses. And fourth, even if the accused had
supplied the relevant information to DW2, that did not constitute “a showing of favour in
relation to his principal’s affairs” as required under s 6(a) of the PCA. In relation to the
first submission, the accused alleged that he was subjected to persistent questioning and
had made the statement when he was ‘stressed and down’ and that he had made it whilst
labouring under an inducement or promise held out by the investigating officer that he
would not be prosecuted.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) Both the accused’s pre-trial statements amounted to confessions under s 17 of the
Evidence Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) (“EA”) and were therefore subject to the
voluntariness test in s 24 of the EA. As the accused person made the statements to non-
police officers, the EA governed the admissibility of the statements, and the Criminal
Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) (CPC) did not apply. The appropriate test for
determining admissibility of a statement, made by an accused person to a non-police
officer, depends on whether the statement amounts to a confession. In this case, both
statements were “confessions”, because taken as a whole and without reference to

66
extrinsic facts, they suggested the inference that the accused had corruptly received
gratification from DW2 in return for releasing relevant information.

(2) The first statement was not involuntary and was properly admitted. A statement is
considered involuntary if there was objectively a threat, inducement or promise, and the
threat, inducement or promise operated subjectively on the mind of the particular accused
through hope of escape or fear of punishment connected with the charge. There was no
evidence that oppressive cross-examination techniques had been employed.

(3) The second statement was also not involuntary and was properly admitted. The
investigating officer did not hold out any inducement or promise to the accused.

(4) The district judge was not wrong in ruling that the second statement contained the
true version of evidence. The two statements were not totally irreconcilable and although
the accused tried to retract his statements at trial, the district judge was entitled to rely on
them.

(5) The district judge did not err in his assessment of the veracity of the witnesses
although he made a procedural error in not making a ruling on the impeachment of
DW2. However, the procedural error did not occasion a failure of justice and as such, it
was appropriate for the court to overlook it.

(6) The supply of the relevant information constituted a “showing of favour” in relation
to the principal’s affairs. The accused was an ‘agent’, as defined in s 2 of the PCA, and
his act of releasing confidential information obtained in the course of his official duties
which were clearly acts in relation to the Police Force’s affairs. The accused had also
clearly shown favour to DW2. By releasing the relevant information to DW2, he was in
effect supplying DW2 with a constant flow of clients in return for a fee.

(7) The sentence passed by the district judge was not manifestly excessive in the
circumstances.

Per Yong CJ

Neither s 122(5) of the CPC, nor s 24 of the EA, applied to a statement not amounting to
a confession, made by an accused to non-police officers. There was, in fact, no statutory
provision subjecting the admissibility of such a statement to the requirement of
voluntariness. Thus if such a statement was relevant, it was prima facie admissible.
Strictly speaking, where a court was faced with a statement made by an accused person to
a non-police officer, which is relevant and admissible, and the court is certain that the
statement does not amount to a confession, a voir dire need not be conducted. However,
as a matter of prudence and good practice, a court should still conduct voir dires to
determine the voluntariness of such statements.
Loganathan – 2000 3 SLR 677 (CA case)
- Change in law

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- For accused s122 CPC statement x need when pros wishes to use statement to cross
ex him/impeach him, and follow cumbercome proced in muthusamy => no need to
show tt it is last two type of inconsistency
- Can just produce statement
- Judge after impeacehment in s157 need not make ruling at tt stage also need not make
ruling at any stage – just needs to bear credibility of accused in mind
- But on s122 statement – pt is still unclear for other statements eg CNB officer etc

b) Treatment of evidence given in voir dire

• general rule is that voir dire is considered a separate proceeding from the main trial and
therefore, evidence at voir dire is not to be used in the main trial
• witnesses may say things relevant to main trial but said during main trial. After vd,
witness will be called again to repeat what he said in main trial
• issue at voir dire is only the admissibility of the contested statement

Wong Kam Ming v R [1980] AC 247

Lim Seng Chuan v PP [1977] 1 MLJ 191 – established principle.

• Facts: The appellant was charged with the murder of a 13-year-old girl whose body
was found naked below the waist. Prosecution sought to prove by circumstantial
evidence that the appellant was the man in question there being no direct evidence. In
addition to this, the prosecution attempted to prove a cautioned statement that the
appellant had made to a police officer at the CID. As the defence objected to the
admissibility of the cautioned statement, the trial judges, who were sitting throughout
without a jury, proceeded to hear evidence to decide its admissibility, the sole issue
being whether or not the cautioned statement was made because of any threats,
inducement or promise proceeding from the police.
• These proceedings by the trial judges to decide on the admissibility of cautioned
statements as well as confessions have been termed a `trial within a trial` and it has
always been the invariable practice during a `trial within a trial` to lead only such
evidence as is material to the issue of admissibility. In this case, the practice was not
followed in that a witness one Tan Huan Piaw was called to give evidence during the
`trial within a trial` where he related a conversation he had with the appellant at the
CID on the day when the cautioned statement was made. What the appellant said to Tan
Huan Piaw was not material on the issue of the admissibility of the cautioned statement
but it was relevant evidence and prima facie admissible evidence as to the guilt of the
appellant on the murder charge because the appellant was alleged to have admitted to
Tan Huan Piaw that he was involved in the death of the girl. After the case was
concluded, the trial judges found the appellant guilty of murder and in their grounds of
judgment, it was clear that they relied on the evidence of Tan Huan Piaw on the issue of
whether or not the appellant had committed the murder of the girl.
• The question before the Court of Criminal Appeal was whether the trial judges had
erred in taking into account the evidence given by Tan Huan Piaw during the “trial
within a trial” in considering whether or not the appellant was guilty of murder as
charged.

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• Held: allowing the appeal and ordering re-trial:
- (1) Fairness to the accused, which was a fundamental principle of the
administration of criminal justice, required that the `trial within a trial` be
considered a separate or collateral proceeding as (a) evidence may be
given at a trial within a trial which was inadmissible on the charge against
the accused but may be relevant on the issue to be decided at the trial within
a trial. It would therefore be grossly unfair if the true principle was that the
evidence was before the court for all purposes; (b) conversely, evidence may
be given at the trial within a trial which may be relevant and admissible on
the charge but not relevant on the issue to be decided in the trial within a
trial and the accused or counsel may well decline to challenge such evidence
in the justifiable belief that it could not adversely affect the accused on the
issue to be decided at the trial within a trial.
- (2) As the trial was unsatisfactory, the conviction was not allowed to stand
and a retrial was ordered.

• But it can go towards credibility and demanour. Can be used as such, NOT in main trial

• Can evidence in one voir dire be used in another voir dire ?

Goh Joon Tong v PP [1995] 3 SLR 305 – no, start all over again.
- Facts: 1st and 2nd As charged with abetting one Tan in the bettings. Statements were
recorded from the As and separate voir dires were held to determine the admissibility of
those statements. Trial J deferred deciding on the admissibility of 1st A’s statements at
the end of his voir dire and proceeded with 2nd A’s voir dire, at which 1st A testified.
Statements of both As were then found to have been made voluntarily and were
admitted. In deciding that 1st A’s statements were admissible, trial J took into account
his assessment of the credibility of 1st A’s evidence at 2nd A’s voir dire. Counsel argued
such evidence was inadmissible to determine the admissibility of 1st A’s statements.
- Held (LP Thean JA):
o TJ erred in using the evidence of what 1st A said at 2nd A’s voir dire and his
assessment of 1st A’s credibility to decide on 1st A’s voir dire.
o Lim Seng Chuan approved – though that case was concerned with evidence in
the voir dire being used in the main trial, the same consideration applies to
evidence obtained in one voir dire being used in another voir dire. “[A voir dire]
should be insulated from another voir dire.”
o There was nothing wrong in TJ deferring decision at the end of 1st A’s voir
dire…though this is unusual, it’s a matter of procedure.

- Can an accused cross-examine his co-accused in the co-accused’s voir dire or cross-
examine prosecution witness testifying in co-accused’s voir dire ?
- Jasbir Singh v PP [1994] 2 SLR 18
o Facts: The appellants were charged with trafficking in 254.36g of diamorphine
in furtherance of the common intention of them both. Both appellants denied the
prosecution’s version of the facts. The trial judge who found them both guilty of
the charge against them rejected their defences.

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 o On appeal it was argued by counsel for the first appellant that the first
appellant’s constitutional right of access to counsel had been violated. Amongst
others, that the first appellant should have been allowed to cross-examine the
second appellant during the voir dire of the latter’s cautioned statement; and that
certain items of evidence admitted by the trial judge were actually inadmissible.
o Held: The first appellant suffered no prejudice in being refused permission to
cross-examine the second appellant during the voir dire of the latter’s cautioned
statement as that statement was admitted only after the trial judge had decided,
on the basis of all the evidence before him, that the prosecution had proved
beyond reasonable doubt the voluntariness of the statement.
o The trial judge had duly considered the second appellant’s attempted
clarification of his cautioned statement but disbelieved the clarification. There
was no cause to disturb this finding of fact.
- Panya Martmontree v PP [1995] 3 SLR 341
o Held: No right to cross-x PWs testifying in VD of statements made by co-A.
o For the same reasons as in Jasbir Singh, no prejudice.
o VD is separate and distinct trial concerning only that co-A. Only after statement
is admitted and becomes evidence will it concern other As and they can then test
this in the same way as other evidence at trial.
o Confined to admissibility of B1’s statement only
o Weight to be attached to B1’s statement.

- S30 EA – confession of accused implicating co accused can be used against co accused

to convict him. Stimes it is the only evid against the co accused

- If accused does not object to admissibility of his statement initially but later raises the
objection, is judge required to hold a voir dire?
o Yes. Third category of adjoda.

Nadunjalian v PP [1993] 2 SLR 682

- Facts: The appellant had stabbed the deceased to death after the deceased had allegedly
insulted the appellant’s mother. At the trial the prosecution sought to admit a statement
made by the appellant under Section 122(6) of the CPC. Defence counsel initially
objected to its admissibility. At the trial-within-a-trial, the investigating officer gave
evidence on the procedure he had followed in recording the statement. He testified that
the statement was recorded by him without any threat, inducement or promise either by
the interpreter or himself before or during the recording of the statement. During the
cross-examination of the investigating officer, defence counsel withdrew the objection
to the admissibility of the statement. The statement was duly admitted and read. The
defence was called. The appellant testified that the statement was partly false and had
been given because the investigating officer had threatened to lock him up if he did not
co-operate. The trial judge rejected his defence. The appellant was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death.
- On appeal, the appellant argued that he had been deprived of the benefit of a full and
fair trial by the failure of the trial judge to reconvene the trial-within-a-trial after the
appellant had given evidence that he had been threatened into making a confession.

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- Held: dismissing the appeal:
o (1) The “tactical move” described in Ajodha v The State of defence counsel
allowing the jury to hear the evidence on the recorded statement before making
his objections to its admissibility is of no application in the context of procedure
and practice in Singapore where the trial judge sits as judge of both fact and
law.
o (2) Ajodha is distinguishable. Evidence was presented to show that the accused
had not been aware of the contents of the statements and had been compelled to
sign them. In this case the appellant admitted making the statement but alleged
that it was partly false because he was coerced into confessing.
o (3) No injustice had been caused to the appellant. The appellant’s allegation was
one, which could easily have been dealt with under the standard procedures of a
trial-within-a-trial, which was in fact convened but inexplicably withdrawn by
the defence. There was no evidence that the appellant had been deprived of a
fair opportunity to present his case.
o (4) There can be no general principle that a trial-within-a-trial should be
reconvened whenever some slight mote of doubt is placed on the voluntariness
of a statement. It would be a waste of the courts` time if a voir dire should be
recalled when the same doubts could have been settled at the original trial-
within-a-trial.
o (5) In any case there was no miscarriage of justice, as the trial judge’s decision
was not based entirely on the strength of the confession. There was sufficient
independent evidence upon which the appellant could have been convicted.

- Effect of procedural irregularities in the conduct of voir dire ?

o No effect.

Rajendran s/o Kurusamy v PP [1998] 3 SLR 225

- Facts: 3rd A charged along with 2 others for match fixing. 3rd A was footballer, together
with Maran who was called as PW. However, on the stand Maran turned hostile and P
applied to impeach Maran under s.157 EA and admit his statements under s.147(3)
whereupon Maran disputed the voluntariness of the statements. VD then conducted.
Maran gave evidence 1st, then CPIB officers, CPIB officers cross-x and then Maran
recalled for cross-x. TJ ruled that statement given voluntarily and admitted it.
Convicted. On appeal, it was argued by 3rd A that the procedure taken at the VD to
determine the admissibility of Maran’s statements was not properly followed and this
led to prejudice being caused in that the voluntariness of the statements could not be
properly determined.
- Held (Yong CJ):
o Statements correctly admitted.
o Such a variation in the usual procedure was immaterial to the outcome of the
case and TJ’s decision. From the notes of evidence and the circumstances
leading to the admission of Maran’s statements, I realise that Maran took to the
stand first before PWs as he was initially expected to give evidence for P case.
Unfortunately, he changed his mind and TJ thought it would be convenient to
allow him to give evidence first before hearing evidence of CPIB officers.

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 o Ultimately, underlying concern for adherence to procedure is to prevent
prejudice to A who is alleging improper treatment during taking of statements.
Here, while 3rd A said there was prejudice, he was unable to show the manner of
prejudice or the exact prejudice caused…he could not show that Maran’s
statements were not considered fully or carefully by TJ. Conduct of VD is hence
a mere irregularity which mattered little during the whole trial.

Cf : Fun Seong Cheng v PP [1997] 3 SLR 523

- Facts: One ground of appeal was that TJ erred in admitting A’s LS in evidence. The LS
was not admitted as part of P’s case but was used by P to impeach A’s credit when he
was cross-x on evidence he gave at trial. P wanted to use s.147(3) and A contended
statement was involuntary. TJ held VD in which DPP continued to cross-x A, directing
cross-x to the question of whether A had made LS voluntarily, after which CNB officers
were called to rebut the evidence given by A. DC contended this procedure was
irregular.
- Held (Karthigesu JA):
o As observed in earlier cases, VD = separate or collateral proceeding and
accordingly ss.188-190 CPC (which deal with sequence of trial) must be
followed – this means that in a VD, PWs to be called 1st for EIC and then cross-
x, followed by A giving evidence if he so wishes and be cross-x + A’s Ws to be
examined and XEd.
o This procedure not followed and in our view, the LS ≠ proved. Thus, TJ erred in
admitting statement

JUDICIAL DISCRETION
- Whether judge can exclude statement even though voluntary ie no TIP

• common law origin

• attitude that test for admissibility is relevance to the matters in issue and if so, it should
be admissible as the Court should not be concerned with how it was obtained
• any improprieties in obtaining of evidence can be redressed through civil means or
through internal disciplinary processes
• discretion to exclude evidence if admitting it would operate unfairly against the accused
• see Kuruma v R [1955] AC 197
• see also R v Sang [1980] AC 402 and Lord Diplock’s important clarification of the
scope of discretion stated in Kuruma
o Held (Lord Diplock)
o TJ in criminal trial always has discretion to refuse to admit evidence if in his
opinion, its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.
• Discretion appears to exist in Singapore
o Cheng Swee Tiang v PP [1964] MLJ 291
 Held (Wee CJ): Evidence obtained through use of A is admissible if
relevant, though there is a judicial discretion to disallow such
evidence if its reception operates unfairly vs. A. Although the Cts
here have consistently criticised the use of As, they have consistently

72
 admitted evidence obtained by As provided such evidence is not
unfair to A.
o Ajmer Singh v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 141
 Held (Chan J): Legal position after R v. Sang as regards
admissibility of self-induced admission is that its subject to J’s
discretion. Same rule applies in Singapore and Cheng Swee Tiang
doesn’t conflict with R v. Sang
o PP v Dahalan [1996] 1 SLR 786 –
 still can rule that unsafe to admit statement in evid though satisfied
that no TIP but think that it is uncertain. See reasoning. And
judgement. Diff bet admissible and admitted in s122.5
 Held (Rajendran J): Use of the words “shall be admissible” instead
of “shall be admitted” in s.122(5) indicate that where provision does
not apply, Court is vested with discretion to admit/ reject statements.
 Statement in this case not admitted (1) effect of drugs on A; (2)
absence of interpreter; (3) flagrant disregard of PGO and s.121
provisions by IO.
o How Poh Sun v PP [1991] 3 MLJ 216
 Yong CJ cited passage from R v. Sang on position regarding the use
of agent provocateurs in England (including comments about
discretion) and went on to say that this reflects the position in
Singapore.

Use of Statements
- depend on how the statement was introduced by the Prosecution
1. contents of the statement of an accused would be part of the Prosecution’s case
against the accused and it will be introduced in Court by the Prosecution through the
officer who recorded the statement
2. evidence in Court is inconsistent with what is in the statement, then the statement can
be used as a previous inconsistent statement to impeach the credit of the witness
under s. 157 EA

1. As evidence to prove relevant facts, facts in issue – eg confession to prove actus reus or
mens rea

2. To draw adverse inferences from accused’s failure to mention material facts in cautioned
statement
- ss 122(6) read with s 123(1) CPC (see above)

3. To impeach the credit of a witness/accused under s.157 EA

- Muthusamy v PP [1948] MLJ 57 on impeachment procedure
o accused gives statement to police stating facts, in court, says sth else. Pros wld
want to admit prev statement of accused to impeach his credibility – he is a liar
o mere witness no qn of TIP – this is merely under s157. no need to be given
voluntarily before it can be impeached. No trial within trial for witness
statements when want to use them to impeach!

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 o Facts: In this case the accused, who is a lorry driver, was charged with house
trespass with the intent to intimidate the occupant and also with assault, under
Section 352, Penal Code.
o Held: In a summary trial the Magistrate should remember (a) that the trial in
summary; (b) that the evidence must be confined to what is legally relevant; (c)
that where the rule of evidence is explicit it must be enforced strictly on both
sides; (d) that where the rule is discretionary, for example, as to points which
are remote or only affect credit, the discretion must be exercised with regard to
the real gravamen of the charge

4. Cross-examine on previous inconsistent statement with a view to substituting trial

evidence with statement
- s147 EA
- Sng Siew Ngoh v PP [1996] 1 SLR 143
o Facts: The respondent was charged with, inter alia, voluntarily causing grievous
hurt through poking the victim’s eyes with her fingers, which led to the
permanent privation of the sight of one of the victim’s eyes. While testifying in
court as a prosecution witness, the victim gave evidence, which was inconsistent
with a statement made to the investigating officer earlier. The prosecution
successfully impeached her credit using the statement, which contained
evidence against the respondent establishing that the hurt was caused
voluntarily, and that the respondent intended to cause or knew that she was
likely to cause grievous hurt. The prosecution sought to adduce the statement as
evidence of the facts stated, relying on Section 147(3) of the EA. However, the
trial judge held that the statement could not be relied upon for the truth of the
facts stated; he considered himself bound by the decision in PP v Sagar s/o
Suppiah Ratnam (CC 6/94) (unreported), where it was held that Section 147(3)
could not apply to a statement governed by Section 122 of the CPC. As
elements of the offence were disclosed only in the statement, this meant that the
offence was not made out on the prosecution’s evidence. Additionally, the judge
also held that the evidence of the specialist was such that a prima facie case of
causation was not established.
o Held: Although Section 122(1) did prohibit the use of police statements except
as provided for in Section 122, statements under Section 147 were considered as
exceptions to such prohibition as they were caught within Section 122(2). The
fact that Section 122(2) related to the use of statements for impeachment, this
does not mean that those statements cannot be relied upon for the truth of the
facts stated. The notion of impeachment has been altered by the passing of
Section 147(3). The legislative intention behind that is clear and must be given
effect to. It is also making too subtle a distinction to allow a statement to be
used to impeach and yet not allow it as evidence of the facts stated. PP v Sagar
s/o Suppiah Retnam (CC 6 /94, HC) (unreported) not followed.
o The purpose of Section 122 is not the regulation of police statements but rather
to ensure the reliability of statements made out of court, either on the basis of
exceptions to the hearsay rule or on policy considerations.

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 o Some of the exceptions to Section 122(1) are based on the notion of reliability
of evidence, while others, including that governing previous inconsistent
statements, are based on policy reasons requiring that they be accepted as
evidence as well. The fact of the inconsistency may indicate that either version
contains the truth; if the truth of the facts stated in the statement was not
admissible, the court may be denying itself a source of evidence, which it would
be artificial to exclude. That previous statement would also have been made
close in time to the events.
o There was no requirement that there had to be corroboration of a previous
inconsistent statement before evidence contained in that statement can be
used as the sole evidence for conviction.
- Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25
o Cross examine him on what he said in court, will ask court to subst evid in court
with prev statement. To prove relevant fact in issue
o Diff bet impeachment and 147. impeachment – not relying on him. Not
believing. Impeaching. For 147, rely on what he said to police as the truth.
Cross examine him in court and subst that prev statement as conclusive evid.
o Held (Yong CJ): Sng Siew Ngoh followed.
o Consequences that follow upon proof of a former statement inconsistent with
any part of the W’s evidence which is liable to be contradicted are:
- W’s credit is impeached under s.157(c)
- Former statement is admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein
under s.147(3). The weight to be attached is stipulated in s.147(6): “To
determine weight have regard to all circumstances, in particular
contemporaneity with facts alleged there in and any
incentive/motive to lie”

5. As corroboration under s 159 EA

- • Note however, the judicial attitude towards the weight to be placed on such statements
as corroborative evidence
- witness says certain things out of court, counsel admits this, pros can ask this to be
corroboration
- though generally self corroboration of little weight
- but restrictions – must be cross examination etc
- Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR 676
o Facts: Complainant claimed accused molested her. Apart from complaints to
her sister and her police report, there was no corroboration of the evidence.
Trial judge held sufficient corroboration, and that Ct could convict without
corroboration if totally convinced of the truth of the complainant’s testimony.
o Held (Yong CJ):
 It is not controversial that the complainant’s previous complaint to her
sister and the lodging of the police report are technically corroboration
in view of s.159 EA.
 However, these are not corroboration by independent evidence. All the
complaints originated from the complainant. They have little evidential
value.

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  It would be dangerous to equate this form of corroboration with
corroboration in the normal sense of the word. I see no reason why a
s.159 corroboration of a complainant’s testimony should necessarily
carry more weight than a s.159 corroboration of the accused’s denial.
Both appear equally self-serving.
 Hence the Ct should regard the sister’s evidence with great
circumspection. Despite s.159, her evidence is no more weighty than
the appellant’s s.121 and s.122(6) statements.
- Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42
o Facts: The victim is a 27 year-old married female. She was also the appellant’s
secretary when the alleged offences of outrage of modesty were committed.
- Lee Kwang Peng v PP [1997] 3 SLR 27
o Held (Yong CJ): Complaints made by Vs to the police, while capable of being
corroboration under s.159 are not independent and are of little evidential value.

6. As evidence against a co-accused under s.30 EA

- • Can an accused’s confession sustain the conviction of a coaccused?
- Ramanchandran v PP [1993] 2 SLR 671
o Looked at Indian provisions and held that A’s confession could not sustain
conviction of co-A.
- cf Chin Seow Noi v PP [1994] 1 SLR 135
o if confession of accusd implic co accused, can be used to convict co accused.
o As long as judge believes that accused, no need for corroboration. It can be the
only piece of evid agasint co accused.
o Held (Yong CJ):
o Ramachandran decided per incuriam.
o Natural interpretation of s.30 is that it allows the conviction of A to be
sustained solely on the basis of a confession by his co-A if the confession
satisfies the Ct of A’s guilt beyond RD.
o However, the assessment of the weight of co-A’s confession is ultimately lies
with the Ct which will take into careful consideration the incentive that co-A
might have to lie.
- Goh Joon Tong v PP:
• Explanation to s. 30 EA extends its operation to the confession of a co-accused
charged with the particular offence where the other co-accused is charged with
abetment of or attempt to commit that offence, or vice versa
- S. 30 does not cover the situation where the accused and co-accused face independent
charges unconnected with each other: Lee Yuan Kwang & Ors v PP
- the retraction of the co-accused’s confession does not prevent it from being used to
convict the accused
- it affects the weight to be accorded to the confession in the light of the retraction:
Panya Martmontree v PP
- if the court is satisfied as to the truth of the retracted confession, it can still rely on it:
PP v Rozman bin Jusoh

6*. Use Of Section 122(6) Statement To Exonerate Co-Accused

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- PP v Virat Kaewnern:
• Court of Appeal expressed view that such an unsworn statement, made out of
court, is of course not evidence unless it is an admission against the maker of it
and then only against the maker
• It is not evidence of the truth of what is stated
• It was therefore not right for the trial judge to have taken it into account as
tending to exonerate the co-accused

7. Treatment of retracted confessions ?

- A retracted confession can still be used to convict an accused if the court is satisfied of
its truth
- Osman v PP [1967] 1 MLJ 137
 retracted confession can still be used against a co-accused under s 30 EA and
the effect of the retraction, if any, is only to the weight of the confession
o PP v Rozman bin Jusoh [1995] 3 SLR 317
 Held: Settled law that a person can be convicted on his own confession even if
its retracted, if the Court is satisfied that it was made voluntarily and was true.
No need for corroborative evidence to support it.
 The same principle is applicable where a confession is sought to be used vs. co-
A.
 Here, there was circumstantial evidence which corroborated the confessions of
A vs. co-A.
o Thongbai Nakalangdon v PP [1996] 1 SLR 487
o Ong Chee Hoe v PP [1999] 4 SLR 688
 Followed Rozman and Panya – retraction of A’s confession does not prevent the
confession from being used to convict co-A. It is at most a matter of the weight
to be given to that confession in the light of the retraction.
o Panya Martmontree [1995] 3 SLR 341
 Facts: Case where appellants found guilty of committing murder in the course
of gang robbery…the only material evidence against them consisted of their
statements made to the police which amounted to confessions. On appeal, it was
contended, inter alia, that the use of the confessions against the co-appellants
was challenged as the confessions had been retracted. CA dismissed appeal.
 Held (Karthigesu JA): Retraction of A’s confession doesn’t prevent the
confession being used to convict A himself. Similarly for A’s confession when
used against co-A. Neither should sufficiency of co-A’s confession be
diminished by retraction.
 “At most it would be a matter of the weight to be given to that confession in the
light of the retraction” but this is a matter for the trial J to decide. There was
nothing here to indicate that the retraction had so affected the confessions that
the trial J was not entitled to rely on them. Even though some of the appellants
had given evidence in defence, this only affected the weight of the confessions
and there was nothing on the facts to require the trial J not to prefer the evidence
in the confessions and rather accept appellants’ evidence.
- Ismail bin U K Abdul Rahman v PP

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  Accused can be convicted on his own confession, even when it is retracted, if
the court is satisfied of its truth

8. Confessions
Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly
under trial for same offence
30. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a
confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons
is proved, the court may take into consideration the confession as against the other person
as well as against the person who makes the confession.
Explanation.—“Offence” as used in this section includes the abetment of or attempt to
commit the offence.
(a) A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said “B and I
murdered C”. The court may consider the effect of this confession as against B.
(b) A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered
by A and B and that B said: “A and I murdered C ”.
This statement may not be taken into consideration by the court against A as B is not
being jointly tried.
Admissions not conclusive proof but may estop
31. Admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but they may operate as
estoppels under the provisions in this Act.

9. in favour of the accused

- defence would want the s. 122(6) statement that is favourable to the accused to be
adduced during the prosecution’s case as it could assist the defence in making a
submission of no case to answer at the end of the prosecution’s case
- on the other hand, prosecution may not want to use that statement because it has
ample other evidence to prove its case
- PP v Mohamed Noor Bin Jantan:
• prosecution is fee to tender or not in evidence such a statement, but if the
recording officer gives evidence, the defence is entitled to cause him to tender it
in evidence even though the prosecution does not itself want to introduce it as part
of its case
• if recording officer is not called by the prosecution, he must be called by the
defence during the course of the defence case for this purpose, and the
prosecution cannot be compelled to tender the statement in evidence during its
case
• if the defence succeeds in having the cautioned statement tendered in evidence
during the course of the case for the prosecution, it should be marked as a
defence, not as a prosecution exhibit because the statement is introduced at the
instance of the defence
- PP v Lim Lian Chen:
• defence sought to admit the accused’s s. 122(6) statement during the prosecution’s
case through the investigation officer in possession of the statement, when the
prosecution did not call the recording officer, to which the prosecution objected

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 • Supreme Court of Kuala Lumpur disagreed with the prosecution that unless the
recording officer is called by the prosecution, the cautioned statement of the
accused can in no circumstances be introduced during the case for the prosecution
at the behest of the accused
- issue has since been resolved by s. 31A Evidence Act (no s. 31A) (1993 Act – has
been repealed)
- prevents the defence from admitting s. 122(6) statements during the prosecution’s
case through any witness, other than the recording officer

10. statement could also be relied upon for the truth of the facts stated as provided for in
s. 147(3) EA
- but the court should bear in mind s. 147(6) EA which provides for various factors to be
taken into account highlighting the dangers of falsification and inaccuracy: Kwang Boon
Keong Peter v PP [1998] 2 SLR 592, Chai Chien Wei Kelvin v PP [1999] 1 SLR 25

Kwang Boon Keong - Facts

The accused was convicted of three charges under s 6(a) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act (Cap 241, 1993 Ed) for the receipt of ‘ang pows’ from PW3
corruptly as gratification or reward. In convicting the accused, the district judge
relied on the uncorroborated evidence of PW3 and photocopies of two documents
(Exhibits P4 and P5) which contained a list of the persons to whom PW3 had
offered ‘ang pows’. The district judge also found that the credit of the accused had
been impeached under s 157 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97) as what the accused had
said under cross-examination was inconsistent with his previous statement to the
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (‘CPIB’). The accused appealed against the
conviction. There were four issues considered on appeal: (a) impeachment of the
credit of the accused under s 157; (b) admissibility of Exhibits P4 and P5 as
evidence under s 67(1)(c) of the Evidence Act; (c) whether PW3 should be treated
with caution as a witness because he was the payor of gratification; and (d) the
conviction under s 6(a) of the Act.

Held, dismissing the appeal:

(1) Section 157 provided for the impeachment of the credit of a witness by the
party who called him if the consent of the court was given or by the opposing party.
This applied to all witnesses, including the accused.

(2) The purpose of the impeachment of a witness’s credit was to undermine his
credibility by showing that his testimony in court should not be believed because he
was of such a character and moral make-up that he was incapable of speaking the
whole truth under oath and should not be relied on.

(3) Section 157(c) allowed for the impeachment of a witness’s credit by proof of a
former statement inconsistent with any part of his evidence in court which was
liable to be contradicted.

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(4) There were two effects upon the proof of a former statement inconsistent with
any part of the witness’s evidence which was liable to be contradicted: (a) his credit
was impeached under s 157(c); and 9b) his former statement was admissible as
evidence of any fact stated therein under s 147(3).

(5) A successful impeachment of a witness’s credit under s 157 went only to the
weight of his oral testimony in court and not to its admissibility.

(6) In the present case, the inconsistencies between the accused’s statement to the
CPIB and his oral testimony in court were sufficiently material to call into question
the credit of the accused. The explanation given by the accused for the
discrepancies was not credible. Thus his credit was rightly impeached and his
former statement correctly admitted into evidence.

(7) The district judge did not err in admitting Exhibits P4 and P5 as secondary
evidence under s 67(1)(c). The circumstances indicated that the originals had been
lost. PW3 need not to show that he was at no default or neglect with regard to the
loss of the original documents, as the two alternative requirements in s 67(1)(c)
were disjunctive.

(8) The combined effect of s 135 and illustration (b) to s 116 was that the court
might convict an accused based on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice,
but should still treat such evidence with caution as the accomplice might be
presumed to be unworthy of credit. There was no requirement for any corroboration
warning or to treat a witness’s evidence with unnecessary caution because he had
some self-interest in the matter. In this case, PW3 had no incentive to lie about
giving the ‘ang pows’ as it did not alleviate his own guilt in any way as he had
admitted to offering the ‘ang pows’ to the accused.

(9) There were four elements which had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
before an offence under s 6(a) was made out, viz (a) acceptance of gratification, (b)
as an inducement or reward, (c) there was a corrupt element in the transaction, and
(d) the recipient accepted the gratification with a guilty knowledge. In order to
prevent confusion in future, when establishing the fourth element, counsel should
refer to ‘guilty knowledge’ not ‘corrupt intent’.

(10) The correct approach with regard to the third and fourth elements was to first
establish ‘an objective corrupt element’ in the transaction. It was only after this was
satisfied that it became necessary to consider the subjective ‘guilty knowledge’ of
the accused.

(11) In this case, all four elements in s 6(a) had been satisfied. With respect to the
first element, the district judge was entitled to believe the evidence of PW3 over the
evidence of the accused. There was also no doubt that the ‘ang pows’ were a reward
or inducement. Applying an objective standard, a reasonable man could readily

80
conclude that PW3 gave the ‘ang pows’ as a bribe. Lastly, it was difficult to believe
that the accused had no guilty knowledge in receiving the ‘ang pows’ when such
large sums of money were involved. The appeal was dismissed and the sentence
upheld.

Chai Chien Wei - Facts

The appellant and the first accused were jointly tried in the High Court. The first
accused was charged with attempting to export controlled drugs (‘the drugs’) from
Singapore to Taipei. The appellant was charged with abetment of the offence in that
he strapped the drugs, which he transported into Singapore, onto the body of the
first accused with tapes at the Changi Airport, in order to enable the first accused to
transport the drugs out of Singapore. The High Court admitted as evidence several
statements made by the first accused, the appellant and one Goh. At the close of the
prosecution’s case, the High Court called for the defence of the first accused and
the appellant. They both elected to remain silent. The appellant and the first
accused were both found guilty and sentenced to death. Only the appellant
appealed.

Held, appeal dismissed:

(1) The argument that the first accused’s statements were not ‘confessions’ and
therefore could not be used against the appellant under s 30 of the Evidence Act
(cap 97) (‘EA’) was not accepted. For a statement to amount to a confession, it need
not be of a plenary or unqualified nature.
(2) Section 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code (cap 68) (‘CPC’) was not
applicable to narcotics officers. The admissibility of the first accused’s statements
fall to be tested under s 24 of EA. The test of voluntariness under s 24 of EA was
partly objective and partly subjective. The objective limb was satisfied if there was
a threat, inducement or promise, and the subjective limb when the threat
inducement or promise operated on the mind of the accused through hope of escape
or fear of punishment connected with the charge.
(3) Where voluntariness was challenged, the burden was on the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made voluntarily and it
was not for the defence to prove on a balance of probabilities that the confession
was not made voluntarily. In this case, the inducement alleged was self-perceived.
(4) Oppression might render a confession involuntary and thus inadmissible, and
whether the accused had been subjected to oppression was a question of fact.
Whether or not there was oppression in an individual case depended upon many
elements including the length of time of any individual period of questioning, the
length of time intervening between periods of questioning, whether the accused was
given proper refreshment, and the characteristics of the person making the
statement. In this case, the allegation of oppression in respect of the first accused’s
confession failed.
(5) The presumption under illustration (b) to s 116 of EA that an accomplice was

81
 unworthy of credit and that his evidence needed to be treated with caution was not
mandatory but permissive or discretionary and depended on all the circumstances.
Where the court did not discern any attempt by the accomplice materially to
minimise his own involvement or exaggerate that of the accused and his evidence
was found to be consistent as a whole and reliable on a review of the whole
evidence, there was no reason why the evidence of the accomplice should be
treated as unreliable. In this case, the first accused’s statement taken together with
the other evidence implicated both himself and the appellant in material particulars
and was coherent and convincing. As for Goh, there was insufficient evidence to
infer that he participated in the crime and he was not found to be an accomplice.
(6) As Goh retracted his previous statement when giving evidence in Court, the
prosecution was entitled to impeach his credit under s 157(c) of EA and admit his
previous inconsistent statement as evidence of any fact stated therein under
s 147(3) of EA. The weight to be attached to the statement was determined by the
factors stipulated in s 147(6) of EA. In estimating the weight of such statement,
regard shall be had to all the circumstances from which any inference can
reasonably be drawn as to the accuracy or otherwise of the statement and, in
particular, to the question whether the statement was made contemporaneously with
the occurrence or existence of the facts stated, and to the question whether the
maker of the statement had any incentive to conceal or misrepresent the facts. There
was no rule of law that the testimony of a witness must either be believed in its
entirety or not at all.
(7) The first accused’s confession together with the statement of Goh and the
circumstantial evidence, when taken together were more than sufficient to justify
the finding that the prosecution had made out a case which, if unrebutted, would
warrant a conviction.
(8) What inferences were proper to be drawn from an accused’s refusal to give
evidence would depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, and was a
question to be decided by applying ordinary common sense. If aspects of the
evidence taken alone or in combination with other facts clearly called for an
explanation which the accused ought to be in a position to give, if an explanation
existed, then a failure to give any explanation might as a matter of common sense
allow the drawing of an inference that there was no explanation and that the
accused was guilty.

Per Yong C J:

Section 30 of EA allowed the conviction of an accused to be sustained solely on the

basis of a confession by his co-accused, provided the evidence emanating from that
confession satisfied the court beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt.

11. where a fact is discovered as a consequence of the information received from the
accused, that part of the statement leading to the discovery may be admitted by s. 27 EA.
s. 24 EA and s. 122(5) CPC will not apply
- before s. 27 can be invoked, it is essential to prove that the information must be
such as has caused the discovery of a fact

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- in determining this, the court should look at all the circumstances of the case, the
offence with which the accused is charged, the other evidence adduced so far and
the relevance of the fact, which is discovered as a consequence, so that no more
than what is necessary is admitted

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