Government oI India Act 1935

The Government of India Act 1935 was passed during the "Interwar Period" and was the last pre-independence
constitution oI India.
The Act was originally passed in August 1935 (25 & 26 Geo. 5 c. 42), and is said to have been the longest (British)
Act oI Parliament ever enacted by that time. Due to its length, the Act was retrospectively split by the Government
oI India (Reprinting) Act 1935 (26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 1) into two separate Acts:
1. the Government oI India Act 1935 (26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 2)
2. the Government oI Burma Act 1935 (26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 3)
ReIerences in literature on Indian political and constitutional history are usually to the shortened Government oI
India Act 1935 (ie. 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8 c. 2), rather than to the text oI the Act as originally enacted.
ontents
|hide|
1 Overview
2 The Act
4 2.1 Background to the Act
4 2.2 Some Features oI the Act
2.2.1 No Preamble The Ambiguity oI the British Commitment to Dominion
Status
2.2.2 No Bill oI Rights
2.2.3 Relationship to a Dominion Constitution
2.2.4 SaIeguards
2.2.5 Reality oI Responsible Government Under the Act Is the Cup HalI-
Full or HalI-Empty?
2.2.6 False Equivalences
2.2.7 British Political Needs vs. Indian Constitutional Needs the Ongoing
DysIunction
4 2.3 Provincial Part oI the Act
4 2.4 Federal Part oI the Act
2.4.1 Terms oI the Act
2.4.2 Objectives oI the British Government
2.4.3 Gambles Taken by the British Government
2.4.4 Indian Reaction to the Proposed Federation
4 2.5 The Working oI the Act
3 See also
4 ReIerences
|edit|Overview
The most signiIicant aspects oI the Act were:
the grant oI a large measure oI autonomy to the provinces oI British India (ending the system
oI dyarchy introduced by the Government oI India Act 1919)
provision Ior the establishment oI a "Federation oI India", to be made up oI both British India and some or
all oI the "princely states"
the introduction oI direct elections, thus increasing the Iranchise Irom seven million to thirty-Iive million
people
a partial reorganization oI the provinces:
Sind was separated Irom Bombay
Bihar and Orissa was split into the separate provinces oI Bihar and Orissa
Burma was completely separated Irom India
Aden was also detached Irom India, and established as a separate colony
membership oI the provincial assemblies was altered so as to include more elected Indian representatives,
who were now able to Iorm majorities and be appointed to Iorm governments
the establishment oI a Federal Court
However, the degree oI autonomy introduced at the provincial level was subject to important limitations: the
provincial Governors retained important reserve powers, and the British authorities also retained a right to suspend
responsible government.
The parts oI the Act intended to establish the Federation oI India never came into operation, due to opposition Irom
rulers oI the princely states. The remaining parts oI the Act came into Iorce in 1937, when the Iirst elections under
the Act were also held.
|edit|The Act
|edit|ackground to the Act
Indians had increasingly been demanding a greater role in the government oI their country since the late nineteenth
century. The Indian contribution to the British war eIIort during theFirst World War meant that even the more
conservative elements in the British political establishment Ielt the necessity oI constitutional change, resulting in
the Government oI India Act 1919. That Act introduced a novel system oI government known as provincial
"dyarchy", ie, certain areas oI government (such as education) were placed in the hands oI ministers responsible to
the provincial legislature, while others (such as public order and Iinance) were retained in the hands oI oIIicials
responsible to the British-appointed provincial Governor. While the Act was a reIlection oI the demand Ior a greater
role in government by Indians, it was also very much a reIlection oI British Iears about what that role might mean in
practice Ior India (and oI course Ior British interests there).
The experiment with dyarchy proved unsatisIactory. A particular Irustration Ior Indian politicians was that even Ior
those areas over which they had gained nominal control, the "purse strings" were still in the hands oI British
oIIicialdom.
The intention had been that a review oI India's constitutional arrangements and those princely states that were
willing to accede to it. However, division between Congress and Muslim representatives proved to be a major Iactor
in preventing agreement as to much oI the important detail oI how Iederation would work in practice.
Against this practice, the new Conservative-dominated National Government in London decided to go ahead with
draIting its own proposals (thewhite paper). A joint parliamentary select committee, chaired by Lord Linlithgow,
reviewed the white paper proposals at great length. On the basis oI this white paper, the Government oI India Bill
was Iramed. At the committee stage and later, to appease the diehards, the "saIeguards" were strengthened, and
indirect elections were reinstated Ior the Central Legislative Assembly (the central legislature's lower house). The
bill duly passed into law in August, 1935.
As a result oI this process, although the Government oI India Act 1935 was intended to go some way towards
meeting Indian demands, both the detail oI the bill and the lack oI Indian involvement in draIting its contents meant
that the Act met with a lukewarm response at best in India, while still proving too radical Ior a signiIicant element in
Britain.
|edit|$ome Features of the Act
|edit|No Preamble - The Ambiguity of the ritish ommitment to Dominion $tatus
While it had become uncommon Ior British Acts oI Parliament to contain a preamble, the absence oI one Irom the
Government oI India Act 1935 contrasts sharply with the 1919 Act, which set out the broad philosophy oI that Act's
aims in relation to Indian political development.
The 1919 Act's preamble quoted, and centered on, the statement oI the Secretary oI State Ior India, Edwin
Montagu (July 17, 1917 March 19, 1922) to the House oI Commons on August 20, 1917, which pledged:
.the gradual development oI selI-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization oI responsible
government in India as an integral Part oI the British Empire.
Indian demands were by now centering on British India achieving constitutional parity with the
existing Dominions such as Canada andAustralia, which would have meant complete autonomy within the British
Commonwealth. A signiIicant element in British political circles doubted that Indians were capable oI running their
country on this basis, and saw Dominion status as something that might, perhaps, be aimed Ior aIter a long period oI
gradual constitutional development, with suIIicient "saIeguards".
This tension between and within Indian and British views resulted in the clumsy compromise oI the 1935 Act having
no preamble oI its own, but keeping in place the 1919 Act's preamble even while repealing the remainder oI that
Act. Unsurprisingly, this was seen in India as yet more mixed messages Irom the British, suggesting at best a
lukewarm attitude and at worst suggesting a "minimum necessary" approach towards satisIying Indian desires.
|edit|No ill of Rights
In contrast with most modern constitutions, but in common with Commonwealth constitutional legislation oI the
time, the Act does not include a "bill oI rights" within the new system that it aimed to establish. However, in the
case oI the proposed Federation oI India there was a Iurther complication in incorporating such a set oI rights, as the
new entity would have included nominally sovereign (and generally autocratic) princely states.
A diIIerent approach was considered by some, though, as the draIt outline constitution in the Nehru Report included
such a bill oI rights.
|edit|Relationship to a Dominion onstitution
In 1947, a relatively Iew amendments in the Act made it the Iunctioning interim constitutions oI India and Pakistan.
|edit|$afeguards
The Act was not only extremely detailed, but it was riddled with saIeguards` designed to enable the British
Government to intervene whenever it saw the need in order to maintain British responsibilities and interests. To
achieve this, in the Iace oI a gradually increasing Indianization oI the institutions oI the Government oI India, the
Act concentrated the decision Ior the use and the actual administration oI the saIeguards in the hands oI the British-
appointed Viceroy and provincial governors who were subject to the control oI the Secretary oI State Ior India.
In view oI the enormous powers and responsibilities which the Governor-General must exercise in his discretion or
according to his individual judgment, it is obvious that he (the Viceroy) is expected to be a kind oI superman. He must
have tact, courage, and ability and be endowed with an inIinite capacity Ior hard work. 'We have put into this Bill many
saIeguards, said Sir Robert Horne. 'but all oI those saIeguards revolve about a single individual, and that is the
Viceroy. He is the linch-pin oI the whole system.. II the Viceroy Iails, nothing can save the system you have set up.
This speech reIlected the point oI view oI the die-hard Tories who were horriIied by the prospect that some day there
might be a Viceroy appointed by a Labour government.`
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|edit|Reality of Responsible Government Under the Act - Is the up Half-Full or Half-Empty?
A close reading oI the Act
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reveals that the British Government equipped itselI with the legal instruments to take
back total control at any time they considered this to be desirable. However, doing so without good reason would
totally sink their credibility with groups in India whose support the act was aimed at securing. Some contrasting
views:
'In the Iederal government. the semblance oI responsible government is presented. But the reality is lacking, Ior the
powers in deIence and external aIIairs necessarily, as matters stand, given to the governor-general limit vitally the scope oI
ministerial activity, and the measure oI representation given to the rulers oI the Indian States negatives any possibility oI
even the beginnings oI democratic control. It will be a matter oI the utmost interest to watch the development oI a Iorm oI
government so unique; certainly, iI it operates successIully, the highest credit will be due to the political capacity oI Indian
leaders, who have inIinitely more serious diIIiculties to Iace than had the colonial statesmen who evolved the system oI
selI-government which has now culminated in Dominion status.
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Lord Lothian, in a talk lasting Iorty-Iive minutes, came straight out with his view on the Bill:
"I agree with the diehards that it has been a surrender. You who are not used to any constitution cannot realise what great
power you are going to wield. II you look at the constitution it looks as iI all the powers are vested in the Governor-
General and the Governor. But is not every power here vested in the King? Everything is done in the name oI the King but
does the King ever interIere? Once the power passes into the hands oI the legislature, the Governor or the Governor-
General is never going to interIere. .The Civil Service will be helpIul. You too will realise this. Once a policy is laid
down they will carry it out loyally and IaithIully. We could not help it. We had to Iight the diehards here. You could not
realise what great courage has been shown by Mr. Baldwin and Sir Samuel Hoare. We did not want to spare the diehards
as we had to talk in a diIIerent language. These various meetings and in due course G.D. (Birla), beIore his return in
September, met virtually everyone oI importance in Anglo-Indian aIIairs conIirmed G.D.'s original opinion that the
diIIerences between the two countries were largely psychological, the same proposals open to diametrically opposed
interpretations. He had not, probably, taken in beIore his visit how considerable, in the eyes oI British conservatives, the
concessions had been. II nothing else, successive conversations made clear to G.D. that the agents oI the Bill had at least
as heavy odds against them at home as they had in India.
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|edit|False Equivalences
"The law, in its majestic equality, Iorbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal bread."
|5|

Under the Act, British citizens resident in the UK and British companies registered in the UK must be treated on the
same basis as Indian citizens and Indian registered companies unless UK law denies reciprocal treatment. The
unIairness oI this arrangement is clear when one considers the dominant position oI British capital in much oI the
Indian modern sector and the complete dominance, maintained through unIair commercial practices, oI UK shipping
interests in both India`s international and coastal shipping traIIic and the utter insigniIicance oI Indian capital in
Britain and the non-existence oI Indian involvement in shipping to or within the UK. There are very detailed
provisions requiring the Viceroy to intervene iI, in his unappealable view, any India law or regulation is intended to,
or will in Iact, discriminate against UK resident British subjects, British registered companies and, particularly,
British shipping interests.
'The Joint Committee considered a suggestion that trade with Ioreign countries should be made by the Minister oI
Commerce, but it decided that all negotiations with Ioreign countries should be conducted by the Foreign OIIice or
Department oI External AIIairs as they are in the United Kingdom. In concluding agreements oI this character, the Foreign
Secretary always consults the Board oI Trade and it was assumed that the Governor-General would in like manner consult
the Minister oI Commerce in India. This may be true, but the analogy itselI is Ialse. In the United Kingdom, both
departments are subject to the same legislative control, whereas in India one is responsible to the Iederal legislature and
the other to the Imperial Parliament.
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|edit|ritish Political Needs vs. Indian onstitutional Needs - the Ongoing Dysfunction
From the moment oI the Montagu statement oI 1917, it was vital that the reIorm process stay ahead oI the curve iI
the British were to hold the strategic initiative. However, imperialist sentiment, and a lack oI realism, in British
political circles made this impossible. Thus the grudging conditional concessions oI power in the Acts oI 1919 and
1935 caused more resentment and signally Iailed to win the Raj the backing oI inIluential groups in India which it
desperately needed. In 1919 the Act oI 1935, or even the Simon Commission plan would have been well received.
There is evidence that Montagu would have backed something oI this sort but his cabinet colleagues would not have
considered it. By 1935, a constitution establishing a Dominion oI India, comprising the British Indian provinces
might have been acceptable in India though it would not have passed the British Parliament.
Considering the balance oI power in the Conservative party at the time, the passing oI a Bill more liberal than that which
was enacted in 1935 is inconceivable.`
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|edit|Provincial Part of the Act
The provincial part oI the Act, which went into eIIect automatically, basically Iollowed the recommendations oI
the Simon Commission. Provincial dyarchy was abolished; that is, all provincial portIolios were to be placed in
charge oI ministers enjoying the support oI the provincial legislatures. The British-appointed provincial governors,
who were responsible to the British Government via the Viceroy and Secretary oI State Ior India, were to accept the
recommendations oI the ministers unless, in their view, they negatively aIIected his areas oI statutory 'special
responsibilities such as the prevention oI any grave menace to the peace or tranquility oI a province and the
saIeguarding oI the legitimate interests oI minorities. In the event oI political breakdown, the governor, under the
supervision oI the Viceroy, could take over total control oI the provincial government. This, in Iact, allowed the
governors a more untrammeled control than any British oIIicial had enjoyed in the history oI the Raj. AIter the
resignation oI the congress provincial ministries in 1939, the governors did directly rule the ex-Congress provinces
throughout the war.
It was generally recognized, that the provincial part oI the Act, conIerred a great deal oI power and patronage on
provincial politicians as long as both British oIIicials and Indian politicians played by the rules. However, the
paternalistic threat oI the intervention by the British governor rankled. that was also a healty sign Ior muslims
|edit|Federal Part of the Act
Unlike the provincial portion oI the Act, the Federal portion was to go into eIIect only when halI the States by
weight agreed to Iederate. This never happened and the establishment oI the Federation was indeIinitely postponed
aIter the outbreak oI the Second World War.
|edit|Terms of the Act
The Act provided Ior Dyarchy at the Centre. The British Government, in the person oI the Secretary oI State Ior
India, through the Governor-General oI India Viceroy oI India, would continue to control India`s Iinancial
obligations, deIence, Ioreign aIIairs and the British Indian Armyand would make the key appointments to
the Reserve Bank oI India (exchange rates) and Railway Board and the Act stipulated that no Iinance bill could be
placed in the Central Legislature without the consent oI the Governor General. The Iunding Ior the British
responsibilities and Ioreign obligations (eg. loan repayments, pensions), at least 80 percent oI the Iederal
expenditures, would be non-votable and be taken oII the top beIore any claims could be considered Ior (Ior example)
social or economic development programs. The Viceroy, under the supervision oI the Secretary oI State Ior India,
was provided with overriding and certiIying powers that could, theoretically, have allowed him to rule
autocratically.
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|edit|Objectives of the ritish Government
The Iederal part oI the Act was designed to meet the aims oI the Conservative Party. Over the very long term, the
Conservative leadership expected the Act to lead to a nominally dominion status India, conservative in outlook,
dominated by an alliance oI Hindu princes and right-wing Hindus which would be well disposed to place itselI
under the guidance and protection oI the United Kingdom. In the medium term, the Act was expected to (in rough
order oI importance):
in the support of moderate nationalists since its Iormal aim was to lead eventually to a Dominion oI
India which, as deIined under the Statute oI Westminster 1931 virtually equalled independence;
retain ritish of control of the Indian Army, Indian finances and India`s foreign relations Ior another
generation;
in Muslim support by conceding most oI Jinnah's Fourteen Points
|8|
;
convince the Princes to join the Federation by giving the Princes conditions Ior entry never likely to be
equaled. It was expected that enough would join to allow the establishment oI the Federation. The terms oIIered
to the Princes included:

The Princes would select their state`s representatives in the Federal Legislature. There would be
no pressure Ior them to democratize their administrations or allow elections Ior state`s representatives in
the Federal Legislature;

The Princes would enjoy heavy weightage. The Princely States represented about a quarter oI the
population oI India and produced well under a quarter oI its wealth. Under the Act:


The Upper House oI the Federal Legislature, the Council oI State, would consist oI 260
members (156 (60) elected Irom the British India and 104 (40) nominated by the rulers oI the
princely states) and,


The Lower House, the Federal Assembly, would consist oI 375 members (250 (67)
elected by the Legislative Assemblies oI the British Indian provinces; 125 (33) nominated by the
rulers oI the princely states.)
ensuring that the ongress could never rule alone or gain enough seats to bring don the
government
This was done by over-representing the Princes,giving every possible minority,the right to separately vote Ior
candidates belonging to their respective communities(see separate electorate), and by making the executive
theoretically, but not practically, removable by the legislature.
|edit|Gambles Taken by the ritish Government
'iability of the proposed Federation. It was hoped that the gerrymandered Iederation, encompassing
units oI such hugely diIIerent sizes, sophistication and varying in Iorms oI government Irom autocratic Princely
States to democratic provinces, could provide the basis Ior a viable state. However, this was not a realistic
possibility (see eg. The Making oI India`s Paper Federation, 1927-35 in Moore 1988). In reality, the Federation,
as planned in the Act, almost certainly was not viable and would have rapidly broken down with the British leIt
to pick up the pieces without any viable alternative.
Princes $eeing and Acting in Their On Long-Range est Interests - That the Princes would see that
their best hope Ior a Iuture would lie in rapidly joining and becoming a united block without which no group
could hope, mathematically, to wield power. However, the princes did not join, and thus exercising the veto
provided by the Act, prevented the Federation Irom coming into existence. Among the reasons Ior the Princes
staying out were:

They did not have the Ioresight to realize that this was their only chance Ior a Iuture;

Congress had begun, and would continue, agitating Ior democratic reIorms within the Princely
States. Since the one common concern oI the 600 or so Princes was their desire to continue to rule their
states without interIerence, this was indeed a mortal threat. It was on the cards that this would lead
eventually to more democratic state regimes and the election oI states` representatives in the Federal
Legislature. In all likelihood these representatives would be largely Congressmen. Had the Federation been
established, the election oI states` representatives in the Federal Legislature would amount to a Congress
coup Irom the inside. Thus, contrary to their oIIicial position that the British would look Iavorably on the
democratization oI the Princely States, their plan required that the States remain autocratic. This reIlects a
deep contradiction on British views oI India and its Iuture.
At a banquet in the princely state oI Benares Hailey observed that although the new Iederal constitution would protect
their position in the central government, the internal evolution oI the states themselves remained uncertain. Most people
seemed to expect them to develop representative institutions. Whether those alien graIts Irom Westminster would succeed
in British India, however, itselI remained in doubt. Autocracy was "a principle which is Iirmly seated in the Indian States,"
he pointed out; "round it burn the sacred Iires oI an age-long tradition," and it should be given a Iair chance Iirst.
Autocratic rule, "inIormed by wisdom, exercised in moderation, and vitalized by a spirit oI service to the interests oI the
subject, may well prove that it can make an appeal in India as strong as that oI representative and responsible institutions."
This spirited deIense brings to mind Nehru's classic paradox oI how the representatives oI the advanced, dynamic West
allied themselves with the most reactionary Iorces oI the backward, stagnant East.`
|9|

Under the Act,
There are a number oI restrictions on the Ireedom oI discussion in the Iederal legislature. For example the act Iorbids ...
any discussion oI, or the asking oI questions about, a matter connected with an Indian State, other than a matter with
respect to which the Iederal legislature has power to make laws Ior that state, unless the Governor-General in his discretion
is satisIied that the matter aIIects Iederal interests or aIIects a British subject, and has given his consent to the matter being
discussed or the question being asked.`
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They were not a cohesive group and probably realized that they would never act as one.

Each Prince seemed consumed by the desire to gain the best deal Ior himselI were his state to join
the Federation the most money, the most autonomy.
That enough as being offered at the entre to in the support of moderate nationalist Hindu and
Muslim support. In Iact, so little was oIIered that all signiIicant groups in British India rejected and denounced
the proposed Federation. A major contributing Iactor was the continuing distrust oI British intentions Ior which
there was considerable basis in Iact. In this vital area the Act Iailed Irwin`s test:
I don't believe that. it is impossible to present the problem in such a Iorm as would make the shop window look
respectable Irom an Indian point oI view, which is really what they care about, while keeping your hand pretty Iirmly on
the things that matter.` (Irwin to Stonehaven, 12 November 1928)
That the ider electorate ould turn against the ongress. In Iact, the 1937 elections showed
overwhelming support Ior Congress among the Hindu electorate.
That by giving Indian politicians a great deal of poer at the provincial level, hile denying them,
responsibility at the entre, it as hoped that ongress, the only national party, ould disintegrate into a
series of provincial fiefdoms. In Iact, the congress High Command was able to control the provincial ministries
and to Iorce their resignation in 1939. The Act showed the strength and cohesion oI Congress and probably
strengthened it. This does not imply that Congress was not made up oI, and Iound its support in, various
sometimes competing interests and groups. Rather, it recognizes the ability oI Congress, unlike the British Raj,
to maintain the cooperation and support oI most oI these groups even iI, Ior example, in the Iorced resignation
oI Congress provincial ministries in 1939 and the rejection oI the Cripps OIIer in 1942, this required a negative
policy harmIul, in the long-run, to the prospects Ior an independent India which would be both united and
democratic.
|edit|Indian Reaction to the Proposed Federation
No signiIicant group in India accepted the Federal portion oI the Act. A typical response was:
AIter all, there are Iive aspects oI every Government worth the name: (a) The right oI external and internal deIence and
all measures Ior that purpose; (b) The right to control our external relations; (c) The right to control our currency and
exchange; (d) The right to control our Iiscal policy; (e) the day-to-day administration oI the land.. (Under the Act) You
shall have nothing to do with external aIIairs. You shall have nothing to do with deIence. You shall have nothing to do, or,
Ior all practical purposes in Iuture, you shall have nothing to do with your currency and exchange, Ior indeed the Reserve
Bank Bill just passed has a Iurther reservation in the Constitution that no legislation may be undertaken with a view to
substantially alter the provisions oI that Act except with the consent oI the Governor-General.. there is no real power
conIerred in the Centre.` (Speech by Mr Bhulabhai DESAI on the Report oI the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Indian
Constitutional ReIorm, 4 February 1935
|10|
.
However, the Liberals, and even elements in the Congress were tepidly willing to give it a go:
'Linlithgow asked Sapru whether he thought there was a satisIactory alternative to the scheme oI the 1935 Act. Sapru
replied that they should stand Iast on the Act and the Iederal plan embodied in it. It was not ideal but at this stage it was
the only thing.. A Iew days aIter Sapru's visit Birla came to see the Viceroy. He thought that Congress was moving
towards acceptance oI Federation. Gandhi was not over-worried, said Birla, by the reservation oI deIence and external
aIIairs to the centre, but was concentrating on the method oI choosing the States' representatives. Birla wanted the Viceroy
to help Gandhi by persuading a number oI Princes to move towards democratic election oI representatives. .Birla then
said that the only chance Ior Federation lay in agreement between Government and Congress and the best hope oI this lay
in discussion between the Viceroy and Gandhi.
|11||12|

|edit|The Working of the Act
The British government sent out Lord Linlithgow as the new viceroy with the remit oI bringing the Act into eIIect.
Linlithgow was intelligent, extremely hard working, honest, serious and determined to make a success out oI the
Act. However, he was also unimaginative, stolid, legalistic and Iound it very diIIicult to "get on terms" with people
outside his immediate circle.
In 1937, aIter a great deal oI conIrontation, Provincial Autonomy commenced. From that point until the declaration
oI war in 1939, Linlithgow tirelessly tried to get enough oI the Princes to accede to launch the Federation. In this he
received only the weakest backing Irom the Home Government and in the end the Princes rejected the Federation 03
2,880. In September 1939, Linlithgow simply declared that India was at war with Germany. Though Linlithgow's
behaviour was constitutionally correct it was also oIIensive to much oI Indian opinion. This led directly to the
resignation oI the Congress provincial ministries which undermined Indian unity.
From 1939, Linlithgow concentrated on supporting the war eIIort.

Government of India Act 1935

1905-1940
The Struggle for Freedom
Partition of Bengal [1905-1911]
Simla Deputation [1906]
Establishment of All India Muslim
League [1906]
Minto-Morley Reforms
The Lucknow Pact [1916]
Montague-Chelmsford Reforms
Khilafat Movement [1919-1924]
Simon Commission [1927]
Delhi Muslim Proposals [1927]
Nehru Report [1928]
All Parties Muslim Conference
Fourteen Points of M. A. Jinnah [1929]
Allahabad Address [1930]
Round Table Conferences [1930-33]
The Communal Award [1932]
Government of India Act 1935
Rule of Congress Ministries [1937-
1939]
The Ideology of Pakistan: Two-Nation
Theory

Personalities
Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk
Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk
Syed Ameer Ali
Maulana Shaukat Ali
Aga Khan III
Maulana Muhammad Ali Jouhar
Allama Iqbal
Choudhary Rahmat Ali

After
the
failure
of the
Third
Round
Table
Confer
ence,
the
British
govern
ment
gave
the
Joint
Select
Comm
ittee
the
task of
formul
ating
the
new
Act for
India. The Committee comprised of 16 members each from
the House of Commons and House of Lords, 20
representatives from British India and seven from the
princely states. Lord Linlithgow was appointed as the
president of the Committee. After a year and a half of
deliberations, the Committee finally came out with a draft Bill
on February 5, 1935. The Bill was discussed in the House of
Commons for 43 days and in the House of Lords for 13 days
and finally, after being signed by the King, was enforced as
the Government of India Act, 1935, in July 1935.

Nehru, whose Congress won a majority in the 1937
elections
The main features of the Act of 1935 were:
1. A Federation of India was promised for, comprising both
provinces and states. The provisions of the Act establishing
the federal central government were not to go into operation
until a specified number of rulers of states had signed
Instruments of Accession. Since, this did not happen, the
central government continued to function in accordance with
the 1919 Act and only the part of the 1935 Act dealing with
the provincial governments went into operation.
2. The Governor General remained the head of the central
administration and enjoyed wide powers concerning
administration, legislation and finance.
3. No finance bill could be placed in the Central Legislature
without the consent of the Governor General.
4. The Federal Legislature was to consist of two houses, the
Council of State (Upper House) and the Federal Assembly
(Lower House).
5. The Council of State was to consist of 260 members, out
of whom 156 were to be elected from the British India and
104 to be nominated by the rulers of princely states.
6. The Federal Assembly was to consist of 375 members; out
of which 250 were to be elected by the Legislative
Assemblies of the British Indian provinces while 125 were to
be nominated by the rulers of princely states.
7. The Central Legislature had the right to pass any bill, but
the bill required the approval of the Governor General before
it became Law. On the other hand Governor General had the
power to frame ordinances.
8. The Indian Council was abolished. In its place, few
advisers were nominated to help the Secretary of State for
India.
9. The Secretary of State was not expected to interfere in
matters that the Governor dealt with, with the help of Indian
Ministers.
10. The provinces were given autonomy with respect to
subjects delegated to them.
11. Diarchy, which had been established in the provinces by
the Act of 1919, was to be established at the Center.
However it came to an end in the provinces.
12. Two new provinces Sindh and Orissa were created.
13. Reforms were introduced in N. W. F. P. as were in the
other provinces.
14. Separate electorates were continued as before.
15. One-third Muslim representation in the Central
Legislature was guaranteed.
16. Autonomous provincial governments in 11 provinces,
under ministries responsible to legislatures, would be setup.
17. Burma and Aden were separated from India.
18. The Federal Court was established in the Center.
19. The Reserve Bank of India was established.
Both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League
opposed the Act, but participated in the provincial elections
of winter 1936-37, conducted under stipulations of the Act.
At the time of independence, the two dominions of India and
Pakistan accepted the Act of 1935, with few amendments, as
their provisional constitution.