Women's Studies International Forum 34 (2011) 349359

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Women's Studies International Forum

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / w s i f

From Tichels to hair bands: Modern orthodox women and the practice of head covering
Valeria Seigelshifer , Tova Hartman
Bar Ilan University, Department of Gender Studies, Israel

a r t i c l e

i n f o

s y n o p s i s
Over the past fifteen years, cultural practices involving the covering of women's heads have been discussed extensively in academic and popular discourse. Although the practice of head covering can be easily interpreted as one of the various forms of the regulation of women's bodies within religious systems, such an understanding, leaves unanswered, perhaps unasked how women living in traditional cultures experience their commitments. In this paper, we examine the experiences of modern orthodox women vis vis the practice of head covering. What emerges from women's narratives is a multivalent and nuanced experience in which the commitment to halakha and the search for self expression are in a permanent and dynamic interplay. Characterized by a high degree of cultural reflection, rather than living in a state of false consciousness, the experience of these women points to a conscious decision to embrace tradition without the need to silence conflict. 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Available online 17 June 2011

Three years ago, we were invited to a Tichel1 party, an evening held by young religious women to celebrate the coming marriage of a friend. The bride's friends bring presents usually head scarves that the bride will use as head coverings after the marriage. Presents are only one element of the encounter: a Tichel party also may include games, songs, and blessings embracing the social, emotional, and sometimes sexual aspects of the post-matrimonial period. In many ways, the Tichel party can be seen as the religious equivalent of a bachelorette party in western secular society. As women, what we found interesting about this ritual was the excitement at the party about what seemed to us, on the face of it, quite unattractivethe practice of covering one's hair. Taking into account the signicant place of hair in a person's looks, and the centrality of appearance in our visual era, we wondered how these women could be willing to put so much of themselves aside for a religious commandment. Celebrating the passage from singlehood to married life seems understandable as a common cultural custom in the western world, especially given the status of married women

Corresponding author. 0277-5395/$ see front matter 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2011.05.006

in general, and [Israeli and] Israeli religious society in particular (see Bartuv, 2003; Chasteen, 1994; Iagan, 1997; Katz & Peres, 1986; Sapir, 1993; Sered, 2000; Shtul, 2003). And yet, the focus of the party on the Tichel itself as the symbol of marriage, and the fact that from the wedding henceforth, the bride would be covering her hair, led us to think that something was going on here that we wanted to understand more deeply. As feminist researchers, we generally regard the practice of head covering as one of the various forms of structured regulation of women's bodies within religious patriarchies. We do not maintain, of course, that regulation of the female body is exclusive to religious cultures. Rather, we see the practice of head covering as Orthodox Judaism's version of this familiar patriarchal device. 2 At the end of this party, when most of the young women had left, the bride-to-be was anxious to try on some of the scarves she had received as head coverings. Tami, a married friend, reacted by making a comment that continues to reverberate in our ears: Enjoy your hair now, because you will have to cover it for the rest of your life. It was then that we realized that the story might be more complex than what rst appeared at the merry party.

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Tami's words shed light on a distinction that had been blurred during the whole evening: the difference between the Tichel as a cultural object symbolizing belonging and social achievement, and the experience of hair covering, which is literally a demand to cover a part of one's body because of a change in a social status (i.e. getting married). Head covering, besides being a sign of belonging to a community, functions as a symbol of successful fulllment of a developmentalreligious ideal, namely, the passage from girlhood to married life. Whereas marriage as a successful, socially sanctioned development elicits positive feelings, the covering over of a part of the self can be experienced in a more complex manner. This distinction between hair covering as a positive religious and social marker on the one hand, and as a more difcult daily practice on the other hand, did not seem to be anticipated in the conversation of the future bride. Interestingly, this distinction has not been discussed at length either in popular or in academic discussions on the bodily practices of religious women. Over the past fteen years, cultural practices involving the covering of women's heads have been discussed extensively in academic and popular discourse. The feminist critique of the practice of head covering maintains that head covering is a regulatory norm aiming to control and constrict women's bodies. Through the practice of head covering women are systematically taught that something is inherently wrong with their bodies, that they should be ashamed of them, and that they should therefore cover them. In addition, the act of covering the head as a consequence of a change in marital status is a way of reminding women of one of the basic patriarchal laws: women have no independent status, but belong to or are subordinated to the authority of the men in their lives (their fathers or husbands). (See Arthur, 1999; Daly, 1999; Eilberg-Schwartz & Doniger, 1995; Nussbaum, 1999; Okin, 1999; Polhemus, 1978; Sanday, 1982; Turner, 1996; Weiss, 2009). Still, multicultural feminists claim that in order to understand a cultural practice and its impact on women's lives, we should listen to the women themselves in order to learn how they negotiate the cultural practices that regulate their lives and through which they dene themselves. (See Abdulhadi, 1998; Bulbeck, 1998; Collins, 1991; Kandiyoti, 1988; Margolis, 1993; Mohanty, 1988, 2002; Tong, 1998; Whelehan, 1995). The academic literature on head covering usually refers to the experience of Muslim women3 (Ahmed, 1992; Daly, 1999; El Guindi, 1999; Ghazal Read & Bartkowski, 2000; Hoodfar, 2001; Lorasda, 2009; Marshall Gul, 2005; Mohanty, 1988, 2002; Smith, 1987; Werner, 1997; Zuhur, 1992). Very few works have been written about the subjective experience of Jewish women who cover their heads (Marmon, 2001, 2006; Schreiber, 2003; Zalcberg, 2007). Israel is a particularly interesting place to learn about this practice since women who cover their heads and belong to different religious groups and afliations live in proximity to one another. There are two other groups of women, besides modern Orthodox Jewish (or religious Zionist) women, who cover their heads for religious reasons: ultra-Orthodox Jewish and religious Muslim women. Thus, the practice of head covering, which is unusual in the secular west, is carried out in the Israeli context not only by women who belong to

different cultures, but by women who have quite different lifestyles. 4 In her pioneering work on the symbolic signicance of the body, Douglas (1966, 1970) treats the body as a text reecting social norms and values. Feminist theorists writing after Douglas have shown not only that the body represents social norms, but that bodily practices also act as mechanisms of social power and control (Bartky, 1990; Bordo, 1993, 1997; Weitz, 1998, 2004). Shilling (1993) emphasizes the social character of the body arguing that culturally specic meanings are needed in order to enable people to act competently and comprehensibly in the world. In addition, scholars have emphasized the individual's capacity to contribute to the creation of social meaning through bodily practices (Reischer & Koo, 2004). In recent decades, the body has been theorized at once as a vehicle for the imposition of social, political, and economic forces onto individuals and groups and [as] a vehicle for resistance to these forces (Reischer & Koo, 2004, p. 308). Therefore, women's bodily practices not only function as a mechanism that mirrors women's position in culture, but offer a powerful means for negotiating, redening, and reconceptualizing that position (Reischer & Koo, 2004, p. 315). How women belonging to different religious afliations engage with a bodily practice that demands that they cover themselves, which appears at rst sight to be an oppressive request, points to the values women embrace and the compromises they make in the process of negotiating and constructing their gender identity within their specic cultural context. This article will try to shed light on the complexity of the experience of modern Orthodox Israeli women vis vis the practice of head covering. Our aim is to offer an analysis that speaks to the apparent gap between the way the practice of head covering is interpreted by feminist theory and the need to listen closely to the voices of the actual women who cover their heads, as advocated by feminist methodologies 5 (Gluck & Patai, 1991; Hoodfar, 2001; hooks, 1989, 1990; Kandiyoti, 1988; Mohanty, 1988; Tova Hartman, 2002; Tova Hartman and Marmon, 2004). By focusing this study on women's voices and allowing their experiences to shed new light on existing theoretical concepts, we join several authors who have also emphasized the nuanced character of the experiences of modern women living in traditional cultures (Avishai, 2008a, 2008b; El Or, 1994, 2002; Joseph, 1999; Lorasda, 2009; Moallen, 2005; Narayan, 1997). Modern and orthodox in contemporary Israel: living at the crossroads of cultures Israeli Jewish society is composed of a secular majority, whereas 22% of its population denes itself as religious or Orthodox. Within the religious population there are two main groups: ultra-Orthodox 6 representing approximately 7% of the religious population, and the National Religious (dati leumi) or modern Orthodox sector, representing approximately 15% of the entire Jewish population in Israel (Levy, Levinson, & Katz, 2002; Sheleg, 2000). 7 The women who participated in this study dene themselves as modern Orthodox women. Modern Orthodoxy is a movement within Judaism, based on the assumption that a total commitment to the laws of the Torah (halakha), can be

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integrated and even be enriched, by its intersection with modernity (Berman, 2001). As modern Orthodoxy attempts to synthesize the observance of Jewish law with the secular modern world, individuals dening themselves as modern Orthodox are situated at the crossroads of overlapping cultures, traditional Judaism, and the modern secular west. This positioning demands a permanent negotiation between truths and loyalties that are sometimes opposed and equally compelling. Orthodox people live according to the norms and dictates of a traditional legal system, accepting the hegemony of the rabbinical authorities in the interpretation of Jewish canonical texts and laws. Unlike the ultra-Orthodox sector, they are not secluded from the larger secular environment that is characterized by technological and cultural aspects of post-industrialized societies. Modern Orthodox people live in the same urban area as secular people, often in mixed neighborhoods. The majority of their children study in mixed-sex primary schools that belong to the religious state education subsystem, and in sex-segregated middle and high schools belonging to the same subsystem. 8 Men usually serve in the Israeli army, and an estimated 22.5% of girls who graduate from the religious state education subsystem also enroll in the army. Usually Orthodox girls who do not serve in the army participate in the national service, which is a framework wherein modern Orthodox girls do community work for a year or two in the areas of education, health, welfare, and immigration absorption (Lotan & Vurgan, 2007). Many modern Orthodox people study in universities with others who have different beliefs, behaviors, and worldviews and who form the majority of the group. In contrast with ultra-Orthodox women who engage with the secular world mainly for instrumental motives, the women interviewed claim many of the values of the secular modern world, and often live in tension as they attempt to balance their different allegiances (El-Or, 1994, 2002; Tova Hartman, 2002, 2007). Commandment to cover the head 9 Although both Orthodox Jewish men and women are commanded to cover their heads, this highly gendered practice is drastically different for men and women, at both the symbolic and the practical level. Orthodox men start covering their heads by the age of three or four with a kippah or yarmulke, 10 following the commandment always to have a reminder that God is above them 11; this covering is therefore a means of honoring God. As with women, men's head covering is a symbol of group belonging, and it is sometime taken as an indicator of different levels of religiosity (the larger the kippah, the more observant the wearer). We have noted that Orthodox Jewish law requires women to cover their heads once married.12 This commandment is often understood as part of the broader subject of modesty laws called Tzniut, which refers to a set of guiding principles that dictate the appropriate way to dress and behave. In contemporary Orthodox Jewish jargon, however, the term Tzniut is usually reduced from its general-inclusive meaning, and it is used to apply primarily (although not exclusively) to the responsibilities of religious women and girls, through their behavior and especially through their dress, to mute the inexorably arousing effects of their feminine presence on the

overweening sex drives of the men around them (Tova Hartman, 2007). In traditional Judaism, a woman's hair is considered Ervah (Berachot, 24a) or a nakedness that equals an erotic stimulus, and for this reason must be covered (Gordon, 1997; Henkin, 2003; Melamed, 1994; Schiller, 1995). In addition, head covering clearly positions a woman as married, as belonging to one man, and as sexually unavailable to all others. Thus, although the bodies of men and women are controlled by practices of covering, the manifestations and rationales are completely different. Men's head covering is related to a positive and intimate relation with God, practiced since childhood, whereas women's head covering is practiced after marriage and marks a part of her body as dangerously erotic and her status as belonging to one man and being forbidden to all others.13 While within Orthodox communities it is widely accepted that covering hair is an obligatory law (even though in practice previous generations of women did not cover their hair), there are a number of interpretations regarding how much, where, and when women should cover their hair. All sources agree that women must cover their hair in public places, but there is some disagreement about whether they should cover their hair inside their homes (Broyde & Krakowski, 1991; Fox, 2003; Gordon, 1997; Henkin, 2003; Melamed, 1994; Shapiro, 1990). Some sources maintain that every single strand of hair must be covered, while others allow a hand's breadth of hair (called a Tefach) to be seen. Modern Orthodox women cover their hair with scarves (Tichels), kerchiefs, wigs (Shaitels), hats, berets, baseball caps, and bandanas. The amount of hair that is covered varies from all the hair, leaving a hand's breadth of hair uncovered, to a ponytail, to long unbound hair uncovered, with just a small kerchief as head covering. Women who cover their hair in this way claim that it is not how much is being covered but the fact that they are wearing something on their head, that is an identity marker of their status as Orthodox and married women. Hair covering as a visible marker of distinction between religious and secular women has also become an identifying marker between different afliations or subdivisions within the religious community. Each grouping has a tenaciously specic code of dress 14 and hair covering, which may not be visible to an external eye but is very clear to those living within a religious context. In addition, sometimes the type of hair covering and the amount of hair left uncovered have come to represent an implicit measure of the woman's adherence to religious laws (Frunmkeit). (See Berkovic, 1999; Goldman Carrel, 1999; Schreiber, 2003; Zalcberg, 2006, 2007). Head covering has certainly come to symbolize an identity marker among groups in modern Orthodoxy. Methodology The authors conducted one-on-one, in-depth, personal interviews with 16 self-dened modern Orthodox Jewish Israeli women, about their experiences with head covering. All had been married no more than ve years. The initial group of participants was contacted directly on the basis of personal acquaintance. These women recommended other women who agreed to join the study (the snowballing technique). The women interviewed are young, educated,

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middle-class women living in Jerusalem and in the center of the country. They range in age from 23 to 29 and all hold at least one academic degree (e.g., a B.A). Most of them are graduate students in master's or Ph.D. programs at two of the major universities in Israel. Thus, the women who participated in this study are highly educated and self-aware. In addition, as a result of their various activities (mainly studies and work) they are exposed on a daily basis to overt and covert feminist discourse. This unique group of women is certainly not representative of either modern Orthodoxy in general or Israeli Orthodox women in particular. Nevertheless, given the limititation of generalization in qualitative research, we found that interviewing these women was interesting because of their high level of reexivity in dealing with complex issues such as the competing values inherent in a practice such as head covering. The strengh of this study as with qualitative research in general does not rely on its being representative, but on its ability to resonate with women's lives (Borland, 1991; Josselson, 1996). We began the interviews with questions about the women's decision-making process and about their experiences of hair covering. For example, we asked: Could you tell me how you decided that you would cover your hair? Did you discuss this issue with others, such as your mother, a friend, a rabbi, or your husband? Now that you have been covering your hair for a while, do you feel the same way you felt at the beginning? Did you ever nd yourself in a place where you felt you needed to justify to others the fact that you are covering your hair? These questions led to further questions that emerged from the participants' narratives. The interviews were semi-structured in order to allow the participants to express themselves freely and to give both interviewer and respondent sufcient time and comfort to explore complex issues and to clarify ambiguous meanings (Josselson, 1996; Lindlof, 1995; Polkinghorne, 1988). The analysis of the interviews is based on the process of grounded theory development (see Chamraz, 1995, 2000; Strauss & Cobrin, 1994, 1998), as well as on elements of Gilligan's voice-centered analysis (Brown and Gilligan, 1992; Jack, 1991), which emphasizes the signicance of linguistic cues such as repeated metaphors and switches in the use of personal pronouns. Since, as Devault (1990, p. 96) observes, language itself reects male experiences and its categories are often incongruent with women's lives, women usually tend to mute their own thoughts and feelings especially when their experiences do not t the dominant, most often described normal reaction to cultural practices (Brown & Gilligan, 1992; Gilligan, 1982, 1990, 1995, 2002; Gilligan, Rogers, & Tolman, 1991; Jack, 1991; Miller, 1976). Therefore, when listening to women's voices, we tried to listen in stereo, that is, we paid special attention to both the dominant and the muted channelsone framed in concepts and values that reect men's dominant position in culture, and one informed by the more immediate realities of women's personal experiences (Anderson & Jack, 1991). The interviewer as insider/outsider As women who are sympathetic and often participants in Jewish Orthodox life but who do not and would not cover

their hair, we researchers are positioned as outsiders in relation to the women who participated in the study. LomskyFeder (1996, p. 234) describes this situation as similar to that of a stranger: The stranger has contacts with others, and these contacts may be intensive and even intimate, but he or she cannot penetrate the group itself or blur his or her separate position. Similarly, Geertz (1986, p. 274) describes the predicament of anthropologists studying different cultures as learning to grasp what we cannot embrace. Therefore, although we are not members of a different culture, we are aware of both our similarities to and differences from the women we interviewed. Discussion From Law to self: Women's engagement with the practice of head covering The Law: It was always clear that I would cover My hair The focus on the decision-making process (in other words, how women decided that they would cover their heads) provides a special vantage point to examine the nuanced negotiations women make while adopting this practice. For Orthodox women who give an authoritative status to religious laws (halakha), the commandment to cover their hair is perceived in the majority of the cases as uncontroversial. Although many have doubts regarding how and when they will cover their heads, for most of them it was clear that once married they would cover their hair. Women emphasize the obligatory character of the law and its being part of a comprehensive and compelling legal system which cannot be interpreted as they please. They frequently use verbs such as must, have to, or need to in connoting duty. Shimrit: It was clear that I would cover my head, it was clear to me, it is important, it is Deoraita 15; that is to say, there is no option; it is a mustit is something important that I cannot decide easilynot to do. It is important to notice that when Shimrit speaks in the rst-person voice she invokes the possibility of not covering her head in the rst place. It may be that she would like to be able not to cover her head, but since it is a clear religious commandment, it is something she cannot decide easilynot to do. For the women we interviewed, it is evident that they are not the ones who set the rules; they know that their subjective will at least at this stage of the decision-making process is irrelevant to the decision of whether or not to cover their heads. A few women, while framing their decision to cover their hair in the compulsory character of the law, add a more personal motive that stems from their understanding of what it entails to be a religious woman. For these women, the decision to cover their hair derives not only from a commitment to a religious legal system but from the understanding that if one adopts the identity of a religious woman, one must perform in a certain way (Avishai, 2008b; Butler, 1990). Not covering the hair is viewed as a kind of contradiction. In Miriam's words, if you are a religious person you must cover your hair it is a kind of personal

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integrity. Gilligan's voice-centered analysis suggests that switches in the use of personal pronouns might point to a conict between the self how one feels and cultural demandsthat is, how one ought to behave or feel. Miriam's use of the second-person voice when referring to her decision to cover her hair discloses this disparity. It can be heard also in Dana's narrative: I always knew that I would cover my hair. it seems there wasn't much way for me to get out of itIf I dene myself as religiousI didn't feel there was room in the halakha to say one wouldn't cover the hair there wasn't the ambiguity that one had to do it. The discourse that emerges from women's narratives is at rst glance highly reminiscent of Jack's (1991, p. 94) analysis of the relationship between women's inner voice the I voice and society's cultural voicethe Over-eye voice. The rst person voice is the self that speaks from experience, that knows from observation. This voice says, I want, I know, I feel, I see, I think I will call it the I, the authentic selfThe other voicesounds like a third person voice, not because it never uses the pronoun I, but because it speaks to the I. It says one should; you can't; you ought; I shouldI will call this third person voice the Over-eye, because of its surveillant, vigilant, denitively moral quality. Other women perceive the commandment to cover the head as more integral to their identity. When talking about the decision to cover their hair, they speak less about the law and more about themselves, namely about how the decision to cover their hair derives from an inner sensation and not from a strict obedience of the law. Leah says: It was very clear to me that I would cover my hairIt suits me; I felt it was right. Although I wear pants, I feel okay [about this] from an halakhic perspective, and without a hair covering, I would not feel okay halakhically. It is not that I asked a rabbi; it is an internal sensation that I don't feel comfortable to dene myself as religious and not to cover my hairAt the end of the day, it is a decision from the gut; it is not something rational. I think it is better this wayI think it is not simply because I am a conformist.It is better for me in this way. In contrast to the previous respondents who stated that it was clear to them that they would cover their hair because that is the law, Leah speaks in the rst-person voice it suits me; I felt it was right. Immediately, as a way of clarifying that she is the one who determines what it is that is right, not that she is simply obeying an external law, she adds that she wears pants, which is halakhically controversial. She even dismisses the relevance of rabbinic authority in her decision to cover her hair in virtue of her own personal self: It is not that I asked a rabbi; it is an internal sensation. Leah is familiar with the feminist critique of the practice of head covering and the view that women who cover their hair are unaware of the meaning of the laws they blindly adopt. She states, as if anticipating this response and needing to reafrm her rstperson voice: It is not simply because I am a conformistIt is

better for me in this way. Leah is not only aware of the meaning of the practice of head covering, she is also aware of how she, and women like her, are perceived in the eyes of other people. Voices of conict: One voice said, It Is Halakha and another voice said, I Don't like It For two of the women in the study, the conict with the practice of hair covering does not involve confronting how they are perceived by others; but rather it is felt as an internal conict between two competing desiresthe desire not to cover their hair and the feeling that they should cover it because of their commitment to halakha. Contrary to the other subjects, who express a somewhat vague wish for not having to cover their hair, Devorah and Chava express this desire in a very explicit and direct way. The rst two years of marriage are described as an intensive and emotionally demanding period of deliberation when the dilemma is at its peak. Devorah says: Till the day after the wedding I didn't know whether I would wear a head covering or notI doubted all the time; there was a voice that said it is halakha and there was a voice that said I don't like it; I don't agree with itI really didn't knowI didn't know for at least a year, but I covered my headIt is hard for me to understand, but there is still something in me that wants to do it, despite that I hate it. Really, every day it is difcult There is an internal voice that tells me to cover; I don't know, it is really difcult for me to give a rational explanation because there isn't [one]. For Devorah the dilemma is between the Over-eye's voice: There is still something in me that wants to do it and the I voice: I hate it; I don't agree with it. During her deliberation period, Devorah covered her hair with typical head coverings. Since then, she has arrived at a delicate balance between the two voices and has decided to cover her hair with small hair bands which are hardly identied as head coverings. I found the hair bands; I like them very much; I just like the way I look with them. I feel comfortable, that's why it is not a problem for me now; it is my interpretation of the Jewish tradition. Devorah is aware that the hair bands with which she now covers her hair are not considered a normative hair covering. Since her conict was internal, she is not concerned with the rules of an objective halakha; she is interested in nding her own way of living in peace with her tradition. However, for Chava the conict with hair covering emerged clearly from the tension between her feelings and an external legal system that imposes something on her that she denitively does not want to do. When I got married, I didn't cover my hair even though I thought that I shouldI couldn't succeed to nd the strength to take it upon myself, because it seemed to me as something terrible, awful; it seemed to me as a complete surrenderI was in a real dilemma, a double bind, [between] what I wanted to do and what an external system forced me to do

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And how can I say that halakha is important to me, if I don't do something that it is so prominent.

The adjectives Chava uses to describe the practice of head covering, which are expressed in the I voice are highly negative: It seemed to me terrible, awful, a complete surrender. Nevertheless, she still considers the practice of head covering as something she should observe (the Overeye voice). She says: I didn't think it was all right that women should not cover their headsthat was denitively not my narrative. During the rst two years of marriage she did not cover her hair, not because of a positive decision, but since she could not nd the strength to take it upon myself. Those two years, which were characterized by living in a permanent state of conict, turned out to be extremely stressful and Chava eventually decided to start covering her hair with berets, a very popular and normative kind of head covering. I started to cover my hair almost two years after I got marriedDuring this period I suffered so much that I felt it wasn't worth it; I prefer not to like the way I look in the morning rather than to be going around with the feeling that I am being torn apart by a subject that is not so importantI really didn't want to do it but I thought that I should, so I said, It just isn't worth all my energies. Chava is not apologetic; but she indeed submits to the law. Although she covers her hair despite her will, she remains connected to her feelings. They do not disappear from her consciousness, as is shown in the following sentence where Chava shifts from the I voice to the Over-eye voice and back. I don't want, (I voice) will is not the right word to describe it; I do it; I feel I must do it (Overeye voice), and I feel okay with it (I voice). Chava knows what she wants and is very sincere about it. Moreover, it seems that her I voice is so strong that the only way of justifying her decision to cover her hair is by despising it: It is not worth it, It is not so important, It is not worth all my energies. This kind of contempt for her feelings is very common in women and adolescent girls as they encounter the wall of civilizationin other words, the prevailing ideals of adult womanhood. Since the penalty for resisting socialization is great and the pain of nonconformity is acute, women disconnect themselves from their feelings, from their experiences, and from their knowledge (Gilligan, 1982, 1990, 1995, 2002; Gilligan et al., 1991, 1988). In the case of Chava, submission is not mindless or blind. On the contrary, the decision to cover her hair takes place after a long period of deliberation and following a conscious attempt to balance her feelings of commitment to halakha and her discomfort with the practice. Recognizing that we are not always in charge and that our choices are deeply inuenced by the norms and values of the culture we live in, runs directly against one of the prevailing ideologies of western culture, specically that of triumphant individualism, whereby Susan Bordo (1997, p. 51) urges us to Just Do It. The way Chava formulates her struggle is very similar to what Bordo (1993, p. 30) calls feminist cultural criticism.

Feminist cultural criticism is not a blueprint for the conduct of personal lifeand does not empower (or require) individuals to rise above culture or to become martyrs to feminist ideals. It does not tell us what to do Its goal is edication and understanding, enhanced consciousness of the power, complexity, and systematic nature of culture, the interconnected webs of its functioning. It is up to the reader to decide how, when, and where (or whether) to put that understanding to further use, in the particular, complicated, and ever-changing context that is his or her life and no one else's. As a feminist cultural critic who is conscious of the oppressive norms in the construction of western femininity and as a person who inevitably compromises her views as she tries to nd her way of living as a woman in western culture, Chava chooses to cover her hair despite her negative feelings toward the practice. There are no simple solutions to true dilemmas. Chava's decision could be easily interpreted as total submission to the law and Devorah's decision as resistance to the law. But we believe these to be overly simplistic accounts of their choices and the way they live by these choices. Both Devorah and Chava know by experience what it entails to conform to and to resist the law. They are conscious of the advantages and disadvantages of both courses of action, and each of them has decided to act according to what is best for her at this specic time in her life. Therefore, it seems that rather than submission or resistance, Devorah and Chava enact the most embodied way of choosing within culture. In other words, Devorah and Chava, together with many of the women in this study, do not cover their hair as a blind submission to a religious law but rather as subjects who have consciously decided to live their lives within the limitations of their own culture.

The self: between oppression and acquiescence Three of the interviewees directly refer to the practice of hair covering as oppressive. One aspect of the oppression is the feeling that they are being subjected to a law under a rationale they are unable to understand. Michal says: It is complex for me because of my internal opposition towards it I don't understand it, really; I don't understand why it is necessary to cover the hairIt is a big sacrice because I am ready to do something that I don't understand because I believe halakha as a whole is important, because I believe in God and I believe in the Torah and I believe in Mitzvothnot because I understand this specic commandment, and the reasons that I understand I am against them. Shimrit experiences the practice of hair covering as a deeper form of oppression, viewed as a direct attack on her self. She cannot disconnect the practice of hair covering from the halakhic sources and their original meaning. Justication of the demand to cover up by the assumption that something is wrong inside her is felt as degrading; thus covering her hair is experienced as a distinctive suffocating practice.

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It's a feeling of suffocation, that something needs to be concealed, coveredSometimes I felt as though I was being suffocatedYou must have something on your head, it is necessary that your head be coveredDon't go out of your house with your hair uncovered. 16 Contrary to the rest of the participants, who reected on the practice of head covering as an intellectual subject, Shimrit describes a bodily reaction suffocation provoked by the practice. Her response is not only based on ideas and on what she has learned from books, but it is a literally embodied physical response. Leah, on the other hand, explains her feelings toward the practice in contemplative terms: I think these two laws [bath immersion and hair covering] imply that something is wrong with women. That something about women's hair is not okay, that the fact that I have a period turns me into an impure being. This is what I feel these laws transmit and I really don't like itI have a basic problem with these laws; they turn women into something Muktze 17I think I am a conformist; I think a lot of things, but in practice, I cover my hair. These accounts resonate with the general feminist claim that religious women's obligations such as the practice of hair covering, by systematically restricting female expression, both oppress and degrade women and their bodies. (See Baskin, 1985; Biale, 1984; Koltun, 1976; Plaskow, 1990; Priesand, 1975; Turner, 1996; Weiss, 2009.) Negotiating the meaning of observance: modesty and marital status The women in the study make a sharp distinction between accepting and taking upon themselves the practice of covering their hair, and accepting what they understand to be a primary reason for the lawthe need to cover women. 18 In the process of engaging with the practice of head covering, women both resist and make conscious choices about aligning themselves with certain interpretations of the law over others, in order to make sense of their experience in a way that works for them. Not modesty While accepting that hair covering is a religious law that has been practiced by Jewish women for centuries, these women clearly reject the modesty argument, claiming that it is invalid for them and that they do not cover their hair because of modesty. They do not ignore the argument, but rather, consciously bring it up in order to show that they are fully aware of its rationale, while making it clear that it is not the reason they cover their hair. Rivka reports: I don't think that I have to cover up because there is something wrong inside me that other people cannot seeIf I hear an explanation of head covering that one has to cover the hair because it is a nakedness (Erva) and it arouses men and it is not modest to go out with unbounded hair, I would not be convinced and I would have to think if this is what I would like to do.

Rivka's response resonated with many of the women we interviewed. I really don't think hair is a form of nakedness that only my husband is allowed to see. (Tamar) My hair is not a form of nakedness, and if it was, I would have to cover it from the age of thirteen. (Chava) I don't feel my hair is a form of nakedness. (Michal) If hair is a kind of nakedness it needs to be shavenit [the modesty argument] doesn't affect me at all (Keren). From these responses, it is clear that the women interviewed are completely aware of this meaning of the practice of head covering and its implications about the essence of womanhood. They do not see themselves through patriarchal eyesthat is to say, they have not internalized the view of women as essentially immodest temptresses who because of these traits must cover themselves.

I Do It in order to Be recognized as a married woman Interestingly enough, whereas most of the women in the study feel totally alienated from the modesty argument, they perceive the recognition (heiker) argument that head covering is an external sign of their marital status as far more neutral and acceptable. Since they do not seem to interpret the recognition argument as the commandment to have a public sign of belonging to a man, 19 most women do not nd the argument bothersome or inherently patriarchal; instead they seem happy to have a public indicator of their marital status. Thus, these women do not feel the need to distance themselves from the recognition argument, or to explain or justify it. I wear a hat not because hair is a form of nakedness, but rather for people to know that I am a married woman. (Keren) When I decided that I would cover my hair it was because of heiker, for people to know that I am an Orthodox married woman, and not because of modesty. (Tamar) I feel very comfortable with the decision of covering my head because of heiker, that is, for people to know that I am married. The modesty thing is irrelevant to me. (Amalia) It is clearly because of heiker and not because it is a form of nakedness. (Chava) The fact that the recognition argument passes so smoothly tells more, in our opinion, about the general (secular) culture of Israeli society than it reveals a particular internalization of patriarchal motives among Orthodox women. In other words, since being a married woman is considered a very desirable status in Israeli society in general (Bartuv, 2003; Cohen-Chazani, 2005; Katz & Peres, 1986;

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Sered, 2000, Shtul, 2003) and the conception of marriage as a woman belonging to one man seems to be widely accepted within the Israeli secular context 20 (Kamir, 2006), the religious women we interviewed do not feel that something is wrong with this argument, but instead are happy to declare it as the reason for covering their heads. It seems that the striking difference between women's approaches to the modesty and the recognition arguments points to a change in the general cultural zeitgeist. Whereas the view of a woman as an oversexed creature incapable of controlling her base urges and the concept of femme coverte as women being covered by their husbands, is inconceivable to the hearts, minds, and ears of Israeli modern Orthodox women. The idea of a woman living independent of a man is still a status that is not fully recognized as legitimate even in modern times and especially in Israeli society (Kamir, 2006; Weiss, 2009). While from a feminist perspective the modesty and recognition arguments are not essentially different, the women interviewed perceive them almost as opposites. They see the modesty argument as totally unacceptable, whereas the recognition argument is seen as neutral and acceptable. 21 Conclusion While only two women in this study talk almost as pure types, voicing the most expected and criticized arguments for covering hair (that they cover their hair because their husbands asked them to do it, 22 or covering their hair is something special for the couple's intimacy), 23 most of the women in the study speak in terms of conicts and struggles about this issue. Through a conscious intent to avoid a dichotomous analysis, we were able to hear the complexity of women's experiences which shed light on their uid and polyphonic subjectivities (Bukobza, 2007; Hermans, 2001; Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon, 1992; Raggatt, 2006; Tova Hartman, 2006). Women's position and positioning at the crossroads of tradition and modernity elicit a multivocal subjectivity that is characterized by an awareness of the complex forces that underlie their equally compelling commitments and a conscious decision to stay with the multiple aspects of their identity. We heard them choosing to submit to a legal system but also to resist and to look for several forms of selfexpression within their understanding of a patriarchal context in which female subjectivity has been silenced, covered, and excluded. Women's relation to the halakhic sources justifying the commandment to cover the head reveals the complex negotiations women make in engaging with the practice. Although at the behavioral level they cover their hair, not only have they not internalized the negative image of the woman emerging from the halakhic sources, but they refuse to endorse the religious rhetoric which argues that hair covering is in women's best interest (Ariel, 2000; Ellinson, 1992; Falk, 1998; Schreiber, 2003). In a deep sense, the experience of the women interviewed resists both structural feminist analysis and religious rhetoric on modesty. The negotiations done vis--vis the practice of head covering by the women in our study point to two widespread

errors in the commonly held view regarding Orthodox women as a group: rst, the belief that submission is mindless and that people subjugate aspects of their subjectivities only when they are unaware of their actions, while they act in a state of false consciousness, or as cultural dupes 24; second, the belief that normative behavior within a patriarchal context is above all about contributing to and colluding with an oppressive system. For the women who participated in this study, hair covering is one element of a system that is larger than the sum of its parts. Living a halakhic lifestyle is not just about obeying a legal system; it is a lived experience that comprises meaningful relations with a community, with a tradition, and with God. Orthodox identity and negotiating with orthodoxy are so much part of who these women are, that they outweigh some of the unsavory aspects of observance. In our study, while women give various attributions to the act of covering their hair, almost no woman justies the act of covering women. To use Kandiyoti's (1988) famous term, women bargain with patriarchy but do not justify it. Therefore, we concur with the insights of post-colonial, non-western and black feminists (Bulbeck, 1998; Collins, 1991; hooks, 1989, 1990; Joseph, 1999; Mohanty, 1988, 2002; Narayan, 1997), we hold that a monolithic analysis of the disciplinary mechanisms taking place in traditional cultures often obfuscates rather than reveals the experiences of women living within patriarchal contexts. Moreover, this type of analysis fails to take into account women's contestations within their own culture. Benhabib's (2002) theorization of the situated self seems more adequate to describe the experience of these women: Individuality [is] the unique and fragile achievement of selves in weaving together conicting narratives and allegiances into a unique life history. Practical autonomy.is dened as the capacity to exercise choice and agency over the conditions of one's narrative identication (p. 16). The practice of head covering is one of the sites in the construction of the women in the study's gender identity. Following contemporary social scientists who conceive of the self in dialogical/multiple terms (Hall, 2000; Hermans, 2001; Hermans, Kempen, Loon, & Rens, 1992; Lifton, 1993; Raggatt, 2006; Schachter, 2004) what emerges from women's narratives about the practice of hair covering is their insistence on engaging with their tradition without needing to silence conict.

End Notes
1 Tichel is the Yiddish word for the scarf with which Jewish women cover their hair after marriage. 2 For a more detailed description of the several disciplinary techniques through which the bodies of women are constructed in western culture, see Bartky (1990), Bordo (1993, 1997) and Weitz (1998, 2004). 3 Muslim women offer several reasons for wearing the veil: from the desire to claim their cultural/religious identity, to dressing in a way that allows them to work and study outside their homes; to avoid the insidious male gaze and protect themselves from sexual harassment; to attain respect and be treated as equals; and nally as a means of resistance to Western values, and as a form of political identication with working-class women who

V. Seigelshifer, T. Hartman / Women's Studies International Forum 34 (2011) 349359 oppose state mandatory de-veiling. For example, during the 1979 Iranian revolution, women from the middle class decided to wear the veil in solidarity with working-class women who were against the state sponsored de-veiling imposed by the shah (Hoodfar, 2001; Mohanty, 1988). Norton observes that forced unveiling of women in Iran [is comparable to] the shock that Westerners would experience if women of all ages were forced to go topless in public (Norton, 1997, p. 165). 4 In terms of dressing and covering codes, ultra-Orthodox and Muslim women cover their heads and bodies to a greater extent than modern Orthodox women. 5 A similar situation is described by Davis (1995) in her study of cosmetic surgery. She states: In order to make sense of women's involvement in cosmetic surgery, I have attempted a kind of feminist balancing act. My analysis is situated on the razor's edge between a feminist critique of cosmetic surgery craze (along with the ideologies of feminine inferiority which sustain it) and an equally feminist desire to treat women as agents who negotiate their bodies and their lives within the cultural and structural constraints of a gendered social order (p.5). 6 Ultra-Orthodox or Haredi Jews view themselves as a distinct group, differing from the surrounding society by lifestyle, dress code, education, and worldview (Caplan & Sivan, 2003, cited in Yafe, 2007, p. 522). The basic premise of Haredi ideology is that Judaism is a holistic system without need for outside inuence. Therefore, modernity and Western culture are rejected. Most Haredi members live in distinct urban areas, struggling to avoid what they view as the evil inuences of modern life (Yafe, 2007, p. 522; See also: El-Or, 1994; Neriya-Ben Shahar, 2008). 7 It is important to highlight that each of these groups (ultra-Orthodox and modern Orthodox Jews) is heterogeneous and comprises rich and diverse subdivisions. The major distinctions within ultra-Orthodox Jews are between Jews of European (Ashkenazi) and Sephardic (Middle Eastern or North African) origins and between mystically oriented Hasidim and their rationalist opponents (Yafe, 2007). The subgroups among modern Orthodox Jews are distinguished mainly according to the extent that they integrate the modern secular world with religious observance. Chardalim refers to a group that is between ultra-orthdox and modern Orthdox Jews, as they are ultra-Orthodox Jews who support the ideology of religious Zionism. 8 There are six school subsystems in Israel: (1) the secular Jewish state education subsystem, where 39% of primary and 53% of middle and high school pupils are enrolled; (2) the religious Jewish state education system, where 14% of primary and 14% of middle and high school pupils are enrolled; (3) and (4) the ultra-Orthodox Jewish state education system currently split in two, where 19% of primary and 10% of middle- and highschool pupils are enrolled; (5) the Arab education subsystem, where 28% of primary and 24% of middle- and high-school pupils are enrolled; and (6) combined state education, a subsystem approved in July 2008 that seeks to build a bridge between Jewish state secular and Jewish state religious education (Dagan-Buzaglo & Swirski, 2009). 9 The Hebrew term for this commandment is Kisui Roshliterally head covering. Since the majority of the women in the study do not cover their head completely, we use the terms head covering and hair covering indiscriminately. 10 A kippah is usually a cloth a hemispherical or platter-shaped skullcap traditionally worn at all times by observant Jewish men. 11 The Talmud states: Cover your head in order that the fear of heaven may be upon you (Shabbat, 156b). 12 It became codied as a rule that Jewish women should follow as a religious obligation during theTannaic period the time of the redaction of the Mishna in years 0200 C.E (Bronner, 1993; Broyde & Krakowski, 1991; Fox, 2003; Gordon, 1997; Henkin, 2003; Melamed, 1994; Schiller, 1995; Shapiro, 1990). 13 According to Jewish law, marriage does not mark men as forbidden to other women and they do not need to wear any external sign indicating their marital status. 14 Modern Orthodox women wear skirts of different lengths, ranging from right at their knees to long skirts covering all the leg. Some women wear pants, while others wear pants topped with a skirt or dress. They wear sleeved shirts in various lengths ranging from short sleeves covering the upper part of the arm to elbow-length. 15 Deoraita means a Torah-derived commandment. 16 Gilligan et al.'s (1988) and Jack's (1991) analyses are particularly illuminating here. When Shimrit speaks of what she feels, she uses the rstperson voice: I felt as though I was being suffocated. When she talks of the practice of head covering with which she is in conict, she uses the second-

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person voice: You must have something on your head, it is necessary that your head be coveredDon't go outwith your hair uncovered. 17 Muktze is the term used for all the things that cannot be touched on Shabbat. Leah uses this term metaphorically, meaning that these laws turn women into something that cannot be touched at all and should be distanced from society. 18 Femme Couverte/Femme covert (covered woman) is a term in English Common Law inherited into American law that denes the status of married women as covered by their husbands. In the Middle Ages, women were viewed legally, morally, and spiritually as extensions of the men in their lives, dependent on either a father or other kinsman as protector, or legally identical to their husband. Coverture was the legal system that transferred a woman's civic identity to her husband at marriage. This meant she had no personal property or property rights; she could not sue or be sued; and she could not appear in court as a witness (Kerber, 1997). The women I interviewed seem to be saying: Although we cover our hair, we are not submitting ourselves to our husband's authority and losing our status as individual and unique beings. 19 The direct meaning [of covering the bride] is the symbolical signicance of ownership or mastery. By covering up the bride the thought is expressed that she is taken possesion of, perhaps also that, as a result, she is taken out of circulation as a free woman (Epstein, 1948, pp. 3839, quoted in Weiss, 2009). 20 The fact that many more secular women than men wear wedding rings and that the majority of secular women change their family name to that of their husband or add the new surname to their previous one rather than keep their original surname points to this phenomenon. (See, Rom, 2008.) 21 In a recent article Susan Weiss directly confronts the recognition argument claiming: I became convinced that it is necessary to decipher and demystify the sign of Jewish women's head-covering in order to confront and challenge the extent to which Jewish culture and Israeli laws continue to view women as the chattel of their husbands (Weiss, 2009, p. 90). 22 I never thought that I would cover my headbut it was important for my husband and I just accepted it (Rachel). 23 It is something between me and my husbandsomething that only my husband can enjoy (Beruria). 24 The term cultural dupe/dope is usually used to describe women as blind and uncritical prisoners of the beauty and fashion industry. (See Bordo, 1993, 1997; Davis, 1995.)

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