SECOND DIVISION

LADISLAO ESPINOSA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 181071 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, BRION, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and PEREZ, JJ. Promulgated: October 17, 2011

-versus-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x------------------------- -----------------------------x

RESOLUTION

NERI, J.:

We grant Ladislao Espinosas (Espinosa) motion for reconsideration of this Courts Decision of 15 March 2010 (Decision).

The assailed Decision affirmed the Court of Appeals, dated 25 September 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29633. The Decision did not consider Espinosas invocation of complete self-defense as provided for in Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.

In support of his motion for reconsideration, Espinosa submits new evidences.

1. An ice peak was pointed at Espinosa just before the stone was thrown at him. 2. Merto was only disarmed after Espinosa was restrained by his cousin, Rodolfo Muya.

This evidence is in addition to the undisputed facts of the case, as found by the Regional Trial Court, and as confirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal. It may be so summarized:

On 6 August 2000, at about 10 oclock in the evening, private complainant Andy Merto, bearing a grudge against the petitioner, went to the house of the latter in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside the house, private complainant Merto shouted violent threats, challenging the petitioner to face him outside.

Sensing the private complainants agitated state and fearing for the safety of his family, petitioner went out of his house to reason with and pacify Merto. However, as soon as he drew near the private complainant, the latter hurled a stone at the petitioner. The petitioner was able to duck just in time to avoid getting hit and instinctively retaliated by hitting the left leg of the private complainant with a bolo scabbard. The private complainant fell to the ground. Petitioner then continuously mauled the private complainant with a bolo scabbard, until the latters cousin, Rodolfo Muya, restrained him.

As a consequence of the incident, private complainant Merto sustained two (2) bone fractures, one in his left leg and another in his left wrist. It took about six (6) months for these injuries to completely heal.

The Issue

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether under the set of facts given in this case, complete self-defense may be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.

The Ruling of the Court

In consideration of the new evidences presented, this court holds that all elements of self-defense are present in this case.

The Revised Penal Code provides the requirement of self-defense as a justifying circumstance, to wit:

Article 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following requisites concur:

First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.1 Unlawful aggression on the part of the private complainant Merto was present in this case. His action of pointing an ice peak and throwing a stone to the latter in a sudden and successive manner were enough to prompt the petitioner to take defensive action. Considering the danger posed by these objects and the manner it was used against the life and limb of the petitioner, the court takes this as a basis for self-defense.

There is lack of sufficient provocation in the part of the petitioner. It was the private complainant Merto, who in the fit of rage, called out the petitioner and invited him for a fight to satisfy the formers grudge.

With the presentation of the new evidences, the argumentation now lies on the existence of the second element which is the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repeal the attack. To wit:

The second requisite of defense means that (1) there be a necessity of the course of action taken by the person making a defense, and (2) there be a necessity of the means used. Both must be reasonable. The reasonableness of either or both such necessity depends on the existence of unlawful aggression and upon the nature and extent of the aggression.2

The necessity of the course of action taken by the petitioner of attempting to incapacitate and disarm the private complainant arose from the threat posed by the latters action of throwing a rock and pointing an ice peak towards petitioner. The petitioner used the only tool available for defense at his immediate disposal the bolo scabbard. He mauled the private complainant until the aggression ceased only
1

People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366 REYES, The Revised Penal Code, 2006 Edition, p 173

by the intervention of a third person. The defense was necessary as well as the means used by petitioner to defend his life. For both conditions to meet this second element of self-defense, necessity should not only be present, they should also be reasonable.

The measure of reasonableness of the action taken is provided for in the doctrine of rational equivalence, delineated in People v. Gutual,3 to wit:

x x x It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury.

The doctrine of rational equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of the nature and quality of the weapons used by the defender and the assailantbut of the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis--vis, the unlawful aggression.4 The private complainants sudden use of force by hurling a rock and pointing an ice peak before the petitioner triggered his instinct of self-preservation to take over his actions. The imminent danger posed by such threats did not afford the petitioner to discern what proper tool to use in able to defend himself. Instinct has instructed the petitioner to use the bolo scabbard he was holding at that time to unable the private complainant from consummating his malicious intention. He continued to maul until the intervention of a third party effectively disabled both of them. In those moments of defense, petitioner has no effective control over his senses. He had no knowledge of what degree of power he applied to consummate his defense. As a consequence, petitioner inflicted those injuries to the private complainant.
3

G.R. No. 115233. February 22, 1996 Espinosa v. People, G.R. No. 181071, March 15, 2010

A review of the facts shows that after petitioner was successful in taking down private complainant Merto. However, the threat to petitioners life has not ceased since the former still held the ice peak and was still capable of thrusting it into petitioners body. The aggressor was not neutralized; the aggression did not cease. This fact was clearly established by the new evidences presented. Clearly, the continuous hacking by the petitioner still falls within the ambit of self-defense thus justified. The aggression effectively stopped when Rodolfo Muya restrained the petitioner and disarmed Merto. By this time, petitioner has already inflicted injuries upon private complainant Merto in an act of self defense.

In the final analysis, all three elements of self-defense are present in this case. The argument on reasonable necessity of the means employed to repeal or prevent such aggression is found meritorious with the introduction of the new evidence. The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in mans natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person or rights from impending danger or peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being.5

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambalaes finding accused-appellant LADISLAO ESPINOSA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby entered ACQUITTING him of the charge. He should forthwith be released from detention, unless his further detention is warranted for any other legal or valid ground.

SO ORDERED.
5

Castanares vs CA, Nos. L 41269 70, August 6, 1979

ERNESTO BACONGA NERI Associate Justice