1
Analysis of the impact of distributed generation
on automatic reclosing
L. K. Kumpulainen, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, and K. T. Kauhaniemi, University of
Vaasa, Finland
Abstract-- Distributed generation is changing the way electricity
distribution networks are designed and operated. One of the key
issues and prerequisites for having significant share of total pro-
duction of distributed generation is that the operation of system
protection is not jeopardized. Automatic reclosing is very impor-
tant for the reliability of overhead networks. On the other hand,
reclosing can be problematic when distributed generation (DG)
units are connected to the network.
In order to find out the impact of distributed generation on pro-
tection, dynamic simulations have been carried out. PSCAD™
transient simulation software and advanced power system models
have been applied. The simulations verify the challenges distrib-
uted generation causes to protection, especially to high-speed
reclosing.
Index Terms-- anti-islanding protection, arc fault simulation,
automatic reclosing, distributed generation, power system model-
ing.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper is focused on the effects distributed generation
has on protection of medium voltage networks. Imple-
mentation of distributed generation means there are mul-
tiple sources of fault current instead of the single source, the
feeding HV grid. This causes several challenges to protection.
Typical problems are listed in this paper, and a more detailed
analysis of the effect of distributed generation on automatic
reclosing is given.
II. CHALLENGES TO PROTECTION OF DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
DUE TO DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
Widespread distributed generation has been found incom-
patible with conventional distribution system protection ap-
proaches. Some of the most commonly mentioned challenges
are the following:
• Unintentional islanding with concerns about reliability,
safety and power quality. Especially when automatic re-
closing is applied, even momentary islanding can be very
detrimental. Anti-islanding protection is regarded as one
This work was partly supported by Distributed Energy Systems Technology
Program of National Technology Agency of Finland.
L. K. Kumpulainen is with VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland,
Vaasa (e-mail: lauri.kumpulainen@vtt.fi).
Dr. K. T. Kauhaniemi is with VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland
and part time Professor with University of Vaasa, Finland (e-mail:
kimmo.kauhaniemi@uwasa.fi).
of the most challenging question to be solved in the field
of distributed generation.
• The operation of DG units can cause failure to operate of
protection. Fault current produced by DG units may re-
duce the current seen by feeder relay. This is also called
protection underreach.
• Distributed generation may cause unwanted operation of
protection. DG units can cause tripping of healthy feeders
in adjacent feeder faults.
• Distributed generation may require upgrading of primary
substation busbar protection. In busbar fault it is no
longer adequate to trip only the infeed from the HV/MV
transformer, because there are fault current sources also
in the feeders. The existence of DG may also require
changes in protection interlockings.
• Nuisance tripping of production units.
• Fault level of networks changes. Fault level can either
increase or decrease due to distributed generation, and
there may be significant variation in fault level of a cer-
tain part of the network, depending on the number and
type of generators operating. Increase of fault level can
require upgrade of switchgear, and decrease of fault level
may cause problems to overcurrent protection.
• Voltage problems can arise. Overvoltage caused by re-
verse power flow is a typical problem. Undervoltage may
arise because of common mode tripping of DG or by DG
caused delayed fault clearing.
III. ANTI-ISLANDING PROTECTION
A. The need of anti-islanding protection
Faulted parts of networks are disconnected from the
healthy network by operation of protection equipment, e.g.
feeder circuit breaker. When there is distributed generation
connected to the network, the islanded part may keep on op-
eration. In most cases islanding is not desirable for the follow-
ing reasons:
• Reconnection of the islanded part becomes complicated,
especially when automatic reclosing is used. This can
lead to damage of equipment and decrease of reliability.
• Network operator is unable to guarantee the power qual-
ity in the island. There could be abnormal voltage or fre-
quency, and the fault level may be too low, so that the
overcurrent protection will not work the way it is de-
signed.
• Safety problems to maintenance personnel arise when de-
energized circuits are back-fed.

In some reports [1] only long time islanding, lasting more
than five seconds, is regarded as islanding. Sustained island-
ing is, however, a rare event, while short-time islanding is
certainly a common phenomenon and it can be very detrimen-
tal.
In order to achieve adequate safety and reliability level of
the distribution system, anti-islanding protection is usually
considered necessary. It is even specifically required in many
of the relating rules. The rules and guidelines vary from coun-
try to country but requirements similar to the following are
often given:
• DG should be disconnected from the network in the case
of abnormality in voltage or frequency.
• If one or more phases are disconnected from the grid sup-
ply the DG units should be rapidly disconnected from the
network.
• If automatic reclosing is applied, the DG units must dis-
connect before the reclosure.
B. On anti-islanding methods and requirements
Anti-islanding protection is hard to accomplish by tradi-
tional means. E.g., basic under-/overvoltage and under-
/overfrequency relays may fail to operate if the power mis-
match in the island to be formed is close to zero.
There are several methods developed for anti-islanding
protection. The methods can be categorized into passive, ac-
tive and telecommunication based approaches. An example of
passive methods is the rate of change of frequency (ROCOF)
protection method as pointed out in [2]. Another common
protection method is the vector shift method presented, e.g.,
in [3]. According to [4], any single passive scheme that relies
on detecting voltage and frequency or their derivatives can
fail.
Active schemes are based on active island de-stabilization,
monitoring the response of the system to a change created by
the anti-islanding protection equipment. Active methods have
been criticized for being often only suitable for inverter-based
systems and for deteriorating power quality [5].
Telecommunication based anti-islanding methods are su-
perior to passive methods, because they don't have non-
detection zone. They have so far been applied mostly with
large DG units because of high costs.
IV. AUTOMATIC RECLOSING
A. The importance of automatic reclosing
Automatic reclosing in overhead medium voltage networks
has been a very powerful means to enhance the quality of
supply. Majority of faults can be cleared by automatic reclos-
ing, which is prevalent both in European and American net-
works. Figure 1 illustrates the principle of reclosing by show-
ing fault current and the autoreclose open time, and after the
2
successful reclosing attempt, the normal load current of the
feeder.
Fig. 1. Principle of automatic reclosing (high-speed reclosing). Circuit breaker
opens at t = 0.9 s and recloses successfully at t = 1.2 s.
The purpose of the dead time is to stop the current so that
the fault arc can extinguish and the arc path can de-ionize. If
sufficient time is not allowed for the gas to disperse, the ion-
ized-gas path will start conducting again after the autoreclose
[6].
B. Automatic reclosing and anti-islanding requirements
Different countries and network companies have their own
standards defining allowed operating times for anti-islanding
protection. In most cases there is a separate strict requirement
for systems using automatic reclosing. E.g. although IEEE
Standard 1547 [7] allows 2 seconds for islanding detection
and DR disconnection, there is a special requirement: "The
DR shall cease to energize the Area EPS circuit to which it is
connected prior to reclosure by the Area EPS." In the USA the
autoreclose open time can be as short as 0.2 s but it can be
several seconds as well. In the Nordic Countries the open time
in high-speed autoreclosing is typically 0.3 seconds. This re-
quires that the anti-islanding protection must operate very
rapidly if it is going to disconnect DG units clearly before the
reclosure. The speed requirement makes reclosing coordina-
tion and anti-islanding protection very challenging.
C. Main impacts of distributed generation on automatic re-
closing
Automatic reclosing is easily implemented in radially fed
networks. The presence of distributed generation units in the
feeder means that there are several sources of fault current,
and reclosing can lose its effect. The DG units may sustain
feeding fault current during the autoreclose open time prohib-
iting the intended arc extinction. The fault that would have
been temporary becomes permanent. The quality of supply
deteriorates, and utility equipment will experience prolonged
arcing which can lead to shortened life and expensive repairs
[8]. According to [9], the voltage level necessary to sustain
the arc is small. A preliminary report of an experimental study
of the self-extinguish current has been presented in [10].
In addition to prevention of successful reclosing, the exis-
tence of DG may lead to out-of-phase reclosing. During the
autoreclose open time the DG generators may accelerate or

slow down so that at the moment of reclosing, in the worst
case there is phase opposition between the islanded part of the
network and the feeding grid. This can lead to serious current,
voltage or torque transients [11]. Damage to both DG units
and network components are possible. Although there is little
documentation of actual damage to turbine-generators, cumu-
lative impact of these stresses must be taken into account [7].
D. Difficulty of ground-fault detection
An especially challenging anti-islanding issue appears to
come from the difficulty to detect ground fault, occurring in
3-wire MV network, on the low voltage side of delta-wye
connected distribution transformer. Delta-wye connection
breaks the zero sequence system, so zero sequence voltage
cannot be detected on the LV side. Thus DG units connected
to LV network are not able to detect the fault. The phase volt-
ages remain normal until the MV feeder breaker trips.
If tripping of DG unit is arranged by means of zero se-
quence voltage, measured by voltage transformers connected
to the MV side of the distribution transformer, there is still
selectivity problem. Protection based on MV zero sequence
voltage is not able to distinguish the faulty feeder from
healthy ones. To prevent nuisance tripping caused by faults in
adjacent feeders, time selectivity in coordination with feeder
directional ground-fault protection could be used. This would,
however, disturb possible automatic reclosing, as described
below. Furthermore, zero sequence voltage detection on the
MV side of the transformer hardly is feasible for small-scale
DG units deep in LV network.
V. SYSTEM MODELING FOR SIMULATION STUDIES
Because it is not possible to carry out extensive testing of
the behavior of DG units and protection equipment in various
power system faults, simulation studies are indispensable.
Dynamic modeling for DG and the power system is a key is-
sue. A good survey of relay and power system modeling and
interfacing techniques has been given in [12].
In this study electromagnetic transient simulation software
PSCAD™ was used for modeling of power system, DG units
and protective relays. The software package includes many
power system component models, but most of the models
applied in these simulations were from a custom made com-
ponent library that has been developed in research projects
during a period of several years.
A typical system model applied when studying the impact
of DG on distribution system protection consists of a simpli-
fied network model with relay models and detailed models of
DG units. In this study the simplified three-wire medium volt-
age network model consisted of an equivalent circuit repre-
senting the feeding HV network, primary transformer and two
MV feeders. One of the feeders was modeled with more de-
tails and the other feeder was used only for studying faults
located in the adjacent feeder. In addition to these there was
an equivalent circuit representing all the other feeders con-
3
nected to the primary substation. A scheme of the network
model is presented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Scheme of the network model used in the simulations.
The network model was based on Finnish rural 3-wire
overhead network. Similar network structures are common
also in other parts of Europe. The network model was
equipped with basic overcurrent and ground-fault relays, and
there was an option for high-speed 3-pole reclosing. For
ground-fault protection directional ground-fault relays were
applied since the grounding practices of the simulated cases
included ungrounded and resonant grounded systems that are
typical in Europe.
The simulations were based on several types of DG unit
models. In principle there are three different types of genera-
tor models: asynchronous generator, synchronous generator
and inverter based unit. For simulations reported in this paper,
only rotating generator models were applied, since the impact
of inverter based units on fault current is much lower than the
impact of rotating generators, and it will be studied later. The
asynchronous generator (wind power plant, 1.65 MW) was
applied in a directly connected fixed speed wind generator.
The diesel power plant (7.94 MVA) model was based on a
synchronous generator and the model was developed together
with a power plant manufacturer. In the simulations one or
several generators could be connected to any point in feeder 1
of the network model.
The DG units were also equipped with appropriate protec-
tion devices. So far specific loss-of-mains relay models have
not been included in the models. Typically DG unit models
have both under-/overvoltage and under-/overfrequency re-
lays.
VI. FAULT ARC MODEL
A third party developed prototype of an arc model was ap-
plied in some of the simulations. The model has been devel-
oped according to theory presented in [13]. The arc model
consists of two separate models, primary arc and secondary
arc. Primary arc model is applied before the tripping of the
circuit breaker and secondary arc model after breaker trip-
ping. In 1-pole reclosing of HV networks the mutual coupling
 4

of phases sustains voltage of the faulty phase and the fault there had been a reclosing trial after a typical 0.3 second auto-
arc. In these MV network simulations reclosing is 3-pole, and reclose open time, the reclosure would certainly have been
DG units sustain the secondary arc. unsuccessful.

Figures 3a, 3b and 3c present a comparison of simulated and

measured arc voltages.

Fig. 3a. Simulated arc voltage, 20 kV.

Fig. 4. Power of a synchronous generator and fault current in a 2-phase short-
circuit fault

The simulation of Fig. 5 illustrates the ability of wind

power plants (3 asynchronous generators) to sustain operation
during a single-phase-to-ground fault. When a fault occurs at
t=1.5 s in the ungrounded network, the phase-to-ground volt-
Fig. 3b. Measured arc voltage, high voltage [14].
age of the faulty phase decreases, but the phase-to-ground
voltage of the healthy phases increase. This is due to the fact
that in ungrounded system the phase-to-phase voltages remain
more or less unchanged during a single-phase-to-ground fault.
After the tripping of the feeder breaker at t=1.9 s the voltage
sustained by the wind power plants gradually decreases. An
unsuccessful reclose attempt can be seen at t=2.2 s.

In a real network recorded data verifies the simulated ef-

fect of wind power plants. Fig. 6 illustrates recorded phase-to-
Fig. 3c. Measured arc voltage waveform in 20 kV network, recorded in a Fin- ground voltages of a feeder having wind power plants.
nish primary substation (by courtesy of Vaasan Sähkö Oy and ABB Substation
Automation).

VII. SIMULATIONS

A. Objectives
The main objective of the simulations was to analyse the
performance of the protection of the system. Therefore the
simulated cases were fault cases. The distribution system
model included several predefined fault locations. For a simu-
lation run any of these fault locations could be selected as
active. Also the fault type could be selected; it could be either
a phase-to-phase fault or a phase-to-ground fault.
Fig. 5. Simulated phase voltages in a ground fault, unsuccessful reclose attempt.
Special focus area of the simulations was analyzing the
potential impact of DG on automatic reclosing. The fault arc
model was applied in some of the ground fault simulations.

B. Results of the simulations

In the simulations, all the problems described in section II
could be verified. However, this report is focused on auto-
matic reclosing. Fig. 4 presents results of simulation of a 2-
phase short-circuit fault, with a diesel power plant connected
Fig. 6. Voltage waveforms recorded in a Finnish primary substation (by cour-
to the feeder. The plant keeps on running almost one second tesy of Vaasan Sähkö Oy and ABB Substation Automation).
after the feeder breaker has tripped, feeding fault current. If

Fig 7 illustrates the development of the phase difference
between the feeder and the grid during the reclosing sequence
of the above simulation. In this case the reclosing is carried
out almost at phase opposition.
Fig. 7. Phase difference between the feeder fed by wind power plants and the
feeding grid during an autoreclosing sequence.
Current transient caused by out-of-phase reclosing in the
case described above is presented in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8. Current transient caused by an out-of-phase reclosing.
In arc faults the secondary arc can be sustained by distrib-
uted generation. This assumption was supported by the com-
parison simulations of cases with and without DG units. When
DG units were not present, there was virtually no secondary
arc at all. The comparison of cases, simulated with the arc
model, is presented in Fig. 9a and 9b. In the presented cases
the single-phase-to-ground fault occurs at t=1.5 s and the
feeder breaker trips at t=2.0 s.
Fig. 9a. Example of the ability of DG to sustain secondary arc after tripping of
the feeder breaker at t = 2.0 s.
5
Fig. 9b. When there are no DG units running, there is virtually no arc current
after tripping of the feeder breaker at t = 2.0 s.
Fig. 10 presents the behavior of the secondary arc voltage,
sustained by the wind power plants. However, because of the
prototype nature of the applied fault arc model, the results
should be inspected with reserve.
Fig. 10. Phase voltage of the faulty phase: secondary arc after t = 2.0 s.
VIII. DISCUSSION
The simulations confirm the challenges to protection of
overhead distribution networks caused by distributed genera-
tion. In order to secure the correct operation of automatic
reclosing, and to prevent out-of-phase reclosure, DG units
must be disconnected clearly before the reclosure. The impor-
tance of the question is growing, because increasing DG pene-
tration makes traditional voltage and frequency based anti-
islanding methods less efficient due to increased likeliness of
load matching.
Dead line voltage relay and sync-check relay would pre-
vent out-of-phase reclosing. Installation of these relays can be
seen as a backup for anti-islanding protection. When using
these relays, it could be possible that too slow operation of
anti-islanding protection of DG units would prevent automatic
reclosing, leading to sustained outages instead of momentary
interruptions.
Increasing autoreclose open time would give more time for
anti-islanding protection to operate, but it would also lead to
inferior power quality. If high-speed autoreclosing is applied,
very fast anti-islanding protection is necessary.
Power-line-carrier based anti-islanding protection schemes
may have the potential to become fast, reliable, selective, and
cost effective. Some of their characteristics have been
sketched in [15]-[18]. Solutions are urgently needed as DG
penetration is growing, and the safety and reliability of net-
works cannot be jeopardized.
 6

IX. REFERENCES Kimmo Kauhaniemi was born in Kankaanpää, Fin-

land, on August 2, 1963. He received his M.Sc degree
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[3] Jenkins, N., Allan, R., Crossley, P., Kirschen, D., Strbac, G., “Embedded ployee in VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland,
Generation”, IEE, 2000. VTT Processes, where he holds the position of senior
[4] Ye, Z., Finney, D., Zhou, R., Dame, M., Premerlani, B., Kroposki, B., research scientist. He is also a part-time Professor in
Engleretson, S., "Testing of GE Universal Interconnection Device". NREL electrical engineering at the University of Vaasa. His special interest areas in-
Technical Report, August 2003. NREL/TP-560-34676. clude the modeling and simulation of power systems.
[5] Finney, D., Kasztenny, B., Adamiak, M., “Generator Protection Needs in
DG Environment”. GE Power Management. [Online] Available
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X. BIOGRAPHIES
Lauri Kumpulainen was born in Padasjoki, Finland,
on April 8, 1962. He received his Master's degree
(1987) and Licentiate degree (2000) in Electrical
Power Engineering from Tampere University of
Technology.
His employment experience includes posts as
development engineer with Hämeen Sähkö Oy and
principal lecturer with Central Ostrobothnia Poly-
technic. Currently he works as a research scientist
with VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. His
field of interest is electricity distribution networks.