THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Army Air Arsenal

AND

Navy Air Depots

CORPORATION REPORT NO. XIX

(AIRFRAMES

AND

ENGINES)

Aircraft Division

February 1947

1 J

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Army Air Arsenal

AND

Navy Air Depots

CORPORATION REPORT NO. XIX

(AIRFRAMES

AND

ENGINES)

Aircraft Division

Dates

Of

Survey:

6 October - 11

November 1945

Date of Publication:
February 1947

^)f

ao-54-

U. 8.

SUPERiraENDENT OF DGCUMENrt

APR

1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the United States StraBombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.
tegic

II

FOREWORD
The Uaitcd States Strategic Bombing Survey
was established by the Secretary of
late

military ficgmcnt of the organization

was drawn

on 3 November 1944, purusant to a directive from the

President Roosevelt.
Its mission

War

from the from the

the

was

to conefl'ects

Army to the extent of 60 percent, and Navy to the extent of 40 perceut. Both Army and the Navy gave the Survey all posmen,
supplies, trans-

duct an impartial and expert study of the

of

sible assistance in furnishing

our aerial attack on Germany, to be used

a basis for evaluating the importance
of air

in

connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish

potentialities

and power as an instrument of

The Survey operated from headquarters established in Tokyo early in Sepport,

and mformation.

tember 1945, with subheadquarters

tearns

in

Nagoya,
the

military strategy, for planning the future develop-

Osaka, Hiroshuna, and Nagasaki, and with mobile

operating
in

ment of the JJnited States armed forces, and for detemiinuig future economic policies with respect A summary report and to the national defense. some 200 supporting reports contaming the fuidings of the Survey in Germany have been
published.

other parts of Japan,

On
i

15

that the
effects

August 1945, President Truman requested Survey conduct a similar study of the of all types of air attack in the war against
submitting reports
in

Japan,

duplicate

to

the

Secretary of

War and

to the Secretary of the

its

Navy.

!The officers of the Survey during

phase were:

Japanese

and the Asiatic maiidand. It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war-production, ])lant by plant, and mdustry by mdustry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations
islands of the Pacific,

leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale

among

the

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.

Paul H. Nitze, Henry Vice Chairmen.

civilian popidation, the effectiveness of the

Japa-

C.

Alexander,

nese civilian defense organization, and the effects

of the atomic bombs.

Harry L. Bowman, J. Kenneth Galbraith,

Rensis Likert,

Separate reports will be

issued covering each phase of the study.

The Survey
Jr.,

interrogated

more than 700 Japaofficials.

Frank A. McNamee,
Fred
Searls, Jr.,

nese military, Government, and industrial

It also recovered

Monroe E. Spaght, Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,

Theoilore P. Wright, Directors.

and translated many documents which not only have been usefid to the Survey, but
also, will furnish

data valuable for other studies.

to turn over the

Arrangements have been made

Survey's
files

Walter Wilds, Secretary.

to the Central Intelligence

will

Group,

The Survey's complement provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The

through which they

be available for further

examination and distribution.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS
rage

Army and Navy Dkpot Hisport (Corporation Report No. XIX) Thk Depots and Thkir Importance in thio Aircraft Industry
Dispersal The Air Attacks Production Statistics Evaluation of Pre- Attack Intelligence Appendices:

1
1 1

2 2 5

Army Arsenal and Navy Depots Frame and Engine Production by Army and Navy Depots First Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-1) Eleventh Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-2) Twenty-First Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-3)_. KozA Naval Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-4) Tachikawa .\rmy Air ."Arsenal (.\rniy Arsenal Report No. XIX-5)
A. GeoKra])liical Locations of
B.

Air

Face Page 6
7 14

23 42 46

IV

THE DEPOTS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION
The Japimi'sc Army
;imilai'

instance,

the

engine section

of

the

Army

.\ir

siiul

Navy

air

depots were

to tliosi'

t)f

this coiuitry in that tlicy

haiuUcd

repair,

modification and distril)iition of aircraft. However, one Japanese Army arsenal and four

naval depots were also producers of aircraft

idijother
aircraft

and

aircraft

accounted for 3.8 percent of all Japanese production and 4.4 percent of all combat jnoduction over the years 1!)4I through

was transferi-ed from Tachikawa to Kanazawa, starting in August 1944 before any air The Twenty-fii-st Naval attacks in the vicinity. Ail- Depot dispersed in the Omura area begiiining in October 1944, following an attack by Chinabased B-29s. And although the Eleventh Naval
Arsenal
Air

Depot

at Hiro did not actually

commence

1945.

In addition to airframe production, the

arsenal
5

Army
Japan

Jamiary 1945, elaborate plans for such a move had been made a year earlier. Except for the transfer of the engine ])roduction
dispersal until

and two of the naval

ail

dej)ots

produced
in

functions of the

Army

Air Arsenal fi'om Tachiof the (lei)ots

percent of

airplane engines

made

kawa
were

to
in

from 1941 through 1945.

Kanazawa, all dispersals the same general location

as the original

The
to the

(lei)ots

were widely scattered geographically

of

plants.

over the

home islands from the island Tokyo area (A])|)endix A).

Kyushu

THE AIR ATTACKS

The Twenty-Hrst Naval Air Depot was
first aircraft
I

The Army Air Arsenal at Tachikawa, and later Kanazawa, jjroduced both airframes and engines, as did the Eleventh Naval Air Depot at Hiro and the Twenty-tirst Naval Air Depot at Omura. The First Naval Air Depot at Kasumigaura produced aircraft and the rocket-propell(>d suicide l)omb, Baka; and, the Koza Naval Depot near Atsugi produced aircraft only. In addition to these primary military producers, the First Naval Air Technical Depot at Yokosuka
partly at
,

he

It plant in Japan to be attacked. was struck on 7 July 1944 during the second B-29 No damage attack on the Japanese homeland.

resulted from this early attack, but the next,

on
to

25 October 1944, resulted in heavy

the plant and touched
oflF

damage

dispersal operations

which, coupled with an efTort to produce newer types of aircraft, crippled aircraft production by
this

conducted
In

experiments in aircraft construction

1944, the

tion never exceeded eight aircraft in

thereafter,

depot for the remainder of the war. Producmonth any

1

and built [irototype aircraft.

November
<S,57()

Army

Air Arsenals had

a total of

were civilians,
bined civilian

employees of which (50 percent and the Navy depots had a comof 88,554.

and engine production ceased entirely after the October attack. Koza was attacked by carrier-based aircraft on 10 and 18 July and 13 August 1945, but danuige

employment

Detailed reports on the operations of the individual depots have been prepared from information

sources

obtained from Japanese Army and Na\'y (USSBS, Aircraft Division Reports No.
5).

XlX-1 through

DISPERSAL
Dispersal
pattern
of

was slight. Aircraft production at the First Naval Air Depot had ceased by the time it was The Elevfirst attacked on 16 February 1945. enth Naval Air Depot suft'ered three attacks on 19 March, 5 May, and 2 July 1945, which destroyed most of the arsenal and many machines. Production, however, for the most part had been
dispersed
or so

moved underground
that
production

prior

to

the

the

depots
it

followed

the

usual
earlier

attacks,

losses

might be

except

that

came somewhat

attributed as

much

to dispersal as to the attacks

than was the case with private producers.

For

themselves.
1

The Army Air Arsenal was hit on 4 April, 10 June, and 2 August 1945, but most of the arsenal had been dispersed prior to the air attacks.
Production then also suffered more from dispersal than from direct attacks.

Engine j)roduction was limited

tary ])roducers: the

to 3 of the mili

PRODUCTION STATISTICS
From January 1941 through August 1945 the Army and Navy Depots produced a total of 2,706
and 5,821 engines, accounting for 3.8 percent of total Japanese airframe production and
aircraft
5 percent of total engine production.

Eleventh and In the number of engines produced from 194 through 1945, the Eleventh Naval Air Depot le with a total of 2,320 engines, followed by th Twenty-first Naval Air Depot with 2,132 and th Army Air Arsenal with 1,369. The trend of total engine production by Arm; and Navy air depots rose gradually from 20 pe month in January 1941 to the peak of 301 in Ma Thereafter, with minor resurgences, th 1944.
trend
declined
2).

Air Arsenal, and th Twenty-first Naval Air Depots

Army

was low at the start of the war, totaling 9 in December 1941, but rose during 1942 and 1943, reaching a peak of 138 in December 1943 (Figure 1). The December
Airframe production
at

sharply

to

51

in

the depots

August

194

(Figure

The peak

of 301 engines constitute

appro.ximately 10 percent of the total Japanes

aircraft engine production for the

1943 production constituted 6 percent of the production of the entire mdustry for that month. Thereaft(>r until the end of the war, the trend wa,<l()wnwaril.

month of M&\ Engine production declined sharply during th

1944 as a result of defects in the

last half of

Ha 4

The trend of production was downward throughout 1944 as a result of changes of aircraft types in production at the Eleventh Naval Air Depot (USSBS Aircraft Division Report No. XIX-2) and the Twenty-first Naval Air Depot (USSBS SlowAircraft Division Report No. XIX-3). down caused by type change-over and loan of employees to Mitsubishi by the Army Air Arsenal
contributed to the decline. Combined with an air attack on the Twentyfirst Naval Air Depot and a poor production
record at the Eleventh Naval Air Depot, these factors caused a 2-year low point in production in

(Homare) engines produced by the Elevent Naval Air Depot, the transfer of engine productio of the Army Air Arsenal from Tachikawa t Kanazawa and the cessation of production at th Twenty-first Naval Air Depot following a; attacks and dispersal. Production was on the increase in Noverabc and Decemher 1944, but again fell oft' and ws generally low in 1945 due to air attacks on th Eleventh Naval Air Depot and the change-ovf
to production of the

Ha

45 engine at the

An

Air Arsenal.

EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence figures on production at the!depots and the types of aircraft produced wci

October 1944, with a total production of only 23 Production gained thereafter until Febaircraft. ruary 1945, when the effects of air attacks and dispersal resulted in a downward trend which was liaited in June with further recovery in July. Only 2 aircraft, however, were produced during

generally accurate, although the First Naval

Depot was not known

to be a producer.

Intelligence only slightly overemphasized tli importance of the depots as aircraft producers
i

August 1945, the

closing

month

of tlie war.

On

the basis of total production

from

1941

Novcmbci 1944 by estimating their contributio at 4 percent of total combat aircraft productidi
Actually, during 1944 the depots accounted U
3.4 percent of the total

through 1945, the Army Air Ai-seual was the most important military producer, with a production of The Twenty-first Naval Air Depot 1 ,005 aircraft. was the most important Nav-y producer (9f)(i aircraft), followed i)y the Eleventh Naval Air Depot
(532),
(75)

combat production,

Im

on the basis of over-n production from 1941 through 1945.

this percentage rose to 4.4

Intelligence sources did not reveal the transK

of engine jiroduction of the

Koza

(128),

and the First Naval Air Depot

Army

Ai^-

Arsenal

froi

(Appendix B).

Tachikawa

to

Kanazawa.

71884547-

APPENDIX B
Airframe and engine production.

Army and Navy

Depots,

January 1941-Auguat 1946

irncBArr fRODCcxioN

FIRST

NAVAL AIR DEPOT, KASUMIGAURA (NAVY DEPOT REPORT NO. XIX-1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pagf

The Depot and Its Importance The Air Attacks

in

the Aircraft Industry

:

8
9

Production Statistics Evaluation of Pre at tack Intelligence Reference Notes

Appendices:
A.

9
.

9
10
11

Employment Graph

B. Dispersal

Map

Graph ^ D. Graph of Air Frame and Engine -Repair

C. Production

12

13

THE DEPOT AND

ITS

IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

August 1945, 12,6' Item 1). Cor paratively small numbers of students and milita personnel wei-e employed (A])pendix A). There wer(> two shifts of 12 hours each, fro 0700 to 1900 and fi'oni 1900 to 0700, with 90 po This sh cent of enq)loyees on the day shift. had 30 minutes for lunch and for supper, and t\ 15-minute rest periods, at 0915 and 1500. T particular time was s])eeified for i-est periods
(5,869 direct workers);

INTRODUCTION
Naval Air Depot (Dai-ichi Kaigun was primarily (Migagod in repair of airframes, aireraft engines, oidnance, and auto-

and

for

(7,271 direct workers) (Reference

The

First

Kokiisho)

motive

('(luipnicnl,

l)iit

also |)ro(luee(l

llie

Type

O:-!

Willow (KoYl) in s-mall (|uantilies from January to July 1944, and the
intermediate
trainer

suieide aireraft

Baka

11

for 4

December
])eicent

1944.

Pro<luetion

months amounted

starting
to
1.3

>

of all
all

Willow jjroduction and about 80

the night shift.

percent of

Baka

II

])roduetion.

The
,")()

in
It

depot, set up as such in Octohei- 1941, was percent completed in that month, 60 percent June 1943, and 100 percent in August 1944.

THE DISPERSAL PROGRAM

from May to Deceml: 1944, involved removing important equipment some 17 points in the surrounding count (Appendix B). This program was only 20 perce completed, and almost no eftect was noticed up
'J'he

first

dispersal,

was located in Ibaraki prefecture, west of Ivasumigaura and about 2 miles south of Tsuchiura eitv, adjacent to Ivasumigaura airfield and the In buildings of the Ivasumigaura Air Group.
addition to the necessary shops, sei'vice buildings, and storage sheds, the dei)ot jiiiivided six dormitories

the operation of the depot.

The second

dispersal,

January to August

19'
ji

and

a hospital.

consisted of a removal to an underground site

The

activities of the depot inelndcd, in addition

outside the dei^ot

to aircraft production, repaii- to the

Type 97 attack

plane Kate, the

Type

96 attack plane Nell (trans-

port version), Willow (in particular, fuel equipment

and landing gear), and the Zeke fighter-bomber

(in particular,

bomb equipment);

repairs to engines

of

many

types; repaii's to navigational meters

and

department) and another near the village of Fukuhara, lying the north of the depot (engine departmen This move was 55 percent completed, and p The decli duct ion dropped about 20 percent. in both capacity and actual repairs shown by engine department during this period was ascril:
(aircraft
t

gages, electiical and optical equipment, machine-

directly to the effects of dispersal.

guns and bombing ("qinpment, and fixed onlnance parts; repairs to automobiles, and production of
au.xUiarv fuel efpupinent
foi'

THE AIR ATTACKS

DIRECT ATTACKS
The depot was attacked on 16 February, May, 9 June, 10 July, and 13 August 1945,
1

automobiles.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

The
ilepot

maintained

scpai'iite

drpai'tmelit

for each ty|)e of woi'k; aircraft dei)artnicnt, engine department, ordnance dej)artment, and (fioni .V[>ril 194.")) an automobile department, as well as the usual sei'vice and administrative departments.

duration of attacks being about 10 minutes each instance. These were Navy raids except May and June attacks (Twentieth Air Fore

The attacks were

airfield or the
itself.

directed primarily against seaplane base rathei- than the de|

The
of

total

employment

for July 1942

was 3,977,

workers; for July 1943, 5,983 (3,504 direct workers); for July 1944. 10.713

which 1,607

wcri' direct

The

ail-craft

department

was

affected

m
f

heavily, suffering

damage

to 107,640 scpiare

tlic

repair shops for larjrcr pianos, as well as

frames was in Octoberl!)

ence Item
air attack
3).

('.\|)|)eiidi\

I); i{cfcr-

the licat licatincnt sliop, jjowcr plant, a blower

)]),

wood
sh()|),

piojieller sliop,

the small-type plane

Ke|)air of

wooden-nianuracturo machine sho]), ntin^, sewinj;;, and metal ])latin<; shoijs, and warehouse for finislunl products, in addition this, 32,292 square feet of the emi)loyee traininjz 1, the materials storaije huildinj; of the accounts )artment, the waste oil reprocessing plant, and assembly hall were damatjed. Casualties from se raids were 21 deaths and 2 injuries, riie air-raid precaution program of the depot vided slit trench shelters for as many as 4,700 sons, and jjlaced greatest emphasis on defense inst fire (Reference Item 2).
lair
1

war.

damage to faciiilics and i'(|iii|)niciil by had no! been nnide by the close of the This was ascril)ed to a lack of labor and
All l)ul one alliicl< occiiri'ed
liie
.'iriiT

materials.

pro-

duction had stopjH'd. bul

to this cause, as well as

general decline in repair work accomplished niusl be laid, in i)art.

t;)

the dis]jersids.

EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
War Department Military Intelligence Service (G-2), recognized the depot as a repair station in operation, but never published any evidence that it w-as engaged in aircraft production.

PRODUCTION STATISTICS
'he

REFERENCE NOTES
the

depot produced,

in
1

all,

75 Willows,

The

following material

is

month being 20 (June Production of Baka 11 amounted to 600 4). lies, of which 197 were made in February 194.5, peak month. The original plan to produce Willows a month through .March 1945 was not
best production in

on

file

with recoi-ds of
Aii-

any

the l^nitpd States Strategic

Bombing Survey,

ciaft Division, at the Office of the

eral,

War

Adjutant GenDepartment, Washington, D. C.

P^mployment
Production
statistics.

ried
air

out {Ap])endix

accomplishments

for

Reference Item 3). Peak both engines and air-

Reference Item 1_^ Reference Item 2,. Ucforence Item 3-

Air raid ))recantions.

stati.stics,

in-

c'.nding iiian-lioiirs.

000

JO SllNfl

Nl

lN3WA01d3

10

11

Ocr.p.to
71S845-47
3

OoOqO "ION ooooo

13

ELEVENTH NAVAL AIR DEPOT

(DEPOT REPORT NO. XIX-2)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

The Depot and Its Importance The Air Attacks

in

the Aircraft Industry

15 16
17

Production Statistics Evaluation of Preattack Intelligence

Appendices:
A. Plant Expansion January 1942~February 1945 B. Location of Depot and Dispersal Plants

18

20

Face page 20
21

and Warehouses D. Bomb Damage, 19 March, 5 May, and 2 July 1945 E-1. Bomb Plot, 19 March 1945 E-2. Bomb Plot, 5 May 1945 E-3. Bomb Plot, 2 July 1945 F. Production Statistics
C. Dispersed Factories

22

Face Face Face Face

page page page page

22 22 22 22

(1) (2) (3) (4)

14

THE DEPOT AND

ITS

IMPORTANCE

IN

THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

arsenal also

INTELLIGENCE
The Klcvcnlli Naval Air Depot (Dai Juiclii Kokusiio) was one of four air depots that were i)ro(lu(iiiji' or were aljout to produce aircraft, The depot luaMufaelured both air frames ami airIn 1943 and 1944 (fiscal year, craft engines. April to March) it completed 150 and 196 aircraft respectively, or about 7.5 and 8.3 percent of the national total production of single-engine bombers
Ivaiguii
for

A branch
1945
in

was established on

April

Iwakuni, which was located to the west of it. This was intended to be used for small aircraft repau- but later was converted for the purpose of aircraft production. Figures for the original floor space of the Eleventh Naval Air Depot were lacking but ex-

pansion

since

1942

amounted

to

more

than

1,300,000 square feet, most of which was above

ground.

About 480,000 square

feet of this (from

those years.

The

principal types of planes

a single-engine

manufactured were the Type 97 Model 3, Kate 12, Navy attack plane; and the Suisei,
11,

Judy

12,

and

33, single-engine

Navy

dive
to

hombers.

At

the close of

war

it

was about

produce the Shiden, George 11, an experimental land-based fighter using a Homare 21, 18-cylinder
radial engine.

In

aircraft

principally
radial

engines the depot manufactured Kasei Model 15 or Ha 32, a 14-cylinder engine, used on the twin-engine bomber
11
;

September 1944) represented dispersal rather than expansion of facilities (Appendix A). The depot was under the direct jurisdiction of the Naval Air Headquarters, which planned the production schedule, supplied and made allocations for raw materials, and in general had direct After the formation of the Munisupervision. tions Ministry, production schedules and allocation of raw materials were coordinated with the over-all schedules set up by the Ministry.

Betty

Model

and the Homare 21 or

Ha

45,

an

EMPLOYEES
The employment for the Eleventh Naval Air Depot for 1945 was 53,200, with 31,920 classified

18-cylinder radial engine.

of

Maximum

production

Kasei engines was attained during 1943; 519 were completed, or 1.8 percent of the total engine
production in Japan.
for

as

direct

or

productive workers,

consti-

Homare
1

engine production

tuting 60 percent of the total.

in

The employment

1944

was 689 or

.4

percent of the total Jaj)-

anese production for this year.

The Eleventh Naval Air Depot was located at

Hiro on the Inland Sea at the

mouth

of the Hirose-

Okawa River
Originally
pairs liut
it

aljout 3 miles southeast of Kure.

1939 was 14,000 with 9,400 or 67 percent in productive work. All these figures seem high for the amount of production achieved but it is believed to be due to the fact that it includes the marine engine department which was not con-

was concerned principally with redid supply aircraft and engines to the
early as 1930.
1

Air Force as
officially

It was,

however,

established

on

October

1941.

The

cerned with aircraft manufacture vmtil June 1945 when it was combined with the Eleventh Naval Personnel in 1945 included regular Air Depot. employees (77 percent), conscripted students

depot at the time of its establisliment consisted of

a

marine engine department and an aircraft de-

partment, but the two operated separately.

6

On

June 1945 the two departments were combuied due to the increasing importance and priority given to aircraft production. The marine engine department was to supply aircraft parts, but by the end of war it had not yet fullv converted itself.

and military (4 percent). Students were employed from June 1944 and military personnel in June 1945. The multiple-shift (3shift) schedule of work was used at the depot but the third shift had only a small percentage of student labor and no other employees. The employment schedule therefore was for all prac(19 percent)
tical

purposes on 2

shifts.

15

Tlu' relative pereeiitage of each type of labor

on eaeh

shift

was

as follows:

Shifts

wood-working mat'hinos such as lathes, cuttinc: In etc., which wore destroyed also. Mil ion, some engine parts were destroyed, causlU'liini's,
'j:

1930 to 1945 was 3,141

units.

No

j)lamie(l

(ig-

(h'op

in

tl'e

niatiufacture of en'j;ines (Ap-

For air defense the only information avaihble

IS

that there were tin-ee antiaircraft machine

at

;ins

Kihatayama manned by a crew of three en each. At Hachiroyama there were two antircraft machine guns manned by a crew of tiiree In adtiition, there was a portahh^ smol<e ell. iccu apparatus in charge of guards, and two
mis used during
irposes.
tlie air

raids for transportation

Tiie effect of the area

I

aircraft engines

bombing on the production can be seen by the fact that

during 1944 and 1945, 1,248 Homare 21 engines were manufactured as against 2,110 planned. Total production from 1940 to 1945 was 2,445 engines (Appendix F). Prior to 1940 the Hikari model and the Kotobuki aircraft engines were manufactured. An average of 60 engines were manufactured annually with considerable increase in 1938 and 1939 when 100 and 130 engines were completed, respectively. In 1940 the Kinsei (1,040-liorsepower, 14-cylindei' I'adial engine) went into production. Beginning with June, 115 wei'e produced during the year. Kasei engine (1,440-horsepower, 14-cylinder radial
but,
1

ures were available for this j)eriod

;i(iut
j,

42 percent of the parts came from cooperat-

works located in Tokyo, Tamashinia in ^ayama prefecture, and Hiroshima. Of these ppliers 58 percent were destroyed which is llccted in the fact that parts shortage became
VCl'C.

manufacture began in June 1941 and amounted to 64 for the year. In 1942 production was devoted exclusively to the Kasei 15, and 240 were completed. Peak production of Kasei, however, was reached in August of the following
engine)
year, only to be discontinued after October in

favor of the

Homare

21

(1,970-horsepowei',

18-

PRODUCTION STATISTICS
from 1939 to 1945 was 594 planned or ordered by the ivcrnment. From 1930 to 1945, 1,211 aircraft ic completed. Aircraft manufactured between i:i(l and 1939 were of various types, l)ut Navy tack planes were manufactured during each of
Over-all production

iliames

with

92(5

During 1944 and 1945 only Homare 21 engines were manufactured. Actual production of aircraft compared to planned indicates a lack of coordination from 1944 From 1939 to 1943 there to the end of the year. was no divergence at all with 348 aircraft planned and completed. In 1944 and 1945 (April 1944July 1945) 555 Judy were planned as against an
cylinder radial engine).
actual of 215 (Figure
1).

I'se

years.

The production

of air

Between 1939 and 1945 the following types of rcraft were produced Type 97 Model 2 (Kate 11), iigle-cngine bomber; Reisui (Jake), a single:

igine

reconnaissance plane;
12), a single-engine

Type 97 Model

vate
lisei

Navy

attack plane;

frames during 1944 and 1945 fluctuatetl greatly and in July and October 1944 it dropped to one and zero, respectively. The drop in October was noted as being due to bombing but no bombing attacks were recorded in the United States Stra-

(Judy 11, 12, and 33), single-engine Navy bombers; and Shiden (George 11), an imoved single-engine Navy fighter (Appendix F). The Kate 11 was manufactured in 1939 with atal of 50 for the year. In 1940 and 1941 anufacture was limited to Jake of which 48 ere produced. In 1942 and 1943 production as exclusively Kate 12 aircraft of which 250 ere produced during the 2 years. In the followyear 30 additional Kate 12s were manug ctured. Production of the Judy type also gan and during 1944 and 1945 a total of 215 icluding Judy 11, 12 and 33) were produced. At the close of war, the production of the imfoved George 11 was just beginning and one was
vc

Bombing Survey Tabulating Section records. The productive capacity in November 1944 was only 30 aircraft per month while the plainied was
tegic

60 and actual 24. Hence, the ordered production was out of line with the capacity and there is
reason to believe that the orders were "hoj)ed for" figures and not the planned figures made l)y the
tlepot.

was a change

Beginning with the fiscal year April 1945, there In in type to the modified George. order to expedite this change it was planned to reduce Judy production to 20 a month. Despite this, at the end of the war the change to the fighter George had been just completed and production had not started. The production of the
fighter

rapleted.

George was delayed by a lack

of jig equip-

Over-all

production of aircraft engines from

ment.

17

Production

in

1945 was directly affected only by

the air attack of 5

May when

Judy

])iO(hiction

declined from 25 in April to 6 in

May.

Considering the actual and planned engine production figures, the 2 approximate each other up to December 1944 except for August and SeptemAn increasing divergence occurs after this ber.
period in which the actual figures take a downward trend while the planned continues to rise (Figure
2)
.

The planned curve

or production figure

lie

raised as a matter of policy to 400

There is sudden decline in January and May 1945. The severe drop in January and August was due to technical causes flaws in the engine which reciuired correcJanuaiy 1945 also was the beginning of the tion. dispersal program and contributed to the decline. The dip in production in May and again after June was due to B-29 l)ombing attacks. Pro1944,

was to by December. production in August

duction in

May,

as a result of the air attack of

PLANNED a ACTUAL AIRFRAME PRODUCTION

APRIL 1944-AUG, 1945

60

COMPARISON OF

MIS.

ESTIMATES AND
MIS ESTIMATES
a ACTUAL KATE
12

ACTUAL PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION

M.I.S.

ESTIMATES 8 ACTUAL JUDY PRODUCTION

JllX
Pf OIIU(TIOP

^' M/TEi

n^
1939
F

1940

1941

1942

1943

I94<

U t U

JAS ONDJ FMAMJ JA

1945

1944

us STRATEGIC BOMB SURVEY

ELEVENTH NAVAL

AIR DEPOT
3

FIGURE

19

APPENDIX A
PUint expansion Eleventh A^dval Air Depol. January 194'2-

February 1946

Name

LOCATION

OF DEPOT AND DISPERSAL PLANTS

SUPPLIES
SUPPLY

BUILDING DEPARTMENT

SHOP BOMBS AND GUNPOWDER WAREHOUSE ENGINE SHOP (PARTS) ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (COMMUNICATION ORDNANCE) KURE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (TORPEDO HEADS^ ENGINE PARTS) ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (ORDNANCE PIECES) BOMBS AND GUNPOWDER WAREHOUSE
SUPPLY WAREHOUSE

ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE [ORDNANCE PARTS) SUPPLY WAREHOUSE TOKUSHIMA BRANCH SHOP SUPPLY WAREHOUSE NAURO BRANCH OF OSAKA SUPPLY WAREHOUSE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE

ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT
MATERIALS WAREHOUSE (BULBS. ELECTRIC WIRE. ETC.) RAILWAY TUNNEL USED AIRPLANE PARTS WAREHOUSE RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE (AIRPLANE PARTS AND LIGHT ALLOY) RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE (COAL, OIL, PAPER, COTTON, ETC) RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE

MATERIALS DEPARTMENT
FOUNDRY (ENGINE CASTING)
FORGING SHOP (ENGINE)

KELMET SHOP (BEARINGS)

ENGINE SHOP (PARTS)

IN

PROCESS OF BEING PLAIWED

AIRCRAFT ENGINE DEPARTMENT

TEST CELL SHOP FOR ENGINES
IN

PROCESS OF BEING PLANNED

AUTOMOBILE DEPARTMENT
ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT
ORDNANCE SHOP (GUNS AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT) ORDNANCE AND AUTOMOBILE DEPARTMENT ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT (HEAT TREATMENT)

AIRCRAFT DEPARTMENT
AIRPLANE SHOP (PARTS)

U S

STRATEGIC B0MB1WG SURVEY

ELEVENTH NAVAL AIR DEPOT

47

irw*

p.

lor

. .

APPENDIX C
Dispersed factories and warehouses
Section

Function
Airplane
stored.

(i(il)ara_

Accounting.

jiarts

and
stored. stored.

liiiht

alloys

Nakakurose. Yakp.yama. Yoshiura

Koyaura
Kamionsaki. Hosogoe
Kaitaichi

do Supply Engine Supply do

do-

Do.

Ordnance parts Ordnance parts

Engine

Parts nmnnfaeturi'.

Tnipedij head seclimi stored.

parl.s sliired.

ArmamentSupply
do.. materials

Kirigushi

Machine ^'luis, hotnbs and equipment niarnifacture. Bombs and exiilosives stored.
Do,
Casting"

optical

Akizuki

Nomi
Tokushima

Raw

work

(engine)
parts.

Repair of planes.

Takuma Do
Kaiiunji

Supply
Airplane. Sujiply Airplane.

Supply work and armament

Repair
(if

large pl;uies.

Supply work and armament parts.

Airplane parts manufacture.

Imabaru
Mitsugaharaa-

Nakashima

Wada
IwakunL
Do-Tojo--

._.

Supply... do do
do....

Armament Armament

[larts

storehouse. parts stored.

Matsuyama-.. Yawatahama.-

Engine Supply

Communication i'qnii>ment stored. Supply work and armament parts. Manufacture of eneine iiarts, Sujiply work and arniament parts.
Repair of planes. Kelmet hearings. Running test of motors.

Raw
.

materials

Atn Hinoura

Engine Supply

Bombs and
.

explosives stored.

Nenoura Kamagari
Yosigasc Kurashiki
Hiraeji

Raw

materials-

Forging of raw materials.

Coal, organic resin, pai)er. Electric bulbs and line stored.

Accounting..
do.:

Naruo Osaka

Do Do
Komatsushima.

Supply do do do Auto plant Accounting

Supply-.

Supply work, arniament Do, Do, Do,

jiarts.

Repairing of atitos. Received and transferred materials in Osaka area-

various

Tokushima Uchinoumi Kure

Hire

doSupply

Supply works and armament parts. Do.

Parts manufacture. Parts stored.

Main

Takehara Kasaoka Mizushima.

Raw

arsenal--. materials-

Airplane

Supply

Foundry shop. Airplane parts. Parts stored.

71884547

21

APPENDIX D
linmh ihimngv
'
I'J

tabic,

Eleventh Naval Air Depot

1945

MARCH

ATTACK
Damage
caused

M up
locaI

iun

Shops or buildings that were dumagt'd

Near

83

Ti'St

foundry shop^
call

Partial

damage.

Xpar
7U
71

Test

shop Lumber wan-bouse.

Baitt'ry room Boiler house

No damage.
Partial damage of 20 iutcent. Practically no damage. Severely damaged, (10 percent. 50 machines: 33 rej>airabli-,
17

09

47

Xo. No.

112
'A

shop.

machine shop

jrre[>airable.
<H)

Xo. 2 maehine .shop assembly shop Xo.

1

Severely damagedSeverely damaged,

cent.

per-

for engines.

Boiler house

Severely dainageil.

ma-

Test running shop assembly shop.

for

Xo. 1 shop. .. Xo. 11 shop.. Xo. 103 shop Xo. 20 shop.. Xo. 50 shop. Xo. 42 shop..
Total
23

chines; 4 repairable, 4 unrepairable. Severely damaged. 40 percent. 18 machines: 12 repairable. (I unrepairable. Partial damage.

Do.
Do. Severely flamaged.
Partial

No

damage. damage.

MAY

1945

ATTACK

90

LEGEND

BUILDING
(RAIDS

LAYOUT
MARCH-1945)

OF

19

LEGEND

BUILDING
(RAIDS OF 5

LAYOUT
MAY 1945)

LEGEND

BUILDING LAYOUT
(RAIDS

OF

2 JULY 1945)

APPENDIX
AIR FRAMES

Planned and actual airframe and engine production, Eleventh Naval Air Depot, 19S045

TWENTY-FIRST NAVAL AIR DEPOT, OMURA

(Depot Report No. XIX-3)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

The Depot and Its Importance The Air Attacks

in

the Aircraft Industry

i .

Production Statistics Evaluation of Target Intelligence

Appendices:
A. B.

24 28 30 32
39 40

Omura

Plant Lay-out

Map

of Plant Locations

C. Dispersal of Airframe Production from

Omura

40
41

D.

Bomb

Plot

23

THE DEPOT AND

Twenty-first

ITS

IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

(Ha
ized.

INTRODUCTION
Naval Air Depot, located town of Omiira, Kyushu Island, produced hoth aiiThe plant had apfj-ames and airplane engines. piincipai buildings and a similar proximately 4.5 number of smaller shops, offices, storehouses, and In addition, there were about engine test cells. various sizes in the area (Appendix 25 hangars of A liranch of the depot was at Hiu at the A).
Tlic
al)()ut

45), l,795-horse])Ower engine

never material-

10 miles nortlieast of Nagasaki in the

Apart from its production functions, the depot was extensively engaged in repair of all Navy types (if aircraft and engines.

EMPLOYMENT
Elmployment at the depot rose more or
of 23,878 employees in
first

less

gradually throughout the war and reached a total

mouth

of the

Omura Bay

near Sasebo in north-

western Kyushu. Forging and casting was done at Hiu. The order establishing the di'pot was issued in March 1939. Construction began in May 1939. Prior to completion of the original plan, an expansion

and construction in was begun immediThe depot officially was opened October ately. although operations had been commenced 1941, some months earlier. Construction was com-

was ordered

in July 1941

line with the expansion plan

September 1944 prior to the Student labor was used after June 1944. Fluctuations in the numbers of em])loyees beginning in October 1944 were due to the varying numbers of students used. Increased employment to 26,391 in October and 28,772 in November 1944 was due to the use of large numbers of students in cleaning up after the heavy October air attack and in assisting in the consequent dispersal o|K'rations (Figure and Table 1).
air

attack.

Taklk

1.

Total

Ill

1)1(1!/

niiiil

Januaiij 19'il~ August

10'r'>

pleted in April 1942.

Date

The

principal aircraft type pioduced

was the

Type

observation seaplane,

Model

1 1,

Pete.

The

depot also produced two types of training fighters, Zeke and Claude, Type O and Type 90 advanced
trainers.

During the

later stages of the war, the

depot aliandoned production of its older types in favor of small-scale production of the Aichidesignetl torpedo and dive bomber, Ryusei, Model

Model

and the Kawanishi fighter, Shiden, George (Photo 1). Peak production of 73 airplanes per month at the depot was reached in December 1943, representing about 3 percent of
11,

Grace,
21,

the

total

production of
1941
II

the

industry

for

that

month.

From
iVniakaze

to

1944,

tlie

depot i)ioduce(l the

9-cylinder,

(Tempu

11),

3Hn-horse])r()(hiction

.power radial aii-cooled engine.

Peak

of 170 of these engines in April 1944 constituted iitire engine 4 percent of the iirodiiction of ll of this Pi-oiliictioii industry for tiie inoiiUi. engine type was abandoned in late 1944, but S-cvhiider llomare planned nioduction of the
1

'I'ahi.I'; 1.

same

<;('ii('ral

(Jiuui;i iirca.

'I'lic

air-iVaiiic assciii(lii-out,''li-

llie

oi'iginal

depot

site

in

Omiira. utilizing

slietl.s

bly functions of the depot wci-c scattci-i'd

const riKled underneath the framework of

bombed-

out the Oiiiuia area,

|)iini!iiily

in

tlic

Ivoiigawa

out buildings (Photo

In the

2).

and .Mizubakai'i disti-icls (Appendix C). desiu'n functions were dis'I'll!' managerial and pcrsc(l in tlic Ilvcda district in 2S hnildings com-

MiznbakaiM

district

(if

the (Jmura area

Sheet working was |)erforiued in seven small buildings in tli(> Suzuta <listrict, and 2 tunnels in the same area with a total space of 15,984 scjuare Production at feet wore used as machine shops. the dispersed locations began in January 1945.
prising a total area of aS.oOO s(|uare feet.

metal

dispersed shops (Photo :{). This development contained 45 builfiings with a total Hoor space of I07,5(J0 .square feet, devoted to fuselage (Photo 4), wing (Photo 5), and final assembly of Geoi'ge (Photo 6).
a

was

similai-

de\('lci|)nient

of

The center
from Omura In the Oguri

of engine^ construction
to the

was

shifted

Most of the airframe I'onstruction took place in Korigawa district of the Onuna area. Fortyone small buildings in upiici' Korigawa contained
the
9(J,720

Isahaya area (Appendix B). district of Isahaya a total of 67,500 S(|uare feet of small dispersed surface shops were devoted to engine construction, and 21,(il)() s(|uarc feet of underground machine shops also were put
into operation.

square feet of lloor space and were used

in

In the
of

Kaneyama
Omura, 80
feet

district of the

and wing assembly of Grace. A like number of buildings and floor area in middle Korigawa was usetl for metal working and machining. Final assembly of Grace was maintained at
fuselage

Hasami area north

plamied
of
till'

i)ercent

of

underground shops had been completed by the end machine

6(1,400

stpiare

of

war.

Plioto 2: As.sembly

slicd.s

under skeleton of No. 2

final asscnibly building,

Omura

27

I'hotu 3; Three uf 45 dispersed shops at Mizubakari

There

was

no

airplane

production

ilurina;

the machine shops had to be moved, and becan

the ])roblem of transplanting the labor suppl}'

November and Deeeniber 1944

was being accomplished.

while the dispersal

Limited production in the dispersed locations began in January 194.5,

but was insignificant thereafter, ilue as much to the difficulty of operation in the dispersed sites as to the change-over to ])roduction of the newer

avoided.

AIR ATTACKS
The
first air

attack on the Twenty-first N;i\

combat

types, George and Grace. Production of Homare engines was planned for tiie dispersed engine plants but, due to the difficulties of obtaining parts and of operating in

Air Depot came on 7 July 1944, during the secoi B-29 attack on the Japanese homeland. Tl attack was of small scale compared to the size

dispersed locations, all production of new engines ceased after the dispersal and the entire capacity of the engini' works was devoted to repair.
tiie

The
I)rogram

predominant
of
111'

featui-e

of

the

dispersal

this

de[)ot

was

the

geographical

piD.ximily
location.

the

new

dispersal aieas to the old

The

dispersal

was accomplished over

a two-nionlh period because of the sliort distances

Although 17 B-2! had the depot, the Sasebo dock area, and tl Tabata Iron and .Steel Works for targets, tin were no hits in the de])ot area (Appendix D). The ne.xt attack on the dejDot occurred on October 1944. A total of 71 aircraft droppi|l E.\tensi^ 1,50 tons of bom])s on the plant. damage to installations and production resultci Both the final air frame assembly buildings an the large machine shop, several tool shops,
i

attacks that were to follow.

28

I'li-iiiii'

shop,
(I'liolo

Miiil

s(()rii,u'('

l)iiil(lin.<;s

were

dr-

ing

in

ihi'
fill

dispersed
forced
lo

locations

to

which

Navy
of the

roycd
I

7).

Many

oilier

Uiiildinns

were

ollicials

move

sis

a 'result

niagi'd incliKliiii; tlic ciiu'luc parts linisliinu' slioj),

tjiiu'
I

Octobi'i- allack.

assembly shop and sonic of lie cnu'inc (est lis (Photos 8 and (). There were 253 eni])loyees killed and a])])i'o.\iiilely 250 injnied as a result of the attack, loduetion of enii'ines had ceased at the plant to the attack, lint conversion from the |i(ir ii:d<a/.e 11 to production oi the Homai'e eng-ine The depot produced no engines after i)^ hailed. attack and the subsequent dispersal.
'

The
of

original

Omura

plant was a target on several

occasions thereafter

bill

wilhout the signal success

the October attack.

On

21

November

the

depot was the target for 94 aircraft cariyiMg 202.5 tons of bombs. No bombs fell in the plant area and there was no damage to plant installations. Two employees were killed outside the planl. On 19 Decembei' 1944, 32 airciaft carrying 51
tons of bombs, had the

Omnia

dejiot as a target.

.Vlso,
i

as
off

result
this 25

of

the

dispei'sal

activities
th(>re

conference building and some dormitoi'ies out-

iih(>(l,

hy

October attack,

was

airframe
hiiilhs

production by the depot for the 2 following. Production of aircraft at the

January 1945, 1 month, extremely low j)ro(luction during 1945 was r partly to the effort to pi-oduce newer combat )es, but also resulted from difficulties of opeiatpri-sed locations

commenced

in

never exceeded eight airplanes in any

immediate plant area were damaged and 2 employees were killed. Forty-five B-29s dropped 89 tons of bombs on the depot on 6 January 1945, resulting in some hits among the engine test cells and on a seaplane maintenance shop. One death resulted from llie
side of the

attack.

Carrier planes of the P^ifth Fleet attacked the

rii.idi 4: Irilericir of
Sl.1-47-

disiKThcd Cicnifre fiisfhigo

a.s.seinlily

shop at

IVIiziihakari

29

I'liiito 5:

Interior of dispersed George wing assembly shop at Mizuliakari

depot

oil

IS

rosultiag in the

Alaroh 1945 with sonic damage hangar ai-ea of the depot. There

enormously greater than that subsequent attack.

infhctetl

in

i\

were no casualties. Following the strike of 18 Alai'ch there were eight moi-e attacks' on the depot in IVIarcii, May, June, and July 1945. The aircraft plant was not the primary target in any of these attacks, l)ut the attacks were against airfield installations or other targets and the depot was hit only incidentally. No additional damage to productive facilities was caused, fasiialties from these later attacks totaled IS killed and a similar numher wounded. The iiistoi-y of the bombing program on this |)articular- target might well be limited to the attack of 25 ()ctoi)er 1944. This attack came at time when o|)ei-ations were being conducted in a normal fasliion. Lat(>r attacks were directed
;i

Th(> dispersal instituted as a direct result wasl important factor in reducing the production! this depot to insignifieaiiee when compared to|
earliei-

production.

PRODUCTION STATISTICS
From April 1941 through August 1945 the de produced a total of 966 aircraft. It had a tc| capacity of 1,030 and govenmient orders for 1,
Over the same period, its engine f duction totaled 2,132 compared with capacity 2,224 and orders for 2,615 engines.
aircraft.

During the early months

aircraft

of the operations of
lif

depot, both capacity and actual production of

against

tlie
its

physical skeleton of the plant after

fiiMctions
))h\'sie!il

th(s

bulk of

where.

The

had been tr'ansferred elseihimai;e then caused was

were small. Airframe production ils abandoned in October 1941 in favor of product n of engines and extensive aircraft and engine vcpn'i-

30

I'rodiicl ioii
!)42,

of aii'lVaincs

and

l)()lli

fiipacity

was rcsiiiiicd in .liily and aclnal pr'udncl ion

7.'>

P.M.")

was

al

liibulable not only to operations

in
I

dispeise<l locations

"cpandrd

rci^iilarly

rracliini;
\\)-i'A

airplanes

pvv

newer

ly|)es

but also to production of of planes, (he l)ond)er, (Jracc, and

he he

lonlli in Dccciiibcr'
rsl
()

(Fiijiiro 2).
fell

Durinji: (lie
oil',

lighter, fleorge.

nionllis of 1(144, production

lo ciit-ljai'lvs in

as did
liic

Government-plaiuied
|)r()(luc(ion fairly closely

|)rodiietion followed actual

iipacity, <lu('

prodnctii)n of

hscrvalion
I

s('a])lan(',

Pete,

and the conversion of

the
iie\\

)ii)e
[id

facilities lo tiie pi'odiictioii of

(ii-ace.

1or|)edo

dive hondxT,

during the early years, but exceeded t)oth capacity and aclii.-il [)roduction during most of 1944 and 194.'). The plans called for a larger production of the newer type eonibal
jilaiies

Durini;' the last half of 1944, ])r()duetion declined

iivally
I'pe,
i

than could be

I'eali/.ed.

due

first

to

abandonment
heavy
air

of

one

(rainei-

the sul)se(|uen( complete cessation of Pete

first

Numerically, the most important type produceil was the observation seajjlane Pete, followed by
It was not war that the depot went into regular ])roduction of any of the tiewei' cond)at type |)lanes. During 194.5, the depot concentrated only on the first-line types Grace and George. The only engine pi'oduced was the Amakaze 1.
'.^).

Iroduction, the

attack in October

the Zeke and Claude trainers (Figure

until late in the

ml the consef|uent dispersal.

Vs a result of the dispersal activities, there

airframe production during the last 2

44.

iiiieed
ulit
1(1

Production at dispersed sites during 104.^, but was still small only airplanes in July and one in August at the of the wai'. Till' low production during

was months of had cnni-

9-cylinder radial air-cooled i>(i()-horsep()w cr engine.

Capacity and actual production increased

in close

Photo

6:

Typical shed used fer

final

assembly of George at IMizubakari

31

Iiitcriiir vii'W

uf (iamage to No. in

final

assembly shop at Omiira

5!

correliition

i'lom

the
to
;i

start peuiv

of of

production
170 engines

total

production; actual produeliun totaled

57().

November
l)ro(luetion

1941

per

as

compared with an estimated

Tlu' highe'

From mid-l 944 4). with a decision on the part of the navy to abandon production of t!ie Amakaze engine in favor of planned production of
montli in April 1944 (Figure
fell

oi^ in line

rate of 40 per month was actual during 4 months, and reached 5(1 p exceeded month during 3 of those months (Figure 5). Pv

estimated

actually went out of production 2 moiitlis Ixfo

it

the 1S-cylindeition
first

Engine produchad ceased altogether by October when tlie

engine.

Homare

was

estimateti to

have ceased.
])er

The

])roduetion rate of the l)omber Grace w;

eH'ective air attack on

Omura

resulted in the

greatly overestimated at 10

month

in

lii4

dispersal of activities.

After dispersal the i)ianned Homare engine production failed to materialize, as preparations for production wer(> halted by the 25 October attack and prockiction in t!ie dispersed locations

when the highest production any month was 4 airplanes.

depot.

actually achieved
Intelligence had
i

inkling as to planned fightei'

production

at

tli

was too

difficult

to

maintain.

Emphasis was

Production of Zeke trainers was correctly

placed on engine

n-jjair aftei' dispersal.

tiibuted to the depot, although actual producti(

of C'lau<k> trainers

EVALUATION OF TARGET GENCE

was missed.

INTELLI-

Production of the
rectly attributed
to

Amakaze
tlie

11

engine was fo

Estimates of pi-oductiun (jf tin reconnaissance plane i'etc wore fairly sound from liie angle of

Twenty-first Naval A Depot by intelligence, but the quantity of pn

duction never was estimated.

32

Pliotci S:

Inicnor

icw

,,t

i-iigine

adjusting shop; engine as.sembl.y building, in background

33

""t..^/\
Photo
9:

Horn!)

damage

to engine test cells

34

t-

36

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Si
%9's
1
tf)

u
a c

m
>

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?=.

< 5
1^

S5 sells ciKgi 4 X
t/) tf)

nz
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a.

f
<i J

5S
r

-N(o*>ior-(BmOr

oau A tor- s!!:s^;

* o

[JQ.ixzzuj33SSu

^
tn

39

Si

KiQ.

>

m2
I

3j
o
I
^
>cfl

^i2q''~;?'2

5^
5 * I

s?:
^
5; tr
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<i

13 _j Q: [

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2

35t/il-iAu.i;

Tiof-.a>o5~^^''^fit5CTiO^'^'^''''^'^'^

?i3

41

KOZA NAVAL DEPOT

(Depot Report No. XIX-4)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

The Depot and Its Importance The Air Attacks

in-

the Aircraft Industry

Evaluation of Preattack Intelligence Reference Notes

Appendices:
A. Total B.

43 44 45 45
45

Employment,

April 19-t4-August 1945

,

Map

of Dispersal Locations

C. Planned, Ordered,

and Actual Production

Face Page 44 45

42

THE DEPOT AND

ITS

IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

THE DISPERSAL PROGRAM
the main and warehouses) to four sites near the dei)ot, making the best possible use of topography and wooded areas.
dispersal

INTRODUCTION
j

The Koza Naval Depot (Koza Kaiguii Koslio)

engaged in the production of the interceptor ighter Raiden (Jack), of whicli 128 were made
ivas

The

plan

was

to

move

facilities

and equipment

(shops, offices,

'rom
)f

May

1944

to

August

1945,

21

percent

The depot opened on Jack production. 1 April 1944 and continued in operation to the end war. It was located in Koza county jf the (Koza-gun), Kanagawa prefecture, about 4 miles
all

Some

of

the warehouses were

after

to

be dispersed

elsewhere (Appendix B).

northeast of Atsugi station.

irea

The

total building

was

2,2t)(),440 scjuare feet (including auxiliary

installations)

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

Details of production flow at the original site
are

not available.

The

functions of the various

shops are recapitulated in the discussion of the

dispersal locations.

The number
throughout
tlie

of

employees increased steadily

period of the depot's operation,

reaching a peak of 10,548 workers in

(Appendix A, Table
ivas

1).

single

June 1945 10-hour shift

be In shoj)s underground, approximately 645,840 square feet; in tunnels, approximately 322,920 square feet; in surface locations, approximately 322,920 square feet. The goals were to maintain the same amount of equipment and facility space, and a monthly production of 120 planes. However, building space was reduced to 60 percent of the predispersal area. Plans were made also to economize on materials and labor, to expedite the dismantling of the original plant, and to minimize damage to buildings from air attack prior to dispersal. Easily destroyed material was transferred to the
dispersal
to

The working area

was

1,291,680 square feet, separable as follows:

used.

dispersed plants.

Further plans were made to expand the

Table
1.

dis-

Employment

statistics

'

persal area in such a

Increase

way
to

as not to intei'fere with

the production of Jack.

Dis-

Man^

Total

Year and month

patchei(l

workers

Regular workers

hours per

number
of

over

crease in area

was
feet.

The contemplated inhave been approximately

in

month
preceding

month

workers
present

538,200 square

Work on

dispersal

commenced

November

1944
April. .__

1944, but because of orders to change plans, lack

2,000 2.000 2,000 2,000 2,000 5,000 5,000
5. IKIO

May
June.
luiy

._

;;;;

August

Septembor
October

2,924 3.708 4.496 5.124 5.912 3,000 3,100

3.

81, 872 84.000 86,800 89,488 94, 7.52

4,926 5,708 6,496

7,

124

628
788 88
100

November
December-

196

904 102, 928 106, 962

99,

7,912 8.000
8, 8,

100 196

96
188

s.omj

3,384

103.

824

8,384

1945

lanuary...

February

March
April.....

May
June...
luly
"

August...

6,000 6,000 5,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3.000 3,000

.3,668

3.676 3.784 6.000 7,440 7.548 6,656 6,688

126.888 143. 472 166. 636 168. 000 180. 320 183. 344 186, 368 187, 264

8,668 8,676 8,784 9.000 10. 440 10, 648 9,656 9,688

184 108 108

216
1,

144 108

and transportation, and the Jack, construction of and operation in dispersed sites did not come up to Construction was to have been expectations. completed by 15 June 1945, and the operation entirely transferred to the new site by 10 July, but at the end of the war, actual progress represented about 80 percent of plans (70 percent of the planned increase).
of materials, labor,

urgent,

demand

for

-892
32

A summary
will also

of progress in each of the four sites of produc-

show the physical organization

'

.AIJ

employment was of a single, 10-hour, day shift. Haken Koin" workers sent or borrowed from other

factories.

tion in the depot.

43


Number One
and
its facilities

plant area

was the southernmost

tunnels or underground and airframe

of the 3 areas to the west of the original plant,

were

all in

on 10 July, 18 July, and 13 August. One sheet metal shop was destroyed by machine gun fire. There was a total of 5 deaths and 10 injuries.

shops.

It

assem])led

airframes

equipment. Monthly production capacity was to Since the 1)6 GO planes (50 percent of the total). in other areas were delayed, final assembly plants this area was important from the standpoint of Temporary roads connected it with production.
the original plant. Number Two plant area was a dispersal inlo It consisted a ravine just north of Nundier One.

PRODUCTION STATISTICS
Government orders
were well
ing
ing a figure of 70 in

started in April 1944 an(

1945.

in excess of plans for production, reach

March

In the follow
to 30, the leve

month

this figure

was dropped

wing and fuselage assembly shops (eai)acity planned for 40 a month), a machine shop (300 machine tools in tunnels), a parts shop (welding, static, metal plates, etc, above ground), and a sheet metal shop (in tunnels). It had by the end of the war assembled 10 wings and fuselages.
of

reached by planned production, and from tliei on the two figures were identical. It was con templated that these figures would rise to SO
ii

February 1946 (Appendix C, Table

T.\BLE
2.

2).

Planned

(tnd

actual producti'oti.

April

U).',^

August 1945
Year and

month
1944

Requested

Nundier Three plant area, north of Number Two, was a dispersal into woods and a ravine, and included a final assembly shop (underground, capacity planned for :iO planes a month), fuselage
and wing assembly (underground, capacity ])lanned for 40 a month), a parts shop (in tunnels), and a parts warehouse (in tunnels). By the end of the war only the major ])art of the tunnels had been completed; the remaiuder was in |)rocess of
construction.

April

May
June
Jul.v

August SeptemberOctober

NovemberDecember..
194."i

January February..

March
April..
--

-May June

Number Four
east
of

plant area lay in

plant.

the

original

completed, and at the end of

woods to the It was practically the war was on the

July .\ugust

Total

It comprised a final point of starting operation. assembly shop (underground, capacity planned for 30 planes a month), fuselage antl wing assembly (above ground, capacity planned for 40 a month), a jig shop, and a wooden parts shop, both above

ground.

The
all.

dispersal plants produced only 10 planes in

How much
is

persal itself

difficult

production was lost due to disto determine, since the

there was, in addi-

move was not completed, and

tion,

shortage of materials and parts. The most serious aspect of the dispersal was that it was not completed according to schedule, since
a

no planning was valid

ready.

until

the facilities were

THE AIR ATTACKS

From
A|)ril
l'J4.5,

at various times

the de|)ot was uniler attack by carrier-based fighters raiding

the Atsugi airfield south of (he arsenal, notM])ly

44

EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
Var
(

total

number made

since 'production started

to

only seven altogether. production was made.

Sorviop

No

estimate of rate of

De|)iirtineiit
iiiul

Military
tlio

Iiiti'llia;enco

21,

itl(Mitiii('(l

(jppot as a production

REFERENCE NOTES
The
following material
is

Inr .laok,

\:\

-started in
sixtli

and supposed tliat plane ])ro(luction October 1944. This was actually
of

on

file

at the office of

the Adjutant General,

ington, D. C.
Reference Note
1,

War Department, WashHotflencck Parts, 1945.

niontli

i)roduction,

hut

the

three

lines

produced

duriiiti;

that time hrought the

"RAIDEN" FIGHTER (JACK)

TOTAL

EMPLOYMENT

APRIL 1944

AUG

PLANNED, ORDERED,

AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION

1945

APRIL 1944

JULY

1945

KOZA NAVAL ARSENAL

APPEICIX

TACHIKAWA ARMY AIR ARSENAL

(Report No. XIX-5)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

The Aksenal and

its

Importance in the Aircraft Industry

___.

Attacks on Plants Production Statistics Evaluation op Pre-attack Intelligence Reference Notes

Appendices: A. Ma|) of Dispersion and B. Monthly Employment
C.
Plant, Locations
.

47 48
49-

49 49
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
61 62

Airframe

Works,

Monthly Employment Engine Works D. Direct Man-Hours Worked Airframe Works Engine Works E. Direct Man-Hours Worked F. Plan for Underground Engine AVorks at Hayasbi G. Plan for Underground Aircraft Works at Shichisei H. Dispersal of Tachikawa Air Arsenal I. Air Attack Damage J. Monthly Aircraft Production K. Monthly Engine Production

63

46

THE ARSENAL AND

ITS

IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

was
locatod 20
tlie

INTRODUCTION
The Tacliikawa Army Air
miles east of Tol^yo
^Vj-senal,

directly

the Air General

were issued.

under the Commanding General of Army from whose office all orders Funds were received from the Army.

town of Tachikawa, was the only Army arsenal engaged production of airframes and ah'craft in the During the period 1941-45 air-frame engines. production accounted for 1.4 percent and engine
on the outskirts of
production 1.2 percent of the Japanese total.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

The commanding
dispersals
officer of this arsenal

and

its

was Col. Sliujiro Tanabe. The airframe and engine works employed
11,940 workers at the war's end.

a total

The principal model produced in the airframe was the Ki-51, Type 99 single-engine Approximately 22 reconnaissance aircraft, Sonia. per month were produced for the years 1942 through 1944 by the Tachikawa Arsenal, which was the sole manufacturer of this model. Other aircraft produced by the arsenal included the Ki-30, Type 97 single-engine light bomber, Vnn, and the Ki-43, Type 1 single-engine fighter, Oscar. Only 49 of the latter model were produced although it was one of the Army's outworks

of

Prior to

September 1943 the arsenal was operated on a

until the end of the were in effect. One began at 0700 and ended at 1800; the other started at 1900 and ended at 0600. The percentage of workers on th(> night shift varied from to 40 percent. The engine works had a peak employment of 5,640 at the end of the war, while the number of air-frame workers reached a peak of 6,300 at the end of the war (Appendices B, C, D, and E). The airframe works loaned the Mitsubishi firm an average of 866 persons per month from April through December of 1944, and the engine works loaned 1,000 workers to Nakajima from June" through October 1944. airfranu' works the turnover in Labor amounted to approximately 2 percent in 1942, 1 percent in 1943, and 2 percent in 1944 and 1945. There is no information as to turnover in the engine works. About 40 percent of the workers in both of the plants were soldiers.

one-shift basis; thereafter,

war,

two

11-hour

shifts

The production Peggy, was planned to begin in the latter part of 1945, Init only one was produced before the war ended. In the engine works the principal product was the Ha-23, a nine-cylinder, air-cooled radial ?ngine of 360 horsepower for trainer aircraft. During the years 1941 through 1944 production iveraged 26 per month. Other models included the 1,050 horsepower, 14-cylinder Ha-31, an lir-cooled radial with a two-sjieed supercharger Tor powering the twin-engine Kawasaki fighter
standing single-engine fighters.
of

Ivi-67,

Nick,

and the 1,970 horsepower Ha-45, an 18-

DISPERSAL
of the Tachikawa Arsenal were two widely separated areas: The engine works centered around Kanazawa in Ishikawa prefecture on the west coast, more than 200 miles from Tokyo, while the air-frame works were scattered in the general pi'oximity of

ylinder radial also ecjuipped with a two-speed

mpercharger, used in the singl(>-engine

ighter Frank.

Nakajima

The

facilities

dispersed

to

In addition to the manufacture of air frames

ind engines, the arsenal
:ions

engaged in all modificaand major repairs for the Tokyo area. In August 1 944 the engine works was moved to he city of Kanazawa, which is on the Japan Sea ibout 100 miles due north of Nagoya (Appendix fV). Owned by the Japanese Army, the Arsenal

Tachikawa within 50 miles

(Appendix A).

of the Imperial Palace

With the capture

of the

Marianas Islands by

47

the United the

States forces

June

1944,

Army

tion of roads

authorities considered plans for the dispersal of

a small scale.

and the distance, this transfer was on At the end of April 1945 compoto

works to Kanazawa. By August, plans were completed and the dispersal

arsenal's

engine

nents were in limited production at the new site. In April 1945 tlu' Army authorities decitled
construct

carried out.

Early
attacks,

in 1945, following the initial

it

urban area

was decided to disperse further.

program was put into effect hy which the t'acilities of the engine works were scatteretl to 35 sites in Ishikawa prefecture and raw materials to 50 additional storage sites.

an underground plant for the airframe works at nearby Shichist-i containing 13,200 Average height and width of the feet of tuimels. tunnels was 10 by 13 feet (Appendix G). In August the Shichisei plant was 80 percent completed.

In early
construction of an

May

it

was decided

to

move

one-half
foi-

In

the meantime,

under-

the assembly shop facilities to Takahagi

the

ground engine works was undertaken in June at Hayashi, 6 miles south of Kanazawa, and was about 30 percent coni[)leted by August when the war ended. This undei'ground plant was to Approximately include 11,616 feet of tunnels. 800 machine tools eventually were to be installed in the underground plant, which was to have, in addition to a machine shop, a raw materials warehouse, components storage, transformer station, and oil storage (Appendi.x F). After the dispersal of the engine works in August 1944, the airframe works for a time occu-

assemlily of Sonia reconnaissance aircraft and the

twin-engine medium bomber Peggy, but at the end of the month construction of a semiuiulerground woiks at Hanno was undertaken to which it was intended to retransfer the final assembly facilities from the Takahagi site. The dispersal of the airframe works was aL within a 27-niile radius of the Tachikawa arseuai (Appendix H).

ATTACKS ON PLANTS
The Tachikawa
arsenal suffered from the
ett'ect

Tachikawa Arsenal vacated by the engine works. AVith the intensification of air attacks toward the end of 1944, plans were
pied the section in the

formulated

for

the

dispersal

of

tlie

airframe

one of which was directc' against the woi-ks as the primary target. Diaing the attack of 4 April 1945 on the Tacli
of three attacks, only

However, because of tliificulties in obtaining building materials and transportation facilities, dispersal of the works' machine shop to Tokorozawa, 12 miles northeast of Tachikawa, was not undertaken until 10 March 1945. During the same periotl the sheet metal shop facilities were moved to the Hikawa tuiuid, 27 miles west of Tachikawa. In the meantime, in early February 1945, approximately 60 warehouses had Ibeen acrjuired in the Tachikawa area, and by the first part of March
works
also.

kawa

Airi)lane Co.'s

main

plant, the "spillover

resulted in hits on the Arsenal.

Thiid\ing

it

wa

the bombers' targi>t, although

oflicials

damage was

ligh

burned

all

Alost of the shop

it

facilities

wooden structures not in us( had been dispersed, bu

fire

was

felt

that an uncontrolled

among empt

buildings wouhl spread to the airfield and destro

the aircraft in the hangars.

On

June 1945, during a Twentieth Air

directed

Forci

attack

against

the arsenal,

airfiel

transfer of easily transported materials took place.

The

decision

to

disperse

resulted

when

the

raw materials stoi-age Musashi plant of the Nakajinui

Co. was bombed.

To
and

cai'ry the dispersion into effect 1,000 vehicles

During the was necessary temporarily to expose certain steel and light alloys to the elements in outdooi' dumps, a portion of these materials suffered considerable damage. With the transfer of the sheet metal shop facilities to Hikawa, a j)ortion of the components assembly shoj) was moved to Sawai, 25 mil(>s southwest of Tachikawa. Due to the poor eoudi10,000
transfer,

men were employed.

il

since

hangars were destroyed. Twenty-nine B-2[ attacked the target and dropped 169 tons of G bombs. Eighteen aircraft bombed visually aiv by radar devices. Damage was light. On 1 August the arsenal was hit during a urban area attack on Hachioji. Incendiarie gutted 4 of the remaining buildings, and there weij 29 casualties; 5 dead and 24 injured. These raids caused damage to only 11 of th approximately 75 buildings (Appendix I). The urban area attacks on other districts had
1
1

'

large effect.

It

such as

oil,

coal,

was cstimaterl numerous shortage and raw material in generf

bombec;

resulted from these attacks.

The Kanazawa Engine Works was not

48

PRODUCTION STATISTICS
From
aircraft.

works
end,
Tnclii-

to

Kanazawa.
dis[)ersal

From
and

April the

1945

to to

the

1941 until

tlic

ond of

tlic

war

(lie

go underground held back pioduclion of the IIa-45

attemi)t
.

furthci'

kawii ai'scnal Inul the capacity to produce 1,7(J0

Actual production was 1,004. During the period April 1941 to the end of the war engine
luction

(Figure 2 ) After March 1 945 Ha-45 was the only engine in production because of the govermnent's

production capacity was 2,730 wliilc actual pro-

attempt to standardize tyix's. The Kanazawa main works never was bombed but suffei'ed extremely from the threat of bombing. Actual ])roduction stayed fairly close to capacity until August 1944 when general confusion and lack of supplies together with attempted dispersal caused the program to fail (Appendix K).

was 1,363. The capacity of aircraft per month

tli(>

in

works was 20 1041, at which level it

airframe

remained until Marcli 1!)42 when it rose to 30. In Septemher of 1943 it rose to 40 and remained until the end of the war (Figure 1). i|iit this level ()r(h'rs lagged below capacity until August 1942 ivhen the 2 coincided at 30 aircraft per month. From Sc])temhi'r 1942 through March 194.'5 orders 'xceeded capacity, rising to 48 aircraft per month n March but dropping sharply to 22 in April In April 1944 orders again reached capacity 1943. vhich was 40 per month and stayed at that ap)ro.\imate level until February 1945 and dropped
)ft'

EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK
INTELLIGENCE
The War Department Military
Intelligence

Service (G-2), estimate of total production for Sonia was 17 percent over actual (Figure 3). The
estimate,

although

it

failed

to

show

all

of the

fluctuations, did give a very

good general trend.

to zeio in March (Appendi.x J). The important production was that

of Sonia.

\n 1942 the divergence between planned and actual

vas

due

to the

attempt

to establish a

program

for

)roduction of Oscar to parallel the production of

5onia.
)ility

This was abandoned because of the inaof production engineers to cope with attend-

amounted to 913 Sonias while estimated 1,068. Intelligence did not have any estimate of production on othfer aircraft as the production was so small it was negligible. There were no estimates of engine production as the only engine produced in appreciable quanOver-all production

MIS

nt problems.

June through December 1944 arose from the loan of about 700 rorkers to Mitsubishi. In early 1945 planned nd actual production fell sharply due to the 'reparation made for the production of Ki 67, a !\vo-engine bomber, Peggy (fig. 1). Only one Peggy was made because of the conjusion arising from dispersal which in turn was laused by bombing and the threat of further
large drop in production in
ttacks.
iispersal

The

tity was the Ha-23. The horsepower and Military made no estimates on low although aware of the fact producing other models.

Ha-23 was only 360

Intelligence

Service

horsepower engines,
that the arsenal was

REFERENCE NOTES
1.

Explanatory table

of plans for dispersion

and evac-

uation.
2.

Damage
Aircraft

to tools

and powered machinery during the

organization.

third raid.
3. 4. 5.

Production of Sonia rose briefly after and then stopped in July prior to the
war.

works

'nd of the

6.

Receipt of principal metal materiivls. Component Shops of the engine works. Explanation table for engine works

di.^persion

In the engine works the difficulties encountered

program.

n production were similar to those in the air-

rame works. Low production in the first half f 1943 accompanied the change over from Ha-23 Ha-31. In September 1944 capacity as well s production fell ofi' due to the dispersal of the
I

with the records of United States Strategic the Aircraft Bombing Survey, in the office of the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Reference items are
filed

Division,

49

a:

TACHIKAWA
INTELLISENCE

AIRFRAME

ARMY

ESTIMATE

WORKS VS ACTUAL PRODUCTION

AIR

ARSENAL

ISOWIA)

FIGURE

52

LEGEND

TACHIKAWA ARMY AIR ARSENAL

MAP OF DISPERSIONS AND PLANT LOCATIONS

AIRCRAFT ENGINE

HONSHU

ISLAND

53

APPENDIX B
Tachikfiii'ii ^\rii/ ^\ir

Arsrnal

nioiithli/ ciiiploiinn

til

chart, dircrl anil itiilinrl workers, airframe works

Direct .

Indirect.
1941

Direct

APPENDIX C
'nrhikawa

Army Air

Arsenal monthbi employment

clitirt, ilirecl

and

indireci workers

Knnnzawa Engine Works April

1!)',0-

Jiily

1945

1940
iri'C'l...

direct.

1941

APPENDIX D
Tacliikuwd

Army

Air ArscKal

direct iiitpluyees (man-hours), airframe leorks, April

WJ}-J uhj

W4'>

APPENDIX
The
1.

c^eneral

plan for umlororoun.l installation

of the engine worlds at Hayashi.

4. Other underground installations includir raw materials warehouse, component warehous

oil

Requirements:
(a)

storage, etc.
Diameter, 10 feet. Height, 7 feet. Length, 1,320 feet.

To

withstaiifl a direct hit

by an 8,800-pouncl
toolt^.

bomb.
(b)

To accommodate about 800 machine

2.

Machine shop:
Diameter, 16 feet. Height, 10 feet. Length, 9,075 feet. Interval between passage,

" 5.

Communication passages,
Diameter, 13 feet
"^'gh*' 1
fe'^^;

etc.:

I^ength, 1,15,^ feet.

fifi

feet.

(]_

Summary:
Diameter
(feet)

:]

Transformer station:
Diameter 16
Length,
feet

lO 10

IG 10

Heiglit (feet)

10 7
1,1

HeigSiefeef
(i6 feet.

Length

(feet)

9,075

66 1,320

Total, 11,616.

58

APPENDIX G
Tlio jionoral plan for undcrgi'ound
f

installation

(1.

Medical treatment rooms:

Span, 13 feet. Height, 10 feet. Length, 66 feet.

the aircraft vvoi'ks at Sliichisci.

1

Requirements:
(a)

(6)

Intended to withstiind direct, hits by 1,100pound bombs. Intended to accommodate 800 macliine tools.

7.

Heat treatment shop:

Span, 20 feet. Height, 10 feet. Leiigtli, 99 feet.

2.

Machine shop:
Span, 13
feet.

Heii^ht, 10 feet.

LengMi, 9,240
.'5.

feet.

Jig shop.
Sjmn, 13
feet.

8.

Miscellaneous undergi'ound installation

oil filtration

in-

spection shops,
Height, 10 feet.

shops,

oil

storage, etc.

Length, 908
4.

feet.

Repair shop:
Span, 13 feet. Height, 10 feet. Length, 363 feet.
9.

Span, 13 feet. Height, 10 feet. Length, 2,788 feel.

Summary:
Span
(feet)

Heiglit (feet)
10

13
5.

Transformer room:
Span, 20 feet. Height, 13 feet. Length, 66 feet.

20 20

13 10

Total length 13, 035 66 99

13,

(feet)

200

59

TOKOROZAWA

U S STRATEGIC

BOMBINC SURVEY

DISPERSAL OF TACHIKAWA AIR ARSENAL

TACHIKAWA ARMY AIR ARSENAL

APPENDIX H

60

UJ
tr.

> D

in

m Z o
CD

U
(9 UJ

t5

H
P
I

APPENDIX K
Monliihj engine produclioji

HA-23
Total capacity
i

HA-31
Ordered

HA-46
Ordered

Total

Ordered

Produced

Produced

Produced

Ordered

ne
lly. Tigust

Iptember,
etober

l>vemberpccmbcr,-

5 10 10 15 15 15 20 20 20

TotaL
1942

130

huary...

Ibruary.
lareh
fril

Ine.. lly.

igust lotembcr_
Itober

livember.
iceraber..

Total.

436

340

263

luary
prch
Iril

Ibruary.

ty
ly
Igust
JDteinber. Itober....

Ivember.. Ieember_.
Total.
66

puary... Jjruary.

M
ly

Irch

y gust
ptember. tober Ivsmber..
ttber...

60 70 70 70 85 85 85 80
10

30 50

Total

695

480

416

60

iuary.. pruary. Irch

TriK....

80
80 100 120

'30
70 100 150

Total

Grand

totah.

730 2,730

1,275

134 1,203

7 145

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST

OF REPORTS
21

The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may lie p\irchased from the Superintendent of Docimients at the Government Piinting Office, Washington, D. C.

Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim,

(iv

many
22 23
24 25
2(j

Metallgussgesellsehaft

Ahaniniumwerk

G m

G m b H, Leipzig, Gerniai b H, Plant No. 2, Bitterfel

b H, Ludwigshafen, Gennai

Ciermany Gebruedei Giulini

Gm

European War

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

*1

27 28
2!)

LuftschifTbau Zeppelin C! b H, Friedrichshafi on Boflensee, Germany Wieland Werke A G, LTlm, Germany Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Soli
gen,

*2 *3

The I'nited States Strategic Bombing Surve.v: Summary Rejjort (European War) The United States Strategic Boml)ipg Survey; Overall

Germany

Lijjpewerke Vereinigte .-Muminiumweike

G, Lime

Germany
Vereinigte

Report (European War)

Effects of Strategic Boml)ing on the

The

German

War Economv

30

Deutsche Metallweike, Heddemheii German\' Duerener Nletalhverke A G, Duren Wittenau-Ber & Waren, German v

AIRCRAFT DIVISION
(

AREA STUDIES DIVISION

*3I

Hy

)i\isi(iii

and

Hran(^li)

*4 6

Aircraft Division Industry Report. Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Ki'|iort)

32
33 31

Airframes Branch
6 7 8
!l

Junkers Aircraft and Aero iMigine

\\'urks,

I_)essau,

35 30 37

Germany
Erla Maschincnwerke
(_i

ni

li

II,

Ilcitcrlilick,

(icr-

AT

many
G' Maschinenbau,

Gm
A

1)

H, Lei]vJg (Mockau),

Germany
Gothaei Waggonfaliiik,
G, Gotha,

Germany

10
11

Focke Widf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany (Over-all Report Part A Messerschmitt A G,
|

38
30

12
13 11

Augsburg, Germaiivl Part B Uiipendiccs 1, II, III Dornier Works, Friecirichshafen & Munich, Germany Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, German,\ Wiener Xeustaedter Flugzengwerkc, Wiener Neustadt, Austria

Area Studies Division Rejrort A Detailed Study of the FIffects of Area liomlji on Hamburg A Detaik^d Study of the I'IffecIs of Area Bombi on Wujtpertal A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Dusseldorf A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Solingen A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bonibr on Remscheid A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Darmstadt A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Lubeck A Brief Study of the Effects of .\rea Bombing Beilin, Augsburg, Boclium, Leipzig, Hagen, Do muufl, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen
i

CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION

*40
41
Final Repoit Civilian Defense Division Cologne Field Report Bonn Field Report Hanover Field Report Hamburg Field Report Vol I, Text; Vol II, Exhib Bad Oldesloe Field Report Augsburg Field Report

Aero Engines Branch

15 Hi
17

42 43

Bussing
wick,

NAG

Flugmotorenwerke

G m

II,

Bruns-

Germany

44 45 46

Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke

G m

b H, Taucha,

47

Reception Areas

in

Bavaria,

Germany

Germany Bavarian Motor Works Germany

Bayerische

Inc,

Eisenach & Durrerhof,

EQUIPMENT DIVISION
Electrical

18
ly

Motorenwerke A

G (BMW)

Munich,
*48 49

Branch

Germany
Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany
Light Metal Branch
Optical and Precision Instrument Branch

German F^lectrical Equipment Industry Report Blown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germa

20

Light Metals Industry (Part of Germany \Part

Aluminum II, Magnesium

I,

50

Optical

and Precision Instrument Industry Repor

64

Abrasives Branch
'il

Submarine Branch
Mjiiii, (ici-iiiany

Tlie

V2

German Abrasive Industry Mayor and Schmidt, Offenbach on

Anti-Friction Branch

92 93
94 95 90

German Submarine Industry Report

Masehinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnbcrg
burg,

G,

Augs-

Germany

i3

The

(iernian Anti-Friction Bearings Industry

Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Deutschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger-

Machine Tools Branch

.1
i."i

many

id
i7

iS

Machine Tools & IMachineiy as Capital E(|uipmenl Machine Tool Industry in Germany Herman Kolb Co, Cologne, Germany ('ollet and iMigelhard, Offenbach, Germany Naxos Union, I'rankfort on Main, Germany

97 98 99 100

Friedrich

Krupp Germaniawerft,

Kiel,

Germany

Howaldtswerke A. G, Hamburg, Germany Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Gerinany

]?remer Vulkan, Vege.sack,

Germany

MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION

:i

Ordnance Branch
*101 102
103 104 105 106

The Defeat

2
.!

of the German Air Force V-\Veapons (Crossbow) Campaign Air Force Rate of Opeiation Weather Factors in Combat Hombanlnient Operalions in the iMiiopean Theaire Bombing Accuracy, I'SAAF Heavy and Medium

Ordnance Industry
Friedrich

Keijorl

Krujjp

Grusonwerke A. G, Magdeburg,

)a

Bombers in the KTO Description of RAF Homliing. The Impact, of the Allied Air
Logistics

I'lffort

on German

MORALE
111

107 108

DIVISION
Bombing on German Morale

Germany Bochumer Vereiu fuer Gusstahlfabrikation .\ G, Bochum, Germany Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, (!ermany Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, Germany Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany Gusstalilfabrik Friedrich Krujip, Essen, Germany

Tlie Effects of Strategic (Vol. I & Vol. II)

OIL DIVISION
*109 *110
*111
Oil Division, Final Report Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Propellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report #1)

Medical Branch

The
in

Effect of

Bombing on Health and Medical Care

Geimany

MUNITIONS DIVISION
Heavy Industry Branch
The Coking Industry Report on Germanv
Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A,"B, C, & D Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Fiiedrich-Alfied Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger-

112
113 114

Underground and Dispersal Plants

nrany

in

Greater Ger-

The German
78

Oil Industry, Ministerial

Report

Team

Ministerial Report on Chemicals

Oil

Branch

many
Reichswerke Hermann Goering

G,

Hallendorf,

115
llfl

Germany
August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Gernrany
117

Ammoniak werke Mer.seburg G m b H, Leuna, Germany 2 Appendices Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany \\'intershall A G, Leutzkendorf, Germany

Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works

of I

Farbenindustrie

Dortnmnd Hoerder Huettenverein, AG, Dorlnuuid, Germany Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Bochum, Germany
Motor Vehicles and Tanl<s Branch German Motor V'ehicles Industry Report Tank Industry Report Daiirrler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Rena\ilt Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris

A G,
118 119 120
121

Lud\yigshafen,

Germany

Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger-

many, Vol, I, Vol. II Rhenania Ossag Mineraloel werke A G, Harburg

Refinery,
Refinery,

Hamburg, Germany

Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke

G, Grasbrook

Hamburg, Germany

Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelmsburg

Refinery, Hamljurg, Germany Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, Vol.
I

122 123 124 125

&

Vol. II

Adam

Europaeische Tanklager und Transport

G,

Ham-

Opel, Russelsheim,

Germany

Daimler Ben z-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany Maschinenfabiik Avigsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg,

Germany Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg burg, Germany

burg,

Refinery,

HamI

Germany
Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany Voigtlander, Masehinenfabrik A G, Ptouen, Ger-

Meerbeck Rheinpreus.sen Synthetic

Oil Plant

&

Vol.

Vol. II

Rubber Branch
126 127 128 129

many
Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Bussing NAG Brunswick, Germany Muelilenbau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Ger-

Deutsche Dunlop

Gummi

Co.,

Hanau on Main, Germany

Industry.

Germany
Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant.
Ministerial Report on

many
Friedrich Krujip Grusonwerke,

Magdeburg, Germany

German Rubber

65

Propellants Branch

l3D
131

132

Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany Sehoenebeck Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff Werke Bad Salzemen, Germany Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Duneberg,

GmbH,

184 185 186 187 188 189 190

191 192

Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, German Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy Ger

many
Neukirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neukirchen, German; Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany Fire Raids on German Cities I Ct Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol & Vol II Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany
I

Germany
133

Deutsche Sprengchemie

G m

b H, Kraiburg, Ger-

many

OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION

134
Over-all

193 194
195 196 197 198 199

Economic

Effects Division
.

Report
Special

papers which together Kriegseilberichte comprise the Hermann Goering Works above report Food and Agriculture J 134u Industrial Sales Output and Productivity
1
I
|

Gross National Product

Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen,

Germany

Chemisehe- Werke, Heuls, Germany Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, German

PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION

134b Physical
135 136 137 138 139 140
141

TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
*200
201

Damage Division Report (ETO) Viliacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France Railroad Rejfair Yards, Malines, Belgium Railroad Rejmir Yards, Louvain, Belgium Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium Submarine Pens, Brest, France
Plant, Angouleme, France Plant, Bergerac, France Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France

The

202 203 204

Effects of Strategic Bombing on Germany Tran portation Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations

Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions. German Locomotive Industry During the War German Military Railroad TrafTic

142 143 144 145 146 147

Powder Powder

UTILITIES DIVISION
*205 206 207 208
Electric Utilities Industry Report 1 to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Report 21 Rheinischc-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A

German

Gnome

et Rhone, Limoges, France Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans,

France
148 149 150
151

Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant,

Ebelsbach,

Ger-

many
Louis iireguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France
*1

Pacific

War
War)

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Summary Report
The
Effects of
(Pacific

152 153 154 155

156 157 158 159 160
161

V Weapons

in

London

City Area of Krefeld Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knapsack,

*2 *3

Japan's Struggle to

End

the

War
a:

Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima

Nagasaki
Tit

Germany

Brauweiler Transformer
weiler,

&

Switching Station, Brau-

CIVILIAN STUDIES
Civilian

*f

Germany Germany
Defense Division
Protection and AUi
Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Tokyo, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Kobe, Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects, Osaka, .Japan Field Report Covering Air Raid Subjects. Hiroshima, Japan Summary Report Covering Air
in

Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach,

162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170

171

Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Gustloff- Werke Weirhar, Weimar, Germany Henschell & Sohn Kassel, Germany Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany

GmbH,

Protection and

Alii

MAN

Protection and AUi Protection and AUi Protection and

Alii

Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Erla Maschinen werke,

GmbH,

Germany
Heiterblick, Ger-

many A T G Maschinenba^i G

Germany Erla Maschinenwerke b H, Mockau, Germany Bayerische Motoren werke, Durrcrhof, Germany
b H, Mockau,

m G m

Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke

G m

No.

Protection and AUi;

1
ai|

b H, Taucha,

*10
*11

Germany
Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Ger-

many
172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180
181

Raid Protection Japan Allied Subjects Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection Allied Subjects in Japan

a)|

182 183

Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Continental Gummiworke, Hanover, Germany Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany Amnion iaworke, Mersetiurg, Leuna, Germany Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany Daimler-Benz A G, I'nterturkheim, Germany Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany Volkswaggon werke, Fallerslebcn, Germany Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany

Medical Division
*12 *13

Bombing on Health and Medical SeiJ Japan I The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and MeditJ Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The
Effects of
ices in

Morale Division
*14

The

Effects of Strategic

Bombing on Japanese Mori

66

ECONOMIC STUDIES
Aircraft Division

*33

Nissan Automobile

Company

The Jajmnese Aircraft Industry Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. I (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) (Airframes & Engines)

*34

Corporation Report No. X VIII (Nissan .Jidosha KK) (Engines) Anny Air Arsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. XIX (Airframes and Engines)

*35

Japan Aircraft Underground

Report No.

XX

Makajima

Aircraft

Company, Ltd.

Corporation Report No. II

(Nakajima Hikok
(Airframes

Kawanishi Aircraft

KK) & Engines) Company

Basic Materials Division

*36

Coal and Metals

in

Japan's

War Economy

Corporation Report No. Ill

(Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha)

(Airframes)

Capital Goods,

Equipment and Construction Division

Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company,

Corporation Report No. I

Inc.

(Kawasaki
Kaisha) (Airframes

Kokuki

Kogyo

Kabtishiki

*37 *38 *39

The Japanese Construction Industry Japanese Electrical Equipment The Japanese Machine Building Industry
Electric

&

Engines)

Power Division

Aichi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. V (Aichi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines)

*40
,*41

The The

Electric Electric ports)

Power Industry of Japan Power Industry of Japan (Plant Re-

Sumitomo Metal

Industries, Propeller Division

Corporation Report No.

Seizosho)
(Propellers)

VI
*42

(Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera

Hitachi Aircraft Company Corporation Report A^o. VII (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation. Report No. VIII

Manpower, Food and

Civilian

Supplies Division
of Living

The Japanese Wartime Standard zation of Manpower

and

Utili-

Military Supplies Division

(Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo

(Airframes)

KK)
Company

J^pan

ISIusical

Instrument Manufacturing

Corporation Report No. IX (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK)

(Propellers)

*43 *44 *45 *46 *47 *48

Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese Japanese

War

Production Industries

Naval Ordnance Army Ordnance Naval Shipbuilding Motor Vehicle Industry Merchant Shipbuilding
Oil

Tachikawa Aircraft Company

Corporation Report No.
(Airframes)

and Chemical Division

X
KK)
XI

(Tachikawa Hikoki
Fuki Airplane Company Corporation Report No. (Fuki Hikoki KK)
(Airframes)

49 50
61

Chemicals Chemicals

Japan's Japan's Oil in Japan's War

in in

War War

Appendix

52

Oil in Japan's

War

Appendix

Showa Airplane Company

Corporation Report No.
(Airframes)

Overall Economic Effects Division

XII

*53

(Showa Hikoki Kogyo

KK)

The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic
.\nalysis and Comparison; Intelligence on Japan Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan and Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical

Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Corporation Report No. XIII (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki
(Kaisha) (Engines) Nippon Airplane Company Corporation Report No. A'/T

Sources)

Transportation Division

(Nippon Hikoki

KK)

*54

The War Against Japanese Transportation, 19411945

(Airframes) Kyushu Airplane Company Corporation Report No.

(Airframes)

XV
*55

Urban Areas Division

Effects of Air Attack on Japanese LTrban

(Kyushu Hikoki KK)

Shoda Engineering Company
Corporation Report No. (Shoda Seisakujo)

Economy

(Summary Report)
*56
Effects of Air Attack on

XVI
XVII

Urban Complex Tokyo-

(Components) Mitaka Aircraft Industries

Corporation Report No.

*57 *58
59 60

(Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) (Components)

Kawasaki- Yokohama Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on Effects of Air Attack on

the City of

Nagoya

Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto
the City of Nagasaki the City of Hiroshima

67

MILITARY STUDIES
Military Analysis Division
61

87

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure I), Comments and Data on Effectiveness
of

Ammunition

62 63
64
6")

Air Forces Allied with the United States in the War Against Japan Japanese Air Power Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army
Logistics

88

Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of
Firing

89

Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on
Jaiianese

War

Potential

Kmploynient

of Forces

Under the Southwest,

Pacific

Command
66

Physical

Damage

Control
(a

The

Strategic Air Operations of

Very Heavy Bom90

91

67

in the War Against Jajjan (Twentieth Air Force) World War Air Operations in China, Bvinna, India

Imrdment

Effect of tlie Incendiary Bomb Attacks or Japan Rejjort on Eight Cities)

n
65
(H

The

Effects of the

Ten Thousand Pound Bomb

(a

on

The

Air Transport

Command

in

the

War

Against

Japan
70
71

The Thirteenth Air Force in tlie War Against Japan The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War The
Against Japan Fifth Air Force
in

92 93 94
95

the \\'ar Against Japan

Naval Analysis Division

96 *72

Report on Nine Incidents) Effects of the Atomic Bonil) on Hiroshima, Jai)aii I'^lflfects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japanese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five Himdred Pound Bombs on JajJanese Targets (a Report on Eight Incidents) A Report on Physical Damage in .Japan (Summary
Japanese Targets
Report)

The Interrogations
II)

of

Japanese

Officials )Vols. I

and

*73 *74
*7!S

Campaigns of the Pacific War Tlic Reduction of Wake Island Tlic Allied Campaign Against Ral:>aul

G-2
97

Division

76

*77 78 79

The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, MiUe, and Jaluit (Vols. I, II and III) The Reduction of Truk The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party Foreword, Introduction, Conclusions, and General

98
99
100
101

.Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Evaluation of Piiotographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa-

Summary
80
81

Report
Report

of Ships
of Sliips

Bombardment Survey Party (En102 103

104

82

83 84
8")

86

Kamaishi Area Bomliardment Survey Party (Enclosure B), Hamaniatsu Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure C), Hitachi Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure D), Hakodate Area Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure Pj), INIuroran Area Report of Sliips Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosure F), Shimizu Area Report of Shi])s Bombardment Survey Party (Enclosures G and H), Shionomi-Saki and Nojimaclosure A).

105

*106

*107
108

nese Homeland, Part II, Airfields Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa nese Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Ploliinjh Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa,i nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part V, Caniovflage Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in tlie Japanese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Jap* nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads
'
i \

p;

Saki Areas

valuation of Photograi)hic Intelligence in the Japanese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

68

U. S.

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:

I9<7