Irish S.

Precion Transportation Law

November 26, 2010 2B

Maranan vs Perez G. R. No. 22272 June 26, 1967

FACTS:

Rogelio Corachea is a passenger of a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez. He was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela who was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance and was sentenced to suffer Imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000. While pending appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela. Defendant Perez claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Defendant-appellant relied solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the carrier is under no absolute liability for assaults of its employees upon the passengers. ISSUE:

whether or not the contention of the defendant is valid?

RULING:

No. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one at bar were very different. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty employee. The Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against willful assaults or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly

remove from their exempting effect the case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force majeure. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. The basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rested either on the doctrine of respondent superior or the principle that it was the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely. Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it was enough that the assault happened within the course of the employee's duty. It was no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here was absolute in the sense that it practically secured the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.

Lhuillier v. British Airways G. R. No. 171092 15 March 2010

Facts:

On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago-Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she took respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy.Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday, one of the respondents flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan, singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the planes safety regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that We dont like your attitude. Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondents ground manager and demanded an apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were only doing their job. Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages, praying that respondent be ordered to pay P5 million as moral damages, P2 million as nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary damages, P300,000.00 as attorneys fees, P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost of the suit. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on the respondent through Violeta Echevarria, General Manager of Euro-Philippine Airline Services, Inc. Respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1).

Issue:

Whether or not the Philippine court have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a Filipino citizen and resident by airline personnel of a foreign carrier travelling beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit. The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in the Philippines as enunciated in the case of Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines. The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention. In the case at bar, petitioners place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the petitioner is deemed to be an international carriage within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention. Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: 1. The court where the carrier is domiciled; 2. The court where the carrier has its principal place of business; 3. The court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or 4. The court of the place of destination. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. The RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.

Santos vs Tolentino G.R. No. L-17394 May 30, 1962

Facts:

Petitioner Amador D. Santos is the owner of several taxicabs being operated in the City of Manila and suburbs under the name and style of "Santos Taxi". While Dolores Banzon Tolentino was at the intersection of Espaa and Dos Castillas Streets, City of Manila, on June 14, 1951, Vicente Duldulao y Dancel, who was driving a "Santos Taxi", backed it without blowing his horns and in such a negligent manner that its rear part bumped Mrs. Tolentino, for which reason she fell down and a rear wheel of the car ran over her, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries in which he was found guilty. In the complaint in te civil case, the Tolentinos prayed that Santos and Duldulao be sentenced to pay, jointly and severally for damages and attorney's fees, aside from the costs. In their answer, Santos and Duldulao alleged that the accident was due exclusively to the negligence of Mrs. Tolentino. In due course, the court ruled that Santos and Duldulao to pay jointly and severally Mrs. Tolentino actual damages, and moral damages, in addition to the costs. Santos and Duldulao appealed however it was affirmed, with the modification that Santos shall pay the aforementioned sums only in the event of inability of Duldulao to satisfy said judgment, the civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code being merely subsidiary to that of the employee who committed the offense giving rise to said liability.1wph1.t Issue:

Whether or not Santos is subsidiarily liable for the payment of moral damages. Ruling:

This pretense, has already been rejected in Miguel San Jose, et al. vs. Romualdo del Mundo which refer to the liability of a carrier for breach of contract with an injured passenger, whereas the action against petitioner herein is based upon his liability arising from a crime, which is governed by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.