Chapter 5 $28 Million Punitive Damages Award For Bank's PL94Ch05

Chapter 5
5.1 Complaint
$28 Million Punitive Damages Award for Bank's Involvement in Home Improvement Fraud
This complaint was later amended to include Skopbank and USF Holding, Inc. as parties defendants. Eventually, Skopbank agreed to indemnify Union Mortgage for any judgment against it in this case. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION LAURA BAKER, ANDREW PERSON, NANCY PERSON, BILL LAMPLEY, JENNIFER LAMPLEY, REGGIE TATUM, ANNE TATUM, WARREN HALL, AND DENISE HALL, [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, LAWRENCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, UNION MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., Fictitious Defendant "A","B", and "C", those persons, firms, corporations or other entities that contributed to injuries and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in this case whose identities are unknown at this time but will be substituted by amendment when ascertained, CASE NO. CV-90 048 COMPLAINT 1. Plaintiffs Laura Baker is over the age of 19 years and resides in Barbour County, Clayton Division, Alabama. 2. Plaintiff Charles Person is over the age of 19 year and resides in Barbour County, Clayton Division, Alabama. 3. Plaintiff Nancy Person is over the age of 19 years and resides in Barbour County, Clayton Division, Alabama. 4. Plaintiff Bill Lampley is over the age of 19 years and resides in Ariton, Alabama, in Dale County. 5. Plaintiff Jennifer Lampley is over the age of 19 years and resides in Ariton, Alabama, in Dale County. 6. Plaintiff Reggie Tatum is over the age of 19 years and resides in Montgomery County, Alabama. 7. Plaintiff Anne Tatum is over the age of 19 years and resides in Montgomery County,
Alabama. 8. Plaintiff Warren Hall is over the age of 19 years and resides in Montgomery County, Alabama. 9. Defendant Charles Harper is over the age of 19 years and resides in Jefferson County, Alabama. Said Defendant does business in Barbour County, Clayton Division, Alabama. 10. Defendant Lawrence Construction Company, believed to be a domestic corporation, is located in Jefferson County, Alabama, and does business in Barbour County, Clayton Division, Alabama. 11. Defendant Union Mortgage Company, Inc. is a foreign Corporation qualified to do business in the State of Alabama and which does business in Barbour County, Clayton Division, Alabama. 12. Fictitious Defendants "A", are those persons, firms, corporations or other entities that contributed to injuries and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in this case whose identities are unknown at this time but will be substituted by amendment when ascertained. 13. Fictitious Defendants "B", are those persons, firms, corporations or other entities that contributed to injuries and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in this case whose identities are unknown at this time but will be substituted by amendment when ascertained. 14. Fictitious Defendants "C", are those persons, firms, corporations or other entities that contributed to injuries and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in this case whose identities are unknown at this time but will be substituted by amendment when ascertained. 15. At all times material hereto, Defendant Charles Harper was an agent of Lawrence Construction Company and Union Mortgage Company, Inc. and was acting for said Defendants in his dealings with Plaintiffs. COUNT ONE 16. In September, 1990, in Clayton, Alabama, Defendant Charles Harper, acting as agent for Lawrence Construction Company and as agent for Union Mortgage Company, Inc., entered into a loan agreement with Plaintiff Laura Baker whereby Defendants agreed to loan her $8,000.00. In
return, Ms. Baker was to give Defendants a mortgage on her home in that amount. 17. Ms. Baker later received a document showing she had borrowed $9,800.00. 18. Ms. Baker executed the mortgage to Defendants on her home in the amount of $9,800.00. 19. Defendants subsequently delivered the sum of $4,000.00 to Ms.Baker from the loan proceeds and kept the balance. 20. Defendants then told Ms. Baker that she only had to pay back the $4,000.00 she received and Defendants would pay the rest. 21. Ms. Baker subsequently made, and is still making, monthly payments on the balance of the mortgage to Defendants. 22. Defendants now claim a balance due in excess of $9,800.00 on the mortgage from Ms. Baker. 23. Ms. Baker is now behind on her payments on the mortgage since Defendant did not make any payments. 24. Ms. Baker contends that she does not owe Defendants anything on the mortgage. 25. Ms. Baker is informed and believed, and upon such information and belief, alleged that Defendants have committed like or similar frauds on other and that the acts in this case were part of a common scheme to defraud persons with limited education or understanding of financial dealings. 26. All Defendants entered into a scheme to defraud Ms. Baker by taking her money and by leaving her indebted on a fraudulently obtained mortgage. 27. Ms. Baker was injured and damaged by losing the value of the money she paid and by now having a mortgage on her home which is apparently unpaid and which constitutes a lien on her home. 28. Defendant' acts were intentional, willful, reckless and/or malicious. 29. Defendants have entered into a pattern or practice of fraud or other intentional wrongful conduct. 30. As a proximate consequence of the Defendant's wrongful acts, Plaintiff Laura Baker was
injured and damaged as follows: She lost the value of her money and now has an unpaid mortgage on her home; and she suffered mental anguish and emotional distress. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Laura Baker demands judgment against all Defendants for an amount of compensatory and punitive damages which a jury deems reasonable plus her costs. COUNT TWO 31. Plaintiff Laura Baker realleged paragraphs 1 through 30 of the complaint as if set out here in full. 32. Defendants intentionally inflicted emotion distress upon Plaintiff Laura Baker. 33. Plaintiff was injure and damaged a alleged in paragraph 30 above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Laura Baker demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs. COUNT THREE 33. Plaintiffs Andrew Person and Nancy Person reallege paragraph 1 through 15 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 34. In September, 1990, in Mount Andrew Community in Barbour County, Alabama, Defendant Charles Harper, acting as agent for Lawrence Construction Company and as agent for Union Mortgage Company, Inc., entered into a agreement with Plaintiffs Andrew Person and Nancy Person whereby Defendants agreed to loan Mr. and Mrs. Person $9,450.00. In return said Plaintiffs were to give Defendants a mortgage on their home in that amount. 35. Mr. and Mrs. Person were to use the loan proceeds for home improvements. 36. Mr. and Mrs. Person executed the mortgage to Defendants on Their home in the amount of $9,450.00. 37. Defendants delivered the sum of $6,500.00 to Mr. and Mrs. Person from the loan proceeds. 38. Defendants then told Mr. and Mrs. Person if they did not want to have the home improvements done on their house they could return the loan proceeds and the loan would be paid in full.
39. Plaintiffs elected to return the money to Defendants. 40. Plaintiffs gave 43,500.00 to Defendant Harper for all Defendants which was never credited by Defendants to Plaintiffs' account. 41. Plaintiffs subsequently made monthly payments on the balance of the money to Defendant Harper none of which was credited to Plaintiffs' account. 42. Defendants now claim a balance due in excess of $9,500.00 on the mortgage from Mr. and Mrs. Person. 43. Plaintiffs' house is now threatened with a foreclosure of the mortgage since defendants did not make the payments. 44. Plaintiffs contend that they do not owe Defendants anything on the mortgage. 45. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and upon such information and belief, alleged that Defendants have committed like or similar fraud on others and that the acts in this case were part to parcel of a common scheme to defraud persons with limited education or understanding of financial dealings. 46. All Defendants entered into a scheme to defraud Plaintiffs by taking their money and by leaving them indebted on a fraudulent mortgage. 47. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged by losing the value of the money and by now having a mortgage on their home which is unpaid. 48. Defendants' acts were intentional, reckless and/or malicious. 49. Defendants entered into a pattern or practice of fraud or other intentional wrongful conduct. 50. As a proximate consequence of the Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as follows: They lost the value of their money and now have an unpaid mortgage on their home, they also suffered mental anguish and emotional distress. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Andrew Person and Nancy Person demand judgment against all Defendants for an amount of compensatory and punitive damages which a jury deems reasonable plus costs.
COUNT FOUR 51. Plaintiffs Andrew and Nancy Person reallege paragraphs 1 through 15 and 34-50 of the complaint as if set out here in full. 52. Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Mr. and Mrs. Person. 53. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 50 above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Andrew Person and Nancy Person demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages. COUNT FIVE 54. Plaintiffs Bill Lampley and Jennifer Lampley reallege paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 55. In December, 1989, in Ariton, Alabama, Defendant Charles Harper, acting as agent for Lawrence Construction Company and as agent for Union Mortgage Company, Inc. entered a loan agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Lampley whereby Defendants agreed to loan Plaintiffs $7,900.00. 56. Mr. and Mrs. Lampley executed the mortgage to Defendants on their home in the amount of $7,900.00. 57. Defendants delivered the sum of $2,900.00 to Mr. and Mrs. Lampley from the loan proceeds and kept the balance. 58. Defendants now claim a balance due in excess of $7,900.00 from Mr. and Mrs. Lampley. 59. Plaintiffs' house is now threatened with foreclosure of the mortgage if they do not make the payments. 60. Plaintiffs are informed and believe upon such information and belief, allege that Defendants have committed like or similar frauds on others and that the acts in this case were part of a common scheme to defraud persons with limited education or understanding of financial dealings. 61. All Defendants entered into a scheme to defraud Mr. and Mrs. Lampley by taking their money and leaving them indebted on a fraudulent mortgage. 62. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged by losing the value of the money and by now have
a mortgage on their home which is unpaid. 63. Defendants' acts were intentional, reckless and/or malicious. 64. Defendants entered into a pattern or practice of fraud or other intentional wrongful conduct. 65. As a proximate consequence of the Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiffs Bill Lampley and Jennifer Lampley were injured and damaged as follows: They lost the value of their money and now have an unpaid mortgage on their home; they also suffered mental anguish and emotional distress. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Bill and Jennifer Lampley demand judgment against all Defendants for an amount of compensatory and punitive damages which a jury deems reasonable plus costs. COUNT SIX 66. Plaintiffs Bill Lampley and Jennifer Lampley reallege paragraphs 1 through 15 and 55-65 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 67. Defendants intentionally afflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiffs. 68. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 65. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Bill Lampley and Jennifer Lampley demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damage, plus costs. COUNT SEVEN 69. Plaintiffs Reggie Tatum and Anne Tatum reallege paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 70. On March 15, 1990, in Montgomery County, Alabama, Defendant Charles Harper, acting as agent for Lawrence Construction Company and as agent for Union Mortgage Company, Inc., entered into a loan agreement with Plaintiff Anne Tatum and Reggie Tatum whereby Defendants agreed to loan Plaintiffs $9,900.00. In return Mr. and Mrs. Tatum were to give Defendants a mortgage on their home in that amount. 71. Plaintiffs later received a document showing that they borrowed $9,900.00. 72. Plaintiffs executed the mortgage to Defendants on their home in an amount of $9,900.00
plus interest. 73. Defendants never delivered any of the $9,900.00 to Plaintiffs from the loan proceeds but instead kept the loan proceeds. 74. Plaintiffs subsequently made and are still making monthly payments on the balance of the mortgage to Defendants. 75. Defendants now claim a balance due in excess of $9,900.00 from Plaintiffs. 76. Plaintiffs content that they do not owe Defendants anything on the mortgage. 77. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and upon such information and belief allege that Defendants have committed like or similar frauds on others and that the acts in this case were part of a common scheme to defraud persons with limited education of financial dealings. 78. All Defendants entered into a scheme to defraud Plaintiffs by taking their money and by leaving them indebted on a fraudulently obtained mortgage. 79. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged by losing the value of the money they paid and by now having a mortgage on their home which is unpaid and which constitutes the lien on their home. 80. Defendants acts were intentional, willful, reckless and/or malicious. 81. Defendants have entered into a pattern or practice of fraud or other intentional wrongful conduct. 82. As a proximate consequence of the Defendants' wrongful acts, Plaintiffs Anne Tatum and Reggie Tatum were injured and damaged as follows: They lost the value of their money and now have an unpaid mortgage on their home and they suffered mental anguish and emotional distress. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Reggie Tatum and demands judgment against all Defendants for an amount of compensatory and punitive damages which a jury deems reasonable plus costs. COUNT EIGHT 83. Plaintiffs Anne and Reggie Tatum reallege paragraphs 1 through 15 and 71 through 82 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 84. Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff.
85. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 82. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Reggie Tatum and Anne Tatum demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs. COUNT NINE 86. Plaintiffs Warren Hall and Denise Hall reallege paragraphs 1 through 15 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 87. In February, 1990, in Montgomery County, Alabama, Charles Harper acting as agent for Lawrence Construction Company and as agent for Union Mortgage Company, Inc., entered into a loan agreement with Plaintiffs Warren and Denise Hall whereby Defendants agreed to loan Plaintiffs $9,500.00. In return Mr. and Mrs. Hall were to give Defendants the mortgage on their home in that amount. 88. Plaintiffs later received a document showing they had borrowed $9,500.00. 89. Plaintiffs executed the mortgage to Defendants on their home in the amount of $9,500.00. 90. Defendants subsequently delivered the sum of approximately $3,000.00 to Plaintiffs from the loan proceeds and kept the balance. 91. The Plaintiffs were forced to file bankruptcy to keep from losing their home as a result of the mortgage placed on the home by Defendants. 92. Plaintiffs now claim a balance due in excess of $9,500.00 on the mortgage from Plaintiffs. 93. Defendants now claim a balance due in excess of $9,500.00 on the mortgage from Plaintiffs. 94. Plaintiffs were informed and believe that upon such information and belief allege Defendants have committed like or similar frauds on others and that the acts in this case were part of a common scheme to defraud persons with limited educational understanding of financial dealings. 95. All Defendants entered into a scheme to defraud Mr. and Mrs. Hall taking their money
and leaving them indebted on a fraudulently obtained mortgage. 96. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged by losing the value of the money they paid and by now having a mortgage on their home which is unpaid and which constitutes a lien on their home. 97. Defendants' acts were intentional, willful, reckless, and malicious. 98. Defendants have entered into a pattern or practice of fraud or other intentional wrongful conduct. 99. As a proximate consequence of Defendant's wrongful acts, Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as follows: They lost the value of their money and now have an unpaid mortgage on their home, suffered severe mental anguish and emotional distress, they were forced to file bankruptcy because of the mortgage placed on their home. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Warren and Denise Hall demand judgment against all Defendants for an amount of compensatory and punitive damages which a jury deems reasonable plus costs. COUNT TEN 100. Plaintiffs Warren Hall and Denise Hall reallege paragraphs 1 through 15 and 87 through 99 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 101. Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiffs Warren Hall and Denise Hall. 102. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 99 above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Warren Hall and Denise Hall demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs. COUNT ELEVEN 103. All Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 102 of the Complaint as if set out here in full. 104. The wrongful acts or omissions of Fictitious Defendants "A", "B", and "C" contributed to cause damages to all Plaintiffs as alleged in the Complaint. WHEREFORE, all Plaintiffs demand judgment against Fictitious Defendants "A", "B", and "C" in such an amount as a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus
costs. COUNT TWELVE 105. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 104 of the complaint as if set out here in full. 106. Defendant Skopbank is a foreign corporation doing business by agent in Barbour County, Alabama. 107. Defendant USF is a foreign corporation doing business by agent in Barbour County, Alabama. 108. Defendant UST is the holding company and sole owner of Union Mortgage Company, Inc. 109. Defendant Skopbank is the holding company and sole owner of Defendant USF. 110. Defendants Skopbank and USF entered into a plan and scheme to defraud Plaintiffs and others by taking their money and leaving them owing money on a fraudulent mortgage as alleged in the original complaint. 111. Defendants Skopbank and USF set up several different companies in an effort to carry out and effect their fraudulent actions. 112. As a proximate result of such fraud, Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as follows: they lost the value of the money they paid on their respective mortgages; they now have mortgages on their respective homes each of which is unpaid which constitutes a lien on their home; they have suffered severe mental anguish and emotional distress and have been otherwise injured and damaged. 113. Defendants acts were intentional, willful, reckless and malicious. 114. Defendants have entered into a pattern or practice of fraud or other intentional wrongful conduct. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendant USF Holding, Inc. and Defendant Skopbank in such an amount a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs. COUNT THIRTEEN 115. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 114 of the complaint and amended complaint
as if set out here in full. 116. Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction entered into an agreement with Defendant Union Mortgage Company whereby they agreed to sell Union Mortgage Company their mortgages with Plaintiffs at a discount. 117. The discount rate of the sale of the mortgages were agreed upon prior to Defendants Harper and Lawrence Construction actually procuring the mortgages from Plaintiffs. 118. The discount from Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction to Defendant Union Mortgage Company was in effect a hidden interest charge to Plaintiffs in that Defendant Union Mortgage Company was lending Plaintiffs money through Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company. 119. Union Mortgage Company acted as the agent for Defendant Skopbank and Defendant USF in its dealings as alleged above. 120. Defendants had a duty to disclose to Plaintiffs 11 at they were paying a hidden interest charge and/or that the mortgages were pre-sold at a discount to Defendant Union Mortgage Company and/or that Defendant Union mortgage company was actually lending them money. 121. All Defendants fraudulently failed to disclose to Plaintiffs that they were paying a hidden charge. 122. Plaintiffs changed their position by entering into the mortgages. 123. Plaintiffs would not have entered into the mortgage if they had known of the hidden interest charges. 124. Defendants entered into a pattern of practicing fraud or other intentional or wrongful conduct. 125. Defendants' actions were intentional, willful, malicious and gross. 126. As a proximate result of such fraud, Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 112 above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against all Defendants in the amount a jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs.
COUNT FOURTEEN 127. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 126 of the complaint and amended complaint as if set out here in full. 128. Defendants USF and Skopbank)mew or should have known that Defendant Union Mortgage Company and/or Charles Harper and/-or Lawrence construction company entered into a scheme to defraud or injure Plaintiffs. 129. Defendants negligently failed to inform Plaintiffs of the scheme to defraud or injure. 130. As a proximate result, Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 112 above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount the jury deems reasonable for compensatory damages plus costs. COUNT FIFTEEN 131. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs I through 130 of the complaint and amended complaint as if set out here in full. 132. Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Plaintiffs. 133. As a proximate result, Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 112 above. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount the jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs. COUNT SIXTEEN 134. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 133 of the complaint and amended complaint as if set out here in full. 135. Defendants Charles Harper, Lawrence Construction Company and Union Mortgage Company acted as agents of Defendant Skopbank and USF in perpetuating the fraud upon Plaintiffs as alleged herein and in the original complaint. 136. As a proximate result, Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as alleged in paragraph 112 above.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount the jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs. COUNT SEVENTEEN 137. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 136 of the complaint as if set out here in full. 138. All Defendants entered into a conspiracy to defraud Plaintiffs as aforesaid. 139. Plaintiffs were injured and damaged as aforesaid. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment against all Defendants in an amount the jury deems reasonable for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs.
[PLAINTIFFS AMENDED THIS COMPLAINT TO INCLUDE SKOPBANK AND USF HOLDING, INC. AS PARTY DEFENDANTS]
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
JURY DEMAND
PLAINTIFF HEREBY DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES OF THIS CAUSE. OF COUNSEL
5.2
Default Judgment
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION
LAURA BAKER, ANDREW PERSON, NANCY PERSON, BILL LAMPLEY, JENNIFER LAMPLEY, REGGIE TATUM, ANNE TATUM, WARREN HALL, AND DENISE HALL,
[vs.]
CHARLES HARPER, LAWRENCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, UNION MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., Fictitious Defendant "A","B", and "C", those persons, firms, corporations or other entities that contributed to injuries and damages suffered by the Plaintiffs in this case whose identities are unknown at this time but will be substituted by amendment when ascertained,
CASE NO. CV-90 048
MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs move this Court to enter a default judgment against the Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company in the above-styled case and for cause shows the following: 1. That the Defendants were duly served with a copy of the summons, together with a copy of the Plaintiffs' complaint, on November 14, 1990. 2. That more than thirty days have elapsed since the date of which Defendants were served. 3. Defendants have failed to answer or otherwise defend as to Plaintiffs' complaint. 4. That the affidavit of Plaintiffs' attorney is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
[vs.]
CASE NO. CV-90 048 APPLICATION TO CLERK FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT The Clerk is requested to enter a default against Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company in the above-styled action for failure to answer or otherwise defend. In support thereof, Plaintiffs submit the affidavit of their attorney attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF EXHIBIT A
[vs.]
CASE NO. CV-90 048 AFFIDAVIT My name is Tom Methvin, a licensed attorney in the State of Alabama, practicing law with the firm of Beasley, Wilson, Allen, Mendelsohn & Jemison, P.C. The said firm is attorney of record for Plaintiffs. On or about November 9, 1990, a complaint was filed on behalf of the above mentioned Plaintiffs in the Circuit Court of Barbour County, Clayton Division, Alabama. Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company were designated as parties-defendant in the said complaint. It is my information and belief, based upon communications with the Barbour County Circuit Clerk, that Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company were served with a copy of the complaint and summons on November 14, 1990. Said Defendants have failed to answer this complaint or otherwise plead within the thirty days prescribed by law. Defendant Charles Harper is not a minor nor an incompetent person. Pursuant to the foregoing, a judgment of default is due to be entered on behalf of all Plaintiffs
against Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF [notarized]
[vs.]
CASE NO. CV-90 048 DEFAULT JUDGMENT This action came on the motion of Plaintiffs for default judgment pursuant to rule 55(B)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, and Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company having been duly served with the Summons and Complaint and not being an infant or an unrepresented incompetent person, and having failed to plead or otherwise defend, it is hereby, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that a judgment of default be entered against Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company. It is further ordered that the amount of damages shall be determined at a later date.
DONE this the __ day of December, 1990.
CIRCUIT JUDGE
5.3
Brief in Response to Motion to Dismiss
LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al. CASE NO. CV-90 048 SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS This Court denied Skopbank's and USF's motion to dismiss in an identical case in Bullock County. Defendants filed a Writ of Mandamus asking the Alabama Supreme Court to direct this Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The petition for Writ of Mandamus was denied. This alone is sufficient to deny Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The crux of Defendant USF Holdings and Skopbank's argument is that they are due to be dismissed because this Court does not have jurisdiction over them. At the outset, it must be noted that this is a Motion to Dismiss and that they must only be dismissed if there is no conceivable set of facts or circumstances which could hold them liable. The crux of our argument is that Defendant USF Holding and Defendant Skopbank are the alter ego of Union Mortgage. In other words, Union Mortgage, USF Holding and Skopbank are really one entity. They could spin off as many corporations as they wanted to, but the manner in which they operate their business makes them one legal entity.
The main point which shows they are one legal entity is the fact that Sakari Virolainen was the CEO of Union Mortgage and USF Holding and was on the Board of Directors of both companies while he was being paid by Skopbank. In other words, he was an employee of Skopbank while he was running the two companies. I have attached a copy of his employment contract with Skopbank which is written in finnish [not reprinted infra]. I have also attached a translated copy. (Exhibit One) [not reprinted infra]. In this contract, Skopbank is referred to as the "employer" and Sakari is referred to as the "employee". I also attached Plaintiff's Exhibit Five which shows Skopbank definitely paid Sakari's salary [not reprinted infra]. Defendants Skopbank and USF Holdings state that Sakari did not run the day to day operations of the companies so even though he was receiving compensation from them, he was not their employee. Composite exhibit number 2 shows all of the documents that Sakari either wrote or received a copy of while he was the CEO of Union Mortgage and USF Holdings. Many of the documents have to do with day to day business operations and show that Sakari was in control of the companies. You will also see attached as Exhibit Three documents with the letterhead Union Mortgage Company which had been marked out and USF Holdings has been written in its place [not reprinted infra]. These companies mixed business back and forth, used each others papers, shared secretaries, (deposition of Sakari) and are definitely one business entity. Also Exhibit Four are documents on the Union Mortgage letterhead which came from USF Holdings. Again, USF Holdings used Union Mortgage Stationary as its own. (See Exhibit Four [not reprinted infra]). Plaintiff's composite exhibit 6 are the USF Holdings Board of Director's minutes. All of the members of USF Holdings board are employees of Skopbank. As you can see from looking at the first page of each Board of Director's minutes, most all the directors of Union Mortgage were finnish people [not reprinted infra]. Further, they were employees of Skopbank. (See Deposition of Sakari [not reprinted infra]). How could the businesses possibly be separate? On page four of the May 7, 1990 board meeting, paragraph 7 it states: Mr. Virolainen explained USF's current operations stating that the accounting,
financial planning and funding activities for the whole conglomerate were already being done on USF level. This shows that USF Holdings' board was handling the above activities for Union Mortgage. On the May 31, 1990 meeting, page 3, number 8, Mr. Virolainen stated that USF should consider Union Mortgage's selling practices. The USF board is telling Union Mortgage what to do. Mr. Riikonen who is a member of the board and an employee of Skopbank states that Union Mortgage cannot sell with recourse on a permanent basis. At the USF Holdings' board meeting of May 7, 1990, page 2, at the top of the page, Ralph Black, the president of Union Mortgage, requested permission from USF to sell loans. The USF board decided to allow him to sell certain loans. In that same paragraph, the board also decided which accounting procedures Union Mortgage was to use. On the delegation order from USF Holdings, Inc. which is attached to the May 31, 1990 Board of Director's minutes under heading Union Mortgage at the bottom of the page, it states: Either one of the ASS.VP's and the VP must approve loans over $25,0000.00. Loans over $35,000.00 must be approved by the president or in his absence the executive VP or the CEO of USF [not reprinted infra]. Again, USF board which is made up wholly of Skopbank employees is running the operations of Union Mortgage. In the November 19, 1990 Union Mortgage meeting, page 3, number 9, Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, it states: Mr. Huhtamaki was authorized to hire a corporate counsel for USF and a legal trainee for Union. Mr. Huhtamaki was on the Board of Directors of USF Holding and that board decided what employee Union Mortgage should hire. This is certainly too close a connection. The Union Mortgage Company audited financial statements of December 31, 1990 (Plaintiff's Exhibit Seven) on page 9 under note 6, states that in 1989 the company received management services from two key employees whose salaries were provided by Skopbank. It is clear that Skopbank employees were running Union Mortgage Company at the time of the fraud. This is enough to establish alter-ego at the motion to dismiss level.
Plaintiff's Exhibit Eight, a telefax message dated August 16, 1990, from Skopbank to Union Mortgage Company. It is to the attention of Olli Reinikka who at the time was not employed by Union Mortgage but was employed by USF Holdings. Again, this is further evidence that all three defendants are really one entity. Also in Plaintiff's Exhibit Nine, which is a Union Mortgage Company newsletter, it states on page 2 in the middle column, first full paragraph: From day to day management point of view there are a number of things that are more efficiently handled in a centralized fashion rather than letting each of the subsidiaries allocate resources to the same task. Some of the areas are obvious, consolidated accounting, purchasing materials, personnel, funding, etc. As the person running these operations, I find some of the areas basically challenging. The person who wrote this is the Chief Financial Officer of USF Holdings. He is running the day to day operations of Accounting, purchasing, personnel and funding of Union Mortgage while being the Chief Financial Officer and on the board of USF Holdings. Further, he was receiving a salary from Skopbank (Deposition of Sakari Virolainen). In the June 28th, 1989, Union Mortgage Company board of Directors meeting, which is also under Plaintiffs Exhibit 10, underneath number 10, it states: Mr. Sukselain stated that UMC is part of the "corporate bank" and should be treated on the "best client basis" when borrowing money from the parent company. Again, this shows the connection between Union Mortgage and Skopbank is more than that of a parent subsidiary. The minutes from the board of directors meeting clearly show that Union Mortgage is part of the "corporate bank" and that they are really one entity. Defendants rely primarily on the case of Matrix-Churchill v. Springsteen, 461 So.2d 782 (Ala. 1984). It must be noted that that case did not involve fraud as is the case here. Further, it dealt with a successor corporation, which is the opposite of what we have here. Here, we have the corporation still viable, but wholly owned by another corporation. Lastly, this is a Motion to Dismiss. This issue can be looked at again at the Summary Judgment level after full discovery has been completed. ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
5.4
Selected Discovery Concerning the Parent Bank

LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al. CASE NO. CV-90 048 INTERROGATORY TO DEFENDANT SKOPBANK 1. State the name of every member of the board of directors of this defendant since Skopbank purchased Union Mortgage, including the time period which the person was a member of the board of directors of this defendant. ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al. CASE NO. CV-90 048 PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO DEFENDANT UNION MORTGAGE COMPANY Plaintiffs specifically requests that the Defendant produce the following documents and things: 1. All documents, notes, correspondence, memos, diagrams, etc., that mention Skopbank or that come from Skopbank to this Defendant or that Skopbank has had in its possession before that this Defendant has now. 2. All documents that mention USF Holding, Inc.
3. All articles of incorporation of this Defendant and Defendant USF Holding, Inc. 4. All minutes of meetings wherein any employee or director of this Defendant discussed incorporation, purpose or duties of Defendant USF Holding, Inc., or Defendant Skopbank. 5. All memos, notes, correspondence or other documents mentioning the corporate purpose of Defendant USF Holding, Inc. 6. All stock certificates of Defendant USF Holding, Inc. 7. All documents evidencing debts of Union Mortgage Company or USF Holding, Inc., paid by Skopbank. 8. Annual reports of this Defendant for the years of 1985 and 1990. 9. All documents evidencing the relationship between this Defendant, Defendant USF Holding, Inc., and Defendant Skopbank. 10. All agreements, contracts, indemnity agreements, stock purchase opinions, or any other type of agreement whatsoever between this Defendant and Defendant USF Holding, Inc., or Defendant Skopbank. 11. Any document that has any of the Plaintiffs names on it. ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
5.5
Plaintiffs' Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for Production

LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al.
CASE NO. CV-90 048
PLAINTIFF LAURA BAKER'S ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT SKOPBANK'S FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
Comes now, Plaintiff, Laura Baker, and answers Defendant Skopbank's First Interrogatories and Request for Production as follows: 1. You contend in your complaint that this Defendant's actions in this case were "part of a common scheme to defraud persons with limited education or understanding of financial dealings." With regard to that contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: Numerous Plaintiffs have made the same allegations and I believe they were doing this to others who have not yet filed complaints. Most of the complainants have a low level of education. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention [addresses and telephone numbers not reprinted infra]. ANSWER: Warren Hall, Bill & Jennifer Lampley, Reggie L. Tatum, Nancy Persons, Ms. Bernice Crenshaw, Ms. Cynthia Brown, Ms. Shirley Truitt, Rosa Vera Hopson, Charles and Jo Ann Lewis. This will be supplemented at a later time.
c.
Identify and produce any document now known to you upon which you rely in making the above contention.
ANSWER: All documents supporting these contentions are in your possession. 2. You contend in your Complaint that Defendant's actions in this case were intentional, willful, reckless and/or malicious. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: The action of having Charles Harper, Lawrence Construction Co. and Union
Mortgage Co. as the agents of the Defendants. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now known to you upon which you rely in making the above contention. ANSWER: See answer #1c. 3. You contend in your Complaint that Defendant has entered into a pattern and practice of fraud or other intentional wrongful conduct. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: The facts are evident by the consistency of the concurring complaints by each of the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit and other lawsuits in Alabama. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now known to you which you rely in making the above contention. ANSWER: See answer #1c. 4. You contend in your Complaint that Defendant intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon you. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: I lost the value of my money and now have an unpaid mortgage on my home; and I have suffered mental anguish and emotional distress because I thought I might loose my home, my credit, and my health. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business
telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now known to you upon which you rely in making the above contention. ANSWER: See answer #1c. 5. You contend in your Complaint that Defendant entered into a conspiracy to defraud you. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: This Defendant conspired with the other Defendants to defraud me. Other claimants have made allegations consistent with mine. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now known to you upon which you rely in making the above contention. ANSWER: See answer #1c. 6. Identify each person now known to you who has factual information in support of the claims stated by you in this complaint. ANSWER: My attorneys and the other Plaintiffs in this lawsuit. 7. State the names and addresses of any and all persons now known to you with whom you have consulted as an expert witness. ANSWER: Bill Crosby from Atlanta, Georgia. 8. In regard to expert witnesses consulted by you, describe in detail the qualifications including educational background and experience of each such expert witness omitting no material fact from that description.
ANSWER: This will be supplemented before his deposition. 9. In regard to expert witnesses consulted by you, state the subject matter on which each such expert was consulted and if you expect that expert witness to testify in support of the allegations made in your complaint, please state the subject matter upon which each such expert is expected to testify. ANSWER: See answer #8. 10. In regard to expert witnesses consulted by you, summarize the substance of the facts and opinions to which any such expert witness is expected to testify or of which he has knowledge, including in your answer a summary of the grounds for the opinion of each such expert. ANSWER: See answer #8. 11. Identify each and every person, firm or corporation you have used to collect information for the preparation or for the trial of this case. ANSWER: I object to this question on the grounds that this would be considered work product. 12. If the persons identified above have given opinions on the merits of this case or any of your allegations, please provide a precise summary of the opinions given by these persons, firms or corporations. ANSWER: I object to this question on the grounds that this would be considered work product. 13. Do you intend to rely upon any statue, ordinance, regulation or law in support of the contentions made by you in your complaint? If so, please state: a. b. The precise citation of such statute, ordinance or law. The way in which you contend such statute, ordinance or law supports the allegations made by you in your complaint. ANSWER: The law of fraud in the state of Alabama. 14. Do you intend to rely upon any text, statute, ordinance or law in your cross-examination of this Defendant's experts? If so, state:
a. b. c. d. e.
The exact title of each text upon which you intend to rely. The name and address of the publisher of each such text. The date upon which each such text was published. The name of the author of each such text. List and identify all tests, treatises, or documents which you or your experts have relied upon in arriving at conclusions or opinions in this case or which may be referred to in testimony of you or your expert or which may be introduced in the trial of this case.
ANSWER: I do not have this knowledge at this time. 15. If you intend to use an expert witness in the trial of this case, please list and identify each and every article that has been written by your expert witness, the date of the article was published, and the name of the publication. ANSWER: I have no knowledge of this information at this time. 16. In regard to each item of damage claimed by you in this complaint, please state: a. The nature of the damage;
ANSWER: The damage was monetary, mental and emotional in nature. b. The monetary amount of the damage;
ANSWER: Whatever the jury thinks I am entitled to receive. c. The method you used to arrive at the monetary amount of the damage.
ANSWER: See answer #16b. 17. Please state your full name, date of birth, present address and present occupation [address not reprinted infra]. ANSWER: Laura Louise Baker BD 10-6-26 My occupation at this time is being a housewife.
18. Please list each place of employment for the last preceding ten years furnishing the dates of employment, rate of pay and reason for leaving.
ANSWER: In January 1987 through December 1989 I worked as a dental assistant making $270.00 to $280.00 per week until I had to quit due to health problems. 19. Please itemize fully your educational background. ANSWER: I attended school through the 12th grade lacking the final quarter, so I did not graduate. 20. If you have ever been charged with or convicted of any criminal offense including traffic violations please state the name of the offense, the state, county and city in which you were charged, the date of the charge, and the sentence or fine imposed. ANSWER: N/A. 21. Please list each and every mortgage on real property which you have taken out and have been personally liable for or signed for setting forth the name and address of the lender, the amount of said mortgage, the date of said mortgage, whether it presently is a valid mortgage or if it has been satisfied. ANSWER: I owned a house located at 3817 Carey, East Chicago, Ind. which I sold in 1975 when we moved to Alabama. I also have a first mortgage on my present home with First Family Mortgage Financial Service, 2700 Hwy. 280 SSTE 104, Birmingham, AL 35223. This is for $42,430.86. 22. Please list each and every credit obligations which are presently in your name including but not limited to credit cards, loans for vehicles and household goods, etc., setting forth for each obligation the following: a. b. c. The name of the institution issuing such credit. The balance of your obligation to such creditor. The interest rates and other terms of credit.
ANSWER: I owe $75.00 for an air conditioner to the Alabama Power Company in Clayton, Alabama and I have $160.00 loan for my car at the Money Tree in Eufaula, Alabama. I also have an account with Cox & Cox Trailer Company in Clio, Alabama. 23. Please state whether you have ever filed for bankruptcy relief. If so, please state the date
of filing and the type of relief sought. ANSWER: N/A. 24. You contend in your Complaint that Union Mortgage Company acted as an agent for this Defendant. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: We believe that this Defendant conspired with the other Defendants to defraud us. Other claimants have made allegations consistent with ours. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now know to you upon which you rely in making the above contention. ANSWER: See answer #1c. 25. You contend in your Complaint that this Defendant failed to disclose a hidden interest charge or the fact that the mortgages were pre-sold at a discount to Union Mortgage and/or that Defendant Union Mortgage was actually lending them money. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Co. entered into an agreement with Defendant Union Mortgage Company whereby they agreed to sell Union Mortgage Company their mortgages with Plaintiffs at a discount. The discount rates of the sale of the mortgages were agreed upon prior to Charles Harper actually procuring the mortgages from the Plaintiffs. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b.
c.
Identify and produce any document now know to you upon which you rely in making the above contention.
ANSWER: See answer #1c. 26. You contend in your Complaint that this Defendant failed to disclose to Plaintiffs that they were paying a hidden interest charge. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: All Defendants fraudulently failed to disclose to us that we would be paying hidden interest charges. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now know to you upon which you rely in making the above contention. ANSWER: See answer #1c. 27. You contend in your Complaint that Defendant Union Mortgage acted as an agent of Defendant Skopbank and U.S.F. Holdings, Inc., in perpetuating an alleged fraud on Plaintiffs. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: We were under the impression from what Charles Harper told me that he worked for Union Mortgage Company. USF, Skopbank, and Union Mortgage Co. are the alter-egos of each other. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now know to you upon which you rely in making
the above contention. ANSWER: See answer #1c. 28. You contend in your Complaint that this Defendant entered into a conspiracy with the other named Defendants to defraud Plaintiff. With regard to this contention, please state: a. The facts upon which you rely in making that contention.
ANSWER: This Defendant conspired with the other Defendants to defraud me. Other claimants have made allegations consistent with mine. b. The names, addresses, business addresses, home telephone number and business telephone number of each witness now known to you who will support this contention. ANSWER: See answer #1b. c. Identify and produce any document now know to you upon which you rely in making the above contention. ANSWER:: See answer #1c. PLAINTIFF [notarized] ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
5.6
Affidavit of Expert Witness

CASE NO. CV-90 048
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM D. CROSBY
Before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the State of Tennessee at Large, personally appeared William D. Crosby, who is known to me and who being by me first duly sworn, on oath deposes and says as follows: My name is William D. Crosby and I am over the age of 19 and of sound mind and competent to testify. I make this affidavit based on facts known to be true by me. I have a bachelor of business administration/finance which I received in 1976 from the University of Georgia. I have attended and completed numerous domestic and international banking schools. I received my national bank examiner commission in 1981 from the secretary of the treasury. From July 1990 to present, I have been Vice President of U.S. Banking Alliance, Inc. We provide consulting service for banks. From September 1988 to July 1990 I was a director of regulatory relations and acquisitions for the Enterprise Network, Inc. I have assisted approximately 25 organizing groups in forming new banks since 1987. I have qualified to testify as an expert witness on banking relations and corporate identity in court, and have served on numerous occasions as an administrative hearing officer on these subjects. I have reviewed all the documents that are produced by Union Mortgage Company, USF Holdings, and Skopbank in their response to Plaintiff's request for production of documents. I have reviewed all depositions taken in this case. It is my opinion that Skopbank is the alterego of Union Mortgage Company. It is also my opinion that USF Holding is the alterego of Union Mortgage Company. It is my opinion that Union Mortgage, USF Holding and Skopbank are in fact one business entity. I base this opinion upon several factors. The board of directors of Union Mortgage has at one time or another been made up of entirely Finnish employees of Skopbank. Further, Skopbank's employee was the CEO of Union Mortgage and USF Holding while he received payment from Skopbank. Further, at the time of the fraud, Union Mortgage had a $200,000,000.00 unsecured line
of credit with Skopbank which could be raised upon request. There is no loan agreement evidencing the repayment plan of this money nor stating what the consequences are if it is not repaid. After USF Holding was formed by Skopbank to purchase Union Mortgage, Union Mortgage's unsecured line of credit with USF Holding has been raised to $500,000,000.00. USF Holding in turn has a $500,000,000.00 unsecured line of credit with Skopbank. Accordingly, the money is still coming indirectly from Skopbank to Union Mortgage with no security. On the rare occasion that Union Mortgage borrows money from other sources, Skopbank fully guarantees the note. Union Mortgage considers its financing from Skopbank to be loans and not capital. If this is the case, it is my opinion that Union Mortgage is undercapitalized. This is far below the normal amount of capital that a company of this size has in the mortgage business. If the unsecured money is looked upon as capital, then Skopbank and USF Holding are directly financing the acts of Union Mortgage. As can be seen from the board of directors minutes of USF Holding, it controls Union Mortgage. Further, when a company like Skopbank lends unsecured money in large amounts with no written document evidencing payments, certainly they have control of where the money goes. The connection between these three companies is such that they are really one in the same company all being controlled and operated by Skopbank. Union Mortgage is referred to as part of the "corporate bank" in the documents. Both USF Holding and Union Mortgage are in the same building in Texas and share employees.
WILLIAM D. CROSBY [notarized]
5.7
Indemnification and Settlement Agreement With Parent Bank

CASE NO. CV-90 048 INDEMNIFICATION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT The undersigned Skopbank (hereinafter referred to as "Bank"), hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the defendant named and designated as Union Mortgage Company, Inc. against any judgment rendered or entered against Union Mortgage Company and in favor of any one or more of the Plaintiffs in this action as set out herein below. It is understood and agreed that: 1. Bank will pay each judgment in this action in full, including accrued interest to the date of payment, without exception, reservation or qualification, as and when such judgment finally becomes due and payable against Union Mortgage Company. 2. No judgment shall be deemed due and payable until the judgment becomes final under Alabama law after all post-trial motions and exhaustion of appeals. If Union Mortgage Company files any type bankruptcy prior to a judgment covered hereunder becoming final, the obligations of Bank shall immediately accrue and become due upon the occurrence of such filing unless Bank shall have filed a supersedeas bond to be approved by the Court superseding any judgment that might be rendered against Union Mortgage Company in this action within fifteen (15) days of the filing of any bankruptcy as aforesaid. The parties agree that the supersedeas bond to be filed will be sufficient if it is issued by an insurance company rated by Best Insurance Rating with a Best Rating of A+13 or better and approved by any Circuit Court of the State of Alabama. It is the intent of the parties
that Skopbank may either pay the judgment or supersede the judgment, but would in no event be required to do both at that stage of the proceedings. It is further understood that the terms supersede or supersedeas used herein shall be construed according to and as set out in the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. 3. This agreement is for, and shall accrue to, the benefit of each of the plaintiffs in this action. 4. This agreement shall not be assignable by any of the Plaintiffs other than as provided herein. 5. The indemnification agreement shall have full force and effect regardless of any action taken by Union Mortgage Company to avoid payment of any such judgment including bankruptcy, receivership, or any other like judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the foregoing does not apply to post-trial motions after a jury verdict and/or an appeal resulting after judgment. 6. The filing of bankruptcy or any other like proceedings by Union Mortgage Company shall have no effect on the obligations of Bank under this agreement. 7. This agreement shall not be interpreted so as to preclude Bank from purchasing any judgment owned by the Plaintiffs against Union Mortgage Company. Upon the purchase of a judgment, or upon payment of a judgment, Bank or its assigns may require the involved Plaintiffs to transfer any rights that the Plaintiff may have against Union Mortgage Company. 8. Bank does hereby waive the provisions of any laws of Finland or otherwise that would alter, modify, or restrict its ability or requirement to pay any judgment covered under this agreement. 9. Bank shall pay the full amount of each such judgment directly to Beasley, Wilson, Allen, Mendelsohn, Jemison & James, P.C., in trust, as attorneys of record for each plaintiff. 10. If there is a judgment in favor of Union Mortgage Company, as to any Plaintiff, this agreement shall be null and void as to that specific Plaintiff only. It shall remain in full force and effect as to all other Plaintiffs. 11. If judgment be rendered in favor of one or more Plaintiffs, and against any other Plaintiff or Plaintiffs in this action, then the indemnification shall survive only to the Plaintiffs receiving
judgment against Union Mortgage and shall be void as to each Plaintiff against whom Union Mortgage prevailed. 12. This agreement shall also have full force and effect as to the settlement of this civil action to the extent that Union Mortgage Company defaults in the payments agreed to be made by Union Mortgage Company. 13. This agreement shall be governed by and interpreted pursuant to the laws of the State of Alabama. 14. All disputes arising in connection with this Indemnity Agreement shall be resolved under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators appointed in accordance with said rules. Each party shall name one arbitrator and the two so named shall name the third arbitrator who will act as Chairman. All arbitrators shall be citizens of the United States of America. It is the intent of the parties that this arbitration provision shall be binding upon Skopbank and shall allow for the enforcement of any judgment in Finland or the United States through arbitration. It is also the intent of these parties that this arbitration provision shall preclude the necessity of the parties relitigating any issue of fact or law under this Indemnification Agreement, or under the underlying cases (the subject of this agreement), in a court of law in the country of Finland or otherwise. Plaintiffs agree that, in the event any of said plaintiffs are awarded a judgment against Union Mortgage Company, they will not place Union Mortgage Company in involuntary bankruptcy. 15. This agreement shall be filed with the Court with the understanding that the agreement shall be kept sealed by the Court and confidential as to any third party. 16. The attorneys representing the Plaintiffs and the named Plaintiffs agree that, after this agreement is executed, they will not mention the name of Bank or its relationship with Union Mortgage Company in the news media. 17. The contents of this agreement or the existence thereof shall not be disclosed to any third party by the parties or their attorneys. 18. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, should a judgment be rendered in favor
of Union Mortgage Company or a judgment be rendered in favor of one or more Plaintiffs and said judgment be superseded with a bond approved by the Court, then Bank will have no further obligations as to that specific judgment (which was superseded) under this agreement. 19. In consideration of this agreement, the Plaintiffs in this cause agree to dismiss Bank and USF Holdings, Inc. as parties defendant from the civil actions in which the Plaintiffs named herein are parties. 20. In the event Union Mortgage Company files any type bankruptcy prior to judgment in this action, Bank and USF Holdings, Inc. shall be reinstated as parties Defendant in the action. 21. The parties state and certify that this agreement is for a valuable consideration and is valid to the best of their knowledge under the laws of the Republic of Finland, the United States, and the State of Alabama.
Dated: July Skopbank By: as its President ATTEST: Secretary
, 1991.
APPROVED AND AGREED TO:
Attorney for Plaintiffs APPROVED: Attorney for Skopbank
5.8
Order and Judgment

LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al. CASE NO. CV-90 048 ORDER AND JUDGMENT This day in open court came the parties with their attorneys and this cause coming on to be heard and issue having been joined between the Plaintiffs and Defendant and this cause having been regularly set for trial the 22nd day of July, 1991, thereupon, in open court on this day, in the presence of both the parties with their attorneys, came a jury of good and lawful persons, to-wit: Charles Beasley and eleven others, who, having been first duly impaneled and sworn, according to law, and who having heard the evidence and the charge of the court, upon their oaths, in open court on this day in the presence of the Plaintiffs, Defendant, and their attorneys, to say:
"We the jury find in favor of the Plaintiff Laura Baker and against Union Mortgage Company and assess damages as follows:
$1,000,000.00 compensatory damages $8,000,000.00 punitive damages
"We the jury find in favor of the Plaintiffs Warren Hall and against Union Mortgage Company and assess damages as follows:
$1,000,000.00 compensatory damages
$8,000,000.00 punitive damages
"We the jury find in favor of the Plaintiffs Nancy and Andrew Person and against Union Mortgage Company and assess damages as follows:
"We the jury find in favor of the Plaintiffs Reggie and Anne Tatum and against Union Mortgage Company and assess damages as follows:
$1,000,000.00 compensatory damages $8,000,000.00 punitive damages "We the jury find in favor of the Plaintiffs Bill and Jennifer Lampley and against Defendant Union Mortgage Company and assess damages as follows:
/S/ Charles H. Beasley FOREPERSON
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by the Court that judgment be and it is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendant as found by the Jury in this cause, and all costs in this cause be taxed against the Defendant for the recovery of which let execution issue.
ENTERED this the
day of July, 1991. CIRCUIT JUDGE
cc:
Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant
5.9
Order Denying Defendant's Post-Judgment Motions

LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al. CASE NO. CV-90 048 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS There is currently presented to the Court Defendant Union Mortgage Company, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial or, in the Alternative, Motion for Remittitur. Union Mortgage Company contends there was insufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury. Union Mortgage Company also claims that the damages awarded were excessive and raises numerous other grounds it contends justifies a new trial. A hearing was held on the motions on October 2, 1991. A Hammond hearing was held on October 25, 1991. For the reasons stated below, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant Union Mortgage Company's motions are due to be DENIED, but that denial of the Motion for New Trial should be conditioned on Plaintiffs' acceptance of a remittitur of the jury verdicts in the amount of $4,700,000 each or a total of $16,500,000 resulting in verdicts of $5,700,000 each for the five sets of Plaintiffs.
MOTION FOR JNOV
Defendant Union Mortgage contends that Plaintiffs submitted insufficient evidence to submit their separate claims to the jury. Under Alabama law Plaintiffs must submit substantial evidence in support of each element of their claim in order to justify denial of a Motion for Directed Verdict. On the other hand, if the evidence is in conflict the issues must be submitted to the jury. Defendant's primary argument surrounds the issue of agency. Defendant denies that Charles Harper was acting as its agent in his dealings with Plaintiffs. Except in the most unusual case, the issue of agency is for the jury. Turner v. Deutz-Allis Credit Corporation, 544 So.2d 840 (1989). This Court finds there was substantial evidence as to agency and that it correctly denied Defendants' motion for directed verdict on this issue. Charles Harper told each of the Plaintiffs that he worked for Union Mortgage Company. When Mr. Harper first came to meet with each of the Plaintiffs he brought certain documents including a credit application, retail installment contract, and mortgage. Each of those documents had been prepared by Union Mortgage Company and provided to Mr. Harper for his use. Most, if not all, of the documents were Union Mortgage Company forms with the Union Mortgage Company name clearly stated at the top of each document. Perhaps the most compelling evidence on this issue was provided by Jim Curtis, a former employee of Union Mortgage Company. According to Mr. Curtis, who served as manager of the Birmingham branch, Union Mortgage solicited Mr. Harper, placed him in business, provided him with all necessary forms, placed a quota on him for the number of loans to obtain, supervised him in every aspect of his job, and as Mr. Curtis put it, "controlled" Mr. Harper. There was also evidence that Plaintiff Laura Baker heard a radio advertisement for Union Mortgage and after she called Union Mortgage, Charles Harper came out to meet with her. Plaintiff Nancy Persons heard another radio advertisement which also linked Charles Harper and Union Mortgage. While Union Mortgage witnesses denied any agency relationship with Charles Harper, this Court is firmly of the opinion that the evidence presented provided more than the substantial evidence necessary to submit the agency issue to the jury. It was very clear that Charles Harper was
only one of a number of less-than-desirable persons recruited by Union Mortgage Company to carry out its overall scheme. Charles Harper could not have done what he did without the active participation of Union Mortgage Company.
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Defendant Union Mortgage raises several issues which it contends entitles it to a new trial. Although the court does not find any of Union Mortgage's contentions to have merit or to entitle it to a new trial, the Court will comment on some of its arguments.
THE JUROR ISSUE Union Mortgage contends it is entitled to a new trial because Kathleen Shepherd was unqualified to be a member of the venire and to serve on the jury. During Voir Dire examination, Ms. Shepherd, a bona fide resident of Barbour County, indicated that she was a resident of Eufaula. There is no contention that Ms. Shepherd was not a resident of Barbour County or that she was otherwise disqualified to serve as a juror. There was evidence presented at the first post-judgment hearing that indicated that this juror's legal residence was in fact within the Clayton division of the Court. Defendants rely on Acts of Alabama No. 195, 1953 in support of their position that Ms. Shepherd was unqualified to serve as a juror. In 1973, the State Legislature passed Act No. 1051 known as the Judicial Article. This Article was enacted as amendment No. 328 to the Alabama Constitution. The Judicial Article was passed to establish a new judicial department. Its passage as a constitutional amendment repealed and superseded all laws related to the judicial system in effect at that time. Amendment No. 328, 6.04 established circuit courts "having such divisions and consisting of such number of judges as shall be provided by law." With the passage of this Article, both Act No. 195 and Code of Alabama 12-16-44 were repealed.
Subsequently, legislature enacted a statute to provide for the qualifications of jurors. Acts 1978, No. 594 codified as Code of Alabama 12-16-60 (1978). It is very clear that Ms. Shepherd met all the qualifications of that code section. This Court is of the opinion that 12-16-60 is controlling and that this juror was well qualified to serve. In this Court's opinion, the manner in which Defendant raised this issue at trial is also determinative. At the time Ms. Shepherd indicated she resided in Eufaula, Defendant Skopbank (this Defendant was dismissed after jury selection but prior to trial) indicated a challenge without citing any grounds. Skopbank was represented by Jack W. Wallace, who served as judge of this circuit for many years. No one in the courthouse, including this Judge and Judge Wallace, knew anything about the 1953 statute which Defendant now cites. It is obvious Defendant's challenge at that time was not based on that statute. Perhaps more importantly, Defendant used its last preemptory strike to remove Ms. Shepherd as a juror. This allowed her to be seated on the jury as the first alternate. Later, a member of the petit jury was excused by agreement of the parties and Ms. Shepherd was then allowed to serve. No objection to her qualifications was made at that time by Union Mortgage nor at the time the jury retired for its deliberations. Ms. Shepherd was allowed to serve on the jury by tacit agreement of the parties since no objection was made. There was a second alternate available to serve at the time Ms. Shepherd became a juror. Had Defendant raised the issue at the time, the second alternate would have served rather than Ms. Shepherd. This Court is firmly of the opinion that Defendant did not sufficiently preserve this issue for review on Motion for New Trial. Without the agreement of Defendant, Ms. Shepherd would never have served on the jury in this case. Union Mortgage thereby waived any possible error that may have occurred during jury selection. No other potential disqualification of this juror was made known to the Court. It is inconceivable that a bona fide resident of Barbour County would, in any event, be disqualified to serve as a juror in this Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Union Mortgage Company has raised a number of contentions that the award of punitive damages in this case violates its constitutional rights. A number of these challenges are inapplicable in this case. Union Mortgage Company argues that certain protections normally afforded in criminal cases should have been afforded in this case. These included an enhanced burden of proof, and a "limit" on the amount of "punishment." In this Court's opinion, these issues are not properly raised because Defendant Union Mortgage Company did not request any jury charge requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Our Supreme Court has held that in the absence of requested jury charges, these alleged constitutional violations are waived. Alfa Mutual Insurance Company v. Northington, 561 So.2d 1041 (Ala. 1990). Each of the constitutional challenges raised by Union Mortgage have previously been rejected by the Supreme Court of Alabama. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has now determined that the system for the award of punitive damages in Alabama is constitutional. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip [Mo. 89-1279, Mar. 4 1991] __ U.S. __, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991).
MOTION FOR REMITTITUR Defendant Union Mortgage contends that the jury verdict was excessive both as to the compensatory damage awards and the punitive damage awards. The Court will first consider the compensatory damage award of $1,000,000 to each Plaintiff family. The fraud perpetrated by Union Mortgage resulted in a mortgage being placed on each family's home. There is a long line of cases from the Supreme Court of Alabama recognizing that it should be reasonably expected that injuries or damage to one's home will likely result in substantial mental anguish. B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan 376 So.2d 667 (ala. 1979). There was substantial testimony from each of the Plaintiffs that he or she suffered mental anguish as a result of concern, anxiety, and worry over possible loss of their home. The jury could have certainly concluded that each of these Plaintiffs suffered tremendous mental pain and anguish and emotional distress. The
helpless feelings of the Plaintiffs were evident at trial. It would have been very easy for the Defendant and its representative (Mr. Harper) to dupe these people. They surely suffered greatly as a result of their dealings with Union Mortgage Company. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court concludes that there is no basis for any reduction in the compensatory award as to any of the Plaintiffs. Defendant Union Mortgage also challenges the punitive damage award. In each of the five cases, the jury awarded $8,000,000 as punitive damages. The Supreme Court of Alabama has prescribed the standards this Court should apply in considering the Motion to Reduce the punitive damage award in its decision in Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986) and Green Oil v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1989).
I. THE HARM WHICH OCCURRED AND THE HARM WHICH IS LIKELY TO OCCUR. It was very clear to the Court that Union Mortgage Company solicited dealers such as Charles Harper, who could not do business with any other lending institution and who were extremely poor credit risks themselves, and turned these people loose to in turn solicit prospective customers with limited educations and in financial need. There was evidence at trial and subsequently at the postjudgment hearings that Union Mortgage Company made thousands of loans similar to those made to Plaintiffs using various dealers with backgrounds identical to that of Harper. Each family in the instant case received little, if any benefit, from placing a mortgage of approximately $10,000 on their home. Instead, they now find themselves saddled with debts and mortgages after having paid varying sums of money on the mortgages. The Court believes that the scheme of Union Mortgage Company is not restricted to that company alone. Testimony at the Hammond hearing indicated that other companies are doing similar things throughout the country. Unless this type conduct is stopped, thousands of citizens throughout the land will be victimized in the future by companies that operate in the "Union Mortgage Company manner." There is no way to know how many persons have already fallen
victim to Union Mortgage Company and others similarly situated and inclined. The philosophy of Union Mortgage Company was put rather well by Mr. Curtis (who was in a perfect position to know) when he testified that Union Mortgage Company wanted to close out the deals before the customers "came out from under the ether" or before they found out what was going on.
II. THE REPREHENSIBILITY OF THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT Our Supreme Court has made it clear that the amount of punitive damages awarded should be directly related to the enormity of the Defendant's wrong. It is difficult to imagine a more reprehensible course of conduct than that of Defendant Union Mortgage Company in this case. Each of these Plaintiffs are poor, uneducated citizens who reside in rural areas. Two of the Plaintiffs can neither read nor write. None of them are sophisticated in business affairs or commerce. It was this segment of our society which Defendant Union Mortgage Company targeted for its fraudulent and horrendous scheme. In addition to these Plaintiffs, hundreds and perhaps thousands of other similar individuals were targeted in Alabama. A case tried in Lowndes County Circuit Court, prior to this case, resulted in a substantial verdict against Union Mortgage Company. This Court presided over a trial in another county with almost identical facts and circumstances, which settled for a substantial amount during the course of the trial. The Court was also made aware of settlements with at least fifty other persons resulting in payments of substantial sums of money to these victims of Union Mortgage Company and its cadre of unsavory dealers. It is interesting to note that victims without lawyers were treated differently than those represented by attorneys and received much smaller settlements.
III. FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE DEFENDANT This Court has considered the financial impact of this verdict on the Defendant. Union Mortgage Company has not argued that this verdict, even with no reduction, will destroy it. Union Mortgage made the decision before this verdict was ever returned to cease operations. Mr. Ralph Black, President of Union Mortgage Company, was adamant that this Court's decision on the Motion
for Remittitur will have absolutely no effect on that business decision. Of course, it is always possible that Skopbank, the parent, will simply open up another company and continue to gain from its deceitful conduct. Consequently, the dispute here is merely whether the assets of Defendant Union Mortgage will go to Skopbank, its parent corporation, or to these Plaintiffs. The trial balance of Union Mortgage Company, dated September 30, 1991, shows assets in excess of $260,000,000 The largest liability of Union Mortgage Company is an unsecured loan from its parent of approximately $250,000,000. This loan could well represent capital put in the business by the parent rather than a loan. The classification of the funds as a loan under these conditions is certainly suspicious and suspect.
IV. PROFIT TO UNION MORTGAGE It is clear that Union Mortgage generated tremendous revenues from its activities. The testimony of Ralph Black indicates some 35,000 mortgages were "made" or "purchased" across the United States. It is undisputed that Union Mortgage Company received a $125.00 origination-type fee on each of these loans. Union Mortgage received the benefit of an immediate discount of 10-15 per cent from each loan which also was deducted from the loan proceeds. Assuming there were only 30,000 loans involved this would amount to a total of at least $33,750,000 being deducted from these loans by Union Mortgage Company. Certainly, many of these mortgages were sold by Union Mortgage with Union Mortgage receiving substantial discount payments as a result. The victims of Union Mortgage Company's scheme were paying interest at approximately 18 per cent per annum.
V. COST OF LITIGATION The Court should consider the cost of litigation. The most recent financial statement submitted by Union Mortgage at the Hammond hearing shows that it has expended more than $3,500,000 in legal fees and incurred additional substantial expenses defending the various claims, including those of these Plaintiffs, over a relatively short time frame. The time expended and
expenses incurred by the attorneys for these Plaintiffs must be similarly enormous. Where a Defendant mounts such a "spare no expense" defense of claims against it, it necessarily follows that Plaintiffs' counsel must reply in kind. Many law firms might decline to represent Plaintiffs such as these where a defense, such has been mounted in this case, is expected to be encountered. Many law firms could not match such spending and would drop by the wayside. This Court is firmly of the opinion that this factor cannot be used to reduce this verdict.
VI. MITIGATING FACTORS Our Supreme Court has taught that the existence of other similar cases and verdicts should be considered as a mitigating factor. It must be noted at the outset that while these five cases arise out of a part of an overall scheme they involve different agents and different transactions than those of the prior cases and settlements. This factor would mitigate most in favor of a Defendant if the identical conduct for which it had already been punished caused the harm. Here the fraud was perpetrated by different agents on different occasions against different individuals. In an attempt to suggest a reduction in this verdict, Union Mortgage presented testimony at the Hammond hearing to suggest that its first knowledge of any wrongdoing came with the Lowndes County verdict and that after that verdict it instituted new policies and procedures to protect against fraud on the part of the dealers. The profit to the Defendant from its wrongful conduct should be considered. Union Mortgage argues that its business has not been profitable and that this factor weighs in favor of a reduction of this verdict. This Court is not aware of any criminal sanctions which have been imposed on Union Mortgage Company as a result of this type conduct even though the Attorneys General of numerous states have investigated, or are currently investigating, Union Mortgage Company. Therefore, this factor cannot be considered to reduce these jury verdicts. The Court is not of the opinion that Union Mortgage Company has ever repented of its sins. The Court is shocked that officials of Union Mortgage Company would continue through the date
of the Hammond hearing to claim innocence. The conduct by Union Mortgage Company in all of the cases that have come to the attention of this Court was reprehensible and outrageous beyond belief. To think that a company such as Union Mortgage Company would treat persons as it did and then try to wash their hands of the whole sordid affair is repugnant to this Court.
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS This Court finds that the five verdicts in this consolidated case were in no way affected by bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive or conduct. The Court finds that the jury's verdicts were based on a conscientious desire to render just verdicts in keeping with the Court's instructions. The case was well tried on both sides. Counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendant conducted themselves in accordance with the high standards of conduct required of members of our profession. This Court had the opportunity to observe the jurors throughout the trial and notes that each of them paid attention to the evidence, arguments of counsel, and the Court's instructions to the jury. Among other things, this Court fully charges a jury on the question of damages in accordance with the directions of our Supreme Court. The Court specifically finds that all of the elements of Plaintiffs' cause of action were proved by substantial evidence. None the less, this Court is of the opinion that considering all the factors from Hammond and Green Oil, the amount of these verdicts is somewhat greater than necessary to effect society's goals of punishment and deterrence. The fact that the Defendant is no longer seeking new business and adamantly states it will cease operations; the fact that another substantial jury verdict was awarded for a small part of this same pattern and practice of intentional and malicious wrongdoing; and the fact that Union Mortgage has expended a substantial amount to settle with other individuals, who have apparently been wronged, leads this Court to the conclusion that the verdicts should be reduced. A certified public accountant testified at the Hammond hearing on behalf of Union Mortgage (at a cost of some $30,000) and indicated the assets of Union Mortgage Company to be $252,000,000. This gentleman testified that certain adjustments should be made to the financial statement as a result
of operations this year which would reduce that amount to $233,000,000. This Court is of the opinion that punitive damage awards amounting to 10 percent of the assets of Union Mortgage will be sufficient to accomplish society's goals and yet provide fundamentally fair verdicts to this Defendant. The Court is firmly convinced, however, that Union Mortgage Company should be severely punished for its conscious and intentional wrongdoing and the injuries it has inflicted. The Court further believes and is convinced that other entities engaged in similar activities should be deterred from such wrongdoing in the future. This effect can only be achieved by a substantial verdict. This Court has considered all facts and circumstances, including those presented at the Hammond hearing, and all factors required by the Supreme Court, in reaching its conclusion concerning the proper amount of punitive damages in each of the five cases. The Court is of the opinion that it will require the level of punitive damages arrived at by the Court to accomplish the goals of society and the ends of justice. To do less could be construed as putting a stamp of approval on the type conduct observed in these cases and in the other cases involving this same Defendant now known to the Court. This Court therefore makes a conscious and well-considered decision in reaching its assessment of the proper amount of punitive damages and is convinced that these verdicts now meet the requirements of all judicial standards and requirements.
ACCORDINGLY IT IS ORDERED BY THE COURT: 1. The amount of compensatory damages is not excessive as to the Plaintiffs and Defendant Union Mortgage's Motion for Remittitur as to compensatory damages as to each of the Plaintiffs is DENIED. 2. The amount of punitive damages is somewhat excessive and Defendant Union Mortgage's Motion for New Trial will be granted unless within fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiffs accept a remittitur in the total amount of $16,500,000, which will reduce the separate awards of punitive damages to a total of $23,500,000 or $4,700,000 in each separate case. 3. The Post-Judgment motions of Defendant Union Mortgage are DENIED in all other respects.
DATED:
CIRCUIT JUDGE

Chapter 5 $28 Million Punitive Damages Award For Bank's PL94Ch05

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Chapter 5

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION

CASE NO. CV-90 048

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF EXHIBIT A

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION

against Defendants Charles Harper and Lawrence Construction Company.

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF [notarized]

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION

DONE this the __ day of December, 1990.

Brief in Response to Motion to Dismiss

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BARBOUR COUNTY, ALABAMA CLAYTON DIVISION

Selected Discovery Concerning the Parent Bank

Plaintiffs' Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for Production

LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al.

CASE NO. CV-90 048

Affidavit of Expert Witness

LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al.

CASE NO. CV-90 048

AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM D. CROSBY

WILLIAM D. CROSBY [notarized]

Indemnification and Settlement Agreement With Parent Bank

LAURA BAKER, et al. [vs.] CHARLES HARPER, et al.

Dated: July Skopbank By: as its President ATTEST: Secretary

APPROVED AND AGREED TO:

Attorney for Plaintiffs APPROVED: Attorney for Skopbank

Order and Judgment

$1,000,000.00 compensatory damages $8,000,000.00 punitive damages

$1,000,000.00 compensatory damages

$8,000,000.00 punitive damages

$1,000,000.00 compensatory damages $8,000,000.00 punitive damages

$1,000,000.00 compensatory damages $8,000,000.00 punitive damages

/S/ Charles H. Beasley FOREPERSON

ENTERED this the

day of July, 1991. CIRCUIT JUDGE

Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for Defendant

Order Denying Defendant's Post-Judgment Motions

MOTION FOR JNOV

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