Aristotles 5 Intellectual Virtues

Aristotle divides the soul into two major categories at the conclusion of Book I in his work Nichomachean Ethics. The decisive characteristic has to do with reason: one element of the soul has it, the other does not. Virtue, he writes, is distinguished along the same lines; and the remainder of his thought throughout the next six books follows this distinction of what he describes as intellectual virtues and character virtues. The later of these two categories deals with our desires and how we respond to them in the arenas of pleasure and pain. Virtue of character is comprised of the actions, or more precisely is the condition or state of being temperate, courageous, just and the like. It is these character virtues that are directly concerned with who we are. Like states arise from like activities, says Aristotle. In other words, the actions we take and the things we do define us as either good or bad. The habits of our character are of utmost importance if we are to be good. But what of the intellectual virtues? What is their relationship to the virtues of character? And if being good really is the goal of ethics what role does each intellectual virtue play in cultivating or maintaining a virtuous character? Before we investigate each of the intellectual virtues in turn, a brief word on the natures of the two types of virtue is in order. We have already mentioned that character virtues primarily operate in the non-rational part of the soul and are engaged in the sphere of desire. While character virtues are complex and involve more than desire alone, the fundamental standard which determines the goodness or badness of those desires is what Aristotle labels as correct or right (orqh). But what is the standard of a desires orthos? We could say that it is the mean between the excess and deficiency of a given action, but what then determines the mean? Aristotle writes that the mean is as correct (orqh) reason prescribes, and we must determine what correct reason is and what its standard is. The oversimplified answer is truth, which is part of the intellectual virtues end (teloV) and the explicit standard of the intellectual virtues as stated at the conclusion of chapter two of Book VI. Already we have discovered an essential idea in the relationship between the two types of virtue: that the desires of the character virtues are to be guided by the truth discovered by intellectual ones.

So what are the intellectual virtues, and what particular roles do they play in the development of character? The five most important intellectual virtues are intellect (nouV), scientific knowledge (episthmh), skill (tecnh), practical wisdom (fronhsiV), and wisdom (sofia). We will take a basic look at the structure of each virtue and then see how it corresponds to the virtues of character. We will start with the virtue labeled intellect. Intellect is the understanding of first and unchanging terms, but it can also be used in practical matters to determine the last terms. Moreover, it is an innate understanding, since intellect is concerned with first terms, of which there is no rational account to be given. When Aristotle divides the rational half of the soul he distinguishes two sub-categories and puts the intellect in the compartment of those things whose first principles can not be otherwise. The principles of intellect are not debatable; they are what they are. Therefore we must begin with those first principles. The innate understanding of first principles is absolute and universal. In the subject of ethics it is the starting point for all knowledge and truth regarding what is virtuous. They are the fundamental ideas that we all agree upon. For example, selfishness, betrayal, and dishonesty are wrong while fairness, loyalty, and honesty are good and right. If we were to have a different nouV regarding virtue we might believe slaying our mother or punishing those kindest and most loyal to us is good. However, almost no one agrees with this. In fact those who think this are called deranged or twisted because they lack a sense of moral gravity or straightness. Therefore intellectual virtue of nouV is the innate understanding of the character virtues as being good and their contraries bad. When the intellect operates from the first principles in practical matters towards the last terms, it is simply recognizing that a universal character virtue such as courage is good and that if we are brave in the midst of a particular dangerous situation it will also be good. Scientific knowledge is like the virtue of intellect in that what is scientifically known cannot be otherwise and the object of scientific knowledge is necessary. This means that the object of episthmh is just as unchanging and absolute as nouV for Aristotle. However, scientific knowledge and intellect differ in that the former offers a rational account and demonstrates what is, while the latter cannot be demonstrated even though both are absolute. Scientific knowledge is dependent on the intellect, For it is when a person believes (pisteuh) in a certain way and understands the first principles that he has scientific knowledge. Aristotle is saying that scientific knowledge begins with the innate and improvable truth of the intellect as its starting

point and from this foundation builds additional truth that can be taught and learned. In short scientific knowledge is the universal truths in a given field that can not be otherwise and can be demonstrated rationally. In ethics if the innate understanding that some actions are virtuous and others are not is the intellectual virtue of nouV, then the virtue of episthmh would be the rational account of how those character virtues operate in an abstract sense. The science of ethics consists in the mean between the excess and deficiency with regard to each virtue, as Aristotle demonstrates in Books II-V. The intellectual virtue of scientific knowledge enunciates what ought to be done with respect to a given character virtue. Skill is within the class of what can be otherwise\and therefore is different from the previous two intellectual virtues. This agrees with the fact that tecnh is concerned with coming into being. Aristotle says it is the same as a productive state involving true reason. Skill is concerned with creating, but what types of things does skill create? Aristotle tells us, skill must be a matter of production (poihsiV), not action (praxiV), and the difference between these two is that while production has an end distinct from itself, this could not be so with action, since the end here is acting well itself. The skill of building is to produce a house, while the act of hiking is usually done for its own sake. So how is skill involved in ethics and what does an ethical skill produce? Unfortunately, Aristotle does not directly answer this concern, but we might suppose that the ethical skill deliberates about how to produce the health of the soul, as the doctors skill (a metaphor which he occasionally uses) deliberates how to produce the health of the body. In other words the ethical tecnh seeks to make us good according to true reason, or maybe this is not the case at all and we are mistaking the goal of the virtue of skill for the goal of its practically identical twin: fronhsiV? Practical wisdom is the same as skill, with a subtle (but significant) matter of distinction: it is concerned with praxiV, and the end of its activity is acting well itself. It is a deliberation (and therefore not scientific knowledge because it can be otherwise) about what promotes good and beneficial living. Aristotle describes practical wisdom as, a true state involving reason, concerned with action in relation to human goods. Ethics is concerned with the goods of the soul, and so fronhsiV is at the heart of our enterprise because it is the blending of the absolute ethical truths of nouV and episthmh with the messy and particular affairs of human life. If justice is character virtue, then practical wisdom is intellectual virtue. Practical wisdom depends

on both a knowledge of the universals as well as an understanding of the particular situations. It needs the universal truths for there to be a standard of right and wrong or good and evil, and it needs some sort of knowledge of the current facts regarding a moral situation. A person who is practically wise is able to assimilate the universal truths with the particular facts and rationally choose what is morally correct. In other words, practical wisdom deliberates how to apply the intellect and scientific knowledge of virtue to real circumstances. It would seem that it would be impossible to act consistently virtuous without practical wisdom in our complex world; indeed Aristotle concludes, we cannot be really good without practical wisdom Practical wisdom, then, prescribes what the mean is for every character virtue in every specific action in life. The fifth and final intellectual virtue with regard to truth is wisdom. Wisdom is the most precise of the sciencesand knows what follows from the first principles of a science, but alsoa true understanding of those first principles. From this we might surmise that sofia is concerned with those things that can not be otherwise. Wisdom is the combination of nouV and episthmh, but Aristotle adds the stipulation of what is by nature most honorable. As such, wisdom deals with the best things which Aristotle says are of divine nature, like the stars and heavenly beings, but in regard to ethics this wisdom is extraordinary, wonderful, abstruse, godlike, but useless So what do we make of wisdom in regard to ethics? Going back to what we said earlier about sofia being a combination of intellect and scientific knowledge, ethical wisdom would be a clear vision of what is virtuous. It would be a pure insight into how the innate understandings of virtue are built on by the scientific knowledge, as well as a how the scientific truths are rooted in the intellect. This pristine perception gives a solid foundation for practical wisdom to make rational choices in the everyday arena of life, thus enhancing our ability to live well and produce a healthy and happy soul. In wisdom all the intellectual virtues are harmonized.