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THE TRUTH ABOUT EAST TIMOR

NOTES AND ANALYSIS ABOUT THE DECOLONIZATION PORTUGAL'S

OF

LAST COLONIAL OUTPOST IN THE EAST

By

JUSSAC M.R. WIROSOEBROTO

JAKARTA.

1976

THE TRUTH ABOUT EAST TIMOR Notes and analysis of Portugal's East. By about the deco10nisation outpost in the

last colonial

Jussac MR Wirosoebroto

+)
in Australia and

According

to a Reuter report published

~uoted.bY several newspapers in Jakarta at the end of 1975, on his way back from the Macau Meeting, one of the leading figures of the UDT political party in East Timor visited Sydney and the

ma~e some remarks about East Timor. He expressed his concern about the possibility th~t Indonesia. would use fo~ce to annex last Portuguese Reuter, colonial outpost 1n the East. As reported by

the UDT leede.r said 'that it'thl.t't.thou1:d("h8ppen-;,:;~p().r.tuguese

,
....
",

Timor would become ,~second vietnam"pmd that Indonesia must prepare itself for wh~t he termed "years o.f'-~erri.~la"warfare.n Lopez da Cruz, wh~ became the first deputy~Governor of E~st Timor after' ~he inte~ration with Indonesia, was rather at ' ~ loss when he was interviewed by this writer at his hotel room in Jakarta on the morning of Friday, July 4-1975 and was asked to comment on the statement made by his colleague in Sydney. "I do not know whether misquoted. added something he really said so. Perhaps he was that the reporter do their journalists Or, there is always the possibility to his story. You knowhow

job " said d~ Oruz, who was President of UDT at that time. He was in Jakarta.on his way to Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand" Malaysia and Singapore. To the reporters of the Indonesian news agency ANTARA who later interviewed him, da Cruz .. revealed response th~t he made the trip to marshal' to questions support for his party In Lopez da Cruz made in to deal with the decolonisation process of the.Portuguese.colony.

made: by the reporters,

some interesting statements: .'" 1. he did not consider the view aired by his colleague S~dneyastheir.partY'sposition;.

l,1k~: he other UDT leaders, that t 2. he was atill' conviI?-ced,., Indonesia would never resor.t:> force in dealing with the to Portuguese Timor problem as stated by the late Leuitenant General
Ali Murtopo, intelligence then. deputy~Chief of BAKIN, Indonesia's se~vice to him and Mounsinho, vice-President in Jakarta o.f' DT U

during. their me~ting

toward the end of April 1975.


'

'3. upon his returntrom ~ ' . '.

the current trip, he would ask his in Sydney

colleague whowas:reported to have made the statement to explain what.reallyhappenedj

\'
,:'Page Two

4. he still did not know the outcome of the Macau Meeting


because when he left Dili on July 2)1975, his colleagues attended the Macau Meeting had not returned as Pr~sident the meeting. Raised who to Dili. Obviously

of the UDT party, Lopez da Oruz was not present at

temperature.

The temperature surrounding the East Timor issue did go up before the Macau Meeting (June 25 to 28 1975). There were indications leadership become t?ld this writer that what some of the FRETILIN in Dili at the end of April 1975 would in Dil! secretary in charge of foreign secretary general)

a reality.

As the .outcome of several discussions (~RETILIN ( FRETILIN

with Jose Ramos Horta affairs),

Alarico Jorge Fernandes

and Xavier Amaral ( FRETILIN'president),

it was known that

,FRETILIN would not 'a~tend the Macau Meeting. The reason given by the three top FRETILIN leaders was, that FRETILIN was not prep~red "to sit at the same table with APODETI" to ~trive.for because'right with for

'- ...

from the start, APODETI decided Indonesia ~nd refused East Timor. Queried whether virtually

integration

to support the idea of independence such position was democratic beCause

it denied the partiCipation

of another group in the Horta

search for 8 democratic solution'to the East Timor problem, who was known to be the mostanti-APODETI replied that "In

politics people use to put forward high claims. If accepted, okay. If not, there will always be the opportunity to compromise. Should in the end the Portuguese political Meeting, parties FRETILIN in East government decide that all three in,lthe Macau Alarico Center Timor must participate

would ,attend." was made clear by Ramos Horta,

Thatpoaition Fernandes

and Xavier

Amaral at least once in Dili and once by with the staff of the Indonesian (OSIS) in Jakarta toward to ' initial: .plans would several times

Horta dur~ng his meeting

for Strategic an4 International Studies the end of April 1975. But the Macau Meeting

which according

have been opened on June 13, 1975 was postponed that unt.ilthe last days FRETILIN

and finslly.',did>not start until June 26 1975; for the simple reason did not show up in Macau. Thus, did carry FRETILIN which was against integration with Indonesia out its',determination to. boycott the Macau Meeting. Meanwhile the developments

in East Timor was tense.

The problem of several thousand refugees from the Portuguese colony who fled to the. territory of the Republic of Indonesia .because they could not stand the FRETILIN acts of terrorism could

still no~. ~e -solyed due:,t~l.<theact that apparently no B\l~table f formula" '.' : . could be! found, although talks ~ad been held between . "


<

-.

PaJ2;e.Three Indonesian Dili. And while there were uncertainties it was reported that on June about the Macau Meeting place near the border Timor, about 5, kilometers Indonesia,a shooting colonial police who or were officials from Kupang and Portuguese officials from

1~1975 ata

between Indonesian ~i~or and Portuguese INSIDE the territory of the Renublicof ... incident too~ place. were apparently

A group of Portuguese

on the heels of a group of refugees

trying to'stop them from entering the territory of the Republic of .. Iadonesia 'were confronted by several Indonesian HANSIP (civil defens~personnel HANSIP was killed. Following the ensuing shoot-out one

Thehightened, temperature in East Timor was not caused only by the relations, between APODETI (inte~ation with Indonesia) and FRETILIN (independenca,for East Timor, anti Integration with Indonesia) which progressively became arch enemies. The so-called UDT-FRETILIN Coalition of only several months was unilat~rally dissolved by UDT on May

27)1975 following the

UDT contention that ,gradually FRETILIN fell under Communist control and that the FRETILIN ways to achieve its goal were , endangering Later, Portuguese Meeting, the interests of the people. in early June 1975, a'member government officials of 8 delegation of

from Lisboa

who came to Dili the Macau secret police all of the FRETIL~N

for talks with local political revealed leadership were Dnce members

parties. to prepare

to UDT leaders that almost

of PIDE, the Port~guese on April

under dictator leadership

Salazar who was overthrown which virtually

25~197~.
their they

The .expos' image. Questions

laid bare the FRETIL,IN completely destroyed

i~ the eyes of the public

were raised. How on earth could they

say

would fight for the independen~eof

the people when only one year Portuguese that somewhere of of

before they were stillleckeys of the oppressive regime who terrorised and~oppressed the people? around Dili and at another unspecified location

.. such ,circumstances reports were circulating In

two members

APODETI'were shot to death by Portuguese soldiers at the inst~gation FRETILIN activists. and five people were wounded and taken to hospital.in Dili following soldiers . ' other incidents of shooting by Portuguese

Later, .on June 27,1975 when UDT staged a demonstration in i1i in support of its policy in the Macau Meeting, a known radical and .. fierc~ FRETILIN. figure, q~rvarino, and his wite were pursued. by the. mass p~ticipa.ting in the demonstration. Carvarino was forc~d.to .flee for his life while his wife found refuge the. house of an APODETI le~~;~g figurel in

Page ]'our The UDT demonstration was also meant

88 a forum to conti

once again its anti-Communist position. Carvarino and his wite ~e~e considered two of the hard-core Communists within the ?~~~~
...J

leadership. assuranoes ... 1975 saw the visits ;;ril of several political and Mayor par't7 and

~igures stayed

~rom East Timor.

Lopez da Cruz (UDT president)

Mounsinho

(UDT vice-president followed

of Dili at that t:ime) their journey J9r~e'Fern8ndes to

in Jakarta several days ,before,continuing in charge of foreign secretary general). affairs)

to several countries, se~retary (FRETILIN

by Jose Ramos Horta (FRETILIN and Alarico

Both UDT and FRETILIN

leaders were given the opportunity

talk with Leuitenant ,General Ali Moertopo who assured them during their meetings that Indonesia would never use force in its efforts to help solve, the East Timor 'problem. The main base for Indonesia's position was its Constitution which would not allow the Repuhlic to pursue a policy

ot territorial

~~ansion' or to indulge in territorial ambitions because the -~epublic of Indonesia is not an expansionist state. Later with obvious relief Lopez da Cruz reported his meeting with LeuitenantGeneral at the Auditorium occasion Republic Ali Moertapo to a press conference for Information da Cruz expressed held of the Department and on every his of the to Horta He

when he spoke to journalists, of Indonesia. assurances '

joy that such assurance Similar and Fernandes

had been given by the gove~nment were also given by A1iMoertopo

during ,his meeting with the FRETILIN

leaders.

also asked tpe ~wo FRETILIN1eaders to convey his message to the leaders of all political parties in East Timor to foster harmonyand unity because The Macau Meeting In the beginning and pub1icised the representatives the so-callAd Macau Meeting was intended as a "Summit Meeting" government between and _ in Lisboa Indonesia could not tolerate chaos in the area.

with much fanfare

of the Portuguese

the 2.'epresentatives",of the_ political parties in East Timor, namely UDT, FRE~ILIN and APODETI to discuss wa~s to'so~ve the problem ot ':thedeco10nisation ot' the -territory. ' The me~ting was considered nececssary because from the s~art ,there -were ,sharp differences in the ideas of the politic_~i parties in , East Timor about the,,region's deco1on1.sation._, ' 'APODETI'with. the_indigeno~s people of East Timor representing t~,e" majority (99~9 percen.-t)of its members opted for inteln'ation with Indonesia in the shortest possible time.

..

Page :E'our The UDT demonstration was also meant 58 a forum to conti

once again its anti-Communist position. Carvariao and his wife ~ere considered two of the hard-core Communists within the

?~~~~
~tonesian

leadership. assuranoes

~yri1 1975 saw the visits of several political party


~~gures stayed ~rom East Timor. Lopez da Cruz (UDT president) and Mayor and Mounsinho (ODT vice-president tollowed ot Dili at that t.ime) their journey J9r~e'Fern9ndes to

in Jakarta several days betore, continuing in charge ot foreign secretary general). affairs)

to several countries, se~retary (FRETILIN

by Jose Ramos Horta (FRETILIN and Alarico

Both UDT and FRETILIN

leaders were given the opportunity

talk with Leuitenan~,General Ali Moertopo who assured them during their meetings that Indonesia would never use force in its efforts to help solve the East Timor 'problem. The main'base tor Indonesia's position was its Constitution which would not allow the Repuhlic to pursue a policy ot territorial ~~ansion' or to indulge in territorial ambitions because the '~epublic of Indonesia is not an expansionist sta~e. Later with obvious relief Lopez da Cruz reported his meeting

with Leuitenant General Ali Moertapo to a press conterence held at the Auditorium ot the Department for Information and on every occasion Republic when he spoke to journalists, of Indonesia . assurances d~ring.his were also given by AliMoertopo meeting with the FRETILIN to Horta He leaders. da Cruz expressed his of the joy that such assurance Similar and Fernandes had been given by the gove~nment

also asked tpe ~wo FRETILINleaders to convey his message to the leaders of all political parties in East Timor to foster harmonyand unity because The Macau Meeting, In the beginning and publicised the representatives

Indonesia

could not tolerate

chaos in the area.

the so-callAd

Macau Meeting was intended between and. government in Lisboa

with much fanfare

as a "Summit Meeting"

of the Portuguese

the representatives", ot the, political parties in East Timor, nsmely UDT, FRETILIN and APODETI to discuss wa~s to'so~ve the problem . ot:the decolonisation ot' the territor;r The me~ting was considered nececssary because from the s~art

.there,were ,sharp differences in the ideas ot the politic.al parties in East Timor about the,,region's decolon:Lsation .. , . APODETI with. the. indigenous people

ot East Timor representing


inte~ation

, percen~) of its members opted,tor the, majority, (99~9 . .. . with Indonesia in the shortest possible time.

. -.

Page Five UDT expressed the hope to gain independence and virtually wished with Portugal. from Lisboa certa~~ but ~

in a gradual process torms ot relationship about independence

to mai~tain

In other words the UDT idea independent as a

can be summed up as follows:

still under Portugal's protection . , FRETILIN made it clear it wanted full independence ,souvereign state andexpressedly with Indonesia.: government refused

the idea of integration

On top of all those ideas there was another one held by the of Portugal who had made a self-commitment to its colonies process that after it managed to throw off the yoke of dictator~hip it would grant independence Timor, through a democratic the issue to the peoples on April

25~1974,

in Africa and East by submitting

of decolonisation

concerned

who will be given the right

for self-determinati:.o,n .in line with the basic human rights guaranteed by the United Nations. When the Macau 'Meeting was finally opened on June 26~1975 at the Hotel ESTQRIL in Macau. and not at the Hotel Pousada de Coloane on the Island of Coloane about six miles from Maca~ of FRETILIN .. government appeared. from Lisboa and delegates , no representatives of the Portuguese Only the representatives

representing UDT and APODETI Representing'the Lisboa

attended the meeting. government were Army Major Vitor

Alves (Ambassador at large), Dr. Almeida Santos (Coordinating~ Minister for Overseas Territories) and Dr. Jorge Campinos. The central Di1i: government delegation was backed by two officials from Army Majors, :Mota:aIidCoelho. UDT was represented by Cesar a da Costa Mousinho by FRETILIN (the Mayor Antonio during the

of Di1i who was later found,murdered

chaos in East \ Timor), Mario Carasca1ao, Nascimento and Jacinto dos Reis. APODETI 4e Araujo, sent Hermegi1dq
.

Joao Ca~ascalao, Casimiro

W. de J Martins,
;'.

Ascencao Jose Pinto

Guilherme

M. Goncalves

(the King of Atsabe),

Fernando Osorio Soares, Jose A.B. des Reis Araujo, Domingos Soares and Albuquerque M. Borges. After it became clear that FRETILIN did not send its
'yo

r~~resenta'tives,..the so-called Macau Meeting was changed into , a hearing, ,much like the ones held by a prime minister_elect at

"

the start of forming

a new government. the~efore that the meetings's outcome made at

It is understand~ble

bore no le~al validity compared with the usual decisions international. summit. d8M.be~ations. Nevertheless,the ~esults of the s~parate bilateral . hearings".be,tween.Lisboaan~ UDT and APODETI respectively

merit ....

attention because no mat~er how weak they were as agreecents, they could be' used ~t.le.8tas a base to gauge the meaning of

Page Six the current developments Before the decolonisation be pertectedwith in ~he Portuguese colony. a concept for

coming to Macau, Lisboa

had conceived

ot E$8t Timor. Atter Macau, the concept would the results ot the hearings with UDT and APODETI.
held prior' to their return to Portugal delegation stated, among the Lisboa

In a press conference atter the Macau Meeting,

other thingsth~t "The people choose their future political or inte~ation with Indonesia,
I

of Portuguese Timor will be free to status. If they want independence they may do so." delegates,

But from talks with various drawn (and this was later.also press) that the final decision problem but in the hands of the Central

a conclusion

could be

reported by the Hongkong and Macau pertaining to the Portuguese Timor parties It could Government of Portugal.

did not lie in the hands of the local political

be more accurately stated that the final word about the future of East Timor is thesole right ot the Revolutionary Council in Lisboa as the holder of the ultimate pOli.~r_inPortugal!': in Macau between the of the Some of the results of the: meetings

representatives of Lisboa, UDT and APODETI ar as follows: 1. fter the approval and ratification of the results Macau Meeting Forces by the Government Counail of Portugal through with ths Revolutionary Movement), be promulgated territory; 2. About three months (one hundred (and that would include for the decolonisation

consultations the Armed of the

a "Law for the Decolonisation

of Timor" will

as the foundation

days to be exact) after Law", the Governor of Dili

the promulgation

of the "Decolonisation

will be replaced by a "Hi~hCommissioner". The High Commissioner of Dili will nominate or telect five~offici~l~ to .assist him, with the title of "Adjunct \ the President of Portugal; Secretaries!!They will be appointed by

3. The High Commissioner and the five Adjunct Secretaries will be assisted by a body called "Government Council". Each,
politicalc.party in East Timor is entitled representatives,iinthe be forced to do
SOj ..

to appoint four Any' political party Council will not

Government

Council.

which refuses to participate

in.the Government

.'

4 . ~The,High .Commissioner, .the five Adjunct Secretaries and the members of the Government Council will be charged with the duty of preparing during a referendum to elect- members for a "Popular Assembly" Assembly Timor: or the third'week of October 1976. It is this Popular the political status of Portuguese a certain bond with Portugal

which later will decide independent integration

but still within with Indonesia.

Page Seven

Further information about the four points as the'resul the Macau Meeting indicated that should the majority of the Popular Assembly be represented by APODETI,Portuguese with Indonesia. as the outcome Timor old be automatically ~~e coopletion inte~rated Following of the Popular

of the integration

nsseobly decision, the High Commissioner of Dili would directly ~and over.sou."e~e;tgnty Over East Timor to APODETI. On the other hand if aDT mana~ed decision Portugal, Meeting , to dominate ~he Popular Assembly leading to a of in East of independence the government October for East Timor under the pr~tection of Portugal would not remain delegation

Timor beyond

1978. The Lisboa

to the Macau

had made it . clear that Portugal ,

had no ambition whatsoever

e~cept to leave East Timor in October 1978 at the latest. In response to the commitment made by the Lieboa representatives APODETI delegates stated that the tim~able could be shortened with the Republic

after APODETI

manag~d,to

carry out inte~ration

After ..he integration, Portugal could leave its t more than 400 years old colony ,as soon as possible. The FRETILIN Eroblem. boycotted the Macau Meeting created

of, Indonesia.

,The fact that ~RETILIN new problems main problem

th~t could not be solved until the end of 1975. The o~ourse was FRETTLIN's future role and participation implementation "of the decolonisation the following ma~ters: one of the Macau Meeting's, boycott of the meeting could be taken occasion during policy to it would be nece~sary

in the subsequent

for East Timor. To answer the question .take note of and to consider 1. sessions

Major Vitor Alves stated during of Portugal

that he would report the FHETILIN

to the government

so that firm actions

ag8in~t FRETILIN; 2. Ma~or Vitor Alves also stated on another the' Macau Meeting organisations that those who were once members

of banned

, like PIDE (Secret Police

of the Salazar regime

which was overthrown on April 25,1974) will not be permitted "to hold governmental and social positions". It had become a pUblic secret then, "both in East ~imor and in the international community, that almost all members of the FkE~ILIN leadership were members of PIDE, the secret police used by the dictatorship to terrorize in the from and to oppress the people; made by APODETI representatives which demanded activities that F~TILI~ should be barred

3.

'the statement

Macau Meeting all political

in East Timor, its boycott

including

the decolonisation

of the territory, following It would be proper participation will and~iscipline

of the Macau Meeting; that in its..

to note in this context

in the Macau Meeting,

APODETI had shown its good

by coming to the Meeting.

Page Eight will and discipline by being present in Macau on June 13 1975,

the originsl date for the opening of the meeting and later waited until the meeting actually took place on June Secause the final word pertaining to the Portuguese of Portugal Timor

rob:eo was. in the hands of the government

in Lisboa,

it woU:c only be fair to assume ,that responsibility

for ,the

F~'IlI:, -~i

problem

should

also be borne by Lisboa.

The world wanted

to know how f~r the government of Portugal. would go in bearing the' conseouences of the FrtETLLIN boycott after it became clear . that by doing so, FHETILIN violations of trust. had deliberately made big mistakes and

It wou.ld be important to note in that context that ]'l'(ETLLI.N stated it would not attend the Macau Meeting because it did not deem it necesaary. 'It reasoned that ultimately Portugal would leave East Timor. In the FKETILIN's view that would m~an .that what all the people of East Timor should db was just wait for the transfer of souvereignty without discussing it in Macau! as a phase by Lisboa

Bearing in mind that the Macau Meeting was designed in the process of decolonisation of East ~imor conceived and was based on the principle of its colony, FHE~ILIN , for the people

of the right of self-determination

it ~hould be clear that with its trampled on the. basic rights

stated position,

deliberately

ot .th$p~ople
. imperialism,

whom it claimed it.would free from the shackles of especially the people's right for self-determination was intended as the first step toward of that particular

because

the Macau Meeting

the implementation Timor.

right for the people of East of the people, with carried out a decolonisation its

Beside trampling boycott deliberate policy. and blatant

on the basic rights FRETILIN sabotage

of th~ Macau Meeting,

virtually

against Portugal's

It would only be proper

therefore

if Portugal

acte~ decisively

against FRETILIN. :At least it may be justly expected that Lisboa would disqualifyFRETILIN after its deliberate violations of the existing rules <;If)thegame by completely barring FRETILIN from taking a part in all and every activities related to the implementation of the decolonisation process of East Timor .. Such punitive .act .would be proper and fair, bearing in mind that

s:tterthe.:.incorporation of' th!t resul ta of the ~Macau Meeting into the decolonisation concept of the government of Lisboa, that concept w?uld.be made into 8 law for the decolonisation of East Ti~or as Lisboa'abasic rule.of the game iri its decolonisation policy, representing the fusion of ideas of the holders of power in Lisboa and those of UDT and APOD~TI which stuck to the rules of the game and attended therMacau Meeting.

Page Nine There were enough reasons act firmly against FRETILIN: FRETILIN had boycotted the Macau Meeting which meant that on the deliberately trampled on the right of self-determination for the government of Lisboa to

,1.
principle
..

(a) FRETILIN

for the people policy

of East Timor ann in so doing it also trampled which was the core of the decolonisation Portugal and (b) FRETILIN

of democracy decolonisation

of the government.of

sabotaged circumstances

Lisboa's

policy,

an act which undep normal

,could be fairly considered an act of rebellion or subversion 2. alm~st all the members of the FRETILIN leadership were former members ofPIDE, the secret pOlice under the overthrown dictator Salazar'who were prohibited from holding governmental at work which and/or social positions. But o~ours~
\

there were other factors Inevitably

could alter and or

..

sUQh line of reasoning. situation in Portugal

the political

constellation

at that time played

a role in de~er~ining

at least in influencing Lisboa's attitude. The most recent developments in Portugal then indicated that the influence of the Communists who . were beaten in the general elections turned out to be stronger thanks

to their, c~nspiracy with the military. The case of the REPUBLICA daily newspaper

which was owned by

the Socialists under Soares and wa~ hijacked by its Communist workers clearly showed that in the eyes of the Armed Forces Movement a~d the Revolutionary Council, the $ocialists (who won a.decisive victory in the general were soundly elections) beaten was the step-son while the Communists (who in the elections) w8s~the favourite son. The

~olicy of like and dislike became more apparent following the hijacking of the Catholic radio station by a small group of its Communist employees. station proceeded After its order to the Communist group to return the radio As the to its owners was ignored, to nationalize the Armed Forces Movement

all radio stations' in the country!

result of the military actio'n, the Catholic radio was freed from the hands of the Communists but it was not restored to the hands of the .

.~

Church! because Forces.

Besides, all the other radio stations lost their independence . of the Armed all must be placed in' the f al~..,.powe1':tull~':hand8 were inclined campaign to speculate that perhaps there was a Movement to control

People

consp~racybetween,the mount a concerted and dissemination of the military.

Communists

and the Armed Forces

to silence all means fo~ the expression

of opinion which were not under the complete \ in connection People wanted to know if perha~s

Such suspicion. was also aroused boycott of the Macau Meeting.

with the FRETILIN

.. ;. \ there was a conspiracy betweenthe,g~vernment of Portugal and.FRETILIN to provide the party with'~lthe;~:()pporttinit;r to boycott the Macau Meeting?

Page Eleven four were people of mixed blood and only one was an indigenous Timorese. He was the secretary of the Mayor of Dili who had no right His sole duty was to act as the to speak in 'the Macau Meeting.

UDT delegation secretary. As noted previously, as pre~ident of the 'party, Lopez da Cruz was not present at the Macau Meeting and up to July 3 1975 did not know the results of the deliberations because the party's delegation had not reported the meetings's results to him. On paper, the UDT's program looked quite impressive but the basic motive of its endeavours was its concern about the future of its members, whether espocially its leading members, should there be a change by FRETILIN or it

in the politic'al status of East Timor. East Timor became indenendent

It would make no difference as intended

choose integration 'with Indonesia as planned by APODETI,. it felt ,that the fate of, its members who almost all held governmental positions I both in Dili and the_outlying regions were in danger. Would the current resents pe still regents after the political change? And what about the current district officers? And so on, and so on . It was interesting by the UDT delegates in~ctober demooratio Indonesia to note in that, connection the Macau Meeting. the position held that attending They asserted

no matter what would result from the proposed 1975, UDT would accent party.

referendum

in East Timor

and honor it because UDT was a in Jakarta that,should

Meanwhile,

Lopez da Cruz als~ stated

resort to force in its interference

in th~48.oo1oni8a~ion.

of East Timor, he might call on'the people

of the region to "go to

mountains and mount a guerrilla warfare a~ainst Indonesia". But if the proposed referendum resulted in the integration of the re~ion ,with Indonesia, democratic UDT would accept it, once ap;ain because " UDT is a party".
\

During his proposed

tour of about three weeks to visit Taiwan,

Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, da Cruz carried with him photographs of the UDT demonstration on June 27

1975 (to support the Macau Meeting and to fight Communism .,.
Timor) which were quite impressive gatherings of people towns. surrounding the outlying loudspeakers parameter majority because UDT figures speaking

in East

they showed large in Dili and with East

It should be noted of course that an open car equipped Timor but anywhere else. What could perhaps

would easily attract a crowd not only in backward

be used as a relia~le

to gauge the real strength of its members were people

of UDT was the fact that the of mixed ancestry. about 650 in of '

The.population

of East Timor at the time numbered

thousand, with no more than 1 000 full-blooded Portuguese, represented by soldiers and government officials at all levels Dili and other towns. ~~xed blood the outlying

Then there were no more than 2 000 people

who were public servants of all levels, in Dili and areas. There were about 20 thousand Chinese in East

Pa~e Ten Such suspicion Portugal sources stemmed from the known fact that both FRETILIN as the real holder obtained of power in frDm several against FRETILIN and controlled intended by the Communists. information

and the Armed Forces Movement were influenced On April 1975 this writer in Dili that Lisboa

to take action

if enough ~vidence could be found that it was indeed controlled by Maoists. Such intention was quite likely because it had become a public power world. wanted secret in the international represented that whatever community that the holders of in Lisboa one of the biggest MOSGOW actions the government lobby in the of Portugal party

It follows

to take against FRETILIN

it would never amount to the from the political by FRETILIN In spite of had at least

total house-cleaning but merely everything, caused

to remove Communists

to rid it from the Beijing brand of Reds. the boycott of the Macau Meeting

itself to suffer since

its absence from Macau had spawned because the answers in Macau, three

questions. which placed

it in an akward position

would not do it any good. On June 18 1975 evening at the MAXIM restaurant

APODET~eading figures who had arrived in the city on June 13, namely GuilhermeM. Goncalves (the King of Atsabe), Casimiro Ascencao de Araujo Chinese and Domingo Pinto Soares held a press conference press in Macau station in Hongkong. attended by and a the representatives speaking of the Chinese-speaking

television

Answering. a question asked by this writer as an Indonesian .journalist covering the Macau Meeting, Casimiro stated firmly that . it was quite likely that .FRETILIN would not attend the meeting because it was afraid to face facts. On May 27 1975, the coalitioID between UDT and FRETILIN was unilaterally t dissolved by UDT, causing FRETILIN with UDT, FRETILIN to lose its real strength. political entity. Casimiro With no coalition

did not have \enough supporters

become a stron~ and significant th~t at the end of April all

also revealed

1975 it had-' become public knowledge members.of Amaral), Fernandes) the FRETILIN leadership,

in East Timor that almoS~ includin~ its president affairs

(Xavier

the secretary

general of the 'Preisidium (Alarico in charge of foreign the secret police

Jorge (Jose Ramos under

and its secretary

Horta) were once PIDE personnel, dictator Salazar!, Another mor~ important the party of half-breeds, Timorese no lass than

in Portugal

and interesting

fact was that UDT was mixed blood, in Dili in April lQ75,

the descendants

of people~f

and ,Portuguese. According

to sources

70 percent of the members of UDT were people of mixed


In its Presidium a n indigenous. that of the five the Macau Meeting, for instance, only

bloodl while almost all of its leaders, both in Dili and the outlying
regions ..ere of mixed ancestry. w the president, Lopez da Cruz, was

It would be proper members


'.

to note in this connection who attended

of ,the UDT central leadership

...

Page Twelve Timor. It could be safely indigenous following assumed then that there were at least in East Timor. of the Salazar dictatorship and

625 thousand in Portugal

people

In the past, until April 25 197~ when there was a revolution the coll~pse the wind of freedom blew in the Portuguese in the emergence of political parties overS8SS colonies resulting and APODETI a group from the

like UDT, FRETILIN

in East Timor, the half-bloods in the region constituted of people who deliberately kept themselves at a distance

indigenous people. Although they were not fully accepted by the (Portuguese) whites, they nevertheless were more inclined to assume a pO,ai.tion, closer to the whites. It.wasoDly after April 25 197~ that the people of mixed ancestry and enthusiastically so.ught a closer place to and of "found themselves"

integr~ted themselves with the ~ndigenous population. That change attitude could not fool the indigenous people "of course. They knew that the new attitude of the mixed-bloods in East Timor was not motivated be a change ancestry in the political status of.East Timor, those of mixed roots, without terra firma

by lofty ideals. They knew that should there

would become a people without

to stand on. Should

they declde .to abandon East Timor and migrate

to

Portugal, they knew they would be reJected because among the whites, racism against people of mixed blood was no less severe then racism against fully coloured people. From the point of view of the people. of mixed ancestry themselves, Portugal was also not very attractive due to its political and socia-economic climate. So it was quite understandable that after April 25,1974 the people of mixed ancestry in East Timor executed a U-turn and moved ~ closer to and united themselves with the indigenous people by posing themselves as leaders who would fight for the interests of the people.of people lesser
..

East Timor, ninety

percent

of whom were indigenous. people, it'would

The it

of mixed ~ncestry

rea1ised

that no matter how unsavoury prospect of

eould be to live among the indigenous of two evils, compared

still be the

with the unattractive

integrating themselves with the (Portuguese) .would not accept them. Viewed against such a background predict Timor, including the balloting
"

whites who they knew to 1976

it would be possible to be held colony.

what UDT would be able to gain from a referendum

in East

"

to elect members of thePopular the political

, , ....

proposed Assembly

in October

which later would decide

status of the Portuguese

Could a minority of only I 000 people of mixed ancestry (the majority of the members of FRETILIN were also half-bloods) who for more than 400 years themselves refused to consciously integrate and trust of mixed with the ... indigenous people win their sympathy would support the minority

so that those indigenous"peop1e the feet of white colonialists

who had been fed up living under

Page Thirteen ancestry who had white blood running FRETILIN Even before leaving Jakarta ~or Dili on April 23, 1975, this writer told Jose Ramos Horta and Alarico Jorge Fernandes who became his travel companioDs'from Jakarta to Dili that he intended to stay in Dili until after May 1,1975 'because he wanted to see the May 1 in their veins?

.,

Rally in Dili which according to the two FRETILIN leaders would be the first International Labour Day in 400 years to be held in the Portuguese colony. at least four meetings preparations Presidium held since April 25 to discuss Prior to May 1, Horta and Alaricoattended of the FRETILIN for the May Day Rally at the Dili soccer field. One day before the event, this writer made an appointment with an official of the Indonesian Consulate in Dili to cover it. But on May 1, at S in the morning, Alarico Jorge Fernandes, Secretary General of the FRETILIN Preiiidium,:came to visit this writer at 'the hotel to agl!lj talk about FRETILIN the FRETILIN and himself. General In response to a question by this writE to Secretary said that he was not interested of him.

attend the May Day Rally because there ,he would meet with what he called , "the group of radicals" who were suspicious Asked where Horta was, Alarico said that the day before~Horta left ~or the interior and quite likely would not attend the event too. Alarico did not leave the ~ hotel until 11. This writer he found there. , In the middle of the soccer field severa~osters were placed with various slogans, including one expressing refusal against integration with Indonesia. in unorderly On the podium a cluster of people sat listening to the to , another who w~s standing scattered speech and occasionally and made a speech. In front of the podium listening responded non~chalantly. was later driven by the Consulate driver what to the site of the May Day Rally and was quite surprised to see

small groups stood people

The usual atmosphere

of a RALLY was completely lacking. No orderly lines of people usually seen in such events were seen. What was in sight were just small .groups of people standing in front of the podium occasionally shouting in in ,response to the speaker. And according .by this writer, Dili, that morning. to the careful count 'made Day

less than 300 people attended

the May Day Rally

..

It was the very first International

ILabour

celebration FRETILIN,the

in Dili in the last 400 years. political

And it was staged by attended

party which claimed to be the most progressive in East Timor. And not even 300 people Consulate who managed

and most revolutionary

it!

. Mr.Subtjlgdj~:;ofthe Indonesian ,
'", ")

to shoot

a reel of pictures of the "Rally" told this writer later that according to his count no more than 250 people were there.

Page Fourteen On the side lines there were seversl tens of peQple but they came only as onlookers. It would be impo~tant Fernandes, Secretary to note the(~act of the Central that Alarico Jorge Committee of the FRETILIN

General

did not attend the "Rally" because this writer at his hotel. road near the beach, driving

since 8 in the morning he visited

About a quarter of an hour later, on the around town, this writer saw Jose Ramos T-shirt riding;piggy-back noon.

Horta wesring white pants and a blood-red

..

with someone ona motorcycle heading West. It was 11:30)near People were forced to think It it turned out that FRETILIN

could not move people to stage

s rally, how would be its chances in marshalling support of the masses to win a reterendum? The behaviour ot its leading figures like Alarico responsibility Horta himself 10:001 and Horta spawned disturbing questions. What about their from as l~aders? Later this writer found out directly that morning himself

that he overslept

and did not get up until within FRETILIN

Alarico who always presented

as a moderat~

did show signs of doubt since several days before the "rally". After seeing the facts: in Jakarta and the area between Jakarta and Bandung, including his visits to some of Indonesia's I atter' exchenging;',ideas with the Indonesian indust~ial projects and leaders, Alarico I s doubt

grew more intense. That morning when he should have been at the_ "rally". he was with this writer at the hotel to discuss the future ot East Timor and his own. He was simply not interested to attend the May

Day celebration
Carvarino". also sutfered

which he termed lithe business of extremists like Aside from the tacts about the "rally", FRETILIN

t~om l-wlAiDfej similar to the one that plagued UDT. 90 percent of the followers ot FRETILIN were people of mixed ancestry.
Among the members \ of its Central' Committee ,except Alkatiri only Xavier Amaral was a Timorese and Hamish native. who were of Arab origin,

The rest were all Portuguese halt-bloods. Pertaining both Horta and Alarico admitted on several occasions was the only one who had real influence .quite straightforward to the people be different occasion, of the interior, stated:

to that fact, that Xavier Amaral

among the people. Horta was to me. It would On another will be

about the matter when he said "If I make a speech they would not listen

with Xavier. He is very influential."

Horta openly

"Without Xavier, FRETILIN

"

finished. It is meaningless." Xavier Amaral was the President

I
of FRETILIN. He was small with

fierce eyes reminding people of Bung Tomo, the leader of the armed confrontation against the coming British forces in Surabaya during the first months of the Indonesian Independence which ledto the

Heroes Da] celebrated annually personality and when he talked Many years ago he studied

o.nNovember 10. He was a man of ten~e about FRETILIN he sounded very spirited . in Macau and was about to be

at a seminary

Page Fifteen ordained a priest. There was no information about what caused him

to back off.When

the wind of freedom blew in East Timor following

the revolution in Portugal on ,April 25 1974, Xavier Amaral entered politics and was one of the founders of FRETILIN which at the outset was a social-democratic movement. Later seven Timores8 'students 'who spent several years studying at various tertiary educational institutions in Lisboa returned to East Timor. During their tenure in Lisboa views political they were influenced by to extremist-radical turn FRETILIN and when they returned party home they managed

.'

into a radical

According to several sources, including two FRETIDIN secret documents, the change from a social-democratic movement to 8 Front for the Liberation of East Timor with the acronym FRET~LIN was the result of Jose Ramos Horta's efforts during his visit to Australia.

According to one of__he secret documents, during his stay in Australia ~ Horta was involved in meetings with a Chinese official representing Communist China in Canberra. movement oolony The Chinese.suggested to.Horta that the movement That was social-democratic of the Portuguese which aspired to fight for the independence into a liberation into PRETILIN. (Social-Democratic Front for the

should be turned from ASDT

like the ones in Africa

and its name changed

the story of the transformation

Assooiation of Timor) into FRETILIN, the Liberation Independenoe of the Eastern part of Timor

. That ofJourse w~uld not suffice to establish beyond doubt~that FRETILIN was a Communist organisation or one controlled by the Communists in East ,Timor. To arrive at such conclusion several matters should be taken into consideration. secret document dated October 18, 1974 clearly Beside that, to revolutionizt They

A FRETILIN

discussed the education o!~FRETILIN cadres in Marxism. two of the returning Timorese students who left Lisboa \ FRETILIN were members of PCP, the Communist

Party of Portugal.

,were Antonio Carvarino and,Abilio. Abilio's wife, Gui~hermina Abilio, was known as a Portuguese woman who accompanied her husband in his campaigns Timorese dress chewing beatle , "Exactly oommented forFRETILIN
I

in East Timor's barefoot

interior

areas

wearing

and walking

and squatting

on the ground

nuts just like a native woman. like a GERWANI agitprop (the women Wing of th~ former Communist (ap;itation-propaganda) Consulate registered in Lisboa! activist." of the in Dili. And

Party of Indonesia)

an official

of the Indonesian

Guilhermina was officially Communist Party of Portugal Aocording to several

as a "sympathiser"

sources in Dili later,

one of the students,

Hamish Basarewan who was of Arab origin, was also an activist of the PCP (Communist Party of Portugal). Meanwhile another secret document obtained from the Chinese ,
.

(almost all of them Kuomintangs,

Nationalist

Chinese)

community

in

Page Sixteen Dili revealed associated .,Chinese by the name of Lim Kian Yung who was During the not too distant past he was Committee of FRETILIN. in Dili to of the Uentral

with FRETILIN.

in charge of the finances (soap Chinese)

The man who owned a soap .factory and was known as "Cina Sabaun" once circulated a letter among the Chinese and other centers FRETILIN. including in East Timor, e~horting them to give support

Information was also obtained from the Chinese in Dili, the COD8u1>-of Taiwan, that Lim Kian Yung also acted as China to that Reds .

.'

go-between co~necting FRETILIN and a source in Communist channel funds to finance the activities of FRETILIN The FRETILIN Central Committee figures adamantly

denied

their party was controlled by Communists within their rank and file . Horta and.Alarico conceded

or that therew.re

there were radical

elements within

FRETILIN. Tpey were ,the Timorese students who returned from I,isboa and took part in the party's campaigns. Horta always tried to create the impression that they had no influence among the masses. "'J!hey do not know the realities among the people. 'l'hey talk in a language not understood by the people. They have no inlfluence whatsoever, among the peop'le." said liorta everyftime he was asked about the students, who had nurtured the revolutionary character of the , party. Alarico uommittee said there were two opposing ~he moderate students moderates. talked twice to of his was on group which groups within the Central himself Basarewan Amaral Oarvarino,
of FHETILIN.

group which included included

and liorta. And the radical and the other returning was among the FRETILI~ While staying Xavier

from Lisboa.

He: said Xavier

in Dili for ten days, this writer

Amaral. 1~e first meeting was held at the front veranda ~he second encounter

house one evehinguntil late at night. \ a sidewalk in the middle of Dili. The first impression ambitious apout Xavier

Amaral was that the man was for the first time in

but not realistic.

lie appeared

East Timor polit;cs in April 1974. ~he most important thing for He was not too Xavier was the independence of Portuguese Timor. deeply concerned about other things associated with the management

of a free country.

The fact that Portuguese

Timo~, with its 650 000

people, 90 percent of whom were illiterate and with an:sunual per capita income less than US$30 was to Xavier no problem in the formation of sn independent in Portuguese nation. lie was, also not concerned about the fact that provide exports Timor there were no industries exchange; no paved roads, agriculture which'could

enough work for the people; to earn foreign of foodstuffs Taiwan the towns; no fairly proper

t~at, there were no significant

even third class connecting to support the production from Hong Kong,

80 that the people needed not to depend, 8S they


(Kupang).

did until then, on the import of the commodity and Indonesia

'Page Seventeen Pressed with the question Timor gained independence Xavier Amaral only vaguely about what he would do to provide and shelter claimed after Portuguese it so, . countries get the it would make

the people with enough food, medicines as FHETILIN

said there must be friendly Talking to Xavier one would dangerous countries,

which would come to his aid. and aupport from friendly

Amaral about aid inevitably about the friendly about

impression that he was entertaining future of East Timor. Diseussinc countries shell, Xavier

thoughts

the',lssuer.ofaid and support

from would-be

with Xavier

Amaral, one also got the impression saying goes. His h~rizon

his narrow-mindedness indeed. Meanwhile for Communism dangerous

and that he was like a frog under the coconut was very limited claimed that the door Alarico Jopge ~ernandes

as the Indonesian was a modera~e, without


I ..

although

it beqame clear that he was opening understanding

or wish to fight it as a

ideology ...

~ccording to Xavier's fantasies (this _~.8the mo~t ~ppropriate phrase that could be applied to him because as a politician who was expected to be i-ealistic,.Xavier Amaral clearly lived in the air with his head stuck among the clouds and his feet not on the ground) after East Timor became independent to make it so, A~strali8, as FHETILIN promised it would fight and Communist China, the Philippines

Singapore would bestow independe~t East Timor with economic and other aid~. Obviously Xavier thought that Independent EAst Timor wi~h FRETILIN ~s its architect would be of so great significance in South East Asia that the countries he mentioned would place such great interest in it and would be willing completely refused Australia to give aid to it. that for the sake of to maintain . and of with the RepUblic interested Xavier to understand

its own security, Indonesia adventure people further

was vitally

even to improve its good~neighbourly an~ that Australia

relations

would not enter into a political

in East Timor that could hurt the feelings the interests

ot the .Indonesian
state. Ue umbrella

or even endanger refused

ot

the Indonesian

to comprehend

that as the result

of deve19pments it from the North.

in Indo Uhina, Indonesia for Australia Australia relations considering

would become a more important the dangers threatening

would therefore and cooperation

use all its resources ,to strengthen its with Indonesia and that it would not be

likely that Australia would do something that could endanger those relations and cooperation. Australia must also be aware that an independent state as fantasiZed by F~T1LI~ would inevitably

need foreign aid and that it would open the door tor the major countries in the world, the Soviet Union and 00mmunist 0hina in particular, to gain a foothold for their influence in the region. That would pose a direct threat for Indonesia because of Timor'a vitally strategic meaning to Indonesia's defense. Stealthily stabbed

there ~rom.the

eastern half, Indonesia would be wounded

at a very

Page Eighteen tender part of its body! During one of his conversations with this writer, Xavier Amaral admitted that he must be very careful in accepting aid from other countries because said as the saying goes, even to plant a new one should heed his neighbour's opinion. eid he would not be rash in accepting But on another occasion tree in his own garden, That was why Xavier from a uommunist hurt Indonesia's "But if educating country

for East ~imor because he knew it would he openly said: so that they would become cleverer is considered vommunist; if providing vommunist; well, I do not

feelings. the people

and more aWa~e of their rights enough food and clothing care."

is considered

At the height of a heated

discussion

with this writer, Xavier on the table and almost

finally laid his true cerds aboutvommunism

shouted: "l do not believe FREJ.'ILli~ controlled by Communists is end I am not a Communist. But I will not fight the O_o~mu~istsor:_ C,ommunism. n Horta who was frequently communism communist into FRETELIN, reported created
.,u_'

as ana of the o~rri.rs

of

speculations

about his true self. his inclination to

There were reports that in his apartment posters and banners.

room in Dili there were

But considering

enjoy jokes and to joke, his tend~ncy good life, there was reason to wonder

toward loose living and the whether Horta was a comm~nist.

What could be near the t~uth was that as an ambitious man who longed for a high position in the government or an'independent state in East Timor, Horta was prepared with just about everyone to accept help from and to cooperata the Communists, like the Timorese

inCluding

students who re~urned to Dili from Lisboa. Perhaps he "knew, but then perhaps he did not know oneottthe~ra~r~~.m~nist traits, namely its inclinat10nto take advantage of the national aspirations of others for its pwn benefi~, or perhaps Horta thought he could take advantage of the communists for tbe ,benefit-'ofhis own ambition. If so, Horta obviously was not aware that if a man goes to bed with the most likely accident that could a cobra under his blanket,

happen during the night wes that the snake would bite the man end not the man bites the sneke! Anyway' Horta se~f-discipline and militancy did not reflect something that could be accepted as proof that he wa~ a Communist. During the May Day "rally" in Dili on May 1, 1975 which began at 9 in the morning, Horta was still asleep in his apartment room and later near noon appeared in the street and not among the no1~y:'people gathered at the soccer field. And during his visits in Jakarta and Bandung in April 1975, Horta created the perfect image of a Don 'Juan. In ,his eyes every woman he saw was beautiful and attractive, either in the night-clubs 8D,di'steambaths he visited or those who kept him company at the hotels where he stayed.

'8

r~-----------------:-
Page Nineteen
"
.'

:-:-.------;--~---------

------.-

According fifties,

to the observation like Horta,

made by this writer especially

since the

there was among the communists, a strict

those occupying it was

. leading positions

code about women. Womanizing because

was co~sidered-taboo

among the1eading.comm~nists

considered one of the weaknesses that could destroy their image in the eyes of the people and their followers. If the communists wanted to rid this world of the bourgeOisieFnd capitalists who like to . eXploit women as playthings, it would only be fitting if refraining from indulging leaders. in the same practices should be a must for communist

While associating with Horta in Jakarta and Bandung, this write~ found out that :Horta did not adhere to such a code and that he
I '

gave free reign:to

his sexual desires,

day and night.

That was why jokingly and Jose Ramos norta that issue, let Alarico become Indonesia ladies

this writer tp1d A1arico Jorge Fernandes after the solution of the East Timor "the 27th Governor. of the Republic of

in Dili", :while Horta should be made"Ambas8ador

to Monaco" from Dili as .'

where he could relax and enjoy the company of as many beautiful as he likea. As a matter of fact until his depa~ture this writer continued to address intensity Alarico in early May 1975 happened While

"Mister Go.vernor"..od Horta as "Mister. Ambassador". s in Bandung which indicated kain Horta's standing

An incident in womanizing. in Eyeing

in front of a sto~e he saw a young lady dressed and kebava who waa indeed very beautifur. Horta said easily: APODETI!"

the. traditional

her with desire and naughtily smiling, get a wife like that, well, I'll join

"If I could

It turned out that A1arico Jorge Fernandes the governor seriously. of the 27th prov~nce He wanted to know whether following

took the joke about of Indonesia very of the inte~ation

of the Republic

East Timor w~th the Republic of ,Indonesia, the ~egion could enjoy the status of a province with certain autonomous rights. This writer informed entitled province him that as a province to elect their own and regencyor.municipa1 the people of East Timor would be assemblies, and regents at"both the or mayors levels and that therel2:ion would the existence legislative

have the right to elect its own governor Considering of the Portuguese language,

some unique facts in East Timor, for instance

as a new province tip of Sumatra.

East Timor would be in Central Alarico Suddenly,

given the status of s Special District Java and Aceh at the northern exclaimed

like Yogyakarta

"Should .anyone know that I discuss

su()h~.metterawith you, that Alarico

I would definitely be stamped a "tr~idor" , s traitor." Even while still in Jakarta there were indications had started ito-change his mind about Portuguese

Timor and Indonesia.

One got the impression that after his visits to Jakarts and Bandung, A1arico's ideas about FRETILIN had undergone drastic transformations. During the heated discussion between this writer and Xavier Amaral

Page Twenty:-one no firm ground to stand on for:a Portuguese-Timorese and that he or she would always float between sky as the saying_goes blood anywhere at LIPNUR
...

half cast

the earth and the

in Indonesia>just

like all people with mixed used for his joy flight in Bandung, Alarico

in this world. off the GELATIK aircraft industry

After stepping

(nowNUSANTARA),:lsircratt ...

spontaneously expressed his wish to learn to fly in Indonesia so But that in the future.he could work as a pilot in Indonesia

during

quiet moments

at the front veranda

of his brother's

house

facing the se~ one night when he was apparently worried in face of the' confrontation between the moderates and the radicals within his party, Brazil Alarico suddenly said that he might decide to migrate to and settle there. Such was the contrast between Alarico Jorge and Jose Ramos Horta. for quite some time made preparations should his effgrt~ to _.~ East Timor meet with failure. to

Fernandes

"Horta had apparently become an important

create his second front for his retreat . man in Independent

His trips to Australia, twice that year, were apparently not onJy in the interest of hi~ party, namely to seek support for FRETILIN from the communists and leftists in Australia, but also his own. With no longer close family ties with his mother and'younger sister and brother in Dili, it~~Uld. be much easier for Horta to leave

everything associated with him and move to another country as .. a migrant. UDT President Lopez da Cruz stated during his interview the news agency ANTARA in Jakarta in/earlY July 1975 that should Indonesia invade Portuguese Timor he might go to the mountains as a guerrilla fighter. When this writer da Cruz laughed became interjected "But I think Horta would not go to the mountains. and settle there.", The FRETlLIN Horta would go to Australia and said he a~reed with the idea. after'the revelation

position

more difficult

about the membership ot alm~st all of its C~nt~al Co~mittee leading figures in the secret police of the former Salazar dictatorial regime. If the three factors were combined , namely that FRETILIN allowed itself to be used as an instrument by Maoists, that~almost all of its leaders were people of mixed ancestry and' that they were former lackeys at the dreaded. dictatorship which terrorized ~n:l oppressed the people, then the face of FRETILIN became very unattractive indeed for the people of East Timor. Both FRETILINleaders UDT figures like daCruz like Xavier, and Mounsinho Alarica and Horta and said that basically it was

difficult for communism to flourish in East Timor. A certain part of the population, .about 30 percent, were Roman Catholics. A small number of them, only several hundred, were Muslims. There were also Buddhists and Protestans in smaller numbers. The majority of the people still adhere to believe in the spirit of their ancestors or animism.

Page Twenty-two Anyway, the political Portuguese Timor believed super-natural, ~.aaders admitted in something that the people of

above them, something

no matter what the unseen power is called: God,

Allah or whatever. In short, the people of the re~ion is religious and it would be difficult for them to accept Communism which denies spiritual things. of a paramilitar'y unit in chapter in the area told this in town and later during a talk

Alfonso do.s Santos, the captain Liqui~a and chairman of the FRETILIN writer during lunch at a restaurant

that lasted mor~ than two hours in his house at the edge of Liqui~a (about 35 KM from Dili, almost two hours by Toyota jeep, over unpaved road, most of it no more than a beaten wheel vehicle and crossing rivers of East Timor would fight against had no knowledge about communism. path wide enough for a fourthat the people that he told in the in Liqui~~ He admitted with no bridges) communism. But the Chinese teaChing

him that communism 'is the most wicked

pr ideology

world and' that it advooate,::"" 'abolition of private property, the the destruction of the family ~Y8tem and the denial of God. That was why Santos claimed he was anti-communist and that if there were communists in his party, especially in the Central Committee of FRETILIN, 'as the FRETILIN'regional leader in Liqui~a, Alfonso dos Santos would move his followers to fight the Central Committee. The discussion with the regional FRETILIN within the FRETILIN line of command. leader showed the ,disarray was that

As a matter of fact the main impression

about FRETILIN

inls pi. t,"e,of its roar~ng voice about independence and its radical-revolutionary pretenses, the no-more-than-one-year old party with Xavier leaders without experience in national movement, turned out to societies~ have no party line or program usually answer this writer's simple question: found in advanced

Amaral, Ramos Horta and Alarico Fernandes

all could not

what would you do to provide

the people with foo~, clothing, education and medicine after East Timor became independent as you cls1med you would fight to make it so? Or considering actually Center abandoned During other events, the three FRETILIN their pronciples about FRETILIN. members Studies of the Indonesian (CSIS) in Jakarta with the that it ot East leaders had

a meeting with six leading and International

for Strat~gic

in late April 1975 for instance, realities in Portuguese would be difficult to wed

after being pressed

Timor, Jose Ramos Horta admitted

the idea 8bout the independence

Timor with the current realities in the region. suggested that Indonesia should launch peaceful and ,to boost the standard Timor so that one morning and feel they are already

He was so open and efforts to educate

of living of the people of Portuguese "the people would awake from their sleep Indonesians.", without integration or

Page Twenty-three other efforts. Indonesian To achieve that goal, Horta suggested that the and

government

should as soon as possible

carry out large-

scale efforts with the aim of creating

more and more education

health facilities in Portuguese Timor and that Indonesia should give economic aid to improve the daily living standard of the people of the region. He called sehool children in Portuguese hospitals study in Indonesian of the Republic scarce. Finally FRETI1IN efforts. rejoice." Horta also admitted discussions the Republic solution peacefully Timor and late~'in during that meeting and subsequently of Portuguese during with this writer of Indonesia in Kupang prior to entering Portuguese Timor with on the Indonesian students government to bring Timor to schools and university schools from Portuguese

and universities

beside building

Timor. Horta

also made the suggestion

to the government centers and were still the

of Indonesia

to help build more health such facilities Studies

in Portuguese

Timor because

in front of the managing and International in charge of foreign

staff of the Indonesian (CSIS) in Jakarta, succeed affairs openly declared: in those of Portuguese Timor I would.

Center for Strategic Secretary "As a FRETILIN member

I would be sad if you gentlemen

But for the sake of the people

Dili that the integration colony.problem

would be the most logical andcorrect as long as it was done by APODETI. right now, ignoring and not in the manner propagated with Indonesia conditions

for the Portuguese and gradually

"APODETI wants

inte~ration

the fact that socio-economic

in the eastern part of the asserted Horta.

island is not ready for such development." That was why he suggested three year transition

that there should be at least

two or

period during which Indonesia

should be allowed

to carry out its;peacetul and developmental efforts in Portuguese Timor until ohe moment in the future there would be no alternative for the people Horta's o~ the colony but integrate with Indonesia. Timor was virtually with this writer at

ideas about the future of Portuguese

supported by Xavier Amaral during the discussions his house one night in late April 1975. "You talk so much about democracy

and the right of self-determinati

for the ~eople of this region. Now, it in the end, democratically and they decide as the implementation of the right ot self-determination, to integraie with the.~epublic this writer pinned'him. Without doubt the FRETILIN President replied: "I am not against that. As long as it is done peacefully." But a few monents later he added: "I am not against inte~ration with Indonesia
Iprovided

of Indonesia,

what would you say?"

it was done after the peonle become more

educated, more aware of their democratic rights. But I think that would be difficult. It would be difficult to achieve inte~ration

Page Twenty-four after the people knowledge of this region are better rights." educated and have more

about their political

What Xavier had in his mind was o~ourse opposed to the elemental teachings of democracy, but he deemed it necessary to add the last statement to his pronouncements if only to cover up the serious leak i~ his own ideas when pinned into a tight corner he finally gave
"

up and admitted

that integration

was the best availlable

solution

for the Timor problem. Alarico's ideas did not differ much from Horta's. Without exports, without His were even it state

more open and' realistic. would be impossible to proclaim

industries,

to develop

East Timor into an independent

in the true sense of the word. He further independence ask for food, clothes and schools,

said that it would be easy the people

but when after the proclamation

what could be done? He deplored

the radical elements within his party, who he said refuse~ to recognise "A politician realities and he endo;,sed this writer's opinion that must be realistic. His head may float among the clouds, but his feet must be planted on the ground of reality." During the last meeting in Dili, one day before this writer left Portuguese Timor for Jakarta, Alarico expressed his wish to resign from his party. " H6rta, who would leave for~Australia his resignation as Secretary on May 5, had tendered affairs of FRETILIN. It in charge of foreign

After he is gone I will be the only o~e to oppose the radicals. would be better for me to resign now." He'said morosely.

"NoJRico. You must not do that. In Indonesia we would say you had jumped into the atreamlong ago and you are now in the water up'to your chest. You must not retreat. Either way you are already wet

a :third quari{er.of.,your bo~y. You must stay to block tpe radicals. The world is placing its hope for a peaceful solution for the Timor problem on people like you moderates." this writer counseled him. is getting worse. and that they Alarico did not utter "You maybe Yesterday thousands I received

word for quite a while and then he said: within FRETILIN from my men in Baucau that several their membership is my turf! Before

right. But the situation reports

of our members had discarded to APODETI.

later defected

And to think that Baucau

coming to Dili to settle I lived in Baucau there."

and helped build FRETILIN quitely visited the that beside the APODETI there was also to the they According

Two days prior to that when this writer headquarters membership APODETI of APODETI in Dili, he observed following membership .cards stacked neatly

the alphabet, cards.

a large carton full of FRETILIN official

on duty there, those cards belonged membership

to people who

were once forced to accept FRETILIN

but recently

submitted their cards to APODETIto: shQw they were .. members. of no FRETILIN and that on the' other hand they asked to be registered as

APODETI members. One week later after returning informed members by reliable sources in Baucau had defected to Jakarta, this writer was was telling

that a week before, 4 000 FRETILIN to APODETI. So Alarico

the truth when he complained about the ~aucau incident. The collapse of the FRETILIN membership involving l.arge numbers ot people was followed by the abolition of the short-lived UDTFRETILIN coalition which was unilaterally done by UDT and other embarrassing incidents like the public beating~of Carvarino by a group of UDT members and the subsequent rescue of Carvarino's wife by a group of APODETI activist men who sheltared her in the house of an APODETI by a member and another public beating, this time of Alarico

of UDT at Dili airport. According Indonesian to Lopez da Cruz (who is now a member Advisory Council in Jakarta), Alas. the would-be of the assassin did not Supreme Alarica gave someone

money to kill an APODETI member.

only fail to carry out the conntract, he went to see ~is'would-be victim and told; him about the whole plan. On the day the UDT delegation was to depart from Dili airport for Macau, Alarico also

came to the airport and came face to face with the man he ordered to be killed. A'heated argument broke out followed by a fist fight. When at a certain monent during the fight Alarico was about to kick his smaller and shorter adversary. the UDT man grabbed Alarico's Secretary le~ and smashed' him to the floor. The well-bodied General was forced to leave in shame. II A FRETILIN top leader fought in public. to his dignity.1I said da Cruz. It was indeed difficult of the people in Portuguese as a defensi\ve manoeuvering With its crushed dignity of Portuguese to imagine how FRETILIN Timor. Its boycott fared in the eyes of the Macau Meeting FRETILIN

It waa devastating

appeared, more like an act of escapism and officials its own apparently came to realize

in the eyes of the people

Timor. FRETILIN

weakness and felt that it did'not have enough spirit and strength to come face to face inrMacau with :the.1representa.t.ives. the of government now. APODETI Although appear like UDT and FRETILIN, Timor politics were recorded APODETI did not officially until April 1974, its stru~~les of Portugal, UDT and APODETI, the latter two its enemies

in Portuguese

and aspirations April 1974. Martins, 26 years the people's

since a long time ago, long before of APODETI at that time spent in in 1959.

who waa vice-President prison uprising

in a Portuguese

in East Timor after his failure colonisation

against Portuguese

Page

~enty-six

And Guilherme figure

Goncalves,

the King

of Atsabe,

was a prominent But

of ,rebellion who had long fought main streng~h , is'

the Portuguese.

APODETI's

the fact that almost

all of its

members and sympathizer~ as well as its whole areas and at all levels were Timorese natives.

leadership in all There were no

half-breeds among its e~tirehcie~~ership. " The people of mixed ancestry may say what told the people Timor, they wanted for the freedom of the people.

they like.

They them.

to fight for the independence crowd

of East

Thev could not deceive blood in tneir to us, the this

We told the people: natives. veins. natives

the UDT and FRETILIN

are not Timorese

They are half-casts

with Portuguese

They do not own this island.

It belongs

of Timor. Only we can fight for the inte~estsof

region." said Casim~~o laughing. In a press conference in Macau


..

on June 18, 1975, responding , "Why'does stated APODETI :" Before Casimiro firmly

to a question want

asked by a IIdmgkong-based reporter with Indonesia?", came to that part of the world, an integral including to colonise

integration island,

the white people undivided or Indonesia. followed

Timor was a wliole, Nusantara of The Portuguese So the people

part of what was called part of Timor.

Then came the Dutch the eastern

the other parts

the archipelago,

the western

and colonised

part of the island~

of East Timor wa;s kept separate from the people of We~t Timo1:'"by Western colonialism. At the be~inning we were one nation. From Aus~st 17, 1945, the other parts of Indonesia, including the western part of.Timor, became independent. Now Indonesia has become a more advanced independent nation. who remained under Portuguese We in the eastern part of the island colonialism for so long want to return

to our familr'fold, the Indonesian family. That's why APODETI wants to inte~rate Portuguese Timor with the Republic of Indonesia in order that the eastern from the western archipelago, part of T~mor which for 400 years had been severed

part of the island and from t~e rest of the Indonesian Indonesia." truth about East Timor! for more then a part of Indonesia location. of the Island of Timor Which was indeed

could be,reunified'with of the Island

That~3is'~the~',truth,he ultimate t The eastern'part 400 years since time remained immemorial a Portuguese archipelago

colony

and was situated

at an important

rr

the Indonesian

were a human body,

Timor was not an ear, the nose, a'knee'"or an elbow. a vit~l part on the Indonesian~body~' wound would be serious, threatening reporters "Would. Indonesia attending

Timor constitutes there, the bodyl one

If it is stabbed and endangering

the whole Timor?" who was

use force to annex Portuguese as an Indonesian to annex

of the:Macau-based Chinese

asked this writer

the press conference


,

reporter Portuguese Timor

"Indonesia

would

not use anything

--------------------~..

I
.

.-

Page Twenty-seven because, truthfully, Indonesia Timor, does not have the slightest means." answered which that the Republic Pancasila, to honour desire

.to annex Portuguese He further democracy. own future

by whatever journalist called

this writer. of Indonesia includes the right their

told 'the Chinese Hence Indonesia's to~the

was based on the five principles of any nation Consequently, Timor. or any people Indonesia

firm committment anywhere democratic

in the world

to determine

according

rules of the game. ambitions toward Portuguese to

has no territorial if the people

On ,the other hand,

of East

Timor decide

reunify themselves with the rest of the Indonesian peoplft, Indonesia would welcome ,the decision with open hands. That would only be natural, because no one would refuse a brother or a sister who wishes to return to the family Talking fold after being separated again about the big family,
,-

by alien forces about rejoining

for so long. the family,

that was the main theme in APODETI's struggle, a theme based on ... '.. historical, cultural and geographical, considerations ~hi~h placed the people of East Timor as a part of the Indonesian nation. That was also the subject discussed by this writer and Xavier Amaral in Dili. In February and several mounted and March

1975 small disturbances


in Portuguese against and houses~even terrorists APODETI

broke out in Dili gangs of and supporters. residence or

other centers

Timor when FRETILIN activists the official wrote

a campaign priest,

of terror

On the walls ,of buildings a Catholic writi~gs, traitors. family

the FRETILIN

slogans.8nd~ther TRAIDORES, APODETI's aspiration as an act bond

some of those condemning By that they meant with Indonesia against and to

what they termed activists. return

APODETI

to inte~ate of treason with

into the fold of the big the people,

was interpreted

by FRETILIN

as selling

the people

of East Timor. but still within aspiration a certain APODETI's to integrate

" UDT wants Portugal

to be independent

and it rejected

theregionrith Indonesia. 'FRETILIN wanted full independence for this region as a souvereign state and opposed integration with Indonesia. So both UDT and FRETILIN of the people the western rejected the idea about the reunification comp8tr~9ts_liying:on of of Portuguese Timor with their

part.,of Timor and the other parts. of the Republic

Indonesia. UDT and FRETELIN went even further. They branded APODETI which merely aspired to reunify the 'people who were once separated by Western Like claimed FRETILIN people colonialism as TRAIDORES, traitors. Try ~o think and FRETELIN is that UDT and of the of flag. any quietly. the people of APODETI, Timorese. accept the followers of UDT

they were refused~to

But the difference

the idea about the reunification of East Timor with and sisters. a separate

of.the

Portuguese

colony

the people

Indonesia, independence

who are their brothers said it wanted

UDT said it wanted nation without

but still under the protection to build

of the Portuguese

And FRETILIN

--------.-----.-.,

Page

Twenty-eight Only APODETI nation. wanted to' be reullitied,with now tell me: who are to return to the of

links with Indonesia. the TRAIDORES? family pinning

its root, the Indonesian The people

Well, Xavier, who wanted

of APODETI

fold, the family

of the Indonesian the idea?"

nation?

Or the people "We

UDT and FRETILIN

who rejected

this writer

asked Xavier,

him down. He never

gave a firm answer,

saying only:

only want to follow in the footsteps of our broth,ers and sisters in Indonesia. They had fought against Dutch colonialism and became an independent nation. gain independence." Betore interjected: " The situation when they confronted faced by our brothers colonialists and sisters in Indonesia ~rom the Dutch were different We in East moved Timor also want to fight to

th~ discussion

to other matters,

this writer

the situation faced.by our brothers and s{ste~s in East Timor now. We in Indonesia then had to really wr~8tleindependence from the Dutch. people. Portugal had d~clared its willingness to leave East status Timor and to submit the region's independent, inte~rate independent. future and political if you really to the to

The easiest way for you, yourselves

want to become namely who are already

would be the one suggested with your brothers be the easiest That would

by APODETI, and sisters

and safest way." supporters was the

There was.~no guarantee had understood and FRETILIN it.

that the whole mass of APODETI that bound them together of Timorese natives who for hundreds party

The main thing

fact that it was the political belonged

while UDT of years

to the half-casts

had never established any lin~s with the natives at a distance from themselves.

and even kept them

Viewed ~ithin the scope of a larger persp~ctive such ethnical sentiment mat be considered unhealthy and even irresponsible. But when all other means of persuasion could not be used to move the people of East Timor to support APODETI in its struggle to inte~rate the region would launched with the Republic the most of Indonesia, weapon such primordial sentiment to be become effective to battle other themes

by UDT and FRETILIN. in the final analysis that nationalism factor in many

It 'should also be admitted 'and patriotism


l<

which for so long had been the moving

struggles for freedom and independence everywhere sprang from such ethnical sentiment. And when the choice was between the use of armed force or persuasion, then the employment Timor problem of ethnical sentiment for

the solution of the East and condoned. Fortunately

could still be accepted that APODETI's real

there were

signs showing

strength and influence could be counted which was support~d by the distribution

on, Its membership system of real membership cards as

Page Twenty-nine observed clear17 by this writer indicated at the party's headquarters which in Dili issued large to gain

that APODETI

was determined

to carry on real

and realistic but unconfirmed mass support.

work, unlike figures

UD~ and F~~T~I~

and used pressures

and coercion

Lisboa's

policy of Portugal in Lisboa had made it clear that Timor and submit of its people that majority

The government its only ambition the future in October Lisboa

was to get out of Portuguese to the will of the

of the colony

1978 at the latest. to be caught lofty. Quite by the illusion likely, by something money was

One should not allow oneself was motivated the main consideration. of not'. les8:",thanUS$lO could

Every year, Portugal had to give a subsidy million to East ~imor. The sooner Lisboa the better for its n~tional repatriated economy of them.

shake off that committment personnel

which was in disarray~' its military with 1!he move was made under its efforts because and power included

As of March

1975 Portugal program

cut the number

in East ~imor and gradually its austerity the Revolutionary

but also in connection Council's position that As recorded of the problems

to strengthen

it still had to cope with various the Socialists

those between there were

and the vommunists.

previously, Macau Lisboa several

suspicions 'that the FR.l!;TILIN oycott b between FKETILIN and certain figures

Meeting

was the 1!'esult,f a conspiracy o of Portugal. be noted

F1tETILIN~and or e1emtts

or at lea~t between things should

'within the government Although

No proof had been found so far but of the suspicion. had been reac~ed "the most logical one could not easily at that time was who did not conceal that an agreement was

as the source

there were reports

by Indonesia, and Portugal and the best'solution forget dominated their

that integration

fo~ the Timor problem.", of Portugal or Communist

the fact that the government by Communists sympathy

sympathi~ers

strong

toward

the Soviet Union.

If the drastic

measu~es it had takenJlike the nationa1isation of companies could n~t be of much help and iI~finally economic aid must be accepted from,~other;~countries, the ... most logical Union. Meanwhile, Moscow choice would be the Soviet between ~he the

in Asia and the Pacific, to establish their

the competition

and Beijing

influence

continued.

conclusion

of the war in Indo-China

did not'in

any way weaken

fierce efforts. On the contrary it intensified it. The formation of a new independenZ state in south-west if FRETILIN succeeded in its struggle to create

Pacific East

an independent

Timor, would provide the Soviet Union with to gain a foothold to spread its influence

a welcome opportunity in the region.

_____

,.,.-.,."A ...

Page Thirty

Its main aim could be similar moves,

quite likely would

just to counter take advantage

Beijing's

but surely Moscow

of its

presence in East Timor to work on Indonesia cnnvenientlyfrom behind its:. back! and 'Australia directly from under its !lose! That was why the holders if it could be proved of power in Lisboa had declared that

that there were Maoists

at wor~ in East Timor

they would take ,firm actions. If the decolonisation process carried through

of East Timor was truely peaceful machinations it would be

out according to the accepted i certain phases, including

the Macau Meeting,

qui~e possible'that F~E~ILIN would suffer a complete failure in its efforts. The latest developments in East Timor discussed in previous parts could not 8scap.'Lisboa's concern observationand considerations. about the and By then Lisboa's must have grown so serious F.H~:.L'ILIN defeat

possi'qd.lity of a complete

if a truely peaceful

democratic'referendum~should be held in East Timor, knew that FKETlLIN did not enjoy sufficient ~upport It should a FRE~ILIN The F~TILIN step
A

because Lisboa from the people.

have become process boycott

clear for Lisboa by allowing

that a better way to avoid and democratic in East Timor. the first in Java ,..

defeat was to sabotage

the peaceful

decolonisation

chaos to happen

of the Macau Meeting officer

could provide

in such a strategy. high-ranking of the Indonesian between Armed Forces in early July 1975 that along the border incidents Portuguese kept occuring Timor and

told this writer more frequently

Indonesian Timor. According to the Army general, were designed to provoke lndonesia into reacting. Indonesiana were ~ot so gullible

those inci~ents Of course

to fall into such a.~rap. against

But thi~gs would become c~ear if Lisboa took real actions FRETILIN. It had become a glaring fact that FHE~ILIN had deliberately of the people face in public for Portugal's sabotaged the Macau Meeting. Because

it did not only Lisboa's a victim of

mea~ that FHETILIN

had trampled

on the right of self-determination boycott which had become Lisboa an obstacle

of East Timor but also that it had slapped since the FHETILIN decolonisation policy had now become

the. FHE~ILIN boycott, the world expectpd . punitive actions against FRETILIN.
t

to take firm of the commitment freedom to be it would

Portugal's decolonisation that .. t would i to d~cide held

sincerity process

pertaining Timor,

to the implementation including Lisboa's

in East

give the people

of East Timor the complete status through in the actions

their own political before

a referendum

in October

1976, should be reflected

take. against FKETILI~ of the Macau Meeting.

the implementation that Portugal

of the results at all r

It had;' b'e'eomehis.~~now

did nothing

Page

~hi~;y-one role administration the Portuguese government in

Dili's

As a provincial

Dili was to function as Lisboa's extended hand/Which should consequently implement all policies decided by the central ~overnment in Lisboa .But pertaining Timor, power which of the Dili to the decolonisation deviations process of East there were occasional by the local holders' of and truthfullness

reflected the lack of seriousness officials. was obtained government

Information of' their

in April 1975 from gave financial

sources

in Dili to the amount

that the provincial 50 000 escudos operations. the money.

subsidies

to the three political APODETI wanted claimed

parties

to help finance a single

It was reported

that both UD'l' and .ltit~J.ELll~ had it had not received

received escudo!

When this writer interview Office) the issue. Since (the mode

to know about the matter was decided

in a written

of interview Claimed

by the governor's touch on in East

with the ~overnor, '.l.'he Governor the emergence

the response

did not nirectly parties

it was just srumour.

of the three political

~imor, they were each g~ven the opportunity to launch campaigns to attract sympathizers .. and members. On certain days the parties staged public gatherings the people at severel to support places them. program for APODETI that wanted received to sell their ideas and to calIon

The implementation was not always During a week before smooth.

of this particular visit to Liqui~a

this writer's

he was informed in Maubara, APODETI

UDT performed of Liqui~a. Officer

such a meeting a telegram meeting. wanted

another

small town West by the District

When a few days later from the Regent

, to do the same thing

in Maubara, the APODETI this writer

was suddenly

of Maubara

of Liqui~a, about in

Portuguese,

banning

Once ,again, when the incident

to get information with

in his second

written

interview

the Governor "those were

Dili, the ,answer was vague. He :was told again that . I only rumours and Timor was full of rumours". According the provincial to the information administration's gathered

by this writer and Major

in Dili, by Jonathans

attitude

was mostly

influenced

.the two assistants who were reported Portugal (PCP)! . The failure

to the Governor,

Major Mota

to be active members of a gaod-will mission

of the Communiat from Indonesia

Party of with two

Indonesia~avY ships carrying 75 Indonesian youths and university students to Dili to carry out programs for social activities and sport .games with the local youth was also caused by the Governor's decision who was under the influence of Major Mota.

---

.1 ...

i __ "." ..~........,_

Page Thirty-three The sympathetic church whose walls'were plastered'by FRETII,IN

One of the buildings activists with the legend

KILL THE TRAITORS .was the official

residence of the Bishop of Dili, not far from the office of the Governor. of Dili. The head of the Catholic Church became the target of FRETILIN's
'-.

anger because

it had by then become quitely endorsed

a public

secret

in

Dili that the Catholic APODETI aspiration This writer who had issued found

Church

and

supported. the the Bishop to meet

to inte~rate

Portuguese

Timor with Indonesia.

it very difficult

to interview

a pre-condition

that he would be willing but would refrain

'with the journalist about politics Church quitely

from Jakarta

from talking in Dili, the

But according to APODETI ffgures supported the APODETI position. celebrated its anniversary an open-air leadership: to conduct Mass

When APODETI sent a message to conduct Mass disturbances?

on May\27,

1975

and plans were made

in Dili, the Bishop it be dan~erous to create in indoors? interfered

to the APODETI Wouldn't.it

wouldn't

in the open? What b~ better APODETI's

if FRETILIN anniversary

to conduct'Mass

The Mass to celebrate the Dili cathedral. Indonesia's interest Portugal

was conducted

Annually to subsidize

spent no

less than ten million US dollars was inte~rated with Indonesia

East Timor.

If the region

that money must come from a new s~urce, Jakarta,: at least during the initial ye~rs until the time comes when the local sources of income could be exploited Republic Anyway like the ones in the other provinces the inte~ration of Indonesia of Portuguese of the of Indonesia. accepting Timor into the of

territory of the Republic new burdens. Is such a policy It harlbeen

would mean the assumption

accountable? previously body, that considering its strategic to Timor is of vital the meeting iMportance

recorded

location on the Indonesian Indonesia's defense. That was the reason Horta and the mana~ement Studies

why during

between

Jose Ramos and

of the Indonesian in Jakarta

Center

for Strategic

International out to Horta a Communist constitute Republic

(C8I8)

in April 1975,

it was pointed into

that Indonesia power center

could not tolerate of influence

chaos in the region because that would of the

and that Indonesia a direct

could also not allow it to be developed or sphere threat to the stability and safety

of Indonesia.

Another point of interest for Indonesia was the raFt that the people of Portu~ue8e Timor were a p~rt of thp. n;~ Tn~~nf~;~n ~nm;lv.

P~ge Thirty~four Hence annex to East


welcome

I11done8i8'13 Timor

dotormination means,
bhn ro~ion
f8[1]5.1;r

that
should

while only

it

would

not to

b;r wlwtover

i t',."ould

be happy

the ]leoulo or

they decide,

democratica1',y,

come home to thf';l old

raId

Jlbout

the

v!r:l.t~r

Jussac NR Wirosoebrot0 '~as hetween January 1966 ond October 1979 Deputy Publ ish o;r and Cb :taf ;~d.i 1;01.' of PEV:WOR YOGY da i ly in A Yoe;ya karta, Ind one s ia. Almo:=l; eluring thE! same period he \'laR Chairmall of th'? local ;lOUrn!ll iS1:8' 138scciati.on (PWI) and viceCh,3irmcJIl of th:; Yop::yekarta chapter of the Inr:Jonesian ne\-v'ST/llner U;P:;). From October 1977 to October put'1ishcrs' associ3tiC<Il 1()82 h9 wa~ a member cf the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and of COTImi~sion I (Infor~ation, Defence, ForeiFD Aff,girs) Decemb"?r
+',..,Y> ..:..v_

of th':; Indonesi9n Yarli:3ment (DPR). From March 1982 to 1 c?,?-? ],9 atteDr1cj trle prestigicus Indonesian Institute "T~+-~O"'3-' ""'''''''ence (T'~\'rrt."!'TAS'\ anrl b 0._ rTI'''d'uated on December 5 , ]9~2 ':"G..,~_ .. ,:~;:-t.. U.lJ:lJ..t ...'.f.l.. / '.
J,. ~

8fter v,'riting, presenting a-rld defending his paDer entitled THE SOI!IET UNIJrJ'S PRESENCE AT NAINL.t\ND ASIA'S PERIMETER: A SOURCE OF POTEN'l'IJ\L Between for tlle Service July THREAT TO A::mAN i:iECURITY. 1959 and August 1963 he was a Translator/Announcer

Indonesian Section of the Australian

of Radio Australia, the Overseas Broadcasting Commission in Me1bournA.

From J(X.l1uary 1962 to J\usp-;ust 1963 he was sponsor, co-founder and ChairITIBll of the INDONp:BIAN INFORMATION TEAM-NON GOVERNMENTAL in Melbourne, Australia.

,/

,. ,

(
y

The writer with Alarico Jorge Fernandes (center)and Jose Ramos Horta, Fretilin , Secretary ueneral and c ~ Fretilin Secretary for .~. Foreign Affairs respectivelJ~ in Kupang before leaving for Dili.

1'he writer with Xavier Amaral, Fretilin President at roadside in Dili

,)''i

The writer visiting Alfonsa dos Santos, Fretilin Chairman, Liqui9a branch Front ~ right to left: Alfonso dos Santos, the writer, Mrs. dos Santos. Back row right to left: Fretilin member, two Apodet members accompanYing writer from Dili and two Fretilin memb0rS.

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