Jack Doe and Jill Doe vs.

Imperial Bucket Corporation This is a case filed by the Plaintiffs, Jack Doe and Jill Doe, both minors, against Defendant, Imperial Bucket Corporation. They allege that (1) they suffered grievous and permanent injuries when a steel bucket manufactured by the defendant proved to be of unsafe design and manufacture, and without proper safeguards, so as to allow it to be operated in an unsafe manner by these minors; and (2) the Defendant is guilty of such gross product liability as to be responsible for these injuries and therefore should compensate Jack and Jill for a sum greater than five million pesos (P 5,000,000). The facts of the case are as follows: Plaintiffs were both completely untrained in the proper operation of the bucket, referred to as the pail, manufactured by Defendant, Imperial Bucket Corporation. The said pail was made of steel and weighed 1.6 pounds when empty. It was designed to be carried by a rounded metal handle, or bail. Depending on the material used to fill the pail, the weight of such pail could vary between 1.9 pounds (cotton) and 61.0 (pig iron). Unless one received proper instruction in the use of this pail, it could easily be overloaded, causing it to become unstable. It does not include directions for safe use, warnings of any kind about the potential danger of the pail, and even safety devices to protect individuals from suffering injuries when using this pail. Due to this, minors operating the pail could not possibly be aware of the inherent dangers in the defective design of this pail and would thus be subject to injury. The plaintiffs testified that as they were skipping up the hill, they hold on to the pail, which swung precariously between them. Upon reaching the top of said hill, they filled up the pail with water, which the weight of the latter will be affixed through laboratory testing. Both minors had no idea that the defective design of this pail permitted it to be filled with water to an unsafe level. As Plaintiffs began carrying the now hazardous steel pail down the side of the hill, the water began shifting inside the pail, causing the weight to be unevenly distributed. This motion caused a partial reduction in the contents of the pail, adding to the unbalanced state of the pail. Since Jack and Jill were not experienced in controlling the weight of a pail with water down a hill, both minors individually and simultaneously did lose their balance owing entirely to the instability of the pail.

According to the police reports, Jack apparently lost control of the pail and fell down the hill. Jill, a young female weighing approximately 48 pounds, could not possibly have been expected to retain control of the pail without assistance and immediately came tumbling after. By reason of the foregoing and of the Defendants negligence, Plaintiffs were severely bruised, injured, and wounded. They suffered, still suffer, and will continue to suffer for some time, physical and mental pain and great bodily injuries. Specifically, Jack broke his crown in three different places in addition to fracturing his ribs and right arm. Jill sustained bruises and contusions to her legs, ankles, and wrist. Some of these injuries may be of a permanent nature so as to affect the lives of these minors. The Imperial Bucket Corporation, being aware for an indeterminate time that the bucket they callously manufactured and offered to market had serious design flaws and under certain conditions could cause severe injury, nevertheless did continue to manufacture and market such a bucket to the public. They failed to take the necessary steps to inform the public of the potential for injury inherent in the use of their product. That they did so, and continue to do so, indicates a disregard for the public welfare, for which punitive damages might be deemed appropriate. The law applicable for this case is the Civil Code of the Philippines, specifically Book IV which pertains to Obligations and Contracts. The damages caused by Defendant Imperial Bucket Corporation are based on quasi-delict. According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.1 Moreover, Article 2187 same law states that, Manufacturers and processors of

foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.2 This provision is new. No similar provision is found in the Spanish Civil Code. The framer of present Civil Code based this provision on the rule obtaining in most states of the United States to the effect that a consumer may recover damages against a manufacturer for the
1 2

Article 2176 of the Civil Code Article 2187 of the Civil Code

negligent preparation or manufacture of food irrespective of any contractual relations between the parties. For example, in the United States it has been held that a manufacturer was liable for negligently bottling beer with broken glass in the bottle. Another manufacturer was held liable for negligent preparation of mincemeat put up in a package. And still in another case a manufacturer was held liable for the careless and negligent canning of spoiled meat.3 The liability imposed by Art. 2187 of the Civil Code is limited only to manufacturers of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods for death or injuries caused by any noxious o harmful substances used. In the United States the principle generally accepted is that a seller or other supplier of chattels for a consideration may be liable for harm to the person or property of third person who may be expected to be in the vicinity of the chattels probable use if he has failed to exercise reasonable care to make the chattel safe for the use for which it is supplied.
4

Thus, in the leading case of MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., 217, N.Y. 382, 111 N.Y. 1050, it appeared that plaintiff was hurt when an automobile which he had bought from a retail dealer collapsed as a result of a defective wheel. Defendant was the manufacturer of the automobile though not of the wheel. It was established that had the defendant employed due care in inspecting the parts before assembling the vehicle, the defect would have been discovered. Plaintiff recovered damages. Justice Cardozo speaking for the court said: We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas vs. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature to things which in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully.5

3 4 5

Jarencio, H.U. Torts and Damages in Philippine Law, Chapter II: Quasi-Delicts Jarencio, H.U. Torts and Damages in Philippine Law, Chapter II: Quasi-Delicts MacPherson vs. Buick Motor Co., 217, N.Y. 382, 111 N.Y. 1050

The following cases, although decided in the United States, will illustrate the application of Article 2187 of the Civil Code. Boyd vs. Coca Cola Bottling Works 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S.W. 80 Facts: Plaintiffs husband bought for her a sealed bottle of Coca Cola from a retail dealer in Nashville. He carried the bottle home and poured a potion of its contents into a glass. His wife drank the liquid poured out, and immediately became intensely nauseated and suffered seriously from its effect. The husband, upon examining the bottle, found therein a cigar stub about two inches long which had apparently been in the liquid for some time. Complaint was made about the incident to an agent of Coca Cola Bottling Works who said the company had employed some Negroes who were careless about washing bottles into which Coca Cola was poured. There was proof to the effect that the defendant was accustomed to buying empty bottles around town and to refill them. A physician testified as to the poisonous effects of a fluid impregnated with nicotine from a cigar stub. Held: Upon a person who undertakes the performance of an act, which if not done with care and skill will imperil the lives of others, the law imposes the duty of exercising the requisite care and skill. In such matters such a person is liable to others suffering from his negligence. This liability does not depend on contract or privity, but arises from a breach of the legal duty, to which we have just referred. A tort is committed, a legal right invaded by practice which prejudices anothers health. So when the manufacturer of this beverage undertook to place it on the market in sealed bottles, intending it to be purchased and taken into the human stomach, under such circumstances that neither the dealer nor the consumer had opportunity for knowledge of its contents, he likewise assumed the duty of exercising care to see that there was nothing unwholesome or injurious contained in said bottle. For a negligent breach of this duty, the manufacturer became liable to the person damaged thereby.

Practically all the modern cases are to the effect that the ultimate consumer of foods, medicines, or beverages may bring his action against the manufacturer for injuries caused by the negligent preparation of such articles. This is certainly true where the articles are sold in sealed packages and are not subject to inspection. Some of the cases place the liability on the general grounds heretofore stated. Others place it on pure food statutes. Other say there is an implied warranty when goods are dispensed in original packages, which is available to all damaged by their use, and another case says that the liability rests upon the demand social justice Defendant was held liable.

Ward Baking Co. vs. Trizzino 161 N.E. 557 Facts: Trizzino purchased a cake made by Ward Baking Co. from a grocer. He suffered injuries from a needle embedded in a cake and sued the maker thereof for damages. Held: Considerations of public policy demand that the utmost care and caution be exacted from the manufacture of articles of food, who not only manufactures the same but causes the same to be delivered to grocery men, bakeries, and so forth for the purpose of general distribution and sale to members of the general public. The consumer has a right to rely upon the implied representation of the baking company that these articles bearing its name are not only free from injurious substance, but are fit for consumption as food. That court also pointed out that in one case it was held that the evidence that a manufacturer of soap placed the same upon the market with knowledge that poisonous and injurious substances were necessary in its preparation, and if too much of the poisonous ingredients was used, and not neutralized in manufacturing, injury was liable to result from its use and did in fact result sufficiently showed negligence in its manufacture which rendered it liable to one who purchase it from a retail dealer, for injuries which resulted from its use; that the liability does not rest upon any contract or privity between the manufacturer and the person injured, but upon the duty imposed by law upon the manufacturer not to put upon the market a

commodity that was unsuitable for use by the public, and which the public could not use without injury.

Another applicable law which can be used by Jack and Jill against Imperial Bucket Corporation is the Consumer Act of the Philippines, specifically Article 77 which states that: Art. 77. Minimum Labeling Requirements for Consumer Products. XXX The following may be required by the concerned department in accordance with the rules and regulations they will promulgate under authority of this Act: (a) whether it is flammable or inflammable; (b) directions for use, if necessary; (c) warning of toxicity; (d) wattage, voltage or amperes; or (e) process of manufacture used if necessary. Any word, statement or other information required by or under authority of the preceding paragraph shall appear on the label or labeling with such conspicuousness as compared with other words, statements, designs or devices therein, and in such terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase or use. The above requirements shall form an integral part of the label without danger of being erased or detached under ordinary handling of the product.

On the other hand, the Imperial Bucket Corporation may use Article 2180 of the Civil Code as defense against Jack and Jill. The first, second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code provide: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2175 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company."

The above-quoted provisions of the present Civil Code are similar to the provisions of the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code.

The liability imposed by these provisions is based on the principle that since children and wards do not have the capacity to govern themselves, their parents and guardians have the duty of exercising special vigilance over them so that damage to third persons due to the ignorance , lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with that duty imposed upon them by law, they will be held liable for the damage caused by their negligence. The liability of parents and guardians for the damage which may be caused to third persons by their children or wards is based on their own negligence in failing to properly care or supervise them so as to prevent their causing such damage. This is the necessary consequence of the provision of the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code which states that "The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage". If the minor or insane person causing the damage has no parent or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him in which case a guardian ad litem is appointed.

The following cases illustrate the meaning and the application of the law: Cuadra vs. Monfort 35 SCRA 160 Facts: Plaintiff's daughter Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and defendant's daughter Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates and friends in Grade Six. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them to wee4d the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged defendant's daughter fount a plastic headband and jokingly she said aloud that she wound an earthworm. To frighten plaintiff's daughter she tossed the object at her and hit her right eye. Plaintiff's daughter rubbed her eye and treated it with some powder. The eye became swollen and although she underwent medical treatment and surgical operation she lost the eye. Plaintiff instituted this action for damages against the father of Monfort.

Held: "The legal issued posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which cause damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read: 'Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault of negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter." 'Art 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. xxxxx 'The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. "The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omissions that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, I the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious almost primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault of negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease

when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage." It implies a consideration of the attendance circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented. "In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however, careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorable on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parent. "The victims, no doubt, deserves no little consideration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience." Plaintiff could not recover.

Exconde vs. Capuno 101 Phil. 843 Facts: Dante Capuno was a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a parade in honor of Rizal upon instruction of the city school supervisor. From the school Dante with other students boarded a jeep and when the same started to run he took hold of a wheel and drove while the driver sat on his left side. The jeep turned turtle and two passengers died. This action was brought against Dante and his father Delfin Capuno for damages. Held: "Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.' Buy this provision applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School, and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with the parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances it is clear that neither the head of the school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law. "The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor child who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educate them and instructing

them in proportion to their "means"; while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Article 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage (Article 1903, last paragraph, Civil Code). These defendants failed to prove." Defendants Dante Capuno and his father Delfin Capuno held jointly and severally liable to plaintiff.

Mercado vs. Court of Appeals 108 Phil. 414 Facts: Plaintiff Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and defendants Augusto Mercado, 9 years old, were students in the Lourdes Catholic School. They quarreled over an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank. Augusto Mercado wounded Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor blade. Quisumbing, Jr. and his father brought an action for damages against Augusto Mercado and his father. Defendant Mercado contended that since the incident occurred while his son was in school it should be the teacher or the head of the school and not Mercado the father who should be held responsible. Held: "This precise question was brought before this Court in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno, G.R. No. L-10134, promulgated June 30, 1957, but we held, through Mr. Justice Bautista: We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above-quoted teachers or directors of art and trades are liable for damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody,' but this provision only applies to an institution or arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made liable, is as follows: 'Art. 2108.

'Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." "It would seem that the clause 'so long as they remain in their custody', contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersede those of the parents. In these circumstances, the control or influence over the conduct and action of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and get back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes the father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. The claim of the petitioner that responsibility should pass to the school must therefore, be held to be without merit." Defendant Mercado, the father was held liable.

Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez 56 Phil. 177 Facts: A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon Bridge on the Manila South Road in Las Pias, Rizal. As a result of the collision a passenger in the truck, Narciso Gutierrez suffered a fracture in his right leg. The truck was owned by the defendant Saturnino Cortex. The automobile was operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. & Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez, also defendants in this case. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother together with several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were in the car. The court found that both drivers of the truck and the car were negligent.

Held:"In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was an incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor." Defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, the truck driver, and Saturnino Cortez, were held jointly and severally liable for P5,000 to plaintiff.

Salen & Salbanera vs. Balce 107 Phil.748 Facts: Gumersindo Balce, a minor below 15 years and son of defendant Jose Balce, killed Carlos Salen, a minor son of plaintiffs. Gumersindo Balce was convicted of homicide. Plaintiffs brought an action for damages against defendant Jose Balce, father of the minor Gumersindo Balce. The trial court dismissed the case stating that the civil liability must be determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and not under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff appealed. Held: "It is true that under Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivision 1, 2 & 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpublished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability

of his parent should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. "The particular law that governs this case is Art. 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: 'The father and, in case of his death, or incapacity the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.' To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void which apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil Code as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or identical cases." Decision of the trial court reversed.

Fuellas vs. Cadano 3 SCRA 361 Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old and classmates. While they were in school they had a quarrel. Their teacher separated them and told them to go home. After going down the schoolhouse Rico Fuellas held Pepito Cadano by the neck and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right-side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. Pepito's right arm was broken. Elpidio Cadano, father of Peipito, filed two separate actions: (a) One filed on October 1, 1954 for damages against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor Rico, and (b) the other on November 11, 1954 against Rico Fuellas for serious physical injuries. The cases were tried jointly. On May 18, 1956 Rico Fuellas was convicted of the offense charged in the criminal case. No pronouncement was made in the criminal case on his civil liability the court stating that the same shall be determined in the civil case. On May 25, 1956 the same court rendered a judgment in the civil case

holding Agapito Fuellas liable in damages in the total amount of P9,600 under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment by reducing the moral damages. Agapito Fuellas appealed to the Supreme Court contended that since the act of his minor son was deliberate and international Art. 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable. Fuellas also contended that the only way by which a father can be made responsible for the criminal act of his son committed with deliberate intent and with discernment, is an action based on the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability of parents. Held: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who act with discernment is determined under the provisions of Art 2180, New Civil Code and under Art 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Judgment affirmed.

Elcano vs. Hill 77 SCRA 100 Facts: Reginald Hill son of defendant Marvin Hill was charged criminally for the killing of Agapito Elcano son of plaintiffs the Elcano spouses. At the time of the killing Reginald Hill was a minor, married and was living with his father Marvin Hill and receiving subsistence from him. Reginald Hill was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill coupled with mistake. Subsequently the Elcano spouses filed a civil action for damages against Reginald Hill and his father Marvin Hill arising from the killing of their son. The case was dismissed by the lower court on defendants' motion to dismiss and plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. One of the questions raised was whether the father of the minor who was already married but living with, and receiving

subsistence from said father was liable in damages for the crime committed by the minor. Held: "Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Marvin Hill, his father, it is also considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld "While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327 Civil Code) , and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399 emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. "Now under Article 2180, 'the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controvert that Reginald, although married was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. "It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do

any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child, while still a minor, does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. Accordingly, in our considered view, Article 2170 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become subsidiary to that of his son." Order of the lower court reversed.

If I were to choose a party/position that I would support, I would prefer the Defendant, Imperial Bucket Corporation. The parents should be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. It is the responsibility of the parents to take care of their child and they should not let their children use things that are not safe without their supervision. In the case at bar, the parents of Jack and Jill let them use an unsafe bucket without adult supervision, hence, making them (parents) liable for the damages suffered by their children. The Imperial Bucket Corporation should not be held liable for the damages of minors, Jack and Jill Doe. The persons liable are the minors parents which should be supervising them while using the pail to get water up the hill.

Petition for Guardianship and Other Legal Relief in the Matter of Beauty, Sleeping The case at bar is filed by petitioner, Mr. King, requesting that an order be issued by the court prohibiting any or all extraordinary or heroic measures being taken now or at any time in the future to resuscitate, awaken, or in any way revive or sustain by artificial means their relation by blood, Sleeping Beauty; and that no experimental treatment be administered and no persons unknown to the Court through its trustees be permitted access to said Beauty. In addition, petitioner and his spouse are requesting that they be named legal guardians of the subject, trustees of all assets, and, in the event of her death, executors of her estate. The facts of the case are as follows: Sleeping Beauty has been surviving for seventy-one years in a trance-like state consistent in every way with the medical condition coma. This state was induced by an unknown drug injected into her system with a needle. The unknown chemical substance, injected either knowingly or unwittingly on or about the subjects sixteenth birthday, did cause grievous damage to her central nervous system and brain stem. This hallucinogenic substance did also cause similar harm to others engaged in the service of Beauty and believed to have had marginal physical contact with the subject. The immediate result of such drug introduction was a total and complete loss of consciousness, the inability to communicate in any form whatsoever with any persons and the complete and total cessation of all bodily functions save breathing. There is no proven antidote to this drug. The source of this drug is unknown to the petitioner. Sleeping Beauty remains in such a trance-like state as described to this date. She has not responded to any attempt to revive her with traditional, proven, safe, and accepted means of resuscitation. The petitioner claims knowledge that a person or persons not specifically known to petitioner have made or will make heroic attempts to revive Sleeping Beauty using a highly experimental treatment medically referred to as artificial respiration, commonly known as mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. There is no evidence of any kind to support the use of said treatment in this case. Additionally, as the drug known to have caused the subjects condition has officially been labeled a dangerous drug, whose properties have not sufficiently been tested, and which drug is proved to have caused the onset of similar symptoms to persons having only casual contact with Beauty, there exists a clear and

present danger to the general populace that any type of physical contact with the subject may result in controlled spread of such symptoms. Petitioner thereby, to protect the general well-being, requests a court order be issued immediately prohibiting such experimental treatment by any and all persons whosoever. He also requests the Court decree that should the physical state of the subject change in any way, shape, or form, no measures except those currently accepted by the medical community as immediate aid to lessen pain and suffering be employed in her behalf. It is the wish of the petitioners that no artificial or mechanical means of any kind known now or at any time in the future be used in this case to extend the condition in which Beauty currently resides. At the commencement of this drug-induced trance, Sleeping Beauty was in possession of a substantial amount of material goods, including but not limited to items of pure gold, jewelry, acreage, and a castle (one). Such holdings were out into a trust to be administered by her blood relatives at the commencement of this current state. Those people charged with supervising said trust have perished through primarily natural causes, such as age and war. In the absence of supervision, the value of such holdings has substantially increased, but without proper legal authority to oversee such holdings, there exists significant risk of loss or depreciation of the value of such holdings. The petitioner hereby declares to the Court that any and all members of the immediate family of the subject, Beauty (including but not limited to father, mother, siblings of any gender, cousins by blood first through sixth, aunts, and uncles), have perished and the petitioner is the sole surviving blood relation. The petitioner voluntarily relinquishes all rights to privacy for matters relating to this claim and will make available to this Court samples necessary for the scientific establishment of this blood link through any and all known means. As the sole surviving blood relation of Sleeping Beauty, the petitioner requests that the Court appoint him legal guardian of Beauty with full power of attorney and such access to herein described trust to enable full and proper management of these assets to the benefit of Beauty, her heirs, and her estate in total. In the event of the untimely death of Sleeping Beauty, the petitioner humbly requests that the Court appoint the petitioner sole executor of the estate of the subject, with full powers to take such actions as necessary to benefit the estate of Beauty.

The Rules of Court on Special Proceedings, specifically Rules 92-97, is applicable in the case at bar. The Petitioner must adhere to these rules and their subsections in order to be appointed as the guardian of Sleeping Beauty and to be granted as the successor to her properties.

RULE 92 VENUE Sec. 1. Where to institute proceedings. - Guardianship of the person or estate of a minor or incompetent may be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province, or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality, or in the municipal court of the chartered city where the minor or incompetent person resides, and if he resides in a foreign country, in the Court of First Instance of the province wherein his property or part thereof is situated; provided, however, that where the value of the property of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace or municipal court, the proceedings shall be instituted in the Court of First Instance. In the City of Manila, the proceedings shall be instituted in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Sec. 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." - Under this rule, the

word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. Sec. 3. Transfer of venue. - The court taking cognizance of a guardianship proceeding, may transfer the same to the court of another province or municipality wherein the ward has acquired real property, if he has transferred thereto his bona-fide residence, and the latter court shall have full jurisdiction to continue the proceedings, without requiring payment of additional court fees.

RULE 93 APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS Sec. 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. - Any relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper. Sec. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or convenient; (c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care; (d) The probable value and character of his estate; (e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed. The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship. Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing; Notice thereof. - When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or special notice thereof to be given. Sec. 4. Opposition to petition. - Any interested person may, by filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor, competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and

may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition. Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. - At the hearing of the petition the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the person in question is a minor, or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter specified. Sec. 6. When and how guardian for nonresident appointed; Notice. - When a person liable to be put under guardianship resides without the Philippines but has estate therein, any relative or friend of such person, or anyone interested in his estate, in expectancy or otherwise, may petition a court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a guardian for the estate, and if, after notice given to such person and in such manner as the court deems proper, by publication or otherwise, and hearing, the court is satisfied that such nonresident is a minor or incompetent rendering a guardian necessary or convenient, it may appoint a guardian for such estate. Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. - When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child's property, with the duties and obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall file the petition required by section 2 thereof. For good reasons the court may, however, appoint another suitable person. Sec. 8. Service of judgment. - Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

RULE 94 BONDS OF GUARDIANS

Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. - Before a guardian appointed enters upon the execution of his trust, or letters of guardianship issue, he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows: (a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all the estate, real and personal, of his ward which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession or knowledge of any other person for him; (b) To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the estate according to these rules for the best interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper care, custody, and education of the ward; (c) To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated by these rules and such other times as the court directs; and at the expiration of his trust to settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay over all the estate, effects, and moneys remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto; (d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed. Sec. 2. When new bond may be required and old sureties discharged. - Whenever it is deemed necessary, the court may require a new bond to be given by the guardian, and may discharge the sureties on the old bond from further liability, after due notice to interested persons, when no injury can result therefrom to those interested in the estate. Sec. 3. Bonds to be filed; Actions thereon. - Every bond given by a guardian shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the court, and, in case of the breach of a condition thereof, may be prosecuted in the same proceeding or in a separate action for the use and benefit of the ward or of any other person legally interested in the estate.

RULE 95 SELLING AND ENCUMBERING PROPERTY OF WARD Sec. 1. Petition of guardian for leave to sell or encumber estate. - When the income of an estate under guardianship is insufficient to maintain the ward and his family, or to maintain and educate the ward when a minor, or when it appears that it is for the benefit of the ward that his real estate or some part thereof be sold, or mortgaged or otherwise

encumbered, and the proceeds thereof put out at interest, or invested in some productive security, or in the improvement or security of other real estate of the ward, the guardian may present a verified petition to the court by which he was appointed setting forth such facts, and praying that an order issue authorizing the sale or encumbrance. Sec. 2. Order to show cause thereupon. - If it seems probable that such sale or encumbrance is necessary, or would be beneficial to the ward, the court shall make an order directing the next of kin of the ward, and all persons interested in the estate, to appear at a reasonable time and place therein specified to show cause why the prayer of the petition should not be granted. Sec. 3. Hearing on return of order; Costs. - At the time and place designated in the order to show cause, the court shall hear the proofs and allegations of the petitioner and next of kin, and other persons interested, together with their witnesses, and grant or refuse the prayer of the petition as the best interests of the ward require. The court shall make such order as to costs of the hearing as may be just. Sec. 4. Contents of order for sale or encumbrance, and how long effective; Bond. - If, after full examination, it appears that it is necessary, or would be beneficial to the ward, to sell or encumber the estate, or some portion of it, the court shall order such sale or encumbrance and that the proceeds thereof be expended for the maintenance of the ward and his family, or the education of the ward, if a minor, or for the putting of the same out at interest, or the investment of the same as the circumstances may require. The order shall specify the causes why the sale or encumbrance is necessary or beneficial, and may direct that estate ordered sold be disposed of at either public or private sale, subject to such conditions as to the time and manner of payment, and security where a part of the payment is deferred, as in the discretion of the court are deemed most beneficial to the ward. The original bond of the guardian shall stand as security for the proper appropriation of the proceeds of the sale, but the judge may, if deemed expedient, require an additional bond as a condition for the granting of the order of sale. No order of sale granted in pursuance of this section shall continue in force more than one (1) year after granting the same, without a sale being had. Sec. 5. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct management of estate. - The court may authorize and require the guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or

encumbrances, and any other of his ward's money in his hands, in real estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of all concerned, and may make such other orders for the management, investment, and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances may require.

RULE 96 GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS Sec. 1. To what guardianship shall extend. - A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship. Sec. 2. Guardian to pay debts of ward. - Every guardian must pay the ward's just debts out of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if sufficient; if not, then out of his real estate upon obtaining an order for the sale or encumbrance thereof. Sec. 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions for ward. - A guardian must settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for, and receive all debts due him, or may, with the approval of the court, compound for the same and give discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and just dividend of the estate and effects; and he shall appear for and represent his ward in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person be appointed for that purpose. Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. - A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereon, so far as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order so to do, and apply so much of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance. Sec. 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition proceedings after hearing. - The court may authorize the guardian to join in an assent to a partition of real or personal

estate held by the ward jointly or in common with others, but such authority shall only be granted after hearing, upon such notice to relatives of the ward as the court may direct, and a careful investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the proposed action. Sec. 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or concealing property of ward. - Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for examination touching such money, goods, interest, or instrument, and make such orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance. Sec. 7. Inventories and accounts of guardians, and appraisement of estates. - A guardian must render to the court an inventory of the estate of his ward within three (3) months after his appointment, and annually after such appointment an inventory and account, the rendition of any of which may be compelled upon the application of an interested person. Such inventories and accounts shall be sworn to by the guardian. All the estate of the ward described in the first inventory shall be appraised. In the appraisement the court may request the assistance of one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers. And whenever any property of the ward not included in an inventory already rendered is discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward, like proceedings shall be had for securing an inventory and appraisement thereof within three (3) months after such discovery, succession, or acquisition. Sec. 8. When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. - Expenses and compensation allowed. Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his appointment, and as often thereafter as may be required, a guardian must present his account to the court for settlement and allowance. In the settlement of the account, the guardian, other than a parent, shall be allowed the amount of his reasonable expenses incurred in the execution of his trust and also such compensation for his services as the court deems just, not exceeding fifteen per centum of the net income of the ward.

RULE 97 TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP Sec. 1. Petition that competency of ward be adjudged, and proceedings thereupon. - A person who has been declared incompetent for any reason, or his guardian, relative, or friend, may petition the court to have his present competency judicially determined. The petition shall be verified by oath, and shall state that such person is then competent. Upon receiving the petition, the court shall fix a time for hearing the questions raised thereby, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the guardian of the person, so declared incompetent, and to the ward. On the trial, the guardian or relatives of the ward, and, in the discretion of the court, any other person, may contest the right to the relief demanded, and witnesses may be called and examined by the parties or by the court on its own motion. If it be found that the person is no longer incompetent, his competency shall be adjudged and the guardianship shall cease. Sec. 2. When guardian removed or allowed to resign; New appointment. - When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging his trust or unsuitable therefor, or has wasted or mismanaged the estate, of failed for thirty (30) days after it is due to render an account or make a return, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him, and compel him to surrender the estate of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto. A guardian may resign when it appears proper to allow the same; and upon his resignation or removal the court may appoint another in his place. Sec. 3. Other termination of guardianship. - The marriage or voluntary emancipation of a minor ward terminates the guardianship of the person of the ward, and shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. The guardian of any person may be discharged by the court when it appears, upon the application of the ward or otherwise, that the guardianship is no longer necessary.

Sec. 4. Record to be kept by the justice of the peace or municipal judge. - When a justice of the peace or municipal court takes cognizance of the proceedings in pursuance of the provisions of these rules, the record of the proceedings shall be kept as in the court of first instance. Sec. 5. Service of judgment. - Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.

The following are cases on petition for guardianship: Guardianship of James E. Stegner vs. Stegner G.R. No. L-8532 October 11, 1957 Facts: W.A. Stegner left a will nominating and appointing the Philippine Trust Company executor of the trustee and as guardian of his children. In 1936, the Court appointed Juanita T. Stegner, mother of the minors, as guardian over the persons of the minors and the Philippine Trust Company as guardian of their properties. When the Philippine Trust Company filed a final consolidated statement of account and petition for discharge containing a detailed statement of cash receipts and disbursement made, Catherine and Mildred Stegner opposed this petition alleging that it did not explain why the minors should be prejudiced by the sum of P15,117.29 allegedly invalidated and that as the loans were in the name of the Philippine Trust Company and not in the names of Catherine and Mildred Stegner, these wards should not be prejudiced by the payments made by the mortgagors during the enemy occupation amounting to P15,117.29 which was declared invalidated. Held: Consolidating the related questions raised by oppositors, the main issue in the instant case is whether the Philippine Trust Company could be held liable for the investments of the funds of the wards made without securing the previous authorization of the Court and which resulted in the loss of P15,117.29. Section 5, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, provides that: SEC. 5. COURT MAY ORDER INVESTMENT OF PROCEEDS AND DIRECT MANAGEMENT OF ESTATE. The Court may authorize and require the

guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other of his ward's money in his hands, in real estate or otherwise, as shall be for the best interest of all concerned, and may make such orders for the management investment, and disposition of the estate and effects, as circumstances may require. Although the authority referred to in this Section may not have been secured prior to the investment of the properties of funds of the ward, yet We believe that the court's approval of the annual inventories and accounts submitted by the guardian, with the conformity and/or acquiescence of the U. S. Veterans Administration and the mother of the minors, wherein the questioned investment was mentioned and accounted for, amounts to a ratification of the acts of the guardian and compliance with the provisions of section 5, Rule 96 aforecited. The Court finds no merit in the imputation of negligence on the guardian with respect to said assets after taking into consideration the satisfactory explanations made by said guardian. Wherefore, the order of the Court, a quo of July 29, 1954, appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Nario vs. Philamlife Insurance Company 20 SCRA 434 Facts: Mrs. Nario applied for and was issued a life Insurance policy (no. 503617) by PHILAMLIFE under a 20-yr endowment plant, with a face value of 5T. Her husband Delfin and their unemancipated son Ernesto were her revocable beneficiaries. She then applied for a loan on the above policy with PHILAMLIFE w/c she is entitled to as policy holder, after the policy has been in force for 3 years. The purpose of such loan was for the school expenses of Ernesto. The application bore the written signature and consent of Delfin in 2 capacities: (1) as one of the irrevocable beneficiaries of the policy; (2) as father-guardian of Ernesto and also the legal administrator of the minors properties pursuant to Article 320 of the Civil Code. PHILAMLIFE denied the loan application contending that written consent of the minor son must not only be given by his father as legal guardian but it must also be authorized by the court in a competent

guardianship proceeding. Mrs. Nario then signified her decision to surrender her policy and demand its cash value which then amounted to P 520. PHILAMLIFE also denied the surrender of the policy on the same ground as that given in disapproving the loan application. Mrs. Nario sued PHILAMLIFE praying that the latter grant their loan application and/or accept the surrender of said policy in exchange for its cash value. PHILAMLIFE contends that the loan application and the surrender of the policy involved acts of disposition and alienation of the property rights of the minor, said acts are not within the power of administrator granted under Article 320 in relation to Article 326 Civil Code, hence court authority is required. Held: SC agreed with the trial court that the vested interest or right of the beneficiaries in the policy should be measured on its full face value and not on its cash surrender value, for in case of death of the insured, said beneficiaries are paid on the basis of its face value and in case the insured should discontinue paying premiums, the beneficiaries may continue paying it and are entitled to automatic extended term or paid-up insurance options and that said vested right under the policy cannot be divisible at any given time. SC also agreed with TC that the said acts (loan app and surrender) constitute acts of disposition or alienation of property rights and not merely management or administration because they involve the incurring or termination of contractual obligations. Under the laws (CC and rules of Court) The father is constituted as the minors legal administrator of the property, and when the property of the child is worth more than P2T (as in the case at bar, the minors property was worth 2,500 his share as beneficiary), the father a must file a petition for guardianship and post a guardianship bond. In the case at bar, the father did not file any petition for guardianship nor post a guardianship bond, and as such cannot possibly exercise the powers vested on him as legal administrator of the minors property. The consent give for and in behalf of the son without prior court authorization to the loan application and the surrender was insufficient and ineffective and PHILAMLIFE was justified in disapproving the said applications.

Assuming that the property of the ward was less than 2T, the effect would be the same, since the parents would only be exempted from filing a bond and judicial authorization, but their acts as legal administrators are only limited to acts of management or administration and not to acts of encumbrance or disposition. Mendezona vs. Ozamiz G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002 Facts: Petitioners alleged that petitioner spouses Mario Mendezona and Teresita Mendezona own a parcel of land which they bought from Carmen Ozamiz. They initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their respective titles of ownership caused by the inscription thereon of the notice of lis pendens which came about as a result of an incident in a special proceeding for guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz initiated by respondents Julio Ozamiz, Jose Ozamiz, Paz Montalvan, Ma. Terresa Zarraga, Carlos Fortich, Jose Roz, Paulita Rodriguez and Lourdes Lon. The respondents alleged that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness on July 1987, had become disoriented and could no longer take care of herself nor manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Both parties agreed that Carmen needed a guardian over her person and her properties. Thus, as guardians, respondent Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz filed their Inventories and Accounts of Carmens properties and other assets including the parcel of land bought by the petitioners. Roberto and Julio caused the inscription on the titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens thus giving rise to the suit for quieting of titles filed by petitioners. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners; however, the appellate court reversed it. Held: A person is presumed to be of sound mind at any particular time and the condition is presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. The respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However, there are nine (9) other important documents that were, signed by

Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not assailed by the respondents. Such is contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree with the trial courts assessment that "it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of Carmen Ozamiz when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them." Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

Petitioner, as a guardian of Sleeping Beauty, has the care and custody of the person of Beauty and the management of her estate. Since he has the care and custody of Beauty, he has the right to request an order prohibiting any or all extraordinary or heroic measures being taken now or at any time in the future to resuscitate, awaken, or in any way revive or sustain by artificial means their relation by blood, Sleeping Beauty. He can also manage her estate, as a guardian, since Sleeping Beauty is incompetent to manage the said properties.