FMEA Analysis

FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):
Key Date:
System: Potential
Subsystem: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Component: Design
Design Lead:
Core Team:
rev 1.0 42303
Potential P
Potential S Current D R
Potential Failure Cause(s)/ R Recommended
Item / Function Effect(s) E Design/Process E P
Mode(s) Mechanism(s) of O Action(s)
of Failure V Controls T N
Failure B
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
© TLC, 2003
FMEA Type: Design
FMEA Number:
Prepared By:
FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of
Action Results
New Prob
New RPN
New Sev
New Det
Responsibility &
Target Actions Taken
Completion Date
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0
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Design FMEA Ex_
FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):
Key Date: FMEA Type: Design

System: Potential FMEA Number:
Subsystem: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
Component: Design FMEA Date:
Design Lead: Revision Date:
Core Team: Page:
Action Results
New Prob
Potential P
New Sev
Potential S Current D R Responsibility &
Potential Failure Cause(s)/ r Recommended
Item / Function Effect(s) e Design/Process E P Target Actions Taken
Mode(s) Mechanism(s) of o Action(s)
of Failure v Controls T N Completion Date
Failure b
Seals 0
Coolant 0
containment. Hose
connection.
Coolant fill. M
Sensor mount. Compression set Leak 8 Gasket material 7 Pressure cycle 1 56 Use imported
Seal w/cold shock. material
Sensor mount. Loosen during Leak. Fall inside 8 Fitting not held in 2 Added rib. 1 16 Implement holding J.P. Aguire
Seal sensor tank place rib in design. New 11/1/95
assembly/service fitting design.
Prototype
validation.
Sensor mount. Damaged internal Cannot install 5 Damaged during 2 1 10
Seal thread sensor installation or
transportation
Sensor mount. Damaged external Cannot install wire 4 Damaged during 3 1 12 Damaged fitting
Seal thread nut shipment to not used by
piracicaba Piracicaba
Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst. Leak 8 Over pressure 8 Burst, validation 1 64 Test included in J.P. Aguire 11/1/95
Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad pressure cycle. prototype and E. Eglin 8/1/96
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete production validation
testing.
Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst. Failed mount 5 Vibration 9 Vibration w/road tapes 3 135 Obtain GMB vibration J.P. Aguire
Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad road tape.
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete
Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst. Hose leak 6 Overpressure. Poor 5 Burst, validation 2 60 Obtain GMB clamps J.P. Aguire 12/1/95
Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad clamp pressure cycle w/GMB and clamping
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete clamps. specification.
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Design FMEA Ex_
Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack Air conditioning does 0 Operator instruction
Heat transfer not work. Sudden
structure refrigerant loss.
Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack Air conditioning does 0

Heat transfer not work. Sudden
Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack Leak. Loss of heat 8 Wicking. Material 7 Thermal cycle 1 56 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
Heat transfer transfer. strength Specification
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion Air conditioning does this is a test while 0
Heat transfer not work. Sudden dan is here
Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion Leak. Loss of heat 8 Coolant quality. 7 SWAT, service 5 280 Brazilian coolant to J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
Heat transfer transfer. Contamination. simulation. Coolant be evaluated. Zince
structure Environment - int/ext. evaluation. lined tubes may need
to be released.
Simulated service
test w/GMB coolant
to be performed.
Hold fluid, flow path, Puncture Leak. Loss of heat 8 External damage. 10 Leak test. Simulated 1 80 100% cores tested in E. Eglin 8/1/96
Heat transfer transfer. Coolant velocity. No service. production.
structure reinf sawcut. Simulated service
included in Product
Specificatin.
Hold fluid, flow path, Seam fail Leak. Loss of heat 5 Environment - int/ext. 1 SWAT, service 1 5 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
Heat transfer transfer. simulation. Specification.
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Burst fail Leak. Loss of heat 8 Over pressure 2 Burst/leak pressure 5 80 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95 Study originated
Heat transfer transfer. contamination. cleanliness.
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Plugged Loss of heat transfer. 8 Contamination. 7 1 56 GMB coolant to be J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
Heat transfer Leakage due to Coolant quality. evaluated. GMB to
structure increase flow velocity study engine
cleanliness.
Hold fluid, flow path, Ballooning Leak. Loss of heat 5 Over pressure 9 8 360 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95
Heat transfer transfer. contamination. cleanliness.
structure Clustomer profile to
be determined.
0
0
0
© TLC, 2003
Page 12
Design FMEA Ex_
of
Action Results
New RPN
New Det
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Design FMEA Ex_
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Severity Criteria
System FMEA Severity Rating
Effect SEVERITY of Effect Ranking

Hazardous without Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 10
warning affects safe system operation without warning
Hazardous with Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 9
warning affects safe system operation with warning
Very High System inoperable with destructive failure without 8
compromising safety
High System inoperable with equipment damage 7
Moderate System inoperable with minor damage 6
Low System inoperable without damage 5
Very Low System operable with significant degradation of performance 4
Minor System operable with some degradation of performance 3
Very Minor System operable with minimal interference 2
None No effect 1
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Severity Criteria
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Severity Criteria
General SEVERITY RANKING TABLE

Rank Category External and Internal Effect
10 Liability Failure will affect safety or compliance to law
9 Catastrophic customer impact
Moderate to major reliability failures
Reliability / End user recalls
Reputation Premature end-of-life (wear out)
at risk Increased early life failures
Intermittent functionality
Major customer impact
8 Minor reliability failures
7 Customer line impact / lines down
Impacts the yield of customer
Customer Wrong package / part / marking
quality Products performing marginally
inconveniences Involved customer's special handling
Damaged the customer's equipment
6 Product assembly error
5 Equipment cross contamination
Internal yield Damaged to down stream equipment
or special Major yield hit
4 handling Significant line yield loss
required Minor yield hit
3 Low line yield loss
2 Special internal handling, effort or annoyance
1 Unnoticed Unnoticed either internally or externally
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Severity Criteria
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Severity Criteria
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Severity Criteria
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Prob_ of Failure Criteria
PROBABILITY of Failure Failure Prob Ranking

Very High: Failure is almost inevitable >1 in 2 10
1 in 3 9
High: Repeated failures 1 in 8 8
1 in 20 7
Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 6
1 in 400 5
1 in 2,000 4
Low: Relatively few failures 1 in 15,000 3
1 in 150,000 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely <3.4 in 1,000,000 1
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Detectability Criteria
Detection Likelihood of DETECTION by Design Control Ranking

Cannot Detect Design control cannot detect potential cause/mechanism and 10
subsequent failure mode
Very Remote Very remote chance the design control will detect potential 9
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Remote Remote chance the design control will detect potential 8
Very Low Very low chance the design control will detect potential 7
Low Low chance the design control will detect potential 6
Moderate Moderate chance the design control will detect potential 5
Moderately High Moderately High chance the design control will detect 4
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
High High chance the design control will detect potential 3
Very High Very high chance the design control will detect potential 2
Almost Certain Design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and 1
subsequent failure mode
Detection Additional Detection Criteria Rank

Cannot Detect Absolute certainty of non-detection of defective product prior to shipment 10
Very Remote Test/inspection gates probably will not detect defective product 9
Remote Test/inspection gates will catch all but 25% of defective product 8
Very Low Test/inspection gates will catch all but 10% of defective product 7
Low Test/inspection gates will catch all but 1.00% of defective product 6
Moderate Test/inspection gates will catch all but 0.25% of defective product 5
Moderately Hight Test/inspection gates will catch all but 500 DPM of defective product 4
High Test/inspection gates will catch all but 60 DPM of defective product 3
Very High Test/inspection gates will catch all but 3.4 DPM of defective product 2
Almost Certain Test/inspection gates will catch all but 1 DPB of defective product 1
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RPN Interpretation
RPN Number
High Due to prob. of failure
High Due to severity
High Due to detection
Moderate Due to detection
Moderate Due to prob. of failure
Moderate Due to severity
Low All
Change design or process
Change design or process
Change process control/test method
Consider improving present control/test method
Consider changing design or process
Consider changing design or process
Maintain present status

FMEA Analysis

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FMEA Analysis

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FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):

FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):

Key Date: FMEA Type: Design

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack Air conditioning does 0

System FMEA Severity Rating

Effect SEVERITY of Effect Ranking

Moderate System inoperable with minor damage 6

Low System inoperable without damage 5

Very Low System operable with significant degradation of performance 4

Minor System operable with some degradation of performance 3

Very Minor System operable with minimal interference 2

General SEVERITY RANKING TABLE

PROBABILITY of Failure Failure Prob Ranking

Detection Likelihood of DETECTION by Design Control Ranking

Detection Additional Detection Criteria Rank

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