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? 1998 Journalof )Peace Research
vol.35, no. 3, 1998, pp. 299-317
RESEARCH SagePublications(London,Thousand
Oaks,CAand NewuDelhi)
[0022-3433 (199805) 35:3; 299-317; 0040231
TANJA ELLINGSEN
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo
A great deal of recent writing has indicated that growing scarcities of renewable resourcescan con-
tribute to conflict. Most of this research,however, suffersfrom two major methodological weaknesses:
lack of variation in the independent and dependent variables,and the absenceof control for other con-
flict-generatingfactors. As one of the first large-N studies of the relationship between environmental
degradationand domestic armed conflict, this article takes on these challenges.On the basis of a mul-
tivariateanalysis for all countries in the period 1980-92 we test and confirm the hypotheses (as indi-
cated from various case-studies)that factors like deforestation, land degradation,and scarce supply of
freshwater,alone and in combination with high population density, increasethe riskof domestic armed
conflict, especiallylow-level conflict. This holds true also when we control for economic and political
factors, such as level of economic development and type of political regime. The latter variables,how-
ever, prove more decisive than environmental scarcity in predicting the incidence of domestic armed
conflict. The severityof such conflicts is better accounted for by militaryexpenditurethan by environ-
mental degradation,poverty or non-democratic rule.
299
300 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume35 / number3 / may 1998
colleagues ignores the more direct linkages democratization and conflict. Theories on
between economic and political factors and the relationship between democracy and
domestic armed conflict. As a consequence, political violence generallylean towards the
the Toronto Group fails to contribute to a view that democracies are likely to experi-
broaderunderstandingof the causalpathway ence somewhat less violent conflict and re-
to domestic armed conflict. For example, do bellion than autocracies and far less than
democratic regimes pursue a more environ- in-between regime types, semi-democracies
mentally sound policy than autocratic (Eckstein & Gurr, 1975, Rummel; 1995).
regimes? We have confirmed this in our earlierwork,
Gleditsch & Sverdrup(1996) found that where we used two differentdatasetsfor do-
the effects of democracy are primarilyposi- mestic armed conflict in the periods
tive when it comes to types of environmen- 1945-92 and 1973-92 (Ellingsen, 1996;
tal degradation such as deforestation and Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997). On the other
loss of bio-diversity, but negative when it hand, the democratizationprocessitself may
comes to the emission of climate gases, CO2 generate conflict (Hegre et al., 1997;
in particular. On the basis of data from Huntington, 1991; Jakobsen, 1996).
around 1990, they arguethat political coun- Another important factor is the level of
teraction to the emerging greenhouse effect economic development within a country.
has not yet taken hold. Midlarsky (1998), Because most armed conflicts during the
on the other hand, finds a significant nega- 1980s and 1990s have taken place in devel-
tive relationship between democracy and oping countries, it seems self-evident that
environmental performance, using indi- the level of economic development must be
cators like deforestation and soil erosion, related to domestic conflict. Moreover, in a
whereasprotected land areasshow a positive study of political and economic develop-
relationship. As Midlarsky (1998: 7) also ment in 65 countries from 1800 to 1960,
notes, however, these differencesmay be ex- Flanagan & Fogelman (1970: 14) found
plained by sample size and different that countries with a high level of economic
measures of democracy used. Thus, there development are less likely to experiencedo-
does seem to be some kind of positive link- mestic violence. This relationship has also
age between democracy and environmental found support in our previous work
preservation. (Ellingsen, 1996, 1997; Hauge, 1997; Hegre
Most democraciesare found in economi- et al., 1997). A variantof this view is found
cally well-off countries, which means in the in Rapkin & Avery (1986), who construct a
industrializedworld. Gleditsch & Sverdrup model in which domestic political instability
also found that when they controlled for is produced by sudden shocks and gradual
level of development (using Gross Domestic effects originating in world commodity and
Product (GDP) per capita and the Human capital markets.The effects of such instabil-
Development Index (HDI) as indicators) ities are mediatedby levels of domestic econ-
the effect of the political system on the omic and political development in Third
environment was reduced (Gleditsch & World countries. In monocultures, for
Sverdrup, 1996: 23). Their study thus example, or in countries dependent on
indicates that both economic and political export income from just a few commodities,
factors affect the environment, and should falling prices on the world market may have
not be ignored. severe consequences for the economy, and
There is also a vast literature studying thus for the propensityto political instability
links among regime types, regime change, and domestic armed conflict. Again, our
Wenche Hauge &rTanja Ellingsen BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY 305
earlier work supports this view (Hauge & cal and economic factors, forming a sixth
Hegre, 1997). and a seventh hypothesis. Finally,we posited
With this discussion of Homer-Dixon's an eighth hypothesis, on the importance of
model and of the theorieschallenginghis ap- the variousvariablesrelativeto each other.
proach, we have underlined the necessity of These hypothesesare tested in two differ-
testing out Homer-Dixon's findings in a ent ways. First, in a mixed cross-sectional
multivariate analysis which includes vari- and diachronicanalysis,where we use a logit
ables from alternative and/or complemen- model based on all country-yearsin the in-
tary approaches. In addition to variables ternational system in the period 1980-92.
indicating degradation of renewable re- Here, incidence of domestic armed conflict
sources and population measures,we would was the dependent variable. Second, in a
also include indicators of the level of econ- pure cross-sectionalanalysisfor the period as
omic development (GNP per capita), regime a whole, with battle-deathsas percentageof
type and regime stability in the analysis. the total population as the dependent vari-
Thus, our next hypotheses are: able.
(6) Democratic countries, and in particular
stable ones, are less likely to experience Methodology
We use results from two different sets of
domestic armed conflict than are coun-
analyses.
tries with other types of political regimes
First, we want to see whether our inde-
(H).
pendent variablesaffect the incidence of do-
(7) Countries with a high level of economic
mestic armed conflict. With a dichotomous
development are less likely to experience
domestic armed conflict than are coun- dependent variablewith only two values in
the mixed cross-sectional and diachronic
tries with a low level of economic devel-
analysis we use a logit model (Aldrich &
opment (H).
Nelson, 1984) with country-years as the
Since degradation of renewable resources unit of analysis.
occurs primarily in countries with low econ- On the other hand, several of our inde-
omic development and non-democraticrule pendent variables are available for a single
we expect to find that: year only, and thus remainstatic throughout
the period 1980-92. Consequently, the
(8) Economic development and regime type
usefulness of the country-year approach is
have a higher explanatory power than
questionable. This leads us to run a cross-
environmentalscarcity(Hg).
sectional logit analysis with a dependent
variable for the occurrence or non-occur-
rence of domestic armed conflict.
Research Design
Since we are also interestedin the severity
Our first three hypotheses refer to the re- of conflict, we have performedan additional
lationship between supply-induced scarcity cross-sectionalanalysisfor the whole period
and domestic armed conflict, whereas the 1980-92, using a continuous dependent
fourth concerns demand-induced scarcity, variable:the number of battle-deathsas per-
and the fifth, structuralscarcity.All of these centage of the total population. Here the
hypotheses were derived from the work of unit of analysisis the country.
Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group. We Because of the different structuresof the
have expandedthe model by including other two methods, the structureof the variables-
conflict-generatingelements, such as politi- dependent as well as independent - is also
306 journal of PEACE RESEARCHv volume35 / number3 / may 1998
example through forest plantations, because Resources,1994). Data on the variable are
of decline in agricultureor because of cli- based on one year of information for the
mate changes). period 1980-92, and have been copied for
Our data on human induced soil degra- the remainingyearsof the period 1980-92.9
dation are based on WorldMap of the Status The categorization of the variable follows
of Human Induced Soil Degradation Shiklomanov (1993).10
(GLASOD, 1991), which refers to four Informationconcerningland degradation
types of soil degradation: water, wind, and freshwater availability is based on a
chemical, and physical degradation.6In this single year of observation.Hence, two of our
article, soil degradationis used to referto all three measures of supply-induced scarcity
the four types. Our classificationof no degra- remain static throughout the period
dation, low, moderate,and high degradation 1980-92. As previouslymentioned, this re-
is basedon the severity7and the extent8of all duces the value of an analysis with
four types of degradationin a country. If the country-years as the unit of analysis. In the
degradationwas not severeor affectedonly a pure cross-sectional analysis, each country is
small part of the country, it was considered only observedonce. The variablemeasuring
to be low. If the degradationwas somewhat decline in forest cover here refersto the per-
severe and covered a larger area of the centage decline in forest cover throughout
country, it was consideredto be moderate.If the whole period 1980-92; that is the per-
the degradationwas severe or covered large centage of change in forest cover in 1992,
parts of the country, it was categorized as relativeto the forest cover in 1980.
high. It has not been possible to obtain data
on soil degradationon an annual basis, so all Demand-Induced Scarcity Homer Dixon's
data are based on 1990 estimatesand copied (1994) demand-induced scarcity is opera-
for the other years. tionalized as population density, with data
Data on freshwateravailabilityper capita from the DemographicYearbook(1980-93).
were collected from World Resources Information concerning this variable was
(1986-95). The variable 'annual internal available for each year in the period
water resources'refersto the averageannual 1980-92 and is well-suited for the dia-
flow of rivers and groundwater generated chronic model. In the purely cross-sectional
from endogenous precipitation (World
i)Theyearof informationvariesfrom countryto country,
' Water erosion is defined as displacement of soil material and in the casesof Egyptand Turkeywe had two yearsof
by water. The GLASOD approach distinguishes between information.For a numberof couistries,the information
two types of water erosion: (a) loss of topsoil, and (b) ter- dates back before 1980: Djibouti (1973), Ghana (1970),
rairsdeformation. Wind erosion is defined as displacement Mauritania (1978), Mauritius (1974), Sudan (1977),
of soil material by wind. The GLASOD approach distin- Tanzania(1970), Uganda (1970), Zambia(1970); India
guishes between three types of wind erosion: (a) loss of (1975), Iran (1975), Iraq (1970), Jordan(1975), Kuwait
topsoil, (b) terrain deformation and (c) overblowing (land (1974), Lebanon(1975), Malaysia(1975), Oman (1975),
surface being covered by wind-carried particles). Chemical Pakistan(1975), Philippines(1975), SasidiArabia(1975),
degraeltion includes three processes: (a) loss of nutrients Singapore(1975), Sri Lanka(1970), SyrianArabRepublic
and/or organic matter, (b) salinization, and (c) acidifi- (1976); Costa Rica (1970), Cuba (1975), El Salvador
cation and pollution. Physical degradation also includes (1975), Guatemala (1970), Jamaica (1975), Mexico
three processes: (a) compaction, crusting, and sealing, (b) (1975), Nicaragua(1975), Panama(1975), Trinidadand
waterlogging, and (c) subsidence of organic soils (see Tobago (1975); Argentina(1976), Chile (1975), Uruguay
Oldeman, 1992). (1965), Venezuela(1970); Albania(1970), Ireland(1979);
'The severity of the process is characterized by the degree Australia(1975). Forthe othercountriesthe dataarebased
in which the soil is degraded and by the relative extent of on the latestyearavailableduringthe period 1980-92.
the degraded area within a delineated physiographic unit' 10The categorizationinto low, average,and high fresh-
(GLASOD, 1991: 14). water availabilityis based on Shiklomanov(1993). The
8 Extent refers to geographical coverage within a country.s values are given in 1000 cubic meters as follows: low:
boundaries. 0-5.0: average:5.1-20.0; high:over 20.1.
308 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume35 / number3 / may 1998
analysis, the variable refers to the total 0-10, where 10 is the highestscore (most
change in population density (in percent) democraticor most autocratic).We sub-
during the period 1980-92. tracted the score for autocracyfrom the
score for democracy,yielding a variable
Structural Scarcity We have operational- varying between 10 (most democratic)
ized Homer-Dixon's concept of structural and -10 (most autocratic).This variable
scarcity as income inequality. A better was categorized into three groups:
measure might have been distribution of democracies(6-10), autocracies(-10 to
land, but because of the lack of precise and -6), and semi-democracies(-5 to 5).
reliabledata on this variable,we had to rely (c) Political stability within a country. If a
on a perhaps second-best measure. country had the same type of regime for
Information concerning income inequality ten years or more, we characterizedit as
was collected from the World Bank's stable, otherwiseas unstable.
Economic Review (1996). The variable
measuresthe ratio of the top quintile share Polity III covers the whole period
of income to the bottom quintile share of 1800-1993; data on level of economic de-
income.11These data were availablefor one velopment were availablefor each year in the
year only and were copied for the remaining period 1980-92. Thus, in the mixed cross-
years of the period 1980-92. This also de- sectional diachronic analysis, the variables
creases the usefulness of the country-year referto the country'stype of political regime
approach. and/or level of economic development in
each of the years 1980-92. In the pure
Other Conflict-Generating Factors In cross-sectionalanalysis, on the other hand,
order to control for economic and political these variablesare basedon the averagescore
conditions, and to test hypotheses six and for the whole period. Since earlierstudies by
seven, we also included the following inde- one of the authors here (Ellingsen, 1996,
pendent variablesin the model: 1997; Ellingsen & Gleditsch, 1997, Hegre
et al., 1997) revealedan invertedU-curve re-
(a) The level of economic development of a lationship between level of democracy and
country, measured here as GNP per incidence of domestic conflict, we used the
capita. These data were collected from squaredaveragescore.
the World Bank's World Development Because our logit model includes the
Report (1982-95). To reduce the huge period 1980-92 with the country-year as
variations within this variable (from the unit of analysisand the incidence of do-
USD 80 to USD 37,000), we log-trans- mestic conflict as the dependent variable,
formed it, so that the variablerangedbe- problems of auto-correlation arise. A
tween 4 (low GNP per capita) and 10 country which is in civil conflict in a given
(high GNP per capita). year is intrinsicallylikely to be in civil con-
(b) Type of political regime within a country. flict the next year as well. To reduce the
This information was obtained from impact of this problem,we have, in line with
Polity III (Jaggers& Gurr, 1995). It in- earlierwork by one of the present authors
cludes indices for institutionalized (Ellingsen, 1996), included a variable for
democracy and autocracy,ranging from whether the country was in conflict in the
last year (1) or not (0). An alternativeap-
1 We re-coded this variable into three groups: (0) low in-
equality (ratio ' 5.0), (1) moderate inequality (ratio > 5.0
proach would have been to perform the
and ' 10.0) and high inequality (ratio > 10.0). analysisfor the outbreak of domestic conflict
Wenche Hauge e& Tanjd Ellingsen BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY 309
Civil War 1980-92: -2 log likelihood: 544.527; model chi-squared irmprovement: 3995).329;* p < 0.05; N = 893;
correctly predicted: 87%. Armed Conflict 1989-92: -2 log likelihood: 311.414; model chi-squared improvement:
103.316; *p < 0.05; N 303; correctly predicted: 83%. The first category for each variable is the reference group.
GNP per capita is a continuous variable, while the other variables are categorical. Several models were tested - the one
presented here had the lowest log likelihood and therefore provides the best fit. No significant interactions were found.
310 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume35 / number3 / may1998
(i.e. coding the dependent variable positive tion, high land-degradation, low fresh-
for only the first year of the conflict), in ad- water availability per capita - have positive
dition to the incidence of conflict, following beta estimates, whether the dependent
the pattern of Gleditsch & Hegre (1997) in variable is civil war or armed conflict. This
their analysis of interstate war. An argument is in line with our hypotheses (H1-H3) -
against using outbreak of domestic conflict the likelihood of domestic conflict is
as the dependent variable is that the years at higher in such countries, than in countries
peace are dependent in exactly the same way: with no or less environmental degradation.
a country which has no domestic conflict in The same is the case with population den-
a given year is more likely to have peace in sity - countries with high population den-
the next year too, compared with a country sity have a higher risk of domestic conflict
not at peace in the first year. To control fully than countries with low or even moderate
for this, one would have to exclude all but population density (H4). However, the es-
the first year at domestic armed conflict and timate for decline in forest is significant
the first year at peace! By including a lagged only for low-level armed conflict. Thus,
variable, we correct for both dependencies at deforestation may not seem to have any
the same time.12 real effect on larger conflicts, only on
Finally, findings from Adekanye (1994) smaller ones. For smaller conflicts though,
indicate that the severity of a conflict is the estimate is not only significant, but it is
highly determined by a country's military ex- also strongly positive - meaning that de-
penditure. Thus, in the pure cross-sectional forestation increases the risk of armed con-
analysis with the number of battle-deaths as flict substantially. This is interesting,
the dependent variable, we included a vari- especially since we also see that the coeffi-
able measuring military expenditure as a cients for the two other environmental fac-
share of GDP. The data for this variable were tors (land degradation and freshwater
obtained from the CIA World Factbook, CIA availability per capita) are stronger for the
(1981-93) and refer to the average percent- incidence of armed conflict than for the in-
age of GDP that a country spent on military cidence of civil war. It is tempting to con-
items in the period 1980-92. clude from this that environmental factors
are more important in explaining smaller
conflicts than larger ones. Could the dif-
Empirical Findings
ference in results be due to different time-
The Diachronic Study spans? A closer examination shows this not
Table I shows the beta estimates for each to be the case: environmental degradation
factor in the mixed model. Although we does not have increased explanatory power
cannot interpret the estimates directly, we after the end of the Cold War, but does
can - depending on whether the estimates have a stronger effect on smaller armed
are positive or negative - say whether they conflicts. This also confirms Homer-
increase or decrease the likelihood of domes- Dixon's (1995) expectations. Of the three
tic conflict. To be able to interpret the re- types of environmental degradation, how-
sults directly, we must translate the estimates ever, land degradation seems in general to
into probabilities, as shown in Table I. have the strongest effect on the likelihood
Taking the estimates first, we see that all of domestic conflict.
of the environmental factors - deforesta- The estimates for income inequality are
12 Another alternative is to use hazard models, as in also positive - indicating an increase in risk
Raknerud & Hcgre (1997) and Hegrc et al. (1997). of domestic conflict. However, these results
Table II. Probabilities (in %) of Domestic Armed Conflict When Risk Factors are Added
Table III. Cross-sectional Analysis of Civil War Battle-deaths as Percentage of Total Population,
1980-92
N= 118; r'=0.51.
are not significant,and should be interpreted war or domestic armed conflict is not par-
with caution. ticularly high in countries that suffer from
GNP per capita has a negative effect on only one of the supply-induced scarcities-
civil war:the higher GNP per capita, the less whether deforestation, land degradation,or
likely is civil war. This is again in line with low freshwater availability. However, as
our expectations. Table II shows, the risk of minor domestic
When it comes to regime type, the results armed conflicts in these countriesis between
are also as expected - with democracies 6 and 7 times the risk of major conflicts.
being the least likely to experiencedomestic Moreover,becauseall these conflict-generat-
conflict, and semi-democracies being the ing factors are intertwined, it is relevant to
most likely. Political instabilityseems also to inquire into the risk of domestic armed con-
increasethe risk of domestic conflict. flict when several risk factors are present
Also in line with our expectations,Table I within a country.Thus, in Table II we show
shows that if the country was in domestic the probability(in percent)when risk factors
conflict one year, it is by farmore likely to be are added to the model one by one. Table II
in conflict the next year, too. clearlyshows that the propensityfor domes-
Finally, Table I shows that both in ac- tic armed conflict increaseswith an increas-
counting for civil war and smaller armed ing number of risk-factorswithin a country.
conflicts, 'conflict last year' has the highest For example, a poor country sufferingfrom
explanatory power, followed by GNP per demand-induced,supply-induced,and struc-
capita and land degradation. For civil war, tural-inducedscarcityhas a 20% probability
type of political regime follows land degra- of incidenceof civil war and 45% probability
dation, while both deforestation and low of domestic armed conflict. The probability
freshwater availability are more important of both of these conflicts increasesfurtherif
than type of political regime in explaining the country is a semi-democracy, unstable
smaller conflicts. Thus, environmental and with a history of conflict. Becausethese
scarcity is indeed less important than econ- conditions are part of realityin many Third
omic factors in explaining domestic armed World countriestoday, these are truly alarm-
conflict, but - contraryto our expectations- ing findings.
in certain circumstances it is more important
than political factors. The Cross-SectionalStudy
In Table II these estimates are translated As noted, some of our independent variables
into probabilities. The probability of civil remain static throughout the period
Wenche Hauge ek Tanja Ellingsen BEYOND ENVIRONMENTAL SCARCITY 313
1980-92, which reduced the usefulness of large scale. Another explanationmay be that
taking the country-yearas the unit of analy- the elite exerts massive repressionof the de-
sis. We thereforeran a purely cross-sectional prived group(s), thus suppressingrebellion.
analysis for the same period, with the inci- Moreover,although most of the estimates
dence of domestic armed conflict as the de- are in the expected direction, all except one
pendent variable.The resultswere similarto are quite small, especiallythose forming the
those presented above and they will not be scarcity concept. Furthermore, before in-
discussedhere. cluding a variable for military expenditure,
Although environmental scarcity con- the model had an R2 of only 0.21. The in-
tributes to the incidence of domestic armed clusion of this variable increasesthe R2 to
conflict, the severityof such conflicts might 0.49. This indicates, therefore,that environ-
be attributable to other factors. Conse- mental factorsdo not necessarilyhave much
quently, we ran a pure cross-sectional influence on how many people get killed
analysis using number of battle-deathsas a during a conflict, even though they con-
share of the total population as our depen- tribute to the incidence of such conflict.13
dent variable.The resultsof this analysisare The relatively weak severity results could
reportedin Table III. possibly be explained by the fact that the
All but one of the coefficients in the cross-sectional analysis includes only the
model are in the expected direction. The number of battle-deaths in civil wars, and
higher the GNP per capita, the lower the consequently all conflicts with battle deaths
number of battle-deathsin civil war. The co- of 0-999 are treated as the same.
efficient for the democracy score revealsan Alternatively,the severity of a conflict may
invertedU-curve relationshipagainas antici- be determined by variablessuch as military
pated, and in line with earlier findings capabilities,weapons technology, size of the
(Ellingsen, 1997; Ellingsen & Gleditsch, armed forces and the duration of the
1997; Hegre et al., 1997). Moreover, the conflict, as well as by various psychological
higher the increase in population density, factors, rather than by environmental,
the greaterthe decline in forest coverage,the political and economic conditions. In any
greaterthe land degradation and the lower case, the one such variablewhich we have
the freshwateravailability- the larger the included, military expenditure in % of
number of deaths. Of these, GNP per capita GDP, turns out to be very important.
has the highest explanatorypower on battle-
deaths as a share of total population. All of
Conclusion
this is in line with our expectations.
Surprisingly, however, the estimate for Recent case-studies investigating the re-
income inequality is negative - lationship between environmental scarcity
indicating
that the higher the income inequality, the and civil conflict have underlined the
lower the proportion of battle-deaths. importanceof depletion and degradationof
Although this estimate is not significant at renewable resources,combined with popu-
the 0.05 level and, thus, must be interpreted lation pressure and unequal distribution of
with caution, it is still quite interesting.One land or income, as sources of domestic
possibleexplanationmay be that in countries armed conflict. In one of the first large-
where income inequalityis particularlyhigh, N studies of the relationship between
the deprivedand, thus, potentiallyrebellious
13 An additional cross-sectional analysis using number of
group(s) simply lack the resources (i.e. country-years of civil war as the dependent variable gave
weapons) to continue fighting, at least on a similar results.
314 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume35 / number3 / may1998
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WENCHE HAUGE, b. 1959; Cand. polit. in TANJA ELLINGSEN,b. 1970; Cand. poli. in
Political Science (University of Oslo, 1991); Political Science (University of Trondheim,
Research Fellow, International Peace 1995); Research Fellow, Department of
Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO); current Political Science, University of Oslo.
main interest:causes and dynamics of conflict
escalation.