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org/story/12375/ The pregnant wife of one protest leader was dragged naked from her home and beat en with batons. Today in Dabhol, the power plant is considered polluting and undependable. Sprin g water has become undrinkable, the mango crop is blighted and the fish catch is dwindling. Often at nightfall, the electricity fails. In 1999 MSEB bought a quarter of its power from the newly completed first phase of the Dabhol power project at Rupees 4.14 per kilowatt hour (roughly 10 US cent s) almost double the average local cost of producing electricity and more than t hree times as much the cheapest producer. What's more, the price of Enron's ener gy is slated to rise to 33 cents per kilowatt hour by 2017! Like many other firms, Enron saw an unlimited future in the Internet. During the late 1990s, it purchased on-line marketers and service providers, constructe d a fiber optic communications network, and attempted to create a market for trading broad band communications capacity. Enron entered these markets near the peak of the boom a nd paid high prices, taking on a heavy debt load to finance its purchases. When the dot com crash came in 2000, revenues from these investments dried up, but the debt remai ned. It is not unusual for businesses to fail after making bad or ill-timed investmen ts. What turned the Enron case into a major financial scandal was the company s respon se to its problems. Rather than disclose its true condition to public investors, as the law requires, Enron falsified its accounts.It assigned business losses and near-wort hless assets to unconsolidated partnerships and special purpose entities. In other words , the firm s public accounting statements pretended that losses were occurring not to En ron, but to the so-called Raptor entities, which were ostensibly independent firms th at had agreed to absorb Enron s losses, but were in fact accounting contrivances created and entirely controlled by Enron s management. When these accounting fictions which we re sustained for nearly 18 months came to light, and corrected accounting statements were issued, over 80% of the profits reported since 2000 vanished and Enron quickly collapsed. Under the existing power purchase agreement of 1995, which itself is the result of a disputed renegotiated deal, the MSEB has to pay the DPC a minimum of $220 m illion a year for 20 years whether it needs the power produced or not. The contr act, which is controversially counter-guaranteed by both the state and federal g overnments, threatens to bankrupt the MSEB and the state exchequer itself. The World Bank's analysis determined that the government had not provided an "ov erall economic justification of this project" and, in particular, noted that the MoU required the MSEB to pay the DPC within 60 days, but the company had no lim itations on actual supply of electricity, importing fuel, construction, or finan cing. In other words, the MSEB would have to pay the company for electricity at a prescribed rate, regardless of whether the electricity was actually available. the MSEB had agreed to a guaranteed minimum fuel purchase, while the fuel suppli er was not concurrently bound to provide a minimum quantity of fuel; and the MSE B had not verified whether the price of fuel was economical. Consequently, the C EA concluded that the "entire MoU is one sided" in favor of Enron and its partne rs.