FINAL COPY - Independent Study One.05

Contemporary Chinese political discourse:
Legitimizing the Party in the English language press

Joseph James Alvaro
Department of English
City University of Hong Kong
Chapter One: Political Language in China

1. Introduction
In this thesis I seek to investigate the construction and deployment of Chinese political
discourse in the print media, with specific reference to China Daily and other officiallysanctioned newspapers and magazines, which are published in English, ostensibly for an
international readership. The introductory part of Chapter One gives an overview of some
pertinent literature, which displays a range of theoretical approaches related to the analysis of
Chinese media. The overall theme of the articles is one of bearing witness to the social,
political and historical transformations reflected in CCP (Chinese Communist Party)
discourse as it gradually modifies its ideology from one of struggle to one of affluence.
Section 2 below, provides a brief account of basic information regarding definitions,
theoretical concerns and relevant CCP history, and proceeds to discuss the foreign reader
dynamic, while elaborating on the importance the CCP places on its English media as part of
the effort to propagate its ideology to a foreign audience. Legitimization for its policies, a
driving factor in CCP discourse, is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 then, offers an
explanation of the culture surrounding Chinas political language from a historical perspective
including the Confucian theory of language called the rectification of names (zhengming),
which has traditionally been a guiding principle in composing government discourse. Slogans
and fixed phrases (tifa) as well as their use in official formulations are discussed as a uniquely
Chinese characteristic, although in practice these are somewhat more than just slogans as they
not only articulate national policies, but may also radically shape these as well. Strategies of
language control from various 20th Century political transitions are summarized in Section 5,
along with the overview of a pivotal document, The Resolution on CPC History (1981),
which, by re-defining CCP the national myth, became the catalyst for Chinas changing
ideology.
The methodologies utilized in prior research, which I discuss in this chapter are
epistemically related to my analytical approach. The discussion of previous investigations
Contemporary Chinese Political Discourse: Legitimizing the Party in the English Language Press
adds contextual depth to the present study by situating it within its family of antecedents, thus
rendering a more comprehensive view.
Drawn by what may well be a classic case of the discursive construction of social reality
in the making, there is a kindred spirit among researchers who have been drawn by the
curious use of language in Chinas highly politicized media. Interested observers, having seen
the contradictions between PRC rhetoric and PRC reality in many contexts, are moved to ask,
What is going on here? As we witness a relocation of global power from West to East in the
early 21st Century, there are new spheres of influence being forged, and, as the PRC becomes
more assertive, it is only natural that the discourse accompanying its rise is beginning to
attract the attention of analysts. While China attempts to obscure its unseemly parts beneath
the rhetorical veneer of a harmonious society, it drifts further from the moorings of its
founding ideology. As soon as dissident voices rise, they are quickly subdued into silence,
while the world watches impotently yet sympathetically, from afar. But an unwritten logic,
that of the observer dictates, that where there are contradictions, questions must be raised.
Within the field of discourse analysis, there has been little written on the political language
of the CCP as it appears in English. Drawing mainly on Chinese-language data, crossdisciplinary studies in media and communication studies, sociology, political science, literary
and cultural studies, etc., have approached this topic from varying perspectives. Though most
are linguistically oriented, the range of approaches to the analysis of Chinese media remains
wide and diverse (see Li 2009, Cai 2008, Lee 2007, Chen 2004, Liebman 2007, Shirk 2007,
Huang 200, Guo & Huang 2002, Shi 2005, Winfield & Peng 2005, Yang 2003, Wang 2006,
Tong 2007, Yin 2007, Farquhar & Berry 2007, to name but a few). Kuo and Wu (2009)
acknowledge that though there exist a diversity of analytical methods that have been used in
the study of media texts produced in Greater China, there are universal characteristics that the
studies share. Among these are firstly, that the most commonly-held view of researchers is
that discourse is a form of social practice (173), and secondly, that researchers have in one
way or another, employed linguistically-oriented discourse analysis to investigate discursive
change of the media in its relationship with the socio-cultural change in the larger society
(ibid.). In the remaining portion of this introduction then, I will attempt to give a review of
some relevant research on the mainland press media.
A comprehensive overview of the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department
(CCPPD) is given in Bradys Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in
Contemporary China (2008). This is a fine-grained account of the intricacies and structure of
the CCPPD in which she explains how the production of propaganda, depending on its
purpose, is divided into two branches: the external (duiwai) and internal (duinei). The duiwai,
overseen by the Office of Foreign Propaganda is the branch related to this study, as it controls
the externally-oriented English language propaganda that forms an important part of the
CCPs interface with the Western world. The Office of Foreign Propaganda is concerned with
Chinas image abroad, its foreign publicity activities as well as monitoring, policing and
censoring all activities within China which fit within the foreign propaganda ambit including
the activities of foreign journalists, monitoring foreign social science research on China, and
controlling the Internet (Brady 2008: 63).
A diachronic study by Feng & Wu (2009) using a critical discourse analysis (CDA)
approach reveals the changing ideologies reflected in a typical Party newspaper at two periods
in time, 1980 and 2002. A comparison of texts from the two eras revealed that the periods are
in sharp contrast in terms of discourse. Though this particular study was on the advertising
genre, the political ideology is nonetheless reflected in the newspapers changing values as
underscored by the political orientation of the time. The 1980s advertising based its
persuasion on ideological values, while the later period advertisements manifested a much
higher usage of hedonistic value appeals and interactive linguistic features (218) to attract
the newly-prosperous (as opposed to ideologically motivated) population.
Huang & Chen (2009), also employing a diachronic CDA approach, discovered an
emerging trend of discursive democratization in certain Chinese print media. Through a
combination of qualitative & quantitative analyses of linguistic features, it was noted that
there was a gradual reduction of explicit power markers and a turn from negative judgment
to the increase of implicit power markers of positive linguistic items of appreciation and
appraisal (199). They hasten to add, however, that the democratization trend is only
conditional and rather limited under the current political system (ibid.).
In another approach to Chinese media analysis, Cai (2008) suggests that defining the social
boundaries of the xiaokang shehui (moderately prosperous society) is deeply rhetorical, since
it forms attitudes and induces actions by means of selecting objects for attention/inattention,
emphasis/de-emphasis, and salience/absence (16 citing Brown 1982, Entman 1991, Hall
1985, McKerrow 1989, Wander 1981). This includes not only what is said, but also what is
left out as noted by Ebert who writes that rhetorical criticism should be a mode of knowing
that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing (1993 cited
in Cai 2008:16) as part of the exposition of the controlling powers behind discourse. Cai also
discusses a rhetorical substitution of meanings using the word democracy as an example.
CCP officials, in their construction of xiaokang discourse, give the impression that democracy
is espoused but they are actually referring to elements of openness, transparency, and a
certain level of public participation (17). By using the word as a symbol without the
substance, the CCP creates a discursive space where it can assuage the burden of introducing
representative democracy (ibid.).
On constructing the xiaokang discourse in Chinese media, Pugsley (2006) discusses the
states plan of complex inter-weaving of Chinese values incorporating them into a patriotic
narrative on nation-building (78). The construction of hero narratives invokes the Maoist
era method of activating citizens will to overcome in times of national trouble through a
strategy of discursive conditioning. To mainland Chinese, this is a familiar narrative which
operates within conceptual frameworks that serve to mobilize the masses and, ultimately,
present a positive outcome in which the enemy (a foreign aggressor, corrupt official, or
Mother Nature) is defeated by the heroic Chinese people. Pugsleys observation is that even
in Chinas current prosperous times when media are supposedly moving away from ideology
to a market orientation, the hero narrative is always at hand as a deliberate and considered
means of operationalizing existing frameworks for the control of mass audiences (ibid.).
Taken as an indicator or revealer of social and political ideology, Pugsleys article is another
example of how textual analysis can uncover realities that belie the rhetoric of governments.
Related to the creation of national narratives, Lee (2007) discusses the national prism
through which world events must be filtered before public release. He writes, in the anarchic
international order, the state is the prime definer of national interests and perspectives
whereas media are a secondary definer (Lee, Chan, Pan & So 2002) which implies that
media lack political self-direction and thus need strong duiwai supervision. Featherstone
(1995 cited by Lee 2007: 2) suggests the state offers citizens a quasi-religious sense of
belonging and fellowship that codifies its visions, interests and myths in terms of foreign
policy.
Assuming a more controversial stance, Farquhar & Berry (2004) discern that in the Chinese
media there is no clear distinction between historical and fictional Chinese narrative for
which they coin the oxymoronic term history-fiction (121). They discuss culture critic Chow
Reys metaphor (1998: 6) describing the historical collective suffering of the nation as the
logic of the wound, which in the traditional yin-yang () dualism, comes before the
healing. This has resulted in the ritual formula yiku sitian (remembering past bitterness is
balanced by appreciating present sweetness) (Farquhar and Berry 2004: 121), a textual
structure regularly used to format media accounts of history-fiction. The current
government, of course, provides the healing most likely through xiaokang discourse and
other rhetorical strategies. Those in power who control the media and manipulate the
message to integrate present political thought with a restructured past (122), have the means
in Chinas mass media apparatus, to rhetorically conceptualize the promise of a bright future
in a harmonious society.
The textual anomalies encountered in the English language media in China are viewed in
terms of hybridized discourse by Guo & Huang (2002). Their analysis of English media in
China revealed the emergence of three socio-political functions (217), which specify the
linguistically construed social roles of the media. These functions offer an explanation for the
apparent contradictions one comes upon in Chinese press. They seem to offer a rationale for
why the text seems both keen to control and eager to please. This implies that, yes, China is
changing but at the same time, ideological indoctrination remains firmly in place (ibid.). It is
acknowledged that English media, within their stretched realm of discourse (218), have a
somewhat lesser obligation to echo CCP ideology, but I do not entirely agree with this. Even
though the English press in China may have an extended field of social and ideological topics
(meaning they can include peripheral information of interest to foreigners), they cannot
detract from or criticize official state views, as the CCP considers its ideology inviolable.
Focusing on how ideological positions are rhetorically constructed, Fang (1994) carried out
an analysis of the ways in which the Peoples Daily portrayed nations considered either
hostile or friendly to China. In comparing the differing textual representations of these two
categories of country, she concludes that the political interests of the CCP provide syntactic
structures in how these countries were represented (favorably or unfavorably). In her words,
lexical choices and syntactic options are not arbitrary (463), but rather designed to hide
causal relationships by choosing intransitivity and the use of the passive voice in order to
deflect criticism.
In a rhetorical analysis of Chinese political slogans from 1949, Lu (1999) discusses the use
of political language in the form of ideographs (McGee 1980), or what he describes as
persuasive ideological slogans designed to induce participation in a rhetorical culture (Lu
1999: 490). Slogans are instrumental in steering the mind of the public [and are] a particular
form of ideographs, [] considered the building blocks of ideology [] controlling mass
consciousness and shaping an individuals reality (ibid.). He suggests that the CCPs
disingenuous use of slogans bear[s] close resemblance to the methods used by the Soviet
Union and Nazi Germany (504).
From the CDA perspective, Fairclough (1989) observes that various notions of hierarchy
are implicit and assumed, and that assumptions of this sort are embedded in the forms of
language that are used [and] such assumptions are ideologies (2). He further explains that
the exercise of power in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and
more particularly through the ideological workings of language. CDA involves a necessary
discussion of the domination through language, by those who produce the text. Regarding
readership of the English language media produced in China, it is my belief that the ideology
is rejected and resisted by most of those it sets out to persuade. Furthermore, it is my
hypothesis that Western readers have already achieved a rather high awareness of what
Fairclough calls the critical consciousness of domination and its modalities (4) and have
developed the ability to read critically and avoid potentially exploitative social relations
(ibid.) implicit in persuasive political discourse.
Though not entirely from the perspective of linguistic discourse analysis, one of the main
works I will refer to is that of Alan Kluver. His Legitimizing Chinese Economic Reforms: A
Rhetoric of Myth and Orthodoxy (1996) sets the framework for my study. In his discussion of
various key historical documents (i.e. the 1978 Communiqu of the Third Plenary Session of
the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, and the 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in the
History of Our Party Since the Founding of the Peoples Republic of China) he has extracted
a range of key features of Chinas political discourse by focusing on concepts such as the
CCPs rhetoric of legitimization, the flexibility of the national myth, and the concept of a
rhetorical trajectory used in justifying the reforms.
These studies, as well as others, demonstrate that textual analyses carried out within a sociohistorical framwork yield significant results, which reflect the transformations of social reality
and the ideological course of the nation. Social change is related to wider discursive practices
and there is usually a co-variational relationship between social change and language use
(Fairclough 1992 cited in Huang & Chen 2009: 200). This is particularly true in time of
ideological shift such as that taking place in China with the promotion of reform and the
harmonious society discourse designed to legitimize the new version of CCP ideology.
These previous studies have looked at linguistic features of Chinese media as a range of
social and discursive issues but what is lacking in the literature so far is a contemporary
historical analysis of the discursive trajectory (Kluver 1996) of CCP discourse as found in
Chinas major English language paper, the China Daily. With this in mind, the questions I
would now like to posit are: What role does Chinas political discourse play in its rise? Does
its political terminology show, as some suggest, that China is a hegemon-in-waiting? How is
political legitimacy maintained during the metamorphosis of socialist dogma into its
antithesis? Or, put another way, how does the CCP discursively justify altering the bedrock of
its core ideology into the very thing it once abhorred (capitalism) without the slightest sense of
irony or betrayal of its historical legacy? And crucially, how does the use of the English
language through the printed media play a political role in China? It has been said that in
China virtually everything is political, and with the nexus of economic power shifting
eastward, the global spotlight is on.
2. Chinas English media: writing for foreign readers
The English press produces discursive objects of primary importance to the CCPs imageconstructing agenda, which are purposefully designed to speak in complete univocal accord
with contemporary policy. English-language newspaper production in China has never been
accorded secondary status by the Chinese Communist Party Propaganda Department (CCPPD
waishi, the department dealing with outside or foreign news) and foreign language media
have performed a major role in Chinas propaganda system since the early days of the CCP
and are considered central to its outreach efforts. For this purpose, an imagined friends of
China discourse community (Brady 2003, Anderson 1983) is assumed in order to elicit an
artful and strategic discourse style from journalists responsible for writing it (Chen & Qi
2009). Brady writes that the CCPPD waishi has long emphasized the friend-foe view towards
the foreign. Foreign friends and friendship have become the key words to the CCPs
ideology of the foreign in China (2003: 251), Brady writes. As a caveat, she observes that
any perception of friendship is only on Chinas terms and strictly in a utilitarian sense (Brady
2003: 249-254).
Chinas English media are designed for the particular purpose of creating an interface with
the international community through the major global medium of English. The objects of this
present study are the English versions of China Daily (since 1981) and Beijing Review
(weekly, since 1958). These, in sum, are linguistically engineered representations of what the
foreign discourse community should be thinking and believing about China. They are
designed to embody the purposely-constructed images China wishes to project to the world.
Chinese political discourse, in its English form, constitutes a compelling corpus of sociopolitical artifacts, particularly when viewed diachronically. This perspective creates a vantage
point from which the discourse of Chinas social and political contexts can be analyzed. The
study of the Chinese print media may thus yield significant and interesting insights into the
discursive construction a totalitarian government in ideological transition uses to legitimize
itself. In synchronicity with the Chinese press, the English press (China Daily, Beijing
Review, etc.) simultaneously reaches out in the attempt to persuade foreign readership.
Kluver (1996: 11-12) points out that since the government is orchestrating all media content
both English and Chinese, English versions convey exactly what Chinas top leaders want it
to convey. It is in this sense, he continues, that it is to our advantage to examine documents
that have been heavily scrutinized and edited. Arendt notes that one-party governments are
by far the most effective agencies in shielding ideologies and images from the impact of
reality and truth (Arendt 2005: 309). In societies where the powerful tend to negate any
dialogue that might result in political challenge, constructive criticism based on social critical
theory (such as CDA) can provide an empirically-based perspective on the situation.
Fairclough suggests that a critical approach to discourse contributes to a more equitable
society by casting light on connections, which may be hidden from people such as the
connections between language, power and ideology (Fairclough 2001a: 4).
In a 2009 exhortation to journalists entitled, International Commentary in the Context of
Globalization: Forestalling Opponents by a Show of Strength, Actively Channeling [Public
Opinion], Xinhua News Agency emphasized the high-priority, when writing for foreign
readers, of being artful and strategic in our commentary writing. Thus, they add, [w]e must
be objective, truthful and clever in expressing our viewpoints, making our reports as
convincing as possible (Chen and Qi 2009). This admonitory article promotes an aggressive
journalistic approach to what is seen as a rivalry between China and the West, or what might
also be interpreted as a clash of competing discourses. In discussing the tensions between two
societies that have greatly differing worldviews, Berger and Luckmann observe:
The problem posed by such a confrontation is typically sharper than that posed by intra-societal heresies
because here, there is an alternative symbolic universe with an official tradition whose taken-for-granted
objectivity is equal to ones own. It is much less shocking to the reality status of ones own universe to have
to deal with minority groups of deviants, whose contrariness is ipso facto defined as folly or wickedness, than
to confront another society that views ones own definitions of reality as ignorant, mad or downright evil.
Berger and Luckmann (1966: 125)
By depicting the China-West tension in a dichotomous Us vs. Them relationship, Xinhua,

to some degree, constrains its journalists to assume a confrontational tone, forcing them to
attitudinally align their discourse with the governments voice. This also accounts for why
public figures that have been outspoken or critical of CCP policy have been labeled as
treacherous collaborators aligned with foreigners against the motherland (e.g. Liu Xiaobo,
Ai Weiwei, Liu Xianbin).
In the 2009 Xinhua article, journalists are reminded to be ever mindful and unswerving in
the task of replicating central government policies in their written output. In doing so, they
must remain entirely consonant with the spirit of the CCP Central Committee and the policy
positions of the government (Chen and Qi 2009: no page). Much of the CCPPDs attempt
toward a more persuasive genre of discourse is aimed at convincing the international foreign
community of the legitimacy of the CCP. In attempting to address foreign sensibilities
regarding controversial issues by either adding a rhetorical display of Confucian harmony or
ignoring the issue altogether, these English media publications remain for the most part,
jejune. The CCPPD and the Xinhua News Agency act on the assumption that the more
emphasis given to the government position, the more status is accorded by the reader.
However, the contrary seems more to be the case. With unintentional yet exacting irony, the
greater emphasis placed on the state voice, the less ethical credibility the publication is
accorded by the reader.
In the same 2009 Xinhua guidelines for journalists, it was also recommended that both
domestic and public opinion needed to be more effectively channeled or manipulated. On
behalf of Xinhua, Chen and Qi exhort journalists writing commentary for international
readers to strictly adhere to correct guidance of public opinion and enhance the intimacy,
attraction and vitality [of our commentaries], while at the same time strengthen the aim and
actual effect of public opinion channeling [] (2009: no page). Perhaps it is somewhat
premature for those writing on behalf of the state to propose that foreign readers might be
convinced of CCP legitimacy through government-sponsored discourse. It is difficult to
conceive of sophisticated readers conferring legitimacy on Chinas political discourse as a
result of writers having been exhorted to produce articles that are intimate, attractive and full
of vitality (ibid.).
3. The CCP and the discursive strategy of legitimization

In order to discuss legitimization, it is necessary to go the 1978 origin of the current reforms.
At that time, Deng Xiaoping and other reformers knew that Maoism was not ideologically
equipped to carry China forward to an age of prosperity. The leadership recognized that
history would move on regardless of Chinas course of action. In order to keep up, China
needed to implement drastic change, and the most delicate part of engineering this change
was how to justify the potentially face-threatening shift from socialism to capitalism, while at
the same time maintaining the myth of the CCPs heroic struggle against capitalism.
Berger and Luckmann note that in pushing new conceptualizations beyond their original
notions (such as in extending the theoretical definition of socialism) challenges will arise. As
a counter-measure, precise linguistic formulations create a preemptively constructed anchor
of legitimization in response to challenges from heretical groups. They write:
[] new theoretical implications within the tradition itself appear in the course of [confronting challenge],
and the tradition itself is pushed beyond its original form in new conceptualizations [] As these
formulations were elaborated, the tradition was maintained and expanded at the same time [] In other
words, the symbolic universe is not only legitimated but also modified by the conceptual machineries
constructed to ward off the challenge of heretical groups within a society. (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 125)
The dilemma, in part, was resolved by setting what Kluver (1996) called a rhetorical
trajectory aimed at incremental adjustments geared toward the development of a market
economy to be accomplished over time. If the national myth and CCP ideology in their
conceptual forms were not able to accommodate the introduction of capitalism, it was crucial
that they were altered discursively to allow for change. This had to be done is such a way as
to save face and not compromise the Partys image.
Rhetorically distancing itself from Mao was a first step (see Section 5.1 for a fuller
discussion), so that in this way, the Party never had to say it was wrong. For example,
socialism, rather than being discarded as inappropriate or anachronistic, became socialism
with Chinese characteristics, which opened the door for variations or transformations of the
national myth or socialist ideology when thought to be expedient. A few short years before,
this would have been condemned as heterodoxy. Even though there is little to distinguish a
socialist market economy from capitalism, the use of the word capitalism would be
reactionary and cause a loss of face. This would give the impression of having been defeated
in the ideological battle with capitalism, as occurred in the former USSR. Avoiding any
negative analogy with the downfall of communism in the USSR was absolutely essential.
The Resolution on CPC History (1981), discussed in more detail later in this chapter
(Section 5.1), put forth the previously unthinkable notion that Mao, who had been accorded
near demi-god status, was seventy percent right and thirty percent wrong. In order to
implement reform, the CCP had to re-formulate the national myth by dismantling ideological
bulwarks in such a way that would justify the gradual introduction of ostensibly capitalistic
policies. In essence, the current purpose of political rhetoric in China is to resolve
contradictions that exist between the pragmatic aspects of government policy on one hand,
and the national myth and ideology on the other. For purposes of justification, such
inconsistencies as exist must be made to look legitimate, and not a betrayal of the heroic
legacy. This is accomplished in an incremental manner by discursively linking the moves
toward capitalism, however tenuously, to socialist ideology and some heroic elements of the
national myth. Language, for the political leadership, has one primary function, which,
observes Kluver, is to transform black into white and white into black. It both legitimates and
de-legitimates (1996: 133).
Berger and Luckmann have suggested that the institutional world requires legitimization,
that is, ways that it can be explained and justified (1966: 79). In modern China, with
decreasing numbers of the first revolutionary generation still alive, the Partys role in the
national narrative is being challenged. Newer generations have no memory of the struggle for
liberation that the first generation lived through, and what they know, they have been taught.
The current generations link to the CCP narrative is one of tradition or inherited fact, rather
than a biographical memory (ibid.). Because the universe of symbols transcends everyday
knowledge by its very nature, it is not feasible to socialize every individual into the
symbolic universe in the straightforward manner in which one can teach the meanings of
everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1996: 124). In the rush to provide legitimization for
policies that have conspicuously diverged from Marxist ideology, the CCP leadership has had
to re-interpret the national narrative in the attempt to make it relevant to the present sociopolitical and economic contexts. In this, the relaxation of ideological demarcations allows
discursive space for the manipulation and revision of both ideology and myth.
The reforms, set in motion by Deng Xiaoping and enacted by the CCP since the end of the
Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, have set China on a course toward
the goal of continued economic progress. Since the Third Plenum in 1978, the Party had
introduced into its rhetoric gradual and subtle modifications of ideology (e.g. Sinification of
Marxism, preliminary stage of socialism), which have allowed it to pursue an unfettered
course toward the goal of xiaokang shehui (a moderately prosperous society). The
formalization of these changes became reality with the 1981 Resolution on CPC History. As
mentioned earlier, this was a pivotal document that re-interpreted past history in order to set
the stage for the new ideology: the all-out pursuit of economic development. Kluver (1996)
has suggested that the discourses extant in the National Party Congresses (NCPCC) held
10
every five years are not so much for persuading the population, as they are to announce the
new Party line. Another function, for the more politically astute, is to provide clues into
acceptable behavior, and ultimately, [the creation of] a political reality (Kluver 1996: 131).
Knowledge of recent political discourse allows one to synchronize his or her attitudes and
actions to suit the prevailing wind of ideology.
The introduction of ambivalent formulations (e.g. socialism with Chinese characteristics,
socialist market economy, practice is the sole criterion of truth, etc.) has broadened the
discursive area from which the CCP can rhetorically justify reforms. Since the meanings of
these formulations are ambiguous, they deflate contestation from the outset because no one
can actually define them. They can be interpreted so as to create a sense of historical
progression within which economic reforms, no longer Marxist in orientation, are legitimized
because they seem like an extension of the natural course of events.
A critical point brought out by Kluver (1996: 126) is that the historical narrative remains a
primary component of political discourse. In the Chinese political context, it is through a
historical perspective and how one is positioned in relation to history, that one achieves an air
of moral authority, a crucial component necessary for political legitimacy. Actors within the
political landscape of China, along with their policies and persona, must find a historical
counterpart with which to identify, thus justifying their actions. A historical exemplar has an
explanatory effect on actions and positions, making them understandable and therefore
legitimate, as they follow a familiar, prescribed model. If there is no historical analogy for an
event of a party, notes Kluver, it is difficult to explain its existence (1996: 127). As an
illustration, he gives the example of students in Tiananmen (1989) who portrayed themselves
as a heroic continuation of the May 4th student movement of 1919. The government, however,
did not see them that way and depicted them as evil seed and counter-revolutionaries.
Forceful measures were then justifiably used in dealing with students and other demonstrators
because they had been discursively branded as a destructive element under the influence of
external agitators.
4. Political language with Chinese characteristics
Political language is a restricted code in which available options regarding vocabulary, style,
syntax and trope are more limited than in common language (Schoenhals 1992: 1). This can
be seen in the forbidden nature of certain terms (bihui) in the CCP lexicon. British
anthropologist Maurice Bloch observed that formalized language, the language of traditional
authority, is an impoverished language; a language where many of the options at all levels are
abandoned so that choice of form, of style, of words and of syntax, is less than in ordinary
language (1975: 13).
11
A word such as massacre, for example, in reference to the crushing of demonstrations in

Beijing on June 4, 1989 has been strategically replaced by the neutral term incident.
Forbidden words might include independence linked with Xinjiang, Taiwan or Tibet;
democracy when related to Hong Kong elections; as well as any terms related to sovereignty
when discussing Taiwan (e.g. President, Ministers, parliament, etc.). Jasmine, in reference
to the Jasmine Revolutions that swept North Africa and the Middle East in the spring of 2011,
has also been recently disallowed. One of the most aggressive objectives of CCP language
control is, as Schoenhals writes, in making the language of the state the sole legitimate
medium of political expression (1992: 3).
In literate societies, control of discourse is synonymous with the distribution of power. In
this regard, Bloch (1975) investigated institutionalized language as a form of power in
traditional societies of Madagascar. In doing so, his fieldwork provided a methodological
point of departure for Schoenhals seminal research on the implicit power encoded in Chinese
political terms. Bloch noted that in ceremonial speeches by tribal political leaders, control was
exercised in fixed formal styles, [and] their endless quotations and proverbs (Bloch 1975:
6). He went on to ethnographically investigate this formalization of political language on the
hypothesis that all political systems and all leaders use a variety of types of coercions, and
therefore use a variety of political language (Bloch 1975: 12). Bloch sought to answer
questions such as: first, How is it that formalization [of language] can become a form of
power or coercion? And second, [i]n what types of political system does one find this power
through form? (ibid.). Interestingly, the second question was answered by noting that the
extreme formalization of language with its accompanying exercise of power is characteristic
of traditional authority (ibid.). Traditional authority is a term sometimes used in reference
to Chinas paternalistic style of governance.
Kluver discusses the language of ideology in China as a way of managing fluctuating
orthodoxy (1996: 129). Stabilizing content (and therefore interpretations) of linguistic
formulations limits the range of available meanings, not in the sense of Orwells fictional
notion of language control/thought control, but rather through the self-censorship of ones
actions as delimited by current ideological mandate.
Ideological innovation is limited by the very fact that subtle changes in word usage and word order, and
hence, meanings, are not allowed. Since there is no outlet for heterodox word usage or meanings, governors
feel content that no serious ideological challenge to authority can arise. (Kluver 1996: 129)
Because ideology is expressed in linguistic formulations, incorrectly worded theories are

suspect of harboring a counter-ideology and hence, can be deemed irregular, if not illegal. For
the purposes of maintaining univocacy, the government offers translators lists of correct
formulas, which translate key terminology for use in the media or diplomacy. 1 Because of its
12
singular purpose, utilitarian style and semantic properties, this use of the English language
might plausibly be dubbed English for Chinese Political Purposes.
Schoenhals introduces the construction of political terminology in China with the following
excerpt:
The subject of the use and abuse of formulations is subject to constant strategic deliberation at the highest
levels of the CCP. In some cases the process of policy making is indistinguishable from the process of policy
formulation. Policy implementation at all levels is affected by concerns with questions like, How should this
be put? What happens if we put it with that? Will putting it like this put people off? (Schoenhals 1992: 3)
Questions like these show the scrutiny to which political language is subjected before it
appears in the public domain. Although all political systems rely on careful formulation of
political language, notes Kluver, the Chinese case is unique because of the ways in which
the use of language lends itself to easy, rigid formulations, formulations that in turn mandate
and proscribe political theory (1996: 7).
4.1 The Rectification of Names
Aware of the potential repercussions of incorrect formulations, Mao, in his day, meticulously
concerned himself with the close examination of semantic detail in government edicts.
Schoenhals cites Mao as having proclaimed one single [correct] formulation, and the whole
nation will flourish; one single [incorrect] formulation and the whole nation will decline
(1992: 3).
This concept is based on the Confucian tenet of zhengming, often translated as the
rectification of names, or the correct naming of things (i.e. roles and titles) in society that
guides the rhetorical choices used in the construction of CCP ideology and the crafting of its
ideological images. In essence, this Confucian tenet suggests that if names (and societal roles
by extension) are properly performed, society will be harmonious. If not, society will
degenerate into instability and chaos:
If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in
accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success [] What the superior man
requires is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.
Confucian Analects: The Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean (1893, 1971) Book XIII, Chapter 3,
verses 4-7.
An understanding of zhengming, its origins and determining effect on the formulaic

constructions of Chinas political discourse, cannot be underestimated. Historically, the
Confucian theory of language was based on the study and teaching of historical discourse
for which Confucius accredited the sage kings. Confucius viewed himself as a
traditionalist who felt a responsibility for being a transmitter (not a creator) of traditional
13
standards by suggesting that a thing so-called, must act (with utmost sincerity) as it is
named (e.g. let sons really be filial; let the tianzi really be respected as Son of Heaven)
(Loewe and Shaughnessy 1999: 758). In cases where the referent has failed to fit the
meaning, Mencius, a disciple of Confucius, asserted that use of the name should be denied.
In one such historical case during the Shang Dynasty (16th-11th Centuries BC), the slaying
of the last ruler of the Shang by King Wu of Zhou was justified because he had stopped
behaving like a ruler. Because the Shang ruler had ceased to reign in the manner required by
his title, King Wu of Zhou was, therefore, not guilty of regicide (ibid.).
In the first volume of The History of Chinese Philosophy, Fung discusses the role of
naming in the political context of ancient China (1953: 59). He describes the Confucian
belief that deterioration in politics and society began at the highest levels of government.
Degeneration would worsen by degree if each of the successive levels of ruler did not
correctly perform his role in the kingdom. The inevitable result, wrote the sage, was that
revolution by the people would eventually take place. To restore order in such situations,
Confucius believed that each level of government should be properly named, and then
exclusively perform its one designated role. Arrange affairs so that the Emperor would
continue to be Emperor, the nobles to be nobles, and ministers to be ministers and the
common people common people. That is, the actual must in each case, be made to
correspond to the name (Fung 1953: 59). Fung explains further that every name possesses
its own definition, which designates that which makes the thing to which the name is
applied be that thing and no other. In a sense, this means that all things that possess names
should follow the code of behavior to which they are bound by their names. Fundamentally,
the name is that things essence, or concept (Fung 1953: 60). In shaping standards of
comportment for humanity, Confucius expounded the doctrine of the rectification of names
believing that once the meanings of names were made fixed, they would serve as standards
for conduct (Fung 1953: 54). In essence, Confucius taught that a well-ordered society
could be achieved by rightly attributing names and that every object, in fact, should be in
agreement with the implications of its name.
The political expediency of the Confucian custom of constructing fixed names or pre-set
phrases corresponds with the use language in todays CCP Propaganda Department. An
article from Reuters News Agency (Beck 2007) on the proliferation of slogans in the current
administration of President Hu Jintao, discusses how the Chinese use of slogans is not just a
politically expedient strategy. The article states that fixed slogans actually steer the nation by
defin[ing] the goals of the nation. One consequence of this predilection for designating
words as correct or incorrect, legal or illegal is that discourse has become a site of struggle
involving well-documented cases of repression and incarceration. Policies, guidelines,
14
theories and plans are composed in fixed formulaic terms and deviation from these is not
permitted in Chinas current political context (Shambaugh 2007).
The case of the most recent winner of the Peoples Literary Prize (2010), novelist Murong
Xuecun (pen-name, Hao Cun), serves as an illustration of the linguistic tension that permeates
the political field in China. Mr. Murong was not permitted to give his acceptance speech on
the mainland and so in February 2011, he delivered it at the Foreign Correspondents Club in
Hong Kong. In his speech, he alluded to the stifling politicization of words in China, noting
that as a result of restrictions placed on contesting official ideology, he had become a word
criminal for unknowingly using reactionary words or words of the enemy:
Some words are revolutionary, and others are reactionary; some words we may use, and others belong to our
enemies [] The only speakable truth is that we cannot speak the truth. The only acceptable viewpoint is
that we cannot express a viewpoint [].
At the end of his speech, he posed a poignant and timely question: Is the Cultural
Revolution really over? (Murong 2011).
4.2 Tifa: a definition
Shambaugh (2007) discusses the use of fixed phrases in Chinese political discourse in the
following way:
The CCPPD very clearly establishes the substance and even the language to be used in such [news] articles.
This is known as tifa, which literally means formulation or wording. In the Xinhua News Agency this is
sometimes called the koujing (unified path). The CCPPD sets and enforces the exact wording to be used by
journalists, scholars and broadcasters in reporting on a given event. Deviation or variation from this tifa is a
very serious transgression, and is punishable. In this way, the Propaganda Department keeps the nations
media and scholarly community on message. (Shambaugh 2007: 53)
According to Shambaughs description above, the hierarchical Chinese propaganda system

has a set method for producing the formalized political language known as tifa. Examples of
tifa (in English) can be found in the Glossary of Chinese Political Terms (Li 1995), compiled
from politicized expressions used up until the time of its publication. 2 As an English language
resource for journalists, there are lists of key words to guide journalistic content such as
those found on the 17th Congress of the CPC (2007) website.3
In addition, the Translators Association of China (TAC 2011) website mentioned earlier,
carries formalized translations of set phrases for contemporary diplomatic and media use. The
phrases are all political in nature, pre-empting other uses such as commercial, cultural,
contractual or academic purposes which one might expect to find on a translators website.
Most examples of tifa on the TAC site reflect the governments current hexie shehui or
harmonious society agenda. For example:
15
All-win harmony; harmony and all winners

Live in harmony
The characteristics of a harmonious society
Harmony is most precious. Peace is to be cherished
Harmony is the way to be (The Doctrine of the Mean)
Reconciliation leads to harmony
To build a harmonious world, we should uphold democracy and equality to enhance cooperation and coordination, ensure amity/fertility and mutual trust to achieve common security; uphold justice and mutual
benefit to advance common development, and stay open to facilitate dialogue among civilizations.
As mentioned above, Schoenhals Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics (1992)
remains one of the major works on tifa.4 In this seminal research, he looks at the way in
which formalized language and formalized speech acts help constitute the structure of power
within Chinas political system (1992: ix). Though Schoenhals limits his research to the era
spanning from the 1960s to the 1990s, it is still relevant in that it focused on a number of
enduring traits of Chinese political terminology, some of which can be carried forward into
todays context.
One criterion of correct formulations in their discursive context is that they are scientific
(9). Scientific simply means that they are politically useful and have a desired effect on the
populace. This explains Schoenhals, is homologous to Western advertising rather than
politics. If the CCP adopts a particular formulation it does so because the formulation is
judged to be politically useful and clever. A highly scientific formulation is one that the state
can use as a powerful tool of political manipulation (9). Central to the process of creating the
political discourse (on which the English version is modeled) there are oft-repeated
ideological phrases, which are central to the operation of national politics.
Brady (2008) describes tifa as the equivalent of Orwells Newspeak, the correct
terminology (stipulated by the Chinese Government), to be used in public discourse (100).
She draws a historical distinction between the Maoist era use of tifa for transforming China
into an ideologically aware socialist state, to its current use, which is the maintenance and
legitimization of the Party-State system (101), which requires a more persuasive (less
ideological) style of rhetoric. It is quite clear to the reader that the discourses of Jiang Zemins
affluent society (xiaokang shehui) and Hu Jintaos Confucianism and harmonious
society (hexie shehui), are designed to legitimate the CCPs mandate to rule by attempting to
create the appearance of historical progression, thus providing the rhetorical justification for
change.
Ideology thus assumes a tremendous rhetorical power within Chinese political life. Since ideological
justifications serve as the primary basis for legitimate rule, all policy and personnel decisions must be framed
within an ideological explanation [] all change must be accounted for within the pre-existing ideology.
(Kluver 1996: 37)
16
The significance of precise wording in CCP discourse is reflected in a quotation from a

Politburo member who said of Maos well-known assiduousness with exact formulations,
the Chairman has always been very strict in his choice of words. In order to understand him you have to pay
attention. If he says something has no major flaws, it still means that it has medium to minor flaws! It does
not mean that it is splendid. (cited in Schoenhals 1992: 4)
This leaves us to consider that what is not said also carries meaning and significance. The
general consensus among CCP leadership was that the slightest inaccuracy in wording could
result in a theory being incorrectly interpreted and misunderstood. It was believed that
tampering with formulations is where revisionists would, historically speaking, attempt their
ideological modifications of Marxism. The convention of using tifa for precision and nuance
of meaning in the current era of reform is geared to a more socially sophisticated audience. In
fact, these fixed formulations, as they are called in English, are constantly being updated
according to whatever ideological agenda the CCP is trying to promote.
In the 1990s, the Party changed strategies and published guidelines for the media on how to
make propaganda attractive, entertaining and inspiring (Brady 2008: 74). Brady describes a
propaganda offensive in which popular culture was designated a useful tool for political
education at which point, media content became less overtly political. This process affected
the arts including television shows, game shows, and even pop music, all of which took on
subtle political content. Artists and writers records Brady, were inspired to write politically
acceptable material through enticement of material gain (Brady 2008: 74). Popular artistic
endeavors were guided by the use of tifa with the calculated purpose of making indoctrination
and thought work more acceptable to the masses. In this way, the nations heroic myth is
never far off, similar to Billigs (1995) concept of banal nationalism and the use of
nationalistic imagery in everyday contexts. This banalization of the national myth does not
signify that propaganda is any less political. It indicates that there is a lateral move in
expanding its radius to include more areas to which indoctrination may be extended. It does
not imply a move toward liberalization.
A related problem in attempting to execute artistic endeavors using state-sponsored
language is brought out by Bloch (1975: 14). It is evident that when certain syntactic and
vocabulary restrictions are imposed on an artistic enterprise, and where expression is ruled
by formulaic structures, static genres and fixed lexical choices, the result is a drastic reduction
in linguistic creativity. In authoritative societies where discourse is produced within strict
boundaries, there is an impoverishment in terms of metaphors and other illustrative language.
Cross-referencing, restricted to the body of official circulars and mandates, becomes a
shallow exercise where the use of inter-textuality is impeded by a narrow body of referents
17
rendering Chinas English media language both colorless and monotonous. But for those who
wish to operate outside the mandated universe of discourse, the stakes are high.
5. The logic of language control
In viewing the formalization of terms for political purposes as social control, one perceives
that the practicality of rebuttal or contradiction is greatly diminished, which exposes a type of
symbiotic mutualism between power and formalized language (Bloch 1975). On the
understanding that to be logical, an argument must be formally contradictable in order to
show its logical nature, Bloch argued that formalized language is not entirely logical because
it [rules] out the two prerequisites for logic. According to Bloch, these are the potential of
one statement to be followed by a large number of others and the possibility of contradiction,
finally concluding that [f]ormalized language is therefore non-logical (Bloch 1975: 21).
Drawing on Austin, Bloch distinguishes between propositional force and illocutionary
force of language. He suggests that formalized language is not altogether meaningless,
indicating, in effect, that two meanings are distinguishable: One is the propositional force of
language, the ability of language to corner reality by adapting communication to past
perception and connecting this with future perception (Bloch 1975: 22). The other is
performative or perlocutionary force, which, notes Austin, is intended not to report facts
but to influence people in this way or that (Austin 1961: 221).
At an earlier time (1929) and from a more ideological perspective, Voloshinov viewed the
field of linguistics from a Marxist perspective where words (semiotic elements) can be seen
as the basic unit of analysis. His approach was that the semiotic, in its most potent form, is a
persuasive conditioning factor most thoroughly conveyed through language (13).
According to Voloshinov, words should be elevated to a prime position in the study of
ideologies as they are the foremost medium of consciousness, so much so, that the word
functions as the essential ingredient accompanying all ideological creativity whatsoever (1415). The word is the most sensitive index of social changes (19 original in italics) and can
reveal incremental revisions of doctrine, which have yet to reach the full bloom of ideology.
This seems to coincide with Kluvers concept of historical progression, which parallels
Voloshinovs diachronic concept of slow quantitative accretions of change.
When we take a longitudinal glance at the Chinese reform process, we see a clear trajectory of the
justifications themselves. In much the same way as time lapse photography reveals the dramatic changes in
scenery, this analysis of the rhetorical trajectory of legitimation reveals the dramatic changes in that rhetoric.
(Kluver 1996: 123)
In this way, the CCP can create an altogether different re-conceptualization and definition
of socialism. The common threads running through each of these stages are the continuous
18
revising and retelling of history and a continuous subtle revision of ideological orthodoxy
(Kluver 1996: 123).
Bringing an Orwellian perspective to bear on political language, Young (1991) discusses one
of the functions of communist slogans as quenching spontaneity and thought (209).
According to government strategies, the circulation of critical thinking or autonomous thought
must be limited to within certain boundaries or areas in order to reduce the possibility of
dissident activity. Since the CCP is no longer a party of struggle, it has now become the status
quo, the [party] of public order and concentrates on building and sustaining its own
legitimacy (209). In a chapter entitled the rectification of language, Young suggests that one
of the first priorities of communist governments on taking power is a re-visitation of the
language. Prior to the actual establishment of a new universe of meanings by the dominant
party, there is a time of chaos in public discourse as to which version of the world will
dominate and gain greater currency with the masses. It is at this point, according to Young,
that the process of assigning meanings begins:
the circle of a new and exceedingly narrow consensus about language, enforced and fostered by officialdom,
begins to close, sealing out more and more the possibilities for alien ideas and images to invade and permeate
the mind. Under pressure from totalitarian dictators and their spokesman from poets and playwrights as
well as publicists and professional agitators words cease to assist and facilitate rational thought, to reflect
objective reality, or to translate past and present experience with reasonable accuracy and reliability. Instead,
they form a language of assent and domination whose essential characteristic is its univocacy: for every
politically significant word, one meaning; for every historical event, one interpretation; for every social
problem, one solution; for every genre of literature, one style of writing. (Young 1991: 31)
This sort of linguistic engineering is precisely what occurred in China after the CCP was
established setting the precedent, which continues to the present. According to Li Chi, who
documented linguistic upheaval from 1956 to 1958 in mainland China, language change was
one of the first goals in consolidating power. The purpose was to impose a new culture and
purge out the old one, so as to cleanse superfluous terms to make sure the lexicon conforms to
the socialist view of society. New terms can also be created for previously unnamed concepts,
not to mention the facilitation of the re-writing of history, which serves to portray the cause
favorably and minimize unseemly actions that have taken place on the way to power. In the
post-civil war society, the CCP considered pre-1949 language as illogical and declared it
should be replaced with pure and healthy language (Schoenhals 1992: 3).
Young has described a systematic process for rectification of language, which he explains as
a three level rhetorical process that has historically accompanied implementation of language
change in communist societies such as East Germany, the USSR and China as well as in Nazi
Germany. The first level of change is the re-definition of old words (semanticide), the
elimination of selected old words (logocide), and creation of new words (neologisms) all
with a view to molding in members of the civil and social order a communist
19
consciousness (1991: 188). These terms seem to roughly parallel what Orwells character
Syme (the 1984 lexicographer) said when he explained to Winston the theoretical essence of
Newspeak:
The vocabulary was so constructed as to give an exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that
a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other meanings and also the possibility
of arriving at them by indirect methods. This was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by
eliminating undesirable words and by stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings. (Orwell
1949: 259)
Change has been achieved when three distinct characteristics are manifest in the modified
language (Young 1991: 189). These are: first, narrowness and rigidity of definition; second,
the fluidity of definitions through time; and third, the Manichaean character of vocabulary.
Narrowness can be defined as the delimitation of meaning assigned by Party semanticists
where one meaning and one meaning only is ascribed to words or formulations of words.
Aggregated symbols wrote Klaus, lead to political action of a divided character (Klaus
1971, cited in Young 1991: 192) which is not conducive to a developing a passive society.
Fluidity acknowledges the need for measured flexibility of language to accommodate the
revisions, amendments and adjustments arising from rectifications in ideology. Young
furnishes an example of fluidity by comparing the pre-Cultural Revolution definition of
Confucianism as: an ancient Chinese philosophical school founded by Confucius, which
advocated benevolence and righteousness, with the definition during the Cultural Revolution:
a school of thought in Ancient China, founded by Confucius, which represented the interests
of the exploiting class (my italics, Lehmann 1975, cited in Young 1991: 192). There were
many other documented examples of such changes.
The party line varied so frequently in the 1960s and 1970s that it was impossible to keep
Chinese dictionaries up to date (Young 1991: 192). An example of this is seen in Klauss
concrete-historical approach to the term people, which allows communist parties to pursue a
flexible policy that takes into account changes in the position of various classes (1991: 195).
In other words, classes can easily be renamed or redefined according to the contemporary
party line. A quite recent example of this is that landlords and business tycoons have been
elevated to the status of eligibility for CCP membership by Jiang Zemins policy of the Three
Represents. Once vilified as class enemies (i.e. capitalist-roaders, bourgeois reactionaries,
rightists, oppressors of the masses, etc.), wealthy entrepreneurs may now join the CCP.
Through discursive manipulation, they have even become a type of patriotic role model.
Manichaean vocabulary divides the world into black and white (good and evil), and Young,
drawing on Carney and Scheers (1964) observations of the Marxist-Leninist value system,
discusses how the political lexicon of Communism can be subdivided into various categories
according to positive and negative word use.
20
5.1 The Resolution on CPC History: legitimization through rectification

In 1978 the Party held the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China. As mentioned in Section 3 above, this was a watershed event, a
decisive moment which laid the groundwork for the 1981 document, Resolution on Certain
Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the Peoples Republic of China
(or Resolution on CPC History, hereafter the Resolution) which re-structured the belief system
of the national myth. This was accomplished by re-defining many previously sacrosanct
historical events regarding the role of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong
and others. In essence, the Resolution was preparing the way for a radical re-working of the
national myth. Its most important rhetorical function, pivotal to the reform movement, was
to legitimate a change of focus away from class struggle toward economic modernization
(Kluver 1996: 46).
In the bid to get China on the road to reform, Maos policies, in a sense had to be
discursively repudiated, however gradually and gently. Deng realized the importance of Maos
image because the national narrative had constantly portrayed Mao as its epic hero. The
Partys credibility was inextricably linked to Maos image and its legitimacy rested largely on
his heroic role as liberator and savior of the Chinese people (Kluver 1996). With new
economically progressive directions in mind, a strategy for addressing necessary changes had
to be devised and large parts of the historical national narrative had to be re-interpreted to
accommodate this. For this purpose, the Resolution was created in 1981. As mentioned in
Section 3 of this paper, the Party had to distance itself from Maos policies. To accomplish
this, Mao and his legacy were discursively re-created through this document. This is where the
now famous 70:30 ratio was unveiled and Maos policies were officially designated as
seventy percent good and thirty percent bad. His involvement in the Cultural Revolution was
portrayed as being unorthodox and in violation of his own highly esteemed Mao Zedong
Thought. Since Mao had been thirty percent in error, this created enough rhetorical space for
the party to forge a new direction a quasi-capitalist economy under Deng Xiaoping.
In addition to casting Mao as theoretically incorrect some of the time, it also reversed
decisions on Deng Xiaopings former heterodoxy and portrayed [him] as having been
intimately involved in the successes of the Party (Kluver 1996: 49). The Resolution absolved
Deng by stating that his past vilification as a reactionary and capitalist roader, etc., in the
1970s had been erroneous.
The confusing of right and wrong inevitably led to confusing the people with the enemy. The capitalistroaders overthrown in the cultural revolution were leading cadres of Party and government organizations
at all levels, who formed the core force of the socialist cause. The so-called bourgeois headquarters inside the
Party headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping simply did not exist. (The Resolution on CPC History, 1981:
20.2)
21
The Party had to make an important strategic distinction in the portrayal of Mao which
allowed for the maintenance of Party legitimacy that largely rested on Maos legacy, while at
the same time labeling Mao as only human and therefore, not infallible. Kluver observed that
this was accomplished by creating a discursive distinction between Mao as Chairman and Mao
as Comrade.
As Chairman, he was at times driven by arrogance; as Comrade, Mao was guided by his consubstantiality
with the people of China, regardless of his mistakes. As Chairman, Mao perpetuated erroneous theories, but
as Comrade, he codified the wisdom of the Party into Mao Zedong Thought. As Chairman, Maos legacy can
be dispensed with, but as Comrade, Maos legacy and his mythic status are invaluable. And thus, Comrade
Mao was honored not as an infallible interpreter of ideology, but as a leader of the people, one whose heart
beat with that of this nation. (Kluver 1996: 56)
The need to make this distinction was in order to continue using Mao Zedong Thought as a
theoretical basis for decisions concerning the Partys line. It was essential to Party legitimacy
and historical continuity to uphold the infallibility of Maos Thought, while at the same time,
maintain control by retaining the exclusive rights to interpret that Thought.
What can be seen from history then, is a trail of discursive artifacts (i.e. media products)
diachronically distributed, clustering around and supporting each significant occurrence along
the historical chain of events. Significant events mean those that introduce rhetorical change
(i.e. NCPCC addresses, Communiqus or Resolutions, etc.) or alterations in either ideology or
myth to legitimize movement toward economic development. This body of documents and
their trickle-down effect on the media, both Chinese and English, is like a shadow world that
does not just reflect society, but sets out to guide it. To the analyst, these discursive artifacts
when juxtaposed in a disciplined and systematic manner on political events and their
outcomes, demonstrate the manner of interplay between words and deeds, between the state
and society, and between discourse and political reality. In its purest form, PRC media sets out
to stipulate, to advise and to notify. It does not describe social reality (i.e. the news), but
rather, it attempts to prescribe and define reality by telling society how it should behave.
6. Conclusion
As discussed above, the Chinese penchant for the rectification of language reaches back to
Confucian times and is still very much alive in todays CCP era of Confucian harmony and
the socialist market economy. The introduction of key documents over the years has been
indicative of this. The Third Plenum (1978), the Resolution on CPC History (1981) and the
discourses promoted at each National Congress have allowed the CCP to continue spinning
the national narrative and following the rhetorical trajectory that was set in motion with the
economic reforms. The re-calibrations in the narrative create the opportunity for reinterpretation of the myth (Kluver 1996), which in turn, justifies any course of action the CCP
22
deems necessary. Socialism has a new ideology which has been theoretically justified by
simply adding with Chinese characteristics to the phrase. Having unfastened the ideological
constraints of Maoism, socialism now means anything that leads to greater and faster
economic development.
The contradictions existing within Chinas universe of discourse continue to characterize a
high-stakes struggle. The English language print versions of this propaganda, as expressed in
The China Daily and Beijing Review, for example, are pitched to persuade the foreign reader
of the legitimacy of the CCPs policies. Newspaper articles produced under Xinhua are not
only shaped by government policies, they act as virtual mouthpieces for the state voice. In
support, waishi journalists are exhorted to produce artfully crafted commentaries geared
toward a subtle persuasion of the foreign reader (Chen and Qi 2009).
This chapter has discussed the historical importance of formalized language in the
propaganda system and the use of tifa as a distinctly Chinese characteristic that can serve to
alter political discourse as needed. The correct naming of policies and positions in Chinese
political culture is a historical and cultural practice still important in framing political
language. Officially formulated terms are regarded as rhetorical guides for the nation, so
much so that they help constitute the structure of power within Chinas political system
(Schoenhals 1992: 1).
In a historical synthesis, theories of political language control are discussed in terms of
logic and lexical manipulation as Young (1991) gives a description of the processes involved
in politically induced language change as it occurred at various crucial times during the 20th
Century. Voloshinov (1929) and Kluver (1996), though separated by nearly seventy years in
their conceptualizing of accretions of change, ultimately find congruence through their
diachronic perspective on the discursive analysis of alterations resulting from attempts at
ideological legitimization.
In closing this first chapter, I draw on Kluvers (1996) observation that governments gain,
maintain and legitimize power, not only through the material world in their organizational and
political systems, but also through their rhetoric. By turning our attention exclusively to the
rhetorical reconstruction of the dominant political ideology, he wrote, we can see clearly the
ways and methods by which an entire national mindset has been re-fashioned (1996: 5).
My objective, therefore, is now to move forward in the next chapter with a discussion of
methodologies and a literature review of the various approaches to discourse analysis suited
to my research purposes.
Endnotes
1.
For current examples of key terminology see: Translators Association of China website at
23
http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content_3917705.htm
2.
In The Glossary, Li writes: Chinese political terms teach a good deal but they have different meanings than
what we may think. Sometimes they represent policies of the Party which must be followed. Sometimes
they encapsulate complex ideas or events. And sometimes, they are new sayings and aphorisms found useful
by the people. One country, two systems and three exchanges and four contacts are Beijings policies with
regard to Taiwan and Hong Kong. Without a clear understanding of these terms, it is easy to misunderstand
the relationships between Beijing and these territories during the Deng era (1995: xxv).
3.
The 17th National Congress of the CPC Press Center (2007) presented a list of Key Words for journalists to
use. Some examples are: socialist central value system; building a well-off society; establishing a socialist
market economy; the three-step development strategy, etc. A list of 17th NCCPC Press Center Key Words
(and their glosses), can be found at http://english.cpcnews.cn/92460/index.html
4.
The title is in homage to John L. Austins How to Do Things with Words, 1962.
References
Anderson, Benedict (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London and New York: Verso.
Arendt, Hannah (2005) Truth and politics. In Jos Medina and David Wood (eds.) Truth:
Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions (pp. 295-314). Malden MA: Blackwell.
Austin, John L. (1961) Performative utterances. In James O. Urmson and Geoffrey J.
Warnock (eds.) Philosophical Papers (pp. 233-252). Oxford: The Clarendon Pres.
Austin, John L. (1962) How to do Things with Words. London: Oxford University Press.
Beck, Lindsay (2007) Chinese slogans mark Hu era. Reuters News Agency, 7 September 2007.
Retrieved on 10 April 2011from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/09/07/uk-china-partyslogans idUKMOL74807920070907
Berger, Peter & Luckmann, Thomas (1966) The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in
the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Penguin.
Billig, Michael (1995) Banal Nationalism. London: Sage Publications.
Bloch, Maurice (1975) Introduction. In Maurice Bloch (ed.) Political Language and Oratory
in Traditional Society. London: Academic Press.
Brady, Anne-Marie (2003) Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the
Peoples Republic. Lanham MI: Rowman & Littlefield.
Brady, Anne-Marie (2008) Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in
Contemporary China. Lanham MI: Rowman & Littlefield.
Brown, W.R. (1982) Attention and the rhetoric of social intervention. Quarterly Journal of
Speech 68, 17-27.
24
Cai, Bei (2008) Official discourse of a Well-off Society: constructing an economic state and
political legitimacy. In Doreen Wu (ed.) Discourses of Cultural China in the Globalizing
Age (pp. 13-26). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
Carney, James D. and Scheer, Richard K. (1964) Fundamentals of Logic. New York:
Macmillan.
Chen, Hegao & Qi Zejian (2009) . China
Journalism Review, 11 June 2009. Retrieved on 2 April 2011 from
http://cjr.zjol.com.cn/05cjr/system/2009/06/11/015584246.shtml
Chen, lily (2004) Evaluation in media texts: a cross-cultural linguistic investigation. Language
in Society 33, 673702.
Chow, Rey (1998), Introduction: on Chineseness as a theoretical problem. Boundary 2 25(3),
1-24.
Communiqu of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China. Peking Review 52, 29 December 1978, 6-16.
Legge, James ([1893] 1971) Confucian Analects: The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of
the Mean (pp. 263264). New York: Dover Publications.
Ebert, Teresa L. (1993) Ludic feminism, the body, performance and labor: bringing
materialism back into feminist cultural studies. Cultural Critique 22, 5-50.
Entman, Robert M. (1991) Framing US coverage of international news: contrasts in narratives
of the KAL and Iran Air incidents. Journal of Communication 41(4), 6-27.
Fairclough, Norman (1992) Discourse as Social Change. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Fairclough, Norman (1989) Language and Power. Harlow Essex: Longman.
Fairclough, Norman (2001a) The discourse of New Labour: critical discourse analysis. In
Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates (eds.) Discourse as Data: A
Guide for Analysis (pp. 229-268). London: Sage/Open University.
Fang, Yew-Jin (1994) Riots and demonstrations in the Chinese press: a case study of
language and methodology. Discourse and Society 5(4), 463-481.
Farquhar, Mary & Berry, Chris (2004) Speaking bitterness: history, media and nation in
twentieth century China. Historiography East & West 2(1), 116-143.
Featherstone, Michael (1995) Undoing Culture. London: Sage
Feng, Jieyun & Wu, Doreen D. (2009) Changing ideologies and advertising discourses in
China: A case study of Nanfang Daily. Journal of Asian Pacific Communication 19(2),
218-238.
Fung, Yu-lan (1953) A History of Chinese Philosophy, Volume1: The Period of the
25
Philosophers. Translated by Derk Bodde. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guo, Zhongshi & Huang, Yu (2002) Hybridized discourse: social openness and functions of
English media in post-Mao China. World Englishes 21(2), 217-30.
Hall, Stuart (1985) Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-structuralist
debates. Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2, 91-114.
Huang, C. (2003) Transitional media vs normative theories: Schramm, Altschull, and China. A
paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association,
San Diego CA, 27 May. Retrieved on 9 January 2010 from
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/1/2/2/5/p112251_index
.html
Huang, Ying & Chen, Jian-ping (2009) Discursive democratization in mainland China: a
diachronic study of the New Years editorials in the Peoples Daily. Journal of Asian
Pacific Communication 19(2), 199-217.
Klaus, Georg (1971) Sprache der Politik. Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissen-schaften.
Kluver, Alan R. (1996). Legitimizing Chinese Economic Reforms: A Rhetoric of Myth and
Orthodoxy. New York: State University of New York Press.
Lehmann, Winifred P. (1975) Language and Linguistics in the Peoples Republic of China.
Austin TX: University of Austin Press.
Lee, Chin-Chuan (2007) Bound to rise: Chinese media discourses on the global order. A paper
presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, San
Francisco CA, 23 May. Retrieved on 13 December 2009 from
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/6/8/8/9/pages168895/
p168895-1.php
Lee, Chin-Chuan; Chan, Joseph M.; Pan, Zhongdang and So, Clement Y. K. (2002)
Global Media Spectacle: News War over Hong Kong. Albany: State University of New
York Press.
Li, Chi (1956) General trends of Chinese linguistic changes under communist rule. Studies in
Chinese Communist Terminology. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Li, Chi (1957) Literary and Colloquial Terms in New Usage & Terms Topped by Numerals.
Studies in Chinese Communist Terminology. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Li, Chi (1957) The Communist Term the Common Language and Related Terms;
Dialectical Terms in Common Usage; Literary and Colloquial Terms in New Usage.
Studies In Chinese Communist Terminology. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Li, Chi (1958) The Use of Figurative Language in Communist China. Studies in Chinese
Communist Terminology. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
Li, Juan (2009) Inter-textuality and national identity: discourse of national conflicts in daily
26
newspapers in the United States and China. Discourse & Society 20(1), 85-121.
Li, Kwok-sing (1995) A Glossary of Political Terms of the Peoples Republic of China.
Translated by Mary Lok. Shatin, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
Liebman, Benjamin L. (2005) Watchdog or demagogue? The media in the Chinese legal
system. Columbia Law Review 105(1), 1-157.
Liu, Xiaobo (2008) Charter 08. Translated from Chinese by Perry Link. Retrieved on 3
December 2010 from http://www.charter08.com/charter08.php
Loewe, Michael and Shaughnessy, Edward L. (1999) The Cambridge History of Ancient
China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Lu, Xin (1999) An ideological/cultural analysis of political slogans in communist China.
Discourse & Society 10(4), 487-508.
McGee, Michael (1980) The Ideograph: a link between rhetoric and ideology.
Quarterly Journal of Speech 66, 116.
McKerrow, Raymie E. (1989) Critical rhetoric: theory and praxis. Communication
Monographs 56, 91-111.
Murong, Xuecun (2011) Words we can use, and those we can not. New York Times. Retrieved
on 28 February 2011 from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/opinion/24iht-edmurong24.html?_r=2
Orwell, George (1949, 1984) Nineteen Eighty-Four: With a Critical Introduction and
Annotations by Bernard Crick. Oxford: Clarendon.
Pugsley, Peter C. (2006) Constructing the hero: nationalistic news narratives in contemporary
China. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3(1), 78-93.
Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the
Peoples Republic of China, Sixth Plenary Session, 27 June 1981. Chinese Communism
Subject Archive. Retrieved on 26 April 2011 from
http://marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm
Schoenhals, Michael (1992) Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five studies.
Berkeley CA: University of California Press.
The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: Press Center (2007). Retrieved
on 7 March 2011 from http://english.cpcnews.cn/92460/index.html
Shambaugh, David (2007) Chinas propaganda system: institutions, processes and efficacy.
The China Journal 57, 25-58.
Shi, Anbin (2005) The taming of the shrew: global media in a Chinese perspective. Global
Media and Communication 1(1), 33-36.
27
Shirk, Susan L. (2007) Changing media, changing foreign policy in China. Japanese Journal
of Political Science 8(1), 43-70.
Tong, Jingrong (2007) Decentralization in the Chinese government-media relation: how
powers struggle in the journalistic field in China. A paper presented at the annual meeting
of the International Communication Association, San Francisco CA, 23 May. Retrieved
on 8 December 2009 from
p171957-1.php
Translators Association of China (2011). Retrieved on 4 March 2011 from
http://www.tac-online.org.cn/en/tran/2010-12/23/content_3917705.htm
Voloshinov, Valentin N. (1929) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. Translated by L.
Matejka and I.R. Titunik. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Wander, Philip (1981) Cultural criticism. In D. Nimmo and Keith Sanders (eds.) Handbook of
Political Communication (pp. 497-528). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Wang, Jian (2006) The politics of goods: A case study of consumer nationalism and media
discourse in contemporary China. Asian Journal of Communication 16(2), 187-206.
Winfield, Betty & Peng, Zengjun (2004) Marketplace or party controls? The Chinese media in
transition. A paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication
Association, New Orleans LA, 27 May. Retrieved on 20 December 2009 from
p113231-1.php
Yang, Jin (2003) Framing the NATO air strikes on Kosovo across countries: comparison of
Chinese and US newspaper coverage. Gazette 65(3), 231-249.
Yin, Jing (2007) The clash of rights: a critical analysis of news discourse on human rights in
the United States and China. Critical Discourse Studies 4(1), 7594.
Young, John W. (1991) Totalitarian Language: Orwells Newspeak and its Nazi and
Communist Antecedents. Charlottesville: University of Virginia.
28

FINAL COPY - Independent Study One.05

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Descrizione originale:

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

FINAL COPY - Independent Study One.05

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Contemporary Chinese political discourse:

Legitimizing the Party in the English language press

Chapter One: Political Language in China

By depicting the China-West tension in a dichotomous Us vs. Them relationship, Xinhua,

3. The CCP and the discursive strategy of legitimization

A word such as massacre, for example, in reference to the crushing of demonstrations in

Because ideology is expressed in linguistic formulations, incorrectly worded theories are

An understanding of zhengming, its origins and determining effect on the formulaic

According to Shambaughs description above, the hierarchical Chinese propaganda system

All-win harmony; harmony and all winners

The significance of precise wording in CCP discourse is reflected in a quotation from a

5.1 The Resolution on CPC History: legitimization through rectification

Philosophers. Translated by Derk Bodde. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Potrebbero piacerti anche