Husserl Studies 18: 165183, 2002. 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

165

Static-Phenomenological and GeneticPhenomenological Concept of Primordiality in Husserls Fifth Cartesian Meditation*

NAM-IN LEE
Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul 151-742, Korea

In the fifth Cartesian Meditation,1 Husserl is interested mainly in the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity that aims to clarify the conditions of the possibility for empathy. In section 44 of this meditation, launching into the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity, he talks about the necessity of carrying out a peculiar kind of thematic Epoch (Hua I, 124) within the universal transcendental realm that has already been disclosed through the transcendental reduction. In contrast to the transcendental reduction as the first reduction, he calls this peculiar kind of thematic Epoch the second reduction. This second reduction consists in disregarding all the constitutive achievements of the intentionality that is related to other subjectivity (Hua I, 124) and delimiting the whole connection of intentionality . . . in which the ego constitutes itself in its ownness and in which it constitutes the synthetic unities that are inseparable from and assigned to it (Hua I, 124). Husserl calls this whole connection of intentionality the primordial sphere. Primordial reduction, as a method of abstraction, is exactly the means to gain access to the primordial sphere that is valid only for me, the meditating ego. According to Husserl, the primordial sphere is the foundation or the motivational ground for empathy and, as such, it is introduced in the fifth CM as a fundamental concept without which it is not possible to develop the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This is the reason why he calls the definition and articulation of the primordial sphere the transcendentally very significant preliminary stage (Hua I, 138) for the development of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. One can recognize the significance of the primordial sphere for the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the fact that, from its first introduction in section 44, reappearing continually until the end of the fifth CM, it guides the whole phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity. Although the concept of primordiality plays such a central role in the development of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the fifth CM, it has undergone many interpretations and critical assessments and there

166 are many different views on it. Among the interpreters who are very critical of it, some hold the extreme view that it is impossible to conceive such a primordial sphere, since it cannot be observed phenomenologically.2 On the contrary, some interpreters hold the view that it is a legitimate concept that is indispensable to the development of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Unfortunately, these interpreters do not agree as to the context in which the concept of primordiality is introduced in the fifth CM. Some interpreters hold the view that it is introduced as a basic concept of genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity,3 whereas some other interpreters hold the view that it is a basic concept essential for the logical clarification of intersubjectivity.4 In my opinion, the various views have been a consequence of the way the concept of primordiality was introduced and elaborated in the fifth CM. Although Husserl handles the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM as if it were a concept that would be self-evident to all those who think phenomenologically, it is, as will be discussed in detail below, a very unclear concept that is ambiguous in many respects and needs clarification. Below I will take into account some ambiguities in the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM. Among these discussed below the ambiguity that reveals itself in the field of tension between static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity5 will come to the fore. In section 1, analyzing some passages of the fifth CM, I will try to show that the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM is actually in many respects ambiguous. In section 2 and section 3, I will discuss the staticphenomenological and the genetic-phenomenological concept of primordiality respectively. Thereafter, in section 4, I will deal with the relationship among the ambiguities discussed in sections 13. In section 5, I will make a brief assessment of the various views on the concept of primordiality mentioned above and a short remark on the basic character of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the fifth CM.

1. Ambiguities of the Concept of Primordiality in the Fifth CM In order to understand the basic character of the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM, one should pay attention to the fact that it came into being after lengthy reflections about the problems of intersubjectivity on Husserls part. As Iso Kern correctly informs us, the concept of primordiality, as it is found as a basic concept in the fifth Cartesian Meditation (Husserliana I), first appears in about 1925 (Hua XIV, 390). However, one can find the preliminary form of it already in the works that were written before 1925. In this context, Husserl writes in a manuscript from 1921 as follows: No matter how much the attitudes directed to objectivity are already in play, we can abstract from them at any time. . . . Through this abstraction we gain access to what I called

167 the solipsistic world and the solipsistic world-view. (Hua XIV, 109) In this passage, Husserl tells us that, before the time he wrote this manuscript, he had called the world-view gained through the abstraction the solipsistic worldview. This implies that he had dealt with the problem of the solipsistic worldview in the works written before 1921. In fact, we can find Husserls attempts to deal with the problem of the solipsistic world-view in the 1910s. For example, in a manuscript from 1918 that has been published as the text no. 15 of Hua XIII: Towards a Theory of Empathy, he contrasts the solipsistic world-view and the intersubjective world-view, and considers the former as something that can be gained by abstraction (solipsistic abstraction): exclusion of all mental entities from nature, exclusion of every individual being given through empathy (Hua XIII, 410). The context reveals that the solipsistic abstraction in this passage, which is the same as the abstraction in the passage cited above from the manuscript from 1921, has a function similar to the primordial reduction in the fifth CM; for this reason, it can be regarded as a preliminary form of this reduction. We can find the solipsistic abstraction as the preliminary form of primordial reduction as early as the period when Husserl was working on Ideas II: Each person has, ideally speaking, his/her egoistic surrounding world within his/her communicative one, so long as he/she abstracts from all the connections of understanding others and the apperceptions founded upon them. (Hua IV, 193) Although the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM came into being as a result of reflections that lasted for a long time, it is ambiguous in many respects. First, as mentioned above, the primordial sphere can be disclosed only by abstracting from all the constitutive achievements of the intentionality that is related to other subjects. That is to say, primordial sphere is a sphere without empathy and this is the reason why Husserl calls it the sphere of my ownness. Contrary to this position, however, he also maintains that each consciousness of the other, each way of appearance of him, still belongs together to the first sphere (Hua I, 131), that is, to the primordial sphere. With this statement, he is contradicting himself by claiming that the primordial sphere both includes and excludes the experience of empathy at the same time.6 Second, the primordial sphere, as a sphere of my ownness that is valid only for me, the meditating ego, is, by definition, my primordial sphere. Contrary to this fact, Husserl also talks about a primordial sphere in which we already have found a world, a primordial one (Hua I, 169, my italics). It is clear that in this case the primordial sphere does not mean a sphere of being that should exclusively be valid for me as a meditating ego, but rather a sphere that I share with other subjects. If one defines the primordial sphere as the sphere of my ownness, how could one meaningfully talk about our primordial sphere? How could it be justified methodologically to extend my primordiality to our primordiality?

168 Third, since the primordial sphere is disclosed through the primordial reduction that, according to the explanation in section 44 of the fifth CM, can be carried out within the already disclosed universal transcendental realm of being, it means originally transcendental primordial sphere. This fact is also expressed in the phrase my ego . . . in its transcendental sphere of ownness (Hua I, 125, my italics). However, near the end of the fifth CM, in section 61, Husserl maintains that the primordial sphere is conceivable not only in the transcendental attitude but also in the natural attitude. According to him, as in the case of transcendental phenomenology, so also in the parallel case of intentional psychology (as a positive science) our exposition has manifestly predelineated a fundamental structure, a division of the corresponding investigations of eidetic psychology into those that explicate intentionally what belongs to the concrete ownness of any psyche whatever and those that explicate the intentionality of the other constituted therein (Hua I, 171). In this context, we can ask at least two questions: Can the primordiality in the natural attitude be called primordiality in a true sense? How do the primordiality in the transcendental and that in the natural attitude fit together? Fourth, as mentioned already, Husserl defines the primordial sphere as the foundation for empathy. This definition is, however, only a formal and empty one, since it is not defined in what sense the primordial sphere can play such a role. The foundation for empathy can have two different meanings, namely, the foundation of subjective validity for empathy and the genetic foundation for empathy. When we investigate empathy from the perspective of transcendental phenomenology, it is the task of static phenomenology of intersubjectivity to clarify the foundation of subjective validity of empathy and it is the task of genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity to clarify the foundation of genesis of empathy.7 The static-phenomenological question about the foundation of subjective validity of empathy can be formulated as follows: What are the subjective validities on the ground of which the subjective validity of empathy can be justified? The subjective validity in this context means a persons belief that a fact seems to be valid or true for him. An example of the subjective validity is the belief contained in the act of empathy, namely the belief that an entity is experienced by her/him not merely as a thing, but also as a person. In order to justify, she/he has to appeal to some other beliefs, for example, the belief that there is a similarity between my body and the entity that is experienced by her/him or the belief that the entity is experienced by her/ him as a human body. In contrast to the static phenomenological question about the foundation of subjective validity of empathy, the genetic-phenomenological question about the foundation of the genesis of empathy can be formulated as follows: What are the subjective acts on the ground of which the act of empathy has been generated in the field of consciousness of a person? In this case, the subjective act as the genetic foundation of the act of empathy can, but does not have to, contain in itself a belief. Not only the acts that contain a belief,

169 but also the acts that do not contain any kind of belief, for example, the instinctive intentionality on the lowest level of transcendental genesis, can serve as the genetic foundation of the act of empathy. Since subjective validity and genesis are two different basic categories of transcendental phenomenology, the concept of primordiality as the foundation for empathy must have two different meanings. Right after the publication of CM, Husserl became aware of the fact that the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM is not a perfect and final one, but rather a very unclear one. This is the reason why, after the publication of CM and until the end of his life, he was occupied intensively with the problem of primordiality and left behind, as Hua XV shows, many manuscripts on this topic. His efforts to clarify the concept of primordiality during this time can be regarded as partly successful. In the 1930s, as distinguished from the time during which he was working on CM, he was fully conscious of the following two ambiguities in the concept of primordiality.8 The first one is the ambiguity that is related to the question whether empathy belongs to the primordial sphere or not. In this context, in a manuscript from 1934, he explicitly talks about the ambiguity of primordiality (Hua XV, 635). The second one is the ambiguity that can be observed in the field of tension between the transcendental and the natural attitude. In a manuscript from 1933, he discusses this ambiguity intensively and talks about the reduction to the primordiality in the natural and the transcendental attitude (Hua XV, 530).

2. The Static-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality Husserl explicitly tells us in the fifth CM that he is dealing with staticphenomenological problems of intersubjectivity.9 Actually the transcendental phenomenology that has been developed in section 4447 of the fifth CM is a static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In fact, these sections aim to clarify the system of layers of subjective validity contained in empathy. Therefore, it is not by chance that in these sections one can find such expressions as meaning and validity (Hua I, 123, 132), unities of validity (Hua I, 96), a series of evidence (Hua I, 100), and validity of being (Hua I, 106, 107), all of which indicate the task of static phenomenology of intersubjectivity as the clarification of the system of layers of subjective validity contained in empathy. Accordingly, the concept of primordiality developed there is a staticphenomenological one. The concept of primordiality that is formally defined as the foundation for empathy thereby receives a clear meaning. The primordial sphere in the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity means concretely the foundation of subjective validity for empathy to which every meditating ego should go back in order to clarify the validity of empathy. As such, it is

170 the sphere of primary evidence, the primary original self-givenness (Hua XV, 572) that makes the validity of empathy possible. In order to grasp the static-phenomenological concept of primordiality concretely, we should examine the whole context of CM and investigate what makes it necessary to elaborate this concept in the fifth CM. In the first Meditation, the transcendental reduction enables the meditating ego to discover transcendental subjectivity as the founding realm of being without which the world as a natural realm of being would not be conceivable. However, the discovery of transcendental subjectivity in the first Meditation, which is guided by the principle of apodictic evidence, has the limitation that only the tiny core of transcendental subjectivity that can be experienced by the meditating ego in the mode of apodictic evidence, namely the living self-presence that the grammatical meaning of the sentence ego cogito brings to expression (Hua I, 62), is captured by the reflecting ego. For this reason, Husserl undertakes, in the second Meditation, the uncovering of the transcendental field of experience according to its universal structure (Hua I, 62). This process of uncovering enables the meditating ego to bring to light the immense realm of transcendental self-experience (Hua I, 68) such as the stream of consciousness according to its structure of noesis-noema, synthesis as the original form of consciousness, identification as the basic form of synthesis, universal synthesis of transcendental temporality, actuality and potentiality of intentional life, and, of course, empathy as the type of intentionality that is related to the other. During the course of uncovering the transcendental realm of experience that continues until the fourth Meditation, the critique of transcendental experience and, consequently, of transcendental knowledge in general (Hua I, 68) is put aside. This critique, that is the critique of the evidence of transcendental experience and knowledge in general, aims to clarify, with respect to each form of transcendental experience disclosed thus far, its system of layers of subjective validity. If one reads the whole CM, one might get the impression that the critique of transcendental experience has been undertaken nowhere and put aside forever. However, that is not the case: What has been undertaken under the title of intersubjectivity and, first of all, under the title of primordiality in sections 4447 of the fifth CM, is nothing other than the critique of the evidence of empathy as the condition of the possibility for the constitution of intersubjective world. The starting point of the critique of the evidence of empathy is the fact that, with respect to the system of layers of subjective validity, empathy as the transcendental constitution . . . of other subjects (Hua I, 124) is in question. Accordingly, it is the task of the critique of the evidence of empathy to render intelligible the validity of empathy from the standpoint of subjective validity, and this task cannot be fulfilled without discovering the foundation of subjective validity on which the validity of empathy is based. The methodologi-

171 cal procedure to disclose the foundation of subjective validity for empathy is the primordial reduction that consists in excluding all that is questionable from the thematic field (Hua I, 124). Thus it disregards all the constitutive achievements of the intentionality that is, directly or indirectly, related to the other subjectivity (Hua I, 124). The procedure aims, finally, to delimit the whole connection of intentionality . . . in which the ego constitutes itself in its ownness and in which it constitutes the synthetic unities that are inseparable from and assigned to it (Hua I, 124). This whole connection of intentionality is called the primordial sphere. Thus, in order to make the validity-claims of empathy understandable, I must go back to nothing other than the primordial sphere, since it is the foundation of subjective validity for empathy. In this context, Husserl states in a manuscript from 1933: If I reduce to my primordial world . . . it is . . . a layer of validity that is founding for the validity of the others . . . (Hua XV, 615). Since the primordial reduction is the method to make, from the standpoint of subjective validity, the questionable meaning of other transcendental subjectivity understandable, it can be regarded as a method of justifying the positing of the other as a transcendental subjectivity. Furthermore, it can, as such, be understood as a method of recognizing the other as a transcendental subjectivity, since it grants me the transcendental right to posit the other as transcendentally constituting and, thus, finally as existing with me.10 The discovery of the primordial sphere through the primordial reduction makes possible the philosophically significant fact that, through an actual interpretation of the intentionality of empathy, the other, at the beginning, the other in phenomenon that has been put in brackets, has been brought to transcendental recognition.11 Thus, without the primordial reduction, it is impossible for us to recognize the other as a transcendental subjectivity in a true sense. In this context, it should be added that the primordial reduction makes it possible to recognize the other not only as a transcendental subjectivity but also as a mundane subject with its various forms, such as an animate entity, a psycho-physical entity or a person. Moreover, since empathy lays the foundation for the constitution of the objective world, the primordial reduction as a method of gaining access to the primordial sphere can be considered as a systematic method to bring about a perfect world-view together with the apodictic knowledge of its condition of possibility (Hua XV, 617). Since the primordial sphere that is valid only for me, the meditating ego, builds the foundation of subjective validity for empathy as the way of apperceiving the other, from the standpoint of subjective validity, I have an absolute priority over other transcendental subjectivities. However, this absolute priority of the meditating ego over other transcendental subjectivities should not be understood as the priority of genesis in the horizon of transcendental temporality, since I cannot, as Husserl also puts it, maintain in advance that the genesis of the apperception of the other presupposes the genesis of a sur-

172 rounding world without other subjectivity (Hua XIV, 477). The primordial sphere, as the foundation of subjective validity for empathy, is not a sphere of being that might actually exist in advance as a concrete entity in the connection of transcendental genesis and make the genesis of empathy possible. From the standpoint of transcendental genesis, it is only a product of reduction, an abstract entity in the concrete ego (Hua XV, 634-5) and, in order to gain access to it, the meditating ego needs a special act of abstractive reflection like the primordial reduction. Therefore, the true meaning of the primordial reduction is not that, with the help of this reduction, every ego actually goes back to the primordial sphere in order to really carry out the genetic act of empathy on the basis of this sphere, but rather that every ego should perform the primordial reduction and go back to the primordial sphere in order to make the validity of empathy understandable. In this sense, the primordial sphere can be called an ideal or normative sphere12 to which the meditating ego should appeal to make the validity of empathy understandable and, just for this reason, static phenomenology of intersubjectivity can be regarded as normative phenomenology. Thus, the primordial reduction turns out to be an attempt to be faithful to the principle of all principles (Hua III, 52) discussed in Ideas I, that is, the principle of a radical self-responsibility that, according to Husserl, should guide every true philosophy.

3. The Genetic-Phenomenological Concept of Primordiality Faithful to his explanation that what matters in the fifth CM is a static analysis, in sections 4447 Husserl is carrying out the phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity almost exclusively static-phenomenologically. In these sections, it is difficult to find any hints of genetic problems or even the expression genesis. In contrast to this, in the following sections, the phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity is no longer carried out exclusively staticphenomenologically, but it also moves to the direction of genetic phenomenology. For example, in section 49, where the problem of harmony among monads as the presupposition for the constitution of objective nature is discussed, Husserl talks about the genesis that occurs harmoniously in individual monads (Hua I, 137). If we examine the following sections carefully, it is not difficult to find out that, to our surprise, the phenomenological analysis of empathy or the higher and lower levels of socialization is guided predominantly by the idea of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In these sections, we often find fundamental concepts of genetic phenomenology such as original establishment (Urstiftung) in sections 50 and 55, associative pairing as constitutive component of empathy in section 51, or temporal genesis, innateness and generativity in sections 58 and 61. Husserl sometimes begins

173 the phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity static-phenomenologically and turns to the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity without examining the necessity or possibility of this procedure. It is quite surprising that, even for the genetic analysis of intersubjectivity, Husserl employs without hesitation the static concept of primordiality. A typical example is the analysis of the primordial sphere in section 50 that is carried out with respect to the explanation of the principle of the genetic establishment of empathy. According to the principle of original establishment, every apperception can be traced back intentionally to original establishment through which an object with similar meaning was constituted for the first time (Hua I, 141). In order to clarify the possibility of genetic original establishment in a child, Husserl employs the static concept of primordiality developed in the foregoing sections 4447 and writes as follows: Finally we always come back to the radical differentiation of apperceptions into those that, according to their genesis, belong purely to the primordial sphere and those that come into being with the sense alter ego . . . (Hua I, 141). In this passage, Husserl holds the view that a child who has never carried out the act of empathy must have the pure primordial sphere free from any kinds of intentionality directed to other subjectivities so that, on the ground of this sphere, it can carry out the first act of empathy. Long before he worked on the fifth CM, Husserl had attempted to clarify the possibility of the genesis of empathy by recourse to the primordial sphere that might have no relation to other subjects. A typical example is a passage in Erste Philosophie where he is considering the possibility that I am alone, or, in my total field of experience, there have appeared no other bodies by means of which I could experience other subjects in the way of empathy (Hua VIII, 176). We can find a similar idea in a passage in Ideas II where a phenomenological analysis of the union of persons is carried out. There Husserl makes a distinction between the concept of pre-social subjectivity, the subjectivity that does not presuppose any empathy (Hua IV, 198199) and social subjectivity (Hua IV, 199) that has the experience of others as well as their inner life. With respect to this distinction, he maintains that obviously it is also significant from the standpoint of constitutive genesis (Hua IV, 198). What he claims in this passage is that social subjectivity as well as the intersubjective world as its constitutive product might be genetically founded on a pre-social subjectivity and its world. Even after the publication of the fifth CM, Husserl did not give up this idea entirely. For example, in a manuscript from 1931/32 he considers the possibility of the primordial development of my singular being (Hua XV, 439) from which primordial quasinature etc. could originate. But why does Husserl attempt to clarify the genetic condition of the possibility for empathy in this way? The main reason is that, as will be discussed below, abstracting reflection as a component of the static-phenomenological

174 concept of primordiality is indispensable to the clarification of the structure of a certain kind of empathy, namely, the structure of the ideal genesis of empathy that can be carried out with the help of abstracting reflection. However, this fact should not mislead one to think that it would be indispensable to the clarification of the transcendental genesis of empathy in general. In my opinion, Husserl was partly aware of this kind of difficulty already at the time that he was writing Ideas II, since, in this work, he calls the distinction mentioned above between pre-social and social subjectivity not an actual distinction that can be observed in the process of actual genesis of empathy, but only an ideal distinction that can be made with the help of the abstracting method. He maintains that, ideally speaking, every person has his/her egoistic, that is, primordial world of the fifth CM, within his/her intersubjective world, so long as he/she abstracts from all the connections of understanding others and the apperceptions founded upon them (Hua IV, 193). The concept of primordiality in the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity is actually entirely different from that of static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the primordial sphere can also be defined formally as the foundation for empathy. Since the foundation in genetic phenomenology does not mean the foundation of subjective validity, but that of temporal genesis, the primordial sphere in genetic phenomenology means exclusively the genetic foundation for empathy. The genetic primordial sphere as the genetic foundation for empathy can be divided into two kinds, namely the pre-ideal genetic and the ideal genetic primordial sphere.13 As will be discussed below, the ideal genetic primordial sphere cannot come into being without some kind of methodological procedure, whereas the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere is pre-given to us daily in the natural attitude as the genetic foundation for empathy. I will deal with the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere first. The pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere differs from the primordial sphere of static phenomenology, first of all, in the fact that it is not a product of reflection, something abstract. We do not carry out daily the act of empathy on the ground of an abstracting Epoch as a kind of reflective act. This fact becomes more obvious, if we consider the problem of primordiality in a child. The problem of the genesis of primordiality in a child is an important topic of genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. In a manuscript on The child. The first empathy . . . from 1935, Husserl also attempts to clarify the genetic process of the constitution of the primordial sphere in a child such as the process of building primordial thing, primordial body (Hua XV, 605). No one will consider the primordial sphere in this context as a product of reflection, something abstract, since it would be ridiculous to maintain that the primordial sphere in a child comes into being on the ground of abstracting reflection. Husserl also denies that a child is a subject that has the ability of reflection.

175 The fact that the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere is not a product of reduction, something abstract, means, at the same time, that it is a sphere of being that contains in itself the social or intersubjective intentions, that is, the intentions that are related to other subjectivities. Since the transcendental genesis of a transcendental ego cannot be performed without the various social intentions functioning incessantly in the field of consciousness, the preideal primordial sphere is shaped intersubjectively. In this sense, even the primordial sphere of a child is no exception; through the work of social intentions, it is also organized from the beginning intersubjectively. The social intentions that can be found in the primordial sphere of a child are mainly the various intentions of social instincts that are indispensable to its self-preservation. Due to the social intentions doing their work incessantly in the process of universal transcendental genesis of a transcendental ego, the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere turns out to be a sphere of being in which not only I, but also other subjectivities dwell together. The others live in me, as I live in them. For this reason, from the standpoint of transcendental genesis, not from that of subjective validity, I as a transcendental ego do not have an absolute priority over other transcendental subjectivities. There is a relation of co-foundation between me and other contemporary subjectivities; I am even one-sidedly dependent on other subjectivities of former generations. The pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere is a unity of development and there are various levels of the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere. A pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere of an ego can serve for a moment as the genetic foundation for a certain act of empathy. After having been carried out, this empathy does not disappear from the field of consciousness, but it becomes a sediment of that primordial sphere and thereby motivates this to be changed into a new level of the primordial sphere. Subsequently this new level of the primordial sphere can serve as a genetic foundation for another act of empathy, and this new act of empathy, becoming a sediment of that primordial sphere, also motivates this sphere to be changed into another level of the primordial sphere. The same process can repeat itself further and, in this way, various levels of the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere can come into being in the field of consciousness. Therefore, it is possible to dismantle the pre-ideal primordial sphere from the standpoint of the genetic foundation and this process of dismantling can theoretically be continued, until we get to the primordial sphere that is working as the genetic foundation for the first act of empathy of a transcendental ego. In a manuscript from 1935, Husserl calls this primordiality the primordiality in the most primitive level (Hua XV, 605) and attempts to clarify its genetic structure. Therefore, it is an enormous task for pre-ideal genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity to clarify the condition of the possibility for the genetic transition from the primordiality in the most primitive level to the primordial sphere

176 of higher levels. It should be noted that social or intersubjective instincts and drives are working incessantly in the constitution of the primordiality in the most primitive level and in the genetic transition from this to the primordial sphere of higher levels. Since the genesis of various levels of the primordial sphere in the field of consciousness would be impossible without the incessant work of social instincts and drives, the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere of any level can be considered as a system of drives, as Husserl writes in a manuscript from 1933: Primordiality is a system of drives. If we understand it as an originally standing stream, there is a drive that is striving to go into other streams and, under circumstances, with other subjects. (Hua XV, 594) Lets consider the concept of ideal genetic primordiality. The genetic transition from a lower to a higher level of the primordial sphere and empathy means, at the same time, the development of the transcendental ego. In the process of development, each transcendental ego, although it can sometimes be mistaken in its act of empathy, strives to achieve the truth of empathy. In most cases, it strives to get the truth of empathy quasi-unconsciously or without any kind of methodological consciousness. At a certain moment, however, it is possible for the ego to make a decision to carry out the act of empathy consciously and methodologically. In this case, for a responsible ego, there is only one way to get at the truth of empathy: As we learned from the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it should attempt to carry out the act of empathy exclusively on the ground of what is given to it evidently. To achieve this goal, being faithful to the principle of self-responsibility, it should try to abstract from all the subjective validities that have their origin in other subjectivities and to carry out the act of empathy on the ground of the sphere of being that is left after the abstraction. Since this kind of genesis of empathy has as its goal the genesis of truth as an idea, it could be called an ideal genesis of empathy; accordingly, the methodological procedure that makes this kind of empathy possible can be called the ideal genetic primordial reduction, and the sphere of being that can be disclosed by this procedure, the ideal genetic primordial sphere. The ideal genetic primordial sphere means nothing other than the genetic foundation for the emergence of science and philosophy in a true sense in the universal horizon of the transcendental genesis of a transcendental ego. The ideal genetic primordial reduction as a methodological procedure that is guided by the principle of self-responsibility enables a transcendental ego to take part in the ideal working society of science and philosophy whose vocation is to find out the truth as an ideal. The ideal genesis of empathy to which the method of abstraction is indispensable can be regarded as the result of the application of the insight gained in the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity into the transcendental genesis of empathy. Therefore, the ideal genetic phenomenology of inter-

177 subjectivity that aims to clarify the structure of ideal genesis has a certain similarity with the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. For this reason, one can get the impression that the ideal genetic primordial sphere might be exactly the same as the static phenomenological one. In my opinion, due to this impression, in the fifth CM, Husserl applies the static-phenomenological concept of primordiality to the analysis of the constitution of lower and higher societies of monads without examining the correctness of this procedure. However, the ideal genetic primordial sphere differs basically from that of static phenomenology; it is a kind of genetic primordial sphere and, as such, has many similarities with the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere. Let me briefly deal with some similarities between the ideal and the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere. First, as is the case with the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, there are various levels of the ideal genetic primordial sphere. The ideal genetic primordial sphere that is disclosed through the ideal genetic primordial reduction can serve as the genetic foundation for a certain act of empathy. After its genesis, the empathy does not disappear from the field of consciousness, but it becomes a sediment of that primordial sphere and, becoming a sediment of the primordial sphere, it motivates this sphere to be changed into a new level of primordial sphere. The process of the genesis of empathy and its becoming a sediment of the primordial sphere from which it is originated can continue further and, in this way, various levels of the ideal genetic primordial sphere can emerge in the field of consciousness. Second, like the pre-ideal genetic primordial sphere, the ideal genetic primordial sphere is also constituted intersubjectively. This does not contradict the fact that the ideal genetic primordial sphere means a sphere of being that can be disclosed through abstracting from the subjective validities that have their origin in other subjectivities. Since I, as a transcendental subjectivity, am finally responsible for the subjective validity of the ideal genetic primordial sphere, even in the ideal genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, from the standpoint of subjective validity, I have an absolute priority over other transcendental subjectivities. Despite this obvious fact, from the standpoint of temporal genesis, I do not have an absolute priority over other transcendental subjectivities, since the factual genetic act of abstracting reflection as the condition of the possibility for the genesis of the ideal genetic primordial sphere cannot be carried out without the help of other transcendental subjectivities. In this context, it should be noted that no one is able to carry out or even to begin his/her scientific and philosophical works alone, but only in a working society of science and philosophy on which he/she is dependent in many respects. Thus, the genesis of various levels of the ideal genetic primordial sphere in the field of consciousness of a transcendental ego is not a solipsistic achievement of this ego, but from the beginning, an intersubjective one.

178 Third, if we focus only on the subjective side, the static phenomenological primordial sphere consists in objectifying acts as the bearers of subjective validity. Contrary to this, the ideal genetic primordial sphere, like the preideal genetic one, contains not only the objectifying acts, but also the nonobjectifying acts that are tied to the former inseparably, that is, the social drives and willings, on the one side, and the various forms of feelings, on the other side. The objectifying act in the ideal genetic primordial sphere is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for the ideal genesis of empathy. The ideal genesis of empathy cannot be carried out without non-objectifying acts. With respect to the drives and willings as an essential component of the ideal genetic primordial sphere, this sphere can also be considered as a system of drives.

4. Relations Among the Ambiguities of Primordiality It turns out that the concept of primordiality is ambiguous in the field of tension between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As discussed above, besides this ambiguity, there are other ambiguities pertaining to primordiality. What is the essence of these ambiguities and what is the relation between them and the ambiguity of the static-phenomenological and the genetic-phenomenological concepts of primordiality? The ambiguity of primordiality in the natural and the transcendental attitudes mentioned above can be observed in the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity. As discussed above, the primordial reduction in static phenomenology of intersubjectivity makes possible the recognition of another subjectivity not only as a transcendental subjectivity, but also as a mundane subject. This recognition of the other as a mundane subject, however, is possible not only in the transcendental attitude, but also in the natural attitude. The problem of the recognition of other persons can be a genuine problem not only for the transcendentally reflecting ego, but also for the person who knows nothing about the transcendental attitude or the transcendental subjectivity. Let us imagine that, in a very critical situation, I who know nothing about the transcendental find a body that is, in some respects, similar, in some other respects, not similar, to my body. I believe that it really is a human being. However, at the next moment, it is not obvious for me that it is a human being. The critical situation requires that I should draw a conclusion whether it is a human being or not. In this case, there is for me only one way to solve the problem: Through a kind of thematic Epoch, I should abstract from all the subjective validities that have their origin in other subjectivities, go back to the primordial sphere and examine if there is something in this sphere that can serve as the foundation of subjective validity for my belief. Since this kind of abstracting method can do its work already in the natural attitude, Husserl calls

179 it the reduction to primordiality in the natural attitude, that is, the primordial reduction in the natural attitude, and the sphere of being that is disclosed through this method the sphere that is the concretely own of any psyche (Hua XV, 530), that is, the primordial sphere in the natural attitude. Since the primordial reduction in the natural attitude enables the meditating ego to recognize the other as a mundane subject, but not as a transcendental subjectivity, it can be considered as the preliminary form of the primordial reduction in the transcendental attitude. Let us examine the ambiguity of primordiality, according to which it includes and excludes the experience of empathy at the same time. Husserl considers this ambiguity as an ambiguity that is essentially founded on a matter (Hua XV, 635). However, he tells us nothing about the matter on which this ambiguity is essentially founded. Since this ambiguity affirms and denies a fact at the same time, one might be tempted to hold the view that the matter in question is nothing other than a dialectic matter that cannot be clarified phenomenologically, but only through a kind of dialectic logic of being and nothingness.14 In my opinion, this view is based on pure speculation that cannot be verified phenomenologically, since the matter in question is just the fact that there is a clear distinction between static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. This means that this ambiguity is one aspect of the ambiguity of the static and genetic concepts of primordiality. The passage of the manuscript in which the ambiguity in question is dealt with reveals that this is the case. There Husserl first describes the static concept of primordiality as follows: In the original methodological sense, it means the abstraction that, excluding abstractly all empathies, I as the ego of the reductive attitude carry out phenomenologically. (Hua XV, 635) Directly thereafter he introduces the second concept of primordiality: When I say primordial ego afterwards, it gets the meaning of the original monad to which the original empathy belongs. (Hua XV, 635) As discussed above, except for the most primitive level, the other levels of the pre-ideal as well as the ideal genetic primordial sphere contain in themselves empathy either as actual or as a sediment. Thus it turns out that the primordiality in question is a kind of genetic-phenomenological primordiality. In this manuscript, with the help of the second concept of primordiality mentioned above, Husserl occupies himself with some problems of genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity such as the self-alienation of monadization (Hua XV, 639) or the naturalization of I-subjects (Hua XV, 639) that occur in the transcendental temporality. It is not by chance that this manuscript bears the title: Monadic temporalization and worldly temporalization . . .. Finally, the ambiguity of primordiality between my and our primordiality is also another aspect of the ambiguity between the static and genetic concepts of primordiality. As discussed above, primordiality in static phenomenology is essentially my primordiality. In contrast to this, primordiality in genetic

180 phenomenology can contain the experience of empathy and, on the basis of this experience, each transcendental ego can constitute an intersubjective world that it shares with other transcendental subjectivities. Since this intersubjective world can serve as the genetic primordial sphere and as the genetic foundation for empathy, it is quite possible to talk about our primordiality in genetic phenomenology.

5. Ambiguities of Primordiality and the Basic Character of Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity in the Fifth CM The concept of primordiality in the fifth CM needs in many respects correction and supplementation. We cannot exclude the possibility that, through further close examination, it can turn out to be ambiguous in other respects than those discussed above. The examination of the ambiguities of primordiality thus far enables us to make a general assessment15 of the views mentioned above from the various interpreters on the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM. First, one can view the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM as a basic concept for the logical explanation of intersubjectivity, if one bases ones interpretation on the static concept of primordiality that is developed in sections 4447 of the fifth CM. The logical explanation of intersubjectivity in this context means concretely the explanation of the logical structure of the foundation of subjective validity. Second, one can view the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM as a basic concept of genetic phenomenology, if one bases ones interpretation on the genetic concept of primordiality developed in the second half of the fifth CM. Finally, one can view primordiality as something that cannot be justified phenomenologically, if one makes a confusion between the static and genetic concepts of primordiality in such a way that, for ones interpretation, one picks up the static-phenomenological concept of primordiality, but unfortunately regards it as a genetic-phenomenological one. In this case, one is necessarily forced to draw the conclusion that primordiality is not something that can be observed phenomenologically, since it is impossible for anyone to observe such a phenomenon as a primordial sphere that would build a concrete sphere of being in the universal horizon of a transcendental ego, but would not contain any kind of empathy. As discussed above, the primordial sphere in static phenomenology is only abstract, a product of reduction that cannot be observed as a concrete in the actual connection of transcendental genesis. Let me conclude with this note. Since the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM reveals itself to be ambiguous, first of all, in the field of tension between static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity developed there is deeply influ-

181 enced through this ambiguity: It is really a mixture of static and genetic analysis. 16 In order to develop transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity systematically, in my opinion, we should make a clear distinction between the static and the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. I believe that, in the 1930s, Husserl was also fully conscious of this fact. In a manuscript from 1933, with respect to the transcendental problems of the other, he writes: The meaning of the other presupposes me, my body as a living body . . . (Hua XV, 615616), and adds to this passage a footnote: However, presuppose does not mean come into being (Hua XV, 616). Thereafter, with regard to the coming into being of the meaning of the other, he writes: The meaning comes into being as a meaning in the validity of being in the foundation in establishment genesis. (Hua XV, 616) Thus, Husserl considers presupposing and coming into being as two different categories of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. According to him, from the standpoint of the subjective validity, the less original form of consciousness, e.g., the experience of empathy, presupposes the more original form of consciousness, e.g., the primordial intentionality, whereas, from the standpoint of the transcendental genesis, the less original form of consciousness, e.g., the genetic primordial sphere of a higher level, comes into being on the ground of the more original form of consciousness, e.g., the genetic primordial sphere of a lower level. In this way, presupposing and coming into being refer to the foundational relation between different kinds of intentionality from the standpoint of the subjective validity and that of the transcendental genesis respectively. It is clear that presupposing is the basic concept of the static phenomenology of intersubjectivity and coming into being is the basic concept of the genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Although Husserl was fully conscious of the necessity of making a clear distinction between static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity, it was impossible for him to develop these two forms of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity systematically in the remaining few years of his life. It is the task of the phenomenologists of the future generation to develop static and genetic phenomenology of intersubjectivity systematically. Since primordiality is, transcendentally, the most important fundamental stage for the constitution of intersubjectivity, it is the first task of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity to develop the phenomenology of primordiality systematically, that is, in its static and genetic form, as I attempted to develop partly. Only on the ground of the full-fledged static and genetic phenomenology of primordiality, will it be possible to develop, layer on layer, the other transcendental theories of intersubjectivity such as the theory of empathy, the constitution of the societies of transcendental subjectivities, the constitution of the intersubjective world, history etc.

182 Notes
* This work was supported by the overseas-research fund 20002001 for the faculty members of the College of Humanities and the College of Social Sciences of Seoul National University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 31th Annual Meeting of Husserl Circle, Indiana University, Bloomington, February 2225, 2001. I thank G. Heffernan, J. Mensch, K.M. Haney for their useful comments on this paper that I received thereafter. I also thank D. Welton, T. Sthler, S. Overgaard for their useful comments on this paper in a reading group led by D. Welton in summer semester 2001 at The State University of New York, Stony Brook. I also thank the editors of Husserl Studies for their useful comments on my paper. A German version of this paper is to be published in the Festschrift for Klaus Held under the title Der Begriff der Primordialitt in Husserls fnfter Cartesianischer Meditation. E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrge (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950) (Husserliana I). In this paper, this work will be referred to with the abbreviation CM. Husserls works that have been published in Husserliana will be cited by giving the number of volume and page in brackets. All translations are my own. For example, A. Schutz, Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivitt bei Husserl, Philosophische Rundschau 5 (1957), 81107; H. Zeltner, Das Ich und die Anderen. Husserls Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Sozialphilosophie, Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 13 (1959), 288315; E.G. Ballard, Husserls Philosophy of Intersubjectivity in Relation to his Rational Ideal, Tulane Studies in Philosophy XI (1962), 338; J. Sallis, On the Limitation of Transcendental Reflection or Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?, Monist 55 (1971), 312333; B. Waldenfels, Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs: Sozialphilosophische Untersuchung in Anschlu an Edmund Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971). For example, K.M. Haney, Intersubjectivity Revisited: Phenomenology and the Other (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1994). For example, P. Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). In Das Problem der Intersubjektivitt und die Idee einer phnomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie, Perspektiven transzendental-phnomenologischer Forschung (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972) K. Held lays emphasis on the significance of the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology for the systematic development of the transcendental phenomenology of intersubjectivity. What I have attempted to show below with respect to the distinction between the static-phenomenological and the genetic-phenomenological concept of primordiality is the continuation of his basic idea. In the editors introduction to Husserliana vol. XV, p. XVIIIXXI, I. Kern also discusses this kind of ambiguity in the concept of primordiality. See the research manuscript from 1933 that bears the title: Static and Genetic Phenomenology. <The Home-world and the Understanding of the Foreign. The Understanding of Animals (Hua. XV, 613 ff). In this manuscript, Husserl regards the explanation of the foundation of subjective validity for the constitution as the task of static phenomenology and the explanation of the genetic foundation for the constitution as the task of genetic phenomenology. In Edmund Husserls Phnomenologie der Instinkte (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 1730, I have dealt with the distinction between static and genetic phenomenology in detail. Below in section 4, we will deal with these ambiguities in more detail. For example, Hua I, 136.

1.

2.

3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

8. 9.

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10. E. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 2. Ergnzungsband (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 251. 11. Ibid, 260. 12. With respect to the normative character of the primordial sphere, a passage reads as follows: Constitutively speaking, the human being is the normal case in comparison to the animal, as I myself am constitutively the original norm for all the other human beings. (Hua I, 154) 13. The distinction between the pre-ideal genetic and the ideal genetic primordial sphere is not Husserls, but my own. We can find the expression ideale Genesis in Hua VII, 296. However, I cannot tell exactly if the ideal genesis that is mentioned in Hua VII is the same as the ideal genesis discussed in this paper. 14. Zeltner holds just this view: Now it is clear that Husserl, after, with a surprising energy, he questioned back to the ultimate premise of the experience of the other, unexpectedly meets with the matters that, from a pure phenomenological standpoint, contain in themselves a dialectic, and it seems impossible to eliminate this dialectic through further phenomenological analysis. (H. Zeltner, Das Ich und die Anderen. Husserls Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Sozialphilosophie, Zeitschrift fr philosophische Forschung 13 (1959), 289). 15. It is my further task to assess in detail the various views of the interpreters on the concept of primordiality in the fifth CM with respect to the ambiguity of this concept that reveals itself in the field of tension between static and genetic phenomenology. It will be a very exciting and tempting task. 16. In editors introduction to Husserliana vol. XV I. Kern also talks about a fundamental inner tension and ambiguity of the Fifth Meditation (Hua XV, XVIII), the ambiguity of the meaning of the Fifth Meditation (Hua XV, XXI).

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