COMMENTS ON THE IAEA PEER REVIEW REPORT ON THE RADIATION SAFETY ASPECTS OF A PROPOSED RARE EARTHS PROCESSING FACILITY

(THE LYNAS PROJECT), REF: NE/NEFW/2011 [1]

0 REV

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION

Lee Chee Hong PREPARED BY

5 AUG 2011 DATE

th

REMARKS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................... 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 3 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 1.2 1.3 2. 3. Background ............................................................................................................................. 5 Purpose of the IAEA peer review ............................................................................................ 5 Purpose of this report ............................................................................................................. 6

SUMMARY OF THE IAEA PEER REVIEW ........................................................................................... 7 GENERAL COMMENTS..................................................................................................................... 8 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Scope of Review ...................................................................................................................... 8 No reference / citation for public review ............................................................................... 8 Gamma ray .............................................................................................................................. 8 Internal Emitters and Decay radionuclides ............................................................................. 9 TENORM vs. NORM ................................................................................................................. 9

4. 5.

COMMENTS ON THE 11 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ 10 SPECIFIC COMMENTS .................................................................................................................... 12 5.1 Chapter 1: Relevant legal and regulatory framework........................................................... 12

5.2 Chapter 2 : Radiation protection (occupational, public and environment) including monitoring systems........................................................................................................................... 12 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 6. Chapter 3 : Waste management ........................................................................................... 12 Chapter 4 : Decommissioning and environmental remediation ........................................... 13 Chapter 5 : Transport ............................................................................................................ 13 Chapter 6 : Safety assessment .............................................................................................. 13 Chapter 7 : Public communications ...................................................................................... 14

RADIOACTIVE WASTE CLASSIFICATION. IAEA. NO. GSG 1 [12]. ................................................. 15 6.1 Lynas intended WLP disposal and storage measures .......................................................... 17

7. 8.

THE IAEA STANDARDS AND MALAYSIAN REGULATIONS .............................................................. 18 CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................... 19

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 20

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (known as LAMP herein) will commence its operation to process the enriched rare earth ore (known as concentrates herein) from Australia to yield the high purity rare earth oxides. The introduction of the LAMP to Kuantan has sparked overwhelmed row and disagreement amidst the public and various environment-concerned groups. Hence, on the 3rd of May 2011, the Malaysian Government approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a request to organise an independent expert review (known here as peer review) for LAMP. The findings of the observations and the peer review were finalised and published on the 28th June 2011. The purpose of this report is to summarise the outcomes from the scrutiny efforts of the IAEA peer review report, the associated IAEA standards, safety guides, the Malaysian Act, its subsidiary regulations and guides concurrently. It was speculated the scope of the peer review could have outlined by the Malaysian Government/AELB, this is demonstrated by the selected lineup of the panel comprises only nuclearrelated specialist. Knowing that this review panel would act upon their areas of expertise by reviewing only the radiation safety aspects, hence one would expect the peer review solely valid to determine the safety aspect in relation to radiation. Other critical aspects such process/occupational health and safety, the plant design, construction, operation, incidents, decommissioning, shutdowns, and waste treatment; environmental, plant asset integrity, civil and structure, socio-economic were not in the scope of the review. Unquestionably the IAEA peer review is not an all-inclusive study but has been wrongly regarded as an ultimate assessment that approves the LAMP. Several critical documents and claims made by the peer review were not appended and cited in the report; this made retrieval of the citation/reference difficult. The unsourced claims in the report demonstrate poor reporting of IAEA and could be doubted and challenged. The study on the radiation exposure protection emphasized only gamma emitter or gamma radiation; this radiation is only trivial in the thorium and uranium decay chains, in terms of its energy level and concentration. Whilst the major radiation emanated in both decay chains, i.e. alpha and beta radiation, were not mentioned anywhere in the report. There was also no emphasis on the risks of internal emitters/radiation; this can pose substantial damage to internal organs upon inhalation/ingestion of the air borne thorium/uranium-containing particles. Numerous radionuclides (decay products) of the thorium and uranium decay chains are poisonous and carcinogen in nature, e.g. thorium, uranium, radon, radium, bismuth and the final decay product, lead. The report has not discussed the hazards posed by these radionuclides, the possible leakage to the atmosphere and the inhalation/ingestion pathways. Instead the peer review this analysis was expected this to be provided in the next licensing phase. The peer review suggested the inhalation of radon gas and ingestion of radioactive dust is not expected to be significant, yet no scientific and analytic ground was provided to back this claim. It is apparent both vital aspects of the radiation safety assessment, i.e. internal emitters and radionuclides, have been guilelessly ignored. This again demonstrates the review does not fit to conclude the LAMP is safe to operate, even from the radiation safety perspective alone. The IAEA peer review report has misleadingly quoted the term NORM instead of TENORM throughout. This gives a false perception to the readers that the feedstock, the processed mineral 3

ore and the wastes generated by LAMP alongside with its radioactivity are regarded as natural. This is only true for the rare earth ore mined at Mt. Weld, but once the ore is processed, concentrated and enriched at the Concentration Plant, it is known as TENORM. It was found that one of the IAEA general safety guides (GSG) was not incorporated and reported in the peer review, i.e. Radioactive Waste Classification. IAEA No. GSG-1. The objective of this Safety Guide is to set out a general scheme for classifying radioactive wastes that is based primarily on considerations of long term safety, and thus, by implication, disposal of the waste. According to the RSA 93. UK Radioactive Substances Act 1993 Chapter 12, the LAMPs WLP waste is classified as Low Level Waste (LLW). Based on this GSG, this waste in this class requires robust isolation and containment for periods of up to 300 years and is suitable for disposal in engineered near surface facilities. The typical safe storage depth is from the surface down to 30 meter. If the Classification of Radioactive Wastes Safety Guide was to be enforced for the WLP residue, then the RSF disposal method proposed by Lynas would be violating the IAEA standards. Regrettably, this standard and the possibly violation were not mentioned in the peer review report. The Malaysia Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 (Act 304) does not accurately define several vital terms; and the Act 304 is general in nature, no specific and details made on construction, handling and operation of rare earth plants; no regulation specific for NORM / TENORM activities; more significantly, the Act 304 gives exceptional power to the appropriate authority and the Minister.

1.
1.1 Background

INTRODUCTION

The Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (known as LAMP herein) will commence its operation to process the enriched rare earth ore (known as concentrates herein) and yield high purity rare earth oxides. The rare earth mineral will be mined at Mount Weld, Western Australia, in which stage; the crude ore contains c.a. 9% of rare earth oxides and with approximate 44ppm thorium oxide/1% REO [2], equivalent to 396 ppm thorium oxide (known as thorium herein) and trace amount of uranium oxide (known as uranium herein). The mineral will be trucked to the Mt. Weld Concentration Plant, located 1.5 km away from the mine. At this plant, the mineral undergoes crushing, grinding, flotation, filtration and enriched to an intermediate products called concentrates. Concentrates are the processed ore contain c.a. 40% of REO with 1600 ppm and 29 ppm of thorium and uranium respectively [3]. The concentrates will be trucked to Port of Fremantle; 1000 km away prior to a 4000 km sea voyage to Kuantan Port (via Singapore); the intended load to LAMP is of approximate 65,000 tonnes/yr. Within LAMP, the concentrates will be stored as raw material stockpile up to 5000 tonnes at any time, and will be fed to the LAMP to undergo the following processes: Cracking Leaching Upstream Extraction Downstream Extraction Product Finishing

The refinery processes require copious amount of chemicals and reagents, such as sulphuric acid, magnesium oxide, hydrochloric acid and utilities such as raw water, natural gas are required to extract the rare earth oxides and to generate three types of gypsum (i.e. FGD, WLP and NUF), flue gas and waste water. The introduction of the LAMP to Kuantan has sparked overwhelmed row and disagreement from the public and various environmental-concerned groups. Hence, on the 3rd of May 2011, the Malaysian Government approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a request to organise an independent expert review (known here as peer review) of the LAMP. The month-long review commenced with a review mission to Malaysia from the 29th of May to 3rd of June 2011, which included discussion with the relevant local authorities, Lynas staffs and other stakeholders; and a visit to the LAMP and the nearby harbor to which the feedstock will be shipped from Australia. Prior to the mission, IAEA experts have been fed with relevant documentation by the Malaysian counterpart, i.e. Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB). The evaluation of the observations and reporting of the finding were finalised and published on the 30th June 2011.

1.2

Purpose of the IAEA peer review

The purpose of the IAEA peer review is to perform an independent and technical expert review for the radiation safety aspect of the rare earth processing facility which was under construction at the time of writing. This review was regarded as the decisive assessment which approves the controversial project [4]; as pointed by the Prime Minister of Malaysia that the government of Malaysia make a final decision based upon this peer review report [5]. The details of the reports are summarised in the next Chapter. 5

1.3

Purpose of this report

The purpose of this report is to summarise the outcomes from the scrutiny efforts of the IAEA peer review report, the associated IAEA standards, safety guides, the Malaysian Act, its subsidiary regulations and guides.

2.

SUMMARY OF THE IAEA PEER REVIEW

The scope of the IAEA peer review was restricted to ONLY the Radiation safety aspect [1; p 1, para 3] of the LAMP. The peer review team has highlighted the source of the reviewing materials, e.g. project and official documents, upon which the peer review based, was limited to those made available in the Construction licensing [6, Class A (b)] phase only [1; p 1, para 5]. Other licensing phases, i.e. siting [Class A (a)], pre-operational [Class A (c) Temporary], operational [Class A (c) Full], and decommissioning [Class G] are not covered [1; p 1, para 5]. The key task of the IAEA review panel is to provide recommendations, to ensure compliance of LAMP to the (International and national) standards and regulations [1; p 1]. Areas of the study including transportation, radiation protection (occupational, public and environmental), safety assessment, waste management and decommissioning and environmental remediation. The Peer Review Team Members The expert team selected by the IAEA to undertake the review consists of nine persons. The team will be led by Dr Tero Varjoranta from Finland, the Director of the Division of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology at the IAEA Department of Nuclear Energy. Internal (IAEA) experts comprise Dr Magnus Vesterlind (Sweden), Dr Horst Monken Fernandes (Brazil) and Hanna Kajander (Finland), while Hiroko Raticliffe will be the administrative assistant. External experts are Jan van der Steen (Netherlands), Dr Leo M. Lowe (Canada), Dr P. M. Balagopala Pillai (India), Dr Dennis Wymer (UK), Ulric Schwela (Finland). The areas of expertise of the review team members can be summarised as followed: IAEA internal staffs External experts 3 x nuclear physicists, 1 x PR officer, 1 x admin officer 2 x nuclear safety experts, 1 x nuclear physicist, 1 x radioactive materials transportation expert, 1 x rare earth safety expert

The Report The 55-page IAEA report (appended in this report) comprises 7 pages of introductory chapter, 17 pages of Appendixes whilst the remainder reports the following chapters: Chapter 1: Relevant legal and regulatory framework Chapter 2 : Radiation protection (occupational, public and environment) including monitoring systems Chapter 3 : Waste management Chapter 4 : Decommissioning and environmental remediation Chapter 5 : Transport Chapter 6 : Safety assessment Chapter 7 : Public communications The report concluded that the review team was not able to identify non-compliances with the International radiation safety standards nonetheless 10 issues have been identified -- to be dealt with 11 recommendations, which has been detailed in the respective chapters of the report.

3.
3.1 Scope of Review

GENERAL COMMENTS

The scope of the peer review could have outlined by the Malaysian Government/AELB in the first place, this is demonstrated by the selected lineup of the panel comprises only nuclear-related specialist from IAEA. Knowing that the IAEA review panel would act upon their areas of expertise by reviewing only the radiation safety aspects, hence one would expect the peer review only valid to determine the safety aspect in relation to radiation, If at all. Other critical aspects such process and safety, the entire plant design, construction, operation, incidents, shutdowns, and waste treatment; environmental, plant asset integrity, civil and structure, socio-economic were not in the scope of the review. Unquestionably this IAEA peer review is not an all-inclusive study but has been wrongly regarded as an ultimate assessment that approves the LAMP. This peer review report is incapable of concluding the compliance of LAMP process to safety standards and of approving the plant by assessing only part of the LAMP. In the radiation safety aspect study, there has been several oversights and inaccuracies as identified (and summarised) in this report. Further, the results of this review are seemingly shallow; apart from the 11 recommendations and the conclusions drawn, one can hardly find any constructive numbers/figures/control limits/process specification that specified by the review panel to the LAMP and AELB to conform to.

3.2

No reference / citation for public review

Several critical documents and claims made by the peer review were not appended and cited in the report, which is essential in official reporting in order to allow readers to easily retrieve the citation/reference. The unsourced claims in the report demonstrate poor reporting of IAEA and they may be doubted and challenged. Not only does bad writing negatively impact the outcome of the review, it can jeopordise the reputation and credibility of the entire review panel. The following outlines some of the unproven claims made by the review panel: Many similar plants producing RE compounds are operating in various parts of the world. [1, p1 pt(a)] Many other RE processing plants that are more radioactive operated in compliance with the international safety standards [1; p2 pt(c)] Critical documents that are not appended in the report: Radiation protection program (RPP) Residue storage facility (RSF) detailed design report Lynas Waste Management Plan Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) plan Emergency planning & preparedness of radiation protection

3.3

Gamma ray

The study on the radiation exposure protection performed in the peer review only emphasised on gamma emitter or gamma radiation, this radiation is only trivial in the thorium and uranium decay chains in terms of its energy and radioactivity concentration. The major radiation emitters emitted from both chains, i.e. alpha and beta radiation were not mentioned anywhere in the report [1; p15 pt(ii)].

3.4

Internal Emitters and Decay radionuclides

There was no emphasis in the peer review on internal emitters/radiation of alpha particles and beta ray [1; p10, para2; p33-34]. Both can pose substantial damage to internal organs upon inhalation/ingestion of the air borne thorium/uranium-containing particles. Yet this aspect was been discussed. Numerous radionuclides (decay products) in the thorium and uranium decay chains are poisonous and carcinogenic in nature, e.g. thorium, uranium, radon, radium, bismuth and final decay product, lead. The potential disastrous facts such as the hazards posed by these radionuclides, the possible leakage of radionuclides to the atmosphere, the inhalation/ingestion pathway were not discussed. Instead the review team has stipulated the investigation of radionuclide effects would only be performed by Lynas/AELB in the next licensing phase [1; p33 para2]. The peer review did suggest the inhalation of radon gas and ingestion of radioactive dust is not expected to be significant [1; p33 para4], which has no scientific and analytic ground to back this claim at all. It is apparent both vital aspects of the radiation safety assessment, i.e. internal emitters and radionuclides, have been guilelessly ignored, and this again demonstrates the review does not fit to conclude the LAMP is safe to operate, even from only the radiation safety perspective.

3.5

TENORM vs. NORM

Naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM) are ubiquitous throughout the earth's crust. However, Human manipulation of NORM for economic ends, such as mining, ore processing, fossil fuel extraction, and commercial aviation, may lead to what is known as "technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials," often called TENORM. [7]. The IAEA peer review report has misleadingly quoted the term NORM instead of TENORM throughout. This gives a false perception to the readers that the feedstock, the processed mineral ore and the wastes generated in LAMP alongside with its radioactivity are regarded as natural. This may be true for the rare earth ore mined at Mt. Weld, but once the ore is processed, concentrated and enriched, it is known as TENORM. The safety requirement aspects for the NORM and TENORM have not been distinguished by the IAEA standards and guides. In America, TENORM is not regulated by the Atomic Energy Act and only indirectly by other Federal regulations. Control and regulation of TENORM is not consistent from industry to industry nor from State to State or Country to Country. About a dozen States have some form of regulations addressing TENORM. [8]. Likewise, TENORM (and NORM) is not regulated by the Malaysian Law, i.e. Act 304: Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 [9]. Nonetheless, the AELB Guidelines for the Preparation of a Radiation Protection Program for TENORM Activities has highlighted the safety measures and guidelines for the protection from the radiation initiated from TENORM activities [10], from which the NORM may be exempted.

4.

COMMENTS ON THE 11 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1. The AELB should require Lynas to submit, before the start of operations, a plan setting out its intended approach to the long term waste management, in particular management of the water leach purification (WLP) solids after closure of the plant, together with a safety case in support of such a plan. The recommendation vaguely proposed Lynas to prepare a long term waste management plan, particularly for WLP solids waste, and failed to highlight the relevant regulations, safety standards, disposal procedures, specification and limits that Lynas shall adhere to. Recommendation 2. The AELB should require Lynas to submit, before the start of operations, a plan for managing the waste from the decommissioning and dismantling of the plant at the end of its life. The RIA and decommissioning plan should be updated accordingly. Ditto. Recommendation 3. The AELB should require that the results of exposure monitoring and environmental monitoring once the plant is in operation be used to obtain more reliable assessments of doses to workers and members of the public, and the RIA updated accordingly. The AELB should also require that dose reduction measures be implemented where appropriate in accordance with the international principle of optimisation of radiation protection. This recommendation failed to specify the critical monitoring sites, details of the exposure monitor system, the control limits and the mitigation measures when these limits are exceeded. This also implies the monitoring is constrained to external radiation exposure only. Recommendation 4. The AELB should develop criteria that will allow the flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) and neutralisation underflow (NUF) residues to be declared non-radioactive for the purposes of regulation, so that they can be removed from the site and, if necessary in terms of environmental regulation, controlled as scheduled waste. FGD and NUF, alongside with the waste water and flue gas cannot be declared and should not be assumed as non-radioactive on the ground of process simulation or simply hypothetical, by which the radioactivity readings were generated. A rigorous monitoring and control system need to be in place and should be regulated in accordance to international standards; rather than to revise the present regulations just to allow these wastes to be exempted. Recommendation 5. The AELB should implement a mechanism for establishing a fund for covering the cost of the long term management of waste including decommissioning and remediation. The AELB should require Lynas to make the necessary financial provision. The financial provision should be regularly monitored and managed in a transparent manner. No comment Recommendation 6. For regulating the Lynas project, the Malaysian Government should ensure that the AELB has sufficient human, financial and technical resources, competence and independence. No comment Recommendation 7. The AELB and the relevant Ministries should establish a programme for regularly and timely updating the Regulations in accordance with the most recent international standards. In particular, regulations pertinent to NORM activities relevant to the proposed rare earths processing facility should be considered to be updated. 10

It has been identified that the Malaysian regulations are lagged behind from the latest international standards. It is also apparent the current regulations are not impeccable in regulating various safety aspects of the rare earth process in the country, including the radioactive waste disposal and storage, clearance threshold, radiation leakage, health and safety damages caused by radionuclides and internal emitters. See Chapter 7 for more details

Recommendation 8. The AELB should enhance the understanding, transparency and visibility of its regulatory actions in the eyes of the public, particularly those actions related to inspection and enforcement of the proposed rare earths processing facility. No comment Recommendation 9. The AELB should intensify its activities regarding public information and public involvement. No comment Recommendation 10. Lynas, as the party responsible for the safety of the proposed rare earths processing facility, should be urged to intensify its communication with interested and affected parties in order to demonstrate how it will ensure the radiological safety of the public and the environment. No comment Recommendation 11. Based on recommendations 110 above, the Government of Malaysia should prepare an action plan that: (a) Indicates how the above-mentioned recommendations are to be addressed; (b) Sets out the corresponding time schedule for the actions; (c) Is geared to the possibility of an IAEA-organised follow-up mission, which will review the fulfillment of recommendations 110 above in, say, one to two years' time, in line with other IAEA review missions. The intangible nature of the 10 recommendations would create a challenging task for the Government of Malaysia to monitor, review, assess and ultimately to approve the compliances by AELB and Lynas. Further, it would be contradictory to the interest of this peer review, if AELB was demanded by the Government to act on its behalf to monitor, review, assess and approve the fulfillment of these recommendations.

11

5.
5.1

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

Chapter 1: Relevant legal and regulatory framework

Pages 8 and 9 List of relevant legal, regulations, standards and supporting documents. There was no rare earth process-specific regulations, standards, nor industry best practice given. The Malaysian regulations have been lagged behind from the latest versions of the International Standards Page 10, paragraph 3, points (a) and (b) Malaysian regulations are even stricter than the IAEA standards. Both statements of the control of radiation doses regulated by the Malaysian Law is ONLY intended for External Radiation. This is irrelevant as the External radioactivity concentration of the TENORM of LAMP is low naturally; drawing attention to the control measures of the External Radiation gives false impression of the Malaysian regulations. The Malaysian law has been loosely regulating the internal radiation and radionuclides.

5.2

Chapter 2 : Radiation protection (occupational, public and environment) including monitoring systems

Pages 13, para 4, line 1 Facilities for the processing of mineral containing NORM may give rise to elevated levels of radiation exposure of workers and, to a much lesser extent, member of the public residing nearby. This statement was made for EXTERNAL radiation protection only; and has disregarded the lifethreatening internal emitters and radionuclides. The affecting zone threaten by both can be extended far from the LAMP premises. Pages 13, para 4, line 5 the process materials (mainly thorium-232 and its decay products) are at relatively low concentrations. Unverified claim. Low concentration of thorium relatively to what? For reference, the process materials contain 1600 ppm thorium, significantly higher than that exist in nature at between 8 to 12 ppm. Peer review made a false statement by quoting low concentration of thorium in the process materials. Pages 13, last para, line 3 The activity concentrations in all other process material are essentially at natural background levels. Unproven claim. Pages 14, para 2 & 3 It was apparent that the radiation protection program (RPP) document submitted by Lynas for review incorporated several important elements of radiation protection and it was claim that the RPP is in accordance with the relevant AELB guidance and the Act 304, 1984. Such an important document should have been released for public review and agreement. Pages 15, para 3, pt (i) With regard to monitoring system, The details of the radiation monitoring system, including its location, control limits, should have done during design/detailed design phase. However, this is not available at the time of writing.

5.3

Chapter 3 : Waste management

Peer review failed to specify discharge limit of radioactive materials into various waste streams of LAMP, in accordance to the International standards and guides

12

Page 17, para 2, line 1 The radionuclide concentrations in the FGD and NUF residues are expected to be very low similar to the average values in normal rocks and soils. Unproven claim. The assumption of low radionuclide concentration in both residues is merely hypothetical, no analytical data nor simulation results was provided by Lynas that supports this claim. Page 17, para 3 Peer review did not specify and finalise the long term management plan for the WLP waste. Their plan to reuse WLP for developing synthetic concrete is nothing much more than just a hypothesis. It was expected by IAEA some (if not all) of the radioactive WLP waste will end up having to be disposed of as waste in Gebeng. Page 18, para 1 and 2 Discharges to the environment Peer review failed to envisage the likelihood and the consequences of contamination/leaking of radioactive materials into both liquid and gas waste streams. Both waste sources will eventually end up in the environment, yet they have been shallowly described in just 6 lines of text. Page 18, para 4 IAEA/AELB/Lynas have not addressed the long term management option for WLP waste, the institutional waste management time scale, or the possibility of future events that could affect the integrity of the waste site. Page 20, para 3, line 3 The WLP contains relatively low concentration of naturally occurring radionuclides and thus the hazards are equally low. It can therefore be assumed that the development of the safety case will be straightforward and that it can rely on established methodologies and assessment tools. Unverified claim. The WLP contains radionuclides significantly higher than that exist in nature. Peer review made a false statement by quoting low concentration of radionuclides and hence low hazards of the WLP; furthermore they have failed to incorporate the risks caused by internal emitters.

5.4

Chapter 4 : Decommissioning and environmental remediation

No comment

5.5

Chapter 5 : Transport

No comment

5.6

Chapter 6 : Safety assessment

Page 33, para 2, line 6 only the WLP residue is expected to contain elevated level of radioactivity. The peer review neglected the possibility of radioactivity materials released to the other waste streams. Page 33, para 2, line 11 Confirmation of these activity concentration values and the basis in the next licensing phase. The peer review has disregarded the study on the key aspects of radionuclides and yet concluded the LAMP is safe to operate and complied with International safety standards. Page 33, para 3, line 6 Pb-210 and Po-210. The more volatile radionuclides in both thorium and uranium decay chains is the poisonous radon gas. The Pb-210 and Po-210 quoted in the peer review report only present in the uranium decay chain, of which concentration is very much lower as compared to that of the thorium (29 ppm vs 13

1600 ppm). Therefore, emission of the radionuclides in the thorium chain (instead of uranium chain) should have been studied instead. Page 33, para 4, line 5 The inhalation of thoron and radon, whether by workers or members of the public, is not expected to be significant. Unverified claim. Page 33, para 4, line 8 daily ingestion of 100 mg of 6 Bq/g thorium containing material would give rise to a worker dose of only 0.2 mSv per year. page 34, para 3, line 6 it can be shown that the maximum dose receive by a worker from inhalation of dust will be less than 0.3 mSv per year False and negligent statement. The figures of 0.2 and 0.3 mSv/year quoted here referred to External radiation dose [3]; ingestion and inhalation of thorium containing material or internal emitters would give Internal emission that is considerably more damaging to the internal organs than external radiation; let alone the poisonous and carcinogenic radionuclides. It is not acceptable that the IAEA nuclear experts misperceived the internal radiation with an external radiation dosage. Page 34, last para; page 35, first and second para Gamma radiation has been used as a basis of radiation safety study In the decay scheme of thorium, one atom of thorium emits six alpha particles, four beta rays and several low-energy gamma rays [11]. The low exposure dosage of workers illustrated in the peer review report denoted to the gamma rays only; it is inappropriate that gamma ray was used as a basis of analysis, as this radiation only present in thorium and uranium decay chains, in minute amount and with low energy, hence low dose reading naturally. The peer review has failed to assess the high energy/high intensity alpha and beta radiation, both radiations were not mentioned anywhere in the report. Page 34, para 4 It was not detailed by either AELB or Lynas that surface water to be treated for radioactivity materials.

5.7

Chapter 7 : Public communications

No comment

14

6.

RADIOACTIVE WASTE CLASSIFICATION. IAEA. NO. GSG 1 [12].

It was found that one of the critical IAEA general safety guides (GSG) was not incorporated and reported in the peer review, i,e, Radioactive Waste Classification. IAEA No. GSG-1. The objective of this Safety Guide is to set out a general scheme for classifying radioactive waste that is based primarily on considerations of long term safety, and thus, by implication, disposal of the waste.

Figure 1 shows the illustration of the radioactive waste classification of this general guide, which is determined by the radioactivity concentration and the half-life. It is noted that different class of radioactive waste requires various mean of safe disposal and storage. Nonetheless, this guide has not incorporated the distinctive numbers that define the boundary of each class. Hence, an international best practice was adopted for the purpose of this reporting.

15

LAMPs WLP waste = 6.2 Bq/g

Figure 2 : Radioactive waste classification system used in the UK [13,14] Figure 2 demonstrates the radioactive waste classification for different radioactivity level used in the UK. Most EU Member States, the Baltic and the Central European countries have the similar categorisation limits (if not more stringent) as per the UKs [15] back in 1998, and is believed to be more rigorous to date. The radioactivity concentration of the water leach purification (WLP) solid waste is reportedly 6.2 Bq/g [3], this puts the LAMPs WLP waste in the Low Level Waste (LLW) category. It is recommended by the IAEA GSG [12], this waste requires robust isolation and containment for periods of up to a few hundred years and is suitable for disposal in engineered near surface facilities. This class covers a very broad range of waste. LLW may include short lived radionuclides at higher levels of activity concentration, and also long lived radionuclides, but only at relatively low levels of activity concentration the latter reflects the LAMPs WLP. The LLW involves near surface disposal facilities at varying depths, typically from the surface down to 30 meter. The LLW may need for controls over time frames for which institutional control can be guaranteed and thus human intrusion into the waste can be prevented. In many States it is assumed that institutional controls can be relied upon for a period of up to around 300 years. A different situation arises for the WLP waste containing significant amounts of radionuclides, for which the activity content will not decrease significantly over such timescales. Since the management of such waste in near surface facilities is in many cases the only practicable option, longer periods of institutional control have to be postulated, with periodic safety review of the facility [12]. All these will depend on safety assessments and on national practices, and are subject to approval by the regulatory body.

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6.1

Lynas intended WLP disposal and storage measures

The RIA and IAEA reports indicated that the WLP solid waste will be stored temporarily in Residue Storage Facilities (RSF) for several years, if the WLP residue cannot be recycled and reused; it will be eventually disposed at a permanent disposal facility in the country. The design of the RSF as revealed by the RIA report [3; p46], will have a dual liner system consisting of a clay layer and a HDPE (High-density polyethylene) layer to prevent migration and leakage of radionuclides into the environment. The WLP residue will be covered with special materials to minimise infiltration of rainwater into the residue materials and spread of materials to the environment. The depositing of WLP residue will be conducted by dispersing the materials into the RSF site and this will build up height on the 24 000 m2 RSF. No details of the methodology, design and location of the permanent disposal site was disclosed by AELB/Lynas. If the IAEA General Safety Guide. Classification of Radioactive Wastes. No GSG-1 , was to be employed for the WLP residue, then the mean of RSF disposal proposed above will be violating the IAEA standards. Regrettably, this standard well as the possibly safety violation were not mentioned in the peer review report. As far as the Malaysian Law is concerned, Lynas is allowed to accumulate and dispose the WLP residue onsite if they obtained a written authorisation from AELB. Given the relaxed nature of the Act 304, no disposal limits nor the method of safe disposal/storage was outlined in the Act and its subsidiary regulations. It is therefore, under the Act 304, up to the AELB to decide those exempted limits and methods for safe disposal and storage.

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7.

THE IAEA STANDARDS AND MALAYSIAN REGULATIONS

Regulating nuclear and radiation safety is a national responsibility, and many Member States have decided to adopt the IAEAs safety standards for use in their national regulations. [16] In Malaysia, the primary legislation for radiation protection is the Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 (Act 304) [9], the subsidiary Regulations and Guides. The regulations are controlled, maintained, executed and supervised by a regulatory body, i.e. AELB [9; Section 3]. Several inadequacies of the Act 304 were identified by the RIA and IAEA, and summarised as followed:

Act 304 "radioactive material" means any nuclear fuel, radioactive product or radioactive waste. No follow-on definition for radioactive product
Radiation protection (Basic Safety Standards) Regulations 2010, the value established by the appropriate authority and expressed in terms of activity concentration and/or total activity, at or below which the source of radiation may be released from the control of the appropriate authority Section 26 and 27 stated that no person shall dispose of or cause to be disposed, accumulate or cause to be accumulated any radioactive waste on any premises without the prior authorisation in writing of the appropriate authority. Section 69 - The Minister can impose, exempt any person or class of persons from any or all of the provisions of this Act.

Description and Implications Under the law of Malaysia, any material that is radioactive is regulated under Act 304, this covers material with background or trivial radiation, e.g. sand, granite rocks etc. Appropriate authority in this case means AELB. The clearance level of radioactive materials to be determined by AELB, and such level has not been established for LAMP. It will be up to AELB to set the exempted limits, below which the materials can be released from the control of AELB and Act 304, and this allows one to transport, process, store, handle and dispose radioactive materials. No clear definition of authorisation. [1; p9, para3] AELB has the authority to allow any person to accumulate (produce) and dispose radioactive materials in the country, if a prior written authorisation is provisioned. The minister has the authority to grant any person to be exempted from the regulations, guides under the Act 304.

To summarise, several vital terms were not defined accurately by the Act 304; and the Act 304 is general in nature, no specific and details made on construction, handling and operation of rare earth plants. [3; p4, para2]; no regulation specific for NORM / TENORM activities [1; p10, pt(c)]; more significantly, the Act 304 gives exceptional power to the appropriate authority and the Minister. Based on the understanding from reviewing the Malaysian regulations, it can be speculated that the Malaysian laws are not impeccable regulating various safety aspects of the rare earth process in the country, including the radioactive waste disposal and storage, clearance threshold, radiation leakage, health and safety damages caused by radionuclides and internal emitters.

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8.

CONCLUSIONS

The IAEA peer review report can be regarded as poorly written given the fairly large number of grammar and typographical errors, non-rare earth-specific assessment, poor organisation and presentation of its contents. This review study has identified several shortcomings, among others, the peer review did not assess the potential hazards that initiated by ingestion of radionuclides and the subsequent internal emission. Several critical documents referred and claims made by the peer review were appended and cited, this has made the retrieval the citation/reference difficult. The unsourced claims in the report demonstrate poor reporting of IAEA and they may be doubted and challenged. It was identified that the IAEA GSG, Radioactive Waste Classification. IAEA No. GSG-1 was not incorporated and reported in the peer review. The objective of this Safety Guide is to set out a general scheme for classifying radioactive waste that is based primarily on considerations of long term safety, and thus, by implication, disposal of the waste. If the Classification of Radioactive Wastes Safety Guide was to be employed for the WLP residue as Low Level Waste, then the mean of RSF disposal proposed above will be violating the IAEA safety standards. Regrettably, this standard as well as the possibly violation were not mentioned in the peer review report. Although it was asserted this peer review report only assess the radiation safety and protection aspect, however, without incorporating other non-radiation-related aspects outlined below. The peer review report is thus not fit to conclude the LAMP is safe to operate. Other critical aspects such process safety, the entire plant design, construction, operation, incident, shutdowns, and waste treatment; environmental, plant asset integrity, civil and structure, socioeconomic were not in the scope of the peer review. Unquestionably this IAEA peer review is not an all-inclusive study and it would be very wrong to regard this peer review as an ultimate assessment that approves safe operation of the LAMP.

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REFERENCES

1. IAEA, Report of the International peer review mission on the Radiation Safety Aspects of a Proposed Rare Earths Processing Facility (The Lynas Project), NE/NEFW/2011, 2011 2. Lynas Corp, Investor Presentation, March 2010 3. Nuklear Malaysia, Riadiological Impact Assessment of Advanced Materials Plant, Gebeng Industrial Estate, Kuantan, Pahang, June 2010 4 The Star Online, Lynas fate depends on IAEA, 23th May 2011 5. The Star Online, PM: Govt wont compromise on projects that jeopardise public safety, 23th April 2011 6. AELB, Radiation Protection (Licensing) Regulations 1986, P.U. (A) 149, 1986 7. D. Vearrier, et. al. Technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive materials, Clin Toxicol (Phila). 47(5):393-406. 2009. 8. AEA 1954. 42 USC 2011-2292. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 9. ACT 304. Atomic Energy Licensing Act, 1984. 10. AELB, Guidelines for the Preparation of a Radiation Protection Program for TENORM Activities, LEM/TEK/45 (Part E), 2001 11. P.M.B. PILLAI, Naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) in the extraction and processing of rare earths, Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM IV), IAEA, Seville (2007), 197 221 12. IAEA, Radioactive Waste Classification. IAEA No. GSG-1 , Vienna, 2009 13 . DELFRA, Policy for the Long Term Management of Solid Low Level Radioactive Waste in the United Kingdom London, 2007 14. RSA 93. UK Radioactive Substances Act 1993 Chapter 12. 15. P. Vankerckhoven (Ed.), Radioactive waste categories - current position (1998) in the EU Member States and in the Baltic and Central European countries, EUR 18324 EN, 1998 16. IAEA, Fundamental Safety Principles, No. SF-1, Vienna, 2006.

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