GANDIONCO vs PENARANDA FACTS This is a special civil action for certiorari to review the orders of the Regional Trial

Court. Private respondent filed for legal separation against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court presided over by respondent judge. Private respondent invoked concubinage as a ground. The court rendered the decision ordering petitioner to pay his wife and child support pendente lite. The court also denied his petitioners petition to suspend hearing pending the criminal case filed against him by his wife for concubinage. Petitioner contends that the 1985 Rules of Court provide that civil cases are suspended such as legal separation and the incidents attached to it like support pendent lite pending a criminal case arising from the same offense until final judgment has been rendered. Petitioner also claims that the presiding judge was biased and should no longer preside over the case by reason of his decision and his denial of petitions to suspend the hearings. ISSUE Whether or not a civil action must be suspended pending a criminal action for the same offense and whether or not the judge was biased in rendering said decision RULING The court denied the petition. The court ruled that a civil action for legal separation can proceed simultaneously with a criminal case arising from the same offense because it does not intend to produce the civil liability arising from that offense rather it intends to obtain the right to live separately with the legal consequences like dissolution of property, custody, support and disqualification from the inheritance. The support pendente lite was also found to be correctly granted, and in case petitioner does not agree with the amount may file a motion in court for modification or reduction. With regard to the issue of the judges decision, the court cannot find the judge biased by reason of his differing opinion with the counsel especially when the judges decision is found to be sound. ONG vs ONG FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the court of Appeals. William Ong and Lucita G. Ong have been married for 20 years. They have three children namely Kingston, Charleston and Princeton. Lucita eventually filed for legal separation claiming that their marriage has been marked by violence, threats and grossly

abusive conduct. Lucita claims that three years into the marriage, he started being violent and verbally abusing her. He would also beat their children with his belt and if Lucita tried to intervene, she receives the blows instead. On December 14, 1995 they argued about their son Kingston and William hit her on the head, cheek, eye, arms and stomach and while she was bent down, he hit her on the head again and pointed a gun at her. He also told her to leave the house. Lucita left the house and stayed with her siblings and parents. She also had her wounds healed by Dr. Elinzano. With the testimonies from Lucita, her sister and the doctors being found credible by the court as against Williams mere denial that said violence never took place while admitting that they had fights almost daily, it granted the petition for legal separation and dissolution and liquidation of their properties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision upon appeal. William contends that the testimonies were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed violent and that the testimonies cannot be found credible because of their relationship with Lucita. Also, William claims that the case can no longer prosper because Lucita has abandoned the house and that this in itself is already a ground for legal separation and that she only instituted the case so she and her relatives can have control of the properties that he alone worked hard for. ISSUE Whether or not it was sufficiently proven that there was grossly abusive conduct in the marriage Whether or not the claim that said legal separation was only instituted by the wife to get the properties is tenable Whether or not Lucitas departure from the house is considered abandonment RULING It is settled that questions of fact cannot be subject of review by the court and that the Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings, more so when the trial courts decision is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. There are exemptions to this, none of which has the present case within its purview. The affirmative statements given by the witnesses are given more weight than that the denials made by William. The testimonies are consistent with the stories and with medical reports. It is also impossible that the wife would ask for legal separation to get the properties. It is highly impossible because she would not throw away 20 years of marriage and leave her children and a comfortable life if it is not filled with sadness and if she was not given sufficient reason to do so. Leaving of the house can only be a ground if the abandonment is for an unjustified reason. In this case it is by reason of the violence against the woman and so she may free herself from the immediate source of the violence.

BUGAYONG vs GINEZ FACTS This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance. Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman of the navy, is married to Leonila Ginez. At first they loved with Benjamins relatives. Benjamin eventually had to return with the U.S. forces. His sister-in-law and other anonymous letters were supposedly being sent to him saying tha his wife has been unfaithful to him. He also claims that he has received a letter from his wife that says she was kissed by another man. Benjamin however, never showed this letter. When he returned he looked for his wife and found her and slept with her for 2 consecutive days as husband and wife. The lower court decided to dismiss the case stating that there was condonation on the part of Benjamin. ISSUE Whether or not there was condonation on the part of Benjamin which may prevent him from seeking legal separation RULING The court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Benjamin by his act of asking Leonila to come and sleeping with her deprives him of an action for legal separation against his wife because he is barred by Article 100 of the Civil Code. He also failed to show the letters which he received and so failed to prove said infidelity sufficiently. The law provides that any cohabitation by the injured spouse with the guilty spouse while he or she truly believes that the spouse has been unfaithful is conclusive evidence of condonation. With this, Benjamin cannot seek legal separation. LAPUZ vs EUFEMIO FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of an Order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio alleging that they are legally married and that her husband eventually abandoned her and is cohabiting with another woman. She asked for legal separation which would cause Eufemios deprivation fo the properties. Eufemio on the other hand, claimed for nullity of marriage saying that the marriage was bigamous. While the case was pending, Carmen died in a vehicular accident and they moved for her replacement with her father in the cases as petitioner. Eufemio moved to deny this replacement stating that the death of the accused caused the abatement of legal separation.

ISSUE Whether or not the death of Carmen abated the case against Eufemio RULING The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The action for legal separation which is nothing more than bed-and-board separation is personal in nature. This means that only the spouse or injured party may institute the action. This provided in Article 100 of the Civil Code which states that only the innocent spouse may file for legal separation. It is also provided in article 108 that the spouses can abate the proceedings through their reconciliation. The nullity of the marriage is no longer in question. The death of Carmen extinguished the marriage and automatically dissolved it rendering the action moot and academic. AGAPAY vs PALANG FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Miguel Palang was married to Carlina Vallesterol with whom he produced their daughter Herminia. Miguel eventually left for Hawaii to work even before Herminia was born. However, when he came home to visit he stayed with his brother instead of his wife and child. He even attempted to divorce Carlina abroad. Upon his return in the Philippines he lived alone in Pangasinan, again, instead of living with his family. A year after his return, he married a 19 year old girl named Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner, with whom he had a son. During said marriage they purchased a parcel of land in Pangasinan whose deed of sale was issued in their names and purchased a house and lot issued in the name of Erlinda only. Miguel and Carlina eventually donated their conjugal property to their daughter Herminia. Also, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted for concubiage upon Carlinas complaint. After Miguels death, Carlina instituted a claim for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against the properties purchased by Miguel and Erlinda during their cohabitation. The trial court denied this claim of Carlina but the Court of Appeals reversed the petition hence, this decision. ISSUES Whether or not Carlina and her daughter have a rightful claim of ownership of the purchased properties? RULING The Court rule din the affirmative. Article 148 provides for property relations between those who cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or

under a void marriage while a previous marriage subsists in the case of either party. In this case, Miguels marriage to Carlina is still considered subsisting. The property relations provided for states that what is conjugally owned by parties under this situation are those which they both contributed to in proportion to their actual contribution. In this case, the Court found it hard to believe that a woman as young as Erlinda could have contributed the money necessary to have a share in the purchase of said properties. Also, said contribution was not even proven. The court also committed an error in holding that there was a termination of the conjugal partnership between Carlina and Miguel by reason of the donation they executed in favor of their child. Such termination, as provided by law can only be effected by a judicial order. Lastly, the sale being named under Erlinda alone at the instance of Miguel is an obvious donation and is of no weight since the law also provides for nullity of donations between person guilty of concubinage. HARDING vs COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANY FACTS This is an appeal from the decision of the Trial Court. Harding owned a Studebaker automobile. Upon payment of 150 pesos as premium and acquiring her husbands consent, Harding acquired an insurance policy with Commerical Union Insurance Co., herein respondents amounting to 3,000 pesos. One month after, the automobile was totally destroyed by fire. Harding eventually claimed for her losses and provided respondents with the necessary documents to prove said loss. Respondents however, failed to pay Harding for the loss even upon demand. Respondents claim that the ownership stated in the policy was false and that they cannot be held liable. The facts show that it was purchased by Hardings husband for 2,800 pesos and when it was painted by Luneta Garage which is an agent of respondents, it was valued at 3,000. ISSUES Whether or not respondents may question the validity of the gift on the basis of moderation Whether or not respondents are liable for the losses incurred by Harding RULING With regard to the first issue, the court ruled in the negative while in the second, the court ruled in the affirmative. In denying respondents the position to question the validity of the gift, it was said by the Court that it is necessary that the respondents had a significant relationship with the parties at the time it was given or they had an interest which are inchoate or present or rights to be protected. This is necessary because it is the reason and nature for the prohibition on transfers or donations between husband and wife. Moderate gifts however, are permitted which in this case cannot be questioned as it was not shown that it was not a moderate gift with respect to the financial circumstances of

the spouses. The automobile was valued at 3,000 at the instance of the Luneta Garage who solicited said policy for respondents, and with clearly no false statements made by Harding, respondents are and must be liable for the losses. RODRIGUEZ vs RODRIGUEZ FACTS This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance. Concepcion Felix was married to Felipe Calderon with whom she produced a daughter, Concepcion Calderon. When Felipe died, Felix eventually married Rodriguez who already has four children. Entering into said marriage, Felix owned two fishponds. These fishponds were eventually transferred to her daughter Concepcion Calderon which Calderon transferred back to Felix and Rodriguez. Said transfers were documented and with titles in the name of Felix and Rodriguez. Rodriguez eventually died intestate. An extra-judicial settlement was done between Felix and the other heirs of Rodriguez and one half of the conjugal property was the subject of the settlement including the two fishponds. Unfortunately, trouble eventually ensued between children of Rodriguez and Felix because of Felix failure to pay the children the income derived from the fishpond. Felix sought the nullity of the transfer of the property from her daughter to her and Rodriguez saying that said transfer was due to force and intimidation only. ISSUE Whether or not the deeds of transfer for the fishponds were null and void RULING The court ruled in the negative and affirmed the decision of the lower court. The claim that there was force or intimidation during the transfer is untenable because the statements made by Calderon were clearly biased and failed to establish the existence of said force. Also, even if force and intimidation was present, the period for said action has prescribed. The period given for such claim is only four years. The action was instituted 28 years after the transfer and 9 years after the person supposedly manifesting the force has died. Also, the transfer was an obvious circumvention of the law, to avoid the prohibition on transfers between husband and wife. The court cannot give relief to a party who is also guilty. ARCABA VS VDA. DE BATOCAEL FACTS This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Francisco Comille and Zosima Mantallana were ownerd of a lot in Dipolog. When Zosima died, Comille executed a document with his mother-in-law, wherein all rights of the mother with regard to extra-judicial partition and said rights to the property were waived by the mother. Francisco, being alone, asked Leticia and her cousin as well as herein petitioner Cirilia Arcaba to take care of his house. Eventually, only Ciriliwa was left to take care of the home and the store. She did not receive payment for her services and Francisco eventually executed a deed of donation in favor of Cirilia with respect to said property. The niece Leticia claimed that Cirilia and Francisco were lovers since they slept in the same room while another niece claims she was told by Fancisco himself that Cirilia was his mistress. When Francisco died, his heirs in the person of his nieces and nephews filed an action for the declaration of the donation in favor of Arcaba as void in violation of the Family Code. The court nullified the deed of donation and said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence this petition. ISSUE Whether or not the deed of donation is void with regard to the application of Article 87 of the Family Code as void RULING The court ruled in the affirmative. Under Article 87 donations between husband and wife are prohibited and this provision includes those cohabiting as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Cohabitation requires that they live under one roof and holding themselves out to the public as such. In this case evidence shows through testimonies that they lived together as husband and wife. Leticia states that they slept in the same room and were lovers. There was also a testimony with regard to Arcaba signing Comille as her surname which means that she thinks of herself as the wife of Francisco. Also, her working for Francisco without salary which she is very much entitled to could only mean that they have more than a relationship between an employer and employee. It is evident that Arcaba was a common-law spouse. This means the donation between Francisco and her is void. BA FINANCE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Augusto Yulo secured a P560,000 loan from BA Finance Corporation, herein petitioner. This was supported by a promissory note signed by him but on behalf of A & L Industries which Lily Yulo manages and which is registered under her name. Augusto Yulo presented a power of attorney which was supposedly issued by Lily Yulo authorizing him to secure the loan on behalf of the company. BA Finance filed a case against the spouses using the promissory note as basis and stating that even if there was forgery involved, they may still claim from Lily since said company is a conjugal property. The lower court however said that the company is an exclusive property of Lily

and cannot be subject of the claims since it was registered under a sole proprietorship in her name. ISSUE Whether or not the company is part of the conjugal property and may be held answerable for the loan RULING The court ruled in the affirmative with regard to the nature of the property but ruled in the negative when it came to its liability. The property of the spouses, despite being registered in their names alone, are considered conjugal property which means that Augusto has a rightful share in the property. This is however, not automatic. It is necessary that for the property to be answerable for expenses, loans and debts, said debts redounded to the benefit of the family which in this case obviously did not. Augusto left the family home 2 months before he procured the loan and it was obvious that there was forgery. This shows that the money from the loan never benefited the family since Augusto secured it for his own interest and benefit. Thus, Lily and the property cannot be answerable for the damages. MARMONT RESORT HOTEL ENTERPRISES V. GUIANG FACTS Marmont Resort Hotel, herein petitioner operated in Olongapo City. By reason of their hotel business, they entered into an agreement with Maris Trading wherein the former would drill for water and provide for the necessary equipment that would give full water supply to the hotel. Maris then builtn a well and drilled a pump which partly occupies the land of Federico and Aurora Guiang. Aurora Guian eventually executed a document selling for P1,500 the land used in favor of Maris Trading. The water supply of Marmont eventually needed upgrading and so it contracted another company for the same services. It tried to gain permission form the spouses to inspect the well and pump made by Maris within the land of the Guian spouses but the latter refused. Marmont eventually filed a complaint for damages caused by this refusal while the Guiang spouses claim that they did not know of any arrangement between Maris and Marmont and that the sale between Aurora and Maris was void because it was without the consent of her husband. ISSUE Whether or not the agreement of selling the land was invalid because of lack of consent from the husband RULING

The court ruled in the negative. It stated that under the Civil Code conjugal properties may not be bound, in this case sold without the consent of the husband. In the present case, said claim by Aurora is not tenable. This is because the document itself shows the signature of Federico. Said signature evidences his being a witness to the execution of the sale and giving consent thereto. Also, the claim that they had no knowledge of the agreement between Maris and Marmont is not believable as this was disclosed in the document they signed. This means that the spouses are liable for the damages caused to Marmont. PNB VS THE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Donata Montemayor mortgaged several parcels of land to the Philippine National Bank as a guarantee for the loan procured by Bacani and Jarmilla in the amount of P40,900. She did the same for her son Vitug in the amount of P35,200, all of which were registered in the Register of Deeds. The properties were all under her name and she was declared a widow in the documents. The properties were eventually foreclosed and sold to third person. After Donatas death, her sons claim that the mortgage and sale in a public auction was void and they had rights to the property, said lands being conjugal in nature. ISSUE Whether or not the mortgage and sale are invalid by reason of the property being conjugal RULING The court ruled that the mortgage and sale were valid. This is because it appears in the documents that the properties were under the name of Donata alone. The law states that conjugal property is composed of the properties acquired during the marriage. Said properties are shown to be acquired after the husband died and Donata was already a widow. PNB was not required to look beyond the face of the instrument. Also, the presumption in Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot stand due to the fact that the property was registered under her name alone and because rights fo third persons are affected.