The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development

Hasan, Noorhaidi.
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Volume 27, Number 1, 2007, pp. 83-94 (Article)
Published by Duke University Press

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The Sala Movement in Indonesia: Transnational Dynamics and Local Development

Noorhaidi Hasan

n the mid-1980s Indonesia began witnessing the expansion of the so-called Salafi Dawa movement, made evident in the appearance of young men wearing long beards (lihya), Arab-style flowing robes (jalabiyya), turbans (imama), and trousers right to their ankles (isbal) and women wearing a form of enveloping black veil (niqab) in public places. Identifying themselves as Salafis, followers of the pious ancestors (Salaf al-Salih), members were inclined to stand distinctly apart from the anything goes open society around them. They lived in small, exclusive tight-knit communities. Under the changing political circumstances of the 1990s the movement evolved rapidly, to the extent that it succeeded in establishing an exclusivist current of Islamic activism eager to organize various Dawa activities openly on university campuses and in mosques located both in city outskirts and in villages in the countryside.1 As a result of this expansion, enclaves, which served as the main areas of concentration of the movements members, sprang up. The growth of the enclaves was followed by the construction of mosques and Islamic schools (pesantrens) under the banner of the movement. Following the collapse of the New Order regime in May 1998, the Salafi movement that hitherto remained relatively consistent in developing a stance of apolitical quietism began to engage in realpolitik. Through various mass religious gatherings (tabligh akbar), its proponents lost no time in attempts to engage in the changing political landscape, responding to current political issues. Under the leadership of Jafar Umar Thalib, they set up the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah (Forum for Communication of the Followers of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet, FKAWJ) in February 1999. Subsequently, they issued a resolution to call Indonesian Muslims for jihad in the Moluccas, a province in eastern Indonesia that had been afflicted by communal conflict since the beginning of 1999. This call was legitimized by fatwas, religious legal opinions, given by a number of prominent Salafi ulema in the Middle East. On 6 April 2000 they gathered in the Senayan Main Stadium in Jakarta to state their determination to fight jihad. Under the auspices of the Laskar Jihad ( Jihad Force), thousands in fact enlisted to venture to the frontlines to fight against Christians. It is the interest of this article to examine how this movement has developed to become one of the most conspicuous phenomena in present-day Indonesia, what factors have made its proliferation possible, and to what extent the transnational dynamics have contributed to this local development.
1. The word dawa is derived from the Arabic root dawa, to call, which generally refers to the proselytizing that is incumbent upon every Muslim.

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The efflorescence of the Salafi movement has marked a new trend in Islamic activism in Indonesia. As indicated earlier, this movement initially adopted a stance of apolitical quietism, even while members were eager to display their distinctive identity. Their main concern embraced the question of the purity of the concept of the oneness of Godthat is, the acceptance of and belief in the oneness of God and His absolute authority considered the foundation of Muslim lifeand a number of other issues centered on the call for a return to strict religious practice and the subsequent moral integrity of individuals. Seemingly trivial, superficial issues such as jalabiyya, imama, lihya, isbal, and niqab have constituted the main themes in their day-to-day discussions. A commitment to wear the jalabiyya by men and the niqab by women, for instance, has been viewed as much more important than taking part in political activities. They believe that Muslim society must first be Islamized through a gradual evolutionary process that includes education (tarbiyya) and purification (tasfiyya) before the comprehensive implementation of the Sharia can be realized. As a strategy to achieve this end, they have been fervently committed to Dawa activities, participating in the establishment of halqas and dauras.2 The prototype of the Salafi movement to a large extent resembles what Olivier Roy refers to as neo-fundamentalism, which he defines as a nonrevolutionary Islamic movement attempting to re-Islamize society at the grassroots level without being formed within an Islamic state. In his analysis, this phenomenon arose from the failure of Islamism, a modern political Islamic movement that claims to re-create a true Muslim society by forming a new Islamic order through revolutionary and militant political action, if necessary.3 It should be noted, however, that despite its strengths in offering a new insight by

which to understand the late-twentieth-century evolution of political Islam, this theory has been criticized. In reality political Islamic movements have never undergone a profound transformation from revolutionary to social modes of action. Both tendencies have constantly coexisted, and the choice of a certain mode has been determined greatly by political constraints.4 What is obvious is that the phenomenon under discussion developed as the consequence of the efflorescence of the contemporary transnational Salafi dawa movement and its representing the most puritanical sect of Islam, Wahhabism. Wahhabism itself constitutes one trend in the Salafiyya (purification) movement, whose aim is to regenerate Islam by a return to the tradition represented by the pious forefathers (al-Salaf alSalih).5 The foundation of this movement, which is also often referred to as islah (reform) and tajdid (renewal), was established by a number of classic Salafi articulators, including Ahmad ibn Hanbal (AH 780 855) and Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (AH 12631328). They advocated a return to pure Islam and to the understanding of doctrine on the basis of the Koran, the Sunna, and the traditions of the Salaf al-Salih.6 Their efforts inspired Muhammad ibn al-Wahhab (170392) to launch the so-called Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century. With a puritanical spirit, ibn al-Wahhab urged his followers, also known as Wahhabis or Muwahhidun, to fight against superstitions prevalent in Arabian society and to attack those who claimed to be Muslim but whose behavior was, in their view, un-Islamic. Indeed, they took a hard line in defining who could be regarded as a believer, stating that no deviation from the Sharia was permitted, and they drew a firm distinction between the world of believers and that of unbelievers. It is perfectly reasonable, therefore, that John O. Voll should interpret this movement as a prototype of rigorous fundamentalism in the modern Islamic experience.7
5. Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. Sala yya, CD-ROM, version 1.0 (Leiden: Brill, 1999). 6. Emad Eldin Shahin, Salayah, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 463 64. 7. John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 53.

2. Halqa, literally meaning circle, is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences, in which an ustadh, teacher or preacher, gives lessons on the basis of certain books, and his participants sit around him to hear and scrutinize his lessons. It is distinct from daura, literally meaning turn, which is a type of workshop held for a certain length of time, ranging from one week to one month, during which its participants gather and stay in one place and follow all the designed programs.

3. Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 25; see Gilles Kepel, La Revanche de Dieu: Chrtiens, juifs, et musulmans la reconqute du monde (The Revenge of God: Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Reconquest of Modernity) (Paris: Le Seuil, 1991). 4. See Francois Burgat, Face to Face with Political Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 54 7.

It is worth noting that what is generally known as Salafism arose nearly one century after ibn al-Wahhab had succeeded in exerting his influence throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Salafism refers specifically to the reform movement centered in Egypt that introduced new approaches to Islam in response to the contemporary demands of modernity. This socalled Islamic reform was not merely a continuation of the older tradition of revitalization of Islamic faith and practices. Rather, it incorporated a new dimension, formulated to integrate modern thought and institutions with Islam.8 The premier proponent of this movement was Muhammad Abd uh (1849 1905). Inspired by his mentor, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839 97), Abd uh urged Muslims to reformulate the heritage of Islam through independent reasoning and open the door for the acquisition of modern knowledge, thus advocating a synthesis of Islam and modern, Western-style scientific rationalization. This synthesis was believed to be a necessity for regaining the lost triumph of Islam.9 The arguments that favored combining Islam and modern science in turn provided the basis for modernism in Islam, a movement that was significantly distinguishable from Wahhabism. Abd uhs ideas gained more resonance through the efforts made by his main follower, Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865 1935), who nonetheless formulated his masters ideas in terms of a more conservative, puritanical approach that emphasized a return to the Koran and Sunna.10 Unlike any reformist, modernist Muslim organizations that emerged across the Muslim world, the Salafi Dawa movement is squarely within the puritanical classic Salafi -Wahhabi tradition, marked by its concern with matters of creed and morality, such as strict monotheism, divine attributes, the purification of Islam from accretions, anti-Sufism, and development of the moral integrity of the individual.11 To a large
8. Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 222. See also Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change, 32. 9. Rahman, Islam, 216 17; Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change, 32 35. 10. On the evolution of Islamic modernism, see Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798 1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 231.

extent it can be conceptualized as a form of reconstituted Wahhabism, the official religion of Saudi Arabia. In fact, its proliferation has been sponsored directly by this kingdom. The term Salafi has been used as the banner of the movement because of the pejorative connotation of the term Wahhabi among many Muslims in the world, thus making it crucial for political convenience. The fact that the Salafi movement is a form of reconstituted Wahhabism is indicated by the determination of its proponents to introduce the thoughts formulated by the three main classical references among Wahhabis, namely, Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (AH 1292 1350), and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, more systematically. Another clue to this is the fact that the followers of the movement often refer to the fatwas issued by contemporary Wahhabite authorities, such as Abd al-Aziz Abd Allah bin Baz (d. 1999) and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), who emphasized, among other things, that political activism (hizbiyya) is a form of bida (heretical innovation) and thus anathema to Islam. These features make it significantly distinguishable from twentieth-century Islamist movements, such as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) and the Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Community), themselves contemporary evolutions of the Salafiyya movement.12
Saudi Arabian Campaign for Wahhabization

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The proliferation of the Salafi movement is inexorably associated with the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in the global politics of the Muslim world. As the place where the two holy sanctuaries, Masjid al-Haram and Masjid al-Nabawi, are located, the kingdom has constantly been obsessed by an attempt to place itself at the center of the Muslim world. For this purpose, it forged an alliance, and to some extent, co-opted Wahhabism. In fact, the origin of what can be called

11. Shahin, Salayah, 463. 12. The main reference work on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is R. P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). On the Jama`at-i Islami, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994).

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the first Saudi Arabian state was born out of a sacred alliance formed between ibn al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud (r. 1747 65), a local prince in Nejd. Its existence was transient, as in 1819 this state was crushed by the Egyptian forces of the Ottoman Empire. Wahhabism remained marginalized until the rise of Abd alAziz ibn Saud (d. 1953) at the beginning of the twentieth century. He created a nation-state by relying on a combination of force and ideological mobilization based on Wahhabism.13 In effect Wahhabism was enshrined as a state religion and the ulema are de facto agents of the state, and as such they are always prepared to provide tacit approval and, when requested, public sanction for potentially controversial issues.14 Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud played an enormously important role in initiating an effort to place Saudi Arabia at the center of the Muslim world and preparing the ground for the sustainability of this position. In 1926 he organized the Muslim World Congress, whose aim was to forge solidarity between Islamic countries. This congress was a tactical move to take the initiative in the development of pan-Islamic politics out of the hands of the Ottoman Empire.15 After World War II, Saudi Arabia adopted the spreading of Wahhabism as a major plank in its foreign policy, particularly to counter the expansion of Arab Socialist Nationalism launched by the then president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This policy brought the kingdom into the Western bloc led by the United States, which was engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union led communist bloc.16 In 1957 Saudi Arabia sponsored the establishment of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), whose purpose was to organize the foreign politics of the Muslim world. Five years later it set up the Rabitat al-

Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League), which was responsible for the institutionalization of its influence in cultural and religious activities across the Muslim world.17 The rise of the Rabita has contributed a great deal to the further spread of Saudi Arabian influence, which has steadily gained momentum since the beginning of the 1970s. This is related to the success of the kingdom in gaining an increasingly crucial position in the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general as a repercussion of the defeat of Muslim countries in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967.18 This position became more crucial after world oil prices skyrocketed.19 To accentuate the spread of its influence, Saudi Arabia urged the Rabita to take part as its philanthropic agent in the liberal distribution of money to Islamic organizations all over the world.20 In tandem with the growth in Saudi Arabian influence, the Muslim world has witnessed the currents of Islamic resurgence marked by the proliferation of Islamist ideas developed by Sayyid Qutb (1906 66) and Abul Ala alMawdudi (1903 79), ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami, respectively. The ideological vacuum caused by the perceived failure of nationalist regimes following the defeat in the 1967 war boosted the popularity of their notions. Alongside the slogan Islam is the solution, the concept of jahiliyya, introduced by Qutb, quickly enjoyed a wide currency. This concept describes the situation of the Muslim world under the nationalist regimes as being in a state of ignorance and barbarism, and this undoubtedly provoked the consciousness of Islamists to resist the established order and devise actions that were aimed to overturn and transform it.21

13. On the origins of Saudi rule, see James Piscatori, Ideological Politics in Saudi Arabia, in his Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 56 63. For a more comprehensive account, see Joseph Kostiner, The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916 1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 14. Joseph Nevo, Religion and National Identity in Saudi Arabia, Middle Eastern Studies 34 (1998): 40. 15. Concerning the politics of pan-Islam, see Jacob M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).

16. Gilles Kepel, Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 46. 17. On these two organizations, see Saad S. Khan, Reasserting International Islam: A Focus on the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Other Islamic Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); see also Kepel, Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam, 72 75. 18. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change, 295 96; Kepel, Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam, 69.

19. Cary Fraser, In Defense of Allahs Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi Foreign Policy Strategy, in Transnational Religion and Fading States, ed. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 222. 20. Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus in 20. Jahrhundert (Islamic Internationalism in the Twentieth Century) (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 215 16; see also Kepel, Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam, 72. 21. Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991), 131.

Saudi Arabia played an important role in the consolidation of Islamist ideology. In the context of the fight against Nassers Socialist Nationalism, this kingdom provided a haven for Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood refuges who escaped Nassers arrests, following Qutbs execution in 1966. From its soil Islamist ideas were spread throughout the world. Consonant with its opposition to the revolutionary and anti-imperialist orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia has preferred a nonrevolutionary wing of this organization, particularly that led by Hasan al-Hudaybi and Umar al-Talmasani. Both have rejected the takfir doctrine propounded by Qutb and opted to insinuate the Islamization strategy from below, rather than embrace the revolutionary strategy of taking over power.22 In addition, Saudi Arabia has forged a close tie with the Jamaat-i Islami, which has likewise rejected the revolutionary mode of politics, while criticizing Western democracy.23 The role of Saudi Arabia in global politics faced a serious challenge when the Iranian revolution erupted in 1979 and brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power. The success of this revolution provided a model, indeed a veritable blueprint, for the struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state, long dreamed of by Islamists all over the world.24 Saudi Arabia was haunted by the speculation that such a revolution would possibly wipe out its own monarchial triumph. This anxiety was to some extent justified when the kingdom witnessed the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca by a group led by Juhayman alUtaybi in November 1979, which was followed by a series of Shiite demonstrations.25 The challenge posed by the Iranian revolution became more apparent when Khomeini proposed that Mecca and Medina be granted international status.26 Saudi Arabia tried hard to limit the devastating effects of the revolution. At the domestic level it sought to prove its commitment to Islam
22. For these developments, see Gilles Kepel, Prophet and Pharaoh: Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985). 23. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Opposition in the Political Process: Lessons from Pakistan, in Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? ed. John L. Esposito (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 137.

by imposing stricter enforcement of religious laws. At the international level it intensified the spread of Wahhabism, whose ideological elements contain anti-Shiite sentiments.27 The intensification of the Wahhabi influence across the world, which also means the expansion of nonrevolutionary Islamic activism, can therefore be seen as a direct reaction to the success of the Iranian revolution. This revolution did indeed awaken ruling regimes in the Muslim world to the threat of revolutionary Islamic activism that was developing within their respective territorial borders. Consequently, activists in Islamic political movements were subjected to the repression and coercion used as weapons by respective regimes, and this situation engendered frustration among the activists. Saudi Arabia utilized the strictures on the domain of Islamic political activism arising from this changing political realm as a space for a further spread of Wahhabism.
The Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia

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The inflow of Saudi Arabian influence has come to Indonesia mainly through the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation, DDII), a Dawa organization set up in 1967 by Muhammad Natsir and other former leaders of the first banned Islamic party in Indonesia, the Masyumi. The catalysts for the establishment of this organization were the various political impasses checkmating the former leaders of the Masyumi, particularly in relation to their demands for the implementation of the Sharia. Suharto, who came to power in the place of Sukarno in 1966 following the alleged abortive coup of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI), rejected the demands and resolutely implemented a strategy of development and modernization and, consequently, preferred not to involve religion. This rejection marked the beginning of
26. On the contestation between Iran and Saudi in the post-Khomeini revolution, see Fraser, In Defense of Allahs Realm, 226 34. 27. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 151.

24. See Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Introduction, in Islamic Fundamentalism, ed. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 9 10. 25. Regarding opposition movements in Saudi Arabia, see Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (London: Macmillan, 1999); see also As`ad Abukhalil, The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power (New York: Seven Stories, 2004).

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an era of marginalization of Muslim politics by Suharto, reinforcing the policies of the preceding Sukarno regime. That the decision of the former Masyumi leaders to establish DDII was a strategic choice to extricate themselves from the political impasse and, at the same time, avoid Suhartos pressures can be plausibly inferred. 28 DDII was initially concerned with the publication of a series of religious homilies. To negotiate smoothly with the Suharto regime, which remained suspicious of it, this organization adopted various strategies. One was to mobilize religious preachers all over Indonesia to hear briefings by government officials about Suhartos policies.29 More important, DDII immediately associated itself with Saudi Arabia, which was engaged in a persistent battle against the remaining forces of Nassers Socialist Nationalism. From its inception, DDII became the Indonesian representative of the Rabita.30 This linkage reinforced the very existence of DDII in the eye of Suharto, who was trying equally hard to eradicate the remaining forces of alleged communists. In the context of its campaign against communism the New Order encouraged religious observance, among which methods was requiring students at all levels of education to take courses in religious instruction. Paradoxically, while encouraging the promotion of personal piety, the New Order sought to increase its control of Islamic political expressions.31 Following the eruption of the global Islamic resurgence, DDII sought to popularize Islamist themes. Through the network of Muslim preachers and the mosques tied to it, the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami, represented by the writings of Hasan alBanna, Sayyid Qutb, Sayyid Hawwa, Mustafa alSibai, and Abul Ala al-Mawdudi, were widely

spread. This propagation partly inspired the birth of a younger generation of radicalized militants unwilling to compromise with the state authority. Fueled by the spirit of the global Islamic resurgence, DDII gradually dared openly to criticize the policies of the Suharto regime, particularly through the pages of its daily, Abadi. Nevertheless, its ambition to enter the political arena was soon countered by an increasingly repressive policy pursued by Suharto, congruent with the New Order enmity toward political Islam. The organization felt its impact directly when Abadi was banned in 1974. Suhartos steadfast determination to marginalize Muslim politics and wipe out its radical expressions encouraged DDII to reaffirm its position as an exclusively dawa movement. The change in the political map in the Middle East brought about by the success of the Iranian revolution had a profound impact on the dawa activities of this organization. As the primary agent of the campaign against Shiites in Indonesia,32 it received more generous influxes of money from Saudi Arabia than before, through such channels as Haiat al-Ighatha al-Islamiyya al-Alamiyya (International Islamic Relief Organization), alMajlis al-Alami li al-Masajid (World Council of Mosques), al-Nadwa al-Alamiyya li al-Shabab al-Islami (World Assembly of Muslim Youth), and Lajna Birr al-Islami (Committee of Islamic Charity). Thanks to the considerable financial support given by Saudi Arabia, its projects in the Dawa and social fields increased significantly and included the construction of new mosques, orphanages, and hospitals; the founding of madrassas (religious schools); the distribution of free copies of the Koran and other books; the training of preachers; and similar works. Within the framework of the Muslim preacher training project it entered into cooperation with
30. Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus, 260. 31. Ruth McVey, Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics, in Piscatori, Islam in the Political Process, 199 225. 32. See Martin van Bruinessen, Global and Local in Indonesian Islam, Southeast Asian Studies 37 (1999): 172.

28. In relation to the establishment of this organization, Natsir has said, Previously we carried out dawa through politics but now we run politics through dawa. See Muhammad Natsir, Politik Melalui Jalur Dakwah (Politics through the Missionary Stream) (Jakarta: Abadi, 1998), 22. 29. Lukman Hakiem and Tamsil Linrung, eds., Menunaikan Panggilan Risalah: Dokumentasi Perjalanan 30 Tahun Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Fullling the Call to Duty: Documentation of Thirty Years of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia) (Jakarta: DDII, 1997), 18 21.

The Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab

The preconditions that had been created by DDII provided a foundation on which Saudi Arabia could develop its Wahhabi influence to a greater extent. Particularly disquieted by the widespread impact of the Iranian revolution, this kingdom attempted to reinforce its influence in Indonesia, for which purpose it set up the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic, LIPIA) in Jakarta in 1980. This institute was initially established as the Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (Institute of Arabic Teaching, LPBA), which concentrated on the development of the teaching of Arabic. It was established on the basis of Decree No. 5/N/26710 of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. Its first location was at Raden Saleh Road, central Jakarta, before moving to Salemba Raya Road, also in central Jakarta, in 1986, and moving again to Buncit Raya in south Jakarta in 2000.34 To pave the way for the establishment of LIPIA, the then Saudi Arabian ambassador to Indonesia, Bakr Abbas Khameis, played an enormously important role particularly in initiating various diplomatic steps with the Indonesian government. LIPIA emerged as the first foreign institution to open formal educational activities in Indonesia. It embarked on its teaching activities on 12 May 1981. In its first three years LIPIA was concerned with the Arabic lan33. Hakiem and Linrung, Menunaikan Panggilan Risalah, 27 28. 34. Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab (LPBA), Prospektus Lembaga Pengajaran Bahasa Arab As-Suudi di Indonesia (Prospectus of the Agency for Arabic Language Studies in Indonesia) (Jakarta: LPBA, 1985), 8. 35. Interview with Misbach Malim, administrative staff of DDII, Jakarta, February 2003.

36. Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA), Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab di Indonesia Pada Tahun Kelima Belas Hijriah (The Agency for Islamic Studies and Arabic in Indonesia in the Year 1500 Hijra) (Jakarta: LIPIA, 1995), 3 5. 37. Interview with Muhammad Yusuf Harun, teaching staff of the LIPIA, Jakarta, March 2003.

38. Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, Warta Tahunan: Tahun Akademik 1418 1419 H (Yearly Bulletin: Academic Year 1418-1419 Hijra) (Jakarta: LIPIA, 1999), 24 25.

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the Majlis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Ulema, MUI), a semigovernmental body that was in fact created by the New Order to domesticate the ulema, to launch a program of dai transmigrasi, preachers to be sent to remote transmigration areas. 33 The impact of the intensification of Islamic revitalization launched by DDII was felt most significantly on university campuses, which witnessed the rapid expansion of Islamic activism.

guage training of candidates recruited by DDII to study in Saudi Arabia. They were generally talented preachers who had completed their task of conducting Dawa activities in remote areas within the framework of the transmigration Muslim preachers program.35 Having reinforced its very existence, LIPIA offered regular programs of Arabic courses, including a oneyear, nonintensive course and a two-year preuniversity course. LIPIA is directly associated with the Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University of Riyadh. 36 To lead this institution the university appointed a director, whose nationality is Saudi Arabian. He is responsible for academic and administrative affairs under the direct supervision of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Jakarta. As the institution directly responsible administratively for LIPIA, the university selects and recruits lecturers from Saudi Arabia and other countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Somalia, and Indonesia. They work with the university on a contract basis.37 To extend the reach of its influence, LIPIA prints Islamic books and Koran editions distributed free of charge to hundreds of Islamic educational institutions and religious organizations. Among the books are Al-Ubudiyya (The Servanthood ); Al-Aqida al-Wasitiyya (The Middle Faith ), by Ibn Taymiyya; Aqidat Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamaa (The Faith of the Followers of the Prophetic Tradition and the Community of the Prophet), by Muhammad ibn Salih al-Uthaymin; Butlan Aqaid al-Shia (Falsity of the Faith of the Shiites), by Abd al-Sattar al-Tunsawi; Al-Khuttut al-Arida li al-Shia al-Ithna Ashiriyya (Petitions against the Twelve Shiites), by Muhib al-Din al-Khatib; and Kitab al-Tawhid (The Book on the Oneness of God ), by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.38 It has also nurtured Dawa activities by organizing the Musabaqat Tilawat al-Quran (Contest of Reciting the Koran), opening halqas and dauras, and running Dawa trainings.

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As an institute sponsored by Saudi Arabia, LIPIA certainly introduced Wahhabite doctrines to its students. This institute has taught them a basic understanding of Wahhabism and has supplied them with books on Wahhabite doctrines. Although the exact extent of their influence cannot be assessed, many aspects of Wahhabite doctrines have been espoused by the students.39 Their acquaintance with the Wahhabite doctrines was facilitated more thoroughly by various halqas and dauras in which LIPIA lecturers had the opportunity to speak on the subject.40 The insights of Wahhabism were forged more intensively through the programs that sent talented students to study in Saudi Arabia, particularly at the Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University and the Medina Islamic University. LIPIA succeeded in producing hundreds of graduates who were able to continue their studies in Saudi Arabia. This opportunity became a major attraction of LIPIA. For many Indonesian Muslims, studying Islam in Saudi Arabia remains a great source of pride. For centuries Mecca and Medina had been the main destinations of Indonesian students wanting to seek religious knowledge in the Middle East. They studied in the halqas conducted by wellknown religious scholars in the Masjid al-Haram of Mecca and the Masjid al-Nabawi of Medina.41 Consonant with the growth of the Salafism of Muhammad Abduh, however, Saudi Arabia was gradually replaced by al-Azhar University in Cairo as a favorite place to study. This university then took over the task of producing religious scholars who played an active role in the dissemination of modernist notions in Indonesia. Cairos position as the center of religious authority remained intact for decades.42 But it began to lose its attraction in the 1970s, ceding its position to the growing popularity of Saudi Arabian universities. The presence of LIPIA undoubtedly

boosted Saudi Arabian efforts to revive its central position in the eyes of Indonesian Muslims, as is confirmed by the fact that the number of Indonesians studying in Saudi Arabian universities grew significantly from year to year. The appeal for volunteers to wage jihad in Afghanistan emerged as the first serious challenge to the foreign students studying in Saudi Arabia with grants from the kingdom. They were required to prove their commitment to Islam. It is not surprising that after fi nishing their studies many such students decided to take part in the Afghan war. The same holds true for students from Indonesia. A dozen of them preferred not to return to Indonesia directly but to spend some time in Afghanistan. Participating in the jihad there turned out to be a sort of fieldwork for them. In the Afghan battlefields they stood shoulder to shoulder with volunteer fighters from various radical organizations in the Muslim world who found in the Afghan war an arena in which they could channel their radical spirit to defend Islam.
A New Type of Middle Eastern Graduate

The return of the LIPIA graduates who had completed their studies in Saudi Arabia and had undergone their baptism of fire in the Afghan war marked the birth of a new Wahhabi generation in Indonesia. Among them are some remarkable names, such as Chamsaha Sofwan or Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, and Aunur Rafiq Ghufron. They were sent to teach in various pesantrens attached to DDII, including the Pesantren al-Mukmin, Ngruki; Pesantren Wataniyya Islamiyya, Kebumen; and Pesantren al-Furqan, Gresik. Given their background, it is apparently inappropriate to characterize them as lumpenintellegentia, a term introduced by Roy in imitation of Marx to describe a new generation of militants who are poorly educated and
41. See Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of MalayIndonesian and Middle Eastern Ulamai in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century (Leiden: KITLV, 2004). 42. For a further account on the dynamics of alAzhar as the center of religious learning for Indonesians, see Mona Abaza, Indonesian Students in Cairo: Islamic Education, Perceptions, and Exchanges (Paris: Association Archipel, 1994).

39. According to Salim Segaf al-Jufri, students were not steered to believe in the Wahhabite doctrines. Those who had the Nahdlatul Ulema (NU) background, for instance, did not generally change in their religious belief and remained with their NUness. The then director of the LIPIA prohibited lecturers to question the difference of students religious belief. Interview with Salim Segaf al-Jufri, Jakarta, March 2003. 40. Interview with Badruddin Busra, a graduate of the LIPIA, Jakarta, March 2003.

have no capacity to speak of Islam as a political project.43 In fact, these graduates are well educated and enjoy a certain status as preachers who are able to produce a proper discourse. They are products of DDII, which nurtures the ambition to mold religious authorities who are capable of speaking Arabic and reading classical and modern Arabic texts, while, in contrast to traditional ulema, adopting puritan views. As DDII cadres, they are certainly well acquainted with the Islamist discourses of modern political Islamic movements. Nevertheless, these fresh graduates can be distinguished significantly from their predecessors, DDII cadres who likewise had the opportunity to round off their studies in Saudi Arabia or other Middle Eastern countries, in terms of their commitment to spread Wahhabism under the banner of the Salafi Dawa. They have asserted that Indonesian Muslims badly need an understanding of true Islam, as practiced by the Salaf al-Salih. In the name of Islamic reform, they have criticized the established modernist Muslim organizations in Indonesia, including the Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad, and Persis, which they perceive as having lost their reformist spirit, sacrificing it to a tendency toward rationalization. Instead of persistently struggling for the implementation of the principles of tawhid (oneness of God) they claim that the organizations have grown preoccupied with their own interests, for example, by participating in politics and managing schools, orphanages, and hospitals, at the expense of the main problems of the umma. The tendency that developed in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the seizure of the Masjid al-Haram by a Juhayman-led group undoubtedly contributed to the birth of this new Wahhabi generation. Saudi Arabian policy to demonstrate its commitment of Islam more clearly, while suppressing radical expressions of political Islam, seemingly became a catalyst for widespread manifestations of Wahhabi resurgence, particularly among the youth, university
43. See Roy, Failure of Political Islam, 84 85. 44. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 139 40.

students, and university staff. This phenomenon has been evident in their enthusiasm to demonstrate a commitment to religious propagation and a puritanical lifestyle while refraining from openly criticizing the government.44 Witnessing this development directly, DDII cadres who studied in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s were seemingly obsessed by the spirit to propagate Wahhabism more systematically. Upon their return, they were ready not just to apply their knowledge of Wahhabism but also to help mobilize the people to join their organization. The efforts made by these new graduates to spread Wahhabism proved fruitful, as marked by the proliferation of the Salafi communities whose membership consisted mainly of university students. Initially, their presence was felt most significantly in Yogyakarta, Solo, and Semarang, where they evolved to form an exclusivist current in the Islamic movement. As other Saudi Arabian graduates returned, including Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Yusuf Usman Baisa, Muhammad Yusuf Harun, Abdul Hakim Abdat, Ahmad Zawawi, and Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, this phenomenon quickly spread to various other cities, such as Jakarta, Bandung, Cirebon, Purwokerto, and Makassar. The efflorescence of these communities led seamlessly to the next development, the emergence of foundations that received considerable fi nancial support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf countries. These included the al-Sunnah, Majlis al-Turath al-Islami, al-Sofwa, Lajnat al-Khayriyya al-Musharaka, al-Huda, Nida al-Sunnah, and Wahda Islamiyya. These foundations were active in sponsoring the construction of mosques and pesantrens, the publication of Islamic books, and the proliferation of various other Dawa activities. Financial support for these foundations came particularly from al-Muassasa al-Haramayn al-Khayriyya (Haramayn Charitable Foundation) and al-Jamiyya Ihya al-Turath al-Islami (Reviving of Islamic Heritage Society).45 The former is a Saudi Arabiabased foundation set up in

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45. These two foundations are mentioned by Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan as the main sources of charity in the Muslim world. See Jonathan Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent: Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 36, 73.

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the mid-1980s. According to its self-proclaimed aims, it seeks to establish correct beliefs and correct Islamic doctrines to concentrate on teaching the the authentic sunnah, to provide aid to Muslims who suffer from catastrophes, to educate new generations according to Islamic doctrines, to confront ideological and atheistic invasion, to call non-Muslims to Islam, to educate and guide Muslim women, and to cooperate with other Islamic organizations. This foundation was backed by the Saudi religious establishment and fell directly under the aegis of the Saudi Arabian government. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Dawa, and Guidance of Saudi Arabia served as the general overseer of this foundation.46 The latter was a Kuwait-based foundation set up in 1981, operating under the supervision of the Kuwaiti government. The establishment of this foundation received support from the Saudi religious establishment, as the letter sent by Abd al-Aziz Abd Allah bin Baz to its founder, Tariq Sami Sultan al-Aishi, shows.47
Post Gulf War Drift

The increase in the interest of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in the development of the Salafi foundations clearly had something to do with the impact of the Gulf War, which was ushered in by the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein on 2 August 1990. Hussein, who had been supported by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries in his battle against Iran, now claimed himself to be a liberator of Arab countries, releasing them from the grasp of Western power. He even threatened other adjacent countries by drawing up his forces at the borders. As a response, Saudi Arabia invited American troops to guard its territory. Since then, the United States has built huge military bases and deployed many soldiers on Saudi Arabian soil. Saudi Arabia even provided itself as a base from where the coalition forces launched counterattacks against Hussein in an effort to liberate Kuwait.
46. For a prole of this foundation, see the Web site Arab Decision, www.arabdecision.org/show_func _3_11_8_1_3_5254.htm (accessed 20 January 2007). Its own home page, www.alharamain.org, is currently not functioning. 47. See Jamiyya Ihya al-Turath al-Islami, Manhaj alJamiyya lil-Dawawa al-Tawjiyya (Revival of the Is-

The presence of the American troops on Saudi Arabian soil unleashed storms of protest. As in other Muslim countries, anti-American sentiments fanned by Hussein gained popular support and a great deal of sympathy there. People praised Hussein as a heroic leader who dared resist what they believed to be the tyranny of the West. The decision by Saudi Arabia to invite the American troops in was certainly not popular in the eyes of the people.48 Criticism of this policy was particularly vociferous among a new brand of Islamists who were predominantly urban and university-educated, having mastered the language both of Islam and of modern concepts of rational government. They were the new generation of Wahhabis who had enthusiastically welcomed the manifestations of Wahhabi resurgence a decade before.49 The tension generated by the Gulf War had a great impact on the development of the Salafi Dawa movement in Indonesia. A division became visible between Nida and Umar Thalib. The setting for this confl ict was the Sururiyya issue fanned by Umar Thalib, who accused Nida and other Indonesian Salafi proponents, including Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, Usman Baisa, Muhammad Yusuf Harun, and Ahmad Zawawi, of being the sympathizers of Muhammad ibn Surur bin Nayef Zayn al-Abidin, one of the main critics of Saudi Arabia. As far as he was concerned, all of them were Sururis, Muslim Brotherhood activists who utilized Salafi only as a cloak but actually believed in the takfir doctrine. He sought to support this claim by pointing out the fact that the name As-Sunnah, the periodical published by Muhammad ibn Surur in London, had been adopted by Nida as the name of his own publication. In addition, he highlighted the linkage between the Jamiyya Ihya al-Turath of Kuwait, the main donor of Nida, and Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, another principal critic of bin Baz. 50 In 1996, the Jamiyya Ihya al-Turath sent Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq to Indonesia. He was charged with a mission to resolve the frag49. R. Hrair Dekmejian, The Rise of Political Islamism in Saudi Arabia, Middle East Journal 48 (1991): 62743. 50. Interviews with Jafar Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, December 2002, and Muhammad Faiz Asifuddin, Solo, December 2002.

lamic Heritage Society: Guide for the Community on Mission and Orientation) (Kuwait: Jamiyya Ihya alTurath al-Islami, 1997), 23; see also the Web site of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, www.alturath .org (accessed 22 January 2007). 48. John L. Esposito, Political Islam and Gulf Security, in Esposito, Political Islam, 56 57.

mentation. In his speech, this emissary sought to defend the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideologues by exposing the fallibility of their detractors. In reply, Shaleh Suaidi, one of the most important of Nidas cadres, raised a question about the hukm (rule) dealing with the critics condemning so uncompromisingly well-known Salafi authorities and their followers. Abd alKhaliq regretted the existence of such people and asked them to repent immediately. 51 This event enraged Umar Thalib, who felt that Suaidis question was intentionally directed at him and part of a plot to discredit him in front of Abd alRahman Abd al-Khaliq. Yet, instead of softening his criticism, he grew more persistent in attacking Nida and the other Salafi proponents. Umar Thalibs persistence in launching criticisms and condemnations of Usman Baisa drew a nettled reaction from Muhammad Syarif Fuad Hazza, an Egyptian on the teaching staff at the Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran, sent there by the Jamiyya Ihya al-Turath of Kuwait. In a pamphlet, he challenged Umar Thalib to stage a mubahala, a term derived from its Arabic root bahla, which literally means cursing each other. It is a sort of prayer challenge in which the disagreeing parties meet and appeal to God to render a verdict by placing his curse on the liars among the participants. To Hazza, this was the only solution open to curb Umar Thalibs libel (fitna), which had occasioned a severe fragmentation among Indonesian Salafi s. The upshot was a heated debate among the Salafis. Its reverberations reached even the ears of some Indonesian students at the Medina Islamic University, particularly the Pesantren al-Irsyad Tengaran graduates who maintained contact with their former teachers. Both Umar Thalib and Usman Baisa felt that the students position on this issue was highly important. They could be used to mobilize the support of Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia. Usman Baisa took the initiative to involve the students in this issue, sending them a letter explaining Umar Thalibs maneuvers.
51. Interview with Yusuf Usman Baisa, Cirebon, February 2003. 52. Usamah Mahdi et al., Nasehat dan Peringatan (Atas Syarif Fuadz Hazaa) (Advice and Warning about Sharif Fuadz Hazaa]) (Malang: Yayasan Waladun Shaleh, 1996). 53. Ibid., 1 10.

In reaction to this letter, the students split into two opposing group. Some supported Usman Baisa and others sided with Umar Thalib. Under the leadership of Usamah Faisal Mahdi, Abu Munzir zu al-Akmal, Ainur Rafiq, and Agus Rudianto, the pro Umar Thalib group approached some of their mentors at the Medina Islamic University, such as Zaid Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, and Abd al-Razaq bin Abd al-Muhsin al-Abbad, known for their pertinacious opposition to Muhammad ibn Surur, in order to gain support. The result of their discussions with these mentors appeared in the form of a pocketbook titled Nasehat dan Peringatan (Atas Syarif Fuadz Hazaa) (Advice and Warning about Syarif Fuadz Hazaa ).52 In his response, Zaid Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali asserted that the mubahala is the Dawa method used by Haddadiyin (followers of Mahmud al-Hadda al-Misri, a Muslim Brotherhood activist advocating the use of the takfir doctrine). Adopting the same tone, Rabi ibn Hadi al-Madkhali clarified that such a method is incorrect and warned Indonesian Salafi s to be aware of the danger posed by people like Muhammad Syarif Fuad Hazza. Abd al-Razaq bin Abd al-Muhsin al-Abbad was of the opinion that recourse to mubahala is forbidden unless a person has been utterly persistent in his deviations and that it is the last alternative.53
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The development of the contemporary Salafi movement in Indonesia cannot be isolated from Saudi Arabias immensely ambitious global campaign for the Wahhabization of the Muslim umma. This campaign can be seen against the background of Saudi Arabias determined attempt to reinforce its position as the center of the Muslim world following the fading influence of Nassers Arab Socialist Nationalism after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Thanks to the skyrocketing of world oil prices, from which Saudi Arabia received considerable economic benefits

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during the 1970s, this kingdom had the opportunity to sponsor a variety of Dawa activities all over the Muslim world, including the construction of mosques and Islamic schools and the publication and distribution of Islamic books, among other things, in cooperation with local agents. In this way Wahhabism was exported and spread further. This campaign was later intensified, particularly in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the takeover of the Masjid al-Haram by a Juhayman-led group in 1979. Indonesia was not beyond the influence of this campaign. The inflows of the Wahhabi influence came particularly from DDII, which had the ambition to revive the political role of the Masyumi. With the generous financial support from Saudi Arabia, this organization was active in sponsoring not only the construction of mosques and Islamic schools but also the dispatch of Indonesian youths to study in various universities in the Middle East. One of the most remarkable impacts of these activities was the emergence of a new type of Muslim intellectual who had the zeal to disseminate Wahhabism under the banner of the Salafi Dawa movement. This new generation set up foundations that were financed directly by philanthropic agents in the Middle East and played a crucial role in the expansion of the Salafi movement. Nevertheless, the rapid proliferation of the Salafi movement was coupled with the eruption of tension among its protagonists, particularly following the Gulf War in 1990. This tension developed alongside the increasing number of people who returned from the Salafi teaching centers in the Middle East engaged in a competition to hold the position as the legitimate representative of the movement. The upshot was fragmentation, and conflict became inevitable. All of them claimed to be authentic Salafis committed to the purity of the movements goal, and in so doing they gained generous financial support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. They were split into two main currents: the so-called Sururis and non-Sururis. Each current was identical in recognizing certain authorities and maintaining specific networks. In the contestation for membership and support, these two currents exploited transnational linkages.

The case of the Salafi movement demonstrates how transnational politics have transcended established cultural and political boundaries and penetrated different cultural and political milieus. What happened in a certain part of the Muslim world has in one way or another informed and influenced the sociopolitical dynamics taking place in another part of the world. Here globalization displays its tremendous impact on twentieth-century Muslim politics. But any determination of the impact of these global interactions must take into account their intersection with the dynamics of Islam vis-vis the state in specific local contexts. Taken together, these two aspects might explain the divergent manifestations of political Islam and their multiplicity in certain areas and at particular periods of time.