W 15815

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT CHARTBOOK: COUNTRY HISTORIES ON DEBT, DEFAULT, AND FINANCIAL CRISES Carmen M. Reinhart Working Paper 15815 http://www.nber.org/papers/w15815 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 March 2010
The author is grateful to Vincent Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff for useful comments and suggestions, National Science Foundation Grant No. 0849224 for financial support and to Maura Francese, Eln Gujnsdttir, Fregert Gustaffson, Sophia Lazaretou, Ashok Mody, Diego Saravia, and Jan-Luiten Van Zanden for providing invaluable references on individual countries and, in some cases, sharing their historical data as well. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 2010 by Carmen M. Reinhart. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including notice, is given to the source.
This Time is Different Chartbook: Country Histories on Debt, Default, and Financial Crises Carmen M. Reinhart NBER Working Paper No. 15815 March 2010 JEL No. F3,H6,N50 ABSTRACT This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of public debt and economic crises of various forms. It is a timeline of a countrys creditworthiness and financial turmoil. The analysis, narrative, and illustrations in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, were primarily organized around themes (serial default, inflation, etc.), although detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific information on the dating, frequency, incidence, etc. of specific crises episodes by country. The Chartbook compliments the thematic analysis with individual country histories, and provides the grounds for a systematic analysis of the temporal patterns of debt cycles, banking and sovereign debt crises, hyperinflation, and, for the post World War II period, the reliance on IMF programs. Carmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland Department of Economics 4118D Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742 and NBER creinhar@umd.edu
C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010
Table of Contents
Section I. II. III. IV. Preamble Key to Charts and Methodology Notes Debt and Crises: Main Themes Highlights and Future Research References List of figures
Figure 1. 2. 3a. 3b. 3c. 4a. 4b. 5a. 5b. 6. 7. 8a. 8b. 9 10a. 10b. 11. 12a. 12b. 13a. 13b. 13c. 14a. Algeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Angola: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1975-2009 Argentina: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009 Argentina: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1865-1895 Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1852-2009 Australia: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1895 Austria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 Austria: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1835-2009 Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation, 1914-2009 Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009 Brazil: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Default and Banking Crises, 1875-1914 Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1919-2009 Canada: Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009 Canada: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 Central African Republic: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Chile: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1826-2009 Chile: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 China: Central Government (domestic plus external), Default and Banking Crisis, 1865-1924 China: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1875-1914 China: Central Government Debt Issuance (domestic plus external), and Banking Crises, 1981-2009 Colombia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1902-2009
Figure 14b 15. 16. 17. 18 19a. 19b. 20. 21a. 21b. 22a. 22b. 23. 24a. 24b. 25. 26a. 26b 27. 28 29. 30a. 30b. 30c. 31. 32a. 32b. 33a. 33b. 34 35a. 35.
Colombia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Costa Rica: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 1892-2009 Cote DIvoire: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Denmark: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 Dominican Republic: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 Ecuador: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 Ecuador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Egypt: Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1862-2009 El Salvador: Central Government (domestic plus external)Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 El Salvador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009 Finland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 Finland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 France: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 18802009 Germany: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 Germany: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1870-1912 Ghana: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Greece: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1884-2009 Greece: Government Domestic Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1884-1939 Guatemala: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Devaluation, 1920-2009 Honduras: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Devaluation, 1914-2009 Hungary: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 Iceland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1908-2009 Iceland: External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009 Iceland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 India: Public (domestic plus external) Debt Reschedulings, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1835-2009 Indonesia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1975-2009 Indonesia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Ireland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 19292009 Ireland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Italy: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1861-2009 Japan: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1885-2009 Japan Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Figure 36. 37a. 37b. 38a. 38b. 39. 40a. 40b. 41. 42. 43. 44a. 44b. 45. 46. 47a. 47b. 48. 49. 50a. 50b. 51a. 51b. 52a. 52b. 53. 54. 55a. 55b. 56.
Kenya: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Korea: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Korea Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Malaysia: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Malaysia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Mauritius: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009 Mexico: Public Foreign Bond Issues, Default, and Banking Crises, 1824-1910 Mexico: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1872-2009 Morocco: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009 Myanmar: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1980-2009 Netherlands: General Government (domestic plus external) and Banking Crises, 1814-2009 New Zealand: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1860-2009 New Zealand: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1905 Nicaragua: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 Nigeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Norway: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004 Panama: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 Paraguay: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Peru: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1917-2009 Peru: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1905 Philippines: External Private and Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1948-2009 Philippines Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1980-2008 Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1917-1947 Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1984-2009 Portugal: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1851-2009 Romania: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009 Russia: Public Foreign Bond Issues and Default, 1815-1945 Russia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1985-2009 Singapore: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,and Banking Crises,
C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010 1969-2009 Figure
57a. 57b. 58a. 58b. 58c. 58d. 59. 60a. 60b. 61. 62a. 62b 63. 64a. 64b. 65a. 65b. 66a. 66b. 66c. 66d. 67a. 67b 68. 69. 70.
South Africa: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1911-2009 South Africa: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1895 Spain: Short-term Loans to the Crown and Defaults, 1601-1679 Spain: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1850-2009 Spain: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 Spain Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Sri Lanka Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1950-2009 Sweden: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1719-2009 Sweden: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Switzerland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 Thailand: Public (domestic and external) and External (public and private) Debts, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1913-2009 Thailand: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Tunisia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Turkey: External Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises 1854-2009 Turkey: External Public and Private Debts, Default, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 United Kingdom: Central Government Debt, Restructurings, and Banking Crises, 1692-2009 United Kingdom Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 United States: Central Government Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1790-2009 United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 United States: Private Debt Outstanding, 1916-2009 United States Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 Uruguay: Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Restructuring, and Banking Crises, 1871-2009 Uruguay: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Default, and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 Venezuela: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1921-2009 Zambia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 Zimbabwe: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Restructuring, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1970-2006
I. Preamble This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of debt and economic crises of various forms. The analysis, narrative, and illustrations in This Time is Different, were primarily organized around themes (serial default, inflation, etc.), although detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific information on the dating, frequency, incidence, etc. of specific crises episodes by country. 1 The Chartbook compliments the thematic analysisindeed, it fills in as documentation to its underpinnings. What follows systematically illustrates for 70 countries the individual timeline of public and private debts, banking, sovereign domestic and external debt crises, and hyperinflation, starting from a countrys independence (and even prior to that in numerous cases) to the present. The dating of the largest output declines and a countrys history with International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs since World War II to deal with an assortment of economic ills contribute to the chronologies. The individual country histories are often fascinating in their own right, highlighting that virtually no country has escaped unscathed from economic crises of one form or another. In effect, in a number of countries, financial crises are more a way of life affecting all, if not most generations. Black swans are not that rare. The prologue to this Chartbook is minimalist by design and is organized as follows. The next section offers an essential guide to the country charts and the accompanying tables, clarifies methodological issues, and delineates the approach followed to document the vast number of sources referenced in this analysis. Section III summarizes some of the main (common or recurrent) themes and patterns that (collectively) the country histories reveal. Some of these are documented in the literature while others merit considerable further study. These big picture themes include: The repeated-game nature of sovereign debt crises and the fact serial default is commonplace among todays
1
Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009)
emerging markets just as it was among advanced economies in an earlier era needs little commentary, as even a causal perusal of the charts display this historical pattern. The serial nature of banking crises (particularly among the more developed economies prior to World War II) is equally compelling. Nearly all of the 21 advanced economies in the sample record an impressive crisis tally, especially from the 1880s to the 1930s. The episodes where there are surges in private debt before the crisis and public debts after the crisis are not only numerous but span across advanced and emerging economies in nearly all regions. And so on The last section discusses where there are gaps in the data and overall analysis of the debt-crisis cycle. As such, it is a roadmap for future research,
II. Key to Charts and Methodology Notes For working definitions of banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises, see the extensive discussion in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a and 2010). As to the crises highlighted in the country profiles, our focus is on primarily external sovereign default (also its less common counterpart-domestic sovereign default) and banking crises. Many countries have a rich history of recurring (and often chronic) exchange rate crashes and inflation crises, particularly (but not exclusively) in post World War II Latin America. We only provide limited information on these recurring follies in monetary history.2 We do include, highlight and date all hyperinflation episodes, as these have been associated with the complete or near complete liquidation (through de facto default) of domestic currency debts. Key to charts Besides the events discussed above, in a few charts we highlight neardefault episodes, which involve some form of international assistance to avoid a default or a restructuring. Their dates are also listed in the first column of the accompanying table. Some examples of sub2
In the tables that accompany each country profile, we do provide, as summary statistic on inflation crises, the share of years with annual inflation above 20 per cent per annum. This inflation performance also gives a reasonable indication of the incidence of currency crashes,
sovereign defaults (by states or provinces) are also flagged. In a few charts, historic currency crashes (such as the collapse of an 80-year old peg) are highlighted as well. More mundane episodes of inflation and currency crises are not shown. However, the full sample incidence (share of years) in an inflation crisis, is reported in the table below the chart, so as to provide information on chronic inflation problems. 3 The major output collapses shown in the tables that accompany the charts and the numerous IMF progams since 1952 (listed as a memorandum item at the bottom of the table) are not depicted in the figures, to avoid compromising clarity. Table 1. Coloring and Shading to Highlight Events in Country Charts
Years in default or restructuring External debt Years in default or restructuring Domestic debt Near default, as defined in text First year of banking crises Hyperinflation (annual inflation > 500%) Pale shading Dark shading Bright shading Black line/bar Medium shading
Insets of smaller tables and charts into the figures Insets are used throughout to provide complementary information to that shown in the main figure. For example, for many advanced economies, an inset plots for household credit to GDP from the mid-1990s to the present to highlight trends in private debts ahead of the 20072008 crisis. In other cases, these insets provide information on the maturity composition of the debt (public or private, as the case may be) on the eve of a banking crisis be it default or hyperinflation. The distribution of public and private debt before and after a crisis also provide documentation of the numerous crisis cases where the government assumed important quantities of private debts.
For evidence on the correlation and overlap between currency crashes and inflation crises, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
Descriptive statistics in the tables to each country Descriptive statistics are mostly self-explanatory, but two particulars merit explanation. The first year of banking crises are listed and those shown in italics indicate that the episode in question was not deemed to be a systemic crisis. Near default episodes are also shown in italics and not counted in the tally of default. The last column provides information on the largest annual output declines, usually the top five, but more or less when relevant. Both the year and the percent decline (in parentheses) are given. For full output collapse episodes, the interested reader is referred to Barro and Ursua (2009). The bottom portion of the table gives memorandum items on IMF programs with the country over the period from 1952 to 2009. The first year of the program is listed as well as the total number of programs. The relevant sources are discussed below. Debt ratios Debt is usually shown as a percent of GDP and in a few cases as a percent of exports. In a handful of cases we have debt data for the earlier part of the 19th century but no GDP or trade measure to scale the debt data by. In those few cases, we show changes in debt (often over three years) to provide an indication of the debt cycle. The nominal GDP data comes from numerous scholars as well as official statistical sources. For a number of developing countries we have more data on exports than for GDP (in all cases we have post World War II nominal GDP data). In these cases the charts show the actual debt/GDP ratio for the period during which GDP data is available (say post 1920s) and use the debt/exports ratio times the average export to GDP ratio (for the period during which both series overlap) to back-cast the series. References and sources Most charts list the main source as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), which has an extensive data appendices listing sources series-by-series and country-by-country over different subperiods. Additional sources listed below each graph usually indicate that we came across these sources subsequent to the publication. Prominent examples of the recent discoveries include: detailed
recent historical studies of Italian, Greek, Dutch and Swedish public debts (Maura Francese and Angelo Page for Italy, Sophia Lazaretou on Greek 19th century domestic debts, Frit Bos for the Netherlands, and Klas Fregert and Roger Gustafsson for Sweden.) As the sample was extended to include Bulgaria, Ghana, Iceland, Ireland, and Switzerland, pertinent sources for these are also listed in the relevant country page. Finally, the sources for the IMF programs are Bird, Hussain and Joyce (2004), Mody and Saravia (2009), and the IMFs Annual Reports for several years to update these studies through 2009.
III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes This section highlights some of the issues where the collective evidence from the country histories are particularly illuminating. Throughout, I use country examples or specific crises episodes to illustrate particular points. (i) Serial default is a widespread phenomenon across emerging markets and several advanced economies. Figures 8a and 26 for Brazil and Greece, respectively (among many more that are similar) call attention to this point by simply shading the years in default throughout the sample; the summary table also lists the timing and duration of each default spell while the tally entry (bottom of column 1) reports the default tally for 1800-2009. Countries such as France and pain have a higher count if pre-1800 default episodes are counted. (ii) Prior to World War II, serial banking crises in the advanced economies was the norm; as the larger emerging markets developed a financial sector in the late 1800sthese economies joined the serial banking crisis club. Country histories for Belgium (Figure 6), Canada (Figure 10a) among others, illustrate this pattern. The world financial centers (the UK, Figure 65a and the US Figure 66a) take the lead in serial banking crises. One can speculate that the less-developed economies substitute foreign bankers for nonexistent domestic ones. As such, when acute sovereign fiscal difficulties arise, these become manifest in serial external default rather than serial domestic banking crises.
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(iii) In light of serial debt and banking crises (not to mention chronic currency and price instability), it is not surprising to see a similar serial pattern in the incidence of IMF programs. Peru and the Philippines set the record with 24 and 23 programs, respectively. However, IMF programs were not always in the exclusive domain of emerging markets. During the 1950s1970s, the IMF was more like the discount window of a central bank and did not carry the stigma it of the default or near default cases. Among the advanced economies, the U.K. holds the record with 11 programs.4 (iv) Private debts typically surge prior to a banking crises. This pattern is evident in total external debt (a stock), capital inflow bonanzas (a flow), domestic banking sector credit (a stock), or any combination of these. 5 Public debts may or may not surge ahead of banking crises. Indeed, especially in financial repression cases the governments efforts to stuff its debts in captive bank balance sheets Procyclical fiscal policies, where the government amplifies the boom-bust cycle in total debt (as documented in Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003), all too often re-enforce the boom in private indebtedness ahead of the banking crisis. For external debts, see Figures 30b and 62a for Iceland and Thailand, respectively. Surges in capital inflows do not last forever. When they end, countries often display the Calvotype sudden stop syndrome, even in crises of an earlier century in advanced economies. 6 The U.S. experience during 1865-1913, shown in Figure 68b, exemplifies this behavior. Domestic credit climbs sharply prior to the banking crisis an unwinds afterwardthe examples form banking in Colombia (Figure 12b) and Norway (Figure 47b) demonstrate this time profile. By contrast, the famous (or infamous) lost decade and bank debt overhang in post 1992 crisis Japan is evident from Figure 34b. The coverage on domestic credit boom in this Chartbook is not intended to be as comprehensive as public and external debtthe primary focus. However, the
4 5
Bird et.al. (2004) aptly title their paper on IMF programs Many Happy Returns?.. The term capital flow bonanza is introduced in Reinhart and Reinhart(2008) and refers to a surge in capital inflows (over and beyond their historoic norm). 6 Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo_Kung (2006), for example.
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pattern alluded to here is strongly supported by the evidence from studies that have focused primarily on the domestic credit cycle. The most comprehensive in terms of country coverage is Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who find most booms are followed by currency crises, banking crises or both. The smaller country set for the 1880-2008 period studied in Schularick and Taylor (2010) presents similar findings.7 (v) Banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises. To be clear, we are referring to domestic banking crises, the issue of whether banking crises in the financial centers precede domestic banking crises and or sovereign defaults or restructurings is examined in some detail in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). The reasons for this temporal sequence may be the contingent liability story emphasized by Diaz Alejandro (1985) and formalized in Velasco (1986), in which the government takes on massive debts from the private banks, thus undermining its solvency.8 Even absent large scale bailouts (and without counting the post-crisis new government guarantees) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) establish that, largely owing to collapsing revenues, government debts typically rise by about 86 percent in the three years following a systemic financial crisis, this sets the stage for rating downgrades and, in the worst scenario, default. The list of country examples of this sequencing is too long to enumerate, we would highlight as illustrative, the Barings 1891 crisis in Argentina (Figure 3b), Austrias banking crisis in 1931 and subsequent default in 1932 (Figure 5a) and Indonesias 1997-1998 banking crisis and 1999-2000 default (Figure 32a). (vi) Public debts follow a repeated boom-bust cycle; many (if not most) of the bust phase involved a debt crisis in emerging markets. Public sector borrowing surges as the crisis nears. Debts continue to rise after default, as arrears accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.9
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Gourinchas et.al. (2001) also document for different samples this boom-crisis-bust pattern. 8 See Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) for a framework that is consistent with these dynamics. 9 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) on evidence on output behavior before during and after debt crises.
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If there is an exchange rate crash associated with default, as shown in Reinhart (2002), the valuation effect on external debts also contributes to further increase in debt/GDP ratios. The boom-bust episodes are very numerous cutting across regions and time. The crisis episode in Figure 69 for Zambia illustrates the pre-crisis surge in public debtas well as its continued climb in the early stage of default. (vii) As suggested in the Diamond and Dybvigs famous framework of banking crises, shortterm debts (public and private) escalate on the eve of banking crisis and sovereign defaults. 10 This pattern is also consistent with He and Xiongs (2010) setting, where creditors' incentives to shorten debt maturity to protect themselves against runs by other creditors. Most famously, Mexico ramped up its short-term debt issuance just in advance of its Tesobonos crisis in 1994 as in Figure 40b. In the march toward hyperinflation, long-term debts disappear altogether; the German hyperinflation of 1923-1924 (Figure 22a) demonstrates these dynamics. (viii) Private debts become public debts-after the crisis. Several examples from the debt crisis that engulfed Latin America in the early 1980s and lasted a decade are documented in various insets that document the rising share of private hidden debts carrying implicit government guarantees (Figure 62a for Thailand, among others) (Figure 19a for Ecuador, for example). 11
10 11
See Chang and Velasco (2000) for an open-economy treatment of Diamond and Dibvig (1983). For a discussion of hidden public debt see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
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Figure 1. Algeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
90 Banking crisis (black line) 80 70 60 50 40 30 Default (shaded) 20 10 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Algeria, 1962-2009
External default Dates 1991-1996 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1990 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 10.4 Share of years in inflation crisis 12.5 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1961(12.1) 1962(21.1) 1966(4.8) 1971(8.5) 1980(5.4) Total number 4
Number of episodes: 1 0 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1989, 1991, 1994,1995
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Figure 2. Angola: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1975-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
700 Banking crisis (black bar) Domestic defaults (dark shading)
600
500
1993-1996 Hyperinflation Year Inflation 1993 1379.5 1994 949.8 1995 2672.2 1996 4146 Default (shaded)
400
300
200
100
0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: No data is available prior to 1985 right after independence from Portugal (1975) and during the early year of the 27-year civil war (1975-2002).
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: Angola, 1975-2009
External default dates 1985-2003 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1976 1992-2002 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1991 Hyperinflation dates 1993-1996 Share of years in external default 54.3 Share of years in inflation crisis 60.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1974 (5.0) 1975 (38.4) 1976 (10.2) 1992(5.8) 1993(24.0) Total 0
19
Number of episodes: 1 2 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs None
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Figure 3a. Argentina: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Public foreign bond issues and default 1827-1857 the first and longest default
250
50 40 30 20 10 0
200 Hyperinflations
1824
1834
1844
1854
1864
1874
150
` External defaults (shaded) banking crises (black lines)
100
50
0 1867 1877 1887 1897 1907 1917 1927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown above. Domestic default episodes are that overlap with external default are not shaded (see table below for dates)
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs: Argentina, 1816-2009
External default Dates 1827-1857 1890-1893 1951 1956-1965 1982-1993 1989 2001-2005 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1890-1893 1982 1989-1990 2001-2005 2007-2009 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1885 1890 1914 1931 1934 1980 1985 1989 1995 2001 Hyperinflation dates 1984-1985 1989-1990 Share of years in external default 32.5 Share of years in inflation crisis 24.7 7 worst output collapses year(decline) 1914(10.4) 1917(8.1) 1931(6.9) 1959)6.5) 1985(7.0) 1989(7.0) 2002(10.9)
31 4 1 10 12 -9
Number of episodes: 7 5 10 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1958-1962, 1967-1968, 1976-1977, 1983-1984, 1987, 1989, 1991-1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003(2)
Total 20
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Figure 3b. Argentina: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1865-1895 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
1890 Barings banking crisis and default 160 140 120 1885, banking crisis and exit from Gold Standard 100 80 60 40 20 0 1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893
1885 and 1890 crises Year Private as a % of total 1884 42.1 1885 96.6 1889 78.2 1890 100.0
Banking crises (black lines)
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
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Figure 3c. Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
70 Hyperinflation First year of the banking crisis (black line); default (shaded) 60
50
40
30 Curency crash; bank holiday and an output collapse of over 30%

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
20
10
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is used. Only systemic banking crises are shown.
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Figure4a. Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,
Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1852-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)

200 Banking crises (black lines); there is a "neardefault" in 1932 in New South Wales. 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1852 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Household debt as a percent of GDP 130 110 90 70 50 1995 1999 2003 2007
Sources: S.J. Butlin (1968), OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: An interesting anecdote on sub-sovereign debt from correspondence with Huw McKay (who also refered us to Butlins work, which dates the earliest banking crises.. During the great depression, the left wing government of the largest state in Australia, New South Wales, voted to default on its foreign debt, only to be over-ruled by the Federal Government. Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Australia, 1800-2009 (calculations since independence1901)
External default dates 1932 Duration (in years) n.a. Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1828 1843 1893 1931 1989 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 2.8 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1882(5.6) 1892(12.3) 1893(5.5) 1930(9.5) 1931(6.7)
Number of episodes: 0 0 5 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1961 Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total.
0 Total 1
19
Figure 4b. Australia: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1895 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
160 1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath Year Private as a % of total 1886 16.9 1887 34.8 1891 17.9 1892 12.8 Banking crises (black lines) 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893
20
Figure 5a. Austria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Banking crisis begins in 1931 (black lines) and default in 1932. 1938 was the last of 7 default episodes (shaded) 100 90 80 70 60 The 1921-1922 hyperinflation Year Share of short-term debt 1919 68.6 1920 87.9 1921 99.1 50 40 30 20 10 0 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: Austria, 1800-2009 (Austria-Hungary pre-1918)
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates Share of years in external default 17.1 Share of years in inflation crisis 13.3 4 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1919(15.6) 1931(8.0) 1932(10.3) 2009(3.8)
1802-1815 14 1945 1873 1921-1922 1816 1 1924 1868-1870 3 1929 1914-1915 2 1931 1932-1933 2 2008 1938 1 1940-1952 13 Number of episodes: 7 1 5 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs Total None 0 Notes: There is an issue whether to treat (more or less) consecutive defaults in 1802, 1805, and 1811 as separate episodes or as a single longer episode, as above. 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
21
Figure 5b. Austria: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
World War I begins 450 400 350 Banking crisis (black line) 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
22
Figure 6. Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1835-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
140
120
100
80
60
40 First year of banking crises (black lines)
20
0 1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Belgium, 1800-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) n.a. Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1838 1842 1848 1870 1914 1925 1931 1934 1939 2008 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 5.2 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1932(4.5) 1938(2.3) 2009(3.2)
Number of episodes: 0 0 10 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1952 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total 1
23
Figure 7. Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
1931 default Share of Year short-term debt 1928 18.3 1929 46.2 1930 51.2 1000 Domestic default (dark shading) 900 800 1984-1985 hyperinflation 700 600 500 The 1931 default episode (shaded) lasted 18 years
400 300 200 100 0
1914
1924
1934
1944
1954
1964
1974
1984
1994
2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports. .
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs: Bolivia, 1825-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates 1984-1985 Share of years in external default 21.6 Share of years in inflation crisis 14.6 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1954(9.5) 1956(5.9) 1982(4.4) 1983(4.5)
1875-1879 5 1927 1987 1931-1948 18 1982-1985 1994 1980-1984 5 1999 1986-1993 8 1989-1997 9 Number of episodes: 5 2 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1956-1957, 1959, 1961-1967, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1986 (2), 1988(2), 1994, 1998, 2001
1 Total 20
24
Figure 8a. Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
1988-1994 Hyperinflation Year Share of short-term debt 1987 11.8 1988 44.1 1989 79.2 900 Hyperinflation 800 700 600 Defaults (shaded) 500 400 300 First year of banking crises (black lines) 200 100 0
1824 1834 1844 1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: For 1824-1945, public external debt; for 1946-2009 external debt is the aggregate of public and private debts. Only the major banking crises are shown. There are a total of 9 default episodes but only 8 shaded regions, as two episodes occur in consecutive years (see table below). Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: Brazil, 1822-2009
External default Dates 1828-1834 1898-1901 1902-1910 1914-1919 1931-1933 1937-1943 1961 1964 1983-1990 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1986-1987 1990 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1890 1897 1900 1914 1923 1926 1929 1963 1985 1990 1994 Hyperinflation dates 1988-1990 1992-1994 or single episode 1988-1994 Share of years in external default 26.6 Share of years in inflation crisis 26.1 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1893(12.8) 1896(7.2) 1930(6.0) 1981(4.4) 1990(4.2)
7 4 9 6 3 7 1 1 8
Number of episodes: 9 2 11 2(1) Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1958, 1961, 1965-1972, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1998, 2001-2002
Total 16
25
Figure 8b. Brazil: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Default and Banking Crises, 1875-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
The Barings crisis of 1890 Banking crises (black lines); default (shaded) 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
26
Figure 9. Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1919-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
350 Three external defaults (shaded)
300
250
200
150
Banking crises (black lines) 1981-1990, only external public debt data available (dashed line)
100
50
0 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Bulgaria

External default Dates 1916-1920 1932 1990-1994 Duration (in years) 5 1 5 Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1931 1994 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 6 worst output collapses year(decline) 1934(8.5) 1990(9.1) 1991(10.8) 1993(11.6) 1996(8.0) 2009(6.5) Total number 8
Number of episodes: 3 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1991-1992, 1994, 1996-1998, 2002, 2004 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
27
Figure 10a. Canada: Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009 (debt as a percent of exports and GDP)
700 1935- Alberta defaults First year of banking crisis (black line) Debt-to-exports (solid) 400 600
500
300
200
100 Debt-to-GDP (dotted) 0 1867 1877 1887 1897 1907 1917 1927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. The 1983 banking crisis (also shown) does not meet the systemic criteria.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Canada, 1867-2009
External default Dates 1935 near Duration (in years) 10 Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1837 1866 1873 1906 1908 1912 1923 1983 Number of episodes: 0 0 8 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs None 0 Total 0 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 0.7 6 worst output collapses year(decline) 1876(6.7) 1919(7.6) 1921(10.8) 1931(15.4) 1932and 1933(7.1)
28
Figure 10b. Canada: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
1890 Barings crisis 50 45 40 35 The Panic of 1907 Banking crises (black lines) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
29
Figure 11. Central African Republic: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
120 Banking crises (black lines) 100
80
60 1994, a rare 100 percent devaluation across the CFA franc zone
40
Second and ongoing default (shaded)
20
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Central African Republic, 1960-2009
External default Dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 56.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 4.0 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1979(5.6) 1983(6.0) 1996(8.1) 2003(7.1) Total 10
1981 1 n.a. 1976 1983-2009 27 1988 Number of episodes: 2 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1980-1981, 1983-1985, 1987(2), 1989, 1994, 1998
30
Figure 12a. Chile: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1826-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
250
9 default/restructuring episodes (shaded)
200
150
100
50
0 1826 1846 1866 1886 1906 1926 1946 1966 1986 2006
Sources: Diaz et. al (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Chile, 1818-2009
External default Dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 27.1 Share of years in inflation crisis 20.3 7 worst output collapses year(decline) 1919(14.2) 1921(13.3) 1930(16.0) 1931(21.2) 1932(15.5) 1947(10.8) 1975(12.9) 1982(13.6)
1826-1842 16 n.a. 1890 1880-1883 4 1899 1931-1947 18 1907 1961 1 1915 1963 1 1926 1965 1 1976 1972 1 1981 1974-1975 2 1983-1990 8 Number of episodes: 9 0 7 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1956, 1958-1959, 1961, 1963-1966, 1968-1969, 1974-1975, 1983, 1985, 1989 (2)
0 Total 16
31
Figure 12b. Chile: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom,
Default and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
120 Banking crises (black lines); default (shaded) The Barings crisis of 1890 80
100
The Panic of 1907
60
40
20
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
Sources:.Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
32
Figure 13a. China: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1885-1937 (debt as a percent of exports)
1600 Banking crisis (black line) defaults (shaded) Domestic default (dark shading) 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: China, 1850-2009
External default Dates 1921-1936 1939-1949 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1921 1932 Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates 1946-1948 Share of years in external default 12.9 Share of years in inflation crisis 10.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1934(8.7) 1960(3.4) 1961(17.3)
1863 1866 1873 1883 1898 1910 1923 1931 1934 Number of episodes: 1998 2 2 10 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1981, 1986 1 No output data from 1939 to 1951.
16 11
1 Total 2
33
Figure 13b. China: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
and Banking Crises, 1875-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
70 Banking crises (black lines)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
34
Figure 13c. China: Central Government Debt Issuance (domestic plus external) and Banking Crises, 1981-2009 (three-year sum in issuance as a percent of GDP)
23 Total (Central government) Year Debt/GDP 2006 16.5 2008 27.8 est. 2009 35.7 est. Asian financial crisis 21 19 17 15 First year banking crisis (black line) US subprime and global crisis; fiscal stimulus plans in China. 13 11 9 7 5 3 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, several issues, National Debt Association of China, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein, and authors calculations. Notes: Data on central government debt outstanding (domestic plus external) is no longer published. Estimates for 2008 and 2009 are based on issuance data for those years.
35
Figure 14a. Colombia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1902-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
90 The runup to default Year Share of Short-term debt 1929 15.1 1930 20.2 1931 43.9 80 70 Banking crises. 1982 and 1998 (black lines) 60 50 40 1932, the last of 7 default episodes (shaded) 30 20 10 0 1902 1907 1912 1917 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Sources: Junguito and Rincn (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Colombia, 1819-2009
External default Dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 35.6 Share of years in inflation crisis 17.8 3 worst output collapses year(decline) 1914(3.4) 1934(2.1) 1999(4.2)
1826-1845 20 n.a. 1982 1850-1861 12 1998 1873 1 1880-1896 17 1900-1904 5 1932-1934 3 1935-1944 10 Number of episodes: 7 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1957-1960, 1962-1964, 1966-1973, 1999, 2003, 2005
0 Total 18
36
Figure 14b. Colombia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
50
The 1998 banking cisis was associated with the worst recession recorded. First year of the banking crises (black lines)
45
Coverage of domestic credit series expanded
40
35
30
25
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is used.
37
Figure 15. Costa Rica: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt Default and Banking Crises, 1892-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
750 6 of a total of 9 defaults/restructurings are shaded
650
550
450
First year of banking crises (black lines)
350
250
150
50 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: Soley Gell (1926), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Costa Rica, 1838-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 34.5 Share of years in inflation crisis 5.3 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1923(7.6) 1927(9.2) 1932(8.0) 1934(11.8) 1942(10.4) 1944(9.4) 1982(7.3)
1828-1840 13 n.a. 1987 1874-1885 12 1994 1895-1897 3 1901-1911 11 1932-1952 21 1962 1 1981 1 1983-1990 8 1984-1985 Number of episodes: 9 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1961-1962, 1965-1967, 1976, 1980-1982,1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2009
0 Total 16
38
Figure 16. Cote DIvoire: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
250
Almost uninterrupted ongoing default for 26 years (shaded)
200
150
100 1994, a rare 100 percent devaluation across the CFA franc zone countries
Banking crisis (black line)
50
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Cote DIvoire, 1960-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 52.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 6.0 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1965(2.2) 1983(3.9) 1990(6.9) 2000(4.6) Total 11
1983-1998 16 n.a. 1988 2000-2009 10 Number of episodes: 2 0 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1981, 1984-1986, 1988-1989, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2009
39
Figure 17. Denmark: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Accounting definition of debt expanded
90
80 70 60 50
Banking crises (black lines) Household debt as a % of GDP 1995 79.6 2000 90.9 2005 115.9 2008 136.7
40 30 20 10 0
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Denmark, 1800-2009
External default Dates n.a. Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1813 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1813 1857 1877 1885 1902 1907 1921 1931 1987 2008 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 1.9 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1856(5.6) 1877(2.7) 1921(2.9) 1932(2.6) 2009(5.0)
n.a.
Number of episodes: 0 1 10 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs None 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total number of years 0
40
Figure 18. Dominican Republic: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
100 1975-2001, default on domestic debt (dark shading) First year of banking crises (black lines). 3 external defaults (lighter shading) 90 80 70 60 50 In 1985 the 1 peso to 1 US dollar peg in place since 1905, is abandoned 40 30 20 Banking crises (black lines) 10 0 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Dominican Republic, 1844-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 28.3 Share of years in inflation crisis 6.6 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1965(12.4) 1985(2.5) 1990(5.5)
1872-1888 17 1975-2001 1996 1892-1893 2 2003 1897 1 1899-1907 9 1931-1934 4 1982-1994 13 2005 1 Number of episodes: 7 1 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1959, 1964, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 2001, 2003, 2005
0 Total 9
41
Figure 19a Ecuador: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP )
140
Shown are five of a total of ten external defaults (lighter shading)
120
100
80
In 2000, in the midst of crisis, Ecuador officially fully dollarized in place since 1905, is abandoned
60
40
Banking crises (black lines) 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
20
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: For the period 1973-1989 the data is for external public debt for general government, this underestimates public indebtedness, as it does not include domestic (or internal) debtsat the same time general government is more inclusive than our central government measure. These two effects are working in opposite directions.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ecuador, 1830-2009
External default Dates 1826-1845 1868-1890 1894-1898 1900-1904 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1999 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1981 1998 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 57.8 Share of years in inflation crisis 13.9 3 worst output collapses year(decline) 1983(2.1) 1987(6.0) 1999(6.3)
20 4 1 5
1906-1911 3 1914-1924 9 1929-1954 1982-1995 1999-2000 2008 Number of episodes: 10 1 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007 Dates of programs 1961-1966, 1969-1970, 1983, 1985-1986, 19881989, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2003
0 Total 18
42
Figure 19b. Ecuador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Private debts become public debts--1982 default Year Share of private debt 1972-1981 18.2 1982 21.1 1983-1992 2.2 160 1999 banking crisis and default Ecuador dollarizes 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 Banking crises (black bars)
1970
0 1995 2000 2005
1975
1980
1985
1990
43
Figure 20. Egypt: Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1862-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
350
300
1876, the first of 2 default episodes (shaded)
250
200
150
No external public debts 1940-1960
100
50
0 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein Notes: By 1945, the outstanding balance on Ottoman debts were either fully paid off or forgiven; no external debts are recorded through 1960.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Egypt 1800-2009
External default dates 1876-1880 1984 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1907 1981 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 2.9 Share of years in inflation crisis 5.2 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1887(2.2) 1914(3.0) 1920(6.6) 1942(3.6) 1991(3.2) Total 8
5 1
Number of episodes: 1990 2 0 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1962, 1964, 1977-1978, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1996 Sources: Pre-World War II GDP from Yousef (2002).
44
Figure 21a El Salvador: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
70 External default episodes (light shading)
60
50
Domestic default (dark shading); first year of banking crisis (black line)
40
30
20
10
0 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports. .
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: El Salvador, 1838-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 22.7 Share of years in inflation crisis 3.5 7 worst output collapses year(decline) 1927(12.1) 1931(10.1) 1932(10.2) 1938(7.1) 1949(9.2) 1980(8.6) 1982(6.3) Total 20
1828-1860 33 1981-1996 1989 1898 1 1921-1922 3 1932-1935 11 1938-1946 21 Number of episodes: 5 1 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1958-1963, 1965, 1967, 1969-1970, 1972, 1980, 1982, 1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 2009
45
Figure 21b. El Salvador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Private debts become public debts--1981 domestic default Year Share of private debt 1971-1980 40.7 1981-1990 5.8 2007 27 60 In 2001, El Salvador dollarizes 50
40
30
20 As an exception to the rule, El Salvador defaulted on its domestic debts (shaded) in 1981 while servicing external debts.
Banking crisis (black bar)
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
46
Figure 22a. Finland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
120 First year of banking crisis (black lines)
100
80
60
40
20
0 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Finland, 1800-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) n.a. Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1900 1921 1931 1939 1991 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 7.5 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1862(5.4) 1867(8.0) 1931(2.4) 1991(6.2) 2009(6.4)
Number of episodes: 0 0 5 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1952, 1967, 1975 1 Excludes World Wars I and II.
0 Total 3
47
Figure 22b. Finland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
In 1992, the markka "crashed" during the Exchange Rate Mechanism Crisis 100
90
80
70
60
50 1991, the first year of the banking crisis (black line)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
40
30
48
Figure 23. France: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
300 Year 1815 1848 1870 1873 Debt/GDP 17.2 45.8 53.4 89.6 200 250
150
50
0 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: France, 1800-2009
External default dates 1812. Duration (in years) n.a. Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1802 1805 1848 1881 1889 1907 1914 1930 1994 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.5 Share of years in inflation crisis 5.7 6 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1848(6.1) 1859(6.5) 1870(7.6) 1876(8.2) 1931(6.0) 1932(6.5)
Number of episodes: 0 10 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs Total 1956, 1958, 1969 3 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. There are a couple of additional output declines comparable in magnitude to those shown in the latter 19th century.
49
Figure 24a. Germany: Federal and Total Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
The march to hyperinflation Year Share of short-term debt 1916 24.1 1918 31.7 1920 51.7 1922 77.7 1923 99.6
Total debt (solid)
80 70 60 50 40 30 20
1923-1924 Hyperinflation
Depressionwartime default (shaded) 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
Federal debts (dash) 1980 1990 2000
10 0 2010
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: Germany, 1800-2009
External default Dates 1807 1812 1850 1932-1953 Duration (in years) 1 1 1 22 Domestic default dates 1948 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1857 1880 1891 1901 1925 1931 1977 2007 Hyperinflation dates 1923-1924 Share of years in external default 12.9 Share of years in inflation crisis 9.5 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1919(19.5) 1923(16.9) 1931(7.6) 1932(7.5) 1946(52.6) 2009(4.9)
Number of episodes: 4 1 8 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs None 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
1 Total 0
50
Figure 24b. Germany: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
and Banking Crises, 1870-1912 (capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
400 Banking crises (black lines) 350 300 250
200 150 100 50 0 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910
51
Figure 25. Ghana: Total Public (domestic and external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
1971-2003, frequent currency crashes and high inflation 1957 Independence
150 130 110 90 70 50
Domestic default (dark shading) external default (light shading) 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
First year of banking crisis (black line) 2002 2007
30 10
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ghana, 1957-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 9.4 Share of years in inflation crisis 45.3 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1955(6.4) 1975(12.5) 1982(6.9) 1983(4.6)
1966 1 1979 1982 1968 1 1982 1997 1970 1 1974 1 1987 1 Number of episodes: 5 2 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1966-1969, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987(2), 1988, 1995, 1999, 2003
0 Total 14
52
Figure 26a. Greece: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1848-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
450 Banking crisis (black line) defaults (shaded) 1941-1944 Hyperinflation 400 350 Household debt as a % of GDP 300 1995 6 2000 12.9 250 2005 35.9 2008 49.7 200 150 2010, Neardefault 100 50 0 1848 1858 1868 1878 1888 1898 1908 1918 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008
Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs: Greece, 1829-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates Share of years in external default 48.1 Share of years in inflation crisis 12.7 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1847(14.0) 1852(14.7) 1856(11.7) 1891(11.5) 1919(17.7)
1826-1842 17 1932-1951 1931 1941-1944 1843-1859 17 1991 1860-1878 19 1894-1897 4 1932-1964 33 Number of episodes: 5 1 2 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007 Dates of programs None 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Source: Kostelenos et. al. (2007)
Total 0
53
Figure 26b. Greece: Government Domestic Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1884-1939 (loans to the government as a percent of Central Bank loans)
60 Central Bank loans to the government as a percent of total loans
50
40
Rising domestic debt in the eve of external default
30
20
Banking crisis (black line) defaults (shaded) 1848 1858 1868 1878 1888 1898 1908 1918 1928 1938
10
Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
54
Figure 27. Guatemala: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Devaluation, 1920-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
70 External default episodes (shaded) The 1-to-1 peg in place since 1900 ends in 1985 50
60
40
30 Banking crisis (black lines)
20
10
0 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Guatemala, 1838-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 31.4 Share of years in inflation crisis 3.5 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1922(5.6) 1931(6.7) 1932(12.5) 1943(33.3) 1982(3.5)
1828-1856 29 n.a. 1991 1876-1888 13 2001 1894 1 2006 1899-1913 14 1933-1936 4 1986 1 1989 1 Number of episodes: 7 0 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1960-1961, 1966-1970, 1972, 1981, 1983, 1988, 1992, 2002-2003, 2009
0 Total 15
55
Figure 28. Honduras: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Devaluation, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
250 External default episodes (shaded) 200
150
Honduras has not had a systemic banking crisis in this period
100
50 The 2-to-1 peg in place since 1919 ends in 1981
0 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Honduras, 1838-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 65.1 Share of years in inflation crisis 3.5 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1924(6.6) 1932(10.4) 1933(6.2) 1942(8.6) 1954(5.7) Total 19
1828-1867 40 n.a. 1999 1873-1925 53 2001 1981-2009 29 Number of episodes: 3 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1957, 1959-1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 1971-1972, 1979, 1982, 1990, 1992, 1999, 2004, 2008
56
Figure 29. Hungary: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
200 Wartime 1941 default lasts nearly 3 decades. First year of banking crises (black lines) 180 160 140 120 1945-1946 Hyperinflation 100 80 60 40 20 0 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: Hungary, 1918-2009
External default dates 1932-1937 1941-1967 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1931 1991 2008 Hyperinflation dates 1945-1946 Share of years in external default 37.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 14.1 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1931(4.8) 1990(6.7) 1991(11.9) 2009(6.7)
7 27
Number of episodes: 2 0 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1982, 1984, 1988, 1990-1991, 1993, 1996, 2008 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
1 Total 8
57
Figure 30a. Iceland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1908-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
80 70 60 50 First year of banking crisis (black lines) 40 30 20 10 0 1908 1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Banking crisis, currency crash, and near default, 2007-present
Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Iceland, 1918-2009
External default dates n.a. 2007-2010 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1985 2007 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 25.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1916(11.7) 1918(6.2) 1920(15.2) 1968(5.6) 2009(8.5)
n.a. near 3
Number of episodes: 0 0 2 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs Total 1960, 2008 2 1 The reported declines for 1916, 1918, and 1920 are on a per capita basis (Historical Statistics of Iceland, 2010). Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
58
Figure 30b. Iceland: External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
External Share of Debt/GDP short-term debt 2005 2006 Banking crisis, currency crash, "near default", 2007-present 2007 2008 2009:Q3 276.4 428.3 522.8 870.1 923.8 16.5 17.5 37.5 39.0 48.5 110 90 70 50 First year of banking crisis (black lines) 30 10 -10 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 130 150
Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
59
Figure30c. Iceland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
420
The exchange rate crashed by about 95% against the dollar in 2008
370 320 270 220 170
First year of the banking crisis (black line); near default (shaded)
120 70 20
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
60
Figure 31. India: Public (domestic plus external) Debt Reschedulings, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1835-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
1400
First year of banking crisis (black lines)
1990-1991 "Near default"

1200
1000
800
600
400
Debt restructuring (shaded)
200
0 1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: India, 1835-2009 (calculations since independence1947--reported)
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 11.1 Share of years in inflation crisis 3.2 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1891(9.2) 1899(7.8) 1918(12.8) 1920(7.9) 1947(17.2)
1863 1908 1914 1921 1929 1947 1993 3 0 7 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1957, 1962-1963, 1965, 1981, 1991 (2) Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total.
1958 1 1969 1 1972-1976 5 1989-1990 Number of episodes:
0 Total 7
61
Figure 32a. Indonesia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1911-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
3 default/restructuring episodes (shaded) "Hidden debts" on the eve of Asian crisis Years Share of private debt 1985-1994 14.2 1995 26.6 1997 34.8 100 Banking crises (black bars) 90 80 70 60 50
1966, the Year of Living Dangerously inflation hits 940 %
40 30 20 10 0
1949, Independence
1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Sources: Creutzberg, P. (1976), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: Indonesia, 1800-2009 (calculations since independence1949--reported)
External default dates 1966-1970 1998-2000 2002 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1992 1997 Hyperinflation dates 1966 Share of years in external default 14.8 Share of years in inflation crisis 31.1 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1931(7.1) 1958(4.7) 1963(4.2) 1967(4.4) 1998(13.1)
5 3 1
Number of episodes: 3 0 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1961, 1963, 1968-1973, 1997-1998, 2000
1 Total 11
62
Figure 32b. Indonesia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
90 During 1997-1998, the exchange rate collapsed by about 235% against the dollar; inflation spikded to 60 percent 80 70 60 50 First year of the banking crisis (black line); default (shaded) 40 The "twin crisis" was followed by defaults 30 20 10 0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
63
Figure 33a. Ireland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1929-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Household debt as a percent of GDP 120 100 80 60 40 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 80 100
60
40 First year of banking crisis (black line) Wartime 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
20
Sources: National Treasury Management Agency, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ireland, 1919-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) 1836 1856 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1933(2.5) 1937(3.8) 1958(2.1) 2008(3.0) 2009(7.5)
n.a.
2007 Number of episodes: 0 0 4 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs None Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total 0
64
Figure 33b. Ireland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
200 First year of the banking crisis (black line) 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
65
Figure 34. Italy: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1861-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
180 First year of banking crisis (black lines) Wartime default (shaded) 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Sources: Francese and Pace (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Italy, 1800-2009
External default dates 1940-1946 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1866 1887 1891 1893 1907 1914 1921 1930 1935 1990 2008 Hyperinflation dates 1944 Share of years in external default 3.3 Share of years in inflation crisis 10.5 7 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1867(8.3) 1881(6.7) 1892(5.6) 1919(16.7) 1920(8.7) 1930(4.9) 2009(4.8)
Number of episodes: 1 0 11 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1974, 1977 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total 2
66
Figure 35a. Japan: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1885-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
200 Wartime 1942 default (shaded) lasts a decade. First year of banking crises (black lines) 180 160 140 120 100 1945 Hyperinflation 1992 banking crisis ushers in lost decade 80 60 40 20 0 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Japan, 1800-2009
External default dates 1942-1952 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1946-1948 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1872 1882 1901 1907 1917 1923 1927 1992 Hyperinflation dates 1945 Share of years in external default 5.2 Share of years in inflation crisis 11.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1896(5.5) 1899(7.4) 1920(6.2) 1930(7.3) 2009(5.0)
11
Number of episodes: 1 1 8 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1962,1964 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
1 Total 2
67
Figure 35b. Japan Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
330 310 Spring and fall 2000 burst of IT bubble 290 270 250 230 210 190
First year of the banking crisis (black line)

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
170 150 130
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
68
Figure 36. Kenya: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
140
120
100
80
60
40 Defaults (shaded)
20
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Kenya, 1963-2009
External default Dates 1994-1998 2000-2001 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1985 1996 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 14.9 Share of years in inflation crisis 8.5 3 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1952(11.1) 1953(2.5) 1961(2.4)
5 2
Number of episodes: 2 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1975, 1977-1980, 1982-1983, 1985, 1988(2), 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003
0 Total 15
69
Figure 37. Korea: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
"Hidden debts" on the eve of Asian crisis Years Share of private debt 1985-1994 18 1995 19.9 1997 30.4
60 Banking crises (black bars) 1998, near-default/bailout episode (shaded) 50
40
30 Private external debt as a % of GDP 30

1997-1998 banking crisis
20
20 10 0 10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 0

1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Korea, 1945-2009
External default dates 1997-1998 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) 1983 1985 1997 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 15.4 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1920(12.3) 1922(7.1) 1939(10.4) 1951(7.7) 1998(6.9)
Number of episodes: 0 0 3 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1965-1975, 1977, 1980-1981, 1983, 1985, 1997 Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total. Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
Total 17
70
Figure 37b. Korea Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
The Asian 1997-1998 banking cisis and "near" default. 120 110 100 90 First year of the banking crises (black lines) 80 70 60 50 40 30
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
71
Figure 38a. Malaysia: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
"Hidden debts" on the eve of Asian crisis Years Share of private debt 1985-1994 15.9 1995 32 1997 32.8 80 Banking crises (black bars) 70 60 Public external debt (solid) 50 40 30 20 10
Private external debt (dash)
0 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Malaysia, 1963-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1985 1997 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 0.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1912(7.2) 1925(12.4) 1938(4.9) 1951(5.5) 1998(7.4) Total 0
n.a.
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
72
Figure 38b. Malaysia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
First year of the banking crises (black lines)
160
140
120
100
80 Domestic credit aggregate expanded coverage
60
40
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
73
Figure 39. Mauritius: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
1997 banking crisis Years Share of private debt 1982-1991 8 1992-1996 16.3 1997 13.5 1998-2002 6.4 70
60
50
40
30 1997 banking crisis (black line)
20
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Mauritius, 1968-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1997 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 11.9 3 worst output collapses year(decline) 1964(6.9) 1968(6.9) 1980(10.1)
n.a.
Number of episodes: 0 0 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1978-1981, 1983, 1985
0 Total 6
74
Figure 40a. Mexico: Public Foreign Bond Issues, Default, and Banking Crises, 1824-1910 (Billions of US dollars, three-year sum)
1
180 The first 6 of 8 default episodes (shaded) 160 140
0 . 9
0 . 8
0 . 7
120
0 . 6
100
0 . 5
0 . 4
Banking crises, 1883, 1907, and 1913 (black lines)
80 60
0 . 3
0 . 2
40 20
0
0 . 1
0 1833 1843 1853 1863 1873 1883 1893 1903 1913
1823
75
Figure 40b. Mexico: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1872-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
500 1994-1995 "near-default" Tesobono crisis Year Share of Short-term debt 1992 43.7 1993 58.6 1994 72.8 450 400 350 300 250 200 150
1982, The last of 8 default episodes (shaded)
100 50 0
1872
1882
1892
1902
1912
1922
1932
1942
1952
1962
1972
1982
1992
2002
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Mexico, 1821-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 43.9 Share of years in inflation crisis 11.1 6 worst output collapses year(decline) 1902(7.1) 1930(6.3) 1932(15.0) 1983(4.3) 1995(6.2) 2009(6.7)
1828-1830 3 1850 1883 1833-1841 1 1928-1932 1907 1844-1850 7 1982 1913 1854-1864 11 1920 1866-1885 20 1929 1914-1922 9 1981 1928-1942 15 1994 1982-1990 9 Number of episodes: 8 3 7 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1954, 1959, 1961, 1977, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995, 1999 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total 9
76
Figure 41. Morocco: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
140 Morocco's first default was 1903-1904 120
1983 was a default and a banking crisis (black line)
100
80
60
40 Defaults (shaded)
20
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Morocco, 1956-2009
1903-1904 2 n.a. 1983 1983 1 1986-1990 5 Number of episodes: 3 0 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1959, 1965-1969, 1971, 1980-1983, 1985-1986, 1988, 1990, 1992
0 Total 16
77
Figure 42. Myanmar: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
250 Single default episode (shaded)
200
150
100
Banking crisis (black bar)
50
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs : Myanmar, 1948-2009
External default dates 1997-2009 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1984 1987 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1996 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 21.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 37.1 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1954(6.2) 1966(4.2) 1987(4.0) 1988(11.4)
13
Number of episodes: 1 2 4 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1969, 1973-1974, 1977-1978, 1981
0 Total 6
78
Figure 43. Netherlands: General Government (domestic plus external) and Banking Crises, 1812-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Household debt as a percent of GDP End of French rule and wartime default (shaded) 130 110 90 70 50 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
300
250
200
150
100
50
0 1812 1822 1832 1842 1852 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: Bos (2007), CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Netherlands, 1800-2009
External default dates 1802-1814 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1802-1814 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1819 1897 1914 1921 1939 2008 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 6.2 Share of years in inflation crisis 0 4 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1830(3.5) 1896(3.8) 1931(6.1) 2009(4.0)
13
Number of episodes: 1 1 6 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1957 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total 1
79
Figure 44a. New Zealand Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1860-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Between 1914 and 1929 the share of domestic debt rose from less than 20% to about 50%
250
Household Debt as a Percent of GDP 110 90 70 50 1995 1999 2003 2007
First year of banking crises (black lines) Wartime
200
150
100
The 1892-1893 crisis was common to Australia and New Zealand
50
0 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: New Zealand, 1907-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1893 1987 Hyperinflation dates Share of years in external default 0.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 0.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1876(11.6) 1908(6.9) 1931(8.5) 1948(9.9) 1951(7.6)
n.a.
Number of episodes: 0 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1967 1 Excludes World Wars I and II.
0 Total 1
80
Figure 44b. New Zealand: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1905 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
140 1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath Year Private as a % of total 1886 16.9 1887 34.8 1891 17.9 1892 12.8 Banking crisis (black line)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0 1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899 1901 1903
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
81
Figure 45. Nicaragua: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
Runup to 1932 default Share of Year short-term debt 1925 8.8 1927 60.6 1929 89.6 1931 93.3 4500
First year of banking crisis (black line)
4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0
1985-1990 Hyperinflation Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Inflation 571.4 885.2 13109.5 4775.2 7428.7 3004.1
Peak debt-to-exports is 524% in 1932
There is no private domestic or external debt; the domestic public debt market disappears (no data 1950s-1960s)
1914
1924
1934
1944
1954
1964
1974
1984
1994
2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Nicaragua, 1838-2009
External default dates 1828-1874 1894-1895 1911-1912 1915-1917 1932-1937 1979-2009 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1985-1990 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1987 2000 Hyperinflation dates 1985-1990 Share of years in external default 47.1 Share of years in inflation crisis 12.2 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1930(19.2) 1936 (20.4) 1978(7.9) 1979(26.6) 1988(12.4)
47 2 2 3 6 31
Number of episodes: 6 1 2 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1956-1958, 1960, 1963-1964, 1968-1970, 1972, 1979, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002
Total 15
82
Figure 46. Nigeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
180 160
Fleeting default on an oil warrant
Banking crises (black bars)
140 120 100 80 60
2004-2005 was the last of 5 default episodes.
40 20 0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Nigeria, 1960-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 28.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 24.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1967(15.5) 1978(5.9) 1983(5.1) 1986(8.8) 1987(10.8)
1982-1992 11 n.a. 1992 1986-1988 3 1995 1992 1 2001 1 2004-2005 2 Number of episodes: 5 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1987, 1989, 1991, 2000
0 Total 4
83
Figure 47a. Norway: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
70
60
50
40
30
20 First year of banking crises (black lines)
10
0 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Norway, 1800-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1898 1921 1931 1936 1987 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 5.2 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1831(7.0) 1848(4.7) 1921(9.7) 1931(7.8)
n.a.
0 Total 0
84
Figure 47b. Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004 (Amount outstanding at year-end as a percent of GDP)
180
160
140
120
100
80
60 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Sources: Eitrheim, ., K. Gerdrup and J.T. Klovland (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
85
Figure 48. Panama: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1914-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
120 1988-1989-US trade sanctions; freezing of assets in US; bank runs and bank holiday; defaults on demestic debts (darker shading) external default episodes (shaded)
100
80
60
There were no external debts Banking crisis (black line)
40
20
0 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1945, hence, we scale debt by exports and adjust it by the ratio of exports to GDP to splice the pre-World War II series.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Panama, 1903-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 27.1 Share of years in inflation crisis 0 3 worst output collapses year(decline) 1948(5.9) 1983(4.5) 1988(13.5)
1932-1946 15 1988-1989 1988 1983-1996 14 1987-1994 Number of episodes: 3 1 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1965, 1968-1975, 1977-1980, 1982-1983, 1985, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000
0 Total 20
Notes: The 1987-1994 default is on bonds, while the 1983-1996 episode is on bank loans.
86
Figure 49. Paraguay: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
2002 banking crisis; 2003 7th default episode
80 70 60 50 40 30 20
Banking crises (black bars)
10 0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Paraguay, 1811-2009
External default dates 1874-1885 1892-1895 1920-1924 1932-1944 1968-1969 1986-1992 2003-2004 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1890 1997 2002 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 22.6 Share of years in inflation crisis 11.1 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1940(5.3) 1947(13.1) 1983(3.0) 2009(4.5)
12 4 5 13 2 7 2
Number of episodes: 7 0 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1957-1961, 1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 2003 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total 10
87
Figure 50a. Peru: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1917-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
1983, The last of 8 default episodes (shaded) 1988-1990 hyperinflation 100 90 80 70 60 50 Banking crises (black lines) 40 30 20 10 0 1917 1927 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1997 2007
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Peru1821-2009

External default dates 1826-1848 1876-1889 1931-1951 1969-1969 1976 1978 1980 1984-1997 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1931-1938 1985-1987 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1872 1983 1999 Hyperinflation dates 1988-1990 Share of years in external default 40.2 Share of years in inflation crisis 13.2 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1930(11.5) 1931(8.1) 1983(9.3) 1988(9.4) 1989(13.4)
23 14 21 2 1 1 1 14
Number of episodes: 8 2 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1954, 1958-1968, 1970, 1977-1979, 1982, 1984, 1993, 1996, 1999, 2001-2002, 2004
88
Figure 50b. Peru: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1905 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
1400
1200
1000
800 Banking crises (black lines); default (shaded)
600
400
200
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
89
Figure 51a. Philippines: External Private and Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1948-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
90 80 70 60 50 Baking crises (black lines) 40 30 20 Private external debt (dash) 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008 10 0
1983 is the single default episode (shaded)
Domestic plus externa public debt (solid)
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Philippines, 1946-2009
External default dates 1983-1992 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1981 1997 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 18.8 Share of years in inflation crisis 6.3 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1904(13.9) 1923(6.1) 1935(6.8) 1984(7.5) 1985(7.5)
10
Number of episodes: 1 0 2 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007 Dates of programs 1962-1968, 1970-1976, 1979-1980, 1983-1984, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998 Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
Total 23
90
Figure 51b. Philippines Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1980-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
1991, the first year of the banking crises (black lines)
91
Figure 52a. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1917-1947 (debt as a percent of GDP)
1919-1923 Hyperinflation Total Share of debt short-term 1919 9,988 77.1 1920 70,741 87.5 1921 252,705 94.0 1922 744,836 97.3 1923 111,509,994 100.0 700 Depression and wartime defaults (shaded)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0 1917 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs: Poland, 1918-2009
External default dates 1936-1937 1940-1952 1981-1994 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1931 1934 1991 Hyperinflation dates 1919-1923 1990 Share of years in external default 31.5 Share of years in inflation crisis 18.5 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1980(-6.0) 1981(10.0) 1990(7.2) 1991(7.0)
2 13 14
Number of episodes: 3 0 3 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1990-1991, 1993-1994
92
Figure 52b. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1984-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
90 Banking crisis (black bars)
Hidden debts? Share of Year private debt 1992 0.8 1996 3.7 1998 25 2007 46.8
80
70
60
1990 Hyperinflation
50
40 The last of 3 defaults (shaded)
30
20 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
93
Figure 53. Portugal: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1851-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Household debt as a percent of GDP 1892, the last of 6 default episodes (shaded) 100 80 60 40 20 1995 1999 2003 2007 50 40 30 1890, 1923, 1931 the first year of banking crises (black lines) 20 10 0 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 90 80 70 60
Sources: OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Portugal, 1800-2009
External default dates 1828 1837-1841 1850-1856 1892-1901 Duration (in years) 1 5 7 10 Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1828 1846 1890 1920 1923 1931 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 11.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 9.5 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1918(5.1) 1928(9.7) 1935(5.3) 1936(7.6) 1940(6.5)
Number of episodes: 4 0 6 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1977, 1978, 1983
94
Figure 54. Romania: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
180 Hidden debts? Years Share of private debt 1996-2000 23.6 2001-2005 38.2 2007 46.4 160 Banking crisis (black bar) 140 120 100 1981 is the second of three defaults (shaded) 80 60 40 20 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Romania, 1878-2009
External default dates 1933-1958 1981-1983 1986 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1933-1958 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1931 1990 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 22.6 Share of years in inflation crisis 9.8 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1989(5.8) 1990(5.6) 1991(12.9) 1997(6.1) 2009(7.2)
26 4 1
Number of episodes: 3 1 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1975, 1977, 1981, 1991-1992, 1994, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2009 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
95
Figure 55a. Russia: Public Foreign Bond Issues and Default, 1815-1945 (as a percent of exports)
1
The first 3 of 5 defaults (shaded);
300
0.9
first year of banking crises black lines

0.8 0.7
250 1918-1924 Hyperinflation 200 1917-1918, domestic debts were also repudiated
0.6
0.5
150
0.4
100
0.3
0.2
50
0.1
0 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945
1815 1825 1835
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs: Russia 1800-2009
External default dates 1839 1885 1918-1986 1991-1997 1998-2000 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1917-1918 1947 1957 1998-1999 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1862 1875 1896 1995 1998 2008 Hyperinflation dates 1918-1924 1993 Share of years in external default 38.8 Share of years in inflation crisis 13.8 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1992(14.5) 1993(8.7) 1994(12.7) 1998(5.3) 2009(7.9)
1 1 69 7 3
Number of episodes: 5 4 6 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1992, 1995-1996, 1999 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
96
Figure 55b. Russia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1985-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
100 Banking crises (black bars). 1998-banking and renewed default 90 80 70 60 1993 Hyperinflation 50 40 30 20 The last two of 5 defaults (shaded) 10 0 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
97
Figure 56. Singapore: Central Government (domestic and external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1969-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
110 The Asian 1997-1998 crisis (shaded) 100 90 80 70 60 50 First year of banking crisis (black line) 40 30 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: Since the mid-1990s all public debts of the central government are domestic.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Singapore, 1965-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1982 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 2.2 3 worst output collapses year(decline) 1964(3.5) 2001(2.4) 2009(2.0)
n.a.
98
Figure 57a. South Africa: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1911-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
120 1985-1987, multilateral trade sanctions and first two default episodes (shaded)
100
1989, banking crisis and last default
80
60
40
20
0 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: South Africa, 1800-2009 (calculations since independence1910--reported)
External default dates 1985-1987 1989 1993 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 5.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 1.0 3 worst output collapses year(decline) 1983(1.8) 1992(2.1) 2009(1.8)
1865 1877 1890 1977 Number of episodes: 1989 3 0 4 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1958, 1961, 1976(2), 1982-1983 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
3 1 1
99
Figure 57b.South Africa: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1895 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
1890 Barings crisis Year Private as a % of total 1888 70.2 1889 84.8 1890 80.3 1891 40.0 300
250
150
100
50
0 1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893
100
Figure 58a. Spain: Short-term Loans to the Crown and Defaults, 1601-1679 (Billions of ducats, three-year sum)
1
35
0 . 9
30
0 . 8
0 . 7
3 of a total of 13 defaults (shaded)

0 . 6
25
20
0 . 5
15
0 . 4
0 . 3
10
0 . 2
5
0 . 1
0 1610 1620 1630 1640 1650 1660 1670
1600
Domestic and External Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation: Spain, 1550-1799
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1557-1560 1575-1577 1596-1597 Banking crisis dates (first year) n.a. Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis
1557-1560 4 1575-1577 3 1596-1597 2 1607 1 1627 1 1647 1 Number of episodes: 6
101
Figure 58b. Spain: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1850-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
1877, the last of 13 defaults (shaded) since 1557 180 160 First year of banking crises (black lines) 1920, 1931,1977, and 2008 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Spain, 1800-2009
External default Dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 23.8 Share of years in inflation crisis 3.8 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1868(10.1) 1874(8.4) 1896(8.0) 1936(22.3) 1937(8.3)
1809 1 1936-1939 1814 1820 1 1829 1831-1834 4 1846 1837-1867 31 1920 1851 1931 1877-1882 7 1977 Number of episodes: 2008 6 0 6 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1959, 1960, 1978
102
Figure 58c.Spain: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
9 The last of 13 sovereign defaults that began in 1557 (shaded) 8 7 6 5 From 1875 onwards all capital flows are private 4 3 2 1 0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
103
Figure 58d. Spain Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
210
First year of the banking crises (black lines)
190
170
150
130
110
90
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
104
Figure 59. Sri Lanka: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1950-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
180 160
Two default episodes (shaded)
140 120 100 80 60 40 First year of banking crises (black lines) 20 0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Sri Lanka, 1948-2009
External default dates 1979 1981-1983 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 1996 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1989 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 6.5 Share of years in inflation crisis 3.2 4 worst output collapses year(decline) 1918(-6.5) 1930(4.0) 1935(5.2) 1944(5.5)
1 3
Number of episodes: 2 1 1 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1965-1966, 1968-1969, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1983, 1988, 1991, 2001, 2003(2) Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
Total number of years 14
105
Figure 60a. Sweden: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1719-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
90
1811, Sweden's only default episode (shaded); unclear whether it involved external debts
80 First year of banking crises (black lines) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10
Three-year inflation reaches 258 %the highest this 300 year-period 1719 1739 1759 1779 1799 1819 1839 1859 1879 1899 1919 1939 1959 1979 1999
Sources: Fregert, K och R. Gustafsson, (2008), "Fiscal Statistics for Sweden 1719-2003", Research in Economic History, volume 25, 137-191, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: Prices are far more volatile during pre-World War II. For this reason, and owing to the fact that deflation is about as likely as inflation prior to the rise of fiat money, we also examine the evolution of (smoother) three year changes in the price level.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Sweden, 1800-2009
External default dates 1811 Duration (in years) 1 Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1811 1876 1897 1907 1922 1931 1991 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.5 Share of years in inflation crisis 1.9 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1826(8.9) 1838(5.7) 1861(5.7) 1921(3.7) 2009(4.2)
Number of episodes: 1 0 6 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs None 1 Excludes World Wars I and II.
106
Figure 60b. Sweden Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
Domestic credit aggregate expanded coverage, 2002-2009 135 125 115 105
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
107
Figure 61. Switzerland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 1880-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
90 First year of banking crises (black line) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Switzerland, 1800-2009
External default dates n.a. Duration (in years) n.a. Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1854(11.1) 1860(13.0) 1867(12.1) 1877(9.7) 1975(7.3)
1870 n.a. 1910 1921 1931 Number of episodes: 1933 0 0 5 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs None 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
Total number of years 0
108
Figure 62a. Thailand: Public (domestic and external) and External (public and private) Debts, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1913-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
350 1997-1998 "Near default" (shaded)
300
250 Public and private external debts (dash)
200
150
100
50 Public (domestic and external debt) Banking crises (black lines) 0 1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Thailand, 1800-2009
External default dates 1997-1998 Duration (in years) near 2 Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1983 1996 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 0.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 9.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1919(4.2) 1942(9.0) 1945(6.8) 1998(10.5) 2009(2.3) Total number 5
Number of episodes: 0 0 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1978, 1981-1982, 1985, 1997 Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
109
Figure 62b. Thailand Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
200 180
160 140 120 100 80 60
Currency collapse, recession and "near default"
40 20 0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
110
Figure 63. Tunisia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Last of 5 defaults (shaded) 80
70
60
50 1991was the first year of a banking crisis (black line) which lasted 5 years
40
30
20 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Tunisia, 1956-2009
1867-1870 4 n.a. 1991 1956 1 1958 1 1963 1 1979-1982 4 Number of episodes: 5 0 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1964-1967, 1969-1970, 1986, 1988
0 Total number 8
111
Figure 64a. Turkey: External Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises 1854-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
1200 8 default/restructuring episodes (shaded)
1000
2000-2001 banking crisis and "Near" default
800
600
400
200
0 1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003
Sources: Pamuk (1995), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Turkey, 1800-2009 (calculations since independence1923--reported)
External default dates 1876-1881 1915-1928 1931-1932 1940-1943 1959 1965 1978-1979 1982 2000-2001 near Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1931 1982 1991 2000 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 19.5 Share of years in inflation crisis 35.6 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1927(9.1) 1932(6.0) 1994(5.5) 2001(5.7) 2009(5.6)
6 14 2 4 1 1 2 1 2
Number of episodes: 8 0 4 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1961-1970, 1978-1980, 1983-1984, 1994, 1999, 2002 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total number 18
112
Figure 64b. Turkey: External Public and Private Debts, Default, Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
70 Banking crises (black bars) 2000-2001,"Neardefault" (shaded)
60
50
40
Publlic and private (solid)
30 1982 was both a default and banking crisis. The last of 6 default episodes Private external debt (dash)
20
10
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
113
Figure 65a. United Kingdom: Central Government Debt, Restructurings, and Banking Crises, 1692-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
In 1932, World War I debts are restructured. 300
250
200
150
100
50 Debt restructuring (shaded) 0 1706 1721 1736 1751 1766 1781 1796 1811 1826 1841 1856 1871 1886 1901 1916 1931 1946 1961 1976 1991 2006
Sources: UKpublicspending, (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: United Kingdom, 1800-2009
External default dates n.a.. Duration (in years) n.a. Domestic default dates 1822 1834 1888-1889 1932 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1810 1815 1825 1837 1847 1857 1866 1878 1890 1974 1984 2007 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 2.4 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1919(10.9) 1920(6.0) 1921(8.1) 1931(5.1) 2009(4.9)
Number of episodes: 0 4 12 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1956-1958, 1961-1964, 1967, 1969, 1975, 1977 1 Excludes World Wars I and II. Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
0 Total 11
114
Figure 65b. United Kingdom Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
190 170 150 130 110 90
Coverage of domestic credit series expanded
70 50 30
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
115
Figure 66a. United States: Central Government Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1790-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
1873-1884, 10 states in default (shaded)
1933, suspension of the Gold Clause
140
Debt restructuring 9 states in default
120
100
80
60
40
20
0 1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: United States 1790-2009
External default dates 1790 Duration (in years) 1 Domestic default dates 1790 1841-1842 1873-1884 1933 Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates Share of years in external default n.a. Share of years in inflation crisis 1.4 5 worst output collapses year(decline)1 1908(10.8) 1914(7.7) 1930(8.6) 1932(13.1) 1946(10.1)
1814 n.a. 1818 1836 1841 1857 1861 1864 1873 1884 1890 1907 1914 1929 1984 Number of episodes: 2007 1 2 15 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs Total 1963-1964 2 Notes: The default of US states are not counted in the tally as the total number of episodes refers to sovereign credit events only. 1 Excludes World Wars I and II.
116
Figure 66b. United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports)
25
20
15
10
0 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900
117
Figure 66c. United States: Private Debt Outstanding, 1916-2009 (end-of- period stock of debt as a percent of GDP)
300
1933, suspension of the Gold Clause default (shaded)
250
200
150
100
50
0 1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006
Notes: Data for 2009 is end-of-June. The Flow of Funds is reported for 1945-2009; prior to that the Historical Statistics of the United States series is scaled (down) to match the Flow of Funds data. Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States, Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, OECD, World Bank, Global Development Finance, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) and sources cited therein.
118
Figure 66d. United States Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008 (credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
250 Spring and fall 2000, burst of IT bubble 230
210 190
170 150 130
Savings and loan decade-long episode
110 90
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
119
Figure 67a. Uruguay: Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Restructuring, and Banking Crises, 1871-2009 (debt as a percent of exports)
"Hidden debts" on the eve of default-2003 Year Share of private debt 1991-2000 3.9 2001 6.9 2002 21.6 600
500
400
300
200
2003, The last of 9 default episodes (shaded)
100
1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. Notes: For the period 1871-1914 only external debt data is available. Domestic debts (only a few observations are available) was negligible during this period.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Uruguay, 1811-2009
External default dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates Share of years in external default 13.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 18.0 6 worst output collapses year(decline) 1905(10.1) 1914(16.7) 1920(12.8) 1931(17.3) 1933(12.5) 1982(9.3)
1876-1878 3 1932-1937 1893 n.a. 1891 1 1898 1915-1921 7 1971 1932-1938 7 1981 1965 1 2002 1983-1985 3 1987 1 1990-1991 2 2003 1 Number of episodes: 9 1 5 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1961-1962, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1975-1977, 1979-1981, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999-2002
Total 21
120
Figure 67b. Uruguay: Total (private and public) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Default, and Banking Crises, 1865-1914 (capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
500 450 400 350 300 Banking crises (black lines) Default (shaded) 250 200 150 100 50 0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
121
Figure 68. Venezuela: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1921-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
90 2004 is the last of 10 default episodes (shaded) 80 70 60 50 40 30 By 1930 Venezuela had paid off all its external debts . 20 10 0 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Venezuela, 1829-2009
External default Dates Duration (in years) Domestic default dates Banking crisis dates (first year) Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 35.9 Share of years in inflation crisis 11.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1914(12.6) 1931(19.2) 1942(12.6) 1989(8.6) 2002(8.9)
1826-1840 15 1995-1997 1978 1848-1859 12 1998 1993 1860-1862 3 1865-1881 17 1892 1 1898-1905 8 1983-1988 6 1990 1 1995-1997 3 2004-2005 2 Number of episodes: 10 2 2 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1960, 1989, 1996
0 Total number 3
122
Figure 69. Zambia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
450 Defaults (shaded) 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 Banking crisis (black line) 50 0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Zambia, 1964-2009
External default dates 1983-1994 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates n.a. Banking crisis dates (first year) 1995 Hyperinflation dates n.a. Share of years in external default 24.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 40.0 3 worst output collapses year(decline) 1966(5.5) 1977(4.9) 1994(13.3)
12
Number of episodes: 1 0 1 0 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983-1984, 1986, 1995(2), 1999, 2004, 2008
Total 12
123
Figure 70. Zimbabwe: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Restructuring, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)
Highest Monthly Inflation Rates in History Country Hungary Zimbabwe Yugoslavia Germany Greece China Month with highest rate 39753.00 34335.00 8675.00 16377.00 18019.00 Highest monthly inflation rate 796000000.00 3130000.00 295.00 113.00 42.10 Equivalent daily rate Time required for prices to double
140
16984.00 1.30 x 1016%
1.95 15.6 hours 0.98 24.7 hours 0.65 1.4 days 0.21 3.7 days 0.17 4.5 days 0.13 5.6 days
Ongoing banking crisis (black line) since 1995
120
100
80
60
Prior default, 1965-1974
40
Defaults (shaded); latest is ongoing
20
0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: Hanke (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, IMF Programs and Hyperinflation: Zimbabwe, 1965-2009
External default dates 1965-1974 2000-2009 Duration (in years) Domestic default dates 2006 Banking crisis dates (first year) 1995 Hyperinflation dates 2006-2009 Share of years in external default 40.0 Share of years in inflation crisis 40.0 5 worst output collapses year(decline) 1977(8.0) 1992(8.4) 2000(7.3) 2003(10.4) 2008(14.1) Total 7
10 10
Number of episodes: 2 1 1 Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009 Dates of programs 1981, 1983, 1992 (3), 1998, 1999
124
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Hanke, Steve H. (2008) New Hyperinflation Index (HHIZ) Puts Zimbabwe Inflation at 89.7 Sextillion Percent. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. (November ) (http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe) He, Zhiguo and Wei Xiong, (2010) Dynamic Debt Runs, University of Chicago and Princeton University, mimeograph, February. Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), http://www2.stjr.is/frr/thst/rit/sogulegt/english.htm#8 Junguito, Roberto and Hernn Rincn (2004). "La poltica fiscal en el siglo XX en Colombia", Borradores de Economa, No. 318, Banco de la Repblica. Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen M. Reinhart, (1999). The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems, American Economic Review, Vol.89 No.4, June, 473-500. Kaminsky, Graciela, Carmen M. Reinhart and Carlos A.Vgh( 2004) When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Policies, with. in Mark Gertler and Kenneth S. Rogoff, eds. NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2004. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 11-53 Kostelenos, G. S. Petmezas et. al. (2007), 'Gross Domestic Product 1830-1939", Sources of Economic History of Modern Greece, Historical Archives of the National bank of Greece Lazaretou, Sophia (2005) Greek Monetary Economics in Retrospect: The Adventures of the Drachma," Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Vol. 34, No. 3, 331 370. Levandis, John Alexander, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers, 1821-1898, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). Mendoza, Enrique G. and Marco E. Terrones (2008). An Anatomy of Credit Booms: Evidence from macro Aggregates and Micro Data, NBER Working Paper 14049, May. Mody, Ashoka and Diego Saravia (2008). "From Crisis to IMF-Supported Program: Does democracy impede the speed required by financial markets?," IMF Working Paper 08/276. National Treasury Management Agency, Ireland (2010) National Debt of Ireland: 1923-2009 http://www.ntma.ie/NationalDebt/historicalData1.php. Pamuk, Sevket (1995), Ottoman ForeignTrade in the 19th Century, Historical Statistics Series, Volume 1 (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics). Reinhart, Carmen M. and Vincent R. Reinhart , Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View of the Past and Present, in Jeffrey Frankel and Francesco Giavazzi (eds.) NBER International Seminar in Macroeconomics 2008, (Chicago: Chicago University Press for NBER, Reinhart, Carmen M., and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2008), The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt NBER Working Paper 13946, April.
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Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton Press). Reinhart, Carmen M. and Rogoff, Kenneth S. (2010), From Financial Crash toDebt Crisis, NBER Working Paper. Schularick, Moritz, and Alan M. Taylor, (2010), Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cyvles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008, Soley Gell, Tomas, Historia Monetaria de Costa Rica, (San Jose, Costa Rica: Imprenta Nacional, 1926). Stone, Irving (1999) The Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 18651914 (New York: St. Martins Press). UKpublicspending, (2010), http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk Velasco, Andres. "Financial and Balance-of-Payments Crises." Journal of Development Economics, October 1987, 27(1/2), 263-83. Yousef, Tarik M., Egypts Growth Performance Under Economic Liberalism: A Reassesment with New GDP Estimates, 1886-1945, Review of Income and Wealth 48, December 2002, 561-579.
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C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010 1969-2009 Figure

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009)

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C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

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` External defaults (shaded) banking crises (black lines)

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Banking crises (black lines)

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30 Curency crash; bank holiday and an output collapse of over 30%

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

Figure4a. Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,

Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1852-2009 (debt as a percent of GDP)

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

40 First year of banking crises (black lines)

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

400 300 200 100 0

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Bulgaria

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

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Second and ongoing default (shaded)

0 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

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Banking crises (black lines)

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

The Panic of 1907

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010

0 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910

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Coverage of domestic credit series expanded

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First year of banking crises (black lines)

C.M. Reinhart Chartbook 2010