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Republic SUPREME Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

150605

of

the

Philippines COURT

surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and 7 surfaced through the intercession of the respondent. The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division. On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of 8 Region VIII. On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition was remanded to the 9 Regional Election Director for investigation. At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate. On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC Second 10 Division. Respondent Locsin alleged that "the evidence on record against respondent is very strong and unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to render the present disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no 11 registry receipt was attached thereto. On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him and this remains unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was 12 attached to the pleading. The records, however, do not show the date the petitioner received the motion. On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division 13 issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of "the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for 14 disqualification." It also directed the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the 15 Commission. As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin's 53,447 16 votes. At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of

December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of the land. This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and SecretaryGeneral Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation. The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the 1 COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached 2 to the petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates, Danilo D. 3 4 Maglasang, Cesar A. Laurente; (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. 5 Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera; (c) Extract Records from the Police 6 Blotter executed by Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho; and (d) Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and

the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed to investigate and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the 17 COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance. Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following: 18 (a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga; (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the 19 Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay Monterico; (c) 20 Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel; (d) Supplemental Affidavit of 21 22 Wilfredo A. Fiel; and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao. On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of 23 Suspension, alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification and after personally obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c) that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested the setting of a 24 hearing on his Motion. On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the parties were ordered to submit their 25 respective memoranda. On June 4, 2001, petitioner submitted 26 his Memorandum in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional candidate be expediently made, even while the disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification 27 issued by PNP Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre; (b) 28 Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer; (c) Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of 29 Ormoc; (d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito 30 31 Restituto; and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion, Igmedio 32 33 Rita and Gerardo Monteza. Respondent Locsin's memorandum 34 also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses. Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second 35 Division promulgated its Resolution in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the "immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." A copy of said Resolutionwas sent by fax to the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the 36 following day. By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for Member of the

House of Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the legislative district 37 for said office." Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001. On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC 38 en banc a Motion for Reconsideration from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for 39 Reconsideration. Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and her copetitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion 40 for Reconsideration. On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc 41 a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation, docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray. On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent 42 Manifestation stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional 43 witnesses which he claims would refute and substantially belie the allegations of petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A 44 45 46 Reply, Rejoinder and Sur-Rejoinder were respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for resolution. From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner 47 Codilla. Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting 48 opinions to the Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional evidence presented by the latter, he concluded that the totality of the

evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor. Equally worth mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's motion for reconsideration on the ground that "[T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I 49 respect the electorate's will. x x x." On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion reads: "JUDGMENT WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1, 2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin. Accordingly: 1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla, promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote: (a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of evidence; (b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having been issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void; (c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;

(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated o June 14, 2001, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence; (e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to comply with its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for that position; and (f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and 2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote: (a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission on Elections; (b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having been issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void; (c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent" and the concurrent order for "the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission; (d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid"

said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence; (e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth legislative district of Leyte he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for the position; and (f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance. Summary of Votes Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases; and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases. The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who joined the majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead, each one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an explanation on his 50 vote." The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra 51 and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a "Comment and 52 Manifestation" with the COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of 53 Members of the House. Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during its regular session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she will not only disregard but will openly defy and disobey the

COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her 54 position. On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an 55 Order constituting the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and "proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte x x x." On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the 56 district. On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial 57 Court of Ormoc City. On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative 58 district of Leyte. Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff 59 support." On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum dated October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy SecretaryGeneral Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that "there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated and now final and executory COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x." These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on 60 September 20, 2001, no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a 61 letter addressed to respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever remedy is available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive." In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter dated October 30, 2001, stating that: "We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly defy and disobey' the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the
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decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same congressional seat, a legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take action. In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously." (emphases supplied) Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto. Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has become final and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the said resolution of the COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the records of the House, to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the House and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends that respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. In his Comment, public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely a ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member. In his Comment, public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading the name of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath before the Speakerelect and sit as Member of the House during the Joint Session of Congress, he was merely performing official acts in compliance 65 with the opinions rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He also contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by mandamus. Respondent Locsin, in her Comment, alleged that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly violating
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the principle of separation of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be directed against the Speaker and SecretaryGeneral because they do not have the authority to enforce and implement the resolution of the COMELEC. Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-proclamation controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge" decision because of the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case. Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin," on the ground that "the allegations stated therein are not proper grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, 67 and that the petition was filed late." In his Reply, petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC 69 pursuant to section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881 and section 3, Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the sovereign will of the electorate. The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin. I
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Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid. After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void for the following reasons: First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz: "C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION (1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation. (2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties against any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of: 2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; 2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; 2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Omnibus Election Code; 2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code; 2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. xxxxxxxxx
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(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a docket number which must be consecutive, according to the order of receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001; (5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any; (6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense; (7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidences including their position paper; (8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk of the Commission through the fastest means of communication, his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case; (9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the same for raffle to a division; (10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the same to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the date of consultation." Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been completed, viz: "Rule 14. Summons xxxxxxxxx

Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it, accompanied with the proof of service. Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines." Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case. (a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation. The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because he never received 71 summons. Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001. More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: "Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office." (emphases supplied) In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the

suspension of petitioner's proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through registered mail. The records reveal that no 72 registry receipt was attached to prove such service. This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz: "Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice, especially on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own motion. The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion. Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without proof of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected." Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service of motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 73 of R.A. No. 6646 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by the complainant or any intervenor", viz: "Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (emphases supplied) Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent 74 Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of paper. It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second Division. On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m., respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion 76 again by registered mail. A registry receipt was attached evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.
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Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads: "Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission nd (2 Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx and considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further 77 orders." (emphases supplied) We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation. (b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification. All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest." This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of the hearing and the reception of evidence. Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the parties. On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to present only on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence which are unavailable during the hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be available during the hearing for the disqualification case. In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the disqualification case against him. This submission was sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon consideration of the additional affidavits

attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division held: "Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the parties' respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion. This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity to consider Codilla's affidavits. This time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus, completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both 78 sides." (emphases supplied) Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his arguments in support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of procedural due process, and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension 79 of his proclamation. He urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main disqualification case 80 should the suspension be lifted. (c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on substantial evidence. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly observed: "Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission 81 (Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified." Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the petitioner, failed to prove 82 the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged. Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads: "Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,

induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office" To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral functions. In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads: "[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his current elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned by the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel and sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte, well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed without period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their 83 votes for said respondent." The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations. For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings "Ormoc City Government" extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent 84 to the property owned by the Codilla family. Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered 85 the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks. On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows: "3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but Engr. Padayao said that it's not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to deliver sand and gravel to 86 whoever requests from Mayor Codilla." Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the petitioner. He alleged that on April 18, 2001,

a white truck with the marking "City Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla as a 87 (sic) congressman during election." His statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The same could be said about 88 89 the affidavits of Randy T. Merin, Alfredo C. De la Pea, Miguel 90 P. Pandac, Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio 91 92 93 94 Rios, Romulo Alkuino, Sr., Abner Casas, Rita Trangia, and 95 Judith Erispe attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on the Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation. Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses of respondent Locsin, all similarly worded, which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground to disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz: "Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party. xxxxxxxxx (o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity x x x." However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC 97 jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on
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the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz: "Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted. xxxxxxxxx Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases." The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. (d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was done with undue haste. The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed. Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 98 2001 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void. Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01208 contains two dispositions: (1) it ruled that the petitioner was

disqualified as a candidate for the position of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner]. As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes. (a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray." Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to 99 disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of 100 government. This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads: "Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation. (b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other proceedings, following their promulgation. (c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation." (emphasis supplied) In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
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"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases). Special Action cases refer to the following: (a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy; (b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate; (c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and (d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election. Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows: (1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court; (2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed; (3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not become final and executory the BEI shall tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate; (4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory; (5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate. All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed." Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a

timely Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz: Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling." (emphases supplied) (b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in 102 case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no 103 one can be declared elected in his place. In Domino v. 104 COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz: "It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. xxxxxxxxx The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the 105 people's right to elect officials of their choice." Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as such, the 106 votes cast in his favor should not be considered.

This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. 107 COMELEC, this Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the election, based on personal circumstances or section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could not take the place of the disqualified winner. II Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity. Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she has become a member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET). We find no merit in these contentions. First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the COMELEC Second Division erred thus: "(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.'" (emphases supplied) In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's directive for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature considering that 108 the Resolution has yet to become final and executory." Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue. The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:

"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc." Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: "Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law. Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling." Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be verified and shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or resolutions. Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court. Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc. Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof." (emphases supplied) Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot,

thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case. Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of 109 the 1987 Constitution. We reject respondent's contention. (a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc. To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc. (b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin. Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo warranto with the HRET. A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of 111 ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office. A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
110

III Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Representative Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected

of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin. Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy 112 and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or 113 judgment. In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory. In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of

Representatives after he has taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

purportedly required underSection 4, paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ( R.A. No. 6646 ). Petitioners add that because of these omissions, COMELECcanvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were notwo separate Senate elections held

simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term. On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the

Tolentino v. Comelec Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then SenatorTeofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ( Senator Guingona ) as VicePresident.Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator

results from all the provinces, it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators

proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on23 July 2001. In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an amended petition impleading Rectoand Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the contentionsraised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006. This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001 ( Resolution No. 01-005 ) andResolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 ( Resolution No. 01-006 ) of respondent Commission on Elections

Guingona who tookhis oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Following Senator Guingona s confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ( Resolution No. 84 )certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a specialelection to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due tobe elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number ofvotes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004. On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica ( petitioners ), as voters and taxpayers, filed the instantpetition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finalitythe candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year termseat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect. Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorateof the position to be filled in the special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ( R.A. No. 6645 ); (2) it failedto require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the special or regularelections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify intheVotersInformationSheetthecandidates seeking

( COMELEC ).Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006declared official and final the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. Issue: WON the petitioners have locus standi to litigate Ruling:NO Rationale: Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because petitioners do not claimthat COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury because of theissuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006. Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or willsustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens thepresentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus,generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or

election under the special or regular senatorial elections as

threatenedinjury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3)the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters,the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalizedgrievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election. Neitherhave petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the specialelection held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections againstabuses of legislative power or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was] deflected to anyimproper purpose. On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suitsinvolving the right of suffrage. Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, we gave the same liberaltreatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ( IBP ).The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directivedeploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though theIBP presented too general an interest. We held: [T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation bythe IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it withstanding in this case.This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x. Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy therequirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved.In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberalattitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush asidetechnicalities of procedure.In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issueswhich deserve the

attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.Moreover,because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedlyaggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not goaway.It will stare us in the face again.It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve theissue now, rather than later. (Emphasis supplied)

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961.

Issue: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication

Held: The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase speech or debate in Congress as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts

performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

damages with interest at the legal rate plus P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of litigation. This case arose as an aftermath of the November 1963 local elections when the official candidate of the Liberal Party (Lorenzo Sarmiento) for governor in Davao lost to the Nacionalista Party standard bearer (Vicente Duterte), and plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino then a senator of the Republic and LP head in that province attributed the loss of the LP candidate to the support given by defendant Brigido R. Valencia then Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the independent LP candidate (Constancio Maglana) which divided the LP votes. In public statements widely quoted in the metropolitan newspapers, plaintiff stated that had not defendant "sabotaged" and "doublecrossed" the LP, its official candidate would have won the election. The cordial relations between the two LP leaders which had begun since their student days in the U.P. College of Engineering became strained. In the Taliba issue of December 21, 1963, it was reported that plaintiff would file unrevealed administrative charges against defendant with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On February 28, 1964, while plaintiff was still convalescing in the hospital from a heart attack on January 27, 1964 while attending a Senate session, he filed a formal request with the said Senate committee to investigate the actions of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications in connection with certain specified alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment, as follows: " 1. The purchase by the department of 100 jeep-rollers costing P1,398,500 from the J.G.R. Enterprises covered by DPWC purchase order No. A-2563; 2. The purchase of road signs from the Neils Enterprises making available the P8 million reimbursable funds of the DPWC; 3. The purchase of 250,000 metric tons of cement valued at $3,950,250 (M) from the Central Trust of China and the sale of such cement to private parties; and 4. The purchase of P194,500 worth of insulating transformers and accessories from the Peninsula 1 Enterprises." Copy of the said charges were likewise furnished on March 5, 1964 by plaintiff to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be considered in passing upon defendant's appointment to the Cabinet. Plaintiff's charges as filed with the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee together with defendant's comments thereon that they were "politically inspired" and had already been answered in the past and that records of the transactions were open to public scrutiny were carried by the press, particularly in the Bulletin and Newsday issues of March 5, 1964. On the same day, March 5, 1964, a two-page press release was issued by the office of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Exhibit A, and the contents thereof were published or reported on the front pages of the six metropolitan 2 papers. Portions of the said published press release are quoted thus: " a) Since Senator Antonino has stubbornly continued telling lies about me, I have no recourse but start telling the truth about him; b) This is no play of words and in due time I will file charges against the Senator before the Blue Ribbon Committee for reportedly anomalous acts that can make him a disgrace to his

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said

communication is not absolutely privileged. Republic SUPREME Manila FIRST DIVISION of the Philippines COURT

G.R. No. L-26526 May 27, 1974 GAUDENCIO E. ANTONINO, substituted by MAGNOLIA W. ANTONINO, administratrix of his estate, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BRIGIDO R. VALENCIA, defendant-appellant. Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for plaintiff-appellee. Eligio G. Lagman for defendant-appellant.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p The Court finds that defendant-appellant has failed to discharge the burden of substantiating the errors of fact and of law allegedly committed by the trial court in its appealed decision and therefore affirms in toto the appealed judgment holding that defendant caused and was liable for the issuance and publication of the libelous press release attacking the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff and rejecting defendant's defense of qualified privilege and defensive libel and accordingly sentencing defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral

Senate position; c) . . . for personal selfish reasons, Antonino had taken advantage of his position as a member of the Monetary Board and even as a Senator; d) Antonino `had suspicious connections with no less than 22 corporations when he became a member of the Monetary Board;' e) Is it not the height of abuse of power to threaten an American with deportation and make him cover from getting a concession because you are a Senator of the Philippines and in the end you get the concession yourself? and f) I cannot avoid unmasking certain alleged high anomalous activities of the Senator as a member of the Monetary Board and 3 as a member of the Philippine Senate." Plaintiff then filed on March 23, 1964 the present civil action in the Manila court of first instance for the recovery against defendant of P1 million as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages and P50,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees. Defendant claimed in his answer that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release; that at any rate, they were made in good faith and in self-defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in character. He sought by way of counterclaim from plaintiff the sum of P1.25 million as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages and P50,000 as litigation expense and attorney's fees, which plaintiff disclaimed in due course as without basis. After due trial, the lower court ruled against defendant, holding that defendant caused and was liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel. It accordingly rendered its judgment of May 21, 1966 sentencing defendant to pay plaintiff "the sum of P50,000 as moral damages with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint, plus P5,000 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit, while the counterclaims of the defendant against the plaintiff are hereby dismissed." Hence this direct appeal to this Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Act then in force as the amount involved was more than 4 P200,000. During the course of the appeal, plaintiff died in a plane crash on November 13, 1967 on the eve of the 1967 elections. As per the Court's resolution of March 3, 1969, the motion of Senator Magnolia W. Antonino as administratrix to substitute her deceased husband as plaintiff-appellee was granted. Defendant-appellant raises questions of fact and of law in his brief. On the question of fact, the Court finds that no error was committed by the trial court in finding that the press release, Exhibit A, issued by the office of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications was issued or caused to be issued by him and the contents thereof to be published in the metropolitan press and in not giving credence to defendant's vague denial and to the vague testimonies of two newsmen Aproniano C. Borres and Laurencio Zabala who could not pinpoint the source of the press release which they simply found on their desks in the evening but nevertheless accepted at face value and wrote up the contents thereof as published in their papers on the next day.

The preponderance of the evidence of record, documentary and circumstantial, as marshalled by the trial court in its decision clearly supports its finding of liability on defendant's part for the issuance and publication of the offending press release, as follows: 1. The issues of several Manila newspapers of March 5, 1964, reproduced the specific charges filed by the plaintiff against the defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee, which were numbered correlatively; 2. On the upper left corner of Exhibit A was typewritten `For release' and immediately underneath was the date `March 5, 1964'; 3. At the bottom of the first page of Exhibit A appears the following: `Valencia answered point by point, the charges made against him, to wit:' followed on the second page numbered correlatively, the first four of which were the brief but specific answers to the charges of Senator Antonino, arranged in the same numerical order, followed on the lower portion with a more detailed explanation; 4. The first sentence of the press release indicates the source thereof as the herein defendant, if not directly at least impliedly Public Works Secretary Brigido R. Valencia today fired his first salvo against Senator Gaudencio E. Antonino saying he cannot avoid unmasking certain alleged highly anomalous actuations of the Senator as a member of the Monetary Board and as a member of the Philippine Senate. 5. The second paragraph of the press release quoted a statement made by the defendant reading as follows: Since Senator Antonino has stubbornly continued telling lies about me, I have no recourse but start telling the truth about him. The defendant admitted that he made such statement in his office in the presence of several persons, some of whom could be

newspaper reporters (pp. 47-50, t.s.n. of hearing of Sept. 15, 1965). 6. The first page of the press release made reference to two persons only the plaintiff and thedefendant, with parts thereof consisting of quoted statements made by the latter while the rest referred to reports and/or information which he received pertaining to Senator Antonino which are derogatory of his character and integrity; 7. The answer to the specific charges made by the plaintiff against the defendant contained on page 2 of the press release expressly states that it was made by Brigido Valencia. Moreover, they mentioned specific figures, both as to quantity and amount, and accordingly, only the defendant or one working in his office and under his authority, could have obtained the same on short notice, considering that the charges of Senator Antonino were publicized in Manila newspapers which came out in the morning of March 5, 1964. Finally, the said answers were reiterated in a more detailed and extensive form in a signed statement by the defendant, which was published in the issues of the Manila Chronicle of March 24, 1964 (Exh. 12-A) and the Manila Times of March 27, 1964 (Exh. 18); 8. The press release was dated March 5, 1964 and on the following day, six Manila Dailies, five (5) of which are the leading metropolitan newspapers with big circulation, played up the matters contained in the press release on the first pages thereof, with most of them carrying the photographs of the defendant and plaintiff. Undoubtedly the defendant could not have missed reading the published news item, and yet he did not make any correction and/or denial of the matters attributed to him therein. The silence of the defendant was in effect an admission that he was correctly quoted and the source of 5 the facts mentioned in the news items." In his second and third assignments of error, defendant claims that the trial court erred in holding that the press release is libelous and that it is not protected as a qualified privilege communication. There can be no serious question as to the defamatory and libelous nature of the statements in defendant's press release which depicted plaintiff as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the 6 Constitution and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made privately nor officially as to be qualifiedly privilege under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of their defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was 7 presumed. It further correctly ruled that defendant had not overcome such presumption of malice, not having shown the truth thereof, or that they were published with good intentions and with justifiable motive or even from the most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials. The trial court aptly observed that "(A)t the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation, the plaintiff was not a candidate for any public office there being no election to be held and his term of office as Senator would not expire until several years more. As a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was answerable to said body for any misconduct committed as a Senator because it had the authority to take disciplinary action against any member thereof. Had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty, and not because of malice, the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat made against an American, should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees. The defendant did not do so but instead made the accusations publicly by causing them to be given widest publication by all the metropolitan newspapers, obviously in retaliation to the charge filed against him by the plaintiff with the Blue Ribbon. Committee 8 of the Senate." The trial court likewise properly rejected defendant-appellant's claim of defensive libel thus: "(S)tress had also been laid by the defendant on the argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former was justified to hit back with another libel. The emphasis laid had been misplaced and based upon a wrong premise. The defendant was charged with the commission of certain anomalous transactions in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed with the Investigation Committee (Blue Ribbon) of the Senate of the Philippines and the Commission on Appointments. Accordingly, the said charges, even assuming that they contain defamatory imputation, would not be libelous because the letter 9 sent by the plaintiff was a privileged communication." As to defendant's counterclaim, the Court finds that the record amply supports the trial court's finding that there was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to hold plaintiff liable for the publication in the metropolitan press of his charges against defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Commission on Appointments, which were at any rate qualifiedly privileged. Furthermore, the trial court had aptly observed that it was doubtful whether plaintiff's charges against defendant of political "sabotage" and "double-crossing" could be held to be defamatory or libelous, since "(A) review of contemporary politics in our country tends to show that no stigma of disgrace or disrepute befalls one who changes political parties. Neither is it unusual for card-bearing party members to support candidates belonging to the other political party. As a matter of fact, even way back during the time when the late President Quezon was the head of the Filipino participation in the Government while the Philippines was still a dependency of the United States, he was quoted to have stated that `My loyalty to my party ends when my loyalty to my country begins.' Presumably, on the basis of this `classical' utterance of that dynamic and beloved former President of the Philippines that those who were elected as official standard

bearers of one party, after election switched to and affiliated with 10 another political party, are referred to as `patriots.'" ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur. Makasiar, J., took no part.

cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the

People vs. Jalosjos G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, includingattendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellant s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. SECOND DIVISION

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

VICENTE P. LADLAD,G.R. Nos. 172070-72 NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C. CASAMBRE, Petitioners,

- versus -

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege

SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity as members of the Department of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, Respondents.cralaw

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR,G.R. Nos. 172074-76 SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners,

cralawThese are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity (RTC Makati) on the

investigation and prosecution of petitioners cases. - versus The Facts RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R. ZUO, in his capacity as Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors composed of EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A. WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detective Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, in her capacity as Acting Executive Officer of DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -x CRISPIN B. BELTRAN,G.R. No. 175013 Petitioner, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, - versus -CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VELASCO, JR., JJ. SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice and overall superior of the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of RegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity, Branch 146, and HONORABLE ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of MakatiPromulgated: City, Branch 150, Respondents.June 1, 2007 x-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

cralawPetitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G. Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A. Casio (Casio), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),[1] are members of the House of Representatives representing various party-list groups.[2] Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private individuals. Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.

G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)

cralawFollowing the issuance by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a State of National Emergency, police

officers[3] arrested Beltran on 25 February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him

in CampCrame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24 February 2006, on the occasion of the 20 anniversary
th

DECISION

of the EDSA Revolution.The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers who claimed to have been

CARPIO, J.:

present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor[4] indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the Metropolitan

The Case

Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC).[5]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralaw

cralawThe authorities brought back Beltran to CampCrame where, on 27 February 2006, he was subjected to a second inquest, with 1 Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion.A panel of State prosecutors[6] from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The inquest was based on two letters, both dated 27 February 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza).Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP), while Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the CIDGs investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San Juan, and several others as leaders and promoters of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government.The plot was supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a tactical alliance.
st

cralawIn its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the finding of probable cause against Beltran.[9]Beltran sought reconsideration but Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without resolving Beltrans motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the case was re-raffled, issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying Beltrans motion. cralaw cralawHence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated 31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltrans prosecution.

cralawIn his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that Beltrans inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.

G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad Petitions) cralawOn 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as leaders/promoters of Rebellion.The panel then filed an Information with the RTC Makati.The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and other individuals conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the duly constituted government, x x x.[7] The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-452, was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino). Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him.[8] Before the motion could be resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya). During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel for the CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes (Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the proceedings. The panel of prosecutors[10] gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their counter-affidavits. Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents supporting the CIDGs cralawBased on Tanigue and Mendozas letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to petitioners on 6 March 2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office on 13 March 2006 to get copies of the complaint and its attachment. Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had quartered themselves inside the House of Representatives building for fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest.

letters only on 17 March 2006.

cralawPetitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media regarding petitioners case,[11] and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners motion on 22 March 2006. Petitioners sought

cralaw1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and

cralaw2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-

944.[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

reconsideration and additionally prayed for the dismissal of the cases. However, the panel of prosecutors denied petitioners motions on 4 April 2006. The Ruling of the Court cralawPetitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006. cralawWe find the petitions meritorious.

On the Beltran Petition cralawActing on petitioners prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the Court issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. Prior to this, however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006, issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46 others with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the corresponding Information with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 (later consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452 in Branch 146), charging petitioners and their co-accused as principals, masterminds, [or] heads of a Rebellion.[12] Consequently, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 17207072 filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944. (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and cralawx x x x In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: cralawInquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.[14]Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus: The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.

cralawIn his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General submits that the preliminary investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities. The Solicitor General also claims that the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-944 has mooted the Maza petition.

The Issues

cralawThe petitions raise the following issues:

The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers[15] states that the officers arrested Beltran, without a warrant,[16] for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest

of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

cralawFor the failure of Beltrans panel of inquest prosecutors to proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltrans arresting and DOJ Circular No. 61, we declare Beltrans inquest officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of void.[19] Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and investigation had he not asked the trial court to make a judicial circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had of such proceeding. committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February There is No Probable Cause to Indict Beltran for Rebellion.

2006.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the detained person was made in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.[18] If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides: Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall: a) b) c) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained; note down the disposition on the referral document; prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.

cralawProbable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[20] To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and forreasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutors determination of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutors findings in such

investigations.[21] However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we have not hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutors findings.[22] This exception holds true here.

d)

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the order

cralawRebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.

entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who looked like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPPs 10 Plenum in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were purchased partly from contributions by
th

The elements of the offense are: 1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws: cralaw(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or cralaw(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.[23]

Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion.Beltrans alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not

2.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.[24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.

In fact, Cachuelas affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). Assuming

cralawThe evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents[25] attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltrans contention that the same are insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,[26] and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,[27]none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.[28] In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo, Casio, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle which

that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.[29] As for the alleged funding of the CPPs military equipment from Beltrans congressional funds, Cachuelas affidavit merely contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding.Cachuela merely alleged that ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x x.[30]Such a general conclusion does not establish probable cause.

cralawIn his Comment to Beltrans petition, the Solicitor General points to Fuentes affidavit, dated 25 February 2006,[31] as basis for the finding of probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his statement regarding meetings Beltran and

the other petitioners attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others.

attended the alleged meeting, there is no other evidence on record indicating that Cris is Beltran. San Juan, from whom the flash drive containing the so-called minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing Beltran.

The claim is untenable. Fuentes affidavit was not part of the attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006.Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes affidavit in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against Beltran on that day. Indeed, although this affidavit is dated 25 February 2006, the CIDG first presented it only during the preliminary investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which Fuentes subscribed to his statement before respondent prosecutor Velasco. cralawTo repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting, maintaining, or heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation. Thus, even assuming that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in a Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the Rebellion.[33]However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran for conspiring and confederating with others in forming a tactical alliance to commit rebellion.As Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes affidavit as part of their Comment to Beltrans motion for judicial determination of probable cause. Such belated On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions worded, the Information does not charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, a bailable offense.[34]

submission, a tacit admission of the dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest, does not improve the prosecutions case. Assuming them to be true, what the allegations in Fuentes affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, not

The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted With Irregularities.

cralawAs in the determination of probable cause, this Court is Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to discuss, similarly loath to enjoin the prosecution of offenses, a practice among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere rooted on public interest as the speedy closure of criminal preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under investigations fosters public safety.[35]However, such relief in Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the equity may be granted if, among others, the same is necessary (a) felony charged in the Information against Beltran and San Juan in to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive Criminal Case No. 06-452 is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and and vindictive manner[36] or (b) to afford adequate protection to not Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San constitutional rights.[37] The case of the petitioners in G.R. Juan, and others conspired to form a tactical alliance to commit Nos.172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these exceptions. Rebellion. Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence cralawThe procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses before it. punishable by at least four years, two months and one day is outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal The minutes[32] of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Procedure, thus: Batangas between members of MKP and CPP, including Beltran, also do not detract from our finding. Nowhere in the minutes was Beltran implicated. While the minutes state that a certain Cris Procedure.The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. (b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense. Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party. (c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counteraffidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit. (d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant. (e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but

without the right to examine or crossexamine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned. The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counteraffidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days. (f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied)

Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage,[38] respondent prosecutors nonchalantly

disregarded it.Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public.Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints[39] and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

cralawFurther, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the case, otherwise he shall issue a subpoena to the respondents. Here, after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ office on 13 March 2006 to secure copies of the complaints and its attachments. During the investigation, respondent prosecutors allowed the CIDG to

present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners or their counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings. Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments to the CIDG letters.

On Respondent Prosecutors Lack of Impartiality cralaw We find merit in petitioners doubt on respondent prosecutors impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation, that, We [the DOJ] will just declareprobable cause, then its up to the [C]ourt to decide x x x.[42] Petitioners raised this issue in their petition,[43] but respondents never disputed

cralawThese uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors statement in the Order of 22 March 2006that the preliminary investigation was done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal Procedure.[40] Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the investigation, and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to members of the media knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the investigation but also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire proceeding was a sham.

the veracity of this statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the Information even in the absence of probable cause. A Final Word

cralawThe obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors brings to mind an observation we made in another equally politically charged case. We reiterate what we stated then, if only to emphasize the importance of maintaining the integrity of criminal prosecutions in general and preliminary investigations in particular, thus:

A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive one, forming part of due process in criminal justice.[41] This especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be nonbailable for those accused as principals. [W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may be publics perception of the impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.[44]

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent prosecutors filing of the Information against petitioners on 21 April 2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot the petitions in G.R. Nos.172070-72 and 172074-76. Our power to enjoin prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of the Information with the trial court.

cralaw WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we SET ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, MakatiCity, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, MakatiCity, Branch 150. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders dated 22 March 2006 and 4 April 2006 issued by respondent

prosecutors. WeORDER the Regional Trial Court, MakatiCity, Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944. Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, SO ORDERED. Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982 Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his

Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could administrative body, appear as counsel before any

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

and SEC was an administrative body.

Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares. Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution velino v. Cuenco

FACTS: The

petitioners,

Senator

Jose

Avelino,

in

a quo

days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place

warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case. 2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved. HELD: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court. 2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the

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