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NATO's Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan
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NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies

in Afghanistan
Prasad P. Rane

Abstract

With the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) taking over com-
mand from the US-led Coalition Forces in southern Afghanistan and the
United States focusing on the eastern part of Afghanistan, particularly
along the border with Pakistan, crucial questions have arisen regarding
securing Afghanistan and its transition to democracy. How will NATO
perform its new responsibilities and what will be its counter-terrorism
strategies? Will it be substantially different from the US counter-terrorism
approach and how will the differences on the issue of ‘use of force’ among
the NATO members be reconciled? These are some of the questions that
this article addresses in the broader context of NATO’s transformation
from its earlier ‘support role’ to now that of a ‘lead role’.

Introduction
Soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on mainland United States, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) invoked Article 5 of the Treaty
for the first time in the history of the Alliance and declared this attack as
being against all NATO member countries. Following upon this decision,
NATO decided to deploy forces and other assets in support of the US-led
global war on terrorism (GWOT).1 Ironically, while this unique decision
reflected cohesiveness and undeterred unity; prior to the incident serious
doubts about the future of the transatlantic alliance were being raised.2
Soon after the initial euphoria, new dividing lines were drawn on the issue
of ‘use of forces’. Subsequently, NATO got involved in the International
Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)3 and in August 2003 took command
and coordination of the ISAF, leading to its first ‘out-of-area operations’.

ISSN 0970-0161 print / ISSN 1754-0054 online

DOI: 10.1080/09700160701353548

C Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
 74 Strategic Analysis
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Since then, there has been a growing involvement of NATO in

Afghanistan, and on December 8, 2005, NATO prepared a revised oper-
ational plan, to guide the ISAF in assisting the Afghan Government to ex-
ercise its authority and influence across the country.4 The NATO-led ISAF
assumed command of the forces in southern Afghanistan from the US-led
coalition forces on July 31, 2006.5 These recent developments in Afghanistan
highlight a significant change in the character of NATO’s counter-terrorism
strategies from ‘NATO in support’ to ‘NATO in the lead’.6
Against this background, the article examines the counter-terrorism
initiatives of NATO in Afghanistan and compares it with those of the
United States. It also examines the dominant discourse amongst the NATO
members on the philosophy of counter-terrorism and its implementation
in Afghanistan. The article argues that NATO’s understanding of counter-
terrorism is different from that of the United States due to differences
within and reservations of some of the NATO members.Crucially, NATO’s
first ‘out-of-area operations’ have brought the alliance to India’s doorsteps.
NATO actively participated in the post-earthquake relief operations in
Pakistan and Pak-occupied Kashmir, and soon after, it proposed to es-
tablish a strategic partnership with Pakistan as an acknowledgement of
its participation and contribution in GWOT and Operation Enduring Free-
dom (OEF).7 NATO’s warming up to Pakistan has the potential to change
the entire strategic landscape of South Asia and the rationale behind this
overture will be examined.

NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy

NATO’s concept for defence against terrorism states that it is an offen-
sive measure to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and prop-
erty to terrorism, and includes counter-force activities and containment
by military forces and civil agencies.8 Any counter-terrorism strategy has
two main components: responses and measures. In the counter-terrorism
responses, one can summarise two models. The first is the criminal jus-
tice model (CJM) and other the war model (WM).9 CJM functions on the
fundamental premise of preservation of democratic principles in the fight
against terrorism. The fundamental principles are to be safeguarded even
at the expense of effectiveness of counter-terrorist measures in CJM. The
WM works on a different premise. It gives preference to restraining and
countering terrorism rather than upholding liberal democratic principles.
In WM, the onus for response lies in the mechanism of ‘use of forces’, that is
 NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan 75
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with the military. However, due to shortcomings and certain grey areas,10
in both types of responses, nations usually opt for the expanded criminal
justice model (ECJM), a hybrid of CJM and WM11 (Table 1).
Counter-terrorism measures in light of the above models can be classi-
fied as ‘defensive’ as well as ‘offensive’. Defensive measures are meant to
reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts while offensive measures are meant
to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism. Offensive measures carry a
contingency plan, which enables a nation-state to respond and address the
challenge of any terrorist incident. There is need for these diverse responses
due to the dynamic nature of terrorism and its capability to act at various
plains and levels. Counter-terrorism measures broadly cover the following
areas of activity12 :

1. politics and governance,

2. economic and social,
3. psychological–communicative–educational,
4. military,
5. judicial and legal,
6. police and prison system, and
7. intelligence and secret service.

US counter-terrorism strategy: Post-9/11 saw a rapid enhancement

of counter-terrorism policies in the United States. Presidential Directives
(PDD) 39 and 62 outlines the US counter-terrorism policy. PDD-39 ensures
that the United States will vigorously pursue efforts to deter and pre-
empt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute,
individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks. PDD-62
also sets the guidelines in creating a new and more systematic approach
in addressing the challenge of terrorism.13 Soon after, the Department of
Homeland Security was created.14 The primary missions15 as chalked out
by the Act were as follows:

1. prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;

2. reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and
3. minimise the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist
attacks that do occur within the United States.
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Table 1. Explanation of the three terrorism response models

Expanded Criminal
Criteria War Model Justice Model Criminal Justice Model
General feature Terrorism is regarded as a Terrorism is regarded as an Terrorism is regarded as a
tactic exercised in exceptional phenomenon crime.
guerrilla activities or that is not necessarily an act
even acts of rebellion. of war, yet also deviates
from the standard
definition of a felonious
crime.
State aims and Apprehending terrorists Arrest and penalisation of Arrest and penalisation of
means and the elimination of terrorists. terrorists while adhering to
terrorism. the ‘rule of law’ and liberal
democratic standards with
respect to the institution of
law and enforcement.
Democratic The exercise of military The expansion of the concept The use of this model
acceptability force and strategies with of the rule of law by corresponds with the
the intention of adopting special legislation elements to the liberal
eradicating terrorism in a in the battle against democratic orientation. Rigid
certain society will lead terrorism and constitutional boundaries.
the country significantly administrative regulations
away from acceptable will divert the regime away
democratic standards. from liberal acceptability,
yet will not completely
violate democratic
boundaries.

Constitutional legal Laws of war dictate
aspects counter-terrorism
measures and
consequently any
constitutional or legal
consideration is solely
secondary.
Operational aspects Forces responding to
terrorism are the army
and special units. The
nature of their response
resides in military
doctrine.
Source: Ami Pedahzur & Magnus Ranstorp, ‘A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel’,
Terrorism and Political Violence, 13 (2), Summer 2001, p. 5.
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The expansion of The state responds to
constitutional boundaries terrorist incidents in
by adopting administrative compliance with state
regulations or special laws criminal law and is
in the fight against subject to constant
terrorism, and the judiciary regulation.
differential treatment by
the court system of offences
defined as terrorist.
Forces responding will be The forces responding will
primarily police and secret be the police. The nature
service, occasionally of the response is
complemented by special circumscribed by the
anti-terrorism units. The standard rules of
nature of the response will authority accorded to an
include preventive arrests, anti-criminal police force.
surveillance techniques and
gathering intelligence data
– a typical method used by
secret services. All this with
the intention of bringing
suspects to trial.
 78 Strategic Analysis
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The US counter-terrorism strategy can be divided broadly into two

phases. The aim of the first phase is to avoid a terrorist attack and while
doing so to address the vulnerabilities in the system. It assigns consider-
able importance and greater role to intelligence agencies. The strategy is
largely ‘pre-emptive’ in nature. The second phase arranges for a post-crisis
management in which law enforcement agencies and the crisis manage-
ment groups play crucial roles after a terrorist attack has occurred. An
important element to this phase is to build up appropriate response at the
international level. The Department of State shoulders the responsibility
for building international consensus and providing assistance to cooper-
ating nations in their efforts to combat terrorism. The major points in US
counter-terrorism policy include the following:

1. no concessions to terrorists by striking deals,

2. bring terrorists to justice for their crimes,
3. isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force
them to change their behaviour, and
4. bolster the counter-terrorism capabilities of those countries that
work with the United States and that require assistance.16

US military operations in Afghanistan: The US military operations in

Afghanistan, as part of the GWOT , also considerably involved diplomacy,
intelligence, law enforcement and financial efforts. However, as events
unfolded, the military component became the dominant strand. This un-
derscores that the United States has been relying more on WM responses
to terrorism than to CJM and ECJM methods, whether it be in Afghanistan,
Africa, the Philippines or Colombia – that are areas of operation under the
GWOT by the administration.17
‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, as spelt out by the United States, was
launched to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The initial objectives
were to destroy the terrorist camps and infrastructure: end terrorist ac-
tivities and capture Al-Qaida leadership.18 Before the launch of the opera-
tion, the British and the US Special Forces infiltrated Afghanistan to make
contacts with the Northern Alliance and organise them to provide logis-
tical support for the planned attack. Tactically, OEF began on October 7,
2001, with a mix of air strikes from land-based B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers;
carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18 fighters; and Tomahawk cruise missiles
launched from both US and British ships and submarines.19 The strikes that
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began at night hit 31 targets in and around Herat, Shindand, Shibarghan,

Mazar-i-Sharif and in particular the southern Taliban stronghold area of
Kandhar, which included early warning radars, ground forces, command-
and-control facilities, Al Qaeda infrastructure and Taliban airfields.20
Diplomacy ran parallel to military in building an international coali-
tion to strengthen the GWOT. The operational plan prepared by General
Tommy Franks, CINC CENTCOM, not only was centred on US power21
but called for significant contributions from the international community.22
Subsequently, by 2002, the coalition had grown to more than 68 nations,
with 27 nations having representatives at CENTCOM headquarters.23 Since
the Gulf War I, the utility of air power had gained credibility and so was the
case with OEF. To facilitate the impending war, the Bush Administration
sought and gained the approval of the Saudi Government for the use of
the Combined Air Operations Centre, maintained by CENTCOM, at Prince
Sultan Air Base. Likewise, some Central Asia Republics agreed to tempo-
rary basing of US aircraft and military personnel, who were supposed to
take part in combat operations in Afghanistan.
By October 2001, the coalition forces had destroyed almost the entire
Taliban and by mid-March 2002 the Taliban had been removed from power.
Yet many questions still remain unanswered. How long will the coalition
forces have to fight this war with increasing number of fatalities? Will the
re-construction process in Afghanistan ever be a success?, etc.
While Afghanistan has had elections but President Hamid Karzai’s
authority largely confined to Kabul is limited and weak. Karzai’s balancing
act with the warlords in the post-election period and increase in opium
production in recent years are a grim reminder that the overall situation is
worrisome.24 While this questions the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism
strategy in Afghanistan, it also brings into focus the crucial aspect of post-
war reconstruction. A war-torn country, not properly managed, becomes a
territory of grumbling voices. The resultant social vacuum complemented
by a weak political centre may become a nursery for terrorists and terrorism.
This raises serious doubts about the effectiveness of US counter-terrorism
strategy.
NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy: NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept25
identifies terrorism as a primal risk threatening NATO security. Post-9/11
a Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism was adopted by NATO dur-
ing the Prague Summit in 2002.26 The plan envisioned a framework for
 80 Strategic Analysis
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cooperation on terrorism and defined the partnership roles and the instru-
ments for fighting terrorism and managing its consequences.27 NATO’s
counter-terrorism strategy is based on the military concept. As discussed
earlier, NATO recognises counter-terrorism as an offensive military action
designed to reduce terrorists’ capabilities. The concept identified two broad
roles for NATO’s involvement in counter-terrorism operations. They are as
follows.
r NATO in Lead.
r NATO in Support.

NATO in Lead prescribes an individual role for NATO in counter-

terrorism operations augmented with adequate command, control
and intelligence structures, as well as a trained force for immedi-
ate response in a crisis. Special attention to certain planning aspects
includes
r procedures and capabilities that support accelerated decision cy-
cles to be successful in detecting and attacking time-sensitive tar-
gets in the counter-terrorist environment;
r access to flexible and capable joint-fires, ranging from precision-
guided stand-off weapons to direct conventional fires; and
r the need for more specialised anti-terrorist forces.28

NATO in Support allows the Alliance to provide its assets and capa-
bilities to any counter-terrorism operation undertaken by another interna-
tional organisation or coalition involving allies. NATO’s support function
includes
r a role as coalition enabler and interoperability provider;
r the ability to back-fill national requirements;
r forward deploying of forces in support of the broader coalition
efforts;
r the expression of political and military commitment;
r practical support as manifested by host-nation support and logis-
tic assistance, including over-flight and basing rights; and
r the use of NATO’s operational planning and force generation
capabilities to plan a mission and generate a force for a coalition
 NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan 81
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of like-minded NATO members, and also help to support and

sustain that operation.29

Since 9/11, NATO has contributed significantly to counter-terrorist op-

erations by deploying troops, aircraft and ships in a number of operations
directed against terrorists or their support networks. NATO’s major con-
tributions have been in Afghanistan, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.30
NATO in Afghanistan: Through the ISAF, NATO is participating in the
re-construction process in Afghanistan. The ISAF is mandated under Chap-
ter VII of the United Nations Charter (Peace Enforcing) by UN Security
Resolutions 1386, 1413 and 1444. ISAF exists to help the Afghan people,
not to govern them.31 At present, around 36 nations are supporting ISAF
in Afghanistan.32 NATO took command and coordination of the ISAF on
August 11, 2003, becoming responsible for the planning and command of
the peacekeeping force. The NAC provides political direction and coordi-
nation, working in close consultation with non-NATO nations taking part
in ISAF. The Allied Joint Force Commander JFC based at Brunssum, the
Netherlands, is responsible at the operational level for manning, training,
deploying and sustaining ISAF.33
In the entire ISAF-NATO assignment, the Provincial Re-Construction
Teams (PRTs)34 play a crucial role. As on October 6, 2006, NATO is leading
the military components of 24 PRTs in north, west and south Afghanistan.35
ISAF-NATO provides training to the Afghan National Army and National
Police and plays a key role in eliminating weapons and is also involved
in protecting the Kabul International Airport. It also provided security
throughout the process of Constitutional Loya Jirga from December 14,
2003, to January 4, 2004.36 Given these tasks and functions, it is quite clear
that NATO is performing a support role in this entire counter-terrorism
operation. The NATO-ISAF and OEF have completely different mandate.
NATO-ISAF is geared towards the stabilisation process while OEF un-
dertakes hardcore counter-terrorism operations. The NATO-led ISAF has
expanded to include south Afghanistan from July 31, 2006, and has a total
strength of 18,500 troops. With this development, it is expected that NATO
might change gears and take up a lead role in the operations. However,
any such position will have to consider apprehensions of major partner
countries such as France on the use of its troops and shortage of funds. Re-
cent reports suggest that NATO wants to push ahead and has conceived of
“NATO-PLUS”, with support from other international organisations such
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as EU and G-8. But the grand strategy in Afghanistan will not be successful
merely by military solutions. The re-construction of Afghanistan and es-
tablishing peace and stability in the region needs a support of non-military
solutions. The US-led coalition retains responsibility for Afghanistan’s east-
ern region.37 It will be interesting to explore the reasons behind NATO’s
initial role as a support mechanism in OEF. Was it because of the diverse
views of the European members on counter-terrorism? And, what are the
reasons behind NATO being assigned a lead role in the later stages in OEF?

Assessing NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies

NATO as a security arrangement was created to counter the former
Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Cold War ended with the disinte-
gration of the Soviet Union but NATO continued to exist. Attempts were
made to redefine its role by expanding it eastwards and include some for-
mer Soviet Bloc states as members.38 With the process of expansion, certain
other exercises such as institutionalising ‘partnerships for peace’ with sev-
eral countries, including Russia, were also taken up. These were seen as
desperate attempts to redefine and readjust its role in the post-Cold War
period. Its role in counter-terrorism, as a response to new challenges in the
post-Cold War, required a fundamental restructuring in the organisation
in both spatial and temporal terms and was not the same as addressing a
monolithic threat of former Soviet Union.

NATO as a Second Line of Defence in Afghanistan

Like the many systemic changes in the post-9/11 world, NATO too
debated its role. Initially, the French Government was the strongest sup-
porter of the United States but soon concerns were raised from certain
quarters of the Alliance in particularly from Germany, the Netherlands
and Norway and later on even France joined them.39 The Bush Ad-
ministration, aware of the different approach of its European partners
on security issues, limited NATO’s operational role in Afghanistan. The
European view on the campaign against global terrorism can be sum-
marised as follows:

1. The response should not primarily be a military one.

2. A greater involvement of diplomacy, law enforcement and interna-
tional intelligence cooperation.
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3. Military response should be limited to Afghanistan, and as much

as possible to precise terrorist targets.
4. To avoid falling into the diabolical trap of a ‘clash of civilisations’.
5. Stress on formation of a broad international coalition and the ap-
proval and involvement of the United Nations.
6. The importance of renewed engagement to resolve regional prob-
lems, such as Iraq and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. A need to
focus on the ‘root causes’ of terrorism.40

These views highlight differences in the perceptions of the American

and the Europeans on counter-terrorism strategies. It also needs to be
stressed that the European partners in the Atlantic Alliance are also mem-
bers of the European Union. In the aftermath of 9/11, an extraordinary
council meeting held on September 21, 2001, approved a comprehensive
‘European policy to combat terrorism’. In this plan, the European Council
(EC) adopted measures in the following five areas:

1. enhancing police and judicial cooperation;

2. developing international legal instrument;
3. putting an end to the funding of terrorism;
4. strengthening air security; and
5. coordinating EU’s global action.41

The above policy statements highlight the Europeans’ firm belief in the
ECJM model response to terrorism and as stated earlier, the United States
subscribes to the WM model of response. These differences at strategic
levels resulted in the United States involving NATO as a support mech-
anism and subsequently NATO Allies agreed to take eight measures to
supplement the United States in its campaign against terrorism:
r greater intelligence sharing;
r assistance to states threatened as a result of their support for
coalition efforts;
r increased security for the United States, and other allies’ facilities
on their territory;
r back-filling of selected allied assets needed to support anti-
terrorist operations;
 84 Strategic Analysis

r
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blanket over flight rights for the US and other allies’ aircraft for
military flights related to counter-terrorism operations;
r access to ports and airfields;
r deployment of NATO naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean;
and
r deployment of elements of NATO’s airborne early warning and
control force to support counter-terrorism operations.42

NATO’s Success Rate

Since the first line of defence was not within the ambit of NATO, the
alliance thus was used primarily in the reconstruction process and other
support activities, which the United States thought would enhance the
process of nation-building in Afghanistan. Even while performing this
assigned task, NATO-ISAF faced considerable challenges. The Secretary
General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, an ‘Atlanticist’, had to go around pleading
for contribution of troops by member states.43 The ramifications of receiving
dead soldiers back home was a huge political price few European countries
were able to pay.
As an exercise to re-cast its image as a peacekeeper and nation-builder,
NATO actively participated in the post-earthquake relief operations in
Pakistan. On a request from Pakistan for assistance in the aftermath of the
devastating earthquakes of October 8, 2005, and with the approval from
NAC, NATO began airlift operations on October 13 and the first install-
ment of supplies arrived in Pakistan on October 14. A NATO headquarters
was established in Pakistan on October 24, 2005, to liase with Pakistani
authorities and pave the way for the incoming troops. During this entire
mission, completed on January 31, 2006, some 1,000 engineers and support
staff, as well as 200 medical personnel, worked in Pakistan.44 Pakistan is
central to the United States in the global war on terror and NATO’s relief
and humanitarian operations was vital. Already, the United States has con-
ferred a major non-NATO ally (MNNA) status to Pakistan. The strategic
partnership with Pakistan that NATO seeks would require higher level of
engagement with intelligence sharing and closer military-to-military rela-
tionship to fight terrorism.45 In the larger geo-strategic calculus, NATO’s
strategic shift towards Pakistan can be viewed as a balancer to the Indo-US
strategic partnership.
 NATO’s Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Afghanistan 85
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A New Dimension to NATO in Afghanistan: From Support Role

to Lead Role?
The NATO-led ISAF expanded its operation to southern Afghanistan
on July 31, 2006, with an objective to provide support to the Government in
Afghanistan’s southern region and to take full command and control of the
PRTs in Lashkargah, Kandahar, Tarin Kowt and Qalat.46 The total strength
of the troops under NATO’s command has gone up to more than 30,000 with
contributions from 37 NATO member and partner countries.47 NATO’s
role can be seen as a crucial component of the 5-year plan, Afghanistan
Compact,48 ensuring links between the government of Afghanistan and the
international community. The September 6, 2006, declaration signed be-
tween NATO and Afghanistan paves the way for a long-term cooperation
in defence reform, defence institution building and the military aspects of
security sector reforms, as well as other areas such as promoting interoper-
ability between the forces of the Afghan National Army and those of NATO
members.49
The recently concluded Riga Summit50 reconfirmed the importance of
Afghanistan to NATO and stressed on the need for re-orientation amongst
its allies. The Summit Declaration came out with a Comprehensive Political
Guidance, which intends to provide a framework and political direction for
NATO’s continuing transformation in the coming 10–15 years. While the
allies agreed on the issue of supporting the operations whenever required51 ;
important partners such as France had certain reservations on the use of
its forces during the operations raising warranted doubts over NATO’s
capability to successfully take up a ‘lead role’ in Afghanistan. The West
European allies essentially consider NATO as a platform to discuss Euro-
Atlantic issues and the debate over the ‘use of forces’ will continue to
persist. In other words, NATO’s understanding of counter-terrorism is
different from that of the United States due to the reservations of some
NATO members.

Inferences
Certain inferences based on the prevailing situation in Afghanistan can
be drawn at this point. The inferences are as follows.

1. The US counter-terrorism strategy subscribes to the WM response

to terrorism and strongly emphasises military operations.
 86 Strategic Analysis
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2. NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy seems to be oscillating between

the WM response and ECJM. This oscillation is due to the Euro-
pean subscription to the ECJM, leaning towards the CJM. While
the core members such as France and Germany subscribe to the
CJM model, the new members lean towards the US approach. This
non-convergence is leading to frictions at three levels: between the
United States and the Europeans; between the East Europeans and
the West Europeans and between France and Germany on the one
hand and the United Kingdom on the other.
3. The United States has preferred NATO to perform the role of a
second line of defence, given its members’ divide and uncertainty
over the approach towards terrorism.
4. NATO’s post-earthquake relief operations in Pakistan were an ef-
fective exercise in improving its image and an opportunity to build
and expand its strategic sphere.
5. Pakistan might use its expected strategic partnership with NATO
to balance India in South Asia.
6. NATO taking command of southern Afghanistan signifies a role
reversal from support to one of lead role. Soon after taking the
command of southern Afghanistan, NATO’s orientation, approach
and operational ability have seen a visible shift.
7. The fundamental problems will continue to trouble NATO. The
philosophical divide between west Europeans and the Americans
within NATO over counter-terrorism strategy will persist and in all
probability grow wider as NATO digs deeper in Afghanistan. The
conflict will test its resilience and its ability to overstretch itself in
terms of both domestic pressure and economics.

Notes
1
Web edition of Chapter 19: “The Alliance’s Role in the Fight against Terrorism and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 167, at
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/handbook-2006.pdf (Accessed May
23, 2006).
2
Philip H. Gordon has extensively elaborated on the reasons behind the divide in
the transatlantic alliance prior to September 11. He highlights two main reasons
for this divide. According to him, a ‘value-gap’ was emerging in the transatlantic
relations, due to major differences over the issues such as the death penalty, the
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environment, abortion, religion and gun control. These differences increasingly

divided the allies, which were no longer held by a common threat in the post-Cold
War period. Also, American ‘unilateralism’, illustrated by the Bush Administra-
tion’s rejection or dilution of a wide range of international treaties and agreements
gave an impression that the sole upper power is in no mood to take its allies’ views
into account. One can find the argument in Philip H. Gordon, “NATO after 11
September”, Survival, 43 (4), Winter 2001–02, p. 90.
3
The ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in Decem-
ber 2001 after the ousting of the Taliban regime. It is not a United Nation
(UN) force, but a coalition of the willing deployed under the authority of
the UN Security Council (UNSC) (four UNSC Resolutions – 1386, 1413, 1444
and 1510 – relate to ISAF). The ISAF structure and other details are avail-
able at http://wwwafnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm; http://www.nato.int/
issues/afghanistan/command.htm (Accessed January 3, 2006).
4
“Revised Operational Plan for NATO’s expanding mission in Afghanistan”, at
http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan stage3/index.html (Accessed January
3, 2006).
5
NATO Press Release Press (2006) 096 dated July 31, 2006, at http://www.
nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-096e.htm (Accessed September 20, 2006).
6
The NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism addresses two roles
for NATO’s involvement in counter-terrorist operations – NATO in the lead and
NATO in support. This concept was approved by the North Atlantic Coun-
cil (NAC) in permanent session and subsequently endorsed by Heads of State
and Government at the Prague Summit on November 21, 2002. Available at
http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm (Accessed May 23, 2006).
7
NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, after
meeting with President Pervez Musharraf on Thursday, May 11, 2006, said:
“NATO would like to develop a strategic partnership with Pakistan to fight
terrorism. . . ”, at http://www.indianmuslimsinfo/news/2006/may/12/muslim
world news/nato for strategic partnership with pakistan.html?PHPSESSID=
aeeb19d0884eb6f94f65e40616e30c55 (Accessed August 4, 2006).
8
Counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism differ on this ground of their respective
methodologies. Anti-terrorism is a defensive measure wherein limited response is
used to contain terrorism. See definitions, Annexure A of the NATO’s Military Con-
cept for Defence against Terrorism, at http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism-
annex.htm (Accessed May 23, 2006).
9
Graeme C. S. Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, Counterterrorism, ABC-CLIO, Inc, 2004,
pp. 100–101; for citations on various theoretical models, see Ami Pedahzur and
Magnus Ranstorp, “A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism in Liberal Democ-
racies: The Case of Israel”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 13 (2), Summer 2001, pp.
1–26. These models and responses were used in the case of Israel. Here they are
used as basic structures for highlighting the differences at structural and approach
level.
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10
For a detailed discussion on grey areas in counter-terrorism models, see Ami
Pedahzur and Magnus Ranstorp, “A Tertiary Model for Countering Terrorism
in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Israel”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 13
(2), Summer 2001, pp. 1–2. The article’s primary aim is to present an expanded
taxonomy between WM and CJM. It also addresses the grey areas in these two
respective models.
11
For information in this regard, see Graeme C. S. Steven and Rohan Gunaratna, no.
9, pp. 100–101.
12
For a detailed discussion on counter-terrorism measures, Ibid, pp. 102–120;
and the list of the measures at http://www.undcp.org/terrorism measures.html
(Accessed March 2, 2006).
13
The Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) series is used to promulgate Presiden-
tial decisions on national security matters. PDD-39 related to Counter-terrorism
Policy was institutionalised on June 21, 1995. PDD-62, which is related to Pro-
tection against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Over-
seas, was institutionalised on May 22, 1998. Information regarding PDD is avail-
able at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/index.html (Accessed February 5,
2006).
14
The Homeland Security Act, at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/hr
5005 enr.pdf (Accessed January 10, 2006).
15
Other points of the primary mission of the DHS are listed in the Homeland Security
Act on H.R 5005-8 of the Act.
16
Frank Bolz, Jr., Kenneth J. Dudonis and David P. Schulz, The Counterterrorism
Handbook: Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group,
2005, p. 32.
17
Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on terrorism:
Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia”, CRS Report for Congress,
February 4, 2005, p. 1, at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32758.pdf (Accessed
January 11, 2006).
18
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm (Accessed
February 4, 2006).
19
Ibid.
20
See Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation
Enduring Freedom, RAND Corporation, 2005, p. 78.
21
As of November 8, 2001, it was reported that more than 50,000 American sol-
diers, sailors, airmen and Marines were deployed across an area stretching from
the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. About half the total American forces were
aboard naval ships operating in the northern Arabian Sea. Approximately 3,000
American personnel were said to be in Oman, including soldiers from the 3rd
Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. Another 1,500 to 2,000 Americans, including
soldiers from the Army’s 10th Mountain Division, as well as special operations
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forces, were reportedly based at a former Soviet air base in Uzbekistan. By early
January 2002, it was reported that the total number of US ground forces de-
ployed in Afghanistan had grown to nearly 4,000 troops. By late January 2002,
the total number of US troops in Afghanistan was reportedly more than 4,000,
including conventional forces to protect bases, along with engineers, forensic
experts and interrogators. By August 2002, there were about 8,000 US troops
in Afghanistan. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-
freedom orbat-01.htm (Accessed March 3, 2006).
22
The attacks on the first day were carried out by the American and British forces
collectively. On the second day only the American troops carried out the attacks.
Very soon, they were joined by many countries such as Canada, Australia,
United Kingdom, New Zealand, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Norway, Croatia, Czech Republic, Bahrain, Jordan, Japan, Portugal,
Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The detailed contribution of these countries can be
accessed from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United States war in Afghanistan#
Coalition Response; http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-
freedom orbat-03.htm (Accessed March 3, 2006).
23
The flow chart of “Operation Enduring Freedom: Chain Command” is cited by
Johann Price, at http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=
1144&programID=39&from page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm, dated
June 26, 2002. It is noted that the chart representing the chain of command in 2002
has undergone a lot of structural as well as personnel change.
24
One can find a detailed discussion on the paradoxes in War on Terror and on
Karzai’s balancing act with the Warlords in Afghanistan, in Vishal Chandra, “War-
lords, Drugs and the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan: The Paradoxes”, Strategic
Analysis, 30 (1), January-March 2006, pp. 64–92, and Vishal Chandra, “Warlords
and Karzai’s Balancing Act”, Strategic Analysis, 29 (1), January-March 2005, pp.
155–161, respectively.
25
The 1999 Strategic Concept was approved during the Washington Summit held
during April 23–24, 1999, at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
(Accessed March 1, 2006).
26
Text of the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism (PAP-T), at http://www.
nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm (Accessed March 12, 2006).
27
Web edition of Chapter 19: “The Alliance’s Role in the Fight against Terrorism and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 171, at
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/handbook-2006.pdf (Accessed May
23, 2006).
28
See NATO’s Military Concept on Defence Against Terrorism, at http://www.nato.
int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm (Accessed May 23, 2006).
29
Ibid.
30
http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/in practice.html (Accessed April 13,
2006).
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31
For information on ISAF, visit http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/about/about
history.htm (Accessed April 13, 2006).
32
http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure structure.htm (Accessed
April 13, 2006).
33
http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/structure/structure whoswho.htm (Acces-
sed April 13, 2006).
34
PRTs are small teams of civilian and military personnel working in Afghanistan’s
provinces to provide security for aid workers and help reconstruction work.
They are a key component of a three-part strategy for Afghanistan – security,
governance and development – helping to spread stability across the country.
See http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/in practice.htm (Accessed May 2,
2006).
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-096e.htm (Accessed May 2, 2006).
38
In the post–Cold War period, NATO has expanded eastwards by undergoing
double enlargement. During the Washington Summit of 1999, it welcomed three
new members, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, and in 2004, it welcomed six
new members, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
39
David Brown, “The War on Terrorism Would Not Be Possible without NATO: A
Critique”, Contemporary Security Policy, 25 (3), December 2004, p. 413.
40
Philip Gordon, “NATO after 11 September”, Survival, 43 (4), Winter 2001–02, pp.
94–95.
41
Council of the EU, “Conclusions and Plan of Action”, Extraordinary Euro-
pean Council Meeting held on September 21, 2001, at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/external relations/110901/actionplan01.pdf (Accessed May 12, 2006).
42
Web edition of Chapter 19: “The Alliance’s Role in the Fight against Terrorism and
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 168, at
http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2006/handbook-2006.pdf (Accessed May
23, 2006).
43
Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Royal
United Services Institute, London on June 18, 2004, at http://www.nato.int/
docu/speech/2004/s040618a.htm (Accessed February 23, 2006).
44
Details on Pakistan earthquake relief operation at http://www.nato.int/issues/
pakistan earthquake/index.html (Accessed July 1, 2006).
45
Ibid.
46
http://www2.hq.nato.int/ISAF/Update/media faq.htm (Accessed April 20,
2006).
47
http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html (Accessed April 20, 2006).
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48
Afghanistan Compact is a 5-year plan between the Government of Afghanistan
and the International Community. This plan sets the goals regarding the
security, governance and economic development of Afghanistan. The Compact
follows the formal end of the Bonn Process in September 2005, with com-
pletion of the Parliamentary and Provincial elections, and will establish an
effective mechanism for co-ordinating Afghan and international efforts over the
next period.Details of The Compact, launched on January 31, 2006, at http://
www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&
c=Page&cid=1134650705195 (Accessed February 1, 2006).
49
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0906a.htm (Accessed
October 10, 2006).
50
Riga Summit of NATO was held on November 28–29, 2006. the information re-
garding the summit is available at http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2006/0611-
riga/index.htm (Accessed February 2, 2007).
51
The major Western European states – Germany, France, Spain and Italy – agreed to
send in emergency forces for the rescue of others whenever required. This has left
the operations to be carried out by British, American, Canadian, Danish, Estonian
and Dutch troops.

Prasad P. Rane was an Associate Fellow at IDSA from October 2003

to February 2007.