MindBody Dualism the Hau-Hau movement among the Maoris which played a role in the Maori Wars; the

Maji Maji Rebellion in East Africa; the afore-mentioned Kitawala movement in Central Africa in provoking the Chilembwe uprising; and the collective resistance movement among erstwhile mutually hostile North American tribes under Tenskwatawa, the Shawnee prophet. Millennialism has often served as an unwitting agency in raising the consciousness of tribal or ethnic identity, or of the need to transcend it in a wider cause. This appears to have occurred among Rastafarians in the West Indies, and more eectively among the Mahdists of the Sudan in the formation of a new state. Prospects of salvation as a chosen people in a new millennium caused Paul to declare that Christians were neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor free, but a new people with a new collective identity. See also: Cargo Cults; Charisma and Charismatic; Christianity Origins: Primitive and Western History; Fundamentalism (New Christian Right); Judaism; Mission: Proselytization and Conversion; Prophetism; Religion: Nationalism and Identity; Secular Religions
Worsley P 1957 The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of Cargo Cults in Melanesia. McGibbon & Kee, London

B. R. Wilson

MindBody Dualism
1. Introduction
According to one version of the dualist account, a person is a union of two radically dierent types of entity, one a material body and the other an immaterial mind. Some, like Descartes (1641), have held that mental phenomena are attributes of a mental substance. While our bodies are all fashioned out of the same stu, each individual mind is a unique thinking thing, an ego identied with the soul. Others, like Locke (1690) and Hume (1739), have held that mental phenomena are immaterial entities, that, taken together, constitute the mind. The mind is a bundle of perceptions and feelings. Since we are aware not only of the messages of the senses but also of at least some of our feelings, desires, and ideas, each person must not only be a center of consciousness but also of selfconsciousness. There is another version of dualism based on a distinction between the kinds of predicates that can be used to describe the material and the mental aspects of human beings. There is only one kind of substance but it has two very distinct kinds of properties. Mind\body dualism, in either form, has raised two major philosophical questions: (a) How is it possible for immaterial mind and material body to interact, as it seems they obviously do, be they substances or properties? (b) Where does the core of personal identity lie, in the material body or the immaterial mind, in the material or the mental aspects of a person? The monistic accounts oered by materialists and idealists purport to be solutions to some of the problems inherent in either version of the dualist account.

Bibliography
Benz E (ed.) 1965 Messianische Kirchen, Sekten und Bewegungen im heutigen Afrika. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands Cohn N 1961 The Pursuit of the Millennium, 2nd edn. Harper, New York Festinger L, Riecken H W, Schachter S 1956 When Prophecy Fails. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN Flegg C G 1992 Gathered Under Apostles: A Study of the Catholic Apostolic Church. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK Gager J G 1975 Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Clis, NJ Harrison J F C 1979 The Second Coming: Popular Millenarianism 17801850. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ Holt P M 1958 The Mahdist State in the Sudan 18811898. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK Muhlmann W E 1961 Chiliasmus und Nati ismus: Studien zur $ Psychologie, Soziologie und historischen Kasuistik der Umsturzbewegungen. Reimer, Berlin OLeary S D 1994 Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric. Oxford University Press, New York Pearson M 1990 Millennial Dreams and Moral Dilemmas: Se enth-day Ad entists and Contemporary Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Penton M J 1985 Apocalypse Delayed: The Story of Jeho ahs Witnesses. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, ON Sandeen E R 1970 The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American Millenarianism, 18001930. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Sharot S 1982 Messianism, Mysticism, and Magic: A Sociological Analysis of Jewish Religious Mo ements. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NJ Wilson B R 1973 Magic and the Millennium: A Sociological Study of Religious Mo ements of Protest among Tribal and Third-World Peoples. Heinemann, London

2. The Ontological Version of Mind\Body Dualism

The origin of the thesis that mind and body are dierent substances is usually credited to Descartes. He came to this view in the course of reecting on whether there was any belief that could not be doubted. The program of analysis that led him to his ontological version of mind\body dualism is set out in his Sixth Meditation.
To begin with, I will go back over all the things which I previously took to be perceived by the senses, and reckoned to

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MindBody Dualism
be true; and I will go over my reasons for thinking this. Next, I will set out my reasons for subsequently calling these things into doubt. And nally I will consider what I should now believe about them (Descartes 1641 p. 51).

He convinced himself that his mental states were better known to him than his material surroundings, including his own body, so the indubitable truth must be mental. The rst step in recovering knowledge of himself and the world must be to nd an undubitable premise or premises from which the main characteristics of the world and of myself as a center of consciousness, that is as a thinking thing, can be deduced. Descartes method in philosophy and in the sciences was based on his faith in the power of logic to ensure that, step by step, the mind passes from truths to truths. there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another (Descartes 1644 p. 16). But what could serve as a premise for the deduction of secure knowledge about myself and from that to secure knowledge about the natural world? It must be both thinkable and indubitable. Borrowing from earlier sources Descartes gives us the most famous philosophical argument in history, cogito ergo sum. It is supposed to undermine the possibility of universal doubt. If someone is doubting that he or she is thinking, then, since doubting is a species of thinking, that person is thinking. So the existence of thinking is indubitable. However, Descartes draws a much stronger conclusion. His argument, so often quoted and parodied, is supposed to prove that a thinking thing exists, namely a mind, soul, or ego, that is truly Descartes (Descartes 1641 p. 19). The argument begins with I am thinking therefore I exist (Descartes 1644 p. 194). Though meant to highlight the indubitability of the existence of the thinker as thinking thing, it led straight to the thesis that the mind and the body of a person are two radically dierent substances. The attributes of a thinking substance, a mind, are immaterial. It is indivisible and, being indivisible, must be immortal. A mind has no properties in common with a material, divisible, spatially, and temporally locatable body. But the body supplies the mind with sensations that are not at the whim of the person, while the mind makes the body move in ways that the person intends. So mind and body must interact. How could such interactions occur when Descartes analysis leaves each with properties that could have no causal relations with one another? The person or self, being an entity, can be the target of acts of reference, just as material entities like Mt. Blanc are denoted by proper names. While the name Descartes refers to the whole ensemble, body and mind, the pronoun I seems to refer to the ego, the really real Descartes, the im9886

material entity that is the mind. It also serves as the source of personal identity. There is one obvious objection to the move from the indubitability of the existence of acts of thinking to the conclusion that there must be immaterial thinking things. At most we know thinkings must exist, not that there must a substance, an entity that is doing the thinking. The circularity of the argument is clearer in French than in Latin.
Je pense donc Je suis.

Far from this argument proving the existence of a Cartesian ego, since je, appears in the conclusion of the argument, and in the premise, the argument is circular. The only valid argument that the doubting paradox supports is this:
Doubting exists therefore Thinking exists.

One might well reject the idea that personal identity is rooted in an immaterial entity while still holding that thinking, feeling, and willing are immaterial processes. The mind\body problem appears on the one hand as the problem of how two quite dierent kinds of entities could interact, and on the other as the problem of assigning priority between bodily continuity and individuality as the basis of personal identity, or on continuity of mind, as given in consciousness through the power of memory.

3. The Discursi e Version of Mind\Body Dualism

An alternative way of making sense of the radical dierences that seem to mark o mental states of persons from material states of their bodies has been to propose that there are two irreducible sets of predicates, one used for describing the body and its states and the other for describing the mental life of conscious beings. Some body predicates can be used to describe any material thing, while others can be used only of other organisms. Mental predicates, for the most part, can be used only of human beings, though some can also be used of animals, such as alert of a dog. But there is just one entity to which these descriptions are to be applied. For some philosophers this entity is the human body as organism (Searle 1992). For others it is the person, the basic particular of human life (Strawson 1956). We recollect that when Descartes realized that the mental and material properties of human beings were very dierent he was tempted into thinking that, therefore, a person must be constituted of two dierent substances each with its proper set of attributes. By an

MindBody Dualism ingenious analysis of the material conditions that are involved in the basic criteria of personal identity, Strawson was able to show that the concept of a person is logically prior to having a body and having a mind. The Cartesian distinctions among predicates do not lead inexorably to the theory of two substances, the material body and the immaterial mind, the alleged thinking thing. The basic particulars of the human world are persons. A person must be embodied in order for it to be possible for that person to be reidentied as one and the same person who one had met before. This involves M or material predicates. But a person is also the subject of ascriptions of P or person predicates, which involve consciousness. According to Strawson a person can ascribe consciousness to him or herself only if that person can ascribe such states to others. There must be logically adequate criteria for ascriptions of P predicates. So we are left with two sets of predicates for describing people, both of which are necessary and neither of which is sucient to encompass the whole of human life. In Searles version of this approach, the dualism is founded on the intentionality of mental states, a feature not shared by material states of the organism. Intentionality is the property that a signicant sign has of pointing beyond itself, of meaning something, whether or not there is anything in the world to which it corresponds. Mental states are just those states of the organism that do point beyond themselves. But thought is not anything other than an aspect of the biology of human organisms, just as is digestion. This view is far from new. Cabanis remarked that thought is a secretion of the brain, just as bile is of the liver. is only one kind of property that human beings possess. It follows that there would be only one kind of predicate which could be ascribed to a human being.

5.1 How Materialists get Rid of the Mind Traditionally materialists have tried to solve the interactional aspect of the mind\body problem by eliminating the mental side of the incommensurable pair. If it could be shown that the phenomenon that people had taken to be mental and so radically dierent from the material attributes of a human being were really material after all, then there would be no ontological problem about the possibility of a causal relation between the states of the sensory systems and sensations and perceptions. One material state can cause another. If it could be shown that all mental concepts could be replaced by material concepts, without loss of content, the mind\body problem would evaporate in a more fundamental way. The logical subject to which the reformed vocabulary would be predicated would be denoted by an expression for a material thing, the body. How could one show that a vocabulary was so radically defective that it ought to be replaced by a dierent set of words? In the 1950s several philosophers of science, notably Hanson (1958), who coined the phrase the theory-ladeness of observations, reviving a thesis popular at the beginning of the nineteenth century, pointed out that there is no sharp division between words used in theories and words used to describe phenomena, since the latter incorporate theoretical concepts. For example when the word heat is used in the description of a caloric phenomenon, people literate in science understand it as having a complex meaning, partly phenomenological, partly in terms of the kinetic theory, of molecules in motion. In an attempt to discredit the psychological vocabulary of one vernacular, namely, English, Churchland (1984) argued that it must be faulty since it was theory-laden with folk psychology, a theory based on mistaken ideas about the nature of beliefs and memories, which are taken to be mental entities. There are no such mental entities, argued Churchland. Folk psychology is false psychological theory. In favor of what terminology should we eliminate the lexicon of everyday life? There is a developing and true theory of cognition, he argued, which is based on a materialist ontology, that of neurophysiology. Thus we should eliminate expressions like pain in favor of ring in the c-bers and the sound of the ute by an expression for the Fourier analysis of the waveform of the propagated sound wave. There is no mind\body problem, because there is no scientically acceptable vocabulary for referring to and describing the mind side of the problematic pair of terms. This is not, be it 9887

4. Super enience
A third suggestion (Kim 1998) is based on the idea that there could be no thought without a material system, such as a brain and nervous system, while there are many material systems that are not conscious or cognitively active. It has been said that the mental supervenes on the material without being reducible to it. This proposal does not seem to touch the deep question of how the states of the material system and the mental states that supervene upon it are related.

5. Criticisms
Ontological dualism has been under attack from its beginnings in the seventeenth century. There have been two lines of criticism, materialist and idealist. If either of these monisms could be defended it would put paid to the discursive dualism based on two radically distinct sets of predicates. Both criticisms are based on arguments designed to show that there really

MindBody Dualism noted, a proposal to translate the mental vocabulary, term by term, into a physiological vocabulary, but to replace one vocabulary by another, across the board. 5.2 How Idealists Get Rid of Matter If the assumption of the existence of matter, as the real substrate of the world, is a mistake, then what is left, the mental realm, must be all that there is. There is, therefore, no interaction problem to be solved. This was the route taken by Berkeley (1729). In order to follow his arguments we need to look at a double distinction made famous by Locke (1690), but one which was by no means exclusive to him. Berkeley argued that the distinction between material and mental qualities is bogus. So there is no need for the hypothesis of the existence of matter to be the substance which carries the primary or material properties. According to Locke (1690), ideas are what a person is conscious of, and qualities are the attributes of material things that cause these ideas in a conscious subject. Perception is the having of ideas of qualities. The ideas of primary qualities, such as the bulk, gure, motion, and texture of material things, resemble the material qualities which cause the ideas, while the ideas of secondary qualities, such as experiences of color, taste, and warmth, do not resemble their causes. Though we cannot say just what the secondary qualities of color and so on are in material things, we can say that there must be powers in material things to produce the ideas of them. What grounds these powers? Natural science oers hypotheses about the corpuscular structures on which these powers depend. Newtonian science elegantly lls out these hypotheses with primary qualities, the bulk, gure, motion, and texture of the insensible parts. So felt warmth is the eect on a person of the motion of molecules in the stu that is felt to be warm. It is only too clear that this account is both close to the way physical science seems to work, and highly contentious. How could the movement of molecules cause a feeling that has nothing of motion in it? The mind\body problem surfaces in even more intractable form in Lockes famous theory of perception. Berkeleys idealism springs straight from his criticism of the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities. According to Berkeley (1729) the distinction must be rejected, and with it the distinction between qualities and ideas. If these linked dichotomies are abandoned, then the hypothesis of a material substrate to underpin experience is gratuitous. Furthermore, since the properties of this alleged matter are clearly passive, and have nothing of power and activity in them, by dropping the whole scheme the problem of how matter could act on mind disappears. As Berkeley remarks, only spirits are active and the most active of all is God. There is no mind\body problem because there is no body in the sense of a material substance, unobserv9888 able but foundational to the existence of each human being, a something that lies behind the qualities that we perceive. To be is to be able to be perceived. To perceive some thing is to have an idea of it. Only that which is perceived or perceivable exists, so the world is a world of ideas. And this, Berkeley insists, is the ordinary world we all know well. In a way we should perhaps say that the ordinary world is neither mental nor material, since Berkeleys argument attacks the roots of this distinction. There is just the world as we perceive it.

6. Expression and Description

Recently the discursive account has taken a deeper and more subtle turn, in Wittgensteins querying of the assumption that mental predicates are used to describe states of mind known only to the person who enjoys them. By looking very carefully at the sorts of occasions we use the mental predicates, Wittgenstein (1953) saw that it would be more correct to say that a statement like I have an itch expressed ones feeling rather than described it. The point is this: when we describe something the description and what is described are independent of one another in the sense that the description could be wrong. But an expression is related to the feeling expressed internally, that is to have an itch is not only to have a certain feeling, but to be disposed to do such characteristic things as scratching and saying I itch! Only if the material and immaterial predicates were used in descriptions could the relation between the states they severally described be causal. The feeling and the tendency to express it are both necessary components of what is to have an itch, be in pain, and so on. So in using the rst person I do not refer to something within the person, the self. Rather in using rst person pronouns, for instance, I express my identity. To be able to use such pronouns is an integral aspect of what it is to have a sense of personal identity. See also: Biologys Inuence on Sociology: Human Sociobiology; Body, History of; Brain, Evolution of; Consciousness and Sensation: Philosophical Aspects; Consciousness, Cognitive Psychology of; Discourse and Identity; Hume, David (171176); Identity and Identication: Philosophical Aspects; Identity in Anthropology; Locke, John (16321704); Methodological Individualism in Sociology; Methodological Individualism: Philosophical Aspects; Personal Identity: Philosophical Aspects; Topographic Maps in the Brain; Wittgenstein, Ludwig (18891951)

Bibliography
Berkeley G 1729 [1985] Principles of Human Knowledge. Fontana, London

Minimum Winning Coalition, in Politics

Churchland P M 1984 Matter and Consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Descartes R 1641\1985 Meditations on rst philosophy. In: Cottingham J, Stootho R, Murdoch D (eds.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, Vol. II Descartes R 1644 Principles of philosophy. In: Cottingham J, Stootho R, Murdoch D (eds.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, Vol. I Hanson N R 1958 Patterns of Disco ery. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Hume D 1739 [1965] A Treatise of Human Nature. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK Kim J 1998 Mind in the Physical World. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Locke J 1690 [1974] An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. J. M. Dent, London Searle J R 1992 The Redisco ery of the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Strawson P F 1956 Indi iduals. Methuen, London Wittgenstein L 1953 Philosophical In estigations (trans. Anscombe G E M). Macmillan, New York

maximum number of votes, politicians must pay a cost by sacricing some personal interests or granting private side-payments to prospective supporters in an eort to avoid alienating potential voters. Riker argued that rational politicians, motivated primarily by a desire to control resources, seek to attract just enough votes to win and no more, subject to variation above minimal winning size only because of uncertainty about the preferences of voters or their loyalty. By forming minimal winning coalitions, politicians make as few concessions as possible while still controlling sucient support to maintain governmental authority and pass legislation. Larger than minimal winning coalitions reduce the vulnerability of leaders to defections by individual legislators or small, highly issue-focused parties, but at a price.

2. Policy Preferences and Coalition Formation

In neither Downss nor Rikers theories are decision makers motivated primarily by policy preferences. Subsequent developments in the coalitions literature rene and challenge elements in the RikerDowns debate, in part by introducing policy preference as another factor, besides victory or resource maximization, that motivates coalition formation. Axelrod (1970) and De Swaan (1973) argue that policy preferences restrict electoral coalitions to political parties with similar policy agendas. Both maintain that ideologically diverse minimal winning coalitions are less likely to form or survive than are ideologically compact coalitions. Axelrod calls such coalitions minimal-connected coalitions and contends that these arrangements are privileged when prospective coalition partners negotiate with one another. The contention that ideological anities play a part in selecting minimal winning coalitions is generally supported by the experiences of political parties in, for example, Israel, but is contradicted by the experiences with coalition formation in India.

R. Harre! Copyright # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Minimum Winning Coalition, in Politics

1. Introduction
Minimal winning coalitions are alignments of parties or politicians just large enough to defeat rivals and no larger. In such coalitions, defection by a single member is sucient to render the coalition no longer large enough to win. Riker (1962) introduced the idea of minimal winning coalitions in the study of electoral and legislative politics as an alternative to the view expressed in Downs (1957). Downs argued that politicians are primarily oce seekers rather than policy makers or allocators of resources. As such, they maximize electoral support and, therefore, forge coalitions as large as possible. Rikers decision makers make authoritative allocation decisions and so seek to minimize the number of claimants on the distribution of resources. A vast literature on coalition formation and government stability has grown out of the debate between Riker and Downs. The Downsian model indicates that on unidimensional issues and in winner-take-all elections, politicians adopt (usually centrist) policy positions in order to maximize their vote share. Downss politicians care only about winning oce. They do not concern themselves with the policy or private goods concessions they must make to others in order to win. Riker, in contrast, argued that maximizing votes is costly. Voters are attracted to a candidate by promises about personal benets. Candidates have preferences of their own about the distribution of scarce resources in the form of private goods to their backers and leftover resources for their own use. To attract the

3. Issue Trading and Multidimensional Issues

The idea that parties or politicians are election oriented, resource oriented, and policy oriented has been developed further. Several scholars extend these ideas by examining coalition formation in multidimensional spaces, that is, in circumstances when policy preferences cannot be portrayed on a single line, but rather reect greater complexity or linkages across issues. Stokman and Van den Bos (1992) constructed an exchange model that identies likely vote-trading partners and the trades that can bring them into coalitional alignment. This model and variations on it have been subjected to extensive empirical testing, with impressive results. Others, notably Laver and Schoeld (1990) and Laver and Shepsle (1996) have used game theory and spatial models to investigate the theoretical and empirical 9889

International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences

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