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,

I
I

. XXI BOMBER COMMAND
A PO 23 ...
00/ C. SJrviJt8
MISSION 26
TACTICAL MISSION RE
and Built-up Urban Area.
KOBE.JAPAN .. FEB.IH5


FORm>RQ
This initia.l Tactical 1418510n Rsport
of the XXI B"omber Command, the first
published for general distrIbution.
is the report of the first aajor
strike employing two Bolllbardll8nt l n ~ l .
Prior strikes had either beoD .taaiona
01' e. nature for wbich DO torlllll report
wus necessary or efforts by e. 810&1.
Bombnrdment 1r1Dl;1 whoae reports re_
oel ved 11m! ted distrIbution.
'r!lllE!' Dr
A-llIO"'_
E __ a

XXI BO).!BEll. Cww.NO
APO 234.
TACTICAL LlISSION REPORT
Field Orders No . 22
1oI 1ss10n !To, 26
Target; port and bull t - up urba.n tU'ea. ,
KOBE. J;"pAN
4. Februo.ry 194. 5
Tab l e of Content e
Ta.ctical Nor rat1vl) Report
Annex A-- Ope rati ons Repor t8
Part 1-- Navigation
Part 11- Bombardier
Part III _-F light Engineering
Port IV- Radal'
Part V-- Gunnery
Part Vl- Air-Sea Rescue
Annex B- ... Po.rt I __ Wea.ther
Annex C-- Communications Reports
Port 1-- Radnr Counter Uea. 8ur es
Port 11-- Communica.tion's Ot:t: i eor 's Report
Annex 0-- Intelligenoe Report.
Part 1-- Enemy Air Oppoli ti on
Part II--Enemy Antla.1roratt
Part III-Boabins' Re.ult. l ..aat
Annex & __ Consolidated Statl.tloal Su..ary
Annex F_ ... rieU Ord ...
111'%
HEADC/;UART$.S
XXI BOlolBJillt COWAND
;.;po 234
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 11 , " II I I
II SECRET II
: ,By o.ut h. or t he C . 01 I
;, XXI Bomber COmmo.n411
I I U II
I I Do. tII Initill18 I j
I I ; I : ; I I :t II I I ; ; I : 1111 I
SUBJECT I Report of Operlltion8. 4 Pebr unry 1945.
TO Commanding Qener D. l, Twenthth Air Porce, 'ffuhingt on 25.
D. C.
1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:
a.. Field Order Number 22. HeadquClr t ers XXI Bomber Com-
mand. dated 31 J!lIluary 1945, directed the 73rd and 313th Bombard-
ment Wings to po.rticipah in the fi r et coord ino.tod D.tta.cic by two
wings of' thio command on 0. to.rget in Honshu.
b. Io.re;ets Spectried;
(lY Primar y Target: Port IU'l.d built-up urbc.n areer
of the city of Kobe: Objoctive f oldor 90. 25 Vap V-9.
( 2" Secondary Tar get: None
(3) Last Resort Target : Any industrial city.
2. STRAT8QY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS :
a. Reasons for Se l ection of Teu-got;
(lJ The weather for ecast pr e sented to the CamQAnd-
ing General on 3 February prognosticated three to four - tentha cloud
coveroge in the Kobe area, with favorable oonditions en r oute and at
bases f or tlllc:e .. off o.nd lo.nding. COnlequently. deoision .... s made to
attack Kobe on 4 February. This command bad been continually strik-
ing the Tokyo and areas and the hAd pos.1bl y conCen-
trated defenses in these two areaS. An attack on Kobe, in addition
to damaging the urban Qrens. would possibly f or ce the to
spre.,d his def enses_ ... o.1rcraft and ont1o.ircro.ft- -wenkenint hil po-
sition in the Tokyo and Nagoya creaa.
b. Importanoe or Targetl
(1)' Kobe. sixth lartest Oity in Japan with.
population of 1.000,000. 1. Japan's prinoipal port.
It. shipyard. represent Japan's lartest ooncentrati on of ship.build-
ins and marine engine At lobe. the Snnyo &Gin r a il lin.
trom the western Up of Honshu join. with the ToIr:Qido .lll.un Una ,..t
to Oso.ka nnd TOkyo. key industrial plant l1oh u .toel. nU..,
equipment. ma.chinery. rubber and ordnanC are olo ly intecra te4
with lob.'s trwnsportation aotiYitles. A natiOnAl oa17
notably good r oad In and out at lobe. al.o rUD. oon-
pstad .ootion. ot the Oity. The area lected for atta.ok .... the
h15hly cOllie. ted core ot the oity. ba.YiDC !l popula.t1oD 01
0.. 100.000 per 'CUlare aU.,
-, -
JIIII11
"
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(H Bombing P lo. ns I
(0.) Petermlnp,tlon of Bomb Lond,
(1) Be CII.USEI of the high dElUGe of 1n_
fl nnrno.bll1ty of the Kobo urbo.n nrao. . nn i ncendiary ntto.ck c on-
sidored most effeot ive. Tha S- 26 . 500 pound lncendlo.ry cluster
( actual weight. 350 I bIS." wee selected beall-Ule it is the best o.va.ll -
ab l e l ncendl nry we npon. The T4 4, 500 pound fra.gplI!Into.t l on cluster
(o.c tulU weight. 4.20 Ib e . ) W,lliS used III o.n anti - per . c nnel wea.pon to
hinder potenti a. l fire thul lnCreo.elng the errectlvene ee
of the lnCendio.ry ntto.Ck .
(2) Ineendlnriea we re fused t o open
a.t 5000 feet beco.use the best p a.tterns are obta.1ned frOD tha..t 1Il. -
titude. Fro.gmento.t1on olusters wer e fused t o open 1000 teet below
tho a ircraft f or the SMla r Bnsons .
(3) I nter vo.lomoter settings of 500
f eet (or maximum poss i ble under pr edicted winds) were uled t o give
pr oper spr eo.d t o i ndividuo. l incend1c. r y bOClbs in eo.ch target lU'eo. .
Pr oper densi ty of bombs wo.s obto. ined thr ough nUClber or e.1rcrott bcc.b-
I ng I n oc.ch f or mc.t l on.
(4) A mixed lond insured even dis-
tributi on of fro.gmentntion clusters and i ncandiories on the tcrget .
The olusters wer G l oo.ded to drop lwst tbe ac-
tunl r o.nge for the fro.gmento.tl on bombs wo.s l ess thru1 tho.t f or in-
cendiary b ombs and it WaS tho.t the frngoento.ti on bomb
pnttern coincide with the i ncendiary bomb po.ttorn.
NOTE : The e ntir e missi on Wo.8 pl c.nned in o.ccorda.nce with
the AhF Board Repcrt 'lncendio.r y Atteck cn
1 Sept. 1944. Only devictioQl in
wore) those necessito.ted by oper o.ti onnl llClito.tion.e: Md
o..vo..1lo.bllIty of o.ircrs.f't.
(b ) Bombo.rdler's Planni ngJ
(1) Tako.tuski was orIgi nally .elected
o.s an in1tic.l point, beat III ohrLnge In f or ecas t wind direotioD t r om. 0Jl
of 260 degroos t o 292 degr ees ns cessito.ted a change t o Ott"
In or der t o out down e xcessi ve drift on the bomb run. The upwind
appr oach WCB used beoause the l ower ground speed, o.s oontralted _itb
Cl. downwind run, all owed the bombardier more time in the 1auDed1o. te
target vicInity f or Qcol1ra.te aynohr onila.t1on.
(2)' Since t he obj ecU..,. .... CLD a.rea
mensured in miles, vulnera.ble orena by 6.000 teet wore aelec-
tad. The designo.ted approaoh, o.xh of a.tto.ck ot 318 dap-eea, W'tI.I
used eo tha.t the t or h tioD wol.lld be on the 10agtltudlDlLl lUis ot tbt
selected area.s. Four aiming points, c l ear ly dl1Oarnlb1e t o tho
bomb:lJ'd i erl on the 316 degree a.xta Of attll.Ok, nre del1sna'tOd so ..
to cover four vulne ra.bh lnd1clo.t.d Oft oUt Bcaber
Litho-Mosaio No. gO.25 a. 058111, 071123, oe21Sa and 111111.
(:5) The strength ot tbe .. tho OD \:M
neoeBaary o.xls of o.tto.ok _u not beUeved to be ,rent .noup to Il100_
deetruotion of inoendiary 10no I Crerar to .ppen4ed
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Dl&p of ltobll). Consideration of pedJcted high 1I'in411 and inter-
va.10J11l1ter set tin, indiofitedl"tlie lfomb p .. ttern of .. squadron w0l114
oover an CLre .. a.pproximatll1y 1700 by 3500 feet. Consequently. to ob-
mnximum destruction, tbs effort against each point WIle
distributed IlS follows: 058115. 3 squadrons; 071123. 2 equadrone;
092132. 2 squlldrons , and 119128. 3 IIquadrons. Thie placed the ef-
forte of 5 equa.drons r easonably concentrated in the la.r,e Dre .. west
or tbe main railroad lltation and five l ess concentrated in
the long na.rrow arell to the weet.
Bnse
1700N _ 14000
2900N _ 13545E
3328N _ 1354SE
3431N ... 13523
(IP)
TlU'get
(.) Navlglltion Plllnning!
Reasona for Choice
Wing departur e poi nt,
A westarly course at low altitude to utlliu
most favorable in climb end pr event 1I1ow
ground sp eed r eBul ting from exce8llive Mad winds .
Center of poninllulo., o.llowing leewo.y for na. ... i-
go..tlon error on either aide of course,
o..II11y identified ro..dnr Ilnd vilual check point
on the Const,
A southea4terly to baae to utilil. tall
wind ..
2300N - 14500E A southerly r oute close to the northern
tli4lit Cheek pOirlft is 1I'ell lUI a. toOl. uhr_
enco point for ditchod aircraft.
(3) Flight Engineer's Plo..nningj
(aY Flight plan, speeds and altitudes were
used as outlined in XXI Bomber Command Regulation Ho, 55-3 to
ma.ximum fuel econo!lly.
(b) Fuel reqUirements were calculated far IIA
o.vernge o.ircrnft flying the worst position in the tormation with
wind conditions. Tho fuel elltimate indi-
cated the best snte minimum bocb load was 6,000 pounds. However. this
WD.S reduced to 5,000 pounds for the 3l3th since this
was their first lorge-scale oporation an extra tuel load ...
deemed desirahlo in Case of errors which would planned tly-
ing t1.me.
(4) Badar Plp.Mlpgl lAndf.ll on tho sou.thern oout-
line ot Honahu at lashimoto and na.isati on north to tho OODAtiloo
initial point or Otsu proyidod exoellent radar ohock pOints. ThO
initial. point would be cleo.rly Yis1ble on the soope a.nd the upias
run of 318
0
Could be acoomplisbod with little or no drift. The tor-
get itself would show u.p .s Q. long no.rrcw return, with Q. detillite
brIght return shOWing juat southwest ot the center at lob.. Ua. at
(r definite wa.ter .. la.nd, radar made tor 00.8y identitlOa.tJ. oJl at'
aiming pOint, wbother tor Yisua.l or radar bombins.
- . -
( 5) B4or Counter Measur os, A 4l.orsionnry Qtt aok
WOos not 4e&.cl ed necessClry because of the diver s i onar y u pecte of the
sel ected r cut e t o Counter measures ago.inst enemy r adClr con
troll ed anti ai rcraft wer e not ccnsider ed si nce i nt ens e o.Ccurate
f ire f r om such contr olled weQPons was not expocted.
( 0. ) Tho Navy was fu.rniahed with t he det c. lh of
the mi ss i on and requ. oat ed t o fu. r nish avail abl e f acil lties f or au-
SOa r escue purpose,. The f oll owi ng f acl1l ti es wor e aval labl e.
(See Annex A. Put VI , f or Air - Sea Ro. cu.e map) .
(1 ) Two submarines wer e diverted fr om their
r out ine patr ol agnins t Japnnese Shi pping c.nd ware suti oned o. s
f ollows cl uring and aftor t he m1sston unti l r e lel\sed by Super -
Cumbos: 31
0
30' N - 136
0
4S' E ana 3000' N _ 13S015'E.
( 2) Ona patrol J! estroya r we.s directed t o
t he f ollowing posi ti ons on t he fol l owi ng time schedul e: N-
14130 ' E from 03234SZ t o 040100Z and t o proceed to 2200' N_l 44,o
30' E f r om 041030Z t o 04l 400Z.
(3) Two Oumbo o. i rp l o.nell were IlllSi g.ned to
t he f ollOWing s t at i ons f or o. ir-seo. r escue work dur i ng tbe mi ssion:
azoSO' N - 140
0
00' E from 040030Z t o 040230Z. and 22
0
QQ' R _ l 42
0
0C' E
f r om t o 04020CZ.
bo ats and cr ash boats we r e ass _
i gned t o the 1mmed i nt e vicini ty of So.ipc.n and Tinian t o co. rry out
AJr -den r escue wo r k during t he cri tica l ? er i ods of to.ke-off
l o.nding as f ollows: 0. picket bOll.t i n So.1pc.n cb:mnel Q2C30Z t o
00 2Z30Z c. nd 041100Z t o 041500Z t o guo.rd 6970 kcs ., o.n1 0. cr ll.5b
bOat off west end of Tinio.n nortb strip C41lCOZ to C4l500Z t o
guard 6970 kcs.
(b)" This commnnd as si gned 2 Super-I)J.mbc d r ...
planes to orbit s ubmo.rine position to
assist in spotting, recaiving distreS B Signals. drop eme r tency
equi pment. and direct tbe submarines i n eve nt r ellcue ...
lities were r equlrGd. The Super ... Cumbos i nstruoted t o
submo.rines to routine patrol duties when 0.11 pl o.nas bo.d pc.ued
Gn r out6 bo.ck t o bnse.
e. Deta ils of Plennlng--Intell i gence
(1) EnemY Fight er Reacti on: Kobe, whIcb f o.l1.
within tho region f or purpos es or enemy fighte r ana. -
lysis, has an estimnted 302 aircro.tt i n i t s area, and
70 per cent would be oparati onGl. 211 nireraft woul d be ava.ilabl e
f or tb3 enOl!ly's defense system. This r notor plus put expe rience
indioated enemy a ir oppositicQ would be no nor e than f or an
operati on in the aren o.nd . election of tc.rget, r out.,
o.ltltude . nnd til'll8 of bombing wu not ..rfeoted by eneay fihter
r enoti on
(2) pelN IOtl &irotnltl A hending of 310 to
330 degrees would bring the o.tto.OkiDf; &1rcr..rt into ro.ns. or the
Kobe-Qsaka. defenss . f or the leo.st aaount of time sino. the approaOk
waS over Oso.ka. Bay. Furtbermore, winds were .uob tha.t thi. bendiDC
could be used without experienoing exc. ssive drift
.
JJJiJlJl
EXECUTION:
to
Wing Cl.t O:l22S5Z,
(.1" TCl.ke . Off; The first or the 73rd Wing
tAke off 0322l 0Z the first or the 313th
Actual wns accomp lished ns folloW81
Airorutt First Lo.st

Airborne Aircnft Takeoff Aircraft Takeoff
73rd
7'
032C56Z 032l 37Z
3l3th

032129Z: 032155Z:
Totnl 110 032056Z 0321552
No
:lSSombl y ditficu.lt1es
-"
exp6rienced
by
either wing,
b, Route Out: The Wings ' form:l.tions
mo.do wi t hin 10 mil es of the brief&d poi nt on Honshu. with
the exception of tho 500th and 504th Bombo.r dment Groups . No.vigo.t-
i ono.l errorfailure t o estimat e correctly tllrn pos ition prior to
cl i mb o.nd compenso.te for i ncreo.sed vol oC ity of cross winds eXileI' .
ionced in the climb t o bombing o.ltitude--resultod in the 5COtb
Bombardment Group making l :lndfoll 50 miles etl.st of the br ief ed
cour se , Consequently. thi s group W08 UMble to r ea. ch Kobe because
of the strong heo.d winds on 0. due westerl y course. which cc.do for
oxcessive fuel consumption. and the formation t urned eo.stwo.rd to
bomb II. lll.s t resort t o.rget. The 504th Bombar dment Group
ovorcorrected t o the wast and was abollt 30 miles west of briefed
course at landfall.
dOwnwind heading. it
However,
wns ab l e
beoo.uss the gr ollp WO.S fl ying on 0.
t o bomb the assigned Objective.
c . kA&!ot: erriYod i n the
tar get areo. an avero.ge of 40 minutes l o.te of wind vel o.
oities tho.n f oreoas t. The o.ircrnft atto.cked the target
in seven formati ons. with S of 49 t o 10
aircraft per formation ... dropping on the loaders who bcmbed by
r adar o.nd 2 formati ons of 20 aircraft dropped on leaders beabed
visually. From 5/10 to 6/10 strato .. cumulus cl oud s ever al thin
layers of cirrus cl ouds between 23. CCC nnd 30, 000 feet wer e expel'.
ienced in the t ar get area. Atotnl of 69 8 .. 29's dropped 159.2 tons
of incendiary clusters 13.6 t cbs of rragmentct i on clusters on
Kobe from t o 27, OCO feet from 04ryS57Z t o 040656Z. (See
Annex E, Part I,Conaolido.ted Stntistical Summo.ry. for
Owmage assessmont r eport& state 2.651. 000 squar e f set wer e do.mo.ged
in the tnrget crea,
d. Secondsry tgrget: Nona assigned.
o. La8t Re80rt target: One formo.ti oD or 15
8 .. 29's of the SOOth Bombcrdment Group for the
rell.80nS givon above in paragraph 3b. Fourteen other B-29
I
bombed
other last r elort t:ll"gets. Atoto.1 of 69.' tons 1ncendi".r)' C1U8-
t era and 5.8 ton. fragment o. tion cluaters were 1ro?ped by 29 8-ZU'8.
(For detnils seo Annex E. Part I, Cons olidated SummAry).
f. To.rget. or Opportunity I
ear ly dro?ped 2.6 t ons incendiary clusters and
to.ti on cluster s on Pagan hland.
-. -
liJJIl
Ona B-2S returnins
0.2 tonI
g. Routo B;Ck: After bombing . f ormo.ti on.
broke up beyond e nemy f i ghte r r o. nge nnc r e turned 0.5 bri ef ed. uti
liting ato.ra o.nd pl nnots dur i ng the l o.5 t 3 hours of flight. The
northe r n ldc. rio.nlls were 11.180 utilized II. EI r o.d nr chec k O>0ints. Oll&
8 29 of the 73rd Bombo. r dmont Wing. ",hln it r a.n out of fuel 12 l:Iill.
from Sll. i pa. n a.ftor suf f er ing dll.MlI.ge in the Xcbe area. , wa. s f orald
to d ttch. Thl"n -ot ' hae bel n k il lo:! prio r to ditchill6. Tho r ema. in-
ing t en crew memblrs wor e p icked up b y o.ir/ sell. rescue .
h. Landing' Ai r cro.ft lo. nded o.t bd.es under
good weathe r conditi ons aEl f ollows :
73rd Wi ng
313th \'l1ng
Tot nl
Numblr At rcr aft First Lo.nd ing Lo.st tl.nding
71
..1L
109
041104.2
C41225Z

041:nn
One nircraft of the 73rd Bcmbar dment Wing hnd its number 1 engine
catch firo nnd the burned af t er lo.nding at Snipan. It
was classi fi ed 0.5 'Lost to survey. 1
i. Oper ntiona Summary:
(1 ) Navigo.tion : (See Annlx A, Par t I f or
de tails). Winds wer e 30 knots mor e ? r edi cte1 the
i on pr oblem wnS primar l ly one ot ?r oper drift cor r ection 1n t he
climb phase on the r oute out. The need for increo.sed t rAi ning and
disCiplino in the use of r adar equipment in the tnrget areo. 0.8 a
nnvigational aid was indiCated since groups t o fly directly
over the initi n. l point des?1te its easily c', isti nguishable bright
r e turn on the scope.
(2) Bombing: (See Annex A, Part II. for
de taile). The mnjori ty of bomb runlS and relenses were accompliShed
by r ado.r with short visual checks. Errors in bombing were attri -
butabl e to both per sonne l and eqUi pment mnltuncti olls . The cost
;reval ent personne l arror waS tho l nck of air The use
of r o.dio bomb r eleases would help t his situnti on.
functions of the A- 2 releo.s e system necessito.tod salvoing ot bombs.
(3) Flight Engineering: (See Annex J ...
Part III for details) . Becaus e of unexpected head winds, more time
waS taken to r each planned altitude nt the target. thus using an
o.veraga of a?proximo.tely 350 more of gascllne ? 8r o.irerart
than plnnned. 8- 29 A' s were employed f or the fi r s t time by this
commo.nd n.n1 due to the sm:\ller center wing secti C' n. these nirern.tt
operate on 200 gallons l ess fuel. On future missions, these nir-
planes were to be given more advnntngeous positions 1n the f or-
mations .
(4) Rnderl (See Annex Part IV tor
ANlA?Q-13 equipment Wn8 u8ed f or target &Tea wind
de t erminnti on tor visuftl r adnr boobing.
ment ot SCR 716 r adio altimeter SCR-695 IFF equipment wns normal .
Fixes taken using ANVAPN-4 A ma j ority were at a
r nnge between 6(.'0 t o 90e mil es .
details ),
using the
(5) GypntrYI (See Annex A. rmrtV f or
Gunners showed iapro .... nt 1n controlling th.ir burst..
interphone, and d.signnt1ng their tnrgete.
- e -


FORm>RQ
This initia.l Tactical 1418510n Rsport
of the XXI B"omber Command, the first
published for general distrIbution.
is the report of the first aajor
strike employing two Bolllbardll8nt l n ~ l .
Prior strikes had either beoD .taaiona
01' e. nature for wbich DO torlllll report
wus necessary or efforts by e. 810&1.
Bombnrdment 1r1Dl;1 whoae reports re_
oel ved 11m! ted distrIbution.
'r!lllE!' Dr
A-llIO"'_
E __ a

FORm>RQ
This initia.l Tactical 1418510n Rsport
of the XXI B"omber Command, the first
published for general distrIbution.
is the report of the first aajor
strike employing two Bolllbardll8nt l n ~ l .
Prior strikes had either beoD .taaiona
01' e. nature for wbich DO torlllll report
wus necessary or efforts by e. 810&1.
Bombnrdment 1r1Dl;1 whoae reports re_
oel ved 11m! ted distrIbution.
'r!lllE!' Dr
A-llIO"'_
E __ a

XXI BO).!BEll. Cww.NO
APO 234.
TACTICAL LlISSION REPORT
Field Orders No . 22
1oI 1ss10n !To, 26
Target; port and bull t - up urba.n tU'ea. ,
KOBE. J;"pAN
4. Februo.ry 194. 5
Tab l e of Content e
Ta.ctical Nor rat1vl) Report
Annex A-- Ope rati ons Repor t8
Part 1-- Navigation
Part 11- Bombardier
Part III _-F light Engineering
Port IV- Radal'
Part V-- Gunnery
Part Vl- Air-Sea Rescue
Annex B- ... Po.rt I __ Wea.ther
Annex C-- Communications Reports
Port 1-- Radnr Counter Uea. 8ur es
Port 11-- Communica.tion's Ot:t: i eor 's Report
Annex 0-- Intelligenoe Report.
Part 1-- Enemy Air Oppoli ti on
Part II--Enemy Antla.1roratt
Part III-Boabins' Re.ult. l ..aat
Annex & __ Consolidated Statl.tloal Su..ary
Annex F_ ... rieU Ord ...
111'%
HEADC/;UART$.S
XXI BOlolBJillt COWAND
;.;po 234
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 11 , " II I I
II SECRET II
: ,By o.ut h. or t he C . 01 I
;, XXI Bomber COmmo.n411
I I U II
I I Do. tII Initill18 I j
I I ; I : ; I I :t II I I ; ; I : 1111 I
SUBJECT I Report of Operlltion8. 4 Pebr unry 1945.
TO Commanding Qener D. l, Twenthth Air Porce, 'ffuhingt on 25.
D. C.
1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:
a.. Field Order Number 22. HeadquClr t ers XXI Bomber Com-
mand. dated 31 J!lIluary 1945, directed the 73rd and 313th Bombard-
ment Wings to po.rticipah in the fi r et coord ino.tod D.tta.cic by two
wings of' thio command on 0. to.rget in Honshu.
b. Io.re;ets Spectried;
(lY Primar y Target: Port IU'l.d built-up urbc.n areer
of the city of Kobe: Objoctive f oldor 90. 25 Vap V-9.
( 2" Secondary Tar get: None
(3) Last Resort Target : Any industrial city.
2. STRAT8QY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS :
a. Reasons for Se l ection of Teu-got;
(lJ The weather for ecast pr e sented to the CamQAnd-
ing General on 3 February prognosticated three to four - tentha cloud
coveroge in the Kobe area, with favorable oonditions en r oute and at
bases f or tlllc:e .. off o.nd lo.nding. COnlequently. deoision .... s made to
attack Kobe on 4 February. This command bad been continually strik-
ing the Tokyo and areas and the hAd pos.1bl y conCen-
trated defenses in these two areaS. An attack on Kobe, in addition
to damaging the urban Qrens. would possibly f or ce the to
spre.,d his def enses_ ... o.1rcraft and ont1o.ircro.ft- -wenkenint hil po-
sition in the Tokyo and Nagoya creaa.
b. Importanoe or Targetl
(1)' Kobe. sixth lartest Oity in Japan with.
population of 1.000,000. 1. Japan's prinoipal port.
It. shipyard. represent Japan's lartest ooncentrati on of ship.build-
ins and marine engine At lobe. the Snnyo &Gin r a il lin.
trom the western Up of Honshu join. with the ToIr:Qido .lll.un Una ,..t
to Oso.ka nnd TOkyo. key industrial plant l1oh u .toel. nU..,
equipment. ma.chinery. rubber and ordnanC are olo ly intecra te4
with lob.'s trwnsportation aotiYitles. A natiOnAl oa17
notably good r oad In and out at lobe. al.o rUD. oon-
pstad .ootion. ot the Oity. The area lected for atta.ok .... the
h15hly cOllie. ted core ot the oity. ba.YiDC !l popula.t1oD 01
0.. 100.000 per 'CUlare aU.,
-, -
JIIII11
"
,

o

o
(H Bombing P lo. ns I
(0.) Petermlnp,tlon of Bomb Lond,
(1) Be CII.USEI of the high dElUGe of 1n_
fl nnrno.bll1ty of the Kobo urbo.n nrao. . nn i ncendiary ntto.ck c on-
sidored most effeot ive. Tha S- 26 . 500 pound lncendlo.ry cluster
( actual weight. 350 I bIS." wee selected beall-Ule it is the best o.va.ll -
ab l e l ncendl nry we npon. The T4 4, 500 pound fra.gplI!Into.t l on cluster
(o.c tulU weight. 4.20 Ib e . ) W,lliS used III o.n anti - per . c nnel wea.pon to
hinder potenti a. l fire thul lnCreo.elng the errectlvene ee
of the lnCendio.ry ntto.Ck .
(2) Ineendlnriea we re fused t o open
a.t 5000 feet beco.use the best p a.tterns are obta.1ned frOD tha..t 1Il. -
titude. Fro.gmento.t1on olusters wer e fused t o open 1000 teet below
tho a ircraft f or the SMla r Bnsons .
(3) I nter vo.lomoter settings of 500
f eet (or maximum poss i ble under pr edicted winds) were uled t o give
pr oper spr eo.d t o i ndividuo. l incend1c. r y bOClbs in eo.ch target lU'eo. .
Pr oper densi ty of bombs wo.s obto. ined thr ough nUClber or e.1rcrott bcc.b-
I ng I n oc.ch f or mc.t l on.
(4) A mixed lond insured even dis-
tributi on of fro.gmentntion clusters and i ncandiories on the tcrget .
The olusters wer G l oo.ded to drop lwst tbe ac-
tunl r o.nge for the fro.gmento.tl on bombs wo.s l ess thru1 tho.t f or in-
cendiary b ombs and it WaS tho.t the frngoento.ti on bomb
pnttern coincide with the i ncendiary bomb po.ttorn.
NOTE : The e ntir e missi on Wo.8 pl c.nned in o.ccorda.nce with
the AhF Board Repcrt 'lncendio.r y Atteck cn
1 Sept. 1944. Only devictioQl in
wore) those necessito.ted by oper o.ti onnl llClito.tion.e: Md
o..vo..1lo.bllIty of o.ircrs.f't.
(b ) Bombo.rdler's Planni ngJ
(1) Tako.tuski was orIgi nally .elected
o.s an in1tic.l point, beat III ohrLnge In f or ecas t wind direotioD t r om. 0Jl
of 260 degroos t o 292 degr ees ns cessito.ted a change t o Ott"
In or der t o out down e xcessi ve drift on the bomb run. The upwind
appr oach WCB used beoause the l ower ground speed, o.s oontralted _itb
Cl. downwind run, all owed the bombardier more time in the 1auDed1o. te
target vicInity f or Qcol1ra.te aynohr onila.t1on.
(2)' Since t he obj ecU..,. .... CLD a.rea
mensured in miles, vulnera.ble orena by 6.000 teet wore aelec-
tad. The designo.ted approaoh, o.xh of a.tto.ck ot 318 dap-eea, W'tI.I
used eo tha.t the t or h tioD wol.lld be on the 10agtltudlDlLl lUis ot tbt
selected area.s. Four aiming points, c l ear ly dl1Oarnlb1e t o tho
bomb:lJ'd i erl on the 316 degree a.xta Of attll.Ok, nre del1sna'tOd so ..
to cover four vulne ra.bh lnd1clo.t.d Oft oUt Bcaber
Litho-Mosaio No. gO.25 a. 058111, 071123, oe21Sa and 111111.
(:5) The strength ot tbe .. tho OD \:M
neoeBaary o.xls of o.tto.ok _u not beUeved to be ,rent .noup to Il100_
deetruotion of inoendiary 10no I Crerar to .ppen4ed
-1-
11A1U
Dl&p of ltobll). Consideration of pedJcted high 1I'in411 and inter-
va.10J11l1ter set tin, indiofitedl"tlie lfomb p .. ttern of .. squadron w0l114
oover an CLre .. a.pproximatll1y 1700 by 3500 feet. Consequently. to ob-
mnximum destruction, tbs effort against each point WIle
distributed IlS follows: 058115. 3 squadrons; 071123. 2 equadrone;
092132. 2 squlldrons , and 119128. 3 IIquadrons. Thie placed the ef-
forte of 5 equa.drons r easonably concentrated in the la.r,e Dre .. west
or tbe main railroad lltation and five l ess concentrated in
the long na.rrow arell to the weet.
Bnse
1700N _ 14000
2900N _ 13545E
3328N _ 1354SE
3431N ... 13523
(IP)
TlU'get
(.) Navlglltion Plllnning!
Reasona for Choice
Wing departur e poi nt,
A westarly course at low altitude to utlliu
most favorable in climb end pr event 1I1ow
ground sp eed r eBul ting from exce8llive Mad winds .
Center of poninllulo., o.llowing leewo.y for na. ... i-
go..tlon error on either aide of course,
o..II11y identified ro..dnr Ilnd vilual check point
on the Const,
A southea4terly to baae to utilil. tall
wind ..
2300N - 14500E A southerly r oute close to the northern
tli4lit Cheek pOirlft is 1I'ell lUI a. toOl. uhr_
enco point for ditchod aircraft.
(3) Flight Engineer's Plo..nningj
(aY Flight plan, speeds and altitudes were
used as outlined in XXI Bomber Command Regulation Ho, 55-3 to
ma.ximum fuel econo!lly.
(b) Fuel reqUirements were calculated far IIA
o.vernge o.ircrnft flying the worst position in the tormation with
wind conditions. Tho fuel elltimate indi-
cated the best snte minimum bocb load was 6,000 pounds. However. this
WD.S reduced to 5,000 pounds for the 3l3th since this
was their first lorge-scale oporation an extra tuel load ...
deemed desirahlo in Case of errors which would planned tly-
ing t1.me.
(4) Badar Plp.Mlpgl lAndf.ll on tho sou.thern oout-
line ot Honahu at lashimoto and na.isati on north to tho OODAtiloo
initial point or Otsu proyidod exoellent radar ohock pOints. ThO
initial. point would be cleo.rly Yis1ble on the soope a.nd the upias
run of 318
0
Could be acoomplisbod with little or no drift. The tor-
get itself would show u.p .s Q. long no.rrcw return, with Q. detillite
brIght return shOWing juat southwest ot the center at lob.. Ua. at
(r definite wa.ter .. la.nd, radar made tor 00.8y identitlOa.tJ. oJl at'
aiming pOint, wbother tor Yisua.l or radar bombins.
- . -
( 5) B4or Counter Measur os, A 4l.orsionnry Qtt aok
WOos not 4e&.cl ed necessClry because of the diver s i onar y u pecte of the
sel ected r cut e t o Counter measures ago.inst enemy r adClr con
troll ed anti ai rcraft wer e not ccnsider ed si nce i nt ens e o.Ccurate
f ire f r om such contr olled weQPons was not expocted.
( 0. ) Tho Navy was fu.rniahed with t he det c. lh of
the mi ss i on and requ. oat ed t o fu. r nish avail abl e f acil lties f or au-
SOa r escue purpose,. The f oll owi ng f acl1l ti es wor e aval labl e.
(See Annex A. Put VI , f or Air - Sea Ro. cu.e map) .
(1 ) Two submarines wer e diverted fr om their
r out ine patr ol agnins t Japnnese Shi pping c.nd ware suti oned o. s
f ollows cl uring and aftor t he m1sston unti l r e lel\sed by Super -
Cumbos: 31
0
30' N - 136
0
4S' E ana 3000' N _ 13S015'E.
( 2) Ona patrol J! estroya r we.s directed t o
t he f ollowing posi ti ons on t he fol l owi ng time schedul e: N-
14130 ' E from 03234SZ t o 040100Z and t o proceed to 2200' N_l 44,o
30' E f r om 041030Z t o 04l 400Z.
(3) Two Oumbo o. i rp l o.nell were IlllSi g.ned to
t he f ollOWing s t at i ons f or o. ir-seo. r escue work dur i ng tbe mi ssion:
azoSO' N - 140
0
00' E from 040030Z t o 040230Z. and 22
0
QQ' R _ l 42
0
0C' E
f r om t o 04020CZ.
bo ats and cr ash boats we r e ass _
i gned t o the 1mmed i nt e vicini ty of So.ipc.n and Tinian t o co. rry out
AJr -den r escue wo r k during t he cri tica l ? er i ods of to.ke-off
l o.nding as f ollows: 0. picket bOll.t i n So.1pc.n cb:mnel Q2C30Z t o
00 2Z30Z c. nd 041100Z t o 041500Z t o guo.rd 6970 kcs ., o.n1 0. cr ll.5b
bOat off west end of Tinio.n nortb strip C41lCOZ to C4l500Z t o
guard 6970 kcs.
(b)" This commnnd as si gned 2 Super-I)J.mbc d r ...
planes to orbit s ubmo.rine position to
assist in spotting, recaiving distreS B Signals. drop eme r tency
equi pment. and direct tbe submarines i n eve nt r ellcue ...
lities were r equlrGd. The Super ... Cumbos i nstruoted t o
submo.rines to routine patrol duties when 0.11 pl o.nas bo.d pc.ued
Gn r out6 bo.ck t o bnse.
e. Deta ils of Plennlng--Intell i gence
(1) EnemY Fight er Reacti on: Kobe, whIcb f o.l1.
within tho region f or purpos es or enemy fighte r ana. -
lysis, has an estimnted 302 aircro.tt i n i t s area, and
70 per cent would be oparati onGl. 211 nireraft woul d be ava.ilabl e
f or tb3 enOl!ly's defense system. This r notor plus put expe rience
indioated enemy a ir oppositicQ would be no nor e than f or an
operati on in the aren o.nd . election of tc.rget, r out.,
o.ltltude . nnd til'll8 of bombing wu not ..rfeoted by eneay fihter
r enoti on
(2) pelN IOtl &irotnltl A hending of 310 to
330 degrees would bring the o.tto.OkiDf; &1rcr..rt into ro.ns. or the
Kobe-Qsaka. defenss . f or the leo.st aaount of time sino. the approaOk
waS over Oso.ka. Bay. Furtbermore, winds were .uob tha.t thi. bendiDC
could be used without experienoing exc. ssive drift
.
JJJiJlJl
EXECUTION:
to
Wing Cl.t O:l22S5Z,
(.1" TCl.ke . Off; The first or the 73rd Wing
tAke off 0322l 0Z the first or the 313th
Actual wns accomp lished ns folloW81
Airorutt First Lo.st

Airborne Aircnft Takeoff Aircraft Takeoff
73rd
7'
032C56Z 032l 37Z
3l3th

032129Z: 032155Z:
Totnl 110 032056Z 0321552
No
:lSSombl y ditficu.lt1es
-"
exp6rienced
by
either wing,
b, Route Out: The Wings ' form:l.tions
mo.do wi t hin 10 mil es of the brief&d poi nt on Honshu. with
the exception of tho 500th and 504th Bombo.r dment Groups . No.vigo.t-
i ono.l errorfailure t o estimat e correctly tllrn pos ition prior to
cl i mb o.nd compenso.te for i ncreo.sed vol oC ity of cross winds eXileI' .
ionced in the climb t o bombing o.ltitude--resultod in the 5COtb
Bombardment Group making l :lndfoll 50 miles etl.st of the br ief ed
cour se , Consequently. thi s group W08 UMble to r ea. ch Kobe because
of the strong heo.d winds on 0. due westerl y course. which cc.do for
oxcessive fuel consumption. and the formation t urned eo.stwo.rd to
bomb II. lll.s t resort t o.rget. The 504th Bombar dment Group
ovorcorrected t o the wast and was abollt 30 miles west of briefed
course at landfall.
dOwnwind heading. it
However,
wns ab l e
beoo.uss the gr ollp WO.S fl ying on 0.
t o bomb the assigned Objective.
c . kA&!ot: erriYod i n the
tar get areo. an avero.ge of 40 minutes l o.te of wind vel o.
oities tho.n f oreoas t. The o.ircrnft atto.cked the target
in seven formati ons. with S of 49 t o 10
aircraft per formation ... dropping on the loaders who bcmbed by
r adar o.nd 2 formati ons of 20 aircraft dropped on leaders beabed
visually. From 5/10 to 6/10 strato .. cumulus cl oud s ever al thin
layers of cirrus cl ouds between 23. CCC nnd 30, 000 feet wer e expel'.
ienced in the t ar get area. Atotnl of 69 8 .. 29's dropped 159.2 tons
of incendiary clusters 13.6 t cbs of rragmentct i on clusters on
Kobe from t o 27, OCO feet from 04ryS57Z t o 040656Z. (See
Annex E, Part I,Conaolido.ted Stntistical Summo.ry. for
Owmage assessmont r eport& state 2.651. 000 squar e f set wer e do.mo.ged
in the tnrget crea,
d. Secondsry tgrget: Nona assigned.
o. La8t Re80rt target: One formo.ti oD or 15
8 .. 29's of the SOOth Bombcrdment Group for the
rell.80nS givon above in paragraph 3b. Fourteen other B-29
I
bombed
other last r elort t:ll"gets. Atoto.1 of 69.' tons 1ncendi".r)' C1U8-
t era and 5.8 ton. fragment o. tion cluaters were 1ro?ped by 29 8-ZU'8.
(For detnils seo Annex E. Part I, Cons olidated SummAry).
f. To.rget. or Opportunity I
ear ly dro?ped 2.6 t ons incendiary clusters and
to.ti on cluster s on Pagan hland.
-. -
liJJIl
Ona B-2S returnins
0.2 tonI
g. Routo B;Ck: After bombing . f ormo.ti on.
broke up beyond e nemy f i ghte r r o. nge nnc r e turned 0.5 bri ef ed. uti
liting ato.ra o.nd pl nnots dur i ng the l o.5 t 3 hours of flight. The
northe r n ldc. rio.nlls were 11.180 utilized II. EI r o.d nr chec k O>0ints. Oll&
8 29 of the 73rd Bombo. r dmont Wing. ",hln it r a.n out of fuel 12 l:Iill.
from Sll. i pa. n a.ftor suf f er ing dll.MlI.ge in the Xcbe area. , wa. s f orald
to d ttch. Thl"n -ot ' hae bel n k il lo:! prio r to ditchill6. Tho r ema. in-
ing t en crew memblrs wor e p icked up b y o.ir/ sell. rescue .
h. Landing' Ai r cro.ft lo. nded o.t bd.es under
good weathe r conditi ons aEl f ollows :
73rd Wi ng
313th \'l1ng
Tot nl
Numblr At rcr aft First Lo.nd ing Lo.st tl.nding
71
..1L
109
041104.2
C41225Z

041:nn
One nircraft of the 73rd Bcmbar dment Wing hnd its number 1 engine
catch firo nnd the burned af t er lo.nding at Snipan. It
was classi fi ed 0.5 'Lost to survey. 1
i. Oper ntiona Summary:
(1 ) Navigo.tion : (See Annlx A, Par t I f or
de tails). Winds wer e 30 knots mor e ? r edi cte1 the
i on pr oblem wnS primar l ly one ot ?r oper drift cor r ection 1n t he
climb phase on the r oute out. The need for increo.sed t rAi ning and
disCiplino in the use of r adar equipment in the tnrget areo. 0.8 a
nnvigational aid was indiCated since groups t o fly directly
over the initi n. l point des?1te its easily c', isti nguishable bright
r e turn on the scope.
(2) Bombing: (See Annex A, Part II. for
de taile). The mnjori ty of bomb runlS and relenses were accompliShed
by r ado.r with short visual checks. Errors in bombing were attri -
butabl e to both per sonne l and eqUi pment mnltuncti olls . The cost
;reval ent personne l arror waS tho l nck of air The use
of r o.dio bomb r eleases would help t his situnti on.
functions of the A- 2 releo.s e system necessito.tod salvoing ot bombs.
(3) Flight Engineering: (See Annex J ...
Part III for details) . Becaus e of unexpected head winds, more time
waS taken to r each planned altitude nt the target. thus using an
o.veraga of a?proximo.tely 350 more of gascllne ? 8r o.irerart
than plnnned. 8- 29 A' s were employed f or the fi r s t time by this
commo.nd n.n1 due to the sm:\ller center wing secti C' n. these nirern.tt
operate on 200 gallons l ess fuel. On future missions, these nir-
planes were to be given more advnntngeous positions 1n the f or-
mations .
(4) Rnderl (See Annex Part IV tor
ANlA?Q-13 equipment Wn8 u8ed f or target &Tea wind
de t erminnti on tor visuftl r adnr boobing.
ment ot SCR 716 r adio altimeter SCR-695 IFF equipment wns normal .
Fixes taken using ANVAPN-4 A ma j ority were at a
r nnge between 6(.'0 t o 90e mil es .
details ),
using the
(5) GypntrYI (See Annex A. rmrtV f or
Gunners showed iapro .... nt 1n controlling th.ir burst..
interphone, and d.signnt1ng their tnrgete.
- e -


XXI BO).!BEll. Cww.NO
APO 234.
TACTICAL LlISSION REPORT
Field Orders No . 22
1oI 1ss10n !To, 26
Target; port and bull t - up urba.n tU'ea. ,
KOBE. J;"pAN
4. Februo.ry 194. 5
Tab l e of Content e
Ta.ctical Nor rat1vl) Report
Annex A-- Ope rati ons Repor t8
Part 1-- Navigation
Part 11- Bombardier
Part III _-F light Engineering
Port IV- Radal'
Part V-- Gunnery
Part Vl- Air-Sea Rescue
Annex B- ... Po.rt I __ Wea.ther
Annex C-- Communications Reports
Port 1-- Radnr Counter Uea. 8ur es
Port 11-- Communica.tion's Ot:t: i eor 's Report
Annex 0-- Intelligenoe Report.
Part 1-- Enemy Air Oppoli ti on
Part II--Enemy Antla.1roratt
Part III-Boabins' Re.ult. l ..aat
Annex & __ Consolidated Statl.tloal Su..ary
Annex F_ ... rieU Ord ...
111'%
HEADC/;UART$.S
XXI BOlolBJillt COWAND
;.;po 234
I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 11 , " II I I
II SECRET II
: ,By o.ut h. or t he C . 01 I
;, XXI Bomber COmmo.n411
I I U II
I I Do. tII Initill18 I j
I I ; I : ; I I :t II I I ; ; I : 1111 I
SUBJECT I Report of Operlltion8. 4 Pebr unry 1945.
TO Commanding Qener D. l, Twenthth Air Porce, 'ffuhingt on 25.
D. C.
1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:
a.. Field Order Number 22. HeadquClr t ers XXI Bomber Com-
mand. dated 31 J!lIluary 1945, directed the 73rd and 313th Bombard-
ment Wings to po.rticipah in the fi r et coord ino.tod D.tta.cic by two
wings of' thio command on 0. to.rget in Honshu.
b. Io.re;ets Spectried;
(lY Primar y Target: Port IU'l.d built-up urbc.n areer
of the city of Kobe: Objoctive f oldor 90. 25 Vap V-9.
( 2" Secondary Tar get: None
(3) Last Resort Target : Any industrial city.
2. STRAT8QY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS :
a. Reasons for Se l ection of Teu-got;
(lJ The weather for ecast pr e sented to the CamQAnd-
ing General on 3 February prognosticated three to four - tentha cloud
coveroge in the Kobe area, with favorable oonditions en r oute and at
bases f or tlllc:e .. off o.nd lo.nding. COnlequently. deoision .... s made to
attack Kobe on 4 February. This command bad been continually strik-
ing the Tokyo and areas and the hAd pos.1bl y conCen-
trated defenses in these two areaS. An attack on Kobe, in addition
to damaging the urban Qrens. would possibly f or ce the to
spre.,d his def enses_ ... o.1rcraft and ont1o.ircro.ft- -wenkenint hil po-
sition in the Tokyo and Nagoya creaa.
b. Importanoe or Targetl
(1)' Kobe. sixth lartest Oity in Japan with.
population of 1.000,000. 1. Japan's prinoipal port.
It. shipyard. represent Japan's lartest ooncentrati on of ship.build-
ins and marine engine At lobe. the Snnyo &Gin r a il lin.
trom the western Up of Honshu join. with the ToIr:Qido .lll.un Una ,..t
to Oso.ka nnd TOkyo. key industrial plant l1oh u .toel. nU..,
equipment. ma.chinery. rubber and ordnanC are olo ly intecra te4
with lob.'s trwnsportation aotiYitles. A natiOnAl oa17
notably good r oad In and out at lobe. al.o rUD. oon-
pstad .ootion. ot the Oity. The area lected for atta.ok .... the
h15hly cOllie. ted core ot the oity. ba.YiDC !l popula.t1oD 01
0.. 100.000 per 'CUlare aU.,
-, -
JIIII11
"
,

o

o
(H Bombing P lo. ns I
(0.) Petermlnp,tlon of Bomb Lond,
(1) Be CII.USEI of the high dElUGe of 1n_
fl nnrno.bll1ty of the Kobo urbo.n nrao. . nn i ncendiary ntto.ck c on-
sidored most effeot ive. Tha S- 26 . 500 pound lncendlo.ry cluster
( actual weight. 350 I bIS." wee selected beall-Ule it is the best o.va.ll -
ab l e l ncendl nry we npon. The T4 4, 500 pound fra.gplI!Into.t l on cluster
(o.c tulU weight. 4.20 Ib e . ) W,lliS used III o.n anti - per . c nnel wea.pon to
hinder potenti a. l fire thul lnCreo.elng the errectlvene ee
of the lnCendio.ry ntto.Ck .
(2) Ineendlnriea we re fused t o open
a.t 5000 feet beco.use the best p a.tterns are obta.1ned frOD tha..t 1Il. -
titude. Fro.gmento.t1on olusters wer e fused t o open 1000 teet below
tho a ircraft f or the SMla r Bnsons .
(3) I nter vo.lomoter settings of 500
f eet (or maximum poss i ble under pr edicted winds) were uled t o give
pr oper spr eo.d t o i ndividuo. l incend1c. r y bOClbs in eo.ch target lU'eo. .
Pr oper densi ty of bombs wo.s obto. ined thr ough nUClber or e.1rcrott bcc.b-
I ng I n oc.ch f or mc.t l on.
(4) A mixed lond insured even dis-
tributi on of fro.gmentntion clusters and i ncandiories on the tcrget .
The olusters wer G l oo.ded to drop lwst tbe ac-
tunl r o.nge for the fro.gmento.tl on bombs wo.s l ess thru1 tho.t f or in-
cendiary b ombs and it WaS tho.t the frngoento.ti on bomb
pnttern coincide with the i ncendiary bomb po.ttorn.
NOTE : The e ntir e missi on Wo.8 pl c.nned in o.ccorda.nce with
the AhF Board Repcrt 'lncendio.r y Atteck cn
1 Sept. 1944. Only devictioQl in
wore) those necessito.ted by oper o.ti onnl llClito.tion.e: Md
o..vo..1lo.bllIty of o.ircrs.f't.
(b ) Bombo.rdler's Planni ngJ
(1) Tako.tuski was orIgi nally .elected
o.s an in1tic.l point, beat III ohrLnge In f or ecas t wind direotioD t r om. 0Jl
of 260 degroos t o 292 degr ees ns cessito.ted a change t o Ott"
In or der t o out down e xcessi ve drift on the bomb run. The upwind
appr oach WCB used beoause the l ower ground speed, o.s oontralted _itb
Cl. downwind run, all owed the bombardier more time in the 1auDed1o. te
target vicInity f or Qcol1ra.te aynohr onila.t1on.
(2)' Since t he obj ecU..,. .... CLD a.rea
mensured in miles, vulnera.ble orena by 6.000 teet wore aelec-
tad. The designo.ted approaoh, o.xh of a.tto.ck ot 318 dap-eea, W'tI.I
used eo tha.t the t or h tioD wol.lld be on the 10agtltudlDlLl lUis ot tbt
selected area.s. Four aiming points, c l ear ly dl1Oarnlb1e t o tho
bomb:lJ'd i erl on the 316 degree a.xta Of attll.Ok, nre del1sna'tOd so ..
to cover four vulne ra.bh lnd1clo.t.d Oft oUt Bcaber
Litho-Mosaio No. gO.25 a. 058111, 071123, oe21Sa and 111111.
(:5) The strength ot tbe .. tho OD \:M
neoeBaary o.xls of o.tto.ok _u not beUeved to be ,rent .noup to Il100_
deetruotion of inoendiary 10no I Crerar to .ppen4ed
-1-
11A1U
Dl&p of ltobll). Consideration of pedJcted high 1I'in411 and inter-
va.10J11l1ter set tin, indiofitedl"tlie lfomb p .. ttern of .. squadron w0l114
oover an CLre .. a.pproximatll1y 1700 by 3500 feet. Consequently. to ob-
mnximum destruction, tbs effort against each point WIle
distributed IlS follows: 058115. 3 squadrons; 071123. 2 equadrone;
092132. 2 squlldrons , and 119128. 3 IIquadrons. Thie placed the ef-
forte of 5 equa.drons r easonably concentrated in the la.r,e Dre .. west
or tbe main railroad lltation and five l ess concentrated in
the long na.rrow arell to the weet.
Bnse
1700N _ 14000
2900N _ 13545E
3328N _ 1354SE
3431N ... 13523
(IP)
TlU'get
(.) Navlglltion Plllnning!
Reasona for Choice
Wing departur e poi nt,
A westarly course at low altitude to utlliu
most favorable in climb end pr event 1I1ow
ground sp eed r eBul ting from exce8llive Mad winds .
Center of poninllulo., o.llowing leewo.y for na. ... i-
go..tlon error on either aide of course,
o..II11y identified ro..dnr Ilnd vilual check point
on the Const,
A southea4terly to baae to utilil. tall
wind ..
2300N - 14500E A southerly r oute close to the northern
tli4lit Cheek pOirlft is 1I'ell lUI a. toOl. uhr_
enco point for ditchod aircraft.
(3) Flight Engineer's Plo..nningj
(aY Flight plan, speeds and altitudes were
used as outlined in XXI Bomber Command Regulation Ho, 55-3 to
ma.ximum fuel econo!lly.
(b) Fuel reqUirements were calculated far IIA
o.vernge o.ircrnft flying the worst position in the tormation with
wind conditions. Tho fuel elltimate indi-
cated the best snte minimum bocb load was 6,000 pounds. However. this
WD.S reduced to 5,000 pounds for the 3l3th since this
was their first lorge-scale oporation an extra tuel load ...
deemed desirahlo in Case of errors which would planned tly-
ing t1.me.
(4) Badar Plp.Mlpgl lAndf.ll on tho sou.thern oout-
line ot Honahu at lashimoto and na.isati on north to tho OODAtiloo
initial point or Otsu proyidod exoellent radar ohock pOints. ThO
initial. point would be cleo.rly Yis1ble on the soope a.nd the upias
run of 318
0
Could be acoomplisbod with little or no drift. The tor-
get itself would show u.p .s Q. long no.rrcw return, with Q. detillite
brIght return shOWing juat southwest ot the center at lob.. Ua. at
(r definite wa.ter .. la.nd, radar made tor 00.8y identitlOa.tJ. oJl at'
aiming pOint, wbother tor Yisua.l or radar bombins.
- . -
( 5) B4or Counter Measur os, A 4l.orsionnry Qtt aok
WOos not 4e&.cl ed necessClry because of the diver s i onar y u pecte of the
sel ected r cut e t o Counter measures ago.inst enemy r adClr con
troll ed anti ai rcraft wer e not ccnsider ed si nce i nt ens e o.Ccurate
f ire f r om such contr olled weQPons was not expocted.
( 0. ) Tho Navy was fu.rniahed with t he det c. lh of
the mi ss i on and requ. oat ed t o fu. r nish avail abl e f acil lties f or au-
SOa r escue purpose,. The f oll owi ng f acl1l ti es wor e aval labl e.
(See Annex A. Put VI , f or Air - Sea Ro. cu.e map) .
(1 ) Two submarines wer e diverted fr om their
r out ine patr ol agnins t Japnnese Shi pping c.nd ware suti oned o. s
f ollows cl uring and aftor t he m1sston unti l r e lel\sed by Super -
Cumbos: 31
0
30' N - 136
0
4S' E ana 3000' N _ 13S015'E.
( 2) Ona patrol J! estroya r we.s directed t o
t he f ollowing posi ti ons on t he fol l owi ng time schedul e: N-
14130 ' E from 03234SZ t o 040100Z and t o proceed to 2200' N_l 44,o
30' E f r om 041030Z t o 04l 400Z.
(3) Two Oumbo o. i rp l o.nell were IlllSi g.ned to
t he f ollOWing s t at i ons f or o. ir-seo. r escue work dur i ng tbe mi ssion:
azoSO' N - 140
0
00' E from 040030Z t o 040230Z. and 22
0
QQ' R _ l 42
0
0C' E
f r om t o 04020CZ.
bo ats and cr ash boats we r e ass _
i gned t o the 1mmed i nt e vicini ty of So.ipc.n and Tinian t o co. rry out
AJr -den r escue wo r k during t he cri tica l ? er i ods of to.ke-off
l o.nding as f ollows: 0. picket bOll.t i n So.1pc.n cb:mnel Q2C30Z t o
00 2Z30Z c. nd 041100Z t o 041500Z t o guo.rd 6970 kcs ., o.n1 0. cr ll.5b
bOat off west end of Tinio.n nortb strip C41lCOZ to C4l500Z t o
guard 6970 kcs.
(b)" This commnnd as si gned 2 Super-I)J.mbc d r ...
planes to orbit s ubmo.rine position to
assist in spotting, recaiving distreS B Signals. drop eme r tency
equi pment. and direct tbe submarines i n eve nt r ellcue ...
lities were r equlrGd. The Super ... Cumbos i nstruoted t o
submo.rines to routine patrol duties when 0.11 pl o.nas bo.d pc.ued
Gn r out6 bo.ck t o bnse.
e. Deta ils of Plennlng--Intell i gence
(1) EnemY Fight er Reacti on: Kobe, whIcb f o.l1.
within tho region f or purpos es or enemy fighte r ana. -
lysis, has an estimnted 302 aircro.tt i n i t s area, and
70 per cent would be oparati onGl. 211 nireraft woul d be ava.ilabl e
f or tb3 enOl!ly's defense system. This r notor plus put expe rience
indioated enemy a ir oppositicQ would be no nor e than f or an
operati on in the aren o.nd . election of tc.rget, r out.,
o.ltltude . nnd til'll8 of bombing wu not ..rfeoted by eneay fihter
r enoti on
(2) pelN IOtl &irotnltl A hending of 310 to
330 degrees would bring the o.tto.OkiDf; &1rcr..rt into ro.ns. or the
Kobe-Qsaka. defenss . f or the leo.st aaount of time sino. the approaOk
waS over Oso.ka. Bay. Furtbermore, winds were .uob tha.t thi. bendiDC
could be used without experienoing exc. ssive drift
.
JJJiJlJl
EXECUTION:
to
Wing Cl.t O:l22S5Z,
(.1" TCl.ke . Off; The first or the 73rd Wing
tAke off 0322l 0Z the first or the 313th
Actual wns accomp lished ns folloW81
Airorutt First Lo.st

Airborne Aircnft Takeoff Aircraft Takeoff
73rd
7'
032C56Z 032l 37Z
3l3th

032129Z: 032155Z:
Totnl 110 032056Z 0321552
No
:lSSombl y ditficu.lt1es
-"
exp6rienced
by
either wing,
b, Route Out: The Wings ' form:l.tions
mo.do wi t hin 10 mil es of the brief&d poi nt on Honshu. with
the exception of tho 500th and 504th Bombo.r dment Groups . No.vigo.t-
i ono.l errorfailure t o estimat e correctly tllrn pos ition prior to
cl i mb o.nd compenso.te for i ncreo.sed vol oC ity of cross winds eXileI' .
ionced in the climb t o bombing o.ltitude--resultod in the 5COtb
Bombardment Group making l :lndfoll 50 miles etl.st of the br ief ed
cour se , Consequently. thi s group W08 UMble to r ea. ch Kobe because
of the strong heo.d winds on 0. due westerl y course. which cc.do for
oxcessive fuel consumption. and the formation t urned eo.stwo.rd to
bomb II. lll.s t resort t o.rget. The 504th Bombar dment Group
ovorcorrected t o the wast and was abollt 30 miles west of briefed
course at landfall.
dOwnwind heading. it
However,
wns ab l e
beoo.uss the gr ollp WO.S fl ying on 0.
t o bomb the assigned Objective.
c . kA&!ot: erriYod i n the
tar get areo. an avero.ge of 40 minutes l o.te of wind vel o.
oities tho.n f oreoas t. The o.ircrnft atto.cked the target
in seven formati ons. with S of 49 t o 10
aircraft per formation ... dropping on the loaders who bcmbed by
r adar o.nd 2 formati ons of 20 aircraft dropped on leaders beabed
visually. From 5/10 to 6/10 strato .. cumulus cl oud s ever al thin
layers of cirrus cl ouds between 23. CCC nnd 30, 000 feet wer e expel'.
ienced in the t ar get area. Atotnl of 69 8 .. 29's dropped 159.2 tons
of incendiary clusters 13.6 t cbs of rragmentct i on clusters on
Kobe from t o 27, OCO feet from 04ryS57Z t o 040656Z. (See
Annex E, Part I,Conaolido.ted Stntistical Summo.ry. for
Owmage assessmont r eport& state 2.651. 000 squar e f set wer e do.mo.ged
in the tnrget crea,
d. Secondsry tgrget: Nona assigned.
o. La8t Re80rt target: One formo.ti oD or 15
8 .. 29's of the SOOth Bombcrdment Group for the
rell.80nS givon above in paragraph 3b. Fourteen other B-29
I
bombed
other last r elort t:ll"gets. Atoto.1 of 69.' tons 1ncendi".r)' C1U8-
t era and 5.8 ton. fragment o. tion cluaters were 1ro?ped by 29 8-ZU'8.
(For detnils seo Annex E. Part I, Cons olidated SummAry).
f. To.rget. or Opportunity I
ear ly dro?ped 2.6 t ons incendiary clusters and
to.ti on cluster s on Pagan hland.
-. -
liJJIl
Ona B-2S returnins
0.2 tonI
g. Routo B;Ck: After bombing . f ormo.ti on.
broke up beyond e nemy f i ghte r r o. nge nnc r e turned 0.5 bri ef ed. uti
liting ato.ra o.nd pl nnots dur i ng the l o.5 t 3 hours of flight. The
northe r n ldc. rio.nlls were 11.180 utilized II. EI r o.d nr chec k O>0ints. Oll&
8 29 of the 73rd Bombo. r dmont Wing. ",hln it r a.n out of fuel 12 l:Iill.
from Sll. i pa. n a.ftor suf f er ing dll.MlI.ge in the Xcbe area. , wa. s f orald
to d ttch. Thl"n -ot ' hae bel n k il lo:! prio r to ditchill6. Tho r ema. in-
ing t en crew memblrs wor e p icked up b y o.ir/ sell. rescue .
h. Landing' Ai r cro.ft lo. nded o.t bd.es under
good weathe r conditi ons aEl f ollows :
73rd Wi ng
313th \'l1ng
Tot nl
Numblr At rcr aft First Lo.nd ing Lo.st tl.nding
71
..1L
109
041104.2
C41225Z

041:nn
One nircraft of the 73rd Bcmbar dment Wing hnd its number 1 engine
catch firo nnd the burned af t er lo.nding at Snipan. It
was classi fi ed 0.5 'Lost to survey. 1
i. Oper ntiona Summary:
(1 ) Navigo.tion : (See Annlx A, Par t I f or
de tails). Winds wer e 30 knots mor e ? r edi cte1 the
i on pr oblem wnS primar l ly one ot ?r oper drift cor r ection 1n t he
climb phase on the r oute out. The need for increo.sed t rAi ning and
disCiplino in the use of r adar equipment in the tnrget areo. 0.8 a
nnvigational aid was indiCated since groups t o fly directly
over the initi n. l point des?1te its easily c', isti nguishable bright
r e turn on the scope.
(2) Bombing: (See Annex A, Part II. for
de taile). The mnjori ty of bomb runlS and relenses were accompliShed
by r ado.r with short visual checks. Errors in bombing were attri -
butabl e to both per sonne l and eqUi pment mnltuncti olls . The cost
;reval ent personne l arror waS tho l nck of air The use
of r o.dio bomb r eleases would help t his situnti on.
functions of the A- 2 releo.s e system necessito.tod salvoing ot bombs.
(3) Flight Engineering: (See Annex J ...
Part III for details) . Becaus e of unexpected head winds, more time
waS taken to r each planned altitude nt the target. thus using an
o.veraga of a?proximo.tely 350 more of gascllne ? 8r o.irerart
than plnnned. 8- 29 A' s were employed f or the fi r s t time by this
commo.nd n.n1 due to the sm:\ller center wing secti C' n. these nirern.tt
operate on 200 gallons l ess fuel. On future missions, these nir-
planes were to be given more advnntngeous positions 1n the f or-
mations .
(4) Rnderl (See Annex Part IV tor
ANlA?Q-13 equipment Wn8 u8ed f or target &Tea wind
de t erminnti on tor visuftl r adnr boobing.
ment ot SCR 716 r adio altimeter SCR-695 IFF equipment wns normal .
Fixes taken using ANVAPN-4 A ma j ority were at a
r nnge between 6(.'0 t o 90e mil es .
details ),
using the
(5) GypntrYI (See Annex A. rmrtV f or
Gunners showed iapro .... nt 1n controlling th.ir burst..
interphone, and d.signnt1ng their tnrgete.
- e -

I
VT detail.).
tho ten
t o.c-Ult1.ea.
(6) AI, a.'99'1 (S &nnex r-.t
B-29 diUSheQ. IloPJMxir;.ll'1sdy 1& .11 hOll
Cl"ew lIIo511ibSl'S _r. picked IlP by air/ ....
_ r; . Weath!!: (See't\nDox B, Part I tor de-te.ll.'.
rhe tu, et. area hll4 0. 6110 to e/lO d to!;,"IiU}v.e cloud b,tl.tld .. t H.
teet with tepa o.t 16. 000 l t 0.8 contro. lt.dwlth rOyeonat'
.. or 3/10 to 4110 Clou.d Wlndl OYer tcM tu&et "arl. t,-oa
'; 260 dev'e.". US knot. t o 280 degr 180 knot.. "o.thl'll oon41t1.01W
o.t fdr- the tclt .... o!:r nd 1 .. 11ng .,..re &6 04.
,(1) ROodill' Counter Mu,ure'I, .. J.J\nax C.
Part I for aet..il.). Four ROM aea.reh d r _craft, wtt.h one Rcnl _
observe'r . poxt1cipo.te4 '1:n this mls.alon. Soarch "0.1 II'1II.41 f or enemy
Eo.rly Warning Ro.do.r equipment u.nt1l the JlllI.lnl Ill'Id w'" reo.chad. where
lUI.reh .WIl I . llIG.de f or. Gel :.J::.'nd GL ,ro.do.u o.nd enlllltY fighter ..communico.t-
i ona cho.nnels. Atoto.l or 51 ro. dar signals WOoS l ogged o.nd :.\ enemy
VHF voice tro.nsmiS$i one were r ecor ded.
(2) Communlco.ti ona: (See Annex C, PQ. rt 11
for details). All f.requencles were jo..rnmed or intert" ered
with o.t difterent pe riods during the mission. The percentc.ge
breo.kdown ot traffic per trequoncy foll ows: 45 per cent on 3145
kilocycles; 28 per cent on 11080 kil ocycl e s, And 27 per cent on
6055 kilocycles. Radio silence was to th5 target o.nd
over o. 11 seourity wns go-xi; .__ __ _. .
- .
- i. Intelligence Snm"'ry:
(1) From Reil intercepts th5 presance
ot paCer o.lrcratt. 1.t is 'belt.eved '\hnt .the ehellY hs.:f eal-ly prior
warnln-g ot the o.ttc.ck lind was able to a:1ert his deteMe..
-'
(2) Enemv Air O;!posit1on: (See Annex Df
Port J tor details); Enemy air oPI}osition 1mB strong. with an
estimated 205 enemy' aircrnft mo..king 273. o.ttacks. Using
eaoh 8-29 susto.ined 2.6 attacks, whioh Is 10S8 thnn tho.t exper-
ienced on preVious mJ.ss1o_DAL.Ea.ch.lnpClllue fighter IfIIlde 1.3 atta.cks,
which Is about normal. One per oent ot the 8-29 torce wns dea-
troyed nnd 12 par cent Jojoa and
Tonya made 61 per C.ent or all attacks. The n080 c.ttack .tHl pre
dominated o.s the enemy's tnvorlte, being uaod in 61 per cont at the
attacks. A breo.kdown of tactios sho.ad 41 per c&nt tor
ap;roache. trgm belOW; as per cent trom and 34 per cent
level. Five coordino.ted attacks .. ro reported. Some Tony Tojo.
Gnd Nicks wore obsorved to lower their lAnding gear prior to attack,
po.sibly to reduce Spe6d and approaCh etrectivene... A
rew enemy met the 8.29'a at lea Qnd trailed the tor.-t.
iona, probably .ith the ir and tighter
controllers.
(3) Aptiairoraft: (See AAftex D. Part II
tor deto.lla). There .. 1'$ no 10 .... to I\nt1airorcJ't, bl.lt 21 8 .. .28'a
or JG per cent ot the toroe. .utter.d battle
J.nt1alroratt n wu no cSeterrent traa lAndfall to t.bI tar,.t aDd
troll ta.rcet to lcmd'. eDd. OYer tt. tarcet, aoourate, IIOderlllte to
intense fire throUih the overcll.t .. e experlonoed by all tor.atioDa,
One 1Il1rcro.tt III ph08phorou. bur at. de.oribe4 Qa -white
u.mbrella..,hapod pattern,- ill the lobe IU"ICl. Tho burat ... ..
1Ila.te1y one mile to the roar or the reporting nil'ontt.
_ 1 _
JiJJlll
(4) B"J:lb1ns; Re sult!; ,",0"; P"p :\!;O 'SSOSSI:l'Jot:
(500 l.noox D, i"nrt III r " r ",et"" lls). !'hoto I nteryrot"l.ti"o ,..,r
i"hot o Roonon .... 1s,"'. oco Un1 t ph':l t Cl s on 5th nn1 6th Fobru,", r y.
1945 , showo:\ v is1bl e :"'..Clf'.f.;e c over1ng 2. 651 , ("C squ"..J'o f 06t . Tho
throe i llQortnnt In:!ustrlC".l t r,r :ots io tho wor e as
rol10wa:
Target 169 . lUtsubishl He!\vy In ' ustri:Js . Ltd, . --:,?,r oxi -
!:Iatoly 68 , 0(( squr,re foet ( 2. pOl' cent) " f tho p 1c.nt wc\s
To.r get 785, KnnoL"r.fuch i Sot.r, In-:',ustry--i " , r ox1mr.tely
squc.r e fo ot ( 49 pOl' cont ) of the ? l nnt wr,s des tr oy tid.
Tnr gEl t II. Kr.w(',s:l.k:1 Locomot i ve n o"! Cor COl!!jlnny - .. p-., r oxl-
mately 2.2, CCC. squ", ro f6 a t of r oof wr.s
I n o.dr.:!l tion, u lscell::cnoous dnon!;e cn!'lunt1n.g t o c,;>p r OX1-
mately l,7U, CO( squ(',ro feot wns sustr.1ned by 6m(\1 1 1ne.uBtr1Els
nnd housing nnd business d1stricts c.bout tho throe t a r gets
listed ('.hove .
-. -
ff" -;, C I""
CURTIS E. LE1;;"Y I
lio.j or U. S. 1
Commndlng
1.11.11
ANN'"
A
OPERSIONS REPORTS
Exhibit Tr".ck Cbo.rts
Part 1 ...
P';:.rt II ... Bomb::trdie r' a
III ... Pllgbt Report
Pa.n - GuM" 11 ,." aepon.
PCLr' VI .. Air .sa':' Rouuo Report
bhlbl t ... Air .. Soo. Re_Gue kl1P
MiuioR Bo. SO
"
SiC 7
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NO. 26-
l
f vj 1,-1 DATE
4 Feb 191=5-
-:3
35'
. n WI NG 73 '"
, ,V .SO' @ GROUP
B r.J
_____ "'11'11>'[.0"" "'99 S.'
135' _, _____ 50
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COMPILED 8Y l!)TH PHOTO TEeM U"l
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MISSION NO. _ 2b_
DATE __ 1.b. "'5 .
....
WING _ 3 13 ---
GROUP
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____ - $0'" <Or-
_._._. 50S' Cop-
140
COMPII.EO BY PHO"'O
OPEiRATIONS REPORTS
UBI....l - NAYIG!.TcmS REPORT
1. on thls ml1i11i110n lI'as ma1nly a problelll or maklnr;
proper drlft oorrect1on 1n the c11mb phase. Three groups of the
73rd W1ng made landfall aa briefed. 1I'1tb the applying ..
proper additional left correction to cOlllpene .. te tor tho 30-knot in-
ereaee in pr ed1cted w1nd velocity. Metro winda were eettmated at
290/130 knots and experienced at 270/160 knote .
2. The 500th Group of the 73rd Wing made landfill 50 mll
etl.at of course, the lni t1d error haTing be.n melds in the f 1nt
phase or the flight botora tho Climb pbllu. The lead llATlglLtor"
ostimo.tod po81t1on of turn 1fQ.G 30 mllss eut or ths briefed turn
II,.t 2900N _ 135458. Not beIng "WIU'S or hh error In poal tion. tbe
llATiga.tor I!Ul.de correction cn the a.8sumption be WDJ on the briet.d
route. Hi8 finell lancifnll error wtt.8 a. combintl.t1on at the inithl
error and 0. failure to correct for the 1ncre:t.8ed 'nlocity of the
croes ... w1nd oxperienoed in the climb. Hia rll.dll.J' JJt -APQ-l3 go.v.
poor roturne, and the navigo.tcr failed to obaerve hh err or 1n
sufficient time to mo.ke tho;, necessary correcti on to the briefed
lo.ndtall point. Upon discovery of hia err or . the formation l.adn
o.ttomptad to r eaoh Kobe. but tho excoS8ive head wind on the du.
westerly course neoessary to reach the to.rget r esulted in .xces.-
ivo fuol oonsumption and tho formation turned enstward and bombed
the last reaort target.
3. The 313th Bomba. rdment Wing navigation good. consider -
ing tho oxeessive wind problem expori enced on its first operational
mission. Nllvigo.tors in the 504th Group overcorr octed to the we.t.
Nnvlgation errors to the west Can be e .. sily oorrected on down
wind but errors to the oast make corr ecti ons to the initial
point impo ible becnuse of excessive hendwinds.
4. The 504th Gr oup made 30 miles west of course
correctod to the Initiul point. The 505th Group mnde landfnll 10
milas welt of briefed point.
5. NQvigntion in tbe tnrget aren wne .ade with the ARAPQ-13.
Crews were still not makIng proper use of thIs eqUi pment tor
precision navlt;ation nece.s(il'Y in target a.rena. The Inithl point
WnS ea.l1y di.tingulsho.ble on tho rndar .oope. but group. rniled
to pnS8 directly over it a. brlered, A program bns been in.tItuted
to give inorea.ed turn wnd target trnining t o oft set the hnndioap.
of high wind velocitle
6. The 3l3th W1ng oriticised ai i on planning nnd expres.ed
the desire t or 0. down wind run, rho high rate or ol o.\lre with
ground epeeda up to 500 UPH with oon.equent 'bortenint at tlae
tor target identification. bOllhaigbt. and radar adJuatMntl: -"e
upwind run. nooe .. ary CD .. n tar,etll. except in c ..... wbere the
probability at tlak additionnl po ibility at
increased bombint o.oourncy. Critioi.m ft.' al.o aade or the dog
leg. to ADd rraa the target, Utaaion. are to utili,e
wind. OD. all route.. During the oUab pha.e ... northerly bud1a&
Gut. eff ... ct of we&torly h,,_d w1f\.de, A' scuthw,uter l '"
r outo'hol:lB lnoreQJIea the groW\d 'Pead o.nd c.otwLlly
diminisho. the t1me flown.
- 1 -
liillll.lll
SKCRET
'. Navigators in the 313th Wing Loran inacouraoy.
but an or the 73rd Wing r eturns indicate that 313th
Wing need additional training in fix interpretation.
The smnll angle of coincidence of the and Ulith chains make a
poor cut, and mny result in a plotting errcr.
8. The route hOllle wus flown Q8 brief ed. with 0.11 no.vigQ.tors
utll1ting the and plo.nets during the last 3 hours af' fl1sht.
The northern Ma.rlnnas were also utili ted Q8 radar check points.
p. Tho total to tlvJ target tLnraged 40 minu.te. lete tor
all units as 0. result af' the increo.aod 'ff1nd velocitios experienced.
However. units of' the 73rd Wing III:I.de use of previous experionce In
utilizing tail winds at fD.vorabl e a.ltitudes. nnd a.r ri vad a.t base
with M o.vero.ge toto.1 time or 1,,12, 4 minutes 1D.ter tha.n estimll.ted.
10. Units of tho 313th Wing were naturD.lly inexperi encod in
utilizing the most fo.vorable winds Md hAd an. o.verage toul timo
of 14146.
PARI II - BOMBARDIER'S REPORT
1. Bombing r esul ts on this missiOn were considered fnir.
based on the number of aircraft end. the predominntin&
e i ght-tenths cloud over target. The mc.jority of r une :md
releases were accomplished by r ndo.r with short visual cheCKS. In
nIl Cases strike photography made it iDpossible to
construct 0. bomb pl ot. However. 0. 11 visual damAge was w1th1n
7000 feet of the briefed aiming poi nts. destroying
2,651,000 square feet in the city of Kobe .
2. Errors in bombing were attributed t o both personnel o.nd
equi pment malfunctions . The most prevalent of per sonnsl errors
woos l ack of ni l' discipline. Several instnnces were noted where
dropped on aircro.ft other thnn lead and doput l end, i. e.
when one element le o.de r experienced trouble before rea.ching tbt
target and dropped his bombs o.nd l ef t f orco.tion, both DOn
dropped on hie and others in the f ormntion dropped o1so l Go.ving
few effective nircra.ft in tho forlD8.tion to drop on the l end o.ir -
craft o.t to.r gat time. Another o.1rcra.ft dropped its bombs upon
bearing IBombs Awayl OYW' VlF, Q.D.d !\glll:n numor ous o.1 rcra.ft dropped
on him. The -Bombs Awtrf report heQrd on VEF WIlS from o.n oo.rller
f ormo. tion over the torget. Tho Qbove showed the imcediete Dood
for ro.dio bomb relenses, (or..tlsh) A shipment of theso roloo.so.
en route. One Group, due t o n major err or in nnvlgo.tion o.nd
poor judgment 1n selocting a target or toto.lly in-
effoctIve.
3. Severnl malfunotion. in tho A-2 r ol eo.so systolD Dacl3as1 -
tilted the So.lvoing or bombs.
- . -
.111.111:
PART III _ FLIGHT ENGI NEER' S REPORT
A. COCllllonta on oTlli s e contr ol during tlvJ lIIisai on ue o.s
f oll olll'S r
1. A1t1tllde Crllis o!
(0.) The low IllUtllde or uiao to the point or climb r e
qpired o.pp r oximo.tely 6r hOllTa or 10 minlltee l ese than p1o.nnad f or
both the 73rd o. nd 313th W1ngs . which indic o.tes tbo.t pro.ctico.lly no
unOxpoc t od wind con4itiona wero oncollnter ed on thil l eg or the
flight plo.n,
(b) The power nttingl requir ed o.t tho Itort of tho
initi(l.l cruise wer o nor m0.1 f or the 73rd ."ing. H,"""ver . l ome ur -
plo.nes of the 313th Wing r oquired Il.llto rich power IOttings f or the
fir s t ho. lf hour during Il.ssembly. Sllbsequent power nttinge; were
normni.
2. Climb t o Bombing Al ti tude! The time for cliab . o.s
o.pproximo.tely 75 mi nutes, IlS pl anned; ne ither wing r equ.lred r o.ted
power settings to lIID.into.ln the formo.ti on.
3, Cr uise o.t Bombing Al ti tude;
( D.) BecD.use of unexpecte d hoo.d winds. both wings spent
nppr oxi mo.tel y 77 minutes nt b ombing nltituda pri or t o r ouching the
tnrget. Thi s was 30 minutes l ongor thAn plo.nned , o.nd caused the
c onsumpti on or additional 350 gul lons of f uol per
( b) Power setti ngs for b oth wi ngs in this cruise
on the bombing run wer e o.S pr edi cted, In no wns core tbnn
ra:ted power necessary to mainto.in f ormo.ti on posi ti on.
4, Return 12 Good ta.1l winds o. i ded cC'nsidero.bly 10
a o.ving fuel on the r e turn to bo.se . The two types of r a.nge
r eturn pr ocedures empl oyed, - Constant Letdown and High Altitude
Best Wind - worked equally well,
5. Gener al Comments;
(a ) This miSSion waS
of flight eneinserlng,
dicted was cnused
c ond itione .
extremel y sucoessful frcm tho
The only devio.t1on from the pre-
by hi gh ILl t1 tude wind
(b) 8-29A
'
s wer e employed fo r the first time by tb1.
COllllDCUld. DuG to the smnller cent er wing seotion. tben ILircro.tt
opero.te on 200 go. l1on8 l oss fuel. On future thel" air_
p i llnos ware t o be g i9'en tho lIIor o advo.ntAgoou, p011t10M in the for-
IIlO.tiona.
PARt IV ReP" OFFICA'S Watt
1. AaMt 1ijpm1gymept!"
-. -
ilJU.ll
(a) Tho radar equ.lpmont WI).S u.sod for ta.rget are ..
nl).vi gCl t1on. wind determinl).tion. and r l).dl).r
o.pprol).oh to v1su. l).l bombin!; I).nd complete ro.dlll'
bomblng.
(b ) Ro.dlll' wus employed by 5 l e o.d witb 44
dropplng on thom.
2. sea na (ReAl0 Altime t er ): Employment 'II1'II.5 norlllo.l .
3, AN/APN- 4:" F1xa s were Ukon a t 0. mo.xImUD of 1000 mllelS.
A lIIo.jor1ty r onge d between aOO- 900 miles, w1th one fIx being I\t 1400
milos.
4. SCR-695 ( I FF)I Employment wtlS norlW-l.
2. Ro.do.r Egu. l pmont Performo.nce;
1 . 73rd W1ngj
(0.) 71 wore r ndo.r oqu1pped.
(b) 61 Ale r eported r ndnr opero.tion eo.ttsfllCtory
for bombing.
(a) 38 Ale wer e ro.dor equi pped,
( b) 21 Ale reperted ndo. r opero.tion BD.t16fo.otor y
fer bcmbing.
( 0) 7 Ale with r adnr were allorted Ale. Two. wer e due
to. r ador mal funct i en,
3. Mo.lfuncti ons l
a. AN/APS-l3t
(1) Two: No. signals at al titude.
(2) One: Inoper o.tivo on r eturn. no data.
(3) One: Low crystal o.nd tro.nsmltter ourreat.
(4) Throe I Tr ansmitter cur r ent out cut.
(5) One r Hc sweep
(6) Three : No. 8igno. l s ,
(7'
One:
Tilt DeobG.ft1am
,tuck.
b.
JJJI APB-4,
(1) One; He e1gnall.
( 2'
0 .. , Une teo.dy invertor
vol t a.go.

SCB-7l8, OnD
Alt1aeter tathre,
4. gu.a91
0- m report-d out.
-.-
PART V _ GUNNERY 0FTICrn'S REPORT
1. The missi on fr om the gunnery highly suc-
CUsafu1. The C.P.C. system 96% the cachine guns
ware g7% Gunnars t o shaw i mpr ovement
i n Contr ol ling thei r bursts , use of the inter phone, am to.rget 4es -
The enemy woos still using of colore with no
definite pg,ttern of color schOllia in the I1IIl. rking of their nlrcro.tt .
Thoy r espected a ti ght f ormat i on wor. not aggressive g,gg,inst
auch Q. for mg,t i on. F./A stUI f g,vor the nose o.ttg,ck fr om ten t o t'fro
o' cl ock from high, l evel Md below. It Wl).S no'tod on this mil8ion
t ho.t Tonya , ToJ os and Nicks If(Ire the a.ircrl1ft. These
three types of EOI A were reported by gunnery observers of the 73rd
Wing o.a letting their geo.r dawn. poss ibly to s low down the r g,t e of
cl os ure or t o g,id f urther t he ir r g,fIIIlI ing tactiOs , Irvinga met
50 miles f r om I nnMc.ll and were evi dently relaying information t o
AA ba. tteri Gs on our al titude, o.i r speed, and directi on of fl ig):l.t.
2, Equi pment oper a. t ed ns f oll ows :
prd Wing 3pth Wing

"
50 cal. AmmUnition
Expendi t Urs 86. 000 r ds . 4.6, .000 rds rda.
b , tion C, F .C.
System 98% 98% 98%
c, Oper ation used
50 Cal. M. G. 9"; 9"; 9";
d , Guns l oaded Col d Hot
3. Enemy air opposition ( See Annex D - Intelligence r eports
for deto.lls).
PART VI - AIR-58A RESCUE REPORT
A .summo. r y of t ho di t chi ng i ncident cccurrlng on thie cission
follows :
a. Aircraf t 4. 2_24629 . call si gn 9V607 - 73rd Bombarement
WOos ditchod on r oute t o bo. s e.
(1 ) First race17ed by thi s nt 041506,
'Aic 4.a. 24.62g ditched o.ppr oximnt Gl y 12 mi les from Snipnn on
of 3.30 deg. Wi ng Super-Dumbo. Cyc l one 22 (A2ll) , Cyclone 2l ( U)
circl ed ditched nircraft unt il r elieved by Naval Dumbo.'
( 2) Second recoived nt 0'15'3, ' Ten ( 10) sur vivors
rescued f rom ditched ai r cr aft 9V60T.
The r escue avnl1abl e (o r thi s mi ssi on we r e on
cour se, but i t i s be lieved had this ditohi ng oocur red north of Iwc
J i ma, the possi bi lity err e6tl ng r escue woul d have been r emot e.
( Soe Ai r-SGa Re souo map f ol lowi ng page) .
- 5 _

... ' - I V ... .. ......

';'. \ ';' . - +-1
/j-+--+--.W: !( ;' rJ 1 1_
! k> I v / MISSION NO. 2.L
1 (e-' V J DATE 4 F. b. "<S.
1 WING XXI B. c. r
,0 i ..-d _ "< 1 GROUP
,- - -
; '/ -(I IT C' I
/ '-', I ....... - __ --1_ ----t-"
_ <;r, rV r'\. 1
- f- - f--- -+- -+- --j-- -+---I-- 1 \
\
1
:
f-+-+- 1 +-+-+-+-+1 \A-I-...2
D
'f' - ?'''+'I
: \ 0' : 4Sk .. lI -ooK. . , \ 20 " OK
: \ Dvml>o. I,
AM,
I
,!.. '4.' ! ..
. ,-_ .... ,-
Mission. NOt 26
4 Fo"""'lIY 1 ~
I ViEAl'iER ru:pCi\T
C 1.. 'I'hl0 operation r:as pl.anD.od on Il forecast prese nte d to t ho
CIOJI:De.nd1Df!, Gcmral. on 3 February 1945. Three to foa t enths cl.Q.ld
cove rs. . ,
t 0 wa s forecast for t he targe t iU'ea. The route il a5 .. orecas
o havo eood iIOather e uealt !ront 'cD eroes. a nd tho hase s '=Elro
eXpeCt'ld to have goed I.esthe r throughout t he de.:t.
t 2 . Tho bases at tsko-off had t "l'l O te n.t hs cWIl.l.l.ua 1'1 1th base s at.
if"too
n
hundred fee t end tops &-t six thoue and t eot. V181b.llity WeB
fifteon mi l es . Thes o c onditions pre vailed to ni ne teen. degroes north
ii he ro c l oUd covo r increase d to ni.no t e nthS s al eea ttc red s ha;;e rs h'e re
OncOUQt c red . reducing v_! s ihility to t '10 IIlilc s . From this to
t ... enty three desroos north tb:lre five t enths a tratocUll1ll.IVl Q. th
six tOQ.t. bs a U ocumu.lus bnse d at t wo l ve t houae.rd. 10011-. wonty
ilour do&rocs end t l'lo nt y dsbt dOe,rOCB north a frontal %oOIW -=88 en-
cooutrt.orod u ith ovorcast. cumulus al1i stratoeW!l.l.l.us olowla. Ceili..neP
t:ore t,':c l vo bUildrod f oot, l cmeri ng to five hundrod toot in shaRe rs.
Ei8ht t(mthS altostratus \70.5 in th i s eroa Cit h bases at
thOUSand f eot /lnd /l cirrootratus owrcas t \-;es prese nt at tll1rty
thousand foot. Vis i bilitios ill this area \';Uro about aiabt milos ,
dropp1nS to a milo i n sbO'iJcrs .. Fran ei ght de greos north to the
t arget thoro was fivo t enths cumulus bascd a.t . thmo thousand foot
tops at eigbt thousand fibur ton"th s a lt06tratus bc.Sod at
fU'tocn thru.sand foct am . Ui e,ht tenth 5 cirroetratus at tb1.rty t boo. -
sand f oet.
3. Tbe target bed six to eight tentbs altoewmllus c.Qlifor based
at foo.rte cn t hoo.sand fGoct t.i tt. t o:DS at sixtoon thousand foot .... bidl
Oecossitatod rade1! bombing m tb short .... oboek.s ..
4. The neat her on the route on re turn -,1as tbo
eame as t he route out. Base conditions .. ero the some as thoy hed
been at take- off tino.
S. Il inda reportcd over t ho target vc.riod tree. 280 degrees, 145
lolots to 2&:1 do.grcOB . 180 knot.s .
SSCRS T
------
III
I)
0
~ ...
.. ~
. -
> i:'
oL
.... 0 IC .::;
~
=
we "
~
<;
" .. : : ) ~
~ ....
u IC -
'"
..
.. <;
"
... u
=
" -
.. -
>
..
"' 0


-
......
~
-
-
0
t-
~
0
It
u
)
UA"

o
RUARy'45
o YAP
N HI_"
P,o", L A U
oS72 L LOW
t. e e. 0 OIP".SSICII&
# " " I ~ L MAP
OZ
'45


oYAP
II """ L LOW
-0
ANNSX
c
COMMUNIC.':'TIONS REPORTS
Po.rt I - Rndnr Counter lf
a
ll81ll'GS
Pr.rt II - Communicati ons Of ticer's Report
Ht'l1on Ro, !!.
, FobrQQ..,. 1945
r
Part I i conS COltJUEll
1, GenerAl : RCU .earoh eAch with one ReW Ob -
server parti ci ?at.d in thi s mi s eion. Search for Early Wa.rning
wus Acoomp lished until the ma inland was r enChed, wb$re a . e_
arch f or OCI and GL r ndnrs nnd enemy fight er communications chnnnele
w. s made. Frequenoie. of 2S t o 3000 mo/s we re searChed.
2 , . I
.. A t otnl of 51 radmr 8i gnnls wae l ogged nnd 3 enemy VHF
voiCe trnnsrnls8i ona were recorded.
No n/Fing of nny wns pos Bi bl e due t o the lnCk of
nntenn.s.
c;. Although fI nk WQS gonera.lly mod" r o. te o.nd ino.ccUTa. te to
nCcurnte . s ix s i gnnls were henrd in the gene r a. l Qrea may
hnve been employed f or gun l nylng. These ere 0. 8 f oll o_:
Frequency
190 1110
198 mc
225 mo
2S3 me
303 mc
307 mC
Pulse Wi dtb
5

3.5
5
9
10
!B!'.
1400
1250
1000
1400
1500
1500
No evidence of radar fighter vectoring was discovered
The complete 8ign3.l intercept log is Il.S follows:
(1 ) target Aren
Frequency n m. Remo,rk.
92,..94
102
106
106
112
h5- 146
150
152
ISS
I
190
190
194-198
225
253
303..307
333
>7S
1'00
33-45
31
,.
50
50
15-15
)0
)0
7

S
15
....
3.S
S
V .. I0
<S.
20
- 1
250
300
450
200
'00
250
200
200
)OCO
750
UOO
250
)250
)000
1'00
1500
300

s.eep1rlg
Sweeping

Swooping
S.eepiD.l;
Sweeping
SweepiQ6
Sweepillt;;
sweep1nt;;

Trnok1D.g
Swuy r nte 11 RPII
nte:5 RPJf
rraokiDI
Traoking
Tuoking
Sweepillb
TrIlOklng
SIr pIOC
(2) Frolll To.rglJt

FrlJgu!ncv
n ur.
RemQtk.
IntotylJDt L2c,tlon
1.5 8
1600 Trll.cklng SwaJ..u Arell.
1.0 12
1500 Tr:..cklng Suml.u Ar ...
160 8
500 Trllcttlng Volcllll lJ Itla.ncl,
lSS

750 Tucking Volco.no 1.1:r.n4.
153 27 250 Tra.okl ng
Volc&no 1.111.0.48
150

200 Tr .. cking Volcano Itla.nd..
"8
30 750 S_G',l rll.te Volcllno
, RPll
145-147
a _lO 250 Tro.cldng, Bonin Itlo.nd.
106-1OS
I'
1500 Tro.cking Bonin 1I1llJ\de
107 .. ' 50
Tro.cking Volcanc 1tlllllde
106 13
1100 TrlLcking VoIco. no l.lo.nd.
106 . 0 . 00 Tncking Volco.no l ' lo.ncla
103
,.
1500 Tr o.cking So1'u o..n
102 2C-3s 7CO_IOCC
Tra.cklng So1'\\ o.n
93-94 35 700-800 Swooping Sctu Go.n
8 0 4C ' OC _500 Swo ep r o. te SWIlhu
V3 RPll
(3 ) To
Ia.rget
Fr equency PL PRP Rernwk. Intercept Locat1on
75 30 6 00 TrIl.Cking, 33 N-1360E
76 26 2.0 Trncking
79 45 100e Tr acking
62 31 3CO Ttncklng
9'
25 l OCO TI'a.cklng
.6 6.5 roco Tncking
9 7 30 1000 Tr acking

6 .5 1000 Tracking
10"' 30 500_lCOO Trncklng
l e3 3 700 Tra.cking Iwo J1II. ..
10,
lO 250 E Sweep r nte
2 RPM
l e 7 15 1000 Sweep ute
1
l c..e .. llC 40-50
' CO trACking
1<.
"
SOC S-oping
1'47 14 450 Tra.cking
150 -152 7-8 :125-400 Trac.klng
151 7 1000 .. }250
Tracking
15l-155 6 3:50-850 Sweep ra. te
1/3
f. Snemy jllJlWllng on the following communicati ons tl'eqll8nole1
wn.a not,d I
Freguenc'll' Typ411 J geming lftectlnpe8
tou
tloA
1l080KC
CW' o.nd IMI' 50J
Rear Bontu
6055
!ICY
leU' BolLinl
3145
err
Bonini to Bue
SOOle
err
OYer Dlplre
'.
lSguiElZlegt :
No DIp' AntenDU hAd b.' n reoo1nd to date and U\ 1.D.Iu.ttlo-
t eat number of C-lC/APA-5X a.oll1ator ... r . aval1abl
b. Two recehora ... and ANJPA-6 i' uu. Ul.qpr. 11&"
b n borrowed t or lot by the 313th 80abardluftt . 1ac.
-10
11 Jl1I.I. 11
o. Squlpment -.lfunction. on thls ml l on were one
A1I/ APA-6 whloh eued fUnotl onl ng. Thll equl plDOnt beln& 'bench cheeked..
4. Conclusion'r
a . Photo coverage of thi. area is incomp l ete. The
phot o. h4ve 'been studi ed f or gun
bllt none btLve been discovered to date 1n .pite of the posl1ble gun
laying 5ignnl. intercepted.
b. The Si gnal inter cepted 1400 mels oorre.pond, to the
signnl ot 1410 mol. once reported over the Tokyo Its
use is still unknown.
c. The pOll8i bi1ity or constructing a DiP Illltenna. usia&
a s l mpl o hor i&ontal di pol o arrangeme nt. ,holl be by
the COWIIand .
d. No s l gno. l s of 'Wurt&bur g r euhr chor llcterllUca hu
t hus tar been inter ceptod.
PART II ... COMMUNICATIONS OfFICQt'S REfORt
1. Strike Reporter. Airc r eJ't r adio oper a. tors tnram1tt.ed.
eleven Strike Repor ts (Bombs AlmY); all wer e r eceiv"d by the Gr ound
StAtion. It directed that. effecti ve with this Field Order.
o.mpli1'ied St.r1k& Reports WOuld not be transmi tted.
2. I2A Tr a. nsmissi ons : WOIl ther enCOded in UCorAC and Time
Tioks wor e transmitted Si multaneousl y on all strike frequencle. OD
t bB halt hour a nd the hour. r espectively. Uo r equosta t or weathjr
or time ticks wer e made by a ircr af t in f light.
3. Freque nc i es ; All strike frequencies wer e jlUlDltd or i nter'"
ferN with at diff erent periods duri ng the 11118810n. The 73rd Wing
r eported moderate interfe r e nce on 11 C80 kce while airornft radlo
oper ators wer e transmitting the Bombs Awoy Reports. Durlag tM
tinal houra of t be 1II188ion. Interte r ence bec .... e greater on llteC
kca. while 6055 kcs wal cl ear untll f eur hour. b.tor.
all' craft were due t o At this time waw lignAl. oauled
I nterfer ence. but wer e readable thr ough it. In ...
effectlve interferenoe was r ec e ived by 3165 kcs and majority
of traffio .a8 oarrled out on tb1. tre quenoy. In a
breo.k:dOWQ ot trntf10 per frequency. forty..,.ln per ceQt .....
curied out on 3}4.6 koa; twenty-olght per oent on llC6C toe. ud
t.enty-seven per oent on &056 kOI. Tba 31Sth Wlag r eported .I1ght
interference on 3410 kOI. 1310 kOI and 11160 ko
'. Tbe 13rd 1Ung gr ound staUon reo.1ftd
bearings; f orty_three ot thele ..re
11pnll and prlorlty at ur gent bearlngl
0".1' cheok beulngs were the OIlU. tor tour be arings DOt be1", ob-
talned, Tha 313th Wing g;rollDd stattoD r . o.h.d twenty r equ.lts tor
DIP bear lng. and t.enty IVP oontaota ..... ooaphted. All a1rord't
utllised Radlo Ra",. aDd Ba.er abd r eported r .lultl.
6. m P'191pl1p' .MIl 'MyrlV. ladlo sl1eDOe ... -.t.talaed
to tho tarpt; On all .1x atrln trequn01... Securlty tor the
lI1.ulon WQI "I'}' goOd ... tar .. U. r u l o operator ... oOMer.d.
Oaly ODe violation ot All :S&0-6 Wlt.I DOted. OM ."ace nt to till
p0u.a4 ltatlon bad oode t;roup rep.",e4 wioe. A YiOla:tJOD of
os
.1.1111.1%
noted when the speed, oourse , and altitude spoken
in t he on VHF' over and nellr the target.
6. Enemy Killno code inter cepted on all strike
frequenCi es a of l etter s as op-
erators are stati on was abl e t o work aircraft
thr Ough enemy transmissions. r adi o are not
briefed to l og jumbo jumbo Kano oode .
7. Distressl The gr ound station r ooeivod one SOS whioh W48
1mmediately changed t o Urgent the con1iti on of this
Thi8 airoraft finally ditChed 12 miles
from baBO, with tho ground station wor king the nircrnIt COntinuously
Wltl1 it WII.8 approximately 500 teot fr om the tho a.iroraft
lrO.8 unable t o notify tho ground station of the ditching; hOW&ver,
clOSe 110.1son WIle nrfectQd with the MEW stati on and the exo.ct po-
s i t i on of tho downed aircraft wna known. Pive lurgentl
requests f or HF/DF boarings Were received by ground st ations; all
wer e obtained.
8. Eq uipment Malfuncti ons ; AN/ARt 13:' one transmitter with
no s idetone, a.nd one trD.Ilsmlttar with intermittent s hort;; SCR 5221
one inopero.t1vo;; Trailing wire o.ntannq.oll: one inopero.tiTe , one
sticki ng;; RC:':3G : t wo shortod :,n4 thr ce I:ll !:e butte!".:!
:.N(;.RN-7: f olt r s ons e :':.lltennr,e s broken, one in
operc.t.ive O.ll.._,.' Co.:.?::..ss ?os i t1on, :'ond one -on .. ntenn::.
pos ition ; BC 34.S: one nnt.enna. gr ounded o.nd one noisy
. , -

ANNEX
o
INTELLIGENCE: RE:PORTS
Part I - Enemy Fighter :..ction Report
Part 11- Enemy A n t l ~ l r c r n r t Fir e Roport
Po.r t III- DDJ:lQ.ge Assessment Report
lItaelon. No, 26
, Februo.ry 19'5
INTELLIGENCE REl'ORTS
- INEMY FIGHTER REACTION REPORT
A. genoral
1. Snemy a1r oppos1t1on was strong, 205 enemy a1 rorart
making 273 attaoks. Bowover, with tho 313th Wing making its first
trip t o Japan, thP size of our 8-29 foroo lfO.l!I inorl!lasod approxlm:;l.toly
50 per oOnt. Conseq,uently. tho 8-29 sueto.ined 2. e attaoks,.
whioh is l ess thIln avorllge for praTi ous miSSions . Tho aTor age J o.p
fi ghter lIIade 1.3 Ilttaoks , which 1& about Ilvero.ge.
2. On" percent (one 8-29) of our c.ir force over Japo.n '1'1'0.11
lost as 0. r eBult of ditehin; co.usod by enomy flghtor attaOk and 12
per cont (12 B- 29's) were damaged by Jnp fightGrs.
B. LoCo.tion of Attacks! Eighty s I x pe r oent of all attacks (0.
r ecord) werG made pr I or to bombs away. Previous hi ghes t perooD,-O
of enemy attacks prior t o bombs a"'6 Wi!1.8 ",hich occurred on
Uissl on No .20, ( AkashI). FollOWing 15 a br eakdown of the locc.ti on
of o.ttacks:
No . of Peroont of
Location Atta.cks Total Atto.cks
Prior t o Landfal l 1 0
lJ"ter LMdfall to InItIal Foint 10. 37
.After IP t o Bombs Away 134-

After Bombs Away t o Coast
"
1>
Attar leaving Coast

-2
Total 273 100
C, Type oC EtA Attacking' rojo and Tony made 31 o.nd 30 per cent.
r espectively. ot all ot the o.ttacka. On all pr i or milla10M. Tojo
rn.o.do 2.8 pOl' cent of all o.tto.cks. The brec.kdcwn Collow:
Type
&fA Atto.cking Ro. ot' Attacks POl' cent of Total Atta.ck.
rojo

31
Tony 63 30
.ok.
39 U
Zeke 32
10
Oaco.r
10

Vol
11

Irving
10

lUck;
5

J.Ck

1
Prolllc
1
0
WI Tis 5
it
WI !Vs
12

total
no
100
- 1 -

D. Directi on or Noae atil l Sixty
OIlO per oent of all of the 'It'ere _de from the noae quarter.
This i e the hi gbDl t percentage of yet made on
The following Ihows di stribution of on
qUarter bill ie"
E. Level of Aotl roo.oh: Fortyooane ,per cent of 0.11 of the a.ttacka
were made from bel ow. a nd only 25 per cent of the a.ttaeka were made
fr om above. Level attacks accounted f or the 3' per cent
of all attacks.
F. Dir ection Bnd Level of Approo.oh" The nose were almost
evenly divided among high, level, and l ow o.ppr oo. ches. being l Q, 20,
nnd 22 per respect1vely. Low tnil constituted only B
per cent of all o. tto.Ok8. (See on tho f ollowing po.ge)
G. Pncin1 A few SlA mot our 8-29. at a.o. nnd trailed our t or-
mnti ons, oommunionting with AA and fli ght controll.ra,
H. Coordipsted Atta9k., There were only tive reported ooordJn-
ated attacks, compri.ing lea. thnn 2 per cant of all attack'. DatA
is available on two Coordinated attaok.,
Over IF. at aD astlonted altitude at !S,SCC te.t.
Tojos oame In o.breo.st. mAkIng a trontal attaok from
abo .... ago.1nat one at our Ale. These two tighten re-
mained t ogether throughout tho nttacka.
b, 0..._ teu-get, o.t 25,000 t t. two Tonya ooma in Abreu'
trom at 11 o'oloOk, 1st down. pre.sed
olo ly, 0.04 broke nt S and 5 o'clock,
-&-
IISLBJl


1%
.,
Direction and Level of Approaoh
of &lemy , 19bter Ale
-
.iJi 21111 %
I. or New Type Attack
1. Over the tArget nren ome Tonya, Tojo. and Nioka were
reported to hnve lower ed thoir gear juat pr i or to pr ea. i ng nn attack.
Obeerving orewe were of tbe opinion thnt thi. t .chniqu. wo.e t o re-
duce .p.ed or to impr ove rammi ng appr oaoh effectiven.... Two lr.
were 0.1 .0 aeen f lying o.breo. et, l owering their gear . but mak
1ng G breGkn'lt'a,y bef or e oom1ng within r a.nge .
2. One B-29 evnded what wo.a believed t o be An attompt
a.t ro.mmin.g by raidng o.Dd l owering tba nose or the B-29,
J, Breaknwa.yst Hblfr olle, divea , a,lit-S' s. atro.ight fly-througha,
a.nd turns to left o.nd ri ght were o..m.ong thoae r epor ted.
K. Type Enemy Armnment a.n! Typo Projeetiles ,
1. ZekOl were nportod firing heo.vy llG thr ough pr ops .
2, One Tony was r eported. G8 firing 0. 2000mm caMon thr ouYt
the propeller hub.
3. Two Irvinga and one unidentifi ed twin_engine fi ghter
wor e r eport ed o.e having notle nnd wing firi ng ecmnon.
4. One J IlCk: we.s reported as having six guns . Th1a Ilir_
craft Wo.S not observed until it ho.d pressed ita
ntto.ck to o.b out 150 yo.rds o. t which time two II\.O.chine
guns (bolieved t o be 7.7) were firi ng. These two
guns were mounted l ow on the 8ides of t he fus el nge
at the wing roots,
5. One unidentified slE going 0. 8- 29 was s een
t o firo blloOlc from his CQJlOPY,
L. Enemy Aircro.ft Markings
2 Zek:e
1 Zeke
1 Zek:e
1 Zelce
1 Zeke
1 Zelce
1 Tony
1 Tony
1 Tony
1 Tony
" Tony
2 Tony
1 Tony
1 Tony
1 Tony
1 Tojo
7 TOjo
" Tojo
1 Tojo
2 Tojo
1 TOjo
Blnak with on nose and
0.0. wIth red
Rod wing',
- All Sl1 vor,
Dark green. riSing sun insignin.
S11"r, red r oundel.,
All allver.
- Shiny blnok. riaing aun in.igni n.
Dnrk in eolor.
- Gr oen, red roundol.,
Pour-toot wida orimloQ on encb wing
bue col or dark green with white belly.
-Dark brown, red .tripe on
- Cemoutlllged.
- Entirely blnok,
SlIver, r ed roundela,
Yollow oowling.
Bla.ok White,
All SUnr.
Silver with rod dota,
- Dark green. light oolorod belly.
Blnok. Y.llow oowling.

=
& Tojo ... Oark Gr aen. aun
I Tojo ... Onrk in ool or.
S Tojo ... SlITer. r lsing sun lnsignla.
1 Tojo ... Brown, r ed r Ollndels.
1 rojo _ Entirely Blnck.
1 Tojo _ CIll!lOIlf1o.ged . - -
1 Niok _ Blnck or dark gre'Un.
I ' _ Blaok or dnrk gr een.
3 IrTing _ Enti r e ly b l a ck.
2 I rvl ng ... Sl I ver , r oundel.
1 Ramp ... Disrup tive pe.1 ntiJll;.
1 V&.l ... Entirel y Bl o.ok.
1 TIE ... Entirely Blo.ek. '
1n-lino
un1dontirtod
1 MUte ... Black, Ger ma.n !llD.rki ngl .
7 Un1dent_ Dark green, rl11ng sun
W. Clo.im by Typo EtA and by GUn Position
D&B troyod
1 Tony
1 Tony
1 Tony
1 Irv1ng
Probo.bly Destr oyed
2 Tony
2 Tony
aTony
I Tony
1, Irving
1 Tojo
1 TOjo
2 Tojo
2 Zek:o
1 ZItko
1 Zoko
1 Zeko 32
1 OacQJ'
1 V.,
1 0/1
_, I _
Jlll ... ll
Dnmc.ged
1 Tony
1 Tony
1 Tony
5 Tony
2 t ony
1 Tony
l ' Jr'f'1D1i
2 IM'lD1i
' 1 IM'ltll:
1 In1n.g
2 rajo
S r OjO
, 'l'ojo
2 'rojo
1 Zoke
1 Zoh
1 leke SI
1 Zoto 31
.-
. -
Gun Posi tiona
(Fe
'SG
TG
....
Bombo.rd1er
TG
Boabllrdier &: CPC
R,G.
RSG
Bombardi er ,
CPC, RG'
CPC. R.G.
RSG
Boobo.rdier
Bombnrdler,H. G.
ROO .-
Bocbudlor
R.G.
cpe
Bombnrdlor
TG ,
UnicnOWD
TO '
Bombardier
BOmbardier.RSG
La
TO
RSa
RSO.BOIIbardhr
LG
'0
RSa
8cabQJ"d1er
TO
Bo.b.,.dbr
RSO
RSa
80abardler

-
by TyPe EtA Sn1 by Gun Pos i t i on ( cont ' d)
DDstr oyad
Probgbly Qe s tr oyed
,2 Osco:Q'
1
I
1 S/E U/ I
2 U/ l
I U/ I
1 stE U/ l
Gun Position,
'SG
Boabo.r dl er, TG
LG
LO, TG
BomblLrdi er
LG
Bombordi ar
PhRT II - ENM ANTIA.IRCRAFT F IRE REJ'ORT
a.. From la.ndf1111 t o f' l o.k Wl18 encount er ed by
diff' er ent f' ormati ons o. s follows:
1. The S04th Gr oup of tho 313th Wing 'lll'l th 12 JJe I1t
25,200 f't. flying over an rnn into monger
flo.k a. t Wo.kayo.ma.
2. The SCsth Gr oup of tho 3l3th Wing went in in two
Squo.dr ons.
(a..) The first squo. dron flying at 25 , 500 f t. o" er
o.n underco.st encounter ed modoro.te and o.ecUr o.te continuous l y pointed
flnk: through Cl ouds tlt Wako.ynmo.. Tho bursts wer e black, l evel,
behind t o o.heo.d. least One no."cl "essel waS r eported In ILction.
(b) Tho second squll. dron Il.t 25, 000 ft. encountered
COntinuously pOinted fInk o.t Shl onomisnki . The f I nk wne und
ino.ccura.te. BiLQ.ck bursts o.ppear ed aheo.:i to behind. and ' Oc.-C ft.
bol ow the for mation.
3.. The 73rd Wi ng ('97th, 498th, '99t h and SOoth Groups)
fir Jt mo t henTY AA fire o.t lnndfall (33
0
lS'N - 136
0
OC 'E) flying
between 25.000 27,000 ft. Flak was of predicted concentrati on
and t ypo. menger . and Inacouro.te, The bursts .ere le"sl,
behind, and to the right.
4, From I. p. to the tlU'get heavy flak .... 15 moder ate,
&Ccuro.te to ino.ccuro.te, le"el to aboye, and t o the right. Ha'I'Ul
vessels in OSo.ka Bay fired bursts which r oCked some of the J/'; ,
Both continuously painted o.nd firo encountered.
5. At t o. rget (lobe) o.ccurate to extremsl y
henvy flllk. modolr "te to InteNie .S I .... t by :111 f ormati ona tbrougb
under cast of 6/10-9/1 0, Black bur.t. Wore level. to behind;
nlao some white bursts .er o observed.
6. Tbres Ale of the SO'th Group minor
13 out of 20 Ale of the 505th Group tlak: damo.go; 5
of 39 A!e of the 1lrd Wint (1 .quadron of '91th, 2 ot
tho &path 1 .quadron of the 699tb Group) .uatnined minor flak

7. Tbe SOOth Oroui ba.be4 MatsuzAka from as,oeo to
Only two AA bursts .oon.
8. The .. oond .quadron of tho '99th QrOIlP bolJlbod vlll'lou
l ut ro.ort tar&ets. At Tan&bo and. Sbiftljl,l .eager. 1.Qaoouro.te tl.
ft.
-. -
JJJlIJl
9, En r oute t o hom& tho fInk wns reported by
var10us Ale 6& f oll ow& ,
( 0.) 505th Gr oup r epor t&d on descending
turn on wlthdr nwal , aFter bombs both squadr ons enoountered
bursts fOl lowing the plnnes down with consider ab l e nccuracy.
(b) At Nish1 No Shimn, at 15.50C ft menger,
1naccur at e flak wns re?orted. It was l ow and trailing. Als o 4 to
6 SlL beams wero obser ved wh10h f ail ed to 1l1wnlnat o any of 01U' ;.Ie.
at 16. 00e. to
(c ) At Iwo J ima r:lenge r inaccurate fInk WD.S
18 , 0(')0 ft,
cali be r flak thnn
(11 ) At Ako.sh1 the 504th Gr oup r eported amaller
a.t other 10co.l it1oe .
l a , The 73rd iYing r eported moage r nnd inaccur ate flak
a.t lo.nd' s end (33
0
4S
'
N _ 134
0
40 'E) . Tho bur sts wor e eotiClt.l.tod no
much as 4eOO ft, bel ow t he f ormo.t1on,
b. Our TBct1cs Versus AA None
c. Air . t o-air Bomb1ng and Rockets
1. None observed by the 313th "li ng.
2. One Ale of the 73rd Wing. 26, 000 ft. in t he v1c _
ini ty of Kobe reported 0. phosphor ous bol:lb bur s t . describing it CLS
e. 'white urnbrella. - Shnped pnttern npproxi mo.te l y I mile t o the r onr
of our Ale. The EtA releasing the projectilo was not seen.
30. Anotber 8 -29 in the same Group r oported 0. large
trac er or r ocket of r eddish color fired from on unobserved EtA in
the Sll.ll10 goneI'd o.ren.
d. Remnrks
Tbe wind at bombing altitude waS from 280
0
at 145! , and
bombing was generally upwind.
_ 7 _
.f.4.Irr. ill _ ~ ASSEss,,;;;':!: , Y.fQfi!.
KOBE HARBOR AREA
<34/39 N--135/10 E)
ltefarODOst PhotograIhy:
Pro- strike,
Pr o- stri ke :
Post- st r ike:
Post- st rike:
3PR5W 19 IV:27- 31; 2:89- 107 __ __ 20 Janua r y 1945.
3 P R ~ 17 IV:41 - 43; 2:50-55-----18 J anunry 1945
3PR5M 33 IV:13- 20-__ ___________ 5 February 1945.
3PRSU 36 2:19-21; I V:1l -15 ----6 Feb r uary 1945.
SlJUJ.l,ARY
Thi s r eport assessee damage to Kobe
fol lowing t he bomb st rike of 4 Febr uary
1945
Visible damage i 8 limited to Tar_
get 169. l,utsubishi hec.vy I ndust r i es . Ltd .;
Tc.r got 785 . Ko.negaf'uohi Sodc. I ndustry ;
Tergot 11. Kawllsllki Looomotivo and Ca r
Company. and misoellaneous secti ons i n the
vioi nity.
All visi ble dQlllago oove r s a t otc.l
a r oo. of a.pprox i mat ely 2 . 651.000 sq. ft.
T"rget ,ill:
TArget ll:
49 por cont (about 820.000
squar o feet) of the pllllDt
wr;:.s d ost r oyed.
2 pe r o ont (about 68.000
squore f oat) of tho pl CIlt
"as dest r oyed .
Four slllall buildings (ap-
proximat el y 22.000 squQrl3
feet of r oof areo. ) wero do-
strcyed.
l&i 800llQlloOUS dgmege: Areae dama.ged i n smoJ.l indust ries .
housing and business districts (center ed Qbout To. r get s
169. 785 o.nd 11) toto.l o.pproximo.tely 1.741.000 squaro
f oot.
(noto : six-inoh photo cov e r age is eompl et e froll! l ebe
oast to 135
0
18', Fivo_tenths o l oud oover po. r tially ob-
soures norther n Osaka.)
All annot ati ons in thh r eport refor to print
3PR511 19 2,89.
TJJIlET l.S.: (34/39 N .... 13S/l0 E) IQll ogaJ'uohi Soda. I ndust ry
(Qnnotflti on 1) : Approximatoly 820.000 squar e f oot of the plant
crell . tho.t put o. lmoet oell'lpl l3 t oly oooupted by bulldil'lge. 1fO.S
dest r oyed . Tho prinoipal building. 10. thi s t arget nrca . r o ot
sawtooth_r oof OODstruoti on. Tho greator port of the do.mage to
the plant 1s in thsso bu1ldings. Fire WillI. i n thl3 malb build ..
i ngs woro off ootive in oODtroll1ng the sproc.d of fllllDOIl.
- e _
DJ>JUwS ASSESSloIEllT RE:POi1.T. Cont'd .
.!,l.fOET J&.11 (34/39 e) Mltsubiehi Heo"'Y Indust rieS ' SlDoll
Ltd. (D.naotD.tlon 2) te tho plant ropresonts only Q
Pa r t of tho total tn; get or oa. 68.200 square f eot
of do.rrt; ruot i on 1n01udosl
About 45 .500 squaro f oot gutted i n bu1ldi ng with or1gi nal
r oof Draa of npp r oximatoly 79,000 sqUD. r e ( ac t .
s ix sll10.11 bu1ldings dostroyed. Tho buildings oove r ed 0.
t otD. l a r oo of approxi mo t oly 27 .700 squar o f oot.
Totol dEllllo. gol oppr o:d mntolY 2 por oont of the plant dost r oyod .
1.
AnG
er 11: (34/39 N--l3S/10 E) XOWD.salc1 Loeomotive IlDd Car
Company ( nnnotnt1on 3). Four smol l st r uotu r os have boon
ad. Tholl' total r oef 01' 00 Was about 22 ,000 s quo.r o f oet.
MI SCELL.\NEX?US DJ.f!.AOE: Tho ar oa bet'll'oon Tnrg,ots 169 Qlld 765
(annot o. ti on 4) 1s t1l1ed with offioo str uotur os , Wa r e-
hOuses and small 1ndustrios . About 1 ,084.000 squll r o foet of the
Ilreo. has boon burnod out.
A r e a1dontio.l and smo.1 1 business 0.1'00. (o.nnotati on 5) Ms
o.bout 205,000 square foot of o. roa.
Fires visiblo (annotation 6) on 5 Fobruo.ry 1945 (3PRsY 33)
nr o s till smoki ng on 6 February 1945 (3PR5L! 36) , the bur nod o.r oll.
i no1udos two unidontifi ed indust ri e s. one of 'll'hich may bo
of Target 11. The ar eo. domnged oovors nppr o)' i mD.te1y 356,000 sqlUlro
fo ot. Furthe r s proad ot the fire nppoars i mp r obabl e.
A tire visiblo (annohtlon 7) on 5 FeCrunry 1945 (3P1\SU 33)
is still smoking the day (3PR5U 3 6). The destroyed ar ea
in this small unidentifi od i ndustry c overs a bout 23,500 square
t eat. Futhor spr ead ot t he tir e nppe o.rS improbabl e .
A r esidential or b usinoas area ( cnnotation 8) hes aD nr ea
ot approximately 73.000 square teet dostroyed .
A small building (nnnotntl on 9) on tho wutertront i n the
n orth port ot Tnrgot 169 has boeD almos t cocpl etely burnod out.
Tho damo.go h visible on the original photo coverago ot the I:l.r ea.
It 1s possible thnt this damage 1s tho r e sult ot woathe r- st ri ke
chslone. Soveral surrounding b ulldi nga shcw possible dCClCLgC.
Lo.ok ot oomparntivo photography in this arel:. provents positive
assessment.
Print 3P8SJ.i 19
Pr int 3PR5J.! 36 -
2;69 UI1notnted
2:20
-, .
and attaohed.
STRIKE
-,;t'J A I R C ~ A F T BOMBING 69
VISUAL r,OMr,INO
I Ale SluHTlNG FOil..
R to D RANGE
2
Ale
DROPPING
OM
LEAD Ale
17
A/e &OM 81N6 A/C DROPPING
IV "AMI'. ON LEAD A/C
5 44
ANNEX

CONSOLIDATED STATISTIC;'L SUl.34ARY
Misston No. as
.. Febrcmry 19<15
I
XXI BCMB.l!R amr.WJD
CONSOLIDATl!D SUl.[lAR'1 OF COMBAT OPERATIOliS
FORM 34
MI SSION J.!O 26
4 FElli"''''Y 1945
PRDIl\R'I TARGET, KOBE. JAPAN ( 1,1IDDUMAN fP.)

Aircraft G .. .. ............. .
Percent of Alr(;raft on Hand ..
Aircraft Bombing Priza).'j' .......

Percent of Ai r craft Airborne .. .. ..
Ai r cr<lft Bombi nc All Targets ......

Forcent of Ai.I craft Airborne ..

Bomba Dropped on All Target s ...

Aircr aft Deetroyed. .. ..
.liO

O . fl. ,"%

69

63%
99

.

90%
. 251 To,,"
4
Aircraft Loo t .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2
Per cent Of .Aircraft AirbC',,:,oe .... .. 2%
Aircraft ................ -... 35
Percent of Airar3f't Airborne , . 32%
Crew McmbClI' Casual ti cq, .. 6
Percent of Total P:lrtlcipat ing .. .5%
" tical. CortN: elit
;I)%'- .9
MtS::. l ON 26 (Mi ddl OOlBJ] #1)
A IR e R A F. T PA R T IC I PAT I N G DATE_ !t February 1945

j
' BOMBING Ja.[3ING
24
21
18
TO
1.
1b
1e
a. Inverter r el ay out.
b. 150 RfM - dr op left tleg #1 engine
I.ASr PFln-i.'>RY S!';"'cOND:. L.R. &T. O.
1257Z
l ]02Z
l 2l7Z
TARGF![' MY
19
8
3
11
15
22
19
15
1
1
2
e. #4 engine cut out , :zIgIlet o distribut or.
d.
1 we i nver ter out beeause of internal
s hort in coil .
1 .ve IfJ. encine would not start
foul ed spark
bec811se of
BRElumo:-m OF ;'.l.L 1.IRCRt..FT FAJLING TO BCMB PJID.;any T/.RGEI'
1illiii:
, ,
,
,
min ,."". Bembed Bombed Non- Bombed Bombed
I >bo-
Effective Secondary Other Effective Other Effeoti"'e
497 1 o.
-
1 b.
- - - -
498
I
1 e.
- -
2 e. ,
-
,
-
-
499
I
1 f .
-
5 g.
- - 5
I
-
500 2 1.
15 j. -
- I
..
- -
73
"i it:
5
-
6
- -
22
,
-
I
-
I
1 k.
- - - - -
-
3 " . - - - - - -

6
-
- - - -
22 9
-
6
- -
-
I
a.. #14 puch r od broken #2 FnelDe.
"::I. Ran s hort of fuel due to leck of po;-:er in #4 ene;ino.
Left formation and banbod Owage.
e. Turbo fallure.
.... Damased by friendly .'/C. Left formation at I.P.
e. releane a t I.F. Bombardier error.
:. Turbos out on all 4 engineD.
&e 2 Ale prop sovernor malfunction.
1 II/c oil leak #3 encina.
1 Ale lost engine.
1 .tC lUel booster pump f ni l ure .
k. J'Uel shortage. r eDSOD unknown.
Bombed
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
I
Bombed 110"..
Bombed

Bo.r:lbed
Jo""j
Other EffectiVI)
Secondary Oth ..
Other
-
- - - - - -
- - - -
- -
ld
- - - -
- - 10
- -
-
- -
-
.
-
- -
- -
-
2
-
- - -
1 1.
- -
-
- -
-
1 n.
-
-
-
2
.
-
-
-
-
2
-
2
-
-
- -
,
,
1.
Blor.n cylinder #1 ellBine,
oil leak.
b'.:l doors t!l8l functiot
j . Faulty naVl
s
atlOD:
r
t 1 _ distributor a."Id fincer
k. 4 sperk p1ucs inw cc us
c over ed with moisture.
1. Ret urnins spare.
1 de axec!]!! oil l eak #4 eD1nc.
me 1 Aje fuel lenk in transfer on push rod housinE;
1 -VC 011 l eak from l oose hose e
n.
Returnina spare.

!lIS:iI<m
26 {ltiddle.-;.au If.ll
BOHBDIG RUN
DAn
, '0', <
TA.RGl T
'/c
TIME OF
"
(J'

,
RI.n ..
,.
1IIll'
NAUE 01 TARGZT ITYP, BO:'IBS Earlie:!t Latest Lowest
A/c ,t.ng
.Ale A/C
\Ie
I. R&D Ih, .
A"
e-1

,
497 Kobe , P 10 0557 Z 0600 Z 24500 26250
- - - 1
9 1
Owase LR 1 0542 Z - 25375
I
1
9
-
- - - - - 1
498
Kobe , (uri an P 19 0600 Z 0604 Z 2J,7OO 26500
- - - 2 17 2 11
at", TO 3 0555 Z -
26000
- - - - 2 1 0
3
499 ...
p
8 0629 Z 0631 Z 25900 27000 1 1 6
- - 2 6
Koya, Shi.-,gu, LR 10 0542 Z 0625 Z 25000 27000 5
- 2
3
- 2
,
Tanabe . 1frIkayama
Paean TO 1 0420 Z -
10000
-
1 - - - - 1 -

),latsuzaka LR 1 5 0604 Z 0604 Z 26300 26700 1 1 13 - - 1 14

Kobe P 37 0557 Z 0631 Z 2J,5oo 27000 1 1 6 3
26 5 32
I;;
25000
1
11 -
-
1 11
Kobe p
12 0628 Z 0630 Z 25000
-
18
2 18
2
Kobe P 20 0642 Z 0656 Z 25500
26000 - - -

11
2
18 3
29
0628 Z 0656 Z 25000
26000
1 -
Kobe P 32
5
'"
,
61
27000
2
1
17
Kobe P 69 0557 Z
0656 Z
2J,5oo
.. - ,.. .. - ...
IUSSIO!I 1;0 .26 (; Ud!ilem:tn #1)
DISPOS I TIOI; OF BO U BS
- ------
II FeJruary 1%5
Type & FU:u I L:ded on J.ir-f' ki.L!..lSm OI l Th.:iGEl'S --I'
mit'

Tleight of Bcmb borne . primary Secondary Last Resort &: T. oj J ettisoned ur J ",.: .. ,0':"'(
- Ton;2 ":::1 .. ::': ,". I ",- i ,,". '""
T4E4 - 500 F Clu. lIote 12 2.4 10 2. 0 1.2 1 1.2 1
>:-26 500 I C1u. 368 61.3 297 49.5 40 6.7 31 5. 1
T4E4 .. 500 F c l u. . 23 19 3 . 8 3 . 6 1 , . 2
-I
E26 ... 500 1 C1u. 274 45. 7 242 40. 3 31 5. 2 1 . 2
E2B .. 500 I Clu. 320 53. 3 I 96 16. 0 128 21. 3 96 16. 0 I
T4E4 - 500 F Cl u. 20 4 . 0 I 3 1 . 6 11 2. 2 1 1 . 2
T4E4 - 500 F C1u._ -l-- --- t-_ _ '_7t- _ _ 3_.
1
,_,___ 15 3 0 _ _ +
192.3 547 91. 2 72. 0 174 I 23. 9 1 I . 2
E26 ... 500 I Cl-.! .
T4E4 .. 500 F Cl u.
E26 ... 500 I Clu.
TU4 - 500 F "lu.
1154
72
182
13
37 7. /1 30 6. 0 5 1. 0
30.3 156
2') . 0
26
4.31
2. 6 11 2. 2
2 . 4
2.
47
7. 6 13
505 , E26 ... 500 I Clu Soe 3
1
2 52. 0 252
3
.6 1
j
4 . 0 TU4 .. 5 00 F Clu. Jlot c
24
4. 8
20

73
"i!!
E2B - s eo I Clu 494
82. 3
68. 0
5
- 500F Cl u ;' 7 7
6. 2
E28. 500 I C1u.
43
2 72. 0
-'7
I Gli 8 274. 6 955
159. 2
3
0
6. 0
.0
'l\E4 ... SOC F Cl u. 109 a .B
(,0
13. 6
...L_
--r-
BO'.l'"", FI1Io;S set t o open 1000 f eot bol on forwotion.
Il;qU,D aet to open 5000 fcet obeve groWl d.
t
d T 0 includod in thl !) figure
banbe dropped on1'e on prl lOry or.d 40 bO;"lba droPIJed oofo on lOst r CIlt'lr OJI
AYe Bomb Loe4 per Ale tor 88ch grOUP I 73 Wing,
31,3 Winel
16 Incen.1iOI'J clu.,ter!ll ond 1 FrOB clus t er.
' l .. ond 1 frog
13 I.1CCl\diory .......
co r I"
12. 1 !1,3
2.
1. 0 ' 1
I 4l .tl'U. 2. ' - !
, 2.0 I, 1 _ ,3,- =-.: '
SECRET
------
mSSION fl o. 26 IrrnD!r..l,' tl' #1
DATE 4 Februarx
194
5
ACCURACY OF Hamme ON PRIJdAR'1 TARG8I'
<
e<J!BS RE-
tlUMBER OF HITS &; DISTANCE FROt.1 AThfiNG ?0I!fl'
jtmIT LEaSED Cfl -
110. pm;mr
TARGEl'
o - 'i00'
<00 _
1000 - 2000 ' 2000 - JOOO ' TCTAL OF HITS
O'


ON
BOMIE
rio. TONS NO . NO. HO. NO.
% NO.

TARC",

7J

f
313 1023 172.8 Because of type of banbs u sed and lack of photo cover age. hits could not be spotted.
Wings
I I I I I I I I I I
Photo' s fran 1 squadron of 7]rd ,{ina: s hol'! 50 fires betf/e en 4000 and 7000 f eet fran A. P,
I I I I I I I
All bombs of 504th Group obs erved to drop on the tarGet area
MI SSIon 110. L (WC;dl eman #1)
DA'ITI Feb 1945
,
PDiSOl iliEL CASUllTIl:S
T ._--' -- - __ _-T ", :! . - . _. _ ___ _ . I ' Prn$a:m:L CASu .r:rlis- - - - i
I 'E/A CRAsHID ! 0THrn It TurAL! E/A I Fl a l;; ' & 1 Ac e . & 1
00m
I : un- I Totai Irotal Kl li-Ittouna I 1:15 -- -----1
I
I Over ,Ace ..:;: ""j Un:--l I! !Fl a k I, ti.ech II
Guns
I Other IknOflIljlIs-.iorTihnor ed ed & -! '!'otal
_ ; __ -1ti_ '--If--+--+---+--j-- -+-- f.--t
l
, _ -.j+- ' _ ! InJd. On:sUal .
/
' , - ,- - " - , I - I - - 1/ 3 1 - - : - - - i - I 4 - . . . '
I
499 , : : , : : I =b II 52 - 1 - - ' . . . I 1 I 4 2;;: ; II 4 . 5 \
: 500 I _ _ _ . 1 , 4 - I . i ' . . I ' I 229 I ' 1 1
.. ' - '--':: 'i - --+-': 1 - : -: --.-+--. --.:--'-_.
1:7 '1 < Ii ' 2 -3
5
_
L 11
--_--.11'- -,-+--,+ --,- - I 1 u:. _ I! Bll i - 6
- - - . - 5fi7T- . . j '
, 503 i - - - - i -I - : . . - 13 - 1 - 2 - - - 15 ' 255 - - I -
!313 : : 1 ., "t'---- I I
\: ! : I t !i -.. _r: =:=tl-=- -:- ;.--/
One i h ' t f f 1 15 r.ul .:l fr<Xl Soipan ru:d crash lanued.
cne; nc S ot oLLt by r.ne y actio)", over turget . LO:;lt Mother ongil C near 1170 J )..:.:o. . Ran ou 0 lIO c .
b. #1 eD_me CD.ught f i r e D.llt, Ll.rned aftor IIlJldil'g at Sni pen. Wing !loction also do ,0.80d . Lost to survey.
.E . R !; ! IfISSI 01T 26 (!1icldl anan #1)
DATE 4 February 1945
EUllUY A1.D A nn,ITlCi, W,il;DI'I'URIS
I I ElmfY Ale DISmOYED U'.!';l..GElJ r
- ----._----------
- -T " --II -
i.J 'l:tJJlITIQU EXP.El ;nI'I'URES
.- ----- -- -- - -.. - .
I EUCCmJ 'l'1'.i.CKSI OR . DES- t FROB. I I
UNIT i TI:RED r 'IN F/t.. IHODEL ' TnO'fED jDISTR'D ' D.I!.:AGED :1
,- 4'fl " -4- --;;; -1-- -
84
-- - - --- , - - - - -; - - -'0 - ii
t.1. 1.1 . .50 c..r.rnrn
+ iWf Tar.".r. ___ _
100 100 29147 29147
49 40 69 3 2 11 Ii
49940136 2 7 i,l
500 10 4
1-- _ .. __ . \l.
I 7Jd " 5 28 i! 1
1<5 , 193 3 1 00
r Sm.--L
5
. ;) 34 - 0--- - -:5 --, - 1 "*
. 505 150 _70 46 1 ; 10 10 II
-- - -- -----11
II
... --
- --'-- i ---
I 313, " , "
. '!7ill& 65 -90 ' 80 1
- -- +
Tar",-: 205 " z/J
15
4 20
11
39
"
100
Val 1 1
Uke 4 2
Tojo 4 11
Tony 3 7 11
Osenr 1
3
Irving 1 1
5
1 2
S/E 1
"
16820 6000 I 22/320
28078 20078
12157 lZ751
---- r-- - }-----;-
,
:----t
100 I 86802 6000
-- -r-- - ---
- " 12326 -
1 33603
,
. '. - - . '[
1
- , - 145989,
_____ -L _---+-_--:-
100 . 132791
__ .....L _
6000
I
92802
-- ---,
12326
33653
"- - ---
136/91

. E 1: Hll
4 Fobrw 1'y J.945
FUEL CONf U'IPTION & FLI GHT Dj\'tA

I
,Ale C('I!,wL!:TING MI!)':' IQN
,!'!EIGHT DATA
Avg &&1c t'lt . of' Ale
Avg Fuel Loaded (Gals . )
Avg Bombs LOfl!l f' d (Lbs.)
Avg Gross Wt . at Toke off
LIcHT DATA
/lvg Timo at Loll' Altitude
Avg of Climb to
Altitude
Avg Time at Bombing Altitude
A vg Flying Time
/lvg Distaneo Flown (Nnutical
Air Miles)
FUEL CONSUUPTION
Consumed to Target :
Average
Mo.ximwn
Minimum
Consumed From Tar eet ToBcse :
(Ale Without Malfunction)
Average
Me.ximum
Mini!:lurn
Consumed from Tnr gct to Base :
(A/CWlth Mal f unction)
Avera.ge
Maximum
Minimum
Total Fuel Used :
Avor nge
Maximum
Minimum
Totel Fuel Remaining :
Ave r age
Maximum
Minimuo
Avg Gals. Fuel Consumed per
Hour
Ava Gnls. Fuel Consumed pe r
MUe
fOUL FUEL CCtlSUIIED AND LOST ON I
A1ILIdI!i URCRAFT
I '
,
SEE r.EICHT SHEET
I
I
I
6 : 50
1 : 15
1:00
' 14:39
2845
4860
5111
4355
1996
2233
1647
6693
6913
6255
548
n 05
1
456. 9
2.35
77935
6 : 37
1:10
1:1)
14: 52
286/.
1 .. 670
5100
4390
2006
2330
1731
6693
7108
6380
737
1020
292
15301
6 : 1.0
1:10
1:35
15: 00
3001
,
4671 i
I
I
I
5131
4261
1912
2116
1315
1878
2078
1643
65'10
6990
6060
819
1390
360
438.0
,
2.19
113797
6:11
1:23
1:25
14:27
2872
1972
2100
16')6
2131
6615
6845
6::13
785
U87
555
\
457.8
2.J()
11l'n11
6:33
1:14
1:19
14:45
2899
5131
l.261 I
6633
710a
6060
737
1187
1
"IISS1011 26 {:!1d,lhlllOn Hll
FUEl. Co'):ISUMPTIOj-i lc FLIGHT DATA
Ie CC\rWLETING MISSION
lJ:: r CHT DATA
Avg Basie Wt . of Ale
Ave Fuel Louded ( Gala . )
Avg BombsLoudcd (Lbs .)
IIvgGross " t . at Take off
0' G
12
o G
1 W
rY1 B.
20
32
Sr.:E W$ICIiT DAn SHt:F:'r
I
LIGHT DATA
Avg Time at Lor. Altitude
Avg Time of Climb to Bombing
Altitude
6 :)0
1:10
1 :13
14: 47
6:27
6 : 29
\
6 : 32
1:16
1:16
14:48
\
Avg Time at Bombing Altitude
Avg Flying Time
Ava Distance Flown (Nautical
Air Miles)
UEL CClNStr.fPTlm!
Cons umed to Tareet :
Average
Ma"dmum
MinimU/U
FTom Tar get to Base :
A/Cnithout Malfunction)
Average
/,la:<imum
lfini mwn
Consumed From Ter gct to Base :
(A/c With Malfunction)
Average
Maximum
Minimum
Total Fuel U:Jed:
Average
r.{(.ximum
Minimum
Total Fuel RCm!lining:
Aver.ge
I.fnxir.rum
;Ainul1.L1l
Average Gal s . Fuel Consumed
Per HoW"
Aversgo Guis . Fuel ConBUIl'IOd
Per Mile
TarAL FUEL CONSlJ:{ED l IND LOST
(1l AIRBORNE AIRCRAFT
2760
4712
4994
4 304
2005
1786
2109
NONE
6692
7036
6398
708
10'- 7
389
452.8
2.1.2
80304
1 :27
1:08
14 : 54
1:21
1 : 10
14: 51
2950 2816
50)1
5423
4621
1904
20%
1641.
NDNE
560
952
99
459.1
2. 4
143338
4912
5423
4)04
1942
1786
164J.
nONE
6786
7301
6398
616
1027
99
456. 7
2.41
223642
2871
4750
5l.23
l.261
6683
7301
6060
696
1187
1
451.8
2. ))
* Data far all Ale is Dot na1lJ1bl e . Aftnges are b .... c.
the lIIissicus shown Wld.;: r grou.,J II.! ca.pletin&: medon. HOWIrfttr,Total l*Il
and Lost 18 based m aU a irborne aircrcft.
I
__________________
?'",-' t:



.
MISS1U! 26 (Middleman #ll
lIEIGH!' DATA
-
D/.TE - '( 194,2
I UNIT

AVlW.GE AVERAGE AVERAGE
AVER/I.GE ';IT
AVERAGE
AVG '.i'l' OF FUEL
CC&!PLEl'mG
:'!5c'T.
USErnL NO OF BOMBS
OF BCI.ms FUEL
AVERAGE
AVERl.GE GRess
IIISSICll
L01J)F.D
"'SC rooCHi'
r
LO.\D LCWlID LOADED LOJIDFD
(6 LBS FEll G;.r.)
,iEIGHl'
AT T.\KE OFF
I
497
11
75593 57
0
99
16 E28 IClu
6030 7241
43446
7
6
23
I-
498
21 76000 57000 1 T4E4 F clu 6030 7400
44400 6570
132692
l)JooO
499
16
75330 56472 Per Group 6030
7369
44334 8108
133802
500 16 76000
57
1
5
6
6030
7400 44400 6726
133156
,
I

64 75762 57425 60,0
!
7370 44220 7175 133187
I
504 12
75<Y15 58055 13 E28 IClu 4960 71125 44550 6525 133130
505 20 74500 57100 1 T4E4 F Clu 4960 7400 44400 7720 1]1600
per sroup
.
.
32 74716 57456 49&0 7409 44454
6024
132174-
I
.1
I

9
6
75414 57435 5
660 7363 44298
7457
1]2B49
I
28 ' Fr cl u ter = 430:1 (actual 'fl"eiah
t
)
- 500# wendiary c luster = 350# (actual \leisht) - ag S
NOl'E:
Bomb:) l7eight supplied
by Chcrnico.l and Ordnance suction of X..I Bomber CommIlnd.
S. E'l'CR4'F-T
'NIl""
P
FIELD ORDERS
MhUon Ro, 26
4 February 1945

1 .
r nl'or lll!l. t i Oil :
A . pr i endly
(1 ) Air
,()(1 BOUIb .. r CCIIII,lM,nd
APO 234
3l January 1945
( 0. ) CTF 93 wi ll provido ai r defenae of tho oper .t1ns beao
(b ) Ownbo Se r vieo : TO 1'0110'/'1.
(2) Ndvo.l
( 0. ) Li 1' ogu!l.rd Submnr ! no : TO f ol l ow.
( b) J)Ostr eyor: To 1' 01101'1.
(1) Airornft : Appr oximat e ly 228 Opc ro.t lonul goemy t l ght..J rs (;. r o Ic:no,rn
t o bo i n t ho !cr oa .
(2) Il
n
t1
w
Aircr o.ft
l
rh )r o a ro 71 hcc.. vy l\ot i wAlror .:. 1't guns in a:ob,J wOa...h..
Ar co. wi thin offeotivo r ange of plo.nnod r out o to t_r got .
2. 1)00iSioo : Tho XXJ Borr:h.; r Co;ruilQ.:ld 1'(111 attc..ok t ar gote: dO:l igllO.tcd b..)1 ..... on
-0- O--y .
3. Instruc tions to unit s .
A. 73rd ' '(ing Objeot! vos :
B.
c
PRT'UJl Y TARGET
por t and bui l t up urban erco
of
tho oity of Kobe:
Objective
folder 90. 25 !.Ia.p " . 9
TMGET :
None
LAST RESORT:
Any industri c.. l
city
FOOCE REg,VI RBD:
7 Sq.uo. drons
3l3th lying Objeot! vos:
T;\RGET
port o.od built up ur b.:m nroo.
of
tho oity of Kobe:
Objeot. ivc
foldor 90. 25 Mo.p M-9
T;,RGE"I':
NODO
L\ST RESCll: T:
Any
i Od:Jstri a l
Clity
FOOCE RE9:U1RED:
3 Sq.uudroQS
SOMlIle of Manouver:
hJ ::': I NG POrnr
to
loILING POINT
to folleM'
(1) Mothod of o.t t ook : ;3y aqu.ldrona in co1w:m. c,tt40k:
i
n& witb A auu.a
tilllO 1ntorvnl botwO!')D OOl.lbo.t squAdron.. Tho t _rlot trill be
o.tto.cirod by vitun.l boobing cothod. if pouiblo ::wd. b. ra.dar balb1rc
methods if naoo.aary.
(2) AZi. and of
toot.
Q
YoXl COI.l/l)f)J'jd
I.PO 234
(3) 'l'lmo control; The first oombot group of tho 73r4 Wi nt .,,111 let-vo thlo
depar ture point at "H" Hour . The fl ret o omb .. t g r oup 01' t.h(l 313th
wing will l oo.ve tho aeparturo point c.t II.pprOltl l11 .... toly "11" Hour plu.
45 minutos .
D. ROutos - 7] rd orld ]13th Winge.
BOllo
1700 ' 11 144 00 ' E (OOpllrtl.lrO
29
0
00
l
fj 135045 ' 8
34
c
4S ' N
3451' N" 13536 ' 8 (IP)
TDrgot
3300 ' N
2J oOO ' " 14500 .
Dn,:w
(2) 90mb Load l
73rd wing - uc..x:lmwJ load pos t l b l o . "mlnlro.uJ::l l oad of 6 , 000 l bo, typo
828, o.lmt.b l o inoendiary cluster fused to opon at 5 . 000 f t Will be
oo.rrlod . Enoh airoraft will o!l.rry ono 5 00 Ib frng olultor fueed
to open 1, 000 f oet below the a iro r aft .
3
1
3
t
h wing - Eaoh nl rcro.ft will carry e. mlnl I:lul:l of 5.000 lbe of .o.ce
type bombs spooified f or 73rd Wing
(3) intervolomotor setting: 5 00 fect .
4. Supply nnd Administration:
A.
Emorgpncy fields :
(1 )
Isley 110 2 ,
Saipnn
(2 )
we st Fi eld,
Tini an
(3) navy
Agano.,
GU""
(4 ) Depot Field ,
Gu,",
5. communioatioos:
A. SOP XXI Bombor Commo.nd will govern the U$e or radio kid to &D4
use of radio ror roporting pur posos .
B. oporational Air Ground stat i on :
(1) 7Jrd Bombardment Wing oall Sign. OOv53
0
(2) 313th Bombardnont Wing 00.11 s ign Oov535
BY aOr.v.Jllnd of Major Gcmcral LoW, Y:
OF'FICIll L:
WILSON
D/OPNS
COtlSOLQ:.rED AHENDI!ErITS FOIl: FO tJ22
IJIOOLE:.!Ml 1
l,([ COIM.nd
I.PO 2)11
Ar.londmont 1:

For 3 .: t.o rond :
A. 7Jrd Wing ObjooUvoa
T.RCET
90. 6 - lTIln
Zooo 1 of Mop M- 9 106136
079132
I.lmln pol:lt r c- r .., ronco
on XXI BOLbor

1 - Nono
1nduetr1r.l
7
eity
b_ par 3 B te TOLd,
B. ]13t h objeotivos
f'CI?CE RE;" 'JIiCD
2 SqUlldTOL '
2 SquCl.dron&
3 S'l.VJldrooa
COII:I:lawl. Litho >.0:. .... 10
PRJ lARY T/RGEr J.IJ'lNC POINT PCJ!CE
90. 25 ZOllO 1 of 074125 3 Squ14ro;
'(UP M- 9
"l1nl ng point roforonce on XXI BOr:'lbor Co;:-;:u:;:r.d Llt.b:I .. oa<.-10
Nun,bo r 90. 25 ur ban .
Nono
ind s trial oit.y
] Squadro:u;
c. par 3 . X (4) to r :Jod ,
(4) Bombing pr evaili ng Bur f_ce
tar got aro:!. '- rc fror.l thu wClSt north .... /est. Ir. ordor to
p:-wv,Jnt BDIOke.. from prooeeding ::..tt t..c k::; obsc ... r 1.i.-6 tM ... 1::.1:1
points fer ::ucooding (.ttaoks tho :..i:r.i olb points w111 bo
attackod in tho followi ng ordor:
1. 139137
2. 106136
3 . 079132
4. 074125
JI.l.1ondoont 2; 0. . Chango p:lr 3X(3) to road: intJr .. :. lo,J .... t ... r sottings:
J,mO!ldJ:iont 3:
a .
ehG.::lgo
X (2)
par 3X(2) to roed:
Bomb Lond:
73rd Wing: 1.:1nlmur.l o.oooptr.blc for _ll :Je will "be 6.000
los . This docs not proolud<J, .0 eVI;:r . lo-diag .\le r.boft
minimur .. oondstent with tll-foty . bility of' \ho iDl!lv1cllUo1
comb!".t orow, _nd Imol-ln oh::trt.ot",ristio8 01' tho lndh1du...-1
Me. tJc: Typo -28. ;.1..tlt.blo inc:.;;nal _ry clu.t ..
fut.od to OpOli .. t 5,000 ft .:.ud 500 lb T4:4 fr"" ol",t(.
fu::o to op .... n 1.000 l't be low the .. ireratt. Tho tr,,"", beat
wl 1 be 10:lcod 80 ';' 5 to drop , ' irst ..
]13th Vline : guch ;,,/C w111 oJ;i.rry u. OlDl.mW:l or .5. 000 lit
of &u.mu tyP'J of bo .. \b 8poo ifi od for 7Jrd 'flng ..
b . J,dd to. par 3X: (5) fr .. g wi 11 OU 10Q,dud to drop 11rat ..
Bombo.rdiorll will b.; bri(;fod to 8.;1,1\'0 toli;b. Ov..:r th ... t...rgot ....,.....
in ouse.. tho ro.11 to r o l o;lso 011 tho '1l1oa tivo mothCld..
AmondQont 4: n. par )x(I) should road: (1) ooy .. ce "H" 08101
2 F<.;bruc..ry 1945
J.QOndrlont 5: u . ptlr 1,\ to roo.d,
I..
(1 ) A1r
(0.) CTF 93 will provido Ilir clotO.l8e of tho op.:ara'lItI
bllIlOIl,
(b) Dwabo lIunic., J.. OWnbc w111 be ill
200.00'. 142000, tro. 0900X to.
24'121,. J.D.othor Duabo _111 bo Got
Amendment 6:
Y.xl iio,ubor couu"r,;."d
I'.PO 234
frog lO)OK to 1230K. call 11gn 80th
guo.r d 4474kol nnd 500keB. Ch&.nne l 0";. on VHP.
(2) H::.vg.l
(0)
(b)
Lifogug.rd Bubmorlno : J submarines will OQ
statlon 32)0 ' " 137 OO ' E, 31
0
30 ' N 1)8000 'E
nnd )OOCO' 1l l 390lS ' E dl.:rlng ontire mluloQ,
Destroyor: I. dostroyor will \;0 On reBoue duty
Ilt 22
0
00 ' 1l 14130 ' from 09451':: to nOOy; . StIma
dostroyor wl l1 bo ou duty from 2030K to
Ilt positi on 22
0
oo , U 14430'. Vol uo 0. 11
b. 3D to
n.
D. Routos 73rd and. 313th
Idd
( b)
SO'
1700 ' N 144 00 ' E (Depa rturo polnt)
29000 l N 13545 ' E
344S ' N 1J.5.53' r.
34
o
S1'U 135)6 , (Ip)
Ta.rgot
34
0
17 ' N 13501 ' E
33
0
00 ' N 13515'
2) oOO ' N 14So00' g
BOoSO
to pilI' l A(l)(b)
2 B- 29 Dumoos will
(31030' u 13
60
45 ' E)
be over 11fo guar" s_b::lllrlns
npprox1!:1t.tdy 1400z:. .
at .. tlon
b. Chango pur l i. (2)(a) to rand:
(D.) 3 submC-rinos v/ ill be on sta tion a t 31030 ' 1l 136045'E.
30
0
00 ' N 138
0
15' E I:.nd 28
0
15 'N 140
0
00'E during olltire
mission.
Amondment 7: a , canool midc;. lolIlC.n ono r epo!lt oance l midalecll.D. one aobeci;J. led.
for 2 Fob 45 .
b. chango par 3x(1) to read: .J' D&.Y and . S. Hour: to Collaw.
Amendmont B: a . Change p&r 3A to reed:
I , . 73rd '.Iring objeotive:
PRnUY T/.RGET Ar.:ING POINT PORCE aw:"'IREP
90 . 25 058113 3 squadrOlll
ZOM 1 of P 19 071123 2 S'l;J.C.dr0n8
092132 2 SqUlLdrOAI
Aiming point refarenoe on XU aomber Litho
nWllbor 90. 25 ... urbo.n. Ballnstio wind have bo3n t..mn 1D.to
oon&idoration i n soleotiou of !l.lmi'-'b pOints and. no oorrec-
tion will be
SSCCND;,RY T'.RGST: None
L'ST RESORT : An:! i=dustri .. 1 oity.
FORCE RE3UIRED: 7 squadrons.
b . Chc.ngo par 38 to r ead:
B. 313th I'/ing objeo tivo:
PRHvRY T1JWt:T
90. 8
70u-' I of ?,;ap 11-9
Al i:nlG POINT
119128
poiut reforono;;t ou XXI Beaber ,Lltbo Moe&1o
urban. aall.,tio v i .uta haft b&ua ta.ba !aM
in s e leotion of .t-iDS po1Dta aDd DO oar-
reotion will bo made.
(Ij . Chango fJ&r to reo.cl.
(2) IIOkn lUis and. altltucle at atthk,
tude or r.
'JD.
e
ll<i1nent 8 oont:
X,(I BOi!l!.ltlr C0I1.m'l.ad
;pO 234
d . chr.nge par 3D to read:
O. RoutO: 73rd .. nd )l)th wings:
D!l.SO
140
0
00'E (Oepc.rturo point)
2.9
0
00 ' N 1,3545'E
3328'N 13545'E
3431'N 1,3523'E (IP)
Tnrgot
34
Q
43 ' N 134
Q
52' E
3300 ' N 1,35l.5 'E
23000 ' N 14500 ' E
BUBO
0. chnnge pur 3X(1) to rend;
(1) -D- Day (.nd "H" Hours : OBlaK 4 February 1945
f. chnngc par 3X(4) to road;
(4) provailing surface winds over tho targot nre from. wcst
north-west. In order to prevent smoke i'rom preceding
attaoks obsouring the aiming point for succeeding to.ttlloka
point will bo o.tto.cko(,j. in the follow ordor:
(1) 058115
(2) 071123
(3) 092132
(4) 119128

,.
DISTRIBUTION
OF
XXI BOMBER CQl.$ihKD
b.CTIC.AL LUssioN REPORT
llisel0!L jOe as
" PebrwJ. .. 19&5
Copy No,
1
2
l
4
5

7


10
11
12
II
14

15
"
17
1.
"
20
21
22
23
24
25 _ 26
27
28
29
30
31
32
'"
34
35
35
>7
3.
-39
40 59
70
71
7.
73
74
75
75
77
78
.,.
80
81
8"
8.


H .. 100
PISTRIBUTION
TACTICAL W.ISSION REPORTS
General . Twentieth Ai r Poree
XXI Bomber
Oeputy Twentieth Air Forco
Ch1&f of Sto1' f , Twenti eth Air For oo
Chief of StcU't, XXI Bomber Commnnd
Depl\ty Cis. O;>no , &: Int XXI Bomber Coaand
Deput y cis. Sup , &: Bottbor
AlC S, A- 2. XXI
Commnod1ng General, Army A1r Forces . Attention: AC/AS
Inte:l1genr
o
o
in Chi of , OCean ( AdT. Hq. )
Commo.nde r In Chlef " Po.c1f1c Ocnn Areu (Ree.r Hq.)
Chi of of No.val 0?- 16-V
J oint Intell i gence Center . Oceo.n Areo.a
Commc.nder Li r Force , Po-c iric Fleet
Commandor, ? lfth Flcet
Commo.nder, First Carri er To.sk Poree
Commander, Forwo.rd Ar Oo.
Commo.nding General. U, S, Army Forcos in Par Eo.at
Commanding Genero.1 , U, S, Porces, ?ac1tic Ocenn !reaa
Allied Air For ces .
Po. c1fic Ar alls
COmr.io.nding General. U. S, Stro.tegic Air Forcos oln Slu' opo
Commr.nding Genero.1. Eighth J..ir ForcG
Commc.n ding Genaro.l. .oUli et! Air FOTen
Commo.ndlng Gena r o.1 . Ai r Foroe
COIMla.ndins Gener o.l, Force
COltmo.ndlng Genernl , So.enth COCllltUld
Commanding Gene r c. l, Soventh Fighter Comm:ln4
Commanding General, XX
Commo.nding Gene"r.ll . 5f>th BODb 'Ring
Commo.ndlng 73rd Bomb Wing
Comcanding Gene r al, 313th Bomb
Commronding Genord, 314th Bonb Wing
Gener o. l. 315th l1ng Sq.)
Commandir>g orficor, 3rd Photo RecoD, Squadron
Communding Of!"ictl r. 33rd StatistiCo.l Ccntr e>l Uni t
Tnctics & Seotion, A-3. IXI CCmaAnd
H1s{;('Irioo. l Officer. XXI Bomber Comannd
COIll.!lc..nding General. Army Air Forces, Attenti on I J.C/AS
Coll ection Division
Commrnd ing Offioer. 6th Bomb Gr oup (VB)
Commo.nding articer, 9th Boab Group (VB)
attioar, 19th Bomb Grou? (VB)
OttlceT. 29th 80mb Groll? (VB)
Officer .. 39th Bomb Groll., (VB)
ott1car, 'Oth BOQb Grou? (VH)
Comrnantirg Offioar, 330th J amb Grou? (VB)
CommAndi ng Offlcer, "'th Bomb Group (VB)
COIIUJIllnding Offioer, 662ftd Bomb Group ( VB)
Commanding attlc.r, 668tb Bomb Grcup (va)
COIIUWlding Offioer, '97th Bomb Group (VB)
Commanding artlcer, 'Ntb Bomb GrollP (VB)
COIIUIIandlng Offloer, "ftb Soab Group (VB)
Coamo.ndlng Of ticer, 600th 8011b Grc1l;I (VB)
COllllllAnding Offioer, 506th BOilb (VII)
CO_Pm:J. 1nc Oftioer, &06tb 8_ 01"011;1 (VB)
Report. a.ouo.,. UI __ 1" ..

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