R 261750Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2447 S E C R E T PANAMA 000704 SUBJECT: PANAMANIAN SECURITY COOPERATION: IRREPLACEABLE?

REF: A. REF A:PANAMA 00223 B. REF B:PANAMA 00467 C. REF C:PANAMA07 00940 D. REF D:PANAMA 00623 E. REF E:PANAMA 00669 Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Stephenson for Reason 1.4 (d) ------Summary ------1. (S/NF) Panama is one of the USG's most important law enforcement and security partners in the Western Hemisphere. Its importance is based on a combination of its strategic location astride one of the world's most important lines of communication, an enormous Panamanian flagged shipping fleet, and the willingness of the Government of Panama (GOP) to cooperate with various USG agencies. The fact that this cooperation is dispersed among many different

agencies makes it difficult to understand the critical nature of our partnership with Panama. Panamanian cooperation allows the USG to: search Panamanian flagged ships in international waters, listen to the phone calls of drug dealers and FARC Fronts, make direct drug seizures, fly counter drug missions over Panama's strategic waters, and conduct the annual Panamax military exercise, SouthCom's largest and most important security cooperation event in the region. 2. (S/NF) Panama's help is much more critical to us than it is to Panama. Because the scope of this cooperation is not fully visible, it risks being inadequately appreciated by even the most seasoned experts in Panama and the U.S. The counter-drug missions the GOP helps us with are not seen as a priority among Panamanians, who see them as an American affair, diverting resources from their own problems. The US must remain engaged in Panama's law enforcement and security efforts to maintain our critical cooperation across the board, and to obtain the even better results which are within reach. This cable seeks to inform Washington Panama watchers and other stakeholders regarding the importance and value of our extensive cooperation in law enforcement and security matters. The nature of our programs essentially extends our homeland security out from the U.S. border to Panama's. ------------------Direct Seizure Rate -------------------

3. (S/NF) Panama has seized over 30 tons of cocaine in the first eight months of 2008, following seizure of almost 60 tons last year. This represents the highest seizure rate in the world by far. Panama is an important transshipment point for cocaine heading to the US and Europe by sea, and land. (Note: Due to Colombian Government efforts, there is very little drug trafficking through Panama by air at this time. End Note.) Drug traffickers use go-fast boats to make short hauls along the coast, working their way up through Central America to Mexico, or take advantage of the Pan-American Highway to ship drugs north. Almost all seizures have been the result of information obtained through the Matador intercept program (see below para 7), or U.S. intelligence passed to the Panamanians. Almost all seizures are carried out by a small number of specialized units, including the Sensitive Investigations Unit (SIU) and the Panamanian National Police's (PNP) Reverine Patrol and Action Unit (UMOF). ------------Special Units ------------4. (S/NF) Panama's Sensitive Investigations Unit is composed of 40 officers from the Panamanian Anti-Drug Prosecutor's Office and the PNP. Their main task is to further major, multi-lateral narcotics investigations in coordination with international law enforcement partners. They are vetted through background checks and polygraphs, and receive extensive USG training and resources,

provided primarily by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), including salary bonuses. They use a "task force" approach, sharing leads and intelligence on a regular basis and in an effective fashion. DHS' Immigration and Custom's Enforcement (ICE) recently established its own vetted unit (staffed by ICE-vetted PNP officials), and that has already produced its own successes. 5. (S/NF) The UMOF was established to patrol the rivers of Panama's almost impenetrable Darien Province, where rivers serve as roads. The unit has proven to be highly competent and aggressive, and has made excellent use of NAS-provided equipment, including two Donzi go-fast boats, to seize large amounts of cocaine, including out at sea. The unit is a sign of how effective resources given to the GOP can be in leading directly to important drug seizures. --------------Problems at Sea --------------6. (S/NF) The UMOF's success only highlights one of the major problem areas Post has encountered in Panama, the ineffectiveness of the Panamanian National Maritime Service (SMN). U.S. aircraft have identified the maritime drug trafficking routes along Panama's coasts, but the SMN has been ineffective at intercepting the go-fast boasts that carry out this activity, despite over $12 million in U.S. assistance, including two Donzi go-fast

boats and four Nortech interceptor boats. The SMN continues to suffer from poor leadership and is likely plagued by internal corruption. While it plays a major role in certain activities of importance to the U.S. (prisoner transfers, High Value Transits of the Canal, Panamax), the SMN has failed demonstrably in recent years to effectively act upon maritime counter-narcotics leads provided by the USG. While frustrating for the agencies involved, it also demonstrates that Panama could be seizing even more cocaine and disrupting drug smuggling routes if a way can be found to engage with the GOP as it attempts to reform the SMN as part of its planned creation of a National AeroNaval Service SENAN) (Panamanian Coast Guard) as part of its planned security reforms. ------Matador ------7. (S/NF) Post's NAS and DEA offices have developed an extraordinarily successful Judicialized Telephone Intercept Program ("Matador") in cooperation with the Panamanian Anti-Drug Prosecutor's office, the Council of Public Security and National Defense (CSPDN), and the Panamanian Supreme Court. This extremely sensitive program, similar to U.S. Title III programs, continues to develop real-time leads in the fight against organized drug trafficking, and in particular the illicit activities of the FARC. The intercepts are also being used by the FBI to investigate the involvement of the FARC in the kidnapping of AmCit Celio Juan Padron in April

2008. The intercepts have allowed DEA to develop an intricate understanding of the FARC presence and activities in Panama, and to prepare a criminal case against them. Major indictments against the FARC in these two cases are expected in the coming months based on evidence obtained through Matador. At present, close to 200 dirty cellular lines are "intervened", each one following approval by the Criminal Chamber of the Panamanian Supreme Court of a request from the Panamanian Anti-Drug Prosecutor's Office. U.S. and Panamanian law enforcement agencies expect a regular stream of arrests and subsequent indictments from these efforts, as information obtained via Matador is valid in U.S. federal courts, as well as in local Panamanian courts. The success of the program stems from excellent cooperation among the Panamanian Supreme Court, the CSPDN, the Prosecutor's office, and vetted elements of the Panamanian National Police (PNP). Matador has benefited from DEA expertise and training, and has counted on financial backing from NAS (over $1 million), DEA, and the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) at Post. ----------------FARC, or No FARC? ----------------8. (S/NF) While the GOP readily admits to Embassy contacts that there is a small regular FARC presence in the thickly forested and largely ungoverned Darien Province, GOP officials shy away from talking about any FARC presence in Panama publicly. Rather than use the terms "FARC" or

"terrorist," the GOP prefers "criminal elements" or "criminal organizations," in keeping with their view that, as the FARC comes under increasing pressure, a breakdown in central command is manifesting itself in a rise in undisciplined criminal actions. The GOP's historical position has been that of "live and let live", whereby FARC units keep a low profile, do not disturb Panamanians, and do not engage in serious crime against Panamanians (kidnapping, murder), and in turn they will not be disturbed by Panamanian forces. The FARC presence in the Darien is not very large, but it now appears likely that there is also a significant logistical operation based in Panama City. The Panamanian authorities do not have the capability to uproot the FARC presence from the Darien or other parts of Panama at this time, and this has been one of the reasons they have given in private for the need to create a new stand alone Frontier Force (SENAFRONT) (see Ref E). The FARC is not a major concern of the Panamanian people, however, who see the Darien as very remote, and are more focused on the day-to-day crime in their neighborhoods. There is little political gain in taking on the FARC publicly, and much to be lost. GOP may fear an aggressive campaign against the FARC could lead to a showdown in the Darien to which the GOP would, with current forces, lose. ---------------------Salas-Becker Agreement ---------------------9. (S/NF) signed the In February 2002, the U.S. and Panama Salas-Becker Agreement (SBA). This

agreement remains one of our most important drug fighting tools in the region. SBA has three main components. Among other things, it allows the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to patrol Panamanian waters with Panamanian SMN officers aboard, to stop Panamanian registered ships on the high seas (after a diplomatic protocol), and to carry out drug interdiction flights over Panamanian waters and land in Panamanian airports. It is an invaluable tool to U.S. counter-narcotics efforts, and for that reason has faced opposition by some in Panama. Panamanian National Assembly President Pedro Miguel Gonzalez (presently under U.S. federal indictment in connection with the 1992 murder of a U.S. soldier) has threatened to challenge SBA in court, and some Panamanians see it as aviolation of Panamanian sovereignty. Nonetheless, the GOP has stood by the agreement, and, on August 17, 4.2 tons of cocaine were seized on the Panamanian flagged M/V Aganmenon 100 nautical miles south of Puerto Rico, under the terms of the SBA. -----------------Ship-Rider Program -----------------10. (S/NF) One of the key aspects of SBA is the Ship-Rider Program. This program allows Panamanian law enforcement officers to serve as liaison officers aboard USCG cutters that patrol in or near Panamanian territorial waters. These officers are able to give orders to Panamanian vessels, and request assistance from the crew of the USCG cutter. This effectively turns the cutters into Panamanian vessels that patrol Panamanian waters.

The program has not been working as effectively as previously because the SMN officers have not been delegated the essential authority to take decisions on their own, and must get clearance from their superiors. Without these officers on board, however, it is not likely that the GOP would be able to justify letting U.S. ships patrol their waters. The GOP is also reluctant to allow shipriders on U.S. Navy vessels which are assigned to law enforcement duties, preferring to put them on "civilian vessels." The program can be improved, but given the amount of narcotics trafficking going on in the territorial waters of Panama, this is still an important tool for the USG. ---------------------------------Boarding of Panama Flagged Vessels ---------------------------------11. (S/NF) SBA also establishes a procedure by which the USG can request from the GOP the right to board Panamanian-flagged ships (one-third of all the ships in the world are flagged in Panama) in international waters. If drugs are found on-board, the GOP can cede jurisdiction of the ship, drugs and crew to the USG, with the critical exception of Panamanian citizens. To date all such requests have been approved. While it is unclear whether Panama has the legal right to cede jurisdiction over its citizens on the open sea, the 2006 case of the M/V Perseus V, where eight Panamanians were taken to the U.S. and tried and convicted under SBA, has made it a political impossibility right now (see Ref d). Also per Ref d, we have requested guidance from the Department on how to respond to

the GOP's Dip Note on the status of the Panamanian sailors. The importance of the Panamanian fleet makes SBA invaluable in attempts to interdict drugs on the high seas, and Post is concerned this case may make it more difficult for the GOP to fully implement it. 12. (S/NF) Panama has also participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a potentially important tool in the bid to prevent WMD proliferation. To date no request to board a Panamanian flagged ship has been made under the PSI. -----------------------JIATF Tocumen Operations -----------------------13. (S/NF) The Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) - South operates P-3 aircraft out of Tocumen Airport in Panama City under SBA. The planes are non-military, either USCG or CBP, and must carry Panamanian law enforcement officials on board, per SBA. SBA allows the planes to track traffic over Panama and its waters, and to relay the orders of Panamanian officials to suspect aircraft or seacraft. The planes may operate out of Tocumen airport while conducting short joint operations, normally lasting a week. The program has allowed JIATF-South to map out the routes used by drug traffickers, and to identify targets. This program also benefits the GOP, whose National Air Service has only two functional helicopters at this time. As noted above, the information gathered has

played a major role in seizures by the PNP and the UMOF, along with seizures made in other countries. The SMN has not been effective in using this information. ----CNIES ----14. (S/NF) JIATF-South currently benefits from Panama,s participation in the Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES) program. CNIES uses Re-locatable Over the Horizon RADAR (ROTHR) feeds to detect air tracks as aircraft transit into or through Panamanian airspace. The Panamanian National Air Service (SAN) is very proficient and aggressive in sorting such air tracks to determine if they are legitimate or illicit airborne activities. The ROTHR feeds are real-time and are viewed at both the SAN Operations Center and JIATFSouth Operations Center. In addition to providing a common operating picture, CNIES provides on-line chat (w /simultaneous translation) capability between JIATF-S and all participating countries. This chat capability allows for coordination and information sharing in real time. Without the SAN's ability to weed out legitimate flights from the raw radar information, JIATF-South would not be able to act on the information. While airborne trafficking is not a major issue right now due to aggressive actions by the Colombian government, the capability to detect air traffic through Central America is a very valuable asset, which may become even more important in the future, as traffickers change tactics to try to stay one step ahead of law

enforcement agencies. ------Panamax ------15. (S/NF) Panama continues to co-host SouthCom's premier event, "Fueras Aliadas PANAMAX." This Canal defense oriented exercise has grown from three countries (Chile, Panama, and the U.S.) in 2003, to over 20 countries this year. This exercise has allowed the countries in the region who are willing to join forces in the defense of the Canal to practice their inter-operablity in real world naval exercises where officers and vessels from all the participants work together at every level to create a truly impressive model of defense cooperation. Panama has now begun to integrate its non-naval domestic security forces into the exercises by practicing its response to lower level emergencies which might precede a full scale international response. These exercises known as Panamax Alpha, show Panama's resolve to become a regional partner in the defense of the Canal, and not just a passive observer. -----------Third Border -----------15. (S/NF) Panama is a choke point in the Americas, and many travelers from South America must pass through Panama on their way north. The

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is working to build up Panama as a "third border", where people and goods coming to the U.S. can be screened and, if necessary, stopped before they reach the U.S. There are several programs that fall into this category. NAS financed the construction of the Guabala checkpoint about one mile from the PanamaCosta Rica border crossing at a cost of almost $500,000. The post is designed to stop illegal migrants, smugglers, and other contraband before reaching to border, and so prevent passage through Central America, and possibly to the U.S. DHS has deployed Border Patrol agents on several occasions to provide operational assistance to the Panamanian authorities, funded by NAS. CBP is also working with the CSPDN and civil aviation authorities to implement a the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) in Panama, that would allow CBP to know who was entering Panama, and prevent potential criminals or terrorists from continuing on to the US. This project would be funded under the Merida Initiative. --CSI --16. (S/NF) Panama is home to three of the most important container ports in the Western Hemisphere, and the world's second largest Free Trade Zone, in Colon. Many containers are transferred in these ports for eventual shipment to U.S. ports, making Panama a critical location for screening cargo bound for the U.S. Panama has

cooperated closely with ICE in initiating a Container Security Initiative (CSI) in the three major ports here. The CSI became operational in Panama in September 2007, with a primary mission of deterring the entry of WMD into the U.S. through containerized shipping. DHS has installed two container scanners in Panamanian ports, and the GOP is looking to purchase several more. ICE currently has four CBP officers and one ICE agent stationed working with the Panamanians on this. --------------------Turning Over Bad Guys --------------------17. (S/NF) Panama is one of the most obliging countries in the region in terms of extraditing non Panamanian foreign nationals. They not only have an Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the U.S., which allows for a formal extradition process, but have been willing to engage in other more creative techniques. These have included: the direct expulsion to the U.S. of people of interest to U.S. law enforcement, under the pretext that they have lied on their request for entry documents; and the use of Conditional Release, under which the GOP releases to the U.S. a suspect already under arrest in Panama on other charges. Under this procedure, the suspect is "lent" to the U.S. for prosecution on the condition that they will be returned for prosecution in Panama at the end of their sentence. This procedure is much faster than a formal extradition, and has proven so successful, that DEA sometimes designs operations to bring suspects to Panama so they can be arrested

in Panama quickly.

and

turned

over

to

U.S.

authorities

-------------Panama Express -------------18. (S/NF) Panama Express refers to an agreement between Panama and the U.S. whereby drug suspects caught by U.S. ships in international waters can be brought to shore in Panama for transshipment to the U.S. A similar agreement exists with Guatemala. This agreement is critical to the work of USG counter-narcotic operations which focus on stopping drug shipments at sea. Suspects are allowed to "unofficially" enter Panama, after which they are taken directly to a SAN base, and then picked up by USG assets. Without this agreement, USCG ships would need to go off station for long periods of time, and burn large amounts of fuel in order to bring the suspects to the U.S. The knowledge that these suspects are going straight to the U.S. also increases their disposition to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement authorities. -----------------Police Cooperation -----------------20. (S) The day-to-day cooperation of the PNP and other local law enforcement with the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in non-drug cases, such as the Padron kidnapping, has been excellent.

The only problem has been a failure to adequately safeguard information from release in the press. -------------Other problems -------------21. (S/NF) The Panamanian security services are hobbled by poor pay, poor organization, and poor coordination among different agencies. Panamanian police are very poorly paid, which invites corruption to take hold. NAS funds extra salary payments for members of the Sensitive Investigative Unit in an attempt to overcome this problem, and reinforce the dedication of the officers. The plan referred to above to create a separate Frontier Force is meant in part to overcome the negative results of transferring police between urban areas and the frontier, which has led to low morale and poor service to citizens by police more accustomed to frontier duty. There have also been major problem with the maintenance of some equipment, including USG-donated boats. ---------------------------------Challenge of a new Judicial System ---------------------------------22. (S/NF) One other major potential problem on the horizon is the adoption by Panama of a new accusatorial criminal justice system (to be phased in over the next five years), that will require major procedural reforms and require extensive

training for judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. Panamanian Anti-Drug Prosecutor Jose Abel Almengor told PolOff August 19 that nowhere near enough money was being invested in this change, and that the result would be catastrophic for drug prosecutions, as it would not be possible to get judicial permission for searches fast enough, and unprepared and underpaid judges would be subject to great pressure to release suspects on bail, which they have not had the power to do up to now. NAS isworking with the U.S. Department of Justice to develop a training program for Panamanian judges and prosecutors. ------Comment ------23. (S/NF) Very few of the programs listed above are generally known to Panamanians. They are the result of programs and relationships built up at a time when the USG had great resources to spend in Panama. Now that Panama is seen as a middle income country, they are being cut out of the foreign assistance loop. The assumption is that they should be able to pay for their own programs. What this cable aims to show is that most of these programs serve our interests more than Panamanian interests. Facing their own worsening crime problems, the GOP will be under increasing pressure to divert all law enforcement resources to fighting street crime, which is creating social alarm. While the street crime may be related to drug trafficking, it is not particularly effected by drug busts of shipments headed to the U.S. or abroad. In addition, with

around 40% poverty and the second most unequal income distribution in Latin American (according to the U.N.) there is great pressure on the GOP to spend money on social programs, thus reducing the amount available for law enforcement. The small, effective anti-drug units in the PNP are essentially working a USG agenda, and need USG support. More such units, especially like the UMOF, might be able to further build on the wealth of intelligence that programs like JIATF-South's P-3 flights give us. The GOP should invest more money in its own defense, and we encourage them to do so. But given that our programs generally extend homeland security out from the U.S. border to Panama's, we should be realistic about the need to provide continued funding if we hope to retain the robust cooperation we currently enjoy. 24. (S/NF) This cable has avoided referring to any active criminal investigations or to Compartmentalized Information. STEPHENSON (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of