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ARROW-STORMS AND CAVALRY PIKES WARFARE IN THE AGE OF JUSTINIAN I, AD 527-565 THE ARMIES OF BELISARIUS AND NARSES
by Michael ORourke mjor (at) velocitynet (dot) com (dot) au Canberra Australia September 2009

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Introduction: Rhomanya Troop Numbers Troop Types Tactics Selected Battles Appendix: Arrows, Armour and Flesh

Rhomanya: The Christian Roman Empire of the Greeks Having been conquered by the Romans, the Aramaic- and Greek-speaking Eastern Mediterranean lived for centuries under imperial rule. Its people had received full citizenship already in 212 AD. So the East Romans naturally called themselves Rhomaioi, the Greek for Romans. The term Rhomanya [Greek h Rhmana: ] was in use already in the 300s (Brown 1971: 41). Middle period examples denoting the Eastern Empire are found in the 600s - as in the Doctrina Jacobi - and in the 800s in various entries in the chronicle of Theophanes (fl. 810: e.g. his entry for AD 678). Although we do not find the name Rhmana in Procopius, fl. AD 550, or in Anna Comnena, fl. 1133, it does occur in the writings of emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, fl. 955. The later medieval West, after AD 800, preferred the style Greek Empire. After 1204 the Latins used the term Romania to refer generally to the Empire and more specifically to the lower Balkans (thus English Rumney wine, Italian vino di Romania). Our own name Rumania/Romania, for the state on the northern side of the Danube, was chosen in 1859. It proclaimed the Romance and thereby Romantic origins of Limba Romna, hitherto known to outsiders as the Wallachian or Vlach language. Like Italian, Limba Romana descends from late Latin. Its speakers call themselves Romni.

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Byzantine of course is an invented modern term for the later Roman empire in the East. Byzantium, used for the later Roman state, was introduced into scholarship only in the 16th century, by Hieronymus Wolf, d. 1580. Bowersock, Brown and Grabar state too starkly that the term "Byzantine Empire" is "a modern misnomer redolent of ill-informed contempt" (1999: vii). Perhaps so, but its use is deeply entrenched. Judith Herrin says that until the seventh century, Byzantium was indeed the Roman Empire (2007: xviii). For her, Byzantine should be used only after about 610. For Treadgold 1997, however, there was in the East a Byzantine society already by the fifth century. Kinnamos, the 12th century Byzantine historian, refers poetically or archaically to the capital as Byzantion and uses the phrase empire of Byzantion. But of course the ordinary Byzantine called her world the Roman Empire: Basilea ton Rhman or h [tn] Rhmain Basilea. In this paper, I have occasionally used "Romanic" and Romaic. The Roman Empire ended of course in 1453 when the Turks finally took Constantinople. But the term Rhomaioi continued to be used for Greeks down to the 19th century. The Greek scholar Rigas Feraios, d. 1798, called on "Bulgars and Arvanites [Albano-Greeks], Armenians and Romans" to rise in arms against the Ottomans. Likewise the Greek patriot Athanasios Diakos, before his death in 1821, said: "I was born a Greek, I shall die a Greek": Ego Romios yennithika, Romios the na pethano. And General Makrygiannis, fl. 1847, recalled a friend asking him: "What say you, is the Roman (Romios) far away from coming? Are we to sleep with the Turks and awaken with the Romans? (see under Romiosini in Merry 2004: 376). But the 19th century was the Romantic Age. So a newly independent Greece chose as its name not Constantinian- Christian Romania but Platonic-pagan Hellas. Territory and Population Before Justinians Western reconquests and before the great plague of AD 542, the Eastern Empire contained some 30 million people. They were distributed possibly as follows: Egypt 8 M; Palestine-Syria-upper Mesopotamia 9 M; Asia Minor 10 M; and 3-4 M in the Balkans (Mango 1980: 23). In 565, after the conquests of Justinians reign, the Empire again ruled the whole Mediterranean basin, from present-day Morocco and southern Spain to Lazica which is modern west Georgia, and from N Italy to Egypt. The only regions of the littoral not under imperial control were Visigothic Catalonia and Frankish Provence. Geographically, the nearest enemy to Constantinople was the recently established Avar Khanate, north of, and on, the lower Danube River. They were Turkic-speaking steppes-nomads who by 580 would extend their domination into the upper Danube basin and threaten the imperial lands south of the lower Danube. Justinian The emperor Iustinianos I the Great, born Flavius Petrus Sabbatius, was the nephew of of his predecessor, Justin I. Aged 34 at accession in AD 527, he ruled for 38 years. The Church of San Vitale in Ravenna, Italy, has two famous mosaic panels,

OROURKE: ARMIES OF BELISARIUS AND NARSES

executed in 548 to celebrate the reconquest of Italy. On the left is a mosaic depicting Justinian, clad in purple with a golden halo, standing next to court officials, Bishop Maximian, praetorian guards and deacons. On the right side is a mosaic featuring a solemn and formal Empress Theodora - aged about 48 in 548 [she died later the same year] - with golden halo, crown and jewels, and a train of court ladies. Belisarius A precocious general, Flavius Belisarios was still only 27 or 28 years old when his troops suppressed (532) the Nika riot in the capital caused by internal political strife. He then defeated (533-34) the Vandals, a Germanic people ruling ex-imperial N Africa. Then, in command (535) of the war against the Ostrogoths in Italy, he took Naples and Rome (536), as well as Milan and Ravenna (540). Justinian replaced him (548) with Narses, a protg of Empress Theodora, but Belisarius returned (559) to drive the Bulgars from the walls of Constantinople. After a brief political imprisonment (562), he returned to favour in the years before his death (565). Belisarius may be the bearded figure depicted on Emperor Justinian I's right in the mosaic in the Church of San Vitale. Narses Nothing is known of the first half of Narses' life. Already aged 54, he was a koubikoularios or chamberlain and spatharios or senior palace official at the time of the Nika Rebellion in 532. Having risen thereafter to grand chamberlain (Lat. praepositus sacri cubiculi), Narses was given the command of Italy in 551. Although already old (73), and a eunuch, he nevertheless proved to be a general of brilliance. 2. TROOP NUMBERS Data from Treadgold 1995 and 1997. There were broadly two categories of soldiers: the professionals serving in the mobile or field armies, and the troops of the static frontier who were a kind of farmer-militia.
Year / Reign 540: Early JUSTINIAN I: Total state revenue in 540: 11.3 million nomismata (gold coins). Highest ever in the Eastern Cavalry Infantry Navy [Oarsmen] 30,000. Remarks

29,000 elite field cavalry; and 97,500 frontier cav. Total 124,500.

116,000 line infantry; and 79,500 frontier infantry.

145,000 field soldiers; and 195,500 frontier soldiers. Grand total land troops = 340,500. Note that there were more cavalry than infantry among the frontier troops.

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Empire. 565: Later JUSTINIAN I: Revenues: total about 8.4 million nomismata (post-Plague). 30,000 field cavalry; and 97,500 frontier cavalry. 120,000 field infantry; and 100,000 frontier troops.

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N/a.

Totals: 150,000 field; and 197,500 frontier. Grand total 347,500 (Note 1). Cavalry: infantry ratio in field armies = 1:4. But an expeditionary force might comprise up to 40% cavalry.

Note 1: Cameron p.52 regards the figure of 435,000 in John the Lydian as exaggerated.

Field or Mobile Armies in 565 Treadgold 1997: 373 has offered the following guesstimates for the size of the Empires nine field armies at the end of Justinians reign (AD 565):
Enemies on the nearest major border: (1) Spania [S Andalusia] 5,000 men (2) Africa [Tunisia and Libya] 15,000 (3) Italy 20,000 (4) Illyricum [NW Balkans] 15,000 (5) Thrace 20,000 (6 and 7) Praesental troops, i.e. those in the emperors presence at or near Constantinople: two armies, each 20,000 (8) Armenia 15,000 (9) The East [Syria] 20,000 Spanish Visigoths, who controlled most of Iberia. Berbers. Franks in the NW; Burgundians in what is now Switzerland. Also Bavarians and Lombards in our Austria. Lombards in present-day Austria and Gepids in present-day Hungary. Avars on the lower Danube. n/a

Persians. Persians. Also detachments could be sent to Egypt, where there was no important external enemy.

Total: 150,000.

5 3. TROOP TYPES

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Like that of Alexander the Great, but unlike that of the Roman Republic, the army of the Eastern Empire was a combined-arms army, a judicious blend of many types who could be used in various combinations. The highly professional army of Constantinople was based around cavalry: lancers or pike-cavalry and horse-archers, typically wearing mail, who were well supported by infantry, both pikemen and foot-archers. Byzantine generals understood the intelligent use of pike-infantry and foot-archers as well as cavalry charges. 1. Cavalry Stirrups were still unknown in Justinians time; they appear only by about AD 590. One assumes that stability for lancers and other horsemen was still supplied by the four-horned Celto-Romanic saddle of High Antiquity, which securely clamped the rider in around the thighs and buttocks (Connolly 1987; Molyneaux 1997: 27). The typical 6th Century cavalry helmet was the almost conical ridge helmet or spangenhelm [Ger. strap/strip-helmet]. It was made of five or four rivetted plates and worn with cheek-guards and a top-plume of stiffened horse-hair. This type had become common in the AD 300s. Boss 1993, Southern 2007: 261. The sword (Latin spatha, Greek spathion) was straight, and up to about 90 cm long, with archaeological specimens yielding a median of around 70 cm [28 inches]. It had, since the second century, been worn on the left on a baldric or shoulder-strap [Greek vltidion or baltidium]. Southern 2007: 213; also Oleson 2008: 697. In the texts, no size is specified for the sword until we come to the Sylloge Tacticorum of the 10th Century, whose specifications can be interpreted as either 80 cm or 96 cm. As Dawson notes, this agrees well with the approximate 90 cm shown in Byzantine art and surviving Western examples of Eastern origin (2007b: 6). Cavalry lances or pikes (plural: kontoi, sarissai) were very long: up to four metres, and thin. The literal meaning of (singular) kontos was pole. They were used for thrusting and stabbing. The favoured weapon of Byzantium was the bow (Gk toxos, toxaria). This was the Hunnic composite bow, so called because it had been adopted from the Huns in the 4th century (McGeer p.207). As used by the Huns, Romans and Turks, recurve composite bows were short, constructed in bent-forward form (recurve) so as to reverse in shape when strung. Composite means made from several materials sinew, wood, horn - glued together. Sinew formed the top or outside of the bow; wood, e.g. maple-wood the core; and horn, typically water-buffalo horn, the belly or inside. Among the Byzantines, the cavalry version was 117-125 cm or 46-49 inches long (McGeer p.213, citing the 10th C Sylloge). I have not found good information about the exact length of the 6th century infantry bow, but we know it was larger (McGeer loc. cit.). Thus emperor Leo VI, writing at the turn of the 10th C, says expressly that the bow of the infantry archer is larger and carries further (quoted by Toynbee 1973: 315 and Hurley p.311). Dawson 2007a: 24 unaccountably says that the infantry variant was only about one metre long or just over 3ft in the 10th C. This must be an error. Different types of cavalry could form units of their own; or they might be deployed in

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combined formations, i.e. horse-archers mixed in with spear and pike cavalry, as when Belisarius (Belisarios) fought the Goths outside Rome in 537. In later centuries it was typical to have mixed units made up of several ranks of horse-archers and several ranks of pike-cavalry (cf Maurice II.7, 1984 ed: 29). Cavalry armed with both pike and bow: The historian Procopius was a member of Belisariuss retinue, and thus an eyewitness to much of what he relates. He describes the typical Romaic cavalryman thus: "[Our] archers are mounted on horses, which they manage with admirable skill; their head and shoulders are protected by a casque [open metal hat, i.e. simple helmet] or buckler [a small shield worn on the upper left arm]; they wear greaves of iron on their legs and their bodies are guarded by a coat of mail. On their right side hangs a quiver,* a sword on their left [worn on a baldric], and their hand is accustomed to wield a lance or javelin in closer combat. Their bows are strong and weighty; they shoot in every possible direction, advancing, retreating, to the front, to the rear, or to either flank; and as they are taught to draw the bowstring not to the breast, but to the right ear**, firm indeed must be the armour that can resist the rapid violence of their shaft". Quoted by Hildinger 1999. Or, from another translation: They draw the bowstring along by the forehead about opposite the right ear, thereby charging the arrow with such an impetus as to kill whoever stands in the way, shield and [mail] corselet alike having no power to check its force. (*) 7th century Byzantine horse-archers had a quiver of 30-40 arrows, while those of the 10th century carried one with 40-50 arrows (Maurice 1994 ed: 12; McGeer p.214). (**) Here Procopius is contrasting the less ancient Hunnic or Avar style of pulling the arrow to the ear using the thumb with the older Greco-Roman or Mediterranean draw - using the fingers to pull the arrow to ones chest. Emperor Maurice likewise highlighted a difference between the Persian and Byzantine draws in his Strategikon, ca. AD 600. It seems implied that the Persians too used the older, weaker Mediterranean finger-pull, namely using the three lower fingers. See the discussion in Bivar 1972. Good illustration of the various draw-styles: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/image:bow_draw_en.svg; accessed 2009. Roy Boss distinguishes between spear-bowmen and lancer-bowmen, the former not carrying a buckler or arm-shield. Procopius uses doru, the ordinary Greek word for a cavalry spearperhaps best translated as lanceto contrast with the doration or doraton, the shorter infantry spear. Then there was the kontos, the long pike used by both cavalry and infantry. Agathias calls the long cavalry lances or pikes sarissa(i); this was the Antique term, a name he would have preferred to the more contemporary and therefore vulgar terms kontos and kontarion. Cf the terminology in the time of Philip and Alexander the Great 900 years earlier: [a] doru, a spear of around eight feet or 2.4 metres; [b] xyston, a longer spear or light cavalry pike of around 12 feet (four metres), spear-tipped at both ends; and [c] the sarissa, the heavy infantry pike of 18 feet (six metres).

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(1.a) The elite of the elite were the guards-cavalry or household cavalry, called Voukellarioi or Bucellarii.* They were private retainers personally recruited and employed by their commanders rather than the state. The majority carried both lance and bow, although there were some pure bowmen (horse-archers). They wore extra armour: mail to the wrist and knees; also greaves and thigh-plates; and carried a buckler (a small shield attached to the upper arm). As illustrated in Bosss book, the helmet was nearly conical, with a top-plume. According to Procopius, Belisarius at one point employed fully 7,000 bucellarii and even a lesser commander such as Valerian could command 1,000 (Wars vii.1.18-20; 27.3, cited in Cameron et al. 2000: 310). (*) Voukellarioi: In later Greek beta [ ] was pronounced like our v. The name means biscuit [hard-tack] eaters, from Latin bucella or bucellatum, military biscuit (literally mouthful), i.e. rations of already re-baked bread. Greek: paxamadion. The Bucellarii were troops not directly supported by the state but rather engaged and paid (using state funds) by some individual such as a general or governor. In essence they were his "household troops". In other words, small, professional private armies equipped and paid by wealthy influential people. As we have said, Belisarius at the peak of his career had 7,000 bucellarii. (1.b) The typical Byzantine (Roman) horsemen, the cavalry of the line, in Justinians time - many were Thracians - were lancer-bowmen. They carried both bow and either spear or pike as well as a sword. They lacked leg-armourexcept for some elite unitsand wore mail only to the waist, i.e. as a sleeveless corselet. Evidently some carried or wore a buckler or round mini-shield, while others did not. Some carried a medium-sized round shield. Having become Romanised, many of the foederati toothe partly Romanised foreigners settled by agreement within the empirewould have been equipped like this. We have no eaxct sepofcations for the size of cavalry shileds, but in the 10th cetiry the Sylloge lists four spans as the desirabel size of a round or oblong cavaley shiled. This peobaly traslet to a diamter of 62 cm [two feet] (Dawson 2007b: 4-5). Allies such as mercenary Huns* and allied Persians (as at Taginae: see later) were of a similar type, although as first-class troops they are probably better bracketed with the elite Bucellarii. Based on artworks, Boss depicts the Hun horse-archers wearing lamellar armour** to the mid-thigh. The Huns heavy armour may have compensated for the lack of a shield. On the other hand, Procopius never mentions lamellar, or at least not in relation to Roman (Byzantine) units. It seems that it was not until after about AD 575 that lamellar armour became common (Haldon 1999: 130). (*) The Huns, or at least their leaders, spoke a Turkic tongue. The nomad empire they established north of the Danube collapsed after the death (AD 453) of Attila. Several of the migratory Germanic tribes they had subjected, notably the Gepids and Lombards, rose against them and broke their power. Some Huns remained in Pannonia for some time. Others took refuge within the East Roman Empire, namely in Dacia Ripensis and Scythia Minor. (**) Lamellar was a type of armour formed of upward-overlapping platelets of metal, horn or leather. The platelets were strung together (usually) on leather strings or rivetted on, creating a flexible corselet (see Dawson 1998).

OROURKE: ARMIES OF BELISARIUS AND NARSES

In lamellar armour the platelets overlapped upwards. Armour with downwardoverlapping platelets is called scale armour. Lamellar will suit cavalry because upwards sword-strokes from enemy infantry will glance off. For the same reason, scale will suit infantry. While soldiers often wore iron lamellar, horse-armour (used after Justinians time) was generally leather scale-armour.

Cataphracts Boss 1993: 46 underlines that horse-armour is never mentioned by our main sources, Procopius and Agathias. It would seem to follow that Justinians army, unlike that of Sassanian Persia, did not include any super-heavy types. But horse-armour is mentioned once more in Maurices Strategikon, ca. AD 600, and thereafter in the reign of Herakleios/Heraclius, acc. AD 610. Evidently, like the use of stirrups, it was copied or re-borrowed in the period 570-90 from the Avars. (1.c) Cavalry with lance or spear only Some Romaics did not carry the bow but only a sword, spear, shield and armour. We might call them medium cavalry. Many foederati and allies were troops of this type. Allied Gepids,* whose shield was large, likewise did not carry the bow; their short lance or medium spear was about two metres long. Allied Heruls** too are depicted as light cavalry spearmen: no helmet, little or no body armour and only a small shield. (*) A Germanic (Gothic) people living north of the middle Danube until about 570. (**) A Germanic people living in what is now Slovakia. In 512 many of them settled around present-day Belgrade under Byzantine suzerainty. (1.d) Bow only: horse-archers Some Romanic horse-archers wore armour; probably most did not. A minority among the bucellarii were pure horse-archers (lacking a lance). So it is probably convenient to distinguish between ordinary and elite horse-archers. By AD 600 cavalrymen seem to have begun to specialise as either pikemen/lancers or specialist horse-archers, and formed up typically 10 deep, with three lancers for each seven archers. Or at least some squadrons had this mix. At the other extreme there could be up to eight lancers for each two archers. In these units the archers went without shields (Maurice II.8 and VII.16, 1984 ed: 29, 77). In the 10th century, and probably also in the 6th century, Byzantine horse-archers used small-medium bows - about 1.20 metres [around four feet] in length - that could shoot arrows as far as 130 metres, with a killing range of perhaps 80 metres.* Based on the practice in later centuries, horse-archers would have carried a single large quiver with 40-50 arrows (as in AD 600: Maurice, Strategikon; and in AD 975: McGeer pp. 68, 213).
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(*) See the discussion in the Appendix. Hildinger 1997 has suggested that the Asian composite recurve bow was only accurate at up to 80 yards or 75 m when shot from horseback. Modern experience confirms this. Todays champion archers have established that one cannot 'guarantee' a hit on an individual target at more than 80 yards (75 metres) with any type or size of bow whatsoever. But of course accuracy is usually unimportant in battle: one can always hit a massed army of thousands of individuals. And "shooting in arcade" - upwards at about 45 degrees - allows for greater ranges. Dress and Equipment of Byzantine Cavalry
Heavy, e.g. bucellarii Helmet Shield Plumed ridge-helmet with cheek-guards. Buckler on the upper left arm: small shield at the shoulder (P). Mail to the wrists and knees; or just a mail corslet (P). Iron (laminated) thigh protectors and greaves: Greaves to the knee (P). Medium The same. Casque (P). Round, medium. None: Some Roman cavalry did not use the spear and buckler (P). Light, e.g. horse archers.

Body Armour

Mail corselet: sleeveless and only to the waist. Nil.

Leg armour

Dress: Body: over Body: inner

Red or red-brown cloak - (D12). Medium tunic to below the knees linen (D11). Wide trousers or tight hose (D18). Leather shoes. Heel-less black boots of goatskin or other leather (D20-21).

Legs Feet

D = Pages references to DAmato 2005. P = Procopius.

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Cavalry dress and equipment: Allies and Federates


Heavy Head protection Shield Ridge-helmet with cheek-guards. Huns: none. Persians: large armbuckler. Huns: lamellar to the elbow and thigh. Persians: mail over the whole upper body. Persians: Iron plates. Trousers or hose only. Leather shoe or short boots. Gepids: large shield. Medium Light Heruls: nil Heruls: Round, small

Body armour

Heruls: none. But when serving dismounted as elite infantry, they were well armoured in mail or even lamellar.

Arms Legs Footwear

2. Infantry When pike infantry (kontaratoi) were joined with light infantry (foot-archers and javelinists) in one mixed unit, a typical arrangement was to have one or two ranks of archers in front of and behind the body of pikemen. That is: about three archers for every seven pikemen. At other times, the archers would all be placed at the rear of the unit, behind the kontaratoi (Maurice XIIb, 1984 ed: 136, 143). At the battle of Casilinum, fought north of Naples in 554, Narses deployed his footarchers, javeliners and slingers behind a centre of heavy infantry. That is, they fired over the heads of the front line. Earlier at Taginae, 552, he placed his units of foot archers further out, on the extreme wings, to provide lateral or flanking fire-power as the Goths rode forward. * * * Heavy and medium infantrymen wore helmets; some light infantry types did not. (2.a) Armoured infantry: spear/pike, sword, shield and mail: The standard or ideal type of Byzantine infantryman wore mail to the waist, i.e. a corselet, and carried a medium-length spear or short pike (doru, doration, kontos, kontarion mikron).

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On one reading of the 6th century manual Concerning Strategy, the infantry spear was up to 2.5 metres long [eight feet] (Dawson 2007b: 8 ff). In later centuries there was also a long infantry pike (kontarion) of over 3.9 metres [12+ feet] used in formations seven ranks deep (ibid.) The 6th century infantry shield was round or oval, slightly convex, and mediumlarge, the diameter being officially specified as at least 109 cm [over 3.5 feet] in the 6th century (not less than seven spans: Dawson 2007b: 2). At its centre was a large metal boss. For comparison, in the 10th century we find small round infantry shields listed as 47 cm in diameter; but they were used by a specialised infantry type that only appeared after AD 900, namely the heavy-pike bearer. Dawson has noted that in the 10th century there are also round shields depicted in art as around 50-80 cm in diameter (2007a: 23; 2007b: 4). Another suggestion for the size of the round infantry shield of the 10th century is a diameter of 82 cm (32 inches: Parani p. 125). Finally the long (teardrop-shaped) infantry shield of the 10th C was required to be at least 94 cm high. It was the standard or common infantry shield. It protected the solder from neck to knee (Dawson 2007 b: 9-11). Evidently in Justinians time only the first two ranks in an infantry formation wore mail armour; the other ranks were unarmoured (except for a helmet and shield). Agathias records that troops placed in the front line wore extra armour, namely mail down to their ankles, and forearm guards and larger shields. (2.b) Light or medium infantry: spear, sword and shield but no armour: In the Romaic army the Isaurians from south-central Asia Minor* were of this type: they bore a spear or javelin about two metres long, sword, medium shield and no helmet. In the 10th century light infantry carried shields of diameter 70 cm [two feet four inches]according to Parani p.126: probably her interpretation of the three spans of the Sylloge: cf Dawson 2007b: 5. (*) Isauria was the inland region of south-central Asia Minor between Pisidia and Lycaonia. In early Byzantine times Isaurians means the semi-tribal and war-loving mountain people living across the greater Isaurian region, i.e. from West Cappadocia to the Taurus mountains. They served the emperors as elite light infantry from about 450 to 650. (2.c) Foot-archers and other missile troops: These types were normally unarmoured, i.e. no helmet and no body armour. Some carried a small shield or buckler, some did not. Some used just a bow. Some also carried short darts, called (Greek:) martzobrboula or (Latin:) martiobarbuli. The darts were fletched for throwing, with an iron head and weighted with lead. Looking like a short arrow, they were about 15 cm long (but perhaps as long as 50 cm) and weighed around 150 gm. They were thrown by hand (MacDowall 1994). In Vegetiuss time, fl. AD 400, each man carried five in the hollow of his shield. I have found no good information on the size of the 6th C infantry bow. As already noted, Dawsons (2007a: 24) figure of about one metre in the 10th C can be rejected. The 10th century cavalry bow - much reduced in force compared to an infantry bow - was at least 1.17 metres long (Sylloge 39.4, quoted in McGeer p. 213). Thus an

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infantry bow must have been of the order of 1.5 metres long. There were also specialist slingers and foot-javelinists. The sling is more accurate and has a greater range up to 400 metres than a bow-fired arrow. This was a staffsling of about 1.2 m or 4ft in length (Dawson ibid.) In the 10th century, Byzantine foot-archers carried two quivers, one with 60 arrows, the other with 40 (McGeer p.206). MacDowell 1994: 57 has proposed that infantry bows had a maximum wounding range, with some hope of penetrationinto unarmoured fleshof 200-300 metres. This agrees with the Sylloge, a late 10th century source. It says that the Romanic heavy infantry bow was capable of sending an arrow over 300 metres, with a killing distance of perhaps 200 metres (in McGeer, pp.68, 207). Infantry Dress and Equipment
Heavy Head protection: Spangenhelm with cheek pieces. Reinforced helmet (Agathias). Front ranks: Mail coat to the ankle; and forearm guards [vambraces] (Agathias). Or mail to the waist (corselet). Round, large: up to 1.5 metres. Medium Head covering of felt or leather (middle ranks) (S). Not mail (S). Middle ranks wore just a padded doublet or himation at least a finger thick. Light Isaurian: none.

Body Armour

Isaurian: none.

Shield

Round, medium, 80100 cm.

Isaurian: Round, medium. Perhaps as small as 70 cm diameter. Some foot-archers wore bucklers on their upper left arm.

Leg armour

Pteruges (long hanging leather straps) around the thighs. Greaves were worn only by the front ranks (S).

Nil: Boot or greaves are not requited (S).

Head-dress:

Round or cylindrical cap (pileus); or wrapped linen turban (phakeolis) (D23). Light red-brown

Body: over

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cloak. Body: Knee-length short tunic worn under a padded doublet or himation at least a finger thick (D23). White trousers. Maurices Gothic shoes or hypodemata: toplaced short boots; (D20); or campagia: open-topped leather shoes with laces or straps (D passim). Trousers. Campagia

Legs Feet

D = page reference in DAmato 2005. S = Maurices Stategikon (ca AD 600).

4. TACTICS Versatile use of both cavalry and infantry; Controlled Firepower and Shock

The household or guards-cavalry, the bucellarii: Gk voukellarioi, could be deployed as skirmishers, using feints to draw the enemy out and then hit them when they became disorganised. Other horsemen, e.g. javelinists, could also lure the enemy to charge against them. And some cavalry types, e.g. the Byzantine regulars and Hun foederati, were capable, when required, of direct frontal charges against the enemy, e.g. at Dara in 530 and Faventia in 542. See later in this paper for descriptions of these battles. But frontal charges were far from typical: Well timed (cavalry) attacks against the enemy's flanks and rear are much more effective and decisive than direct frontal charges and attacks. . . . [If the enemy must be faced in open battle, therefore,] do not mass all your troops in front, and even if the enemy is superior in numbers, direct your operations against his rear or his flanks. For it is dangerous and uncertain under all conditions, and against any people [nation], to engage in purely frontal combat (Maurice SM: 27). If the enemy became disorganised, the cavalry could outflank them; if the enemy broke, the cavalry pursued them. Often the infantry bore the main shock of the enemy army while the cavalry served as a mobile firepower-platform and as a pursuit force. To help the infantry stand up to the enemy, they could be stiffened with dismounted elite cavalry (as at Taginae in AD 552: see later) or with a line of wagons in its rear or by trenches in front. The bow13

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equipped cavalry would provide supporting arrow-fire (as at Casilinum in 554: the battle is described below). Infantry were rarely used to lead an attack. More commonly they formed a defensive fire-base around which the cavalry operated. The infantry were trained to open up intervals in their ranks to receive their retiring horsemen and to stand fast to rescue them [from pursuers] (Procopius viii.22.18, quoted in Boss 2003: 52). While the normal role of infantrymen was defensive, the missile-power of the footarchers could, especially if they were brigaded in units of their own, be used offensively. While the infantry were capable of moving forward to attack in a shieldwall formation [Maurices foulkon], with spears pointed forwards and archers firing from behind, this would usually not be relevant as the Empires major enemies (Persians, Vandals and Goths) were cavalry-oriented armies. The foulkon normally served as a defensive ploy. Procopius puts the following words into Belisariuss mouth: Our own regular Roman [Byzantine] horse and our Hunnish Foederati are all capital horse-bowmen, while the enemy [the Gothic army in Italy] has hardly any knowledge whatever of archery. For the Gothic knights use lance and sword alone, while their bowmen on foot are always drawn up to the rear under cover of the heavy squadrons. So their horse-men are no good till the battle comes to close quarters, and can easily be shot down while standing in battle array before the moment of contact arrives. Their foot-archers, on the other hand, will never dare to advance against cavalry, and so keep too far back." Archery Although the Persians won at Callinicum, commonly the East Romans dominated, thanks to the more powerful bows used by their foot-archers (McGeer p.207, citing Kolias). In the 10th century, and no doubt also in the 6th century, the Byzantine infantry used heavy bows capable of sending an arrow over 300 metres, with a killing distance of perhaps 200 metres (McGeer pp.68, 207). The Persians of the 6th century were noted for their high rate of arrow-fire, though it was not as powerful as Byzantine archery (Maurice, Strategikon XI.1, 6). Procopius takes this further when he says that the Persians, almost all bowmen, shot more rapidly than the Byzantines, but their arrows broke upon hitting Byzantine armour and had no power to hurt them, because they were shot from weak bows: . . . since the Persians are almost all bowmen, he writes, and they learn to make their shots much more rapidly than any other men, still the bows which sent the arrows were weak and not very tightly strung, so that their missiles, hitting a corselet, perhaps, or helmet or shield of a Roman warrior, were broken off and had no power to hurt the man who was hit. The Roman bowmen are always slower indeed, but inasmuch as their bows are extremely stiff and very tightly strung, and one might add that they are handled by stronger men, they easily slay much greater numbers of those they hit than do the Persians, for [at close range*] no armour proves an obstacle to the force of their arrows (Procop., Wars, I.18, 32-33).

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(*) The killing power of the bow is a vexed question. I offer a short discussion of a large topic in the Appendix to this paper. During their defence of Rome in 537-38, the imperial forces used essentially the same tactical feat. A troop of horsemen would leave the city by one of the gates, provoking a number of Goths to attack them. The Byzantine horse-archers and archer-lancers would then shoot down their assailants from a distance with their bows. When the Goths retreated in the face of this missile onslaught, the Romanics would charge the unprotected Gothic infantry with their lances. The Goths had both armoured lancers and foot archers, but it seems they never combined the two methods of fighting into a single system as the Byzantines had done, and so the Byzantines' stratagem routinely succeeded or so argues Erik Hildinger 1999. More likely, Belisarius used skirmishing tactics also because he knew he would suffer defeat if he engaged all of the much larger Gothic army in a pitched battle. As noted below (see Battle Outside Rome), the Goths did put their foot archers to good use on at least one occasion. In Belisariuss own words, quoted or invented by Procopius: "Ever since we first met the Goths", the commander said, "in small engagements, I studied the differences in our tactical methods for the purpose of adapting my tactic so as to make up for the inferiority of my numbers. I found that the chief difference is that almost all our Roman [Byzantine] troops [our regular Roman horse] and our Hunnic allies [foederati] are excellent horse-archers [capital horsemen], whereas the Goths are totally unpractised in this form of warfare. Their cavalry [the Gothic knights] are accustomed to use only lances and swords, while their bowmen are unmounted and go into battle under the cover of their heavy armed cavalry [the heavy squadrons]. And so, except in hand-to-hand fighting, their cavalry have no means of protecting themselves against the missiles of the enemy and can easily be cut up [shot down], and their infantry are ineffectual against mounted forces." Procopius, Bell. Goth. i.27.26. The wording in square brackets is an alternative translation of the Greek original. 5. BATTLES 1 Dara, AD 530. 2 Callinicum, 531. 3 Outside Rome, 537. 4 Faventia, 542. 5 Tadinae, 552. 6 Casilinum, AD 554. 5a. The Battle of Dara, 530 Background Conflict between the Persian (Sassanian) and Roman empires was re-ignited in 52425 when Iveria (Iberia), the Christian kingdom in the Caucasus, switched sides, i.e. it defected from Persian suzerainty. Overt RomanPersian fighting broke out in the Transcaucasus region and upper Mesopotamia in 526527. A series of setbacks prompted the new Roman emperor, Justinian I, to reorganise the Eastern armies. He appointed (527) a new young commander named Belisarius, hitherto a palace guards

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Belisarius, aged 25 or 26, led the Romaics to a victory over the Persians outside the fortress of Dara or Daras, also known as Anastasioupolis: 18 km NW of modern Nusaybin, medieval Nisibis.* This was followed by a near defeat - really a mutual escape - at Callinicum on the upper Euphrates River in 531. The emperor and the shah then negotiated an "Endless Peace". (*) Anastasioupolis is modern Oguz in Turkish Kurdistan, west of the Upper Tigris. Nusaybin, on the Turkish side of our Syrian-Turkish border, is about halfway between modern Turkish Diyarbakir (ancient Amida) and Iraqi Mosul. The intersection point, on the Tigris River, of the borders of the modern states of Turkey, Syria and Iraq, is located a little to the east. Amida/Diyabakir lay on the Roman side of the border; Nisibis/Nusaybin on the Persian side. The Battle Belisarius ordered the digging of a trench or a number of ditches on the road towards Dara to block the Persian cavalry, and organised most of his infantry in a single block. On the left and right flanks of his infantry were the Heruli (German) cavalry - allies or foederati - under Pharas and Bouzes. Also on the left, according to the Wikipedia authors [Battle of Dara: accessed 2009], were 300 Hun cavalry under Sunicas and Aigan, along with 600 more Huns on the right under Simmas and Ascan. John Haldon see below sees these units located in the centre and out front. A reserve of Byzantine cavalry led by the general John was located in the rear of the right flank (or more likely, as Haldon proposes, there were cavalry divisions on both extreme flanks). Gibbon writes thus in his The Decline and Fall: The Mirranes [marshal] of Persia advanced, with 40,000 of her [Persias] best troops, to raze the fortifications of Dara; and signified the day and the hour on which the citizens should prepare a bath for his refreshment, after the toils of victory. He encountered an adversary [Belisarius] equal to himself, by the new title of General of the East; his superior in the science of war, but much inferior in the number and quality of his troops, which amounted only to 25,000 Romans and strangers, relaxed in their discipline and humbled by recent disasters. As the level plain of Dara refused all shelter to stratagem and ambush, Belisarius protected his front with a deep trench. It was prolonged at first in perpendicular, and afterwards in parallel, lines, to cover the wings of cavalry advantageously posted to command the flanks and rear of the enemy. When the Roman [infantry] centre was shaken, their [the cavalrys] well-timed and rapid charge decided the conflict: the standard of Persia fell [actually the standard of one of the deputy commanders]; the Immortals fled; the [Persian] infantry threw away their bucklers, and [more than] 8,000 of the vanquished were left on the field of battle. John Haldons analysis of Dara (Haldon 2001: 30 ff) Points to note: (a) The small part played by infantry, which served as the anchor-force on both sides; the cavalry did nearly all the fighting. (d) Ditches were dug by the

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Byzantines to help the infantry centre resist attack by cavalry. (c) The use of the arrow-barrage. (d) Belisariuss use of small units of fast Hun cavalry as flankattackers and ambushers. Belisarius army of some 25,000 men formed up just outside Dara astride the road to Nisibis. The Persians dispatched a substantially larger army of perhaps 40,000 under the Mihran [Gk: mirranes] or marshal named Firuz (Gk Perozes). Many were unreliable and poorly armed conscripted peasantry (Procopius, Wars, I.xiii, 21-22; pp.107-08 of the 2007 Cosimo edition of Dewings translation). Reaching Dara in June 530, Firuz formed his battle-line about 4.5 km from Belisariuss position. Although outnumbered, Belisarius decided - probably because he was aware of the motley nature of the enemy forces - not to withdraw behind the walls of Dara but to fight a an aggressive-defensive battle. Bury 1923: 85 notes that, addressing his soldiers before the battle, Belisarius described the Persian infantry as "a crowd of miserable peasants who only come into battle to dig through walls and strip the slain and generally to act as servants to the soldiers (that is, the cavalry)." According to Procopiuss eyewitness account, the Byzantines prepared a position partially shielded by a series of defensive ditches dug across the main road, with numerous crossing places for their own troops to pass through. Belisarius placed two units of allied Hun cavalry (300 men on the left, 600 on the right) forward in the centre, in front of the main ditch. The large Romaic centre mainly infantry - was drawn up in a deep formation: a rectangular block - behind the main ditch. A small detachment of Herul cavalry was placed on the left of the infantry and a larger Byzantine cavalry unit was stationed in the right. On the two extreme wings were two large divisions of cavalry placed somewhat further forward than the mainly infantry centre but also behind the ditches (map, Haldon 2001: 33). Firuz formed up the Persians in two lines, the stronger cavalry units in front of the weaker peasant infantry. The cavalry were brigaded in three large divisions. (Phase 1:) In the opening phase of the battle, the Persian cavalry division on the right attacked the Byzantine left. After an inconsequential skirmish, the Persian division withdrew. Next followed a personal duel. A lone Persian rode out offering a challenge, which was taken up by Andreas, a Byzantine bucellarius [elite soldier] who had been a wrestler in civil life. Andreas unhorsed the challenger, dismounted and killed him. Now a second Persian challenger, a better-trained man, rode out. But Andreas was able to kill him too. Its morale gone, and dusk approaching, the Persian army retired to its base-camp. Overnight a further 10,000 men arrived to strengthen the Persian side. Then on Day Two, the two armies took up the same dispositions as on the first day, except that Belisarius now hid a small force of Hun cavalry behind a hill to the left, ready to ambush the Persian right flank when it came past. (Phase 2:) The battle re-opened with a massive exchange of arrow-fire between the two armies, which inflicted only a few casualties on either side. This was followed by a general attack by all three Persian cavalry divisions. The Persian right managed to force back the Romaic left under Bouzes. But at this point the several Hun units one from behind the hill and another from the Byzantine front-line - charged into either side of the advancing Persian division. It broke and fled back to the shelter of the Persian second line. Firuz lost some 3,000 men in this phase.

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The two armies now regrouped. (Phase 3:) This time Firuz focussed his attack against the Byzantine right, which was commanded by John the son of Nicetas. After strengthening his left by moving across more infantry, and bolstering his left cavalry division with crack units of the Immortals, Firuz again launched a general assault. Johns cavalry division gave way and withdrew in disorder, in part because the Persians were beginning to come around the end of the ditch. Belisarius quickly responded by ordering a counter-charge to the side by his reserve cavalry: the two Hun units from in front of the ditch and the Byzantine cavalry that made up the right end of his second line. When the main division joined in, this broke the Persian attack and indeed cut it in two. The standard of Baresmanes, the Persian divisional commander, fell, and the retreating Romaic right under John rallied. Now Baresmanes was killed, and the Persian Immortals began to falter. Some 5,000 Persians died in this phase. Next the whole Persian line began to break up, eventually falling into headlong rout. The Byzantines briefly pursued, and now they killed an even greater number of the enemy until Belisarius called them back. 5b. Battle of Callinicum 531 Fought at modern ar-Raqqah, on the upper Euphrates in what is now north-central Syria. A clear map of the Syrian stretch of the Euphrates can be found at Jonildo Bacelars website: http://www.geographicguide.net/asia/maps/syria-map.jpg; accessed 2009. The Romans or Byzantines under Belisarius and the Persians under Azarethes clashed in upper Mesopotamia.* The campaign involved the East Romans forcing the Persians to fight as the latter retreated from Roman territory. The Persian forces, around 15,000 men, were supported by a contingent of Lakhmid Arab allies. They were opposed by an East Roman force of c.20,000 men led by the young general Belisarius which included some 5,000 Ghassanid (Syrian) Arab allies. (*) Here Upper Mesopotamia means the valley of the upper Euphrates: the border region of present-day Iraq-Turkey-Syria; or "Kurdistan". In Romanic-Byzantine times, it was generally under Arab rule. For many centuries, the languages of the common people were Syriac and Kurdish. The Kurdish language is an Iranian tongue, related to Persian. In medieval times, the major cities included, from west to east: Germanicea, modern Marash, in modern Turkey; Samosata: modern Samsat, on the Euphrates, today all but surrounded by the great Ataturk Dam; and Edessa or Urfa: now part of Turkey. Further north was Melitene: Byz. Melitine, Arabic and Turkish Malatya, also in present-day Turkey. The Battle In this battle the Persian cavalry routed the Byzantine cavalry, compelling Belisarius and his retinue to fall back upon the infantry force. The Romaic foot soldiers stood with their backs to the river to prevent encirclement by the Persian horsemen, whose frontal attacks were successfully resisted (Procopius, Wars I.18.41 ff, cited by

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McGeer p.278). Cf 544. As this shows, massed spearmen, if well-trained and determined to stand their ground, will normally prevail against attacking cavalry. This is not to be wondered at: horses naturally resist suicide. The East Romans deployed with their left flank on the Euphrates. The Persians broke through the Roman right flank and were able to drive Belisarius against the river. Here, however, the Romans were able to resist the Persians and withdraw much of their army across the river. The Persians were then able to complete their withdrawal from Roman territory and did not attempt to follow up their victory. See next. Belisarius' forces consisted of about 20,000 Byzantines and another 5,000 Ghassanid Arab allies. They had marched down the road leading into the heart of Persian territory along the right bank of the Euphrates in what today would be northern Iraq. It formed the eastern borderland between the Roman Empire and Sassanian Persia. The retreating Persian forces numbered about 15,000 and an additional group of Lakhmid Arabs (Wikipedia, 2009). Belisarius anchored his left flank on the bank of the river with infantry, put the Ghassanid Arab allies on the right flank, and placed several ranks of heavy cavalry in the centre of the front line. In more standard formation, the Persians split their forces into two roughly equal groups, with infantry in front of cavalry. The Persians broke through the Roman right flank, forcing Belisarius to retreat in an effort to re-form his line, but the retreat was followed. Soon the Romans found themselves pressed against the river. Here the Romans were able to resist the Persians and withdraw much of their army across the river. The Persians chose not to follow up this victory, and returned to their withdrawal from Roman territory. Procopius: The enemy were not able either to rout them or in any other way to overpower them. For standing shoulder to shoulder they (the Byzantines) kept themselves constantly massed in a small space, and they formed with their shields a rigid, unyielding barricade, so that they shot at the Persians more conveniently than they were shot at by them. Many a time after giving up, the Persians would advance against them determined to break up and destroy their line, but they always retired again from the assault unsuccessful. For their horses, annoyed by the clashing of the shields, reared up and made confusion for themselves and their riders (Wars, trans. Dewing; Plain Label Books, 1914, p.43). 5c. Battle Outside Rome, 537: The Goths under Witiges defeat the imperials under Belisarius. Background The (traditional) last Western Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustus, was deposed in AD 476 by an Eastern Germanic general, Odoacer. The German subsequently ruled in Italy for 17 years, theoretically under the suzerainty of the Eastern Roman Emperor Zeno, but in practice in total independence. Emperor Zeno decided in 489 to oust the Ostrogoths living south of the Danube - a foederatum people: barbarians settled by permission within the empire - by sending

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them into Italy. Their leader Theodoric the Great defeated Odoacer in 493 and became the king of the Ostrogoths. Theodoric, who had lived long in Constantinople, was a Romanised German, and ruled over Italy largely through Roman personnel, although the armed forces were mainly ethnic Goths. Buoyed by the successful re-conquest of Vandal North Africa (modern Tunisia, 533-34), Justinian resolved to restore as much of the Western Roman Empire as he could. In 535 he commissioned the conqueror of the Vandals, Belisarius, to attack the Ostrogothic Kingdom in Italy. Sicily was taken, and Belisariuss army crossed into Italy proper, where in 536 they quickly captured Naples and Rome. The latter was simply abandoned by the Goths. The new Gothic king Witigis resolved to recapture Rome and restore the integrity of the regnum Gothorum. The Battle This account again follows Boss 1993; much of his analysis is speculative, albeit well-speculated. The two armies formed up outside the Salerian Gate on the north-east side of Rome. Witiges led some 24,000 Goths against Belisarius main force of 8,000 imperials. Meanwhile, on the north-west, a separate battle was being fought. There at the Plains of Nero near the Tomb of Hadrian - the present-day Castel SantAngelo: converted to a fortress in AD 401, - Witigess general Mardas commanded 4,000 Goths. He was tasked with preventing 1,000 imperial cavalry under Valentinus from joining up with Belisarius. Behind Valentinuss regulars stood a large force of irregular infantry in the shape of perhaps 4,000 local Roman-Italian citizens. 1a. Valentinuss force: no regular infantry. 4,000 light irregular foot: local Latin-Romans with spears. 400 horse-archers Byzantines or Greeks (40% of his regulars; but only 8% if we count the Italian irregulars). 300 light cavalry: North African Moors with javelins. 300 spear cavalry or lancers: elite Foederati. 1b. Mardass 4,000 Goths: 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 heavy cavalry (spears). light cavalry (javelins). light infantry (spears). foot archers (25%).

The Goths were fearful of attacking because of what appeared to be an immense number of Latin-Italian irregulars. But the skirmishing by Valentinuss Moorish javelinists forced the beginning of a battle: this discomfitted the Goths. Then Valentinuss lancers and horse-archers charged and dispersed the Goths, who fell back to nearby hills. But the imperialists neglected to secure the all-important bridge which could lead them to Belisariuss aid. Instead they fell into disorder as they pillaged the Gothic camp. This encouraged the Goths to rally; they returned and drove off the enemy rabble; the latter rushed back into the city.

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At about the same time, the Byzantine main force came up against the Gothic main force: 2a. Belisariuss force of 8,000 Notice that 3,800, or nearly one-half, carried bows: 2,400 spear cavalry: 1,800 Byzantines and Isaurians [mounted infantry in both cases] and 600 Foederati. 2,000 horse with bow and lance: 1,200 bucellarii and 800 Huns. 1,400 light infantry with spears and/or javelins: 800 Slavs and 600 Isaurians. 1,200 foot archers: 1,200 Byzantines and Isaurians. 600 horse archers: 600 Byzantines. 400 armoured spear infantry: all Byzantines. ------8,000 2b. Witigess 24,000 Goths: 12,000 spear and javelin cavalry: the majority (say 8,000) with armour. 6,000 spear infantry, unarmoured. 6,000 foot archers (only 25%). -------24,000 Belisarius seems to have placed his 5,000 cavalry in three large units or divisions in front of his 3,000 infantry. The mounted divisions, each of at least 1,500 men, were all ad hoc mixed units: mounted infantry and regular cavalry bolstered by bucellarii. Witiges drew up his troops in the more usual formation of an infantry centre with two cavalry wings. His cavalry wings each numbered about 6,000 men. The battle opened with skirmishing by the imperial cavalry: mainly, it seems, quick brief encounters between the lancers on either side. (It is not clear what use the imperial cavalry made of their bows.) Probably the Gothic spear-infantry formed a shield-wall in front of and around their foot-archers; at any rate many of Belisariuss riders and/or their horses were lost to arrow-fire. Then at the right moment, the Gothic right wing of 6,000 spear-cavalry charged. The Byzantine cavalry pulled back or perhaps fled. The decisive moment came when the Belisariuss infantry joined in the withdrawal or rout, instead of holding firm as a base around which the cavalry could rally. One small body of imperial infantry, however, did resist the onrushing Goths. This created enough time for most of Belisariuss men to retreat inside the city walls. This is a curious case of the archery-oriented imperials being unsettled by the infantry-bowmen of an enemy who usually relied more on his spear-cavalry. But of course the big difference in numbers would also have been important.

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5d. Battle at Faventia (modern Faenza) near Ravenna, Italy, 542 Totilas Goths defeat the imperials under Artabazes. Witigess nephew Baduila, 541-552, was the new young Gothic-Italian king. His name is rendered Totila in the Greek sources, and the modern writers generally follow the Greek style. He was quite successful in resisting the Byzantines, even recapturing Rome briefly in 546. For the battle at Faventia, Boss 1993 proposes the following numbers: (1) Artabazess 12,300 imperials: More than half the troops carried bows; no armoured infantry were used. 4,000: 1,800 1,400 1,300 600 200 horse-archers: all Byzantines. elite lancer-bowmen: 1,000 bucellarii and 800 Persians. light infantry: 1,000 Isaurian and 400 Byzantine spearmen. spear cavalry: 1,000 foederati and 300 Heruls. foot-archers all Byzantines. light cavalry: 200 Moors with javelins.

(2) Totilas 5,300 Goths, all cavalry: 3,300: heavy cavalry (spears and lances). 2,000 light cavalry with javelins. A disaffected Italian let some of Artabazes men into Verona, but the Gothic garrison rallied and expelled them. The imperialist army then retired south across the Po River to Faventia (Faenza) on the Via Aemilia, in order to cover the main highway to Ravenna.* Presumably Artabazes expected the Goths to come south to Bologna and thence along the Via Aemilia towards Ravenna. A branch road left the Via Aemilia at Faventia and connected it to Ravenna. (*) The north-east Italian coastal city located about halfway between Rome and Venice: capital of the Western empire after 400, then the seat of the Gothic kings. In 540 it was recaptured from the Goths by the Rhomaioi, who made it the capital of Byzantine Italy. Ravenna would eventually become the last Greek outpost in northern Italy until captured in AD 751 by the Italians (Lombards). In preparation for the battle, Totila detached an ambush force of 300 heavy cavalry. Probably both sides deployed only cavalry, the infantry being left behind in garrisons; if so, then the numbers of either side were probably not far from equal. When the imperialists committed to a charge, the Gothic ambush force came in from the side and Artabazess men panicked and fled. At one stage - presumably before the charge - there was a single combat between Valaris, a gigantic Goth, and Artabazes, in which the Goth was slain and Artabazes mortally wounded (Bury p.230 note 8). 5e. Battle of Tadinae or Taginai, northern Italy 552. The imperials under Narses defeat the Goths under Totila.

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Background In 552, the ever-suspicious Justinian recalled Belisarius from his campaign against the Ostrogoths in Italy and replaced him with the aged chamberlain Narses. Narses army, large by early medieval standards, set out overland from the East in June 551. After some delay, they marched around the top of the Adriatic and reached Italy in the summer of 552. There in July 552 Narses met and crushed the Goths at Tadinai. The Battle The exact site of the battle has been much debated. Narses marched from Rimini in the direction of Rome, but could not, or preferred not to, proceed along the Via Flaminia which was controlled by the Goths. Rather than go up the Flaminian from Fano, Narses at some point between Rimini and Fano led his army inland, i.e. SW, along a minor road. Then, swinging south past Urbino, they came onto the Flaminian Way itself, well behind the detachment of Goths who were guarding the highway down near Fano. In the Assisi region, three towns lie close together to the NE of Perugia and north of Foligno, namely: [1] Gualdo Tadino on the Via Flaminia, [2] Fossato, also on the Flaminian, and [3] Fabriano, in the hinterland 15 km east of Fossato. Having come onto and along the Flaminian, Narses army camped at a place that Procopius calls Busta Gallorum. Bury 1923: 290 proposes that this was near Fabriano. Haldon 2001: 38 prefers to place Narses camp at Fossato. Meanwhile Totilas army marched from Rome NE along the Flaminian Way to beyond Foligno. The two armies came up against each other at, or near, a place that Procopius calls Taginai, evidently a misrendering of the Latin Tadinum, i.e. our Gualdo Tadino, an ancient rest-station on the Via Flaminia. Totila seems to have camped at little to the north of Taginai, possibly at Fossato. As noted, Haldon believes it was Narses who camped at Fossato. Procopius says the two camps were 15 Roman miles or 22 km apart. Location: If one draws a line direct from Perugia to Ancona, Gualdo Tadino is onethird of the way from the former. Or, more locally, if one draws a line from Assisi to Gubbio, then Gualdo Tadino is to the east about halfway slightly nearer Gubbio. Narses deployed a larger force than Totila's. Boss proposes that the imperials had over 28,000 men. Haldon 2001: 37 prefers up to 25,000. This included seasoned cavalry and infantry, new recruits from Thrace and Illyricum, and many allies: a small number of Persians, an unknown number of Gepids and Huns, some 4,000 Heruls and nearly 6,000 Lombards. At any event, the imperial army was very large for the era, especially so soon after the great plague of the 540s. Totila led some15,000 Goths, made up of some 8,000 cavalry (initially 6,000 but reinforced to 8,000) and 7,000 infantry. The two armies drew up no further apart than two bowshots, which is to say: about 500 metres. (In the 10th century, and no doubt also in the 6th, infantrymen used heavy bows capable of sending an arrow over 300 metres, with a killing distance of perhaps 200 metres: McGeer pp.68, 207.)

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The Gothic army was drawn up in a conventional formation of three large divisions: the 7,000 infantry in a central division, with a division of about 3,000 cavalry on either flank. The larger Byzantine force was deployed in a crescent formation drawn up as follows. Or rather, it adopted a crescent formation immediately ahead of the final phase of the battle: Far left: Horse archers. Left: Foot archers, 4,000 men: Narses placed himself here. Centre: Dismounted Germanic cavalry acting as heavy infantry: Gepids, Heruls and Lombards.* Right: Foot archers, 4,000, commanded by Narses lesser commanders: John the Glutton, Valerian and Dagisthaeus. Far right: Horse archers. (*) Allies and mercenaries drawn from among the Germanic peoples living north of the middle Danube in ancient Pannonia and Dacia (present-day Austria, Slovakia and Hungary). Or thus, as presented by Boss 1993. The point to note is that the foot-archers formed the ends of the crescent: Detached forces on the far left (ambush and support): Hidden cavalry numbering 1,500 (Byzantines). Haldon 2001: 38 locates this unit behind the left flank. In addition, he says, there was a tiny unit of 50 men blocking a gully or ravine to the left which might be used by the enemy to come around the flank. Forward Left: 4,000 Romanic or Byzantine foot-archers. Haldon has them immediately in front of the cavalry. Left flank: Narses and John commanding regular Byzantine and allied cavalry, i.e. Gepids and Huns (2,500+). This included 500 elite bucellarii. Reserve: 1,500 cavalry were placed behind the left flank, according to Haldon 2001: 38. Their role was to intervene as a flanking force if the Gothic infantry should attack the Byzantine centre. Centre: 9,500 dismounted Gepid, Heruli and Lombard cavalrymen with lances (light pikes). Over half were Lombards (Haldon 2001: 38 concurs). In effect they served as heavy infantry. Totila seems not to have understood that they were first-class troops. Evidently he imagined they were poor quality foot-soldiers who would easily be pushed back. In addition there were 4,000 Byzantine spear-infantry, for a grand total of 13,500 in the infantry centre. Right flank: The lesser Byzantine commanders in charge of cavalry: mainly elite bucellarii with some allied cavalry, i.e. Persians (2,500+). Forward Right: 4,000 Byzantine foot-archers. As we have said, the imperial foot-archers moved forward to form crescent-horns on

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either side. Oddly, the Goths seem not to have used their own infantry archers. Totila ordered his entire cavalry, perhaps 8,000 men in all, to charge the enemy centre, ignoring the Byzantine foot-archers and leaving their own foot-archers behind. Procopius stresses the order and discipline maintained by the central division of Byzantine infantry and dismounted allied cavalry. By holding firm they forced the charging Goths to pull back and reform in order to charge again. But as they did so, large number of the Gothic cavalry were cut down by the fire of the Byzantine footarchers. After several assaults, the Goths retired, and Narses immediately ordered a charge: the Gothic horse were swept back onto their infantry and destroyed. John Haldons account of Tadinae (Haldon 2001: 37 ff) Points to note: (a) The well chosen battle-ground. (b) The Goths reliance on cavalry. (b) The Byzantines use of foot- and horse-archers. (c) The Goths failure to use archers. (c) Imperial foot-soldiers forming the anchor-point. (d) The bravado or braggadocio of the Goths or at least that is the way that Procopius portrays them. (e) The Byzantines good discipline and first-class generalship. Narses chose his ground very carefully: there was rough terrain around and behind the plain that the Goths would have to pass to attack him. And his centre formations were on forward-sloping ground, giving them a defensive and counter-attacking advantage. The battle opened with an attempt by the Gothic right to dislodge the small Byzantine unit blocking the ravine on Narses left. Their several assaults failed. The fact that the Gothic cavalry were used may imply that Totilas infantrymen were regarded as only second-class troops. After a parade of horsemanship by Totila performing alone, a Gothic champion came out and challenged for single combat. A Byzantine responded and killed the Goth. Totila now heard that an expected 2,000 reinforcements had arrived back at this camp. So at about midday he withdrew his army to meet up with them. He may have been hoping that Narses would now mount an attack, but he did not, probably because it would mean abandoning his advantageous defensive location. Instead Narses ordered his men to take a light lunch while remaining in their positions. Thus, when Totila came back strengthened with reinforcements, he found the Byzantines exactly where they were before. The Gothic king now had his own cavalry line up in one large formation in front of his infantry. Narses could see that Totila was planning an all-out cavalry charge against the Byzantine centre, and so moved his foot archers out and forward, creating a crescent. This placed them on higher ground and out of immediate reach of a Gothic cavalry assault. The Gothic lancers all charged at the imperial centre, taking a few casualties from the enfilading fire of the enemy foot-archers. The well-positioned spearmen in the Byzantine centre held their ground, no doubt in a shield-wall formationProcopius emphasises their good order and staunch disciplineand the Goths soon pulled back. Narses now ordered a general attack by the whole Byzantine line. The Gothic cavalry formation began to break up under this pressure, and instead of regrouping it ploughed on through the line of its own infantrymen. This brought about a general rout. The imperial cavalry pursued with vigour, and when the battle ended some 6,000 Goths were dead. Totila himself was wounded and died a little later.

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The imperials under Narses defeat the Franks and Alamanni led by Buccelin. Background The Frankish king sent to Italy two armies under the Alamannic chieftains Leutharis and Butilin - or he allowed them to go - as much for booty and prisoners as to aid the Goths. The Alemanni lived in what is now SW Germany, N Switzerland and nearby parts of France. Although pagans, they were part of the Christian empire of the Franks. The ducate of Alamannia was under Frankish suzerainty. The count or duke is named Butilinus in Agathias: Buccellinus in Gregory of Tours and Buccelinus (one l) in the Chronicle of Marcellinus Comes. The large barbarian force entered the Po valley in June 553. Defeated at Parma, the imperialists pulled back to Faenza. Then Narses went into winter quarters, in order to prepare for battle in the spring, allowing the Franco-Alamannic expeditioners to divide into two plundering armies that penetrated right to the very ends of the Italian peninsula. One ravaged through to Puglia, the other to Calabria. In 554 the army led by Leutharis was so ravaged by disease (probably dysentery) and dispersed by desertions that it disappeared; but this still left a large force in Calabria under Butilin. His horde came back from the south headed, via Campania, towards Rome. In the autumn Narses marched out from Rome against them, and the two armies met near Capua on the banks of the Volturno or Casilinus River. Deployment Boss 1993: 28 proposes that the opposing forces were drawn up as follows. (a) Frankish-Alemanni horde: Butilin originally had some 30,000 men, but this had been reduced by disease and desertions to perhaps 22,000, all infantry: - Left side of the wedge: perhaps 7,000 Alemanni or Alamanni. - Head of the wedge: 8,000 Franks. - Right side of the wedge: 7,000 Alemanni. The flat-fronted wedge [Latin cuneus] or boars head formation [Latin caput porcinum] was an immense single formation of two deep columns that converged into a single head (Halsall p.195, citing Agathias). (b) Byzantine army (Narses): Bury 1923 and Haldon [2001: 41], propose that Narses had about 18,000 men in his army. Roy Boss prefers 15,300. They drew up as follows, according to Boss. Narses placed his heavy infantry - a lesser proportion of his whole force - in the centre, with lancer-bowmen cavalry in larger numbers on the wings. Narses himself

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Forward left: hidden ambush force commanded by Valerian: 1,500 Byzantine cavalry. This included 500 elite bucellarii. Left wing: 1,500 Byzantine cavalry, all with bows, i.e. bow-lancers and horse-archers. Haldon suggests that it was this division that was partly concealed in woods, with orders to attack the enemys right flank as it passed. The cavalry were placed on the wings at either side, carrying short spears and shields, while a bow and arrows and a sword hung at their side; a few of them [also] held pikes (Agathias II.8.1, trans. Frendo). Centre: 8,000: all foot, i.e. infantry and dismounted cavalry: 4,000 Goths, Gepids and (eventually) Heruls; and 4,000 Byzantine heavy infantry formed up as a shield-wall. The first one or two ranks wore mail to their ankles. The Heruls were not quite in position when the fighting commenced. Behind the main infantry centre, a second line of missile-infantry: 4,000 foot archers, javeliners and slingers. As we have said, the sling is more accurate and has a greater range up to 400 metres than a bow-fired arrow. Haldon 2001: 42 also has a third line: a small cavalry reserve behind these two lines of infantry. Right wing, where Narses was stationed: 3,000 cavalry, mainly Byzantine but including some Huns, nearly all with bows. This included 500 elite bucellarii. The Battle As soon as Narses learned that Buccelin [Butilin, the Alemannic leader] had occupied . . [a] position at Capua, he marched from Rome with his army, numbering about 18,000, and encamped not far from the enemy. The battle which ensued was probably fought across the Appian Way which passed through Capua and crossed the river at Casilinum. . . . He [Narses] placed his cavalry on the two wings and all the infantry in the centre (J B Bury). The infantry occupied all the ground in the centre. The men in the van, clad in mail right down to their feet and wearing especially strong helmets, formed a solid wall of shields. Behind them were less heavily armoured infantry, with slingers and footarchers at the rear (Agathias II, 8.4). There was a wood on the left, and Valerian and Artabanes, who commanded on that side, were directed to keep a part of their forces concealed in the wood till the enemy attacked. Narses himself commanded on the right. . . . Buccelin had drawn up his army, which consisted entirely of infantry, in the shape of a deep column [formed in arrow-head shape], which should penetrate like a wedge through the hostile lines. In this array the Franks arrived, armed with missile lances, swords and axes, confident that they would sweep all before them at the first rush (Bury). The Frankish column began the battle by moving forwards and scattering, or rather: it smashed through, the first line of Byzantine infantry and the second line of imperial archers behind them, without any great difficulty. The Franks then came into contact

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with Narses' advancing Heruli, who held them. Meanwhile, wheeling his Roman (Byzantine) cavalry inwards, Narses had them threaten to charge both flanks of the Frankish mass. The Franks and Alamanni were forced to halt their advance, and to ready themselves to receive the charge. As noted, the Herul heavy infantrymen in Byzantine service had not arrived when the Franks charged in a wedge formation. There was an empty space where the Heruls were to join the line. Thus the enemy penetrated deep into, and through, the Byzantine infantry line, but only so as to expose their unguarded backs to the Byzantine horsearchers on either wing. The Heruls soon arrived to plug the line and hold the point of the Frankish wedge, while the imperial horse-archers fired withering volleys into the sides of the Alamanno-Frankish wedge. Gibbon, citing Agathias: The host of the Franks and Alamanni consisted of infantry: a sword and buckler hung by their side; and they used, as their weapons of offence, a weighty hatchet [sic: throwing axe] and a hooked javelin, which were only formidable in close combat, or at a short distance. The flower of the Roman [Byzantine] archers, on horseback, and in complete armour, skirmished without peril round this immovable phalanx; supplied by active speed the deficiency of number; and aimed their arrows against a crowd of Barbarians, who, instead of a cuirass and helmet, were covered by a loose garment of fur or linen. Narses quietly issued orders to his wings to face about [i.e. turn inwards], and the enemy were caught between the cross-fire of the cavalry, who were all armed with bows. The Franks were now facing both ways. The archers on the right wing aimed at the backs of those who were fighting with the infantry on the left, the archers on the left wing at the backs of those who were engaged with the right (Bury 1923: ch XIX). Instead of letting the horsemen charge, Narses halted them perhaps a hundred metres or less* from the enemy. The horse-archers now let loose a hail of arrows into the dense Frankish column. It was an easy target, and the Franks dared not move either to front or to flank for fear of breaking ranks and allowing the cavalry to ride them down. All they could do was to stand helplessly while the arrow-storm of East Roman horse-archers cut them to ribbons. The Byzantine bow-lancers and horsearchers proved decisive, firing into the mass of the mainly armour-less enemy infantry (Fauber p.127). (*) Hildinger 1997 has suggested that the Asian composite recurve bow was only accurate at up to 80 yards (75 m) when shot from horseback, but "shooting in arcade" or upwards at 45 degrees allowed for greater ranges. As we noted earlier, modern champion archers maintain that one cannot guarantee a hit on an individual target at more than 75 metres with any bow whatsoever; but of course one could always hit a massed body of thousands of individuals. See also the Appendix to this paper. The heroic Frankish and Alamanni infantry stood perhaps for several hours under the deadly shower, but eventually their nerve broke and some men began to flee to the rear - the only remaining escape route. Waiting until he judged them sufficiently disordered, Narses at last ordered his cavalry to charge. The Roman and allied horsemen rode repeatedly through the broken column and hacked it to pieces. Woods 2004.

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The Franks and Alemannii broke and were pursued by the Heruls and other imperial troops; Narses infantry threw javelins and his cavalry kept firing their arrows. The barbarians were annihilated (Agathias II, 9: trans Frendo p.41). John Haldons account of Casilinus (Haldon 2001: 40 ff) On the eve of the battle, Narses had chosen to execute a leading man among his Heruls for killing a slave. Accordingly the Heruls all stayed behind when Narses marched out of camp to assemble in battle lines. Peace was soon made, however, and a spot was left in the centre of imperial line for the Heruls to insert themselves when they caught up. The battle began with the charge of Franco-Alamannic wedge or blunted triangular phalanx. It quickly smashed through the Byzantine central lines, penetrating all the way through and into the rearguard. The imperial rearguard or second line responded with arrow-fire. Narses now ordered his cavalry wings to drop back and turn in against the head (blunt point) of the enemy wedge, attacking it with archery. Thus the barbarians were being shot at from three sides. Narses Herul foot-soldiers now came up from further in the rear and joined in against the head of the wedge. This caused the head to break and flee away to the side. This freed the Byzantine cavalry wings to move back around to the flanks of the enemy wedge while the Herul foot-soldiers advanced against the now exposed body or arms of the wedge. The Byzantine cavalry half-hidden in the wood also joined in, meaning that the barbarians were surrounded on three sides. Crowded together and thus unable easily to fight or to escape, they were assailed with sling-stones, shot down, speared and hacked to pieces by the imperial troops. -----------------------------------------Appendix: ARROWS, ARMOUR AND FLESH Much of the modern experimental work done in archery has been limited to the noncomposite, simple wooden longbow, an infantry weapon. The longbow of course was the famous weapon of the Welsh and English in the period 1250-1550. Fewer studies have been done of the range and killing power of the composite recurve bow, used in different sizes by both cavalry and infantry. Those interested in the superior mechanics of the composite recurve bow are referred to the Ashmolean Museum article, 1985: 155-57. Although the longbow was too primitive for our sophisticated Byzantines, we will list its specifications as a benchmark. Experimentally, the maximum range attainable with an English-style long-bow is around 300 metres. One heavily-built and wellpractised modern archer achieved 305 metres or 334 yds, firing an arrow weighing 465 grains (30 gms) (Bickerstaffe 2009). This agrees well with the medieval literature examined by Payne-Gallwey, who reports a maximum of 350 yards, i.e. 320 metres. We assume that at this distance the arrow does not even scratch flesh.

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A large, heavy bow typically releases a force (energy) of 150 J [joules]. Datum: to pierce both mail and padding, 120 J must be realised at impact (Ashmolean 1985; Alan Williams, citing Strickland & Hardys Great Warbow). Williams says that, at the maximum longbow range, which he cautiously cites as about 175 metres, no arrow of any size fired from a very heavy 150 lb longbow [ = pull-force of 667 newtons] even reaches 100 J [joules]. At that distance arrows fired by longbows are not effective in defeating mail armour. A longbow does generate enough force (energy) to easily kill at short range, i.e. around 25 metres. But, says Williams, past 50 or so yards, 45 metres, the kinetic energy decreases to point where mail piercing seems unlikely. This can be checked against the experimental result obtained by the BBC (2007). They found that at just 30 metres an English longbow punctures but it does not penetrate through a steel breastplate of unstated thickness [probably 1.5 mm]. It would appear, then, that ordinary longbows of 100 lb pull-force [445 newtons] could be a serious danger to unarmoured troops and horses at up to about 150 metres. But they were ineffective against troops wearing mail except at very close range: under 45 metres. Of course an arrow-storm will still be quite effective at beyond 45 metres: armour commonly leaves the extremities exposed, and most medieval armies always contained a large proportion of unarmoured troops. When we turn to composite recurve bows, we have to rely more on the medieval literature and less on modern experimental work:
Metres 365 (400 yards) 330 200 90 80 About 75? Effective range (not defined) of the 14th C Mameluke cavalry bow. (Taybugha). Probably means simply maximum range. Byzantine infantry bow, maximum distance (10th Century Syllogoge, cited by McGeer p.213). A modest figure, and for that reason credible. Killing distance, Byzantine infantry bow (McGeer). Presumably the killing of an unarmoured man. Armour-piercing range, Byzantine cavalry bow (Hyland 1994: 29, citing Bivar). See next. Killing distance, Byzantine cavalry bow (McGeer). Adam Karpowicz has calculated that a light-weight 72 lb composite bow can shoot a war arrow at 200 fps [feet per second], while the more realistic 125 lb+ bows are capable of around 250 fps [75 metres per second: 270 kilometres an hour]. This would result, he says, in a killing range of well over 50 metres. John France, 1994: 148, proposes that the effective, or killing, range of a Seljuq (Turkish) cavalry bow of the 11th century was over 60 metres. See next.

60+

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50-75 50 30-50 20

Killing distance, heavy-pull recurve bow, according to Karpowicz. Light-pull longbow: limit for piercing mail armour, according to Williams. Arrow fired from a longbow penetrates mail (Williams: see discussion above). Light-pull (82 lbs at full 33 inch draw) composite recurve bow firing a steel-hardened iron arrow-point fails against Byzantine lamellar armour (experiment by Dawson 1998).

Noting this data, one might conclude that a soldier carrying a shield and wearing armour would be quite safe from arrows fired from a cavalry bow at a good distance: beyond say 100 m. But unarmoured light troops could be killed and, importantly, horses could be wounded by foot-archers at about 200 metres. In other words, horse-archers would be effective against soldiers wearing mail only when they had closed on their enemy, i.e. to within perhaps 50 metres. And, if the enemy could deploy enough foot-archers, then horse-archers would presumably be reluctant to ride very close, i.e. not within about 150 m . . . Foot archers would be most effective against cavalry charging towards or past them: certainly within 100 m; and also when firing an arrow storm into enemy infantry, e.g. from the rear ranks of a Romaic infantry unit moving to close with enemy infantry. Against horse-archers from the steppes, e.g. the Magyars, emperor Leo VI (d. 912) advised that the imperial cavalry should engage quickly without exchanging preliminary arrow fire; by immediately charging, the Byzantines heavier lancercavalry could break them. So too could the Byzantine infantry with their more powerful bows, which shot further, enabling them to shoot down the Magyar horses before the Magyars closed (Hyland p.50, citing Oman). Sources cited: Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, 1985: Bone, Antler, Ivory and Horn: The technology of skeletal materials since the Roman period. Published 1985, digitally reprinted in 2003. Accessed 2009 at http://www.ashmolean.org/services/publications/publicationslisting/?id=67 BBC, 2007: The Longbow at =http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/W/weapons/longbow1.html, citing tests at the Royal Military College of Science Testing Ground at Shrivenham; accessed October 2007. Pip Bickerstaffe: In the magazine Primitive Archer, 9, 2; online (2009) at http://www.primitivearcher.com/articles/warbow.html. Bivar: see in main Bibliography below. Tim Dawson, 1998: Kremasmata, Kabadion, Klibanion: Some aspects of middle Byzantine military equipment reconsidered, Byzantine and Modern Greek

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32 Studies number 22, pp. 38-50.

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John France, 1994: Victory in the East: A Military History of the Crusades. Cambridge, UK. Ann Hyland, 1994: The Medieval Warhorse, From Byzantium to the Crusades. London. Adam Karpowicz: Turkish bows; accessed 2009 at http://www.atarn.org/islamic/performance/performance_of_turkish_bows.htm. Chaarles Oman and John H. Beeler, 1960: Art of War in the Middle Ages A. D. 3781515. Cornell. S R Payne-Gallwey, 1907: The Crossbow. Reprint London: Holland Press, 1976. Originally published 1907. Matthew Strickland and Robert Hardy, 2005: The Great Warbow: From Hastings to the Mary Rose. (Hardcover:) Sutton Publishing. Taybugha (AD 1368): Egyptain (Mamluk) Arabic primary source, translated in J D Latham & W F Paterson, Saracen Archery. London, Holland Press, 1970. Alan Williams, 2003: The Knight and the Blast Furnace: A History of the Metallurgy of Armour in the Middle Ages and Early Modern period, History of Warfare, 12. Leiden: Brill. Sources and References: Main Text Agathias: On the Reign of Justinian, written ca. 559. Translated by Joseph D. Frendo as Agathias: The Histories, in Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae, vol. 2A, Series Berolinensis, Walter de Gruyter, 1975. A. Bivar, Cavalry Equipment & Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, vol. 27 (1972), 272-291. Roy Boss, 1993: Justiniains Wars: Belisarius, Narses and the Reconquest of the West. Montvert Publications, Stockport UK. G.W. Bowersock, Peter Brown and Oleg Grabar, 1999: Late Antiquity, A Guide to the Postclassical World. Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. Peter Brown, 1971: The World of Late Antiquity, AD 150-750. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. J B Bury 1923: History of the Later Roman Empire, ch XIX. Online at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/BURLAT/19 A*.html

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Averil Cameron, 1993: The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity. London. Averil Cameron et al., eds. 2000: Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 14. Peter Connolly, 1987: The Roman Saddle, in M Dawson, ed., Roman Military Equipment, BAR International Series 336, pp.7-27. Raffaele DAmato, 2005: Roman Military Clothing, AD 400-640. Oxford: Osprey. Tim Dawson, 1998: Kremasmata, Kabadion, Klibanion, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, no. 22. Tim Dawson, 2007a: Byzantine Infantryman, East Roman Empire, c. 900-1204. Oxford: Osprey. Tim Dawson, 2007b: Fit for the task: equipment sizes and the transmission of military lore, 6th to 10th centuries, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 31 (1), 1-12. Doctrina Jacobi nuper baptizati, 634 AD. Source text: quoted in A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284-602, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 316. L H Fauber, 1990: Narses, Hammer of the Goths. Gloucester UK: Alan Sutton. J F Haldon, 1999: Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine world, 565-1204, Routledge. J F Haldon 2001: The Byzantine Wars, Battles and Campaigns of the Byzantine Era. Stroud, UK: Tempus. Guy Halsall, 2003: Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450-900. London: Routledge. Judith Herrin, 2007: Byzantium, the Surprising Life of a Medieval Empire. London: Allen Lane. Erik Hildinger, 1997: Warriors of the Steppe: A Military History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1700 A.D. Sarpedon Publishers. Erik Hildinger, 1999: Belisariuss Bid for Rome, originally published in Military History Magazine, October 1999. http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/prm/blbelisariusd.htm Victor Hurley, 1975: Arrows against Steel: the History of the Bow. New York: Mason-Charter. Simon MacDowall, 1994: Late Roman Infantrymen, 236-565 A.D. Oxford: Osprey. Cyril Mango,1980/1988: Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome. London. Paperback

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edition, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988. Maurice [1984/94]: The Strategikon [of the Emperor Maurice]. G T Dennis, trans., Vienna, 1994. Paperback edition: Maurices Strategikon, Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984. Maurice was not so much the author as the supervising editor [thus Dawson 2007b: 12[.. Eric McGeer, 1995: Sowing the Dragons Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks. Translations of and notes on Phocass Praecepta and Ouranoss Taktika. Bruce Merry, 2004: Encyclopaedia of Modern Greek Literature. Greenwood Press. Brian Molyneaux, 1997: The Cultural Life of Images: Visual Representation in Archaeology. Routledge. J P Oleson, 2008: The Oxford Handbook of Engineering and Technology in the Classical World. Oxford. Maria G. Parani, 2003: Reconstructing the Reality of Images: Byzantine Material Culture and Religious Iconography, 11th-15th Centuries. Leiden: Brill. Procopius of Caesarea. Edited by H. B. Dewing. 7 vols. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and London, Hutchinson, 191440. Greek text and English translation. There is a useful website devoted to Procopius: http://www.isidore-of-seville.com/justinian/3.html For online editions of his works, see http://www.gutenberg.org/browse/authors/p#a4712 Pat Southern, 2006: The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History. Oxford. Arnold Toynbee, 1973: Constantine Porphyrogenitus and His World. Oxford University Press. Warren Treadgold, 1995: Byzantium and its Army. Stanford University Press. Warren Treadgold, 1997: A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford University Press. Paperback edition. M Woods, 2004: Narses, at http://www.fanaticus.org/dba/battles/narses.html; accessed December 2004. -Ends.-

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