Philip Reynor

May 05

Quines Defence of Ontology against Carnap

Philip Thomas Reynor _____________________________________________________________________

In analysing the ontologys of Quine and Carnap some arresting resemblances between the two standpoints emerge, which Quine himself recognizes1, and it the main aim of this paper to investigate how ingrained these resemblances are. Once the degree of resemblance or non-resemblance has been established, it will be apparent how far Quine has to reach in order to defend his ontology. I intend to show that his reach does not have to extend incredibly far. In fact, through the course of the investigation it becomes evident that instead of mounting a defence against Carnap what Quine is attempting is an examination, one that instead of creating a gulf will create a bridge and an attempt at a unified ontology. The problem of explaining and assessing Quines defence then revolves into the problem of explaining and assessing the value of Quines attempt at unification. The brilliance of Quines method of defence is that he renders the situation such that there is nothing in need of defence. Is it necessary to organise a defence, or an attack, against something with which you agree? Certainly not, instead of an attempt at defence Quine opts for an approach that that is favourable for both ontologys. Why argue for one theory against another when it is possible to argue for both by accepting reconciliation. If this reconciliation can be achieved through unified theory, there is no need to defend at all. However, how successful is Quine in his attempts at defence through unification? First, I will be forwarding Quines ontology and his use of a traditional defence
1

In his paper called Carnaps Views on Onology, in The Ways of Paradox and other essays (see bibliography).

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Philip Reynor

May 05

against problems such as Platos beard; after this, I will examine the apparent divergences of the two theories and finally I will investigate how Quine maintains his defence through reconciliation and whether it is a lucrative course of action. In Quines paper On What There Is we see him argue in defence of his ontology against two fictional characters of his own imagination. When defending his ontology against Carnap in his earlier paper On Carnaps Views on Ontology we are witness to a distinctly contrary approach to defence, mentioned above, which I will be getting to later. Firstly, let us look at Quines ontology as expropriated from On What There Is. He begins with the problem of Platos beard the tangled doctrine of non-being. Quine and his fictional debating partner Mr X differ in their ontologys; Mr X maintains that there is something, an entity, which Quine maintains there is not, and thus the problem arises. With respect to Quines formulation of the problem, he cannot without contradiction claim that Mr Xs entity is not, i.e. Non-being must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?2Quine sustains that this is confusion on the part of Mr X who must admit that a physical being, such as Pegasus, does not exist and instead must posit being for the mental Pegasus-idea. However, this same Mr X would never suffer confusion regarding the Parthenon and Parthenon-idea, so why tolerate it with Pegasus and why not just admit to the nonbeing of Pegasus. Enter Quines second apparent opponent Wyman who upholds the being of Pegasus as an unactualized possible. Wyman admits to the non-existence or non-actuality of Pegasus while simultaneously maintaining that it is. Quine then decides to clear Wymans slum (of possibles) and be done with it. Wyman can hardly admit the round square cupola on Berkeley College as an unactualized possible instead he claims that it is meaningless.

Ibid, p.1.

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Philip Reynor

May 05

Now, to attempt an entanglement of Platos beard Quine utilizes Russells theory of singular descriptions.
When a statement of being or non-being is analysedit ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity whose being is in question, so that the meaningfulness no longer can be thought to presuppose that there be such an entity.3

So now, in place of the meaningless Pegasus we can use the descriptive phrase the winged horse of Bellerophon; and if there were no descriptive phrases available for Pegasus we could simply substitute is Pegasus or pegasizes, thus cutting off and disposing with Platos beard. It can now be safely said that we do not commit ourselves to an ontology containing Pegasus if we commit ourselves to Pegasus is not. We now come to the beginning of the conflict between Carnap and Quine. The essential difference between teacher and student breaks down to this Carnaps dichotomy consists of a fundamental distinction between the two kinds of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities4 and Quine disagrees. Quines undivided idea develops from his opposition to Mr X and Wyman when he investigates the problem of universals.
When we use the word similar, without defining it in any anterior terms, do we thereby commit ourselves to the acceptance of an abstract entity which is the relation of similarity.5

How do we discover if we are committing ourselves to abstract entities? The anti-nominalist claims that in using a general term such as fish we are alluding to abstract entities. On the other hand, the nominalist would believe they are referring to a concrete
3 4

Ibid, p.7. Supplement A Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology from Carnaps Meaning and Necessity, p.206. 5 Ibid, p.204.

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Philip Reynor

May 05

particular fish and not committing themselves to naming an abstract fishhood. In addition, when we say that the word similar is true of each X with regard to each Y we do not however name a relation of similarity. How could fish or similar be put on level terms with Dublin or Morning Star? Even if the nominalist is found guilty of using the word fishhood, they could easily claim to be alluding to the general term and not the abstract entity. However, Mr X may counter with the claim that fishhood has meaning and is still a universal and Mr X believes we commit ourselves to abstract entities in this way. Nevertheless, by examining the difference between meaning and naming, we find a gulf. Using Freges example of the phrases Evening Star and Morning Star, we find that both phrases name the same entity but have a different meaning. Quine, in response, must refuse to admit meanings, but in doing so, he does not deny the meaningfulness of statements and can still view utterances as significant without supporting a domain of meanings. He also denies a commitment to entities by the use of alleged names that are quickly dismissed as admissible without claiming to name.6 Are there any entities that we commit ourselves to in a given theory? By utilizing the phrases there is a number between one and ten or there are brown cars are we not implying that there are abstract entities and physical objects respectively.
the objects we are to be understood to admit are precisely the objects which we reckon to the universe of values over which the bound variables of quantification are to be considered to range.7

Thus, to answer the earlier question, the entities we are committing ourselves to, according to Quine, are bound variables of quantification and not alleged names. The entities over which these bound variables range are the ones that are true for a given theory.
6 7

Ibid. From Quines Word & Object, p.242.

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Philip Reynor

May 05

Using bound variables, we have full reign to commit to entities that we cannot name, as it has already been shown that names can be abolished with Russells theory of descriptions. To be assumed as an entity isto be reckoned as the value of a variable8 However, in determining what entities we are allowed to presuppose i.e. what there is, we see the dichotomy of Carnap which I mentioned earlier. In Quines essay Carnaps Views on Ontology, he places questions of the being of a number between one and ten or of there being brown cars on one side of Carnaps dichotomy and questions of physical entities or abstract entities on the other. Quine, however, does not acknowledge this distinction and instead unifies the dichotomy by blurring the distinctions and allying the two question types. In Carnaps paper Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology, the dichotomy is at it most prevalent in the discussion concerning the framework of the language.
If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions.9

Now that I have forwarded Carnaps ontological dicotomy, I will proceed to explicate Quines method of reconciliation between Carnaps ontology and his own. Quine begins by reinterpreting Carnaps external and internal distinction as a distinction between category questions, which exhaust the range of a particular style of bound variables10and subclass questions, which do not exhaust the range. However, Quine does re interpret the terminology used by Carnap that the analytic type of internal question is contained, in
8 9

From Quines From a Logical Point of View, p.13. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, p.206. 10 Quine, The Ways of Paradox and other essays, p.207.

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Philip Reynor

May 05

Quines formulation, within the subclass range. Quine holds that if we use a single style of variables to encompass the whole range of entities then questions of numbers, classes, and physical objects all become subclass questions, thus trivialising11 Carnaps dichotomy into the problem of whether to use one or two styles of variables. He argues further against the compartmentalisation of variables by utilizing Zermelos set theory12 under this theory all questions of numbers or physical and abstract entities become subclass questions. However, under a strict adoption of Russells theory of types13 the problem remains until we take Russells method of typical ambiguity and exploit it to its full potential discarding the use of a distinct style of variables for every and all types. In this way, Quine has shown that Carnaps dichotomy is trivial, and thus reconciled the two ontologys even under the adoption of the theory of types. With regard to Carnaps paper Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology Quine has shown that it is possible to eradicate the distinction without damaging its philosophical aims. I have shown how Quine defends his theory against opponents like Mr X and Wyman and also how he achieved what he set out to and reconciled his ontology with that of Carnaps rendering a negligible need to defend against an ontology that commits to the same entities as his own. Nevertheless, the wound was stitched by the re-interpretation of Carnaps terminological distinction between external and internal questions. However, this does not affect Carnaps formulation in any major respect; for the introduction of his framework he to admits that entities of the new kind, as internal
11

Quine explains this triviality mathematically. He states that the difference between using the explicit hypothesis x is a real number between 0 and 1 and introducing the restricted variables is so negligible that at the level of ordinary mathematical writing it cannot usually be detected; nor is there any reason why it should be detected. Quine, The Ways of Paradox, p.208. 12 Zermelos axiomatization of set theory classified the existence of sets regulated by a predicate to just those sets whose members were members of a given set and satisfied the predicate. 13 A proposition relating to other propositions must, Russell says, be of another type from, a higher order then, the proposition it is about. So we must say that the classes of all first order classes which are not members of themselves are a second order class, thus it is nonsense to say that a class is or isnt a member of itself.

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Philip Reynor

May 05

within the framework, are substitutable for variables and using these variables sentences of the new kind can be generated. If the internal questions concern the existence of entities of the new kind, mentioned above, then Quines subdivision must lead to an analytic/synthetic distinction between category and subclass questions within the internal framework. This further implies that external category questions, which are synthetic, can be abandoned in favour of internal subclass questions. Essentially questions about the reality of the thing world or the system of entities can be formulated as internal subclass questions. The problem for Quine now lies with the quandary of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In the paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism Quine attempts to prove that there is no distinction, Carnap however would appear to disagree until we look at his formulation of the connotative, propositions of meaning, and formal, syntactical propositions. It is possible to view connotative as synthetic and formal as analytic modes of expression, and in On the Character of Philosophical Problems Carnap, so as not to cut the branch he sits on, reduces all propositions to the formal mode while retaining their meaningfulness. In this way, he too is blurring the lines between analytic and synthetic proposition and in a sense bestowing the reconciliation upon Quine.

Bibliography: Carnap, R; Meaning and Necessity; Chicago University Press (Chicago 1988). Carnap, R; On the Character of Philosophical Problems reprinted in The Linguistic Turn; ed: Rorty, R; Chicago University Press (Chicago 1967).

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Philip Reynor

May 05

Flew, A (ed.); A Dictionary of Philosophy; Pan Books Limited (London 1979). Quine, W.V.O; From a Logical Point of View; Harvard University Press (U.S.A 1980-1996). Quine, W.V.O; The Ways of Paradox and other essays; Harvard University Press (London 1997). Quine, W.V.O; Word & Object; M.I.T Press (U.S.A 1996).

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