ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by Attorney-in-Fact, TRINIDAD S. VIADO, Petitioners, G. R. No.

70484 January 29, 1988 -versusREGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN CITY, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, Respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in Her Own Behalf and in Behalf of the Other Members of the CONSUELO HEIGHTS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioners-Intervenors.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power than that manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals of the Martial Law regime. Relief to the victims must be, as it is hereby, extended by the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning as unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts complained of. Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. [hereafter simply, Carmel] a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens Title [No. 64007] over the lot was cancelled and a new one [No. 8314] issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. Some eight [8] years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the

owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof." On September 14, 1973, a year almost to the day after the declaration of Martial Law, Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The Decree invalidated,inter alia, the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public[(the Tuasons being among the buyers]. The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate [one of the so-called "Friar Lands"]. Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Under these statutes: [1] a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase [if he did not wish to lease] the portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government, in cash or on installment; the interested buyer was given a certificate of sale, which was regarded as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price in the and at the interest specified, the acceptance of such certificate making the occupant a debtor of the government; [2] until the price was fully paid, however, title was reserved in the Government, and any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was explicitly declared to "be invalid as against the Government and, in all respects, subordinate to its prior claim;" [3] in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands [now Director of Lands] had the duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien on the property and by selling it in the same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale being deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the proceeds of the sale being applied to the payment of the costs of the court and all installments due or to become due; and [4] in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred title to the land to the purchaser "by proper instrument of conveyance", the certificate of title over the land to issue and become effective in the manner provided by the Land Registration Act.[1] Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding[2] that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. It adjudged that: According to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all

installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said Association[3] stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government and the land now occupied by the members of said Association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being, therefore, null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and sale pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended."[4] It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his Decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging, on the one hand, that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. [are] the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well-known is the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants. But this notwithstanding and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following imperious manner: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any and all transfers thereafter, covering Lots 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226, 1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 [LRC PSD-1730], all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City, are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government; that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604, 62605, covering Lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are declared invalid and considered cancelled as against the

Government; and that said lots are declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended. On the strength of this Presidential Decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following: MEMORANDUM. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and voidab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos Decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain[5] but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles;[6] and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund. Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the Decree. In his Comment on the Petition,[7] he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation,[8] they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessorin-interest; and the Decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund. Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four [64] persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own, the allegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition.

The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari[9] may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power. The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function,[10] or an exercise of jurisdiction which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause.[11] He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of the Association [of homeowners] stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that "any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic were null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy." These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law, [12] the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as Chief Executive and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the Martial Law regime. Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power i.e., determined the relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of

these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons [and the petitioners in intervention] were never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had, in addition, exercised it unconstitutionally. In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the Petition for Certiorari as one for Prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter.[13] Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction, exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws, and had, furthermore, performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings.[14] There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government. This, of course, gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,[15] that official duty being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the payment in full of the price, together with all accrued interest. Against this presumption, there is no evidence. It must, hence, be accorded full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner provided in Section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act."[16] It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of mortgages.[17] This it can do, despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors

from it of portions of the land covered by its original title must be respected. At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and cannot in any manner affect this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or any portion thereof on the part of the members of the so-called "Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc." The Decree was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was, in reality, a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law. One last word respecting the petitioners in intervention. Their petition to intervene substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a class suit[18] and was consequently given due course by the Court. They are, therefore, covered by this judgment. WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth, to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANOENDRIANO, Petitioners, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 187910 June 16, 2009

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, Respondent.

RESOLUTION PUNO, C.J.: This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall not shirk its bounden duty to wield its judicial power to settle "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."1 Be that as it may, no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper. The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by this Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes. It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is.2 The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its "solemn and sacred obligation" under the Constitution.3 This Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.4 The "case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,"5 lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.6 In the illuminating words of the learned Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission7 : Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at

all.8 Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration.9 In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.10 An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.11 In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
1avvphi1

Tan v. Macapagal presents a similar factual milieu. In said case, petitioners filed a petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Langley resolution, which dealt with the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The court resolved the issue thus: More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling. It is implicit in the rule of law.12 Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.13 In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.14 The lack of petitioners personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.15 It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public

funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved.16 While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental importance" doctrine. The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As stated in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,17 viz.: x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government." It thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies. xxxx A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today. Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of "personal injury" to the broader "transcendental importance" doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit. In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury.18 When warranted by the presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed. SO ORDERED.
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.LOZANO-ENDRIANO vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives Facts: The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens

and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. Both petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations. Issue: Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109. Held: No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury. The petitions were dismissed.

G.R. No. 149719

June 21, 2007

MOLDEX REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD, OFFICE OF APPEALS, ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL AFFAIRS, EDITHA U. BARRAMEDA in her capacity as Regional Officer and METROGATE COMPLEX VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: This is a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, issued by the Housing and Urban

Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), as well as the two issuances and the writ of mandatory injunction issued by public respondent Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in connection with the implementation of the assailed Resolution. The factual antecedents are as follows: Petitioner Moldex Realty, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate development. It is the owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, a subdivision situated in Meycauayan, Marilao, Bulacan. In 1988, the HLURB issued petitioner a License to Sell 696 parcels of land within the subdivision. In 1993, a sufficient number of lot buyers and homeowners in the subdivision formally organized to become the Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners Association (respondent association). Petitioner claims that since the completion of the subdivision, it had been subsidizing and advancing the payment for the delivery and maintenance of common facilities including the operation of streetlights and the payment of the corresponding electric bills. However, in 2000, petitioner decided to stop paying the electric bills for the streetlights and advised respondent association to assume this obligation. Respondent association objected to petitioners resolution and refused to pay the electric bills. Thus, Meralco discontinued its service, prompting respondent association to apply for a preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction with the HLURB against petitioner. On 5 April 2001, Editha U. Barrameda, in her capacity as Regional Officer of HLURBs Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs, issued a Resolution granting respondent associations application for injunction. In support of the Resolution, Barrameda cited the relevant provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) Nos. 957 and 1216 and HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994. HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, particularly provides that "subdivision owners/developers shall continue to maintain street lights facilities and, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, pay the bills for electric consumption of the subdivision street lights until the facilities in the project are turned over to the local government until after completion of development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and their implementing rules and regulations."1 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was rebuffed in an Order dated 28 May 2001.2 After respondent association filed a bond, Barrameda issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated 28 June 2001 ordering petitioner to assume the obligation of paying the cost of electricity of the streetlights starting from December 2000 until their turn over or donation to the Municipality of Meycauayan.3 Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari, praying not only for the reversal of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as well as the Resolution dated 5 April 2001 and the Order dated 28 May 2001, but also for the nullification of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

During the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals, the HUDCC approved Board Resolution No. R-699, series of 2001, entitled Amending the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree and Other Related Laws.4 On 27 August 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner should have raised the constitutionality of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, directly to this Court. The appellate court likewise found that no proof was submitted to show Mr. Juanito Maltos authority to execute the requisite verification and certification against non-forum shopping in behalf of petitioner.5 Following the Court of Appeals pronouncement that constitutional issues should be raised directly before this Court, petitioner instituted on 21 September 2001 an action for certiorari and prohibition.6 The petition reiterated the prayer for the reversal of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the Resolution dated 5 April 2001 and the Order dated 28 May 2001, all issued by the HLURB and for the setting aside of HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994. The instant petition is anchored on the following arguments: 1. Resolution No. 526 Series of 1994 issued by the HUDCC is unconstitutional for being a void exercise of legislative power. 2. Public respondent gravely abused its direction in issuing the Mandatory Injunction on the basis of a void regulation (HU[D]CC Resolution No. 526 Series of 1994). 3. Public respondent abused its discretion in not commanding that the obligation to maintain the subdivision including the payment of the streetlight consumption belongs exclusively to private respondents.7 In its Comment,8 respondent association brought up the tardy filing of the instant petition. It contends that the instant petition, which assails the two HLURB issuances dated 5 April 2001 and 28 May 2001, was filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In its opinion, the prior filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals did not toll the running of the 60-day period. The Solicitor General agrees, pointing out that the instant petition, captioned as Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari, does not assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals but the twin issuances and the writ of mandatory injunction issued by the HLURB and, therefore, should have been filed within 60 days from petitioners receipt on 18 June 2001 of the HLURB Order dated 28 May 2001. It appears that when reckoned from 18 June 2001, the filing of the instant petition would go beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Petitioner maintains, on the contrary, that it filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period, but the same was dismissed by the appellate court and "referred" to this Court, as it raised a constitutional issue. When an administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being

enforced. For the Court to exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity.9 This requisite should not be taken to mean that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional, would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to challenge the same.10 In the instant case, petitioner has complied with the requirement that the issue of the constitutionality of the subject HUDCC Resolution must be timely raised. Petitioner had already raised the question of constitutionality in its petition filed with the Court of Appeals. The alleged injury caused to petitioner as a result of the implementation of the HUDCC Resolution is continuous in nature in that as long as the assailed resolution is effective, petitioner is obliged to pay for the electricity cost of the streetlights. For every occasion that petitioner is directed to comply with the assailed resolution, a new cause of action to question its validity accrues in favor of petitioner. Thus, the instant petition is not time-barred. The Solicitor General also points out that it is the Regional Trial Court, and not this Court nor the Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of this original action for certiorari and prohibition, notwithstanding Section 4, Rule 6511 of the Rules of Court. It must be emphasized that this Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law or an administrative regulation. In Drilon v. Lim,12 it was clearly stated that the lower courts also have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality at the first instance, thus: We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. x x x Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.13 The general rule is that this Court shall exercise only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in circumstances where the Court believes that resolving the issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic and moral well being of the people. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a question on the constitutionality of a regulation may be brought only to this Court. The instant petition does not allege circumstances and issues of transcendental importance to the public requiring their prompt and definite resolution and the brushing aside of technicalities of procedure. Neither is the Court convinced that the issues presented in this petition are of such nature that would nudge the lower courts to defer to the higher judgment of this Court. The application of the assailed HUDCC resolution mainly affects the proprietary

interests of the parties involved and can hardly be characterized as overriding to the general well-being of the people. Ultimately, the Court is called upon to resolve the question of who bears the obligation of paying electricity cost, a question that the lower courts undoubtedly have the competence to resolve. However, it is also a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law, or an administrative regulation as in the instant case, to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may raise its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable.14 In other words, the Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the case.15 Apart from the non-observance of the hierarchy of courts principle, a subsequent development occurred which has not only rendered the question of constitutionality unpivotal but made the resolution of the case itself a pure theoretical exercise. During the pendency of the petition before the Court of Appeals, Board Resolution No. 699, series of 2001, entitled Amending the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree and Other Related Laws, was passed by the HUDCC. The regulation amended certain design standards for subdivision projects, among which is the proportionate obligation of subdivision homeowners in the payment of the electricity cost of streetlights.16 The amendatory provision has superseded the provision in HUDCC Resolution No. R-562, series of 1994, directing subdivision developers to shoulder the electricity cost of streetlights. At the time of the filing of the instant petition, the new provision was already in effect. That being the situation, the instant petition has become moot and academic. One final note. In the main, petitioner is assailing the constitutionality of Resolution No. R562, series of 1994, issued by the HUDCC. However, the HUDCC, although obviously an indispensable party, was not impleaded either in the instant petition or in the petition before the Court of Appeals. An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable parties renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.17 That is why the case is generally remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. In this case, however, remand is not feasible because the initial action has to be discarded for failure to observe the hierarchy of courts principle. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127022 June 28, 2000 FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Spouses CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG KENG, Spouses CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG CHONG, Spouses SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA and LETICIA NOCOM CHAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI of Rizal) and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, METRO MANILA, respondents, ALEJANDRO B. REY, petitioner-intervenor. G.R. No. 127245 June 28, 2000 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCNIO E. MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA A. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI) of RIZAL, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIAS, respondents. RESOLUTION

PURISIMA, J.: This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases, which the Third Division decided on September 2, 1999. The motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993: . . ., the following are considered en banc cases: 1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; 2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty;

3. Cases raising novel questions of law; 4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; 5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit; 6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both; 7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed; 8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and 9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order. The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in question, when the herein private respondents obtained their decree of registration thereover. In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded that it is not infallible. Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and the parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded from seeking relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of paramount importance. Here, there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases for the consideration of the Court. A pleading, entitled "FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA," was presented but when the same was first brought to its attention on March 7, 2000, the Court opined that since the Third Division had not yet acted on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was then premature for the Court to resolve the consulta. However, the Court succinctly cautioned that the action of the Third Division on the matter would just be tentative. On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners' motion to transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000, the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that

the cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its attention. Evidently, the action of the Court under the premises is a legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of November 18, 1993, which reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention." (emphasis supplied) Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to treat these consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any cogent or compelling reason for such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of the Resolution of this Court dated November 18, 1993, has been cited to support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and therefore, the prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private petitioners for the Court en banc to hear and resolve their pending motions for reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and decide petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
1wphi1.nt

It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be observed. Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the Sumilao case is misplaced. The said case is not on all fours with these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc en consulta, the motion for reconsideration of the decision therein rendered had been voted upon by the Second Division with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that the stalemate resulting from the said voting constituted a denial of the motion for reconsideration. In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and unresolved. Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.

WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated as en banc cases; and petitioners' motions for reconsideration are hereby set for oral argument on July 18, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Let corresponding notices issue. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr. JJ., concur. Melo, J., I joined the dissents and in view of the close vote, urge that this actions be not repeated and that it be reviewed again. Puno, J., please see separate opinion. Vitug, J., I joined the dissenting justices. Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., please see dissenting opinion. Quisumbing and Pardo, JJ., I joined the dissent of J. Reyes. Separate Opinions PUNO, J., separate opinion; In the session last March 21, 2000, information was given that a majority of the members of the Third Division intends to hear the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic and then report its result to the Court en banc. I sincerely believe that the result of the said oral arguments will be a vital factor to consider before the courten banc should finally decide to assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. The issue for resolution in the said Motion for Reconsideration concerns res judicata. This is an issue that does not strictly involve a question of law for beyond doubt its resolution will rest on some amorphous questions of fact. Until and unless these questions of fact are sharpened and given shape in the intended oral arguments, I am of the opinion and so vote that the Courten banc should defer its action to assume jurisdiction over the case at bar.

GONZAGA-REYES, J., dissenting opinion; With due respect, I am constrained to dissent from the acceptance by the Court en banc of the referral of the motions for reconsideration in the cases at bar. The justification for the referral is stated thus: These cases involve a vast tract of land around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals under a decision allegedly rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said decision and of the original certificate of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto is contingent on the character or classification of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated to private persons, the determination of the same is essential. The decision sought to be reconsidered does not clearly reflect or indicate the

correct character of the land involved at the time the private respondents obtained a degree of registration thereover. Thus, should it be established that indeed the land in question was still within the forest zone and inalienable at the time of its disposition to private parties, reversal of this Court's decision is in order. In Lemketkai Sons Milling, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,1 this Court has acknowledged that it is not infallible and that, if upon examination an error in judgment is perceived, the Court is not obliged to blindly adhere to such decision and the parties are not precluded from seeking relief by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything else, is paramount. The fact alone that the property involved covers an area of 99 hectares does not provide a cogent reason to elevate the cases to the Court en banc. Nowhere in the extant guidelines for referral to the Court en banc is the value of the property subject of the case relevant to determine whether the division should refer a matter to the Court en banc. Moreover, the validity of OCT No. 4216, which petitioner Republic raised as a principal issue in the instant petition, had already been long settled by final judgments of this Court in three (3) cases.2 It was also submitted that the cases are of sufficient importance to be "reexamined and reviewed" by the Court en banc pursuant to S. C. Circular No. 2-89 dated February 7, 1989 as amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993, which considers the following, among others, as en banc cases: xxx xxx xxx 9. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. It is believed that the acceptance by the court en banc of the referral on the proposal of one member of the division is not called for on the following grounds: (1) The motion for reconsideration from the decision unanimously adopted by the 3rd Division on September 2, 1999 is still pending. If there is any error to be rectified in the said decision, the matter should be left to the sound judgment of the members of the division which promulgated the decision unless there is a demonstrated incapacity or disqualification on the part of its members to render a fair and just resolution of the motion for reconsideration. (2) The court en banc is not an appellate court to which a decision or resolution may be appealed: Art. VIII, Section 4, of the 1987 Constitution provides: (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under

the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. It is implicit in the paragraph immediately preceding that decisions or resolutions of a division of the court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis a vis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is considered not a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en banc itself. The only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en banc. (3) Circular No. 2-89 of the Court en banc laid down the following Guidelines and Rules on the referral to the Courten banc of cases assigned to a Division: 1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in Divisions of three, five or seven Members (Sec. 4[1]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At present the Court has three Divisions of five Members each. 2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). 3. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed. 4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before a judgment or resolution therein rendered becomes final and executory, the Division may refer the caseen consulta to the Court en banc which, after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such referral, may return the case to the Division or accept the case for decision or resolution. 4a. Paragraph [f] of the Resolution of this Court of 23 February 1984 in Bar Matter No. 205 (formerly item 6, en banc Resolution dated 29 September 1977), enumerating the cases considered as en banc cases, states:

f. Cases assigned to a division including motions for reconsideration which in the opinion of at least three (3) members merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable by a majority vote of the actual members of the Court en banc. 5. A resolution of the Division denying a party's motion for referral to the Court en bancof any Division case, shall be final and not appealable to the Court en banc. 6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court en banc, the latter may, in the absence of sufficiently important reasons, decline to take cognizance of the same, in which case, the decision or resolution shall be returned to the referring Division. 7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be entertained. 8. This Circular shall take effect on March 1, 1989. In the Resolution of the Court en banc dated November 18, 1993, the following were enumerated as the cases to be considered as "en banc cases": 1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; 2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty; 3. Cases raising novel questions of law; 4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; 5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit; 6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.000 or both; 7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed. 8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and 9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. Notably, the rule that "cases assigned to a division which is the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the Court en banc" has been reiterated. However, a new paragraph was added in the 1993 Resolution, as follows:

9. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention. The immediately foregoing paragraph may lend itself to an interpretation that any case which the Court en banc by majority vote of its members "may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention" is an en banccase. This interpretation is of doubtful validity and soundness. To begin with, Resolution dated November 18, 1993 is essentially an amendment to Sections 15 and 16, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court which deals with the form ("unglazed paper," margins, number of copies, etc.) of unprinted and printed papers to be filed with this Court. This Resolution was clearly not intended to lay down new guidelines or rules for referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a Division. Thus, the principle that the court en bancis not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed could not have been intended to be abrogated. Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution, earlier quoted, expressly provides that "when the required number (the concurrence of at least three members of the division) is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc." The obvious contemplation is that when the required vote of at least three members is obtained, the banc's participation is not called for. (4) It is true that the Constitution itself recognizes the power of the Supreme Court to require other cases to be heard en banc (Article VIII, Sec. 4(2)). As pointed out, the November 18, 1993 Resolution quoted earlier, could not, by reading the issuance in proper context, have been intended to expand the enumeration of en banc cases. A reasonable interpretation is that paragraph 9 refers to cases accepted by the banc pursuant to existing rules, foremost of which is that the referral requires the concurrence of at least three of the members of the division. If the provision "all other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention" was intended to give the court en banc a general residual power and prerogative to cause the elevation of any case assigned to a division, without a consulta from the division itself, this intent should be ineluctably expressed, having in mind the essential and traditional role of a division of the court sitting veritably as the court en banc itself. The court en banc should be shielded from the importunings of litigants who perceive themselves aggrieved by a decision of a division of the court and resort to the convenience of an appeal to the court en banc on the plea that its case is "of sufficient importance to merit its attention." In the Sumilao case, the majority of the banc's members refused to take the case where there was a two-two tie vote in the division for the elevation of the motion for reconsideration to the court en banc. In an earlier precedent involving the conviction of Imelda Marcos' by the Sandiganbayan, the case was considered as deserving of a full court treatment, despite the fact that the motion for reconsideration did not garner a majority vote in the division. The Court Should establish a consistent policy on these referrals for the stability of its policies and procedures. The prerogative to take out a case from the division without the concurrence of a majority of its members, should, if at all, be used only for clearly compelling reasons; otherwise the decision of the Court en banc to take cognizance of the matter itself would be suspect of

irregularity and the precedent would be difficult to justify before litigants who may be similarly situated. I vote to deny the motions to refer the motions for reconsideration to the Court en banc.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion; With due respect, I dissent from the majority's Resolution. Very briefly, these are the relevant antecedents. On September 2, 1999, the Court through the Third Division unanimously promulgated its Decision denying the Petitions in these cases. Thereafter, both the government and private petitioners filed separate (1) Motions for Reconsideration and (2) Motions to Refer the Cases to the Courten banc. By vote of 4-1,1 the Third Division rejected the Motions to Refer the Cases to the full Court because the movants had utterly failed to adduce any legal reason for such referral. Subsequently, Justice Fidel P. Purisima, the lone dissenter, asked the Court en banc to yank the case out of and against the will of the said Division, and to empower the banc to resolve the pending Motions for Reconsideration. By the instant Resolution, the majority has agreed with Justice Purisima. With due respect, I say that the majority has not given any cogent or compelling reason for this unprecedented action. Its Resolution, penned by Justice Purisima, simply pontificates that "these consolidated cases are of sufficient importance to merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court," without stating why. The majority simply used its sheer voting strength to bulldoze the earlier 4-1 action of the Third Division. If at all, the lame excuse given that the "subject Decision [promulgated by the Third Division] does not clearly indicate the classification of said land" is merely an argument why the pending Motions for Reconsideration should be granted, not why the banc should take over this case. I fully agree with the well-reasoned Dissent of Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, the ponente of the Third Division's unanimous Decision. I write, however, to stress one point. In the celebrated Sumilao farmers' case,2 a similar motion to refer to the full Court was turned down by the Second Division by a vote of 3-1. Arguing that the Division's earlier vote of 2-2 on the Motion for Reconsideration was not decisive, Justice Jose A. R. Melo (who was then a member of the Second Division) subsequently asked the banc to take over the case. Justice Melo argued that under Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, "[c]ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such members." Since the Motion for Reconsideration did not obtain the required three votes in the Division, he added that the banc should thus take over and resolve the impasse. In other words, Justice Melo presented a genuine "question of sufficient importance" which the Second Division was not in a position to resolve to justify a take-over by the banc. Yet, the full Court turned down his proposal. Only Justice Vitug and I supported Justice Melo.

I therefore cannot understand why the banc is now taking over this case against the wishes of the Third Division. It turned down the poor farmers' plea and the Melo proposal. Why then should the banc grant the not-so-poor private petitioners' prayer here? Why then should it approve the groundless Purisima proposal? At the very least, if it should take over this case, then it should likewise assume jurisdiction over the farmer's suit. After all, the vote in the Motion for Reconsideration in that case was two in favor and two against, while in the present case, the Third Division has not even voted on the plea for reconsideration. In other words, there was sufficient reason for the banc to take over the Sumilao problem because of the 2-2 vote of the Division. Here, no cogent reason whatsoever other than the motherhood peroration that the case was "of sufficient importance" is given by the majority. Parenthetically, I should add that the Third Division is not averse to hearing the petitioners' Motions for Reconsideration. As a matter of fact, if the banc did not take over this case, it would have scheduled the said Motions for oral argument. Simply stated, the Third Division is not incapable of rendering objective and fair justice in this case and to rule on the issue of "classification of said land." Having taken over this case, the banc in the name of equal justice should also take over the Sumilao farmers' Petition. But having rejected their case, then it should also turn down this one. Sauce for the poor goose should be the same sauce for the rich gander. That is simple, equal justice for all.
1wphi1.nt

G.R. No. 176951

December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177499

December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178056 December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-InIntervention. DECISION VELASCO, JR. J.: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,1 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is

not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.2 Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.3 Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.4 So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a coequal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes.5 This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.6 Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.7 BACKGROUND The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas8 assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,9 each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. By Decision10 dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause. Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.11 By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows: WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its "Resolution" dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss the "Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case.

Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion as follows: By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009. The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009" and "Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon." Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution."12 Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will now rule on this incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises: (1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have already been passed upon" reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision; (2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved; and (3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority

of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated groundthat the "basic issues have already been passed" suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question? The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon" betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured. It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members" contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis added.) Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total."13 In plain language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the view that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value."14 As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the majority was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration."15 To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion. If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases "shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock. On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate16 entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby.17 In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.18 Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.19 While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan20 is most apropos: To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now.

The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration. This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case. The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief During the 11th Congress,21 fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives.22 Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon. Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 215723 to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income. In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that "[a] municipality x x x may be converted into a component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices." After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 2924 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29. Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval. The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.25 Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement. As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the

COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion. As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.26 Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek leave and be allowed to intervene. Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in question, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an order issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites in the affected areas. An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain the poll body from proclaiming the plebiscite results. On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions and the petitionsin-intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral arguments. The Issues In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection clause. In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the twin posers in the affirmative and accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law. After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider. Petitioners threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple Congress valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions. By constitutional design27 and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.28 But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.29 The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus: Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria

established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.) As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution. Petitioners posture does not persuade. The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the term "barrio" in lieu of "barangay," "may be" instead of "shall," the change of the phrase "unit or units" to "political unit" and the addition of the modifier "directly" to the word "affected," the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.) It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the subject provision, explains: Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan.30 Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that "the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature."31 Pelaez, however, conceded that "the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities."32 Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect

creates a new municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature. Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to "criteria established in the local government code,"thereby declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries "subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."33 x x x (Emphasis added.) It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.34 Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 335 of the Constitution. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators. Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws. As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.36 Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading "Requisites for Creation." The section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income "of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years" as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that "[a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x." RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: xxxx (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.) The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis37 or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.38 To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,39 resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.40 It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.41 The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentels sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of

particular significance is his statement regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, viz: Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities. It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement, which, under the [LGC], is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds. Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills, thus: THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard. We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration? SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities. THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt? SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill.

Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive effect. THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected. SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the following complementary legislative intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws. Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.43 In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.44 Torres v. Limjapcould not have been more precise: The intent of a Statute is the Law. If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x.45 (Emphasis supplied.) As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.46 Consequently, to him who would assert the unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared invalid if a conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt.47 Unfortunately for petitioners and petitionersin-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden. It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering joint resolution were undertaken in the 11th and/or the 12th Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA

9009 certain municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the 13th Congress, Congress not being a continuing body. The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood billswhich were already being deliberated upon even perhaps before the conception of RA 9009were again being considered during the 13th Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And specific reference to the cityhood bills was also made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.48And of course the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16 municipalities in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body and that unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress. This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal protection grounds. To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." Petitioners challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution. The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.49 This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned.50 In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is

presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such. As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify,51 necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.52 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause. As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H. Joint Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted with the "changing of the rules in the middle of the game." Some excerpts of Senator Lims sponsorship speech: x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied for city status, confident that each has met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly the income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while the rest twenty-four (24) in all failed to pass through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way to the May elections x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into law, effectively raising the income requirement for creation of cities to a whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24 cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded were swift and overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act on the measures. Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of President Estrada x x x and the May 2001 elections. The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport changing the rules in the middle of the game.

Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x x. They filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. For the second time, [however], time ran out from them. For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of the [13th] Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they could be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the [LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I immediately set the public hearing x x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I delivered the sponsorship x x x. x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was when the then acting majority leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader for the House to first approve the individual Cityhood Bills of the qualified municipalities, along with the provision exempting each of them from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to the certification issued by the proponents shortlisting fourteen (14) municipalities deemed to be qualified for city-status. Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the House of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a provision of exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year, December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your Committee immediately conducted the public hearing x x x. The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x. In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. The proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness. Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component city based on the old requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x x x53(Emphasis supplied.) In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lims speech, which respondent LGUs found themselves in were unsettling. They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed "unfair," to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the

necessary qualifications for city status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification. To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification.54 By the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of those became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment. While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause. The irony is not lost to the Court. Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of

RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991. Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009. Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009. A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following: (1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009; (2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement; (3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice. (4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from

other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC. And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question. WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED. The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177721

July 3, 2007

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: Filed on May 23, 2007 was this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners are peoples and/or non-governmental organizations engaged in public and civic causes aimed at protecting the peoples rights to self-governance and justice. Respondent Executive Secretary is the head of the Office of the President and is in charge of releasing presidential appointments including those of Supreme Court Justices. Respondent Gregory S. Ong is allegedly the party whose appointment would fill up the vacancy in this Court. Petitioners allege that:

On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications. On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacaang in view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been cancelled by the Office of the President. On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)." Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. Petitioners invoke the Constitution: Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines." Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."1 Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen. Petitioners further argue that respondent Ongs birth certificate speaks for itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the Civil Code: Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ongs birth certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of the fact that Ongs citizenship at birth is Chinese. Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as long as Ongs birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is stated in his birth certificate.2

This birth certificate, petitioners assert, prevails over respondent Ongs new Identification Certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated October 16, 1996, stating that he is a natural-born Filipino and over the opinion of then Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona that he is a natural-born Filipino. They maintain that the Department of Justice (DOJ) does not have the power or authority to alter entries in a birth certificate; that respondent Ongs old Identification Certificate did not declare that he is a natural-born Filipino; and that respondent Ongs remedy is an action to correct his citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate. Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court. Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the functions of Associate Justice of this Court. The Court required respondents to Comment on the petition. Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment, essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution, thus: SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated: "The appointment, however, was not released, but instead, referred to the JBC for validation of respondent Ongs citizenship."3 To date, however, the JBC has not received the referral. Supporting the Presidents action and respondent Ongs qualifications, respondent Executive Secretary submits that: 1. The President did not gravely abuse her discretion as she appointed a person, duly nominated by the JBC, which passed upon the appointees qualifications. 2. Justice Gregory S. Ong is a natural-born citizen as determined by the Bureau of Immigration and affirmed by the Department of Justice, which have the authority and jurisdiction to make determination on matters of citizenship. 3. Undisputed evidence disclosed that respondent Ong is a natural-born citizen. 4. Petitioners are not entitled to a temporary restraining order.4 Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, maintaining that he is a naturalborn Filipino citizen; that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit; and that the

issue raised ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts. Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the appointment. As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent Ongs mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; that, therefore, respondents mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother were included in the naturalization. Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was born. Summarizing, his arguments are as follows: I. PETITIONERS LACK OF STANDING AND INABILITY TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY WHOSE OFFICIAL ACTION IS THE VERY ACT SOUGHT TO BE ANNULLED CONSTITUTE INSUPERABLE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER AND SHOULD PREVENT THIS CASE FROM PROCEEDING FURTHER FOR DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS BY THIS HONORABLE COURT. II. RESPONDENT ONG IS, IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, CONSIDERING THAT: A. DY GUIOK SANTOS WAS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF HER MARRIAGE TO EUGENIO; and B. HAVING BEEN BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 OF A FILIPINO MOTHER AND WHO ELECTED FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF MAJORITY, RESPONDENT ONG MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE IV, SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. III. THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF RESPONDENT ONG AS PRESENTED BY PETITIONERS CAN, IN NO WAY, WITHOUT MORE, ESTABLISH WITH FINALITY THAT HE IS A CHINESE NATIONAL, OR DISPROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT HE IS, IN FACT, A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, DESCENDED FROM "INDIOS."

IV. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR RESPONDENT ONG TO RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION UNDER RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT FOR HIM TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM AND ENJOY HIS RIGHTFUL STATUS AS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO. V. THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION HAS PREEMPTIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY OR PRIMARY ADMINISTRATIVE JURIDICTION TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS REGARDS THE CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT ONG, AND UPON SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES, ISSUE A DECLARATION (I.E., IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE NO. 113878) RECOGNIZING THAT RESPONDENT ONG IS A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO, THEREBY RENDERING NONEXISTENT ANY CONTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENT FOR HIM TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT.7 Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is one of transcendental importance. They claim that the Presidents appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that respondent Ongs birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen. The petition has merit. First, as to standing. Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely, the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. Standing has been accorded and recognized in similar instances.10 Second, as to having to implead the President as an alleged necessary party. This is not necessary since the suit impleads the Executive Secretary who is the alter ego of the President and he has in fact spoken for her in his Comment. Furthermore, the suit does not seek to stop the President from extending the appointment but only the Executive Secretary from releasing it and respondent Ong from accepting the same. Third, as to the proper forum for litigating the issue of respondent Ongs qualification for memberhip of this Court. This case is a matter of primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution,11 the Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has the initial competence to do so. Fourth, as to the principal issue of the case is respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen?

On this point, the Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ongs petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar. In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E. No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth certificate12 states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen. Specifically, the following appears in the records: PETITION COMES now the undersigned petitioner and to this Honorable Court respectfully states: 1. That he is single/married/widower/widow, Filipino citizen and 26 years of age, having been born on May 25, 1953, at SAN JUAN RIZAL, to spouses Eugenio Ong Han Seng and Dy Guiok Santos who are citizens of the Philippines, as evidenced by the attached copy of his birth certificate marked as Annex A (if born outside of wedlock, state so; or if Filipino citizen other than natural born, state how and when citizenship was acquired and attach the necessary proofs: By Nat. Case #584 of Eugenio Ong Han Seng (Father) See Attached documents Annex B, B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4. xxx VERIFICATION Republic of the Philippines ) City of Manila ) S.S. I, GREGORY SANTOS ONG, after being sworn, depose and state: that I am the petitioner in the foregoing petition; that the same was prepared by me and/or at my instance and that the allegations contained therein are true to my knowledge. (Sgd.) GREGORY SANTOS ONG Affiant SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of August, 1979, City of Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting his/her Residence Certificate No. A-___________, issued at ________________, on __________________, 19__. (Sgd.)

Notary Public Until December 31, 1979 PTR No. 3114917 January 19, 1979, Pasig, MM Doc. No. 98; Page No. 10; Book No. VIII; Series of 1979.13 In fact, Emilio R. Rebueno, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant, wrote respondent Ong a letter dated October 3, 1979 stating that in connection with his Petition for Admission to the 1979 Bar Examinations, he has to submit: 1) A certified clear copy of his Birth Certificate; and 2) A certification of non-appeal re his citizenship from the Office of the Solicitor General. Respondent Ong complied with these requirements. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take the oath as a lawyer. It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,14 this Court held that: Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.15 Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality. Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.16 The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the

records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions.17 Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED as one of injunction directed against respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby ENJOINED from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship. This Decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179895

December 18, 2008

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN GREGORY SANTOS ONG and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,1 the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007, enjoined Ong "from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship."2 On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the "amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth," docketed as S.P. Proc No. 11767-SJ, "Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, et al."3 Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint4 of September 5, 2007, implored respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo

warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution5 in conjunction with the Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita,6 petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October 1998. The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it "cannot favorably act on [his] request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality."7 Petitioner assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from Ongs continuous discharge of judicial functions. Hence, this petition, positing that: IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-QUALIFIED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1, SECTION 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, TO BE APPOINTED AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, MERELY ON THE STRENGTH OF AN IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND A 1ST INDORSEMENT DATED 22 MAY 1997 ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, RESPONDETS BIRTH CERTIFICATE INDICATED THAT RESPONDENT IS A CHINESE CITIZEN AND BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, THE RECORDS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT IS A NATURALIZED FILIPINO CITIZEN.8 (Underscoring supplied) Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the position of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship, whether gauged from his birth certificate which indicates him to be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his status as a naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita. Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null his appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting his appointment, and that there is no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs that he, nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of judicial statesmanship.9 By Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss of January 3, 2008, Ong informs that the RTC, by Decision of October 24, 2007, already granted his petition and recognized him as a naturalborn citizen. The Decision having, to him, become final,10he caused the corresponding annotation thereof on his Certificate of Birth.11 Invoking the curative provisions of the 1987 Constitution, Ong explains that his status as a natural-born citizen inheres from birth and the legal effect of such recognition retroacts to the time of his birth. Ong thus concludes that in view of the RTC decision, there is no more legal or factual basis for the present petition, or at the very least this petition must await the final disposition of the RTC case which to him involves a prejudicial issue.

The parties to the present petition have exchanged pleadings12 that mirror the issues in the pending petitions for certiorari in G.R. No. 180543, "Kilosbayan Foundation, et al. v. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al," filed with this Court and in CA-G.R. SP No. 102318, "Ferdinand S. Topacio v. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al.,"13 filed with the appellate court, both of which assail, inter alia, the RTC October 24, 2007 Decision. First, on the objection concerning the verification of the petition. The OSG alleges that the petition is defectively verified, being based on petitioners "personal knowledge and belief and/or authentic records," and having been "acknowledged" before a notary public who happens to be petitioners father, contrary to the Rules of Court14 and the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004,15 respectively. This technicality deserves scant consideration where the question at issue, as in this case, is one purely of law and there is no need of delving into the veracity of the allegations in the petition, which are not disputed at all by respondents.16 One factual allegation extant from the petition is the exchange of written communications between petitioner and the OSG, the truthfulness of which the latter does not challenge. Moreover, petitioner also verifies such correspondence on the basis of the thereto attached letters, the authenticity of which he warranted in the same verification-affidavit. Other allegations in the petition are verifiable in a similar fashion, while the rest are posed as citations of law. The purpose of verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition or complaint have been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement.17 In the same vein, the Court brushes aside the defect, insofar as the petition is concerned, of a notarial act performed by one who is disqualified by reason of consanguinity, without prejudice to any administrative complaint that may be filed against the notary public. Certiorari with respect to the OSG On the issue of whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto, the Court rules in the negative. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.18 The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it.19

The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law.20 The pertinent rules of Rule 66 on quo warranto provide: SECTION 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof, must commence such action. SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor may commence action with permission of court. The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the permission of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the request and upon the relation of another person; but in such case the officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved by and to be deposited in the court by the person at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought. (Italics and emphasis in the original) In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action forquo warranto where there are just and valid reasons.21 Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez,22 the Court ruled: Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters get by law but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.23 Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand.24

It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ongs citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case. Certiorari and Prohibition with respect to Ong By petitioners admission, what is at issue is Ongs title to the office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan.25 He claims to have been constrained to file the present petition after the OSG refused to heed his request to institute a suit for quo warranto. Averring that Ong is disqualified to be a member of any lower collegiate court, petitioner specifically prays that, after appropriate proceedings, the Court . . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against Respondent Ong, ordering Respondent Ong to cease and desist from further exercising the powers, duties, and responsibilities of a Justice of the Sandiganbayan due to violation of the first sentence of paragraph 1, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution; . . . issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition against Respondent Ong and declare that he was disqualified from being appointed to the post of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan in October of 1998, considering that, as of October of 1998, the birth certificate of Respondent Ong declared that he is a Chinese citizen, while even the records of this Honorable Court, as of October of 1998, declared that Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino; x x x26 While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warrantoproceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of the petition.27 Being a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally,28 even through mandamus29 or a motion to annul or set aside order.30 In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,31 the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office.32 Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible.

A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.33 It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office,34 and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.35 Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor,36 reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin,37 that for a quo warranto petition to be successful, the privateperson suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.38 In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.39 In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the controverted public office, position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a right to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage.40 (Emphasis in the original) The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, or by any other, except in the form especially provided by law.41 To uphold such action would encourage every disgruntled citizen to resort to the courts, thereby causing incalculable mischief and hindrance to the efficient operation of the governmental machine.42 Clearly then, it becomes entirely unwarranted at this time to pass upon the citizenship of Ong. The Court cannot, upon the authority of the present petition, determine said question without encroaching on and preempting the proceedings emanating from the RTC case. Even petitioner clarifies that he is not presently seeking a resolution on Ongs citizenship, even while he acknowledges the uncertainty of Ongs natural-born citizenship. 43 The present case is different from Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, given Ongs actual physical possession and exercise of the functions of the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, which is a factor that sets into motion the de facto doctrine. Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.44 If a person appointed to an office is subsequently declared ineligible

therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer.45 x x x A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power alone. Accordingly, it is a well-established principle, dating back from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jurejudge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.46 If only to protect the sanctity of dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State, and without ruling on the conditions for the interplay of the de facto doctrine, the Court declares that Ong may turn out to be either a de jure officer who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired, or a de facto officer who enjoys certain rights, among which is that his title to said office may not be contested except directly by writ of quo warranto,47 which contingencies all depend on the final outcome of the RTC case. With the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to dwell on the ancillary issues raised by the parties. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 91-10-160 May 15, 1996 RE: REQUEST OF JURISCONSULT SAMANODIN L. AMPASO FOR UPGRADING OF HIS POSITION TO SALARY GRADE 31, EQUIVALENT TO ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p Samanodin L. Ampaso, former Judge of the Shari'a Circuit Court in Tubod, Lanao del Norte, was appointed as Juris-consult in Islamic Law on March 26, 1991 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, and took his oath of office on April 10,1991. The said position was created by virtue of Section 164, paragraph 2 of P. D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Thereafter, on May 2, 1991, the newly appointed Juris-consult requested this Court for the upgrading of his position to Salary Grade 31, equivalent to an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, claiming that under P.D. 1083 he is the highest Muslim Judicial Officer of the

Philippines. He also submitted a proposed plaintilla calling for the creation of 209 staff positions for the Office of the Jurisconsult. Under P.D. 1083, a Jurisconsult in Islamic Law or Muffi is an officer who renders legal opinions on any question relating to Muslim law. He assist the Qadi or Judge, by giving him fatwas or legal opinions. The opinions thus rendered shall merely serve to enlighten the court or the parties concerned, who, however are not necessarily bound to follow the same. The pertinent provisions of P.D. 1083 are herein below reproduced for ease of reference: Title III. Jurisconsult in Islamic Law Art. 164. Creation of office and appointment. (1) There shall be a Jurisconsult in Islamic Law, who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and hold office for a term of seven years, without prejudice to reappointment, unless sooner removed for cause or incapacitated to discharge the duties of his office. (2) The Office of the Jurisconsult shall be under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which shall also fix its permanent station, preferably in the City of Zamboanga. Art. 165. Qualifications. No person shall be appointed Jurisconsult in Islamic Law unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, at least forty years of age, of good moral character and proven integrity, and an eminent scholar in the Qur'an and Hadith and in Islamic jurisprudence as well as proficient in Arabic. Art. 166. Functions. (1) The Jurisconsult shall, on the written request of any interested party, have the authority to render legal opinions, based on recognized authorities, regarding any question relating to Muslim Law. For this purpose, he may, if he deems it necessary, consult or ask for a consensus of the 'ulama. (2) The Jurisconsult shall consider and act on every such request unless, in his opinion and for good reason, the question need not be answered. (3) The Office of the Jurisconsult shall keep a compilation and cause the publication of all his legal opinions. Art. 167. Compensation. Until otherwise provided by law, the jurisconsult shall receive an annual compensation of forty-eight thousand pesos which shall not be diminished during his term of office. Art. 168. Office personnel. The Jurisconsult may, in accordance with the Civil Service Law and subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary for the performance of his functions. However, a cursory check by the Office of the Court Administrator into the 201 files of Mr. Ampaso revealed that he was born on January 2, 1952. This information regarding his date of birth was personally supplied by him in his Personal Data Sheet for judges and in the information sheet for membership in the GSIS which he personally filled up and filed on July 1, 1985. On the basis of such data, it is evident that when he took his oath as Jurisconsult on

April 10, 1991, he was only 39 years, 3 months and 8 days, and that therefore, he failed to comply with the age requirement as provided under Article 165 of P.D. 1083. Thus, on March 31, 1992, the Court through an en banc resolution required Mr. Ampaso to show cause why he should not be removed from office for failing to fulfill the age requirement at the time he took his oath as Jurisconsult. In his comment, he claimed that his true birthdate is January 2, 1948 and not January 2, 1952 as appearing in his GSIS information sheet and personal data sheet, and that the latter documents were not personally prepared by him but by his brother who inadvertently misstated the year of his birth. To support his claim, he submitted various documentary proof, including the original of his passport issued on July 17, 1985, and a duplicate copy of his "Birth Certificate for Late Registration" issued on February 10, 1983. He alleged that the misstatement in his year of birth was not done in bad faith nor was it intended to cause damage to any party, it having been the result of an honest mistake. Obviously, the issue of the validity of the appointment of Mr. Ampaso as Jurisconsult must first be resolved before determining whether or not his request for upgrading of salary is proper. The resolution of said primordial issue hinges on whether all the requirements for the appointment had been duly complied with or not. The Senior Deputy Court Administrator found the comment and explanation of Mr. Ampaso attributing to his brother the innocent mis-declaration of his year of birth, to be unacceptable. We hold that Mr. Ampaso's claim is nothing but a lame excuse and a mere after-thought. It is very unlikely, improbable and unbecoming that a person aspiring to such a high office would request another to fill up and file such personal data farms. But granting that he did make such request, still, he himself had to sign the forms just the same prior to filing, and in the normal course of things, he should have read the documents before affixing his signature thereto. That he signed it without reading and/or understanding its contents is not excusable, nor credible. As an aspiring member of the Bench, it was incumbent upon Mr. Ampaso to check and double-check important personal data being supplied through such forms. It is thus no excuse to say that someone else prepared the forms or that his own brother must have forgotten. (or was not aware of) his year of birth. The subsequent submission of what purports to be a late-registration birth certificate (uncertified), plus a passport and affidavits of disinterested person attesting to his actual date of birth did not cure the defect. Neither do they constitute adequate proof as to the actual date/year of his birth, since the affidavits are hearsay and self-serving, while passports by their very nature and process of issurance cannot pass as conclusive evidence insofar as the year and date of birth are concerned, since such data are supplied by the passport applicants themselves. Neither would purportedly issued some thirty-five (35) years after the supposed date of birth. The foregoing premises considered, we are constrained to hold that the appointment of Mr. Ampaso as Jurisconsult was legally invalid from the beginning. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby Resolves to declare NULL and VOID ab initio the appointment of Samanodin Ampaso as Jurisconsult. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC

February 24, 2009

IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120. DECISION PER CURIAM: Before this Court is the Report of the Investigating Committee created under the Resolution dated December 10, 2008, to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, to determine who are responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc. The investigating committee, composed of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing as Chairperson and Mme. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona as Members, submitted the following report: INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE CREATED UNDER THE EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 MEMORANDUM FOR: HON. REYNATO S. PUNO, Chief Justice HON. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, Associate Justice HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Associate Justice HON. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Associate Justice HON. DANTE O. TINGA, Associate Justice HON. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, Associate Justice HON. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Associate Justice HON. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, Associate Justice HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Associate Justice HON. ARTURO D. BRION, Associate Justice HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA, Associate Justice

RE: Report on the Investigation of the Unauthorized Release of the Unpromulgated Ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the Consolidated Cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, Docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, Respectively, to Determine Who are Responsible for the Leakage of a Confidential Internal Document of the En Banc Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court the following report on the results of the investigation of the committee created under the En Banc Resolution dated December 10, 2008. ANTECEDENT FACTS During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. Comelec, Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, (Limkaichong case) which was used by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations. Since no one raised any further objections to the draft, the En Banc approved it. It having been already printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they were concurring "in the result," Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session. After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that seven of the 13 Justices (excluding Justice Reyes) concurred "in the result" with the ponencia of Justice Reyes (hereafter Gilbert copy or Justice Reyess ponencia or ponencia or unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro then informed the Chief Justice that they too wanted to concur only "in the result." Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only "in the result," the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy. It was noted that if a majority concurred only "in the result," the ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision ousting a sitting member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme measure. Justice Antonio T. Carpio then volunteered to write his Reflections on Justice Reyess ponencia for discussion in the following weeks En Banc session. During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpios Reflections which had in the meantime been circulated to the members of the Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to push through and set the date for holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008. On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral arguments remained, however. On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. In his

letter, Biraogo insinuated that the Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the other Justices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia. Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court and constituted contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 2008, directed 1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, with Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division and Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Working Chairperson, First Division, as Members to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are responsible for this leakage of a confidential internal document of the En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc the appropriate actions thereon; 2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be punished for contempt for writing the undated letter and circulating the same together with the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes. As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior Justices, conducted initial hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008. In the meantime, in compliance with the Courts above-quoted Resolution dated December 10, 2008, Biraogo submitted to the Court his Compliance dated December 22, 2008 to which he attached the following annexes: (1) an undated photocopy of a 3-page printed letter addressed to "Dear Mr. Biraogo" which purportedly was sent by a "Concerned Employee" as Annex "A"; (2) a June 12, 2008 note handwritten on a memo pad of Justice Reyes reading: Re: G.R. Nos. 178831-32, etc. [the comma and "etc." are handwritten] Dear Colleagues, I am circulating a revised draft of the ponencia. (Sgd.) RUBEN T. REYES, together with a copy of Justice Reyess Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda asAnnex "B"; (3) a photocopy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices asAnnex "C"; and (4) a photocopy of Justice Carpios Reflections as Annex "D". Justice Ynares-Santiago later inhibited herself upon motion of Justice Ruben T. Reyes while Justice Carpio voluntarily inhibited himself. They were respectively replaced by Justice Renato C. Corona and Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, by authority of the Chief Justice based on seniority. Additional hearings were then held by the reconstituted committee on January 14, 16, 19, 20, 21 and 22, 2009.

The following witnesses/resource persons were heard: 1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes 2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes 3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes 4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario 5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura 6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro 7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information Office 8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the Chief Justice 9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc 10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of Administrative Services 11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court 12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court 13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura 14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court 15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes 16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes 17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura 18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONIES Below are the summaries of their testimonies: 1. ARMANDO A. DEL ROSARIO, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as follows:

He was in charge of circulating ponencias for the signatures of the Justices and of forwarding signed (by all the Associate Justices who are not on leave) ponencias to the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ). On July 15, 2008, after the En Banc session, he received from Justice Reyes the original of the unpromulgated ponencia (Gilbert copy). Because he was busy at that time, he instructed his co-employee Rodrigo Manabat, Jr. to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature and to wait for it. He instructed Manabat to rush to Justice Nachuras office because the latter was going out for lunch. After more than 30 minutes, Manabat returned with the Gilbert copy already signed by Justice Nachura, who was the last to sign.1 Del Rosario then transmitted the Gilbert copy together with the rollo, temporary rollos, and diskettes to the OCJ pursuant to standard operating procedures for the promulgation of decisions. The documents were received by Ramon Gatdula on the same day at around 3:00 p.m. The following day, on July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy and the accompanying documents and diskettes as he was told that the promulgation of the ponencia had been placed on hold. He brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. He then placed the Gilbert copy in a sealed envelope and placed it inside his unlocked drawer and wrote a note in his logbook when he retrieved the Gilbert copy that its promulgation was on hold and would be called again on July 29, 2008.2 The Gilbert copy was in his sole custody from July 16, 2008 until December 15, 2008 (when the investigating committee held its first hearing).3 He never opened the envelope from the day he sealed it on July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008, when Justice Reyes told everybody in their office that the Gilbert copy had been photocopied and leaked. He did not have any news of any leakage before then. And he also did not photocopy the Gilbert copy. The seal placed on the envelope was still intact when he opened it on December 10, 2008.4 Although the lawyers in their office knew that he kept original copies of drafts in his unlocked drawer, he believed that nobody in his office was interested in photocopying the Gilbert copy. He was solely responsible for keeping the Gilbert copy. He did not know any of the parties to the case and none of them ever called him. And he did not know what Gatdula did after receiving the Gilbert copy.5 The Limkaichong case was called again on July 29, 2008 as Item No. 66. The Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda for the said date on July 25, 2008. Upon receipt of the said En Banc agenda and the new item number, their office prepared a new cover page and attached it to the Gilbert copy. The original cover page of the Gilbert copy for the agenda of July 15, 2008 showing the case as item number 52 was thrown away.6 On being recalled on January 20, 2009, Del Rosario further testified as follows: On July 15, 2008 when the Justices were about to leave the En Banc session room after the adjournment of the session, he entered the room just like the rest of the aides.7 He carried the folders of Justice Reyes, returned them to the office, and went back to, and waited for Justice Reyes until Justice Reyes finished lunch at the En Banc dining room.8 The Gilbert copy was left with Justice Reyes.9 Before 1:00 p.m., after the Justices had taken

lunch,10 Justice Reyes, who was then carrying an orange envelope, handed to him the Gilbert copy and instructed him to speed up the ponencias signing by Justice Nachura (who was not taking part in the oral arguments of a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day) since the latter might be leaving.11 He heard Justice Reyes say "Ihabol mo ito Ihabol na ipapirma kay Justice Nachura" in the presence of Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Rosendo Evangelista, as the three of them were going down the stairs to their office from the session room.12 He was not the one who brought the ponencia to the Office of Justice Nachura because he gave the task to Manabat to whom he relayed the instruction.13 There were already signatures on page 36 of the ponencia when he gave it to Manabat and only the signature of Justice Nachura was missing.14 He pointed this to Manabat saying, "ito na lang ang walang pirma, dalhin mo doon." Manabat obliged him.15 After a few minutes, Manabat returned to their office bearing the Gilbert copy. He went to Atty. Evangelista, showing him that the ponencia had already been signed by Justice Nachura. Atty. Evangelista then instructed him to have the ponencia promulgated by delivering the same to the OCJ. He (Del Rosario) complied, personally handing the Gilbert copy with the rollo, records and diskettes to Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ at 3:30 p.m., also of July 15, 2008.16 The ponencia stayed at the OCJ until the afternoon of the following day, July 16, 2008.17 He was not told that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold until the afternoon of July 16, 2008, when Justice Reyes called him to his chambers and instructed him to retrieve the ponencia. He also stated that someone from the OCJ called their office and requested them to retrieve the ponencia because its promulgation was on hold.18 At 4:00 p.m. that day, he retrieved the ponencia etc. from the OCJ19 and gave the ponencia to Justice Reyes.20 He merely showed the ponencia to Justice Reyes who ordered him to keep it ("tabi mo muna yan").21 He then placed a note "Hold, reset July 29" in his logbook after being informed by Atty. Evangelista of such date of resetting.22 He reiterated that he placed the Gilbert copy in a brown envelope, sealed it with the officially issued blue and white seal provided by the Printing Office, and placed the envelope inside his unlocked drawer. The envelope was still sealed when he checked it on December 10, 2008.23 He admitted that from the time he kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer until the Special En Banc meeting on December 10, 2008, he and no one else was in possession of the Gilbert copy. But he denied that he ever opened the envelope or photocopy the Gilbert copy. In fact, he did not mind it.24 And nobody inquired about it since July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008.25 He likewise denied that he knew Congressman Paras or Biraogo or that the two ever called his office.26 When asked if he could produce the envelope into which he placed the Gilbert copy, he replied that Justice Reyes had taken it.27 He also informed that what was placed on the face of the brown envelope was a computer print-out containing the title of the case, the names of the ponente and the other Justices, and the manner they voted.28 When he was asked by Justice Carpio Morales whether it was possible for him to recognize any tampering if, for instance, the envelope and the seal were replaced with a similar envelope and blue and white seal with a similar print-out information on the face of the envelope, he answered in the negative.29 (At that point, Justice Carpio Morales remarked that

Del Rosario, therefore, could not have been certain when he said that the envelope remained sealed from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.)30 Nobody else knew where he put the Gilbert copyin the same place as the other drafts. It was possible for someone to take the Gilbert copy from his drawer and photocopy it on a weekend or after office hours.31 Nobody told him to guard the Gilbert copy.32 Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine.33 He drew a sketch of the layout of the desks inside the office of Justice Reyes, illustrating that his location was two desks away from the table of April Candelaria, a secretary in the office, and that the xerox machine was situated at the back of the long table of the receiving clerks.34 He stayed in the office as long as Justice Reyes was still there but he could not say for sure that nobody photocopied the Gilbert copy after office hours as he also went out of the office to smoke in the nearby garden area or repair to the toilet.35 He never reported to office on Saturdays and there was one time Justice Reyes went to office on a Saturday as he was also asked to report but he refused.36 Justice Reyes sometimes dropped by the office on Sundays after attending services at the United Methodist Church along Kalaw Street, as told to him by the driver.37 He also circulated copies of the Revised Draft of the decision to the other Justices but he never received a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections.38 He did not offer an explanation why the Gilbert copy, which was in his possession, and the Revised Draft, were leaked.39 No information was supplied by his officemates, friends or relatives to help explain the leakage.40 Among his relatives working in the Court are his mother-in-law, Jasmin P. Mateo of the OCJ, sister of former Court Administrator Ernani Pano, and Mrs. Mateos sibling, who works at the Hall of Justice Committee.41 He and the driver of Justice Reyes were given keys to the main door of the Office of Justice Reyes but he could not say that only the two of them held keys to the main door.42 April Candelaria and Atty. Ferdinand Juan asked for and got duplicates of the key, but could not remember exactly when. Atty. Juan got a duplicate of the key because the lawyers sometimes went out for dinner and needed to go back to the office to retrieve their personal belongings.43 April Candelarias secretarial functions included recording of the social activities of Justice Reyes and delivering door-to-door papers to his chambers.44 Candelaria and the driver were in the staff of Justice Reyes since the latters stint at the Court of Appeals, while Atty. Juan was employed ahead of him.45 Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine because all of them photocopied personal documents and were too ashamed to ask other officemates to do it for them.46 When news of the leakage came out, Justice Reyes called all his legal staff and him to a meeting. In a tone that was both angry and sad, Justice Reyes asked them if they knew anything about the leakage.47 A meeting among Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and him took place on December 15, 2008, before the initial hearing by the investigating

committee.48 Justice Reyes also talked to him one-on-one and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and other documents when they were sent to the OCJ. He replied that there was none and that he just kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer and had in fact forgotten all about it until Justice Reyes inquired about it in December.49 He was not able to read Jarius Bondocs column about the leakage of the Gilbert copy (which came out in the Inquirer in October 2008 about the Gilbert copy) nor had Justice Reyes confronted him about said column before December 2008.50 During the initial hearing in December 15, 2008, nobody talked to him or knew that he was testifying as he was even surprised that he was called to testify.51 When confronted with the testimony of his officemate, Chester Del Castillo, who testified that Justice Reyes called only one meeting, he opined that Del Castillo might not have known about the meeting with the lawyers since Del Castillo was frequently absent.52 2. RODRIGO E. MANABAT, JR., PET Judicial Staff Employee II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as follows: He was the personal aide of Justice Reyes. On July 15, 2008, he brought the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature upon the instruction of Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista.53 He gave the Gilbert copy to the receptionist and waited outside the said office. After ten minutes, the document was returned to him.54 He then immediately gave it to Del Rosario. It took him not more than 15 minutes to return the document to Del Rosario.55He averred that he did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor did he notice if anybody from the Office of Justice Nachura photocopied it.56 He also did not know if Del Rosario placed the document in a sealed envelope or photocopied it.57 After returning the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario, he went back to Justice Reyes who asked him if Justice Nachura had already signed the ponencia. He answered yes and told Justice Reyes that the ponencia was already with Del Rosario.58 3. ATTY. ROSENDO B. EVANGELISTA, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified that as follows: Around 1:00 p.m. on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes instructed him to have signature page 36 of the ponencia reprinted and circulated for signing allegedly because Justice Minita ChicoNazario wanted to change her qualified concurrence thereon"in the result"to an unqualified concurrence. He thus instructed Jean Yabut, the stenographer in charge of finalizing drafts, to reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy. Then he ordered the reprinted page circulated for signatures together with the other pages of the ponencia. He assumed that the original page 36 was discarded as it was no longer in their files. He likewise assumed that the signatures were completed on the reprinted page 36 as the Gilbert copy was forwarded around 3:00 p.m. to the OCJ per standard operating procedure.59 He was not informed then by Justice Reyes or anybody that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy had been put on hold per agreement of the Justices.60 He came to know that it was on hold only on July 17, 2008, when Del Rosario informed him upon his arrival at the office. Because the information was unusual and because it was his duty to make sure that signed decisions were promulgated, he asked Justice Reyes. Justice Reyes then confirmed that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold.61 After that, he just assumed that the Gilbert copy was in their office with Del Rosario who was assigned to keep such documents. However, he

did not know exactly where in his work area Del Rosario kept it.62 He did not make a photocopy of the Gilbert copy nor did he order Del Rosario and Manabat to make photocopies. Neither did he know how the Gilbert copy was photocopied. He only came to know about the leakage last December 10, 2008.63 When, on January 22, 2009, he was recalled by the committee, he further testified as follows: He occupied the last cubicle in the lawyers room and the xerox machine was located outside the lawyers room.64It was upon the instruction of Justice Reyes that their office reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy and circulate it for signature. The instruction to circulate the reprinted page, which was circulated together with the other pages of the Gilbert copy, was given by him to either Manabat or Del Rosario.65 He saw the original page 36 where Justice ChicoNazario (supposedly) wrote the phrase "in the result" on top of her signature.66 Aside from him, Court Attorney VI Czar Calabazaron, who principally researched on the case, also saw the qualification in Justice Chico-Nazarios signature while the Gilbert copy lay on top of Justice Reyess coffee table inside his chambers. He recalled that at about 12:30 p.m. or before 1:00 p.m. right after the En Banc session on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes called the him and Atty. Calabazaron to his chambers.67 In that meeting, Justice Reyes phoned Justice Chico-Nazario after noticing that Justice Chico-Nazarios signature bore the notation "in the result."68 He, however, did not hear what they talked about since the less-than-five-minute phone conversation was inaudible, even though he was just approximately one meter away.69 Justice Reyes thereafter instructed him to reprint the second signature page (page 36). He assumed from the context of the instruction that it was due to the change in Justice Chico-Nazarios concurrence, without asking Justice Reyes the reason therefor.70 He then directed the stenographer to, as she did, reprint the second signature page, page 36, which was brought in to Justice Reyes in his chambers.71 He attended the oral arguments on a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. on that day (July 15, 2008) and arrived at the session hall before that time.72 As far as he could recall, he went down to the Office of Justice Reyes about 3:00 p.m. to retrieve a material needed for the oral arguments. He denied having testified that he went down purposely to check if the ponencia had been circulated and the second signature page signed anew and to make sure that the ponencia had already been transmitted to the OCJ.73 When confronted with the transcript of stenographic notes, he maintained that it was part of his duties to see to it that every ponencia of Justice Reyes was promulgated.74 He was sure that he went down to their office at around 3:30 p.m., although he could not recall his purpose for doing so. It was probably to get some materials related to the oral arguments, and that it just so happened that Del Rosario saw him and informed him that the Gilbert copy had already been transmitted to the OCJ.75 When asked as to the whereabouts of the original signature page 36, he surmised that it must have been shredded since it was not made part of the official documents submitted to the OCJ.76 While he searched for it in his cubicle, it could no longer be located. 77 He did not inquire from Justice Reyes or from Del Rosario who also had access to that page, because he assumed that it could not be located since what was submitted to the OCJ was the one where Justice Chico-Nazarios concurrence was no longer qualified by the phrase "in the

result."78 As he was attending the oral arguments, he had no opportunity to see the reprinted signature page 36 with the affixed signatures prior to the transmittal to the OCJ.79 He came to know that the Gilbert copy was retrieved on July 16, 2008.80 It was Del Rosario who informed him on July 17, 2008 that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold and was returned to their office.81 Justice Reyes did not advise them earlier that the promulgation was on hold.82 After learning about it, he inquired from Justice Reyes who confirmed that the promulgation was indeed on hold. He never asked for the reason even though that was their first "on hold" incident because he thought that the case would be called again at another session.83 He read the newspaper reports about the unpromulgated ponencia but did not validate them with Justice Reyes.84 He assumed that Del Rosario, being the custodian, kept the Gilbert copy in their office.85 Their office reprinted the second signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy.86 When shown page 36 of the Gilbert copy by the committee, heassumed that it was the reprinted page since Justice Chico-Nazarios signature no longer contained any qualification.87 He stated that it was the practice of their office to photocopy drafts signed by Justice Reyes and to furnish the other Justices with advance copies for their review before the session. Only such drafts were photocopied. Ponencias, which had already been signed by the other Justices and printed on Gilbert paper, were never photocopied. Del Rosario only logged them in his logbook and prepared soft copies for submission to the Division Chair or the Chief Justice.88 He assured the committee that this practice was 100% complied with despite the fact that he was not one of those assigned to photocopy, but later yielded to given situations by Justice Carpio Morales.89 When directed to compare the front page of the photocopy Biraogo submitted as Annex "C" to his Compliance to the Show Cause Order with the original Gilbert copy submitted to the committee by Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista noticed the difference in the dates of the agenda. He noted that Biraogos copy, which was the copy allegedly leaked to him, bore the agenda date "July 15, 2008," while the Gilbert copy submitted by Justice Reyes to the committee bore the agenda date "July 29, 2008." He also noted that the item numbers were also different because the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 52 in the photocopy submitted by Biraogo, whereas in the Gilbert copy, the case was listed as Item No. 66.90 To him, it was probable that Biraogo got his copy from another source but it was not probable that Biraogo photocopied a copy in the office. Only a few persons were authorized to operate the xerox machine in their office, namely, Conrado Bayanin, Jr., Armando Del Rosario, Chester Del Castillo, a certain Leonard and a certain Ramon.91 He could not recall who among the five had been directed to photocopy the July 15, 2008 draft.92 He ventured a guess that the top page of the Gilbert copy might have been reprinted but could not impute any motive to any person.93 Even if he was the staff head, he was not privy to the preparation of the first page nor of the top cover bearing the date "July 29, 2008" copy.94 Finally, he manifested that from the time the Gilbert copy was signed by 14 Justices until December 15, 2008, he did not acquire exclusive control or possession of the Gilbert copy because Del Rosario was the custodian thereof.95 He reiterated that he did not know where, exactly, Del Rosario kept the documents. He admitted that he was remiss in his duties as

staff head for not knowing.96 It was their practice not to lock drawers.97 He was aware that Justice Reyes eventually prepared another draft of a ponencia changing his position in the Limkaichong case because he helped in the research in November 2008.98 He never consulted the Gilbert copy because he had a softcopy thereof in his computer. 99 He did not ask why Justice Reyes was departing from his original position.100He denied that he knew Biraogo, Limkaichong, Jerome Paras, Olive Paras or any party to the case.101 He winded up his testimony by manifesting that the investigation was an experience that he hoped would not happen again and that he would not have to undergo again.102 4. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO testified as follows: She signed the Gilbert copy only once, in the En Banc conference room before going to the En Banc dining hall.103 Justice Reyes was beside her, looking on, when she affixed her signature. Immediately after signing, she returned the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who circulated it for the signatures of the other Justices. She remembered that Justice Reyes was holding the document even when the Justices were already at the dining hall. She did not photocopy the ponencia nor was there any opportunity for her to do so as there was only one Gilbert copy and the only time she held it was when she affixed her signature. She added that her concurrence to the ponencia was without qualification but when it was noted during lunch that most of the Justices had simply concurred "in the result," she and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro signified their intention to qualify their concurrence and concur likewise only "in the result."104 However, she was no longer able to indicate the change on the document as she and the other Justices had decided to put on hold the promulgation of the decision until after holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case. No reprinted signature page was ever sent to her office for her signature and she did not affix her signature on any other copy of the ponencia. She was not the last to sign the ponencia.105 5. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO testified as follows: She signed the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session and Justice Reyes was right beside her when she signed the ponencia.106 No reprinted signature page 36 was ever sent to her office for signature and she did not affix her signature on any other copy of the ponencia. She did not photocopy the ponencia and there could have been no opportunity to do so right after she signed it.107 6. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA testified as follows: He believed that he signed the ponencia in the En Banc conference room just before he went to the En Banc dining hall for lunch. He believed he was never sent a reprinted signature page. He either returned the ponencia to Justice Reyes right after signing it or passed it on to the other Justices for them to sign. He could not recall if he was the last to sign the ponencia. Asked whether he leaked the decision, Justice Nachura replied that he did not. Nor did he order any of his staff to photocopy it. In fact, there was no opportunity to photocopy the ponencia as he was not in custody thereof.108 Although he knew the husband of one of the petitioners, Olivia Paras, neither she nor her husband ever asked for a copy of the ponencia.109

7. ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ, Chief, Public Information Office (PIO), testified as follows: The copy of Biraogos undated letter with the attached copy of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes, which he furnished the En Banc, came from a member of the media. Around 3:00 p.m. on December 9, 2008, a reporter called him on the phone, asking if he would like to give a statement because Biraogo was going to hold a press conference about the Limkaichong case later that day at Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, in front of the Court of Appeals. He requested the reporter to inform him of what was going to be taken up during the press conference. The reporter went to his office around 5:00 p.m. the same day, and furnished him a copy of Biraogos undated letter. Attached to the letter was a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. The reporter informed him that Biraogo distributed to the media during the press conference copies of the letter and the attachment.110 Sometime in October 2008, months before Biraogo held the press conference, Jarius Bondoc had published a blind item column on the Limkaichong case. On November 8, 2008, another column, this time by columnist Fel Maragay, came out in the Manila Standard. The words used in both columns were the same so he thought that there was really an effort to report the story in the media. Knowing Jarius Bondoc to be a respectable journalist, he met with him to clarify matters as many of the statements in the news item were false or inaccurate. He provided Bondoc with the surrounding circumstances on the matter so that Bondoc would have the proper context in case he was again requested to publish the story. Bondoc offered to write about what he had said, but he told Bondoc that there was no need because there was no truth to the story given to the media anyway. He left it to Bondoc whether he would use the new information if he was again asked to publish the story.111 The leak could not have come from the PIO as they were never given a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. He also did not bring drafts from the OCJ to the PIO. It is only after a case has been promulgated that the Clerk of Court gives the PIO copies. But in this case, the Clerk of Court did not even have a copy as the decision had not been signed by the Chief Justice.112 8. RAMON B. GATDULA, Executive Assistant III, Office of the Chief Justice, testified as follows: On July 15, 2008, at 3:30 p.m., he received from Armando Del Rosario the Gilbert copy of the ponencia together with the rollos and two diskettes. He kept the Gilbert copy in his locked cabinet overnight and gave it to the Chief Justices secretary the following day. In the afternoon of July 16, 2008, an employee from the Office of Justice Reyes retrieved the Gilbert copy. He did not inquire anymore about the reason why they were retrieving it as it was common practice for the offices of the ponentes to retrieve drafts whenever there were corrections. When asked whether he photocopied the ponencia, Gatdula said that he does not photocopy the decisions he receives. Their office also never photocopies decisions. They forward such decisions straight to the Clerk of Court for promulgation and they receive copies thereof only after the Clerk of Court has affixed her signature thereon and indicated the date of promulgation.113

9. ATTY. MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA, the En Banc Clerk of Court, testified on the procedure for promulgation of ponencias. After the Chief Justice affixes his signature on a decision, the decision is brought together with the rollo to the En Banc Clerk of Court to be logged, recorded and checked. If the necessary requirements for promulgation are present, she signs the decision. It is at this time that the decision is considered as promulgated. The Office of the Clerk of Court distributes copies to the parties to the case. The date of promulgation is then encoded in the case monitoring system and a copy of the decision is given to the PIO.114 Decisions reaching their office usually come with the rollos except where a particular decision is considered rush.115 She denied having seen the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes and stated that the same never reached their office during the period from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.116 She and her staff only learned of the draft decision after it was circulated by the media.117 In her office, decisions for promulgation are always brought to Verna Albano for recording, then to her for signature.118 If Verna is absent, it is Atty. Felipa Anama, the assistant clerk of court, who receives the ponencias and rollos.119 She further stated that in her more than 10 years of work in the Court, she never heard any incident of a draft ponencia being leaked except this one.120 10. MAJOR EDUARDO V. ESCALA, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security Division, Office of Administrative Services, testified as follows: Security personnel inspect all offices everyday at 5:00 p.m.121 Security personnel used to inspect even the offices of the Justices, but they stopped doing so since last year.122 As far as photocopiers are concerned, security personnel only make sure that these are unplugged after office hours.123 His office has nothing to do with the operation of the machines.124 They always check if employees bring out papers from the Court. But they encounter problems especially from the offices of Justices because employees from these offices always claim that they have been allowed or instructed by their Justice to bring papers home with them, and there is no way to check the veracity of those claims.125 Since he assumed office on July 14, 2008, he is not aware of any record of a leak.126 He suggested that the memory cards of the machines be checked.127 11. ATTY. FELIPA B. ANAMA, Assistant Clerk of Court, testified as follows: She acts as Clerk of Court in the absence of Atty. Villarama.128 Their office never releases unpromulgated ponencias129 and they ascertain that every decision or resolution to be promulgated is complete.130 She remembered that their office released the Show Cause Resolution dated December 10, 2008 and had it delivered personally to Biraogo as it was an urgent resolution.131 Willie Desamero was the employee who personally served the resolution on Biraogo.132 She indicated that it was very difficult to serve something at Biraogos residence for by the account of Desamero, he was stopped at the guard house and was made to wait in the clubhouse until Biraogo was notified of his presence; and that it took Desamero two hours to serve the December 10, 2008 resolution on Biraogo.133

She has been with the Supreme Court for 29 years and she never encountered a leak nor did she ever issue a resolution or decision without the signature of the Chief Justice.134 12. WILLIE DESAMERO, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as follows: He served the December 10, 2008 Resolution on Biraogo on December 12, 2008.135 It was difficult to serve the Resolution. It took him six rides to get to Biraogos subdivision in Laguna and when he got there, he was stopped by the security guards at the entrance of the subdivision. They asked him to wait at the clubhouse and it took Biraogo two hours to arrive.136 When Biraogo saw him, Biraogo commented, "Ang bilis naman"137 and "bakit ka lang naka-tricycle? Meron naman kayong sasakyan"?138 Birago read the Resolution before he signed to receive the document.139 Biraogo arrived in a car and had a back-up car.140 Biraogo was in his early 50s, was wearing short pants, and had a sarcastic smile at that time.141 An officemate of his had also been to Biraogos house to serve some Resolutions.142 While it was not his usual duty to serve court processes, Atty. Anama and Atty. Villarama requested him to serve the resolution on Biraogo since the regular process servers in their office were not then available and he is the only one in their office who resides in Laguna.143 In his years of service with the Court, he knew of no case which involved leakage of court documents.144 13. GLORIVY NYSA TOLENTINO, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows: She is responsible for communications, drafts and door-to-door papers that come in at the Office of Justice Nachura.145 She presented page 267 of her logbook, to which Justice Reyes had earlier invited the committees attention. According to the logbook entry, the Gilbert copy was brought to their office on July 15, 2008 and that Justice Nachura signed the copy. However, since it is not office practice to record the time of receipt or release, she could not remember what time the Gilbert copy was brought to their office for signature.146 Nonetheless, the Gilbert copy did not stay long in their office because it was a door-to-door paper and was accordingly given preferential treatment. Justice Nachura immediately signed the ponencia when she gave it to him.147 However, she could not recall if Justice Nachura was the last to sign the Gilbert copy.148 She added that their office did not have a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. They only had the advance copies circulated for concurrence.149 14. ONOFRE C. CUENTO, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as follows: He personally served two resolutions on Biraogo at his residence last August 6, 2008, together with driver Mateo Bihag.150 On the day he served the resolutions, they were stopped at the guardhouse and were escorted by a barong-clad security officer to Biraogos house.151 They had a hard time getting to the residence of Biraogo whom he does not personally know.152 Biraogo did not mention or send his regards to any member of the Court.153

15. CHESTER GEORGE P. DEL CASTILLO, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as follows: He joined the staff of Justice Reyes in September 2007 upon the recommendation of Court of Appeals Justice Mariano Del Castillo and Retired Justice Cancio Garcia.154 He was the most proficient in the use of the photocopiers in the office of Justice Reyes so it was to him that the task of photocopying documents was usually given by Del Rosario and the lawyers.155 He, however, never photocopied any paper bearing the signatures of the Justices.156 He did not handle ponencias in Gilbert paper nor ever photocopy any ponencia in Gilbert paper.157 He usually left the office at 4:30 p.m. He sometimes saw members of the staff photocopying papers even beyond 4:30 p.m. It was Del Rosario who often gave orders to photocopy drafts and who was the most trusted member of the staff as demonstrated by the fact that he could go in and out of Justice Reyess chambers.158 Del Rosario never left the office before Justice Reyes and he (Del Rosario) often left late.159 He had never been to Barangay Malamig although he had been to Bian, Laguna.160 He does not know Biraogo or his wife.161 Neither does he know Paras.162 He did not know where Gilbert copies were kept.163 When he was asked who would leave the office first, Justice Reyes or Del Rosario, he said he did not know. Del Rosario was tasked to lock the main door of the office.164 The office staff knew of the leaked decision on the Limkaichong case, but the staff remained apathetic and did not talk about it.165 The apathy was probably because the staff thought that the matter had already been settled since Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista had already been interviewed.166 He was not sure if anyone from their office was involved in the leakage.167 He was not part of the meeting called by Justice Reyes before the start of the investigation.168 Only Atty. Evangelista, Del Rosario, and Manabat were called to the meeting.169 He surmised that the meeting was about the leakage.170 16. CONRADO B. BAYANIN, JR., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, who was called by the committee upon Justice Reyess suggestion, testified as follows: Part of his duties in the Office of Justice Reyes was to receive and release papers and rollos as he was seated near the door.171 It was not his duty to handle or receive ponencias in Gilbert form.172 He could not remember if he had ever received any paper in connection with the Limkaichong case.173 While he knew how to operate the xerox machine, just like all the other utility workers in the office,174 he had never photocopied anything signed by the Justices, especially those on Gilbert paper.175 When asked who handled photocopies ordered by Justice Reyes, he replied that he did not know.176 He did not know and had no opinion on how the ponencia was leaked.177 He only knew that his officemates talked about the leak,178 but he did not know specifically what his officemates talked about.179 Before Justice Reyess retirement ceremony, Justice Reyes called him to his chambers and very calmly asked him if he knew if anybody had photocopied the unpromulgated ponencia.180

17. FERMIN L. SEGOTIER, Judicial Staff Assistant II and receptionist at the Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, testified as follows: His duty is to receive communications, but only Glorivy Nysa Tolentino keeps a logbook for the door-to-door papers that come to their office.181 He does not remember any details pertaining to the July 15, 2008 signing of the Limkaichong Ponencia, aside from the fact that it was to Justice Reyess staff to whom he gave it back.182 He assumed that it was to Del Rosario to whom he returned the Gilbert copy because in the Office of Justice Reyes, Del Rosario was the one in charge of circulating ponencias in Gilbert form for signature. 183 He could not recall handing a Gilbert paper to Manabat.184 The ponencia stayed only for a short time (about 5 minutes) in their office because it was a door-to-door paper. After it was signed by Justice Nachura, it was handed back to the staff of Justice Reyes, so there was no chance for them to photocopy the ponencia.185 It was not their standard operating procedure to leave any Gilbert paper in their office if it could not be signed right away.186 18. RETIRED JUSTICE RUBEN T. REYES, for his part, submitted during the hearing on January 22, 2009, a written statement entitled "Notes/Observations" (Notes) consisting of 12 paragraphs. In his Notes, Justice Reyes stressed the following: Biraogo did not point to him as the source of the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia; 187 in Biraogos December 22, 2008 Compliance with the Courts Show Cause Order, Biraogo stated that his informant was allegedly a "SC concerned employee" who left a brown envelope with a letter and some documents in his Bian, Laguna home; it could be seen from the attachments to Biraogos Compliance that it was not only the unpromulgated ponencia or Gilbert copy that was leaked but also two other confidential documents: his Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda (attached as Annex "B" to the Compliance) and Justice Carpios Reflections (attached as Annex "D"); and since these other documents were circulated to all Justices, the investigation should not only focus on the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia but also on the leak of the two other confidential and internal documents of the Court.188 Justice Reyes also pointed out in his Notes as follows: the committee should not only look into his office but also the offices of Justice Carpio and the other Justices. He, however, reiterated that he had said in his media interviews that he believed that none of the Justices themselves, much less the Chief Justice, leaked the ponencia or authorized its leakage. Justice Reyes pointed out that Biraogos informant mentioned a certain Atty. Rosel, who was allegedly a close friend and former partner of Justice Carpio. Justice Reyes said that Atty. Rosel allegedly asked a favor from Justice Carpio before the latter wrote his Reflections.189 Thus, he said, the committee should also question Atty. Rosel and even Justice Carpio himself. On why he did not lift a finger when Biraogo got hold of the decision, despite reports regarding the leak, Justice Reyes stated that he was on a sabbatical leave with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education research in four States in the United States from October 10, 2008 to November 1, 2008.

He had nothing to do with the leak and he even prepared a second draft decision (deviating from his prior disposition) after oral arguments were held on the case. Thus, in his Notes, he posed: "If he leaked it, why would he prepare a second different decision?" He willingly obliged to the holding of oral arguments. He had no commitment to anybody and had no reason to leak the unpromulgated ponencia. 190 He added, "[I]f he had a hand in the leak, why would it include Justice Carpios Reflections which was contrary to the unpromulgated decision?" Justice Reyes, still in his Notes, stated that no Justice in his right mind would leak the unpromulgated ponencia or other confidential documents, such as the Revised Draft and Justice Carpios Reflections. He went on to refer to Biraogos Compliance that the informant was purportedly "an old hand in the Supreme Court who was accustomed to the practices of the Justices" and had a "circle" or group in the Supreme Court. Since all his office staff, except two stenographers, one utility worker and one messenger, were all new in the Court, then the "old hand" referred to could not have come from his office. But if it could be proven by evidence that one of his staff was the source of the leak, Justice Reyes argued that only that staff should be made liable, for he had publicly declared that he did not and would never allow nor tolerate such leakage.191 More on Justice Reyess Notes: He suggested that Newsbreak writers Marites Vitug and Aries Rufo be cited for contempt of court, for obtaining, without lawful authority, confidential information and documents from the Court, officials or employees, and for writing false, malicious articles which tended to influence the investigation of the committee and to degrade, impede and obstruct the administration of justice. 192 Aside from submitting his Notes, Justice Reyes also testified as follows: While he was first heard on January 16, 2009, after he presented a 9-paragraph written statement, he noticed that it needed refinement and revision so he requested for time to edit it. Hence, he submitted his above-mentioned Notes on January 22, 2009. Justice Reyes identified the Gilbert copy, which he submitted earlier to the committee for safekeeping, and his Notes."193 He clarified that the Compliance he was referring to in his Notes was Biraogos December 22, 2008 Compliance with the Courts Show Cause Order.194 His desire to include Justice Carpio in the investigation, per number 4 of his Notes, came about because it appeared from Biraogos Compliance and from the alleged informants letter that it was not only the unpromulgated ponencia signed by 14 Justices that was leaked but also the Revised Draft ponencia and Justice Carpios Reflections.195 He suggested that what should be investigated was the source of the three documents.196 Justice Quisumbing replied that the matter seemed settled because Justice Reyes also mentioned in Paragraph No. 6 of his Notes that he believed that none of the Justices, much less the Chief Justice, caused or authorized the leak.197 Justice Reyes stressed that he thought it was only fair that the Committee also call Justice Carpio to shed light on the matter in the same way that he was asked to shed light thereon.198

Justice Carpio Morales pointed out that Justice Reyess ponencia as signed by 14 Justices did not come into the possession of the other Justices but only of Justice Reyes.199 She added that if logic were followed, then all of the Justices should be investigated because copies of Justice Carpios Reflections were circulated to all. She declared that she was willing to be investigated and that she was volunteering to be investigated.200 However, she pointed out that the logic of Justice Reyes was misplaced, considering that the documents attached to Biraogos Compliance were allegedly received at the same time. If Biraogo received the documents at the same time and one Justice never took hold of the ponencia as signed, said Justice could not have made the leak to Biraogo.201 Justice Reyes went on to testify as follows: The Gilbert copy which he submitted to the committee was given to him by Del Rosario.202 He did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor provide Biraogo a copy thereof or instruct any of his staff to photocopy the same.203 The xerox copy of the Gilbert copy attached to the Compliance of Biraogo appeared to be the same as the committees copy because he (Justice Reyes) looked at the initials on each page and found them to be similar.204Justice Quisumbing thereupon invited Justice Reyess attention to the cover page of the Gilbert copy which had been submitted to and in custody of the committee (committees copy).205 Upon perusal thereof, Justice Reyes stated that the cover page of the committees copy did not appear to be the same as the cover page of Biraogos copy. He observed that the cover page of the committees copy showed the agenda date "July 29, 2008," and that the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66, whereas the cover page of Biraogos copy showed the agenda date "July 15, 2008," and that the same case was listed as Item No. 52.206 Justice Reyes then qualified his earlier statement and said that he was only referring to those pages of the decision itself which bore his initials, when he spoke of similarity, and said that the cover page did not bear his initials.207 Justice Corona pointed out, and Justice Reyes confirmed, that page 1 of the committees copy also differed from page 1 of Biraogos copy. Justice Corona pointed that in the committees copy, there were asterisks after the names of Justice Azcuna and Justice Tinga and footnotes that the two were on official leave, whereas no such asterisks and footnotes appeared on page 1 of Biraogos copy.208 Justice Corona also pointed out and Justice Reyes once again confirmed that there was a slight variance between the initials on page 34 of the committees copy and the initials on page 34 of Biraogos copy.209 Justice Quisumbing then posed the question whether Justice Reyes would admit that there were at least two sources.210 At this juncture, Justice Reyes brought out another photocopy (new copy or Justice Reyess new copy) of the Gilbert copy to which new copy the left top corner of the top cover was stapled a 1"x1" piece of thick paper bearing the initials "RTR" and on the right top corner of the same cover appeared a handwritten notation reading "Gilbert copy." Justice Reyes repeatedly stated that his new copy was a facsimile of the committees copy.He pointed out that the initials on page 34 of the new copy and that of the committees copy matched. He concluded, however, that page 34 of Biraogos copy was not a faithful reproduction of the committees copy.211Justice Reyes avoided the question of whether he or his staff kept more than one xerox copy of the Gilbert copythat had been signed by majority or 14 members of the Court, saying that he could not say so because he did not personally attend to photocopying of decisions.212 He stressed that his initials on page

34 of the new copy differed from the initials appearing on page 34 of Biraogos copy.213 He also pointed out that in Biraogos copy, particularly on page 3, there was a handwritten correction superimposed over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such handwritten correction appeared on page 3 of both the committees copy and the new copy.214 He added that he did not know who made the handwritten correction in Biraogos copy and that the new copy he was presenting to the committee was furnished to him by the committee. Said copy was allegedly the xerox copy of the Gilbert copy.215 Justice Reyes professed that he had nothing to do with the leak as he would not leak, authorize, allow, or tolerate any leak of his decision or revised draft. He dispelled any pecuniary profit from such leakage, especially since he was about to retire when the leak happened. He could not, however, say the same of his office staff since he did not want to speculate, so he was giving the committee the broadest latitude in calling any of his staff.216 Upon Justice Carpio Moraless interrogation, Justice Reyes stated that he found the new copy in his files just the week before the January 22, 2009 hearing.217 Justice Carpio Morales then invited his attention to the fact thatpage 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogos copy, did not contain the footnotes and asterisks appearing in the committees copy. She also noted that the copy of Biraogo and the new copy presented by Justice Reyes matched to a T.218 Justice Reyes only replied that he did not pay particular attention nor personally attend to the photocopying.219 Justice Reyes stated that there should only be one copy of the Gilbert copy,220 but it appeared that he supplied the committee with two apparently different copies (the Gilbert copy and the new copy).221 Justice Reyes noted that the new copy and Biraogos copy did not match exactly as regards pages 3 and 34. He stressed that there appeared on page 3 of Biraogos copy a handwritten correction over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such correction was made on the new copy. Additionally, on page 34 of Biraogos copy, his initial appeared to have a smudge while on page 34 of the new copy, there was no smudge.222 When asked to explain why the new copy, which he claimed to have been photocopied from the committees copy, did not match the committees copy on page 1 but matched page 1 of Biraogos copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation.223 Justice Reyes also refused to submit the new copy to the committee ("Why should I?") and questioned the committees request that he initial the controversial pages of the new copy.224 Thus, the committee members decided to affix their signatures on the first five pages of the new copy and then drew a rectangle around their signatures and the dateJanuary 22, 2009. 225 The committee then had the new copy photocopied. 226Justice Corona soon noticed that Justice Reyes was trying to hide the new copy between his files. At that point, Justice Corona pulled out the new copy from Justice Reyess files. Justice Reyes then repeatedly said that he was not submitting it to the committee.227 The committee proceeded to discuss the other matters contained in Justice Reyess Notes. Justice Reyes at that point then stated that he had not withdrawn his standing motion for inhibition against Justice Carpio Morales, to which Justice Carpio Morales replied that she would remain impartial. Justice Carpio Morales likewise stressed that the committee would decide according to the evidence.228

Upon being asked by the committee, Justice Reyes said that he could not recall if he was holding the Gilbert copy after the En Banc session and while having lunch.229 He stated that per standard arrangement, his staff would usually get his folders and bring them to his office.230 As far as he could recall, before the Court adjourned, the members already knew that many concurred only in the result.231 He could not recall, however, if the Chief Justice learned about it only at the dining room.232 Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the instruction to reprint signature page 36 of the Gilbert copyand stated that it must have been Atty. Evangelistas sole decision. What Justice Reyes remembered telling Atty. Evangelista after the En Banc session was that many concurred only "in the result" and that Justice Chico-Nazario wanted to change her concurrence.233 Justice Carpio Morales confronted him with certain portions of the December 15, 2008 TSN where he clearly volunteered the information that he was the one who instructed Atty. Evangelista to reprint page 36 which is the second signature page.234 Justice Reyes replied that maybe Atty. Evangelista was under the mistaken impression that the change of the said page pushed through because, as it turned out, there was no qualification in the concurrence of Justice Chico-Nazario. He also insisted that he did not volunteer the information that he was the one who ordered the reprinting of page 36. He contended that he was in fact questioning Atty. Evangelista when the latter said that the instruction came from him.235 With regard to the "re-signing" by Justice Nachura,236 Justice Reyes declared that it was difficult to speculate and rely on inaccurate recollection, especially since several months had passed. Justice Corona replied that the testimonies could not be inaccurate since there were entries in the logbook, showing that Justice Nachura indeed signed in his chambers.237 Justice Reyes stated that the changing of the original signature page 36 was not carried out238 and that Atty. Evangelistas recollection of the event was inaccurate. Justice Reyes also stated he could not recall calling Justice Chico-Nazario on the phone after the En Banc session on July 15, 2008.239 Justice Reyes stated that Del Rosario was assigned to keep and take care of the circulated drafts and ponencias printed on Gilbert paper, and from time to time Atty. Evangelista would have access to them since the latter was the judicial staff head.240 Justice Reyess staff members in October were the same until he retired on December 18, 2008.241 Justice Reyess impression of Biraogos letter was that somebody who had an axe to grind against the Chief Justice or who wanted to discredit him could have done it.242 Justice Reyes said that he never had any personal interest in the case and argued that the best proof of this was that he did not stick to his original decision after the case was heard on oral arguments on August 26, 2008, just to prove that he was not beholden to any party.243 Justice Reyes could not offer a straight answer to the question of what his undue interest was in still trying to have the signature of all the Justices after he had taken his lunch and to forward the Gilbert copy and the rollo etc. to the OCJ even after the decision to put the promulgation of the ponencia on hold was arrived at, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008. He simply dismissed the recollections of his staff and preferred to believe Del Rosarios over those of Evangelistas or Manabats. He insisted that he never had the chance to talk to Del Rosario or to Atty. Evangelista right after the En Banc session, and claimed that he never

gave the instruction to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura. He likewise insisted that the testimony of Atty. Evangelista was incorrect and that he would rather believe Del Rosarios testimony.244 THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES FINDINGS OF FACT From the testimonies of the witnesses, the committee finds the following facts established. On July 15, 2008, even after the Justices had agreed at lunchtime to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy in the Limkaichong case, Justice Reyes, under his misimpression that Justice Nazario had "concurred in the result" and that she would finally remove such qualification, instructed his Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Evangelista, and Del Rosario to have the signature page 36 (where the names of Justices Nazario, Nachura and three others appeared) reprinted and to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature as Justice Nachura, who was not participating in the oral arguments on the case scheduled at 1:30 that afternoon, might be going out. Jean Yabut was tasked by Atty. Evangelista to reprint the second signature page (page 36) on Gilbert paper. The reprinted signature page 36, together with the rest of the pages of the Gilbert copy, was then given by Atty. Evangelista to Del Rosario. Del Rosario, in turn, gave the Gilbert copy, together with the reprinted signature page 36, to Manabat whom he instructed to go to the Office of Justice Nachura for him to affix his signature thereon. Manabat immediately went to the Office of Justice Nachura and handed the Gilbert copy to Fermin Segotier, the receptionist at Justice Nachuras office. As the Gilbert copy was a doorto-door document, Segotier immediately gave it to Glorivy Nysa Tolentino who recorded it in her logbook. She then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Nachura. When the reprinted page 36 of the Gilbert copy was brought out from Justice Nachuras chambers and returned to Tolentino, she recorded it in her logbook that it was already signed. The whole process took not more than five minutes. The Gilbert copy was returned to Manabat, who had waited outside the office of Justice Nachura. Manabat then repaired to the chambers of Justice Reyes who inquired from him if Justice Nachura had signed the reprinted page 36 to which he answered in the affirmative. Manabat thereafter handed the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario. When Atty. Evangelista, who was attending the oral arguments on a case scheduled that afternoon, went down the Office of Justice Reyes at about 3:30 p.m., he and/or Del Rosario must have eventually noticed that Justice Nazario did not, after all, qualify her concurrence on the original signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy with the words "in the result." Since neither Atty. Evangelista nor Del Rosario was advised by Justice Reyes that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold, Del Rosario brought the Gilbert copy, together with the rollo, records and diskettes to the OCJ to be promulgated and gave it at 3:30 p.m. to Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ. Gatdula later transmitted the Gilbert copy to the secretary of the Chief Justice. The following day, July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes called Del Rosario to his chambers and instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy, etc. from the OCJ, informing

him for the first time that the promulgation of the ponencia had been put on hold. Around that same time, the OCJ phoned the Office of Justice Reyes and told them to retrieve the ponencia for the same reason. Thus, Del Rosario went to the OCJ and asked for the return of the Gilbert copy. As Gatdula had already forwarded the same to the Chief Justices secretary for the Chief Justices signature, Gatdula retrieved it from the secretary. Del Rosario retrieved all that he submitted the previous day, except the rollo which had, in the meantime, been borrowed by Justice Carpio. Del Rosario then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. Del Rosario informed Atty. Evangelista the following day, July 17, 2008, that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold. After Atty. Evangelista verified the matter from Justice Reyes, he (Atty. Evangelista) told Del Rosario that the case would be called again on July 29, 2008. Del Rosario made a note in his logbook to that effect. On July 25, 2008, the Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda for July 29, 2008 where the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66. A new cover page reflecting the case as Item No. 66 was thus prepared and attached to the Gilbert copy bearing only 14 signatures. After the Gilbert copy was retrieved from the OCJ on July 16, 2008, it remained in the sole custody of Del Rosario until December 15, 2008, the initial hearing conducted by the investigating committee. The Gilbert copy remained inside his unlocked drawer, in a brown envelope, which he had sealed with the blue and white seal used by all Justices. He opened it only on December 10, 2008, after Justice Reyes informed his staff that there was a leak of the ponencia. When news of Biraogos conduct of a press conference on December 9, 2008 bearing on the leakage came out, Justice Reyes immediately called his legal staff and Del Rosario to a meeting and asked them if they knew anything about the leakage. He called for a second meeting among Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and Del Rosario on December 15, 2008, before the hearing by the investigating committee took place in the afternoon of that day. Justice Reyes likewise had a one-on-one talk with Del Rosario and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and related documents when they were sent to the OCJ, to which he (Del Rosario) answered in the negative. EVALUATION The committee finds that the photocopying of the Gilbert copy occurred between July 15, 2008, before it was brought to the OCJ or after it was retrieved on July 16, 2008 from the OCJ, and July 25, 2008, when the Office of Justice Reyes caused the preparation of the new cover page of the Gilbert copy to reflect that it was agendaed as Item No. 66 in the July 29, 2008 En Banc session, because the cover page of the photocopy in the possession of Biraogo, as well as the cover page of Justice Reyess new copy, still bore the agenda date "July 15, 2008" and Item No. 52.

The committee likewise finds that the leakage was intentionally done. It was not the result of a copy being misplaced and inadvertently picked up by Biraogo or someone in his behalf. The committee notes that none of the offices to which the Gilbert copy was brought (OCJ and the Office of Justice Nachura) and which acquired control over it photocopied ponencias in Gilbert form and released photocopies thereof to party litigants. In any event, as earlier reflected, page 1 of the Gilbert copy that was sent to the OCJ and Justice Nachuras Office and page 1 of Biraogos photocopy differ. To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14 Justices was photocopied and that a copy thereof was intentionally leaked directly or indirectly to Biraogo. As will be discussed below, the committee FINDS that the leak came from the Office of Justice Reyes. It bears reiterating that the leak did not come from the OCJ even if the Gilbert copy stayed therein from 3:30 p.m. on July 15, 2008 up to 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2008. This is clear from the fact that page 1 of the copy in Biraogos possession differs from page 1 of the Gilbert copy which was forwarded to the OCJ. Thus, on page 1 of the Gilbert copy which contains the names of the Justices of the Court, there appear asterisks after the names of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna and Justice Dante O. Tinga. These asterisks have corresponding footnotes stating that Justice Azcuna was on official leave per Special Order No. 510 dated July 15, 2008 and Justice Tinga was likewise on official leave per Special Order No. 512 dated July 16, 2008. In contrast, page 1 of Biraogos copy and Justice Reyess new copy, glaringly contain no such asterisks and footnotes, which indicates that page 1 of Biraogos copy was photocopied from page 1 of the draft prepared by Justice Reyes before it was finalized on Gilbert paper. The leak also could not have come from the offices of the other associate justices, contrary to Justice Reyess insinuation. Justice Reyes insinuated that because all the Justices were furnished with advance copies of the draftponencia before the session of July 15, 2008, anyone from those offices could have leaked the decision. An examination of the copy in Biraogos possession readily shows that every page thereof pages 1 to 36 contained Justice Reyess authenticating initials while none of the advance copies furnished to the Justices was similarly authenticated. Advance copies of a draft given to the justices as a working basis for deliberations are not initialed by the justice who prepares it. And they do not contain the signature of any of the Justices, except the one who prepared the draft, precisely because the Justices have yet to go over it and deliberate on it. As standard procedure, it is only after a draft decision has been adopted by the Court that it is finalized-printed on Gilbert paper and every page thereof is authenticated by the ponente, and circulated for signature by the other Justices. It need not be underlined that there was no opportunity for anyone from the offices of the Associate Justices to photocopy the ponencia as none of said offices acquired possession of the document, except the Office of Justice Reyes and the Office of Justice Nachura. But based on testimony, the unpromulgated ponencia stayed in the Office of Justice Nachura only for less than five minutes, which did not suffice for it to be signed by Justice Nachura and to be photocopied. Again, and in any event, page 1 of the photocopy in Biraogos possession does not match the same page of the Gilbert copy.

Furthermore, except for Justice Reyes, the Associate Justices took hold of the Gilbert copy only briefly when they signed it at the En Banc conference room. At no other time did any of them hold the document long enough to photocopy it. Pursuant to standard procedure, only the ponente, Justice Reyes in this case, and his staff, took custody of the ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices before it was sent to the OCJ. But who from the Office of Justice Reyes leaked the unpromulgated ponencia? While the evidence shows that the chain of custody could not rule out the possibility that the Gilbert copy was photocopied by Del Rosario who had control and possession of it, and while there is no direct evidence as to the identity of the perpetrator of the leakage, the committee FINDS that based on the circumstantial evidence reflected above, particularly the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to circulate a draft ponencia of the case soonest even before the memoranda of all the parties fell due, and to withhold the information to Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold and, instead, allow the immediate promulgation after lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the promulgation was arrived at at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself who leaked a photocopy thereof. Recall that the Court gave due course to the petition on April 8, 2008 and the first memorandum was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General only on June 16, 2008. The other parties, namely, Olivia Paras, Speaker Nograles, et al., and Biraogo subsequently filed their respective memoranda only on July 1, 2, and 24, 2008. Even before the En Banc session of June 10, 2008, however, Justice Reyes had already circulated a draft decision. Further, still later or on June 12, 2008, Justice Reyes circulated, via transmittal letter of even date printed on his memo pad and signed by him, a Revised Draft, copy of which transmittal letter, as well as the Revised Draft, also came into the possession of Biraogo (Annex "B" to Biraogos Compliance). Furthermore, even after the Justices had, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008, unanimously decided that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy would be put on hold--and this was, it bears repeating, admitted by Justice Reyes--, Justice Reyes, after partaking lunch at the dining room and before 1:00 p.m., instead of advising his Chief of Staff Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the promulgation was put on hold, still instructed them to reprint the second signature page (page 36) and to have the reprinted page immediately brought to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature; and before Justice Reyes left for the session hall for the oral arguments of that case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, Justice Reyes still followed up the case by asking Manabat if Justice Nachura had already signed the Gilbert copy.245 When confronted with the incontrovertible evidence of his undue interest in the case and haste in having the Gilbert copy promulgated, Justice Reyes was notably evasive. On January 16, 2009, Justice Carpio Morales asked Justice Reyes if he would admit that he prepared a draft of the decision even before the first memorandum was submitted on June 16, 2008. Justice Reyes stated that he could not admit that fact.246 Such fact is documented, however, and it would not have escaped him as the records of the Limkaichong case were with him and yet he already prepared and caused the circulation of a draft of the decision on June 12, 2008.

Justice Reyes also gave conflicting accounts on when he gave the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the En Banc session of July 15, 2008 was adjourned. During the proceedings of the committee on December 15, 2008, Justice Reyes categorically stated that pursuant to standard operating procedures, he gave the signed Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the Chief Justice noted that seven Justices had concurred "in the result."247 It bears recalling that the Chief Justice confirmed noting such fact during lunchtime. However, the following day, during the December 16, 2008 proceedings, Justice Reyes implied that pursuant to standard operating procedures, his staff got his folders including the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session. Hence, so he reasoned, as the agreement to put on hold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy and to hold oral arguments on the case was arrived at only afterlunch which followed the adjournment of the En Banc session, his staff did not know about such agreement.248 But even Del Rosario, whose testimony he credits more than any of the other members of his staff, categorically stated that Justice Reyes gave him the Gilbert copy after he (Justice Reyes) had taken his lunch and while he (Del Rosario), Justice Reyes and Atty. Evangelista were, before 1:00 p.m., on their way to Justice Reyess office, and that, at that instant, Justice Reyes instructed Atty. Evangelista to have the signature page 36 reprinted and have Justice Nachura (who was not participating in the oral arguments scheduled that afternoon) sign. During the January 22, 2009 hearing, when asked to explain why the top cover of the new copy which he brought with him and which he claimed to have been photocopied from the committees copy, did not match the top cover of the committees copy (or the original Gilbert copy) but matched the top cover of Biraogos copy, Justice Reyesoffered no explanation. Neither did he account for the other dissimilarities between page 1 of his new copy and the same page 1 of Biraogo on one hand, and page 1 of the Gilbert copy , viz: page 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogos copy, does not have asterisks after the names of Justices Tinga and Azcuna and the corresponding footnotes, which the Gilbert copy has. Justice Reyes, despite his professed desire to bring out the truth, refused to submit his new copy to the committee and questioned the committees request that he place his initials on the questioned pages of his new copy. Later, while the committee was discussing other points in his Notes, Justice Reyes tried to hide his new copy. Justice Corona had to pry it out of Justice Reyess files. As Justice Reyes repeatedly said that he was not submitting his new copy to the committee ("Why should I"), the committee members were prompted to photocopy his new copy, but only after they affixed their signatures and date (January 22, 2009) on the first 5 pages thereof.
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To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven facts and circumstances constitute more than substantial evidence which reasonably points to Justice Reyes, despite his protestations of innocence,249 as THE source of the leak. He must, therefore, be held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Effect of Justice Reyess Retirement The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he is answerable.250

A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite Justice Reyess retirement. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed if one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses charged, including the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.251 The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him/her guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would the people have against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his/her last days in office? What would prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he/she would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune from all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, a respondent official merits vindication of his/her name and integrity as he leaves the government which he/she served well and faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.252 The Court cannot over-emphasize the importance of the task of preserving the confidentiality and integrity of court records. A number of rules and internal procedures are in place to ensure the observance of this task by court personnel. The New Code of Judicial Conduct253 provides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties.254The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to wit: SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information acquired by them while employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources. Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers. The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even after the decision, resolution or order is made public.

SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule or administrative policy shall be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so. SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not disclose confidential information given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or any other person. SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them during their employment in the Judiciary when disclosed by current court personnel of the same information would constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any disclosure in violation of this provisions shall constitute indirect contempt of court.255(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential.256 A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.257 In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr.,258 the Court stated that "[c]ourt documents are confidential documents. They must not be taken out of the court without proper authority and without the necessary safeguards to ensure their confidentiality and integrity." Thus, the Court found the clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct. Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross misconduct destroy the good image of the judiciary so the Court cannot countenance them nor allow the perpetrators to remain in office. This same pronouncement was reiterated in Betguen v. Masangcay.259 Though both cases involve indiscretions of clerks of court, it is but logical that a higher standard of care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court. PAGCOR v. Rilloza,260 in fact, commands persons who routinely handle confidential matters to be confidential employees. They are thus expected to be more careful than an ordinary employee in their day to day business. They are reposed such trust and confidence that a breach of their duty would mean breach of trust. As applied to the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of duty amounts to breach of public trust as the committee believes that the leak was motivated by self-interest. The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is settled that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.261 In People v. Valenzuela,262 which deals with the administrative aspect of a case brought on certiorari, the Court dispensed with the conduct of further hearings under the principle of res ipsa loquitur and proceeded to considercritical factors in deducing malice and bad faith on the part of the judge, after it did not accept at face value the judges mere denial. In that case, the judge ordered the return of the peso equivalent of the foreign currency to the accused despite its forfeiture as dutiable goods and even after the finding that the accused had nothing to do with the mailing thereof.

In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr.,263 where the Court took into account glaring circumstances in the proceedings of the case in concluding that the judge acted with bad faith, the judge was similarly found guilty of grave and serious misconduct when he unjustly declared the defendant in default and awarded outrageously exorbitant damages. l Prudential Bank v. Castro264 was an administrative case spawned by a partys complaint, wherein the Court, in light of the surrounding circumstances, found that the judge committed serious and grave misfeasance because the issuance of the orders and ill-conceived summary judgment showed the judges partiality to, or confabulation with the plaintiff and its lawyers. In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano,265 the Court proceeded in adjudging the attendant circumstances as tainted with bad faith and questionable integrity to call for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers over members of the judiciary. In that case, the Court found the submissions of the judge unacceptable and clearly inadequate to overcome the cumulative effect of the highly questionable actuations taking cognizance of a claim for damages arising from an attachment, instead of having it litigated in the same action where the writ was issued as evincing gross ignorance of the law and active bias or partiality. The Court, in Cruz v. Yaneza,266 perceived the judges persistent pattern of approving bail bonds and issuing release orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction as evincing a modus operandi that flagrantly flaunts fundamental rules. In De Los Santos v. Magsino,267 the Court again applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when a judge irregularly approved a bail bond and issued a release order of an accused whose case was pending in another province, in palpable disregard and gross ignorance of the procedural law on bail. The principle was also applied to discipline court personnel and suspend members of the Bar from the practice of law. The Court, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Pardo,268 found the clerk of court guilty of gross discourtesy in the course of official duties when he failed to accord respect for the person and rights of a judge as can be gleaned from a mere reading of his letter to the Executive Judge. In Sy v. Moncupa,269 the Court found the evidence against the clerk for malversation of public funds eloquently speaks of her criminal misdeed to justify the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The clerk admitted the shortage in the court funds in her custody and pleaded for time to pay the amount she had failed to account for. In maintaining an earlier Resolution,270 the Court, in In re Wenceslao Laureta,271 also declared that nothing more was needed to be said or proven and the necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated. In that case, the Court found that the letters and charges leveled against the Justices were, of themselves and by themselves, malicious and contemptuous, and undermined the independence of the judiciary.

Meanwhile, in Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda,272 it was held that it was reasonable to conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the respondent committed an infringement of ethical standards by his act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in a case and subsequently failing to render such service. The Court found the respondent liable for disloyalty to his client and inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him. The Court, in Dizon, clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, viz: In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an injustice against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was already of record. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary.273(Underscoring and emphasis supplied.) The apparent toning down of the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule was further amplified in at least two cases. In Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva,274 the Court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to cases of knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment, and even if the doctrine is appreciable, complainant still has to present proof of malice or bad faith. Then came Fernandez v. Verzola,275 where it was held that failure to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery and mere reliance on conjectures and suppositions cannot sustain an administrative complaint. In dismissing the complaint, the Court rejected as untenable the reasoning that the decision itself is evidence of corruption per doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It upheld the rule that rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify the judges dismissal from the service. The supposed tempering of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in Dizon only bolstered and solidified the application of the doctrine in cases not only of gross negligence but of serious misconduct as well, since it speaks of "inference of evil intent." As explained in Louis Vuitton, the familiar rule in administrative cases is that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, and that he cannot be subjected to civil, criminal or administrative liability for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. The rule adds that the proper remedy is via judicial recourse and not through an administrative action.
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It must be pointed out that Louis Vuitton involves gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. In cases of leakage or breach of confidentiality, however, the familiar rule obviously does not apply. While the injured party is the Court itself,

there is no judicial remedy available to undo the disclosure. Moreover, the premature disclosure does not spring from the four corners of the assailed decision or resolution nor can it gleaned on the face of the issuance itself. Indeed, one need not dwell on the substance of the decision since that in itself is inherently insufficient. In unearthing the misdeed, it becomes not only desirable but also necessary to trace the attendant circumstances, apparent pattern and critical factors surrounding the entire scenario. In Macalintal v. Teh,276 the Court pronounced: When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.277 (Underscoring supplied.)
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The same norm equally applies in the breach of the basic and essential rule of confidentiality that, as described in one case, "[a]ll conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation [and c]ourt personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present.278 As Dizon declared, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses that absent a credible explanation, it is clearly sound and reasonable to conclude a strong inference of evil intent on the basis of facts duly admitted or shown by the record. In fine, jurisprudence allows the reception of circumstantial evidence to prove not only gross negligence but also serious misconduct. Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice Reyesadministratively liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he may be disbarred or suspended per Section 27,279 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and impeded and degraded the administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it was committed by no less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example to the bench and bar.

That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of no moment. The rule prohibiting the institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer who is required by the Constitution to be a member of the bar as a qualification in office applies only during his or her tenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations.280 Once the said impeachable officer is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed against him or her and impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to the Courts power of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court may penalize retired members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed during their incumbency. Thus, in Caada v. Suerte,281 this Court ordered the disbarment of a retired judge for misconduct committed during his incumbency as a judge. However, pernicious as Justice Reyess infractions may have been, the committee finds the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment unwarranted. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, the Court takes into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to the Courts sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Under the circumstances of this case, the committee finds the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law sufficient and proper. Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista The Committee finds that Atty. Evangelista, Justice Reyes Judicial Staff Head, was remiss in his duties, which includes the supervision of the operations of the office, particularly with respect to the promulgation of decisions. While it is incumbent upon him to devise ways and means to secure the integrity of confidential documents, his actuations reflected above evinced "a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."282 Atty. Evangelista was admittedly unmindful of the responsible safekeeping of draft ponencias in an unlocked drawer of a member of the staff. He failed to make sure that the unused portion of confidential documents like the second signatory page of the ponencia in Gilbert form had been properly disposed of or shredded. He was not on top of things that concerned the promulgation of ponencias, for he failed to ascertain the status and procedural implication of an "on hold" order after having been apprised thereof by his subordinate, Del Rosario, on July 17, 2008. Despite his awareness that the Limkaichong case would eventually be called again, he admitted that he was not privy to the preparation of the copy of the ponencia for the subsequent session on July 29, 2008. With these findings, the Court finds him liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY.

Liability of Armando Del Rosario The committee likewise finds Del Rosario administratively liable for failing to exercise the required degree of care in the custody of the Gilbert copy. Del Rosario admittedly kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked drawer from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008 when he should have known that, by the nature of the document in his custody, he should have kept it more securely. His carelessness renders him administratively liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, defined as the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.283 Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative.284 Following the Court's ruling in several cases involving (simple) neglect of duty,285 we find the penalty of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively, just and reasonable. RECOMMENDATIONS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Investigating Committee respectfully recommends that (1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) be found liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his oath as a member of the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility and be meted the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION as a member of the Bar; (2) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) also be found liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and be FINED in the amount of P500,000, to be charged against his retirement benefits; and (3) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario be held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and be FINED in the amount of P10,000 and P5,000, respectively. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. (Sgd.) LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Chairman (Sgd.) RENATO C. CORONA Member (Sgd.) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Member

The Court finds the above-quoted report well taken. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court En Banc by a unanimous decision of all the members of the Court except for two (2) Justices who are on official leave. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the findings and APPROVES WITH MODIFICATIONthe Recommendations of the Investigating Committee as follows: (1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal document of the Court and he is FINED P500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the aforementioned findings. (2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTYand are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively. This Decision shall take effect immediately. SO ORDERED.