O 142123Z MAY 08 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1870 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000687 SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH CENTCOM

ACTING COMMANDER, DEFMIN MURR ARGUES FOR LAF SUPPORT REF: A. BEIRUT 618 B. BEIRUT 681 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------SUMMARY -------1. (C) Acting CENTCOM Commander and CENTCOM J5 Policy and Planning Director Major General Allardice, in a May 13 visit to Beirut, met with Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Elias Murr to discuss support for the LAF. There has been a shift in Murr's thinking since we last saw him three days ago on May 11: he now insists that the current majority must maintain control of the Ministry of Defense in any new government, regardless of whether it retains the majority. Earlier this week we had assessed that control of the Ministry of Interior was essential to Murr and

to his father, wily political leader Michel Murr (since the Ministry of Interior oversees electoral law, voter registration, and the Internal Security Forces). However, Murr was clear that Hizballah could not put a Hizballah-sympathizer at the head of the Ministry of Defense. 2. (C) Murr's priority now is to have a "friendly" Defense Minister who will influence the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) strategy, and ideally, control over the LAF and LAF G-2 (military intelligence), and then work towards summer 2009 parliamentary election victories. This message was conveyed to visiting Central Command Acting Commander Dempsey so that the U.S. will be willing to provide up-armored humvees, night vision goggles, body armor, and upgrading the Huey UH-I to Huey UH-II. 3. (C) Murr outlined three scenarios for the region in which Hizballah is weakened and the LAF must be strengthened in order to assume Hizballah's weapons. First, an international military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities; second, a new round of fighting between Israel and Hizballah in which Hizballah is defeated; third, a longerterm proposition whereby the LAF is gradually strengthened in the hopes that it will stand up to Hizballah "in better days." Regardless of the scenario, Murr concluded, the stronger the LAF is, the weaker Hizballah will be. -------------------------------VISIT IS A DEFIANCE TO HIZBALLAH -------------------------------4. (C) Acting Commander Lieutenant General Martin for Central Command Dempsey, CENTCOM J5

Policy and Planning Director Major General Allardice, LTC Paddock, and POLAD Ensher, in Beirut for the day, and the Charge visited Defense Minister Elias Murr on May 14. A defiant Murr started the meeting with a photo op, telling Dempsey that the pictures will be Murr's response to al-Manar's (Hizballah's TV station) accusation that Murr is a "puppet of the U.S." Murr thanked Dempsey for incurring risks to visit him. (Note: Approximately 200 Hizballah members have stationed themselves around Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun's residence, a few hundred meters down the street. End note.) ----------------------------------------------EXPLAINING HIZBALLAH'S AIRPORT CAMERA STRATEGY ----------------------------------------------5. (C) There is not an army in the world that can conduct a coup d'etat in 12 hours without significant preparation, Murr began. The surveillance cameras that were placed at the airport by Hizballah (Ref A), used in conjunction with radios, were part of a larger plan by Hizballah to shift the balance of power in the government, he said. For previous political assassinations, he explained, Hizballah has typically spent two to three months monitoring its target, and then the last few weeks in closer scrutiny before attacking. 6. (C) Murr noted that the airport cameras, stolen in September 2007 from Transportation Minister Safadi's private aviation business office and installed on April 23, 2008, were positioned to watch private jet traffic. They were providing intelligence for an imminent assassination attempt.

He believes that March 14 Sunni leader Saad Hariri (whose name is often mentioned as the next prime minister) and current Prime Minister Fouad Siniora (also Sunni) were the top targets, and he himself was next on Hizballah's list. He noted that all three had been likely to travel in the next few weeks. 7. (C) The coup indicates that Hizballah wanted to do something to bring down the Sunnis, Murr said. If Saad were killed, the Hariri dynasty would be over, and Sunni fighters would take to the street. He continued, Hizballah would have a reason to use arms to defend itself because it will have pointed to Al Qaeda as the mastermind of the assassination. Murr supported this hypothesis by revealing that he had received reports that Al Qaeda was preparing an attack on a plane over Beirut International Airport. Murr highlighted that these intelligence reports were coming from the LAF G-2 (military intelligence) office in Dahiyeh, the southern, predominately-Shia suburb of Beirut. Murr concluded that someone was feeding false information to the G-2 to prepare the atmosphere. 8. (C) An alibi was further established when Al Qaeda's second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is purportedly financed by Iran, announced last month that Lebanon "will play a pivotal role in the Islamists' fight," Murr posited. Then, when the Cabinet responded to the cameras on May 5 by transferring the head of airport security, Hizballah seized the opportunity to launch its coup.

-------------------------------ASSESSING THE LAF'S PERFORMANCE -------------------------------9. (C) "The LAF did not do the job like it needed to," Murr assessed. He said that the army cannot enter into a civil war because it would be split. Another weak point, according to Murr, is that the LAF's current commander, General Michel Sleiman, is also the only presidential candidate. Once a general has his eye on becoming the president, Murr said, he can no longer take a stand against any single group. "He will play the hero o the end," Murr continued. Sleiman was playing two roles, Murr relayed, he was first trying to make a balance between the victorious Shia and the defeated Sunnis, while also serving as an army commander afraid of Hizballah and of splitting the army. 10. (C) He qualified his assessment of the LAF by recounting past LAF achievements, most notably Nahr al-Barid, and concluded that the LAF can be counted on again, if the internal political process is functional. He added that its future success is further guaranteed if the next LAF G-2 Intelligence Director, LAF commander, and Defense Minister are allies. 11. (C) "I can't say I am disappointed (with the LAF's performance) because I always knew what I could expect. Besides, every army goes through a turbulent period," Murr said. "I could take one of two approaches now. I could criticize the LAF and explain its faults to the world. Or, I could acknowledge that the LAF had a difficult moment, and now it is time to equip, train, and develop a forward-looking program."

---------------------------DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE U.S. ---------------------------12. (C) Murr relayed that he had heard from politicians, LAF officers, and ordinary citizens that they are disappointed in what they see as a lack of support from the U.S. Some believe they have "been left in Saigon," Murr added. He said that he himself had not been expecting more because he understands how the "U.S. agenda can't move according to Saad and Walid Jumblatt's agendas." Nevertheless, I am realistic and with my feet on the ground -- it is time to move forward, he declared. ------------------------------GIVE THE LAF HOPE, MORALE, TIME ------------------------------13. (C) Murr urged Dempsey (whose next meeting was with Sleiman) to give the impression to Sleiman that the U.S. is very serious about Lebanon and will continue to train and equip the LAF. Tell him that this "incident" will not change U.S. policy towards the LAF, Murr encouraged. If the LAF doesn't have hope, it will go to Hizballah, he warned. Right now, we need to have hope, a positive morale, and more time in order to survive and ultimately win, Murr rallied. -----------------------------------------DRUZE STOOD THEIR GROUND AGAINST HIZBALLAH -----------------------------------------14. (C) He remarked on the solid performance of

the Druze fighting Hizballah in the Chouf, saying that "lightly-armed boys" were able to defeat the fighters who held off Israel in 2006. Adding that the leader of Hizballah's troops in the south (which specifically fought Israel) was killed by the Druze, Murr concluded that Hizballah is less than what it appears, though still strong. ------------------------------------------------SCENARIOS IN WHICH THE LAF STANDS UP TO HIZBALLAH ------------------------------------------------15. (C) In response to Dempsey's interest in what would prompt the LAF to stand up to Hizballah, Murr outlined three possible regional scenarios which would result in a weakened Hizballah, and consequently enable the LAF to take control. First, he described, Iran announces it has nuclear weapons and the international community conducts military strikes taking out its nuclear facilities. Additionally, the U.S. (or international community) threatens or attacks Syria. Hizballah is consequently weakened without its power and funding sources, and the GOL will feel emboldened to discuss Hizballah's arms. 16. (C) Second, Murr continued, war could break out again between Israel and Hizballah, and Hizballah is defeated. The LAF takes over in the south and the GOL is again ready to discuss disarming Hizballah. Murr commented that he did not see the likelihood of this scenario. 17. (C) The approach during by-step while cautioned that third scenario takes a long-term which the LAF is strengthened step"waiting for better days." Murr Hizballah is also brainstorming now

about its strategy, and this long-term approach could be a reinforcement race. "The best day for Lebanon will be when we move Hizballah from a resistance movement to a group of gangsters." The goal of this scenario is to wait until the dynamics have changed to favor the GOL and the LAF, and then the empowered GOL and LAF would take on Hizballah. However, Murr warned, this strategy would take a long time. 18. (C) In these three scenarios, the premise is for Hizballah to be weakened by external events while at the same time, the LAF has been strengthened. With GOL resolve, the LAF can then take on Hizballah. When asked whether the LAF would use attack helicopters, if we provided them, against Hizballah, Murr responded, "The stronger the LAF is, the weaker Hizballah is." ---------------------------------MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MOST IMPORTANT ---------------------------------19. (C) Having argued that a strong LAF could ultimately stand up to Hizballah, Murr continued laying out his strategy, focusing on the GOL's role. Murr said that Saad, who could be the next PM, is inexperienced and would need strong ministers in key positions in the new government, "or else he will fail." (He took himself out of the running, claiming, "I'm tired!") (Comment: We don't believe this for a minute. End comment.) 20. (C) Murr seemed to accept the ten-ten-ten formula for dividing the cabinet, if ten seats are for "strong" majority candidates and the president's ten are for "respectable, strong"

individuals. According to Murr, the opposition is determined to install its own people as the ministers of defense and interior so "there's no one who can say 'no' to any strategy to strengthen the LAF." He explained that the defense strategy is proposed to the Ministry of Defense, which then has the final word. Therefore, he deduced, it is less dangerous to give the opposition the Ministry of Interior than Defense. 21. (C) While acknowledging that both positions were considered essential and it would be a "catastrophe" if the opposition held both, Murr downplayed the Interior Ministry (which oversees many of the politicized issues including electoral law, voter registration, and the Internal Security Forces). He told us that when he was previously the Minister of Interior, his sister lost an election by one vote, concluding, "Trust me! The Minister can't change election results! It's hard to cheat, I know!" 22. (C) Moreover, he said, there should be international observers for the summer 2009 parliamentary elections. "Ideally, we win the parliamentary elections, and have a strong LAF Commander and G-2," he hoped. He concluded by stressing that it is an investment in the future to strengthen the LAF, regardless of what is happening on the ground. 23. (C) This strategy requires teamwork, Murr stated. He voiced our thinking, "You don't want to invest in the LAF if it is between the hands of Hizballah." While a Hizballah-controlled Defense Ministry is a red line for Murr, he said he is unsure if he is willing to trade the Interior

Ministry for Defense because the Interior Minister could impose conditions on the LAF. ------------------------------------------MURR'S OWN ATTEMPTS AT COUNTERING HIZBALLAH ------------------------------------------24. (C) Murr told us that 58 percent of the LAF was Shia when he assumed his position as the Defense Minister. Now, the Shia make up 23 percent, he said, because of his efforts. He explained that after UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was passed, the LAF went on a hiring spree to deploy troops to the south, and the bulk of the new hires was intentionally Sunni, Druze, and Christians. "Hizballah does not need to turn its arms against the Lebanese people if it controls the LAF," he continued, reasoning, "Today, if the Shia resign from the LAF, I still have almost 80 percent of the army." ------COMMENT ------25. (C) As Murr told us, his family has been a part of the government since Lebanon's independence. His grandfather had served as the Minister of Interior, his father, who is currently an MP, held positions in 17 governments, and he has served for 19 years in public service. Clearly, the Murrs are seasoned politicians and tacticians. Elias Murr anticipated and addressed CENTCOM's key concerns about the LAF's standing. He tactically criticized the LAF's performance, chalked it up to a "storm cloud that has passed," and focused on why the U.S. should not give up. In what was certainly

a prepared 90-minute speech, Murr argued why a strong LAF is the best defense against Hizballah. We agree with his assessment. 26. (C) Murr's focus on the Ministry of Defense is a marked changed from his previous position, which was his strong desire to become the Minister of Interior. His fear of losing U.S. support for the LAF, an institution he values, could explain his shift. 27. (U) Lieutenant General Dempsey departed Beirut before clearing this cable. SISON (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of