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SEMESTER-II (MCTP) MAC004 SUBSTACE-VIEW SCHOOLS OF INDIA

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2.1. SUBSTANCE VIEW ACCORDING TO NYAYA-VAISESIKA 2.2. THE DUALISTIC REALISM OF SAMKHYA 2.3. ADVAITIC VISION OF REALITY 2.4. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 2.5. PHILOSOPHY OF JAINISM

2.1.

SUBSTANCE VIEW ACCORDING TO NYAYA-VAISESIKA BOSCO. P

Introduction Ever since the dawn of civilization, human has been constantly engaged in the pursuit of unraveling the mystery of nature with a view to arriving at the fundamental values of life. The harder he strives to extricate himself out of the web of these problems, the more he is caught and involved in it. Underneath the morass of conflicting values lies mans quest for the real meaning of life and the destiny to which it leads. With all scientific and technological revolutions that the humans have achieved so far, have not helped to discuss the fundamental moral and spiritual values of life or how to live. So Indian philosophy has addressed to these problems. Therefore philosophy implies a natural and basic urge in human beings to investigate the nature of the concept of reality pertaining to nature, soul and God. Thus philosophy implies the enquiry into the phenomenon of life and its various permutations and combinations. However, philosophy in the widest etymological sense means love of knowledge. Western philosophy has remained more or less true to the etymological meaning of philosophy, in being essentially an intellectual quest for abstract truth guided by theoretical interest. Indian philosophy on the other hand, does not go wholly with the etymological meaning of philosophy. It includes both theoretical and practical aspects, at the same time goes beyond speculations. Before we take-up the study of Nyaya-Vaisesika system, we will look very briefly the systems of Indian Philosophy. The systems of Indian philosophy are divided into two broad classes, namely, (a) Heterodox- Nastika- atheist viz. those who do not believe in the authority of Vedas. (b) Orthodox- Astika-theist viz. one who believes in the authority of the Vedas. Under the first group there are three schools, viz. 1. Charvakamaterialist who, do not realize the realty of the soul and God. 2. Buddhist- they are phenomenalists and recognize in the reality of phenomena, changes, or impermanence . 3. Jainas are dualists. They have faith in the reality of souls and non-soul (matter). Reality for them is not merely many, but manifold. Also they do not believe in God as the creator of the world. The second group belongs to the six chief philosophical systems, (popularly know as sad-darsana) namely : 1.Mimamsa- there are a few divisions in this school. A. one is called Purva-mimamsa or Karma Mimamsa founded by Jaimini, stress on the performance of duties enshrined in the Vedas. Another two schools of Mimamsa are founded by Prabhakar and Kumarila and both the schools admit self-validity of knowledge, eternity of Vedas and eternity of sounds; and reject the concept of God as the creator of the world and the composer of the Vedas. 2.Vedanta- deals with the nature and knowledge of Brahman. 3. Samkhya- is a philosophy of dualistic realism attributed to the sage Kapila and it admits two ultimate realities, namely Purusa and Prakrti. 4. Yoga- founded by Patanjali is closely allied to Samkhya. Besides the epistemology and metaphysics of the Samkhya, it also admits the existence of God and advocates the practice of yoga to control the mind. 5 & 6. Nyaya and Vaisesika schools founded by Gautama and Kanada respectively, though different in their origin and early development, were amalgamated later on into one syncretic school known as
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nyaya-vaisesika system. Nyaya is primarily concerned with the conditions of correct thinking and means of acquiring a true knowledge of reality. Vaisesika develops metaphysics and ontology on the basis of seven categories (padarthas). In fact, the Nyaya and Vasishesika supplemented each other in respect of their subjects and styles. The Syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika Of all Indian philosophical systems, the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika school is the chief exponent of realism. The two schools were separate in their origin as well as in the early course of their development. Nyaya takes ups the exposition of right knowledge of reality and Vasishesika takes up the exposition of reality on the basis of the seven categories which have been accepted as the basis of realism. Consequently the approaches of the Nyaya-Vasishesika system stand purely as a realistic one to the universe. This joint-system also reflects a more scientific and philosophical attitude towards world phenomena than the other philosophical systems of Indian philosophy. In the writings of Vacaspati Misra, the process of developing the Nyaya position in collaboration with the Vaishesika ideology is profound. Indian tradition regards Udayana as the first writer who thought of formally combining the two systems. Sridhara gives to his Vasishesika work the title of Nyaya Kandli which indicates that the two schools were so much allied that the work of one system could bear in its title the name of other system. From this it is clear that the two schools had a close relation from the very inception. In fact, the Nyaya and the Vasishesika philosophers supplemented each other in respect of their subjects and styles. Hence the two philosophies were called Samana-tantra or allied systems or similar philosophy. However, Nyaya epistemology is an inquiry into the methods and criteria of valid knowledge. Nyaya metaphysic is concerned with delineating the various kinds of objects of knowledge (Knowable) constituting reality. With regard to Vaisesika, the ordinary meaning of the term vaisesa is distinguishing quality or feature. But in the context of the Vaisesika, vaisesa means particularity. Vaisesika metaphysics is pluralistic realism. It is pluralistic on the account of its central claim that variety, diversity and plurality are warp and woof of reality; in other words, ultimate reality constituted of irreducible particulars (atomism). Vaisesika is realism because of its teaching that reality as particulars exists independently of our perceptions. Hence Vaisesika metaphysics is substance metaphysic as contrasted with the process (flux) metaphysics of Buddhism. And so Vaisesika develops its metaphysics and ontology on the basis of seven categories (padarthas). Thus Vaisesika represents the positive, constructive or creative side of the combined school and the Nyaya represents it defensive side. As matter of fact we can conclude, that the Nyaya and Vaisesika schools uphold a thoroughgoing, pluralistic realism. The Metaphysical Positions of Nyaya-Vaisesika Nyaya-Vaisesika advocates pluralistic realism as their metaphysical position in explaining the nature of reality. So we initiate the analysis by asking, what is Realism and Pluralism? Realism: Realism from medieval-philosophical point of view means the one who accepts
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independent existence of the universal apart from the particulars. E.g. tableness, bookness. Here the essence of an object (universal) takes the precedence. From the modern philosophical point of view realism is viewed as a belief that objects exist independently of a perceiving mind. It is just being opposed to idealism. viz. to be means to be perceived, which means a thing cannot exist outside the mind or independent of the mind. In this perspective the existence of an object (universal) takes the precedence. In other words, realism holds that the external world is real and exists in the same form in which it is experienced, and that it exists in the same form independently of our experience. Here Nyaya-Vaisesika would combine the two perspectives and advocate that an object should have its own essence and existence independently. Pluralism: Everything in the world is different from the other. They are not one. So NyayaVaisesika arrives that the world of objects are directly perceived and exists independently of our experience of them. In other words that the belief in the reality of the external world independent of its knowledge by a knower is ingrained in the unsophisticated human mind. Whatever we experience directly must have an eternal existence. According to NyayaVaisesika an object should have its own essence and existence independently. Based on this standpoint Nyaya-Vaisesika would look at an object in two different ways viz. 1. Substance and attributes/ qualities. 2. Part and Whole. Substance: Substance is something that exists in and by itself. It does not require anything for its existence. A Substance is also the substratum (Adhara) of qualities and actions. So everything in the world has some sort of foundation or basis (Adistana, asraya, adhare) on which other things are gathered together. Attributes/Quality cannot exist by itself. It needs something to support. Qualities and actions are parasite and it has to exist on something else (i.e. on Substance). Whole and Pars: An object is a whole made up-of parts. The part is the cause of the effect (whole). The cause of the effect (whole) here means not that the cause transferring its essence to the effect (Part to the whole) as Samkya philosophy would say, but the cause is inhearing in the parts, which means the cloth co-exist with the thread. The cloth (whole) inhears in the thread (part). Yet, the whole is different from part i.e. cloth is always different from thread, which means both them possess their own respective essences independently. Therefore we can say that the essence and the existence are different and not identical, but only relational. Belief in the reality of external world independent of its knowledge by a knower is ingrained in the unsophisticated human mind. Whatever we experience directly must have an external existence. Starting from this fundamental idea, the Nyaya-Vaisesika laid down a basic and guiding principle that experience is the sole criterion of our acceptance of the reality of external objects. It should not be the function of philosophy to challenge the common experience of all mankind which accepts the reality of the external world. The function of philosophy is rather to analyze that experience and evolve a coherent system out of that analysis. The Nyaya-Vaisesika metaphysics undertakes just that analysis and bases its metaphysical structure thereon.
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A common experience presents a world consisting of separate individual objects which are called substances (dravyas). They appear as substrata of certain properties. Substances being the substrata of properties, the two appear in the relation of the container and the contained (adharadheya-bhava), and therefore the two cannot be identical; they must be different in their essence. For instance, in the case of the experience of a white cloth, the white colour is experienced as property which resides in the substratum, cloth; and therefore, white colour and cloth are different in their essence. Essential differentiation between the substratum and its properties (dharama-dharmi bheda) is the corner stone of the structure of realism. The six categories accepted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika follow as corollaries from the basic principles. Substratum (dharmin) is always in the form of a substance (dravya). But the properties1 (dharmas) residing in a substratum are found, on further analysis to be of various kinds. Some properties like colour appear to be of the nature of stationary attributes of their substrata. They are called qualities (gunas). Others are of an evanescent nature, for example, the motion of a body. They are called movements (karma). Of the numerous objects of our experience, some are so similar that they are designated by a common noun, and there must therefore be something common to all individuals of a class. That common thing was regarded as the universal (samanya or jati), which is the fourth category of the school. In the case of atoms of the same class, differentiation of one atom from another was assumed to be due to a special property called visesa residing in the atoms, which was later on extended to other eternal substances also. Guna, karma, samanya, visesa being of the nature of properties (dharmas), are only found to be residing in their substratum (dharmin) which is the first category, i.e., substance. The universal (samanya) is held to be residing in dravya, guna and karma. Although the properties, guna tec. Are different in essence from dravya, they cannot exist as separate from, or independent of, a dravya. Therefore, the relation between the former and the latter cannot be an ordinary one called connection (samyoga), which obtains between the two substances that they can be connected and separated at will. The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of causation also rests on the same basic principles, the differentiation between the properties and their substratum ( dharma-dharmi-bheda). An effects like cloth, which is experienced as produced in its cause, viz., the threads, is like a property of the threads which are its substrata. it would thus appear that a property is not only in the form of qualities and actions, etc., but it may also be in the form of a substance. A substratum and its property being different in essence, according to the above mentioned principle, the Nyaya-Vaisesika school, true to its principle, declared that the essence of cloth was different from that of threads. Thus the principle of differentiation between properties and their substrata (dharma-dharmi-bheda) is the corner-stone of the structure of the Nyaya-Vaisesika metaphysics.

In modern philosophy, mathematics, and logic, a property is an attribute of an object; a red object is said to have the property of redness. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right, able to possess other properties

The Theory of Causation The Nyaya-Vaisesika concept of realism stands upon the theory of causation. Causality is the universal feature of reality. That means a thing which is real is also capable of casing something. A cause is that which causes the event. So we define the cause as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The first essential characteristic of a cause is its antecedence; the fact that it should precede the effect (Purvavrtti). The second is its invariability; it must invariably precede the effect (Niyatapurvavrtti). The third is its unconditionality or necessity; it must unconditionally precede the effect (Ananyathasiddha). Hume defines a cause as an invariable antecedent. J.S. Mill defines it as an unconditional and invariable antecedent. Carveth Read points out that unconditionality includes immediacy. A cause, therefore, is an unconditional, immediate and invariable antecedent of an effect. Cause and effect are simultaneous. Plurality of causes is also wrong because causal relation is reciprocal. The same effect cannot be produced by any other cause. Each cause has its distinctive features and has only one specific cause. The cause is an aggregate of the unconditional or necessary and invariable antecedent conditions which are called karanasmagri. The absence of negative counteracting conditions is called pratibandhakabhava. An effect (karya) is defined as the counter-entity of its own prior non-existence, (pragabhavapratiyogi). It is the negation of its own prior-negation. It comes into being and destroys its prior non-existence. It was non-existent before its production. It did not pre-exist in its cause. It is a fresh beginning, a new creation. This Naya-Vaisesika view of causation is directly opposed to the Sankhya-Yoga and Vedanta view of satkaryavada. It is called asatkaryavada or arambhavada. The effect (karya) is non-existent (asat) before its creation and is a new beginning (arambha), a fresh creation, an epigenesist. It is distinct from its cause and can never be identical with it. It is neither an appearance nor a transformation of the cause. It is newly brought into existence by the operation of the cause. There are three kinds of causes- samavayi, asamavayi and nimitta. The first is the samavayi or the inherent cause, also called as the upadana or the material cause. It is the substance out of which the effect is produced. For example, the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth and the clay is the inherent cause of a pot. The effect inhears in its material cause. The cloth inhears in the threads. The effect cannot exist separately from its material cause, though the cause can exist independently of its effect. The material cause is always a substance (dravya). The second kind of cause is asamavayi or non-inherent. It inheras in the material cause ad helps the production of the effect. The conjunction of the threads (tantusamyoga) which inhears in the threads is the non-inherent cause of the cloth of which the threads are the material or the inherent cause. The colour of the threads (tanturupa) is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth. The cloth itself is the inherent cause of its colour. The effects as
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well as its non-inherent cause both co-inhere in the material cause. The non-inherent cause is always a quality or an action (guna or karma). The third kind of cause is nimitta or efficient. It is the power which helps the material cause to produce the effect. The weaver is the efficient cause of the cloth. The efficient cause includes the accessories, eg., the loom and shuttle of the weaver or the staff and wheel of the potter. The efficient cause may be a substance, a quality or an action. The Nature of Reality After the background of the metaphysical position of Nyaya-Vaisesika and the theory of causation, it is easy to discuss the nature of reality. Existence from Non-Existence Is reality eternally fixed to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be subtracted? In other words, nothing that is non-existent can come to being and all that exists can never be non-existent. Buddhist holds that the reality comes into existence out of the void and resolves into the void. According to Samkhya reality comes to existence from its preexistence in some other form (matter is eternal). The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory stands midway between these two positions. According to its theory of causation, an effect which was altogether non-existent comes into existence after the operation of its causes. According to its theory, an effect is not produced out of its cause, but it is produced in its cause. A piece of cloth is not produced out of the yarn which (yarn) continues to exist separately and simultaneously with the piece of cloth. In other words, although the piece of cloth subsists in the yarn which is held to be its inherent cause (Samavayi-karana), the essence of cloth does not come out of the yarn, for the simple reason that even after production of cloth, the yarn continues to exist intact as it did before, not a whit of its essence being lost or subtracted from it to constitute the essence of its effect (cloth). It would appear that according to the NyayaVaisesika theory, the essence of an effect comes into being out of the void, although the Nyaya-Vaisesika would emphatically deny that position and point out that causes have actually worked to bring about that effect. Cause and Effect different in their essence According to Nyaya-Vaisesika, an effect, although non-existent before its production, is existent after its production. The Principle cause (e.g., yarn is not conceived, by the NyayaVaisesika school, as material cause or upadana-karana (as it is by the Samkhya school), but as inherent cause (samavayi-karna). According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika school an inherent cause is always in the form of parts (avayavas), while an effect is in the form of a whole (avayavin). The Nyaya-Vaisesika school maintains against the Buddhist that a whole is not merely an aggregate of its parts. A whole (avayavin) emerges as residing in its parts by inherent realtion (samavaya sambandha). This means that an effect is different in essence from its cause in which it resides by inherent relation as a separate entity. Cause and effect are not conceived by the Samkhya as different entities; they are identical. A piece of cloth, according to Samkhya, is only a different arrangement of threads. The thread imparts essence to the cloth, or more exactly, the essence of both is the same. According to the NyayaVaisesika school, however, the inherent cause, which exists simultaneously and side by side
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with its effect and as such retains its full essence to its cannot in any way, impart essence to its effect. An inherent cause is thus not a material cause. In fact, so far as the essence of an effect is concerned, the inherent cause (e.g., yarn) is as extraneous to its effect as the accessory causes (ninitta-karanas) like loom, shuttle, etc. Uddyotakara clearly suggests that an inherent cause is not a material cause, but is extraneous like the accessory causes. So the question of the source of the essence of cloth is thus a problem for the Nyaya-Vaisesika. The only possible answer can be that an inherent cause, without transferring its own essence and retaining it intact, imparts in some way essence to its effect which resides in it by an inherent relation. The essence of an effect is constituted by the fact of its residing in the cause by inherent relation. The existent becomes non-existent As is the case with the production of an effect, so also with its destruction. An effect comes into existence without having any source for its essence-stuff. Similarly, an effect is destroyed without leaving any residue, ie., any of its essence-stuff. It is complete destruction. It is in a way niranvaya vinasa, i.e. the destruction of an object without its continuity in any form. Usually, that term is technically employed to denote the destruction of a moment as propounded by the Buddhist theory, and not in connection with the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of the destruction of an object. But it is equally applicable to the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory in connection with the destruction of an object. The fact that the yarn continues after the destruction of the cloth does not mean the continuity of cloth in any way, because the latter, which is quite different from the former, is destroyed without leaving any bit of its essence. The Nyaya-Vaisesika calls the destruction of an object as its past condition (atita-vastha) which it also designates as consequent negation(dhvamsabhava). Of course, the consequent negation, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory, is a rality. But it may be noted that the consequent negation of a cloth (pata-dhvamsa) is quite a different entity from that of the cloth, and continuity of the consequent negation (dhvamsa) of the cloth does not mean the continuity of the cloth in any way. Therefore, the destruction of the cloth is complete and without any continuity (niranvaya). In the same way, the production of an effect may be also be regarded as niranvaya, i.e. without cause continuing in the form of an effect, for the simple reason that the cause does not impart its essence in any way to its effect. In the case of production, however, cloth is produced as residing in its cause (yarn) by inherent relation, and there is, thus, continuity of the cause from which its effect has emerged as residing in it by inherent relation. But it would appear this is the continuity of cause as cause, and not its continuity in the form of its effect. So far as the effect is concerned, it has come into existence without having any previous trace of its essence-stuff. The production of an effect (cloth) is therefore niranvaya, i.e., without any former essence-stuff continuing in the form of effect. The fact that an effect resides in its cause cannot be cited to refute the objection that the production of an effect is without any continuity of cause-essence (niranvay-otpatti), in as much as the cloth and the yarn are two different entities. The difference between the Buddhist and the Nyaya-Vaisesika is that while the reality, according to the former, is momentary, according to the latter, it is stationary, i.e. it lasts for some time. Further, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, an effect after being produced resides in its cause
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which continues to exist side by side with its effect. But according to the Buddhist, the cause disappears without any continuity to its stuff as soon as its effect is produced. The Essence of non-eternal Substances The effect-substances are non-eternal. They are the products of atoms of the first four substances (earth, water, fire and air). The four types of atoms of these substances and their effect-substances constitute material and physical substances according to the NyayaVaisesika theory. All physical or material objects, or strictly speaking all substances which we see, touch, taste or smell are effect-substances produced out of the four kinds of atoms. It has been said with regard to these non-eternal effect-substances (karya-dravyas) that they have not derived their essence-stuff from their immediate causes e.g., a piece of cloth has not derived its essence from the yarn, and the latter (yarn), in turn, from its cause, filaments of threads and so on. As already explained a cause is conceived as different in essence from its effect-the former existing and retaining its essence intact, side by side with its effect. The essence of all the effect-substance, thus, has got to be admitted, as though it had sprung up from the void. This is the inevitable consequence of the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of causation. The residing of an effect in its cause by inherent relation makes the effect inseparable from its cause, and appears as identical with it. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, an effect can exist only in its cause. A necessary conclusion from the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory, (namely, that a cause continues to exist retaining its essence intact side by side with its effect) is that the essence of effect-substances (karya-dravyas) has got to be admitted as though sprung up from the void. Four kinds of Atoms While the reality of effect-substances is without any abiding essence-stuff, the reality of four kinds of eternal atoms is based on their eternal essences. The essence of atoms is fixed. New atoms cannot come into existence, and the existing ones can never be non-existent. These four types of atoms are physical or material substances; it is only through them that physical or material nature belongs to effect-substances which, apart from atoms, have no essence. These four substances earth, water, fire and air constitute matter. There are five more substances ether, time, space, manas and soul which are eternal. In as much as they are substances they possess quality and other properties, but still they are not material or physical substances. The most important characteristic of these four atomic substances which differentiates them from other substances is that they produce effect-substances (dravyarambhakatva). Conception of Substance When we perceive a substance like a jar, we perceive its qualities, colour, touch, size, form, etc. apart from these qualities, do we also perceive a separate substratum called substance in which these qualities reside? The Naiyayika says, Yes; the Buddhist says, No. The Buddhist refutes the conception of a separate substance apart from its qualities as emphatically as he does that of a whole (avayavin) apart from its parts (avayavas). The acceptance of substance, as an entity separate and distinct from its qualities is a bone of contention between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Buddhist. In fact, from the Buddhist point of view, the basis of the two erroneous conceptions, viz., that of substance and that of whole, is the same.
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It may be pointed out that, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, a substance which we can experience with external senses is always an effect-substance (karya-dravya) and it is necessarily an avayavin whole. Although all the effect substances are avayavins, the denotation of the term dravya (substance) is wider. While all avayavins are substances (dravyas), all the substances are not avayavins in as much as they also include eternal substances (non-avayavins) like ether, etc. The connotations of the two terms are different. A substance connotes an entity in which qualities and movements reside by samavaya relation. An avayavin connotes an entity which has parts in which it resides by samavaya relation. For instance, a cloth, as avayavin, resides in its parts (threads) by samavaya relation, but as a substance, it is the abode of its qualities- colour, etc.-which reside in it by samavaya relation. Now, let us revert to the question of the conception of substance. The Nyaya-Vaisesika , as already noted, follows the dictum that our experience is the sole criterion for determining the nature of reality. In our experience we distinctly see that there is a substratum (e.g. a jar) in which qualities like colour, touch, size etc. reside. Our experience presents two separate realities, the properties and their substratum, which two are different in their essence. We have seen that differentiation between properties and their substratum (dharma-dharmibheda ) is the basic principle of the Nyaya-Vaisesika. A substance is thus conceived as the substratum of its properties. Of, course, a substance itself may be a property (dharma). A whole (avayavin) is a property (dharma) of its parts (avayavas) in which it resides. Thus, while a substance may itself sometimes be a property, a substratum of properties is necessarily a substance. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, properties include universals (samanya), and the universals reside in qualities and actions also. For instance, the universal colourness (rupatva) resides in colour (rupa) which is a quality. Here we find a substratum of properties other than a substance. But properties, such as substance (in the form of avayavin), quality and action, in which the universal (satta) resides are, for that reason, real objective properties. These properties reside only in a substance. The difference between properties and their substratum, i.e., the substance, is that the former are dependent for their existence on the latte. So long as the properties exist, they can exist only as residing in their substance. But a substratum (substance) does not depend for its existence on anything else. Substance is defined by Kanada as possessing qualities and actions, and as an inherent cause. The theory of a substance in the form of a whole residing in its parts was not perhaps firmly established in his times, otherwise, Kanada would have included substance also in the properties residing in a substance. In the context of differentiation between properties ad their substratum (dharma-dharmi-bheda), it may be pointed out that the word property (dharma) in this context does not mean only qualities, but it is used in a wider senses and includes all five kinds of properties, (i.e. substance, quality, movement, the universal and visesa) which subsist in their substrata by inherent relation. The first type is substance itself which, in the form of a whole, resides in its parts by inherent relation. The second type consist of quality and movement, which properties together with
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the first one (i.e., substance) possesses the universal being (satta). The third type consists of the universal (samanya) and the particular (visesa) which do not possess the universal being, and which, in the early stage of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, were regarded as mere intellectual abstractions, and not full-fledged objective realities, as they were held in the later period. Reality of the Categories other than Substance The differentiation between properties and their substrata being the basic principle of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, qualities, actions, the universals, visesas and even the relation called samavaya are held to be externally existent objective realties, quite different in essence from the substance in which they reside. . even the seventh category, the negation (abhava), which was added latter on to the list of the original six ones, is accepted by the later NyayaVaisesika school as an objective reality. According to it, abhava is not unreal or non-existent like the horn of a hare. It is, of course, negative, but even then, it is real and existent. From the stand point of the nature of their reality, out of the seven categories, the first six are of a positive nature, while the negation or non-existence (abhava) is negative. The last three of the six positives categoreies, namely, samanya, visesa and samavaya are eternal, while the second and third categories, namely, qualities and actions, are non-eternal, except that some of the qualities of eternal substances such as, oneness (ekatva) of ether, time, space, etc., are eternal. These two categories, i.e. guna (quality) and karman (movement) together with the substabce, are eld to be possessing the universal being (satta-jati). Kanada says that the word artha (which literally means a real object) is applicable only to the first three categories, Viz, substance, quality and movement. The last three categories, samanya, etc., according to Kanada, are pasarthas, but not arthas. This clearly shows that Kanada conceived padartha only as the meaning of a word and not as an external objective. Extreme Realism of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Different grades of reality of the Nyaya-Vaisesika categories result from the basic principles that whatever enters into the texture of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. Critical thinkers of the school, however, did not fail to notice the limitations of this basic principle. In the first instance, all our experience, according to the NyayaVaisesika, is not necessarily valid as it is held to be by the Prabhakara School of the PurvaMimamsa. The evidence of experience therefore may sometimes be erroneous. Secondly, if we were to assume an external counterpart for every factor of our experience, our world of reality would be flooded with unlimited contents. For instance, in that case, we shall have to assume a new relation for the subsistence of the inherent realtion (samavaya) also. Another realtion will have to be assumed for the substitence of abhava in the objects where it resided. The Nyaya-Vaisesika held tht the realtion of abhava with the object where it resides is in the form of that object itself (svarupa sambandha). That realtion, therefore, apart from the object in which it resides, is not a separate external entity; it thus appears to be only a mental entity. External reality, according to the later Nyaya-Vaisesika, is to be assumed only where the assumption leads to brevity (laghava). Samavaya as a separate category is accepted on the same principle. Instead of numerous relations in the form of numberless objects, the assumption of one ubiquitous entity (samavaya) leads to brevity. Similarly, the universal
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dravyatva is accepted by the latter Nyaya-Vaisesika, not because of its being experienced as such, but because it is the determining or distinguishing characteristic (avacchedaka) of the inherent causation. In simple language it means that only a substance can be an inherent cause (samavayai-karana). Conception of Existence (Satta) in the Nyaya-Vaisesika Is there any warrant for postulating different gradations of reality in the Nyaya-Vaisesika? In order to answer fills question, let us first consider as to what constitutes the existence or reality of an object. According to the Buddhist, efficiency for purposive action, i.e., efficiency to produce an effect, constitutes the existence, the essence or the reality of an object.39 According to Kanada, it is the universal called sattd-jdti (existence or being) which produces the notion of existence in the case of the first three categories, viz., substance, quality and action. 40 Here the notion of existence is not analysed beyond what is given in experience. It will be seen that there is a fundamental difference in the Buddhist's and Kanada's conception of reality. According to the Buddhist, reality is constituted solely by the efficiency to produce an effect, i.e., a desired object. According to him, the perception of an object is followed by a desire either to take it or to leave it (hdnopddana-buddhi). On the other hand, the Nyaya-Vaisesika holds that, besides these two desires, perception is sometimes followed by indifference (upelcsd'buddJii) also. This is emphatically denied by the Buddhist. The real reason of tins controversy lies in their different conceptions of reality. If reality, as held by the Buddhist, consists only in causal efficiency, the attitude of indifference towards it is not possible. On the other hand, the Nyaya-Vaisesika conceives reality as something static towards which there may be, sometimes, an attitude of indifference as well. 'Being (satta-jati) is accepted by Kanada as a universal which resides only in the first three categories. As already stated,42 Kanada regarded only the first three categories as 'artha (objective reality). The highest universal is named by Kanada as bhava (existence). Bhava, according to him, is the pure universal (samanyam eva) inasmuch as it is the cause of inclusive notion alone (anuvrtter eva hetuh) and not of-exclusive notion (vyavrtti). It is difficult to say whether this bhava is the same as satta (which resides only in the first three categories), as all commentators explain; or bhava is a wider universal than satta, and covers all the six categories. The last aphorism of this section of the Vaisesika-sutra suggests that the two may be identical. But why Kanada should have used two words for the same thing in the same context is inexplicable. Be that as it may, the real difficulty arose when after the recast of the Vaisesika system by Prasastapada, full objective reality was assigned to the last three categories, and when, at a still later stage, even negation (abhava) was accepted as an existent reality. In face of this, how could the universal satta (which means being or existence) be conceived as residing only in the first three categories? There was another problem. Prasastapada, holding satta as identical with the bhava of Kanada, declared that the universal satta was the cause of the inclusive notion alone (anuvrtter eva hetuh).47 But, if it resides only in the first three categories, it will surely exclude the last three categories from the first three ones, and thus it will be the cause of exclusion also. Sridhara
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replies thus: "Although the universal satta is excluded from subsisting in Samanya, etc., it cannot exclude its substrata dravya, etc., from samanya, etc. in as much as these latter are also comprehended in the notion of being, which is their own nature. This would indicate that besides satta, there is also svarupa-satta, 'existence by the very nature of an entity', which is possessed by the last three categories. Now, what is this 'existence by nature' (svarupa-satta) which is different from the universal 'existence' called (satta) Prasastapada says that svarupa-sattva which he calls svatma-sattva i.e., existence by one's very nature, is a common characteristic of the last three categories, samanya etc. Sridhara explains that the categories samanya, etc., do not possess the universal existence (satta-jati), and 'existence' in their case consists only in 'the form of their own nature' (svarupa-sattva). Now the problem is: if the categories samanya, etc., do not possess the universal 'existence (satta-jati), why do they appear as existent? Sridhara gives a queer explanation: "Why there is the common notion of being existent in the case of samanya etc.? It is because existence (satta) is imposed upon them on account of similarity between the universal existence (satta-jati) and existence in the form of their own nature (svarupa-satta). Then, is that notion false? It is indeed false. A notion of commonness of existence in the case of objects which are of different nature cannot but be false. Of course, the comprehension of their nature is not false, because their nature is real. The categories (samanya, etc.) arc existent because their nature is real; but they are- not existent, because commonness in the form of the universal 'existence' is not apprehended in those objects. But why commonness in the form of the universal 'existence' is upheld in the case of the first three categories which are also of a different nature? By a mere verbal trick, the categories, samanya, etc., are held to be at the same time existent and non-existent. The real reason why the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika made such frantic efforts at a solution was that Kanada had accepted the objective reality of the first three categories alone, and, therefore, he rightly assigned the universal 'existenceonly to them. But the exponents of the school, from Prasastapada onwards, ascribed objective reality to categories, samanya, etc., also. As its corollary, they should have extended the universal 'existence' also to them, but in deference to Kanada, the founder or the system, they continued to hold that the universal 'existence resided only in the first three. Hence arose their puzzle whether to accept or not to accept 'existence' in the categories, samanya, etc. Anyway, this differentiation between 'existence as a universal' (satta-jati), and 'existence by nature' (svarupa-satta) clearly indicates that the ascription of objective reality to the categories, samanya, etc., was only half-hearted. It is a proof positive that different levels or gradations of reality were conceived in the Nyaya-Vaisesika, though not expressly admitted. Summary

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Although, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, all the objects coming under the categories and their sub-divisions possess objective reality, it appears that there are different levels or gradations of reality. Conclusions arrived at in this chapter may be summarized thus: I. In the case of substance as accepted by the Nyaya-Vaisesika: 1. The material or physical reality, to which nothing can be added or from which nothing can be subtracted, belongs only to the four types of eternal atoms.
2. All effect-substances (karya-dravyas) held to be produced ultimately from the four

types of atoms have got their separate and simultaneous essence side by side with their causes, i.e., atoms. Although their essence has come about through the operation of causes, it has not come out of those causes (atoms). The conclusion, therefore, seems to be forced on the Nyaya-Vaisesika that essence of all the effect-substances, apart from the atoms, has come as if out of the void.
3. Of the five exclusively eternal substances which are immaterial, the soul and manas

are psychic and related to the phenomenon of knowledge.

4. Time and space are non-psychic substances, but they are also connected with the

phenomenon of knowledge in the sense that all objects of our experience are presented to us through time and space.

5. Ether is another non-psychic substance. Its existence is assumed solely for the reason

that it is held to be the inherent cause of sound.

6. Besides substance, only two other categories, viz., guna (quality)

and karman (movement), were originally regarded as objective realities. The universal (called satta) was held to be residing only in these three categories. intellectual abstractions. Objective reality was ascribed to them by Prasastapada. They both reside in their substrata by samavaya.

7. Samanya (universal) and visesa, were, in the beginning, regarded only as

8. Samavaya (inherent relation) is also regarded as an objective reality. It is related to

the objects (which are related by it) not by any other relation, but in the form of the related objects themselves. Therefore it appears that its level of reality is different from that of samanya and visesa.
9. The later Nyaya-Vaisesika school holds

negation' (abhava) also to be a reality. But its reality, being of a negative nature, is different from that of the first six categories which are of a positive nature.

DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE

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SUBSTANGETAS A SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE The Buddhist splits reality into discrete, disconnected, and discontinuous bits called moments or point-instants (ksanas)1 coming in continuous succession. The so-called perceptible objects do not exist as such in the external world. They are constructed (not created) by our mind on account of the continuity (samtana) of point-instants (ksanas). But as the continuity of point-instants is not an objective reality, there is no principle of synthesis or unity of these bits of reality in the external world. It is only our mental synthesis which causes the appearance of synthetic or unified objects. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, the world of external objects is made up of the smallest bits called atoms, the ultimate reals. But the fundamental difference between the two schools is that while the Buddhist discards any real principle of synthesis in the external world, the Nyaya-Vaiiesika holds that there are two synthetic principles which are objectively real. These two principles are 'substance (dravya) and the 'universal' (samanya or jati). According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, besides the smallest ultimate reals called atoms, there is also 'substance-' in the form of a unifying 'whole' (avayavin). The avayavi-dravya (substance in the form of 'whole') is distinct and different in essence from the parts which it holds together. As already stated, it is a basic doctrine of the Nyaya-Vaisesika that parts (avayavas) and their 'whole' (avayavin) are two different substances. The parts, in their turn, are also avayavins in respect of their own parts, and so on, till we reach the atoms which are only parts, and themselves have no parts, and, therefore, they are not avayavins. It may, however, be noted that although a substance in the form of avayavin is the unifying principle of its avayavas, the conceptions of avayavin and that of 'substance' (dravya) are not identical. Substance has a wider scope and includes atoms and eternal entities like ether, etc., which are not avayavins. Of course, so far as the material objects of ordinary experience are concerned, they are all effect-substances (karya-dravyas), and, as such, they are avayavins, i.e., the unifying principles of their parts. The term 'effect-substance' (karya-dravya) is coextensive with avayavin. A substance' in the form of avayavin is thus a unifying principle. The other unifying principle of the Nyaya-Vaisesika which brings about the unity of the objects of a class is the 'universal' (sdmdnya). The substance and the universal have an objective* existence in the external world. Both the concepts (as external entities) were vehemently assailed by the Dignaga School, according to which, all synthesis is mental. The Theory of Substance as the hall-mark of the Orthodox Camp The conception of substance is one of the basic tenets of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, which is also adopted by other orthodox realist schools like the Purva-Mimamsa, etc. In fact, in one form or the other, it has a place in all the systems of the orthodox camp. 'Substance', as conceived in the Nyaya-Vaisesika is not, of course, acceptable to the Vedanta or the Samkhya, but they both accept the existence of a substratum (dharmin) of properties (dharmas). Properties are held to be identical with the substratum by the Samkhya, and unreal by the Vedanta. The differentiation between the substratum and its properties (dharma-dharmi-bheda) is the line of demarcation between the realistic schools (the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Purva-Mimamsa)
15

which accept it and the idealistic schools (the Vedanta and the Mahayana Buddhist) which reject it. The Vedanta denies the differentiation of dharma and dharmin, because, according to it, only the dharmin (Brahman) is real. The Buddhist also denies it, but he does so because he holds that only dharmas (momentary point-instants, the ksanas) are real. It would appear that the acceptance of dharmin, the substratum of properties, is a common point of all the orthodox schools, realistic as well as idealistic. Emphatic denial of dharmin, on the other hand, is the corner-stone of Buddhist metaphysics. The 'no-soul theory' (anatma-vada) of the Buddhist, is not simply a denial of the soul in human beings or other living creatures, but it is also a denial of 'soul, i.e., the unifying principle called substance(dravya) or 'whole' (avayavin) as existing in the external world. The Buddhist theory of 'no-soul' is, therefore, fundamentally 'a denial of the theory of substance' (adravya-vada) against which all the orthodox schools, realistic or idealistic stand arrayed: Internally, the orthodox schools differ from one another.

There is a fundamental difference between the Samkhya-Yoga and the Nyaya-Vaisesika in their conception of substratum. According to the Samkhya, substratum (dharmin) is identical with its properties (dharmas), while, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, it is different in essence from its properties. Vyasa, the commentator on the Yoga-sutras, has actually used the Vaisesika word dravya for substratum. But he explains that in his system (SamkhyaYoga), dravya means the aggregate of general and special properties. In the NyayaVaisesika, however, dravya means substratum of those properties from which it is different in essence. According to the Vedanta, properties are unreal. The reality of the substratum is, however, common to all the orthodox systems. When therefore the Nyaya-Vaisesika advanced interminable arguments in refutation of the theory of flux, it was leading a crusadeon behalf of the whole orthodox camp against a common enemy.

Four Planks in Defence of Substance The refutation of flux and the establishment of avayavin are the two main planks in the defence of the theory of substance. In fact, these are the two aspects of one and the same thing. Substance, when conceived in terms of extension in space, requires the establishment of avayavin (whole), but when conceived in terms of duration in time, it presupposes the refutation of the theory of flux. There are two more theories which are also related to the defence of substance. The atomic theory of the Nyaya-Vaisesika, as we have-already seen, provides a material or physical basis for its realistic structure. That theory was attacked by other schools, especially by the Buddhist. Their arguments and counter-arguments deserve consideration in the context of the defence of substance. The Buddhist holds that there is no separate substance apart from qualities. Of course, they conceive of point-instants (ksanas) as something like qualities.

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There are thus four topics which we have to discuss in connection with the defence of substance: (i) The theory that a 'whole' (avayavin) is different in essence from its parts (avayavas). (ii) Refutation of the Buddhist theory of flux (ksana-bhanga-nirakarana). (iii) The atomic theory, especially its metaphysical aspect. (iv) The theory of substance being separate from and independent of its qualities.

The Atomic Theory of the Vaisesika School All the physical objects of the universe, i.e., all the effect-substances which are made up of parts, when split into their parts or parts of parts, culminate in atoms (paramdnus) which cannot be split further, and are therefore indivisible and partless. According to the NyayaVaisesika, causes are always in the form of parts, atoms must be held to be causeless (akaranavat) and therefore eternal (nitya).

The stock argument for proving the existence of the atom is: if the existence of partless atoms is not accepted and the process of splitting up into parts and parts of their parts goes on infinitely, the Meru Mountain and a mustard seed, both having in that case infinite parts, would be of the same size. Another argument allied to the previous one is: the measure called large' (mahat-parimana) has its culmination in 'all-pervading measure' (vibhu-parimana as that of ether). Similarly, the 'minute measure1 (anu-parimdna) should also have its culmination in the minutest measure, which can only be that of an atom. The existence of the atom, therefore, must be assumed. Udayana, however, rejects the argument on the ground that it leads to the fallacy of interdependence. This is explained in Kiranavali-prakasa thus: the measure called minute (anu), as different from the measure, called large (mahat), can be assumed only if the existence of the atom is first established; and its existence is sought to be established by the assumption of the measure called minute.

From a try-anuka which has the smallest perceptible measure, we arrive at the conception of an atom through an intervening entity called dvy-anuka which partakes of the nature of both, the objects of our experience and the atom. Like the former, it is made up of parts, and like the latter, it possesses minute measure (anu-parimana). The existence of the intervening dvyanuka is argued in this way: the smallest perceptible particle, viz., a try-anuka, must be made up of parts (dvy-anukas), because it is perceptible, and further its constituent parts (dvyanukas) must also be made up of parts (atoms) because dvy-anukas are the cause of the measure called large (mahat-parimana). The argument can in the same way be further ex17

tended to prove that these parts of a dvy-anuka (atoms) should also be made up of further parts on the ground that they give rise to an effect-substance (karya-dravyarambhakatvat). But that kind of argument would lead to a process ad infinitum (and-vastha), and therefore the Nyaya-Vaisesika points out that it should be rejected.

Problem of Change in Measure It has been stated that in the first instance only two atoms combine to produce an effect. Sridhara points out that one atom cannot produce an effect, because if it could, it would always do so, for which it would not stand in need of anything else. Secondly, the effect produced from one atom would never be destroyed, because destruction takes place only by the disconnection of parts. Nor could three atoms combine in the first instance to produce an effect. It is held, for reasons to be explained in the sequel, that the number, more than two (bahutva) of the samavayi-karana is also one of the causes of the large measure. Three atoms, as inherent cause (samavayi-karana) therefore, having a number more than two (bahutva), will produce an effect characterized by large measure (mahat-parimana); but another condition of the large measure is that it can be produced only by such constituent parts as are themselves made up of parts, i.e., effect-substances (karya-dravyas). If, in the first instance, three atoms produce an effect, the constituent parts would be atoms which are not effect-substances. It is therefore held that in the first instance only two atoms (neither less nor more) combine to produce an effect, i.e., a dvy-anuka. A dvy-anuka is held to possess, like an atom, the minute measure (anu-parimana). As the large measure can be brought about only by plural number, at least three dvy-anukas must combine in the second instance to produce an effect having large measure, i.e., a try-anuka. But as the large measure can be produced even by four or more dvy-anukas (which possess bahutva, i.e., plural number), the possibility of those combinations cannot be ruled out. But usually a try-anuka has been regarded as the necessary unit of a material object. If alternatively three, four or more dvy-anukas are held to combine to produce the first smallest perceptible particles, the latter would be of various dimensions. It appears that probably in order to bring about uniformity of the smallest perceptible particles of matter (comparable to the molecules of modern science), the later writers laid down that, in the first instance, only three dvy-anukas combine to make a try-anuka (molecule) which was regarded as the smallest perceptible unit. After the formation of a try-anuka, two, three or more of them might combine to produce larger objects.

One of the problems of the Nyaya-Vaisesika school was: how from the measure called minute (anu-parimana), belonging to an atom, there could arise the measure called large, (mahat-parimana) which is the measure of a different kind. The smallest perceptible measure (which belongs to a try-anuka) is technically called large' (mahat-parimana). Now this large measure, which is different in kind from the minute measure (anu-parimana) belonging to an atom or to a dvy-anuka, cannot arise from the measure of either. It is held that the measure of an atom does not produce the measure of a dvy-anuka, and the latter, likewise, does not
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produce the measure of a try-anuka, because in that case the measure would not be of a minute type, but it would become minuter still.

According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika principle, the measure of an effect must be of the same kind as, and of a higher degree than, that of its cause. The measure of a dvy-anuka is therefore held to be produced by duality residing in two atoms. As already stated, the large measure is produced by a number more than two (bahutva), and therefore it is produced in a try-anuka which is made up of three dvy-anukas. The measure of a dvy-anuka which is made up of two atoms continues to be -minute. It does not become more minute because it is not produced from the measure of atoms, but from the number two inherent in two atoms. Duality and plurality are, however, produced, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika theory, by the simultaneous perception (apeksa-buddhi) of two or more onenesses residing in atoms or dvyanukas.

Measure of Atom and dvy-anuka The measure of an atom and of a dvy-anuka is minute. There is no difference in the minute measure of the two except that the minuteness of an atom is eternal, and that of a dvy-anuka is non-eternal. The minute measure of an atom is named as parimandalya which means spherical or circular. Parimandala is the word used by Kanada for the atom. Prasastapada says that the eternal measure of an atom and manas is parimandalya. The term anu is used to denote substance (atom) as well as quality, i.e., the minutest measure residing in an atom or a dvy-anuka. The term paramanu is also likewise used in both the senses, but when it is used in the sense of measure, it denotes the measure of an atom only and not that- of a dvy-anuka. Apart from the question of measure, both the words anu and paramanu have been used for an atom without distinction. Some writers use the word anu and others paramanu. The real reason of this double usage seems to be that Kanada had not arrived at the conception of dvyanuka, which is the intervening link between the paramanu and the try-anuka.

Kanada used the word parimandala for an atom, and following this usage, Prasastapada named the measure of an atom as pdrimdndalya. He introduced the conception of a dvyanuka as possessing the same minute measure as that of an atom. But at the same time, in deference to Kanada, he retained the use of the word parimandalya exclusively for the measure of an atom. This suggested to the ancient writers of the Nyaya-Vaisesika after Prasastapada a quantitative difference between the measures of a dvy-anuka and of an atom. The writers of the Navya-Nyaya period, however, discarded that difference. It appears that in many cases Prasastapada developed new ideas, but still he clung to the old words which sometimes caused confusion. We have already noted that although Prasastapada accorded objective existence to the last three categories, samanya, etc.,

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he still adhered to the idea that satta (existence) resided only in the first three categories, substance, etc. *******************************

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2.2. THE DUALISTIC REALISM OF SAMKHYA JAYAKUMAR. D General Introduction SANKHYA is undoubtedly one of the oldest systems of Indian Philosophy. The Sankhya possesses an advantage as against other systems on account of its antiquity as its origin reaches far back into the period of oral tradition.2 We find references to the Sankhya-Yoga doctrines in some of the Upanisads, e.g., in the Chandogya, the Prashna, the Katha and particularly in the Shvetashvatara; in the Mahabharata; in the Gita; and in the Smrtis and the Puranas. Badarayana, the author of the Vedanta-sutra, repeatedly refers to the view whether the Sankhya can be regarded as the teaching of the Upanishads and rejects it, besides undertaking refutation of the Sankhya in the Tarkapada on rational grounds. Shankaracharya regards it as the 'main opponent' (pradhana- malla) of Vedanta and says that though Sankhya and Yoga are generally accepted by the wise as conducive to the Highest Good, yet these systems advocate dualism and cannot be supported by the Shruti. These words are used in the Shruti and the Smrti in the sense of knowledge and action respectively and words like Mahat, Avyakta etc. are used in the sense of names and forms. Sankara and others do not advocate Samkhya because according to them though Samkhya accepted by the wise, is not based on the Upanisads because it advocates dualism. There is an opinion that some thinkers belonging to the Sankhya must have claimed the teaching of Sankhya it to be the teaching of the Upanishads. Though nothing can be said with absolute certainty, it seems highly probable that the Sankhya in the beginning was based on the Upanisads and had accepted the theistic Absolute, but later on, under the influence of the Jaina and the Buddhist thought, it rejected theistic monism and was content with spiritualistic pluralism and atheistic realism. And it is this Sankhya to which Badarayana Shankara are opposed. This also explains why some of the later Skhyas, e.g. Vijnanabhiku in the sixteenth century, tried to revive the earlier theism in Sankhya.3 Samkhya is one of the most prominent and one of the oldest of Indian philosophies. An eminent, great sage Kapila was the founder of the Samkhya School. Based on the Upanishads, two schools of philosophy developed in India: (1) The realistic (e.g. Samkhya) (2) The idealistic (e.g. Vedanta). The Samkhya philosophy combines the basic doctrines of Samkhya and Yoga. However it should be remembered that the Samkhya represents the theory and Yoga represents the application or the practical aspects. The word Samkhya is based upon the Sanskrit word samkhya which means number. The school specifies the number and nature of the ultimate constituents of the universe and
Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Rupa &Co, 2007. PP.221-222. 3 Chandradhar Sharma: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Canarsidass Publishers, 1994. P.149.
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thereby imparts knowledge of reality. In fact, the term Samkhya also means perfect knowledge. Hence it is a system of perfect knowledge. The background of the Samkhya thought is the Upanisadic teaching of Brahman. In the Upanishads, there were two types of descriptions about Brahman, the ultimate reality. On the one hand, Brahman is described as Kutasta (unchangeable and immutable entity). For instance, in the Gita the Self or the Brahman is described as the eternal principle which the fire cannot burn; the wind cannot dry; the water cannot wet and the sword cannot cut. On the other hand, Brahman becomes the world. Here the example of spider is presented; the spider spins its web from its own resources, so also Brahman is the only reality and from him all things come. Thus Brahman is presented as a changing principle. So there is a contradiction in the description of Brahman in the Upanishad as changing and unchanging. Its a logical problem and in order to solve this problem the Samkhya propose two ultimate principles Purusa (unchanging) and Prakrti (changing). Therefore Samkhya is dualistic realism. It is dualistic because it advocates two ultimate realities: Prakriti , matter and Purusha, self (spirit). Samkhya is realism as it considers that both matter and spirit are equally real. Samkhya is pluralistic also because of its teaching that Purusha is not one but many. 1.1. THE METAPHYSICS OF SAMKHYA SYSTEM 1.1.1. The Theory of Causation4 The Sankhya Metaphysics, especially its doctrine of prakrti, rests mainly on its theory of causation which is known as Satkarya-vada. According to this theory the effect is not something altogether new but the effect pre-exists in the cause and is essentially the same as the cause. The specific question discussed here is this: Does an effect originally exist in the material cause prior to its production? According to the Buddhists and the Nyaya Vaisesikas the answer to this question is in the negative. Because for them, the effect cannot be said to exist before it is produced by some cause. The cause and the effect are two different things and the effect is something new. If the effect already existed in the material cause prior to its production, there is no sense in our speaking of it as being caused or produced. If the pot already existed in the clay, or the cloth in the thread or the curd in the milk why should the potter produce the pot at all or should a weaver exert himself to produce cloth? Moreover, if the effect were already in its material cause, then there is no sense in calling one as cause and the other as effect, both would be logically indistinguishable. Why do we differentiate and call one as clay and the other as pot; one as milk and the other as curd; and as thread and cloth? Would not the clay do the purpose of pot? Would not the thread serve as clothe? And why should not the curd taste like milk? Is the production a repeated birth and thus absurd? Therefore, we have to admit that there is something in the effect which is not to be found in its cause and, therefore, the effect does not really exist in the cause. This theory that the effect does not exist in the material cause prior to its production is known as Asatkarya-vada (i.e. the view that the karya or the effect is asat or non-existent before its production). It is also called arambha-vada, i.e. the theory that says, the production is a new beginning.
Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Rupa &Co, 2007. p.238-240.
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The Sankhyas on the other hand repudiate the asatkaryavadins and establish their view of satkarya-vada, namely, that the effect exists in the material cause even before it is produced. According to the Samkhyas all material effects are modifications (parinama) of Prakrti. They pre-exist in the eternal bosom of Prakrti and simply come out of it at the time of creation and return to it at the time of dissolution.5 The Sankhyas base their theory of causation on the following grounds: (a) Asadakaranat: (Non-existent beings cannot be produced) If the effect were really non-existent in the material cause, then no amount of effort on the part of any agent could bring it into existence. Can any man turn blue into red, or sugar into salt? Hence, when an effect is produced from some material cause, we are to say that it preexists in the cause and is only manifested by certain favorable conditions, as when oil is produced by pressing seeds. The activity of efficient causes, like the potter and his tools, is necessary to manifest the effect, pot, which exists implicitly in the clay. (b) Upadanagrahanat: (There is an invariable relation between a material cause and its effect.) A material cause can produce only that effect with which it is causally related. It cannot produce an effect which is in no way related to it. But it cannot be related to what does not exist. Hence the, effect must exist in the material cause before it is actually produced. (c) Sarvasambhavabhavat: (Impossibility of things being produced from anywhere/any cause). We see that only certain effects can be produced from certain causes. Curd can be got only out of milk and a cloth only out of threads. This shows that the effect somehow exists in the cause. Had it not been so, any effect could be produced from any cause; the potter would not have taken clay to produce pots. (d) Shaktasya shakya-karanat: (Only what is potential can be produced). Even capable person can produce a particular effect only from particular cause. This is known as Shaktasya Shakya Karan. Eg : Even clever Goldsmith can prepare Gold chain from Gold only & not from Iron. The fact that only a potent cause can produce a desired effect presupposes that the effect must be potentially contained in the cause. The potent cause of an effect is that which possesses some power that is definitely related to the effect. But the power cannot be related to the effect, if the latter does not exist in some form. This means that the effect exists in the cause in an unmanifested form before its production or manifestation. (e) Karanabhavat: (The effect is in the form of the cause) If the effect be really nonexistent in the cause, then we have to say that, when it is produced the non-existent comes into existence; i.e. something comes out of nothing, which is absurd. Therefore, the effect is not different from, but essentially identical with, the material cause. If, the cause exists, the effect also must exist. In fact, the effect and the cause
Chandradhar Sharma: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Canarsidass Publishers, 1994. pp.151-152.
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are the explicit and implicit states of the same substance. The effect is in visible form and the cause is in invisible form. The cause itself exhibits as effect. A cloth is not really different from the threads, of which it is made; a statue is the same as its material cause, stone, with a new shape and form: the weight of a table is the same as that of the pieces of wood used in it. The conclusion drawn by the Sankhya from all this is that the effect exists in the material cause even before its production or appearance. This is the theory of Satkarya-vada (i.e. the view that the effect is existent before its appearance). 1.1.2. Parinama-vada and Vivarta-vada The theory of satkarya-vada has got two different forms, namely, parinama-vada and vivartavada. The parinama vada holds that when an effect is produced, there is a real transformation (parinama) of the cause into the effect, e.g. the production of a pot from clay, or of curd from milk. On the contrary in Vivarta-Vada, the cause produces the effect without undergoing any change in itself. Snake is only an appearance on the rope. The rope has not transformed itself into a snake like milk into curd. Brahman is immutable and eternal. Therefore, it cannot change itself into the world. The Sankhya is in favor of the view of parinama vada as a further specification of the theory of satkarya-vada whereas the Advaita Vedantins uphold the vivartha vada, that the change of the cause into the effect is merely apparent. The vivarthavadins argue that when we see a snake in a rope, the rope is not really transformed into a snake but only appears as a snake. So also, God or Brahman does not become really transformed into the world produced by Him, but remains identically the same, while we may wrongly think that He undergoes change and becomes the world. Thus, Sankhya considered Satkarya Vada as Parinama but Vedanta considered Vivarta Vada as Parinama.6 Thus we can see that there is a longstanding controversy about (and thereby the debates between) parinama-vada and vivarta-vada. Therefore the focus of the following discussion is to show that vivarta-vada, if correctly understood, does not oppose parinama-vada, but subsumes it under itself. Parinama-vada is the theory (view) that when anything, undergoes changes and transformations, those changes and transformations are real. On the other the vivarta-vada is the theory (view) which holds that the changes and transformations are not real but merely appearances. Sankaras Advaita-Vedanta upholds the vivarta-vada and other schools of Vedanta and Samkhya uphold the parinama-vada. (Buddhism, Jainism, etc are not considered at this point.) Vivarta-vada does not deny changes and transformations but maintains that the changes and transformations are not real; according to Sankara, real change is the change by which, something, loses its essential nature and becomes something absolutely different it, for example, a piece of wood becoming a lump of gold. Thus when Brahman becomes the world,
6 Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Rupa &Co, 2007. p.241.

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Brahman undergoes no real changes and does not lose its essential nature (and being) as Atman, pure consciousness. Yes, Brahman appears as the world, without undergoing any real change, for there is, in principle, nothing other than Brahman for Brahman to become. Both Sankara and Samkhya subscribe to satkarya-vada, according to which the effect is identical to (and pre-exists in) the cause; that is, there will be nothing in the effect that is not already in the cause. The question now arises: Does all this mean that the cause does or does not undergo any real change in producing the effect? Samkhya, through its teaching of parinama-vada, maintains that the cause does undergo real changes in producing the effects. Sankara points out that such a teaching contradicts satkarya-vada, which the Samkhya upholds, and therefore parinama-vada is false. In other words, when the potter makes, cups and saucers, from clay, the clay does not undergo any real changes and become something other than clay; the changes the clay undergoes are only in forms and names; note further that the cups and saucers have no existence apart from the clay, whereas the clay exists even when there are no cups and saucers (before the potter made them as well as after he destroys them). Simply put, the clay does not undergo any real changes in becoming cups and saucers but only apparent changes. Hence Sankara rejects parinama-vada and upholds vivarta-vada (changes in appearance only). Similar arguments can also be presented with equal validity and soundness against other schools of Vedanta, such as Ramanujas and Madhvas, which uphold parinama-vada. To conclude, parinama-vada cannot subsume under itself vivarta-vada, whereas the latter can easily subsume the former, insofar as it does not deny changes and acknowledges changes in appearances only, thereby remaining faithful to satkarya-vada, unlike Samkhya and other parinama-vadins. Brahman, in becoming the world, does not undergo any real changes, since there cannot, in principle, be anything other than Brahman for Brahman to become. Is there, then, a real distinction between parinama-vada and vivarta-vada? The answer is clearly in the affirmative; while parinama-vada and vivarta-vada both acknowledge changes in the cause in producing the effects, the changes are not real but only in appearances (forms and names) for the vivarta-vada, whereas they are real for parinamavada, thereby contradicting satkarya-vada, to which both Samkhya and Sankara subscribe . (Note: Samkhya subscribes to satkarya-vada in regard to the evolution of Prakrti, whereas Sankara subscribes to satkarya-vada in regard to Brahman becoming the world. For Samkhya, there are two ultimates, namely, Prakrti and Purusha, whereas for Sankara there is just the non-dual Brahman, for the doctrine of two ultimates is self-contradictory.) 1.1.3. Prakrti According to the Sankhyas theory of causation there is a real transformation of the material cause into the effect. This logically leads to the concept of Prakrti as the ultimate cause of the world of objects. All objects of the world, including our body and mind, the senses and the intellect, are limited and dependent things produced by the combination of certain elements. Thus the world is a series of effects presupposing a cause. What, then, is the cause of the world? The cause cannot be purusa because purusa is pure consciousness; it is not produced and does not produce anything. So the cause of the world must be the not-self, i.e. some
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principle which is other than and different from spirit, self or consciousness. Can this not-self be the physical element of the material atoms? According to the Carvakas or the materialists, the Buddhas, the Jainas and the NyayaVaisesikas, the atoms of earth, water, light and air are the ultimate constituents of the physical world. Samkhya differs on the issue because according to Samkhya the cause is always subtler than the effect and so they rule out the possibility of gross atoms of matter to be the cause of such subtle and fine objects as mind and intellect? The Samkhya argue that some finest and subtlest stuff or principle must underlie all physical existence. And that principle must be one which can explain the gross objects of nature like earth and water, trees and seas, as well as its subtle products. Now it is a general rule that the cause is subtler than the effect and that it pervades the effect. Hence the ultimate cause of the world must be some unintelligent or unconscious principle which is uncaused, eternal and all-pervading, very fine and always ready to produce the world of objects. Samkhya names it as Prakriti. Prakriti is the primordial substance behind the world. It is the material cause of the world. Prakriti is the first and ultimate cause of all gross and subtle objects. It is the first cause of all things and, therefore, has itself no cause. As the uncaused root-cause of all objects it is eternal and ubiquitous, because nothing that is limited and non-eternal can be the first cause of the world. Being the ground of such subtle products of nature as mind and the intellect, Prakrti is a very subtle, mysterious and tremendous power which evolves and dissolves the world in a cyclic order. 1.1.3.1. The Samkhya Gives Five Proofs for the Existence of Prakrti (a) Bhedanam parimanat: (effects are limited and many) All particular objects of the world, from the intellect to the earth, are limited and dependent on one another. The finite or the limited principle cannot be the cause of the universe. So there must be an unlimited and independent cause for their existence. And it is Prakrti which is infinite, unlimited, independent, all-pervading source of the universe. (b) Samanvayat (harmony): All worldly things possess certain common characters, owing to which every one of them is capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. Therefore, they must have a common cause which is composed of these three gunas and that is Prakrti. (c) Karyatah pravrttescha (effect is produced due to action): All effects proceed from the activity of some cause which contains their potentiality within it. The world of objects which are effects must, therefore, be implicitly contained in some worldcause. And that is Prakrti. (d) Karanakaryavibhagat (cause and effects are separate/different): The effect differs from the cause and hence the limited effect cannot be regarded as its own cause. The effect is the explicit and cause is the implicit state of the same process. The effect therefore point to a world-cause where they are potentially contained. And that is Prakrti.

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(e) Avibhagat vaishvarupyasya (unity): In the universe everything has a purpose and thus the whole universe is a unified whole. Therefore the unity of the universe points to a single cause and that cause is called Prakrti. We should not imagine a cause of this ultimate cause, for that will land us in the fallacy of infinite regress. If there be a cause of prakrti, then there must be a cause of that cause, and so on, ad infinitum. Or, if we stop anywhere and say that here is the first cause, then that first cause will be the prakrti which is specifically described as the supreme root cause of the world (para or mula prakrti). 1.1.3.2. Prakrti and the Gunas Prakrti is constituted by the three gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakrti is the unity of gunas held in a state of equilibrium. What are these gunas and how are they related to Prakrti? These gunas here are constituent elements or components and not an attribute or quality of Prakrti. Hence the gunas of sattva, rajas and tamas are the elements of the ultimate substance called prakrti. The gunas are not perceived by us. Although they are called as gunas, yet they are not ordinary qualities or attributes like the Nyaya-Vaishesika gunas. They themselves posses qualities like lightness, activity, heaviness etc. and they are called as gunas because, they are elements of Prakrti or because they are subservient to the end of purusa, or because intertwined like three strands, to make up a rope of Prakrti which binds the purusa. They are extremely fine and ever changing elements. They are inferred from the objects of the world which are their effects. Since there is an essential identity (tadatmaya) between the effect and its cause, we know the nature of the gunas from the nature of their products. All objects of the world, from the intellect down to the ordinary objects of perception (e.g. tables, pots, etc.), fire found to possess three characters capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference, respectively. The same things are pleasurable to some person, painful to another, and neutral to a third. For instance, a rose delights the, youth, dejects the dying man and leaves the gardener cold and indifferent. Victory in war elates the victor, depresses the vanquished and leaves the third party rather apathetic. Now as the cause must contain what is in the effect, we can infer that the ultimate cause of things must have been constituted also by the three elements of pleasure, pain and indifference. The Sankhya calls these three sattva, rajas and tamas respectively. These are constitutive of both prakrti, the ultimate substance, and the ordinary objects of the world. 1.1.3.2.1. Sattva Sattva is that element of prakrti whose essence is purity, fineness and subtlety. It is the principle of goodness, pleasure, lightness, transparency and brightness and so it is bright or illuminating (prakasaka). The manifestation of objects in consciousness, the tendency towards conscious manifestation in the senses, the mind and the intellect, the luminosity of light, and the power of reflection, upward movement like the blazing up of fire or the upward course of vapor, pleasure in its various forms, such as satisfaction, joy, happiness, bliss, contentment, etc. are all due to sattva. Its color is white. Its association with the
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consciousness is the strongest. Though sattva is an essential condition for consciousness, it is not sufficient. It should be remembered that consciousness is exclusively the Purusa.

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1.1.3.2.2. Rajas Rajas is concerned the action of things. It is the principle of activity and motion. It always moves and makes other things move. That is, it is both mobile and mobile and stimulating. It is on account of rajas that fire spreads, the wind blows, the senses follow their objects and the mind becomes restless. In living beings not only activity and restlessness, but pain also are caused by rajas. Its color is redness. It helps the element of sattva and tamas, which are inactive and motionless in themselves, to perform their functions. 1.1.3.2.3. Tamas Tamas is the principle of passivity and negativity in things. It is inert and inactive. It is heavy (guru) and obstructs the manifestation of objects as opposed to sattva. It also resists the principle of rajas or activity in so far as it restrains the motion of things. It counteracts the power of manifestation in the mind, the intellect and other things, and thereby produces ignorance and darkness, and leads to confusion and bewilderment. By obstructing the principle of activity in us it induces sleep, drowsiness, and laziness. It also produces the state of apathy or indifference. Its color is darkness. 1.1.3.3. The Interconnectedness of the Gunas These three gunas which constitute Prakrti are never separate. Their relation with one another is one of constant conflict as well as co-operation. They always go together and can never be separated from one another. Nor can any one of them produce anything without the help and support of the other two. They are compared to the oil, the wick and the flame, which are relatively opposed to one another but closely co-operate to produce the light of a lamp. Just as the oil, wick and flame the gunas co-operate to produce the objects of the world with their own different and opposed qualities. These three gunas are present in everything of the world, great or small, fine or gross. But the nature of a thing is determined by its predominant guna, as each guna tries to suppress and dominate over one another. We cannot point to anything of the world which does not contain within it all the three elements, of course, in different proportions. We classify objects into good, bad and indifferent, or into pure, impure and neutral, or into intelligent, active and indolent, based on the predominance of sattva, rajas and tamas respectively in objects. 1.1.3.4. Gunas and Evolution Another characteristic of the gunas is that they are constantly changing. When these gunas are held in a state of equilibrium, the state is called as Prakrti and at this state evolution does not take place. There are two kinds of change or transformations which the gunas undergo homogeneous and heterogeneous. During pralaya or dissolution of the world, the gunas change homogeneously, each within itself, without disturbing the others. That is, sattva changes into sattva, rajas, into rajas and so too with tamas. Such transformation of the gunas is called sarupa-parinama or change into the homogeneous. Evolution occurs when the gunas combine, and one of them predominates over the others. So before creation, the gunas exist as
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a homogeneous mass in which there is no motion (although there is transformation). This is the state of equilibrium (samyavastha) for the gunas. The other kind of transformation takes place when one of the gunas dominates over the others which become subordinate to it. Such transformation is called virupa-parinama or change into the heterogeneous, and it is the starting-point of the world's evolution.

1.1.4. Purusa or the Self The second ultimate reality admitted by the Sankhya is the self or the pususa which is the pure consciousness. It is the spiritual principle as opposed to Prakrti and is conscious. It is called differently as kevala(theonly), udasina(indifferent), saksi(witness), drsta(seer), sadaprakashasvarupa(self illumining).7 Before describing the notion of purusa or the self of Samkhya, let us know about some of the agreements and the disagreements regarding the notion of self; the existence of the self and the nature of the self. The existence of the self must be admitted by all. Everybody feels and asserts that he or she exists, and has this or that thing belonging to him or her. The feeling of one's own existence is the most natural and indubitable experience that we all have. In fact, no one can seriously deny the existence of his self, for the act of denial presupposes the reality of the self. So it has been said by the Sankhyas that the self exists, because it is self-manifest and its non existence cannot be proved in any way.8 Although there is a general agreement with regard to the existence of the self, there is a wide divergence of opinion about its nature. Some Carvakas or materialists identify the self with the gross body, some with the senses, some with life, and some others with the mind. The Buddhists and some empiricists regard the self as identical with the stream of consciousness. The Nyaya-Vaisesikas and the Prbhakara Mimamsakas maintain that the self is an unconscious substance which may acquire the attribute of consciousness under certain conditions. The Bhatta Mimamnsakas, on the other hand, think that the self is a conscious entity which is partially hidden by ignorance, as appears from the imperfect and partial knowledge that men have of their selves. The Advaita Vedanta holds that the self is pure eternal consciousness which is also a blissful existence (saccidananda svarupa). It is one in all bodies, and is eternally free and self shining intelligence. Thus understanding of the nature of self is divergent to each school. But according to the Sankhya, the self is different from the body and the senses, the manas and the intellect (buddhi). It is not anything of the world of objects. The self is not the brain, nor the nervous system, nor the aggregate of conscious states. The self is conscious spirit which is always the subject of knowledge and can never become the object of any knowledge thus remains the foundation of all knowledge. It is not a substance with the attribute of consciousness, but it is pure consciousness as such. Consciousness is its very essence and not
Chandradhar Sharma: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Canarsidass Publishers, 1994. p.156. 8 Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Rupa &Co, 2007. pp.246-247.
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a mere quality of it. Nor should we say that it is a blissful consciousness (anand asvarupa), as the Advaita Vedantin thinks because, bliss and consciousness being different things cannot be the essence of the same reality. The self is the transcendent subject whose essence is pure consciousness. As pure consciousness the purusa is ever inactive and unchanging. It is above all change and activity. It is an uncaused, eternal and all pervading reality which is free from all attachment and unaffected by all objects. All change and activity, all pleasures and pains belong really to matter and its products like the body, mind and intellect. It is sheer ignorance to think that the self is the body or the senses or the mind or the intellect. But when, through such ignorance, the self confuses itself with any of these things, it seems to be caught up in the flow of changes and activities, and merged in the mire of sorrows and miseries. 1.1.4.1. Proofs for the Existence of Purusa The existence of the self as the transcendent subject of experience is proved by the Samkhya by following arguments: a) Sanghataparthatvat (this proof is teleological): All the objects of the world are composed of parts. They are means to the ends of other beings because they cannot be ends in themselves. In other words they are created for the enjoyment of someone else as an object cannot enjoy itself. The enjoyer must be quite different from the worldly objects and cannot be an unconscious thing, made up of parts. They must be conscious selves, to whose ends all physical objects are the means and that is purusa the transcendent consciousness for whose enjoyment everything else is created. b) Trigunadiviparyayat (this proof is logical): All material objects including the mind and intellect are composed of the three gunas and must be controlled and directed by some intelligent principle in order that they can achieve anything or realize any end. A machine or a car does its work when put under the guidance of some person. So there must be some selves who guide the operations of prakrti and all her products, which is purusa. c) Bhoktrbhavat (this proof is ethical): All objects of the world are of the nature of pleasure, pain and indifference. But pleasure and pain have meaning only as they are experienced by some conscious experiencer. Hence there must be some conscious subjects or selves who enjoy and suffer pleasure and pain respectively. d) Kaivalyartham pravrtteh (this proof is mystical or religious): Some persons at least of this world make a sincere endeavor to attain final release from all suffering. This is not possible for anything of the physical world, for, by its very nature, the physical world causes suffering rather than relieve it. So there must be some immaterial substances or selves transcending the physical order. Otherwise, the concept of liberation or salvation and the will to liberate or to be liberated as found in saints and saviours of mankind would be meaningless. 1.1.4.2. Plurality of Selves

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The Samkhya system is also pluralistic because against the Advaita Vedantins, one universal self, the Samkhya admits a plurality of selves, of which one is connected with each body. The selves are all essentially same but are different numerically. The essence is the conscuouness. Thus the Samkhya purusas are subject to qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism. 9 Samkhya validates their contention of many purusas by the following arguments; (a) The functioning of each individual is different from one another. There is an obvious difference in the birth and death, and the sensory and motor endowments of different individuals. The birth or death of one individual does not mean the same for all other individuals. Nor does blindness or deafness in one man imply the same for all men. If all had one self then one persons birth/death or blindness/deafness will affect all others equally. But it is not the case, therefore selves are many. (b) If there were only one self for all living beings, then one persons liberation or bondage should bind everyone; the activity of and one must make all others active. But as a matter of fact, when we sleep, others make restless efforts, and vice versa. Therefore selves are many. (c)Men and women are different from the gods, on the one hand, and birds and beasts, on the other. But there could not have been these distinctions if gods and human beings, birds and beasts possessed the same self. Thus we see that there must be a plurality of selves, which are eternal and intelligent subjects of knowledge, as distinguished from prakrti which is the one, eternal and non-intelligent ground of the objects of knowledge, including manas, intellect and the ego.10 1.1.5. Evolution of the World According to the Samkhya the world of objects are evolution of Prakrti (primal matter) when it comes into relation with the purusa (the self). Prakrti is essentially dynamic and always changing. Before creation the change in Prakrti is homogeneous, in which the three gunas are held in a state of equilibrium. It is only when the heterogeneous change takes place, the evolution takes place. In heterogeneous change the rajas vibrates and makes sattva and tamas vibrate and so the equilibrium is disturbed and the evolution begins. Sattva, the principle of manifestation and rajas, the principle of activity were before creation held in check by tamas, the principle of non-manifestation and non-activity. But when rajas vibrates and makes other gunas vibrate, the process of creation begins. Thus the creation of the world of objects are not a new creation, but only making explicit of that which was formerly implicit in Prakrti.11 According to the Samkhya, this evolution is cyclical and not linear and teleological and so not blind or mechanical. Its cyclical because, there is no continuous process one direction but alternating periods of evolution and dissolution (pralaya) in a cyclical order. Its
Chandradhar Sharma: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Canarsidass Publishers, 1994. p.157. 10 Satischandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Rupa &Co, 2007. p.249. 11 Chandradhar Sharma: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Canarsidass Publishers, 1994. P. p.158.
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teleological in the sense, evolution has a purpose; Prakrti, the gunas, the senses, the mind, the ego, the intellect, the subtle body etc., are constantly serving the end of purusa. The creation is for the enjoyment of purusa and to its end. The end is both enjoyment as well as liberation. Prakrti and purusa are two opposed and eternal principles. Now, the evolution of the world cannot be due to the self alone, for it is inactive; nor can it be due to matter (prakrti) alone, for it is non-intelligent. There can be no evolution unless the two become somehow related to each other. Therefore, the question is how does the evolution take place? Because, the activity of prakrti must be guided by the intelligence of purusa, if there is to be any evolution of the world. It is only when purusa and prakrti co-operate that there is the creation of a world of objects. So how can two such different and opposed principles like purusa and prakrti cooperate? What brings the one in contact with the other? How does the equilibrium disturbed? All realistic pluralism including Samkhya fails to answer these questions satisfactorily. If purusa and Prakrti are eternal principles, they can never unite together. And if they do not unite, there is no creation possible. To solve this problem the Samkhya give the example of blind man and a lame. A lame man and a blind man can co-operate by lame sitting on the shoulders of the blind and point the blind man the way and thus both can reach the destination. Just as a blind man and a lame man can co-operate in order to get out of a forest, so the non-intelligent prakrti and the inactive purusa combine-and co-operate to serve their respective interests. Prakrti requires the presence of purusa in order to be known or appreciated by someone and purusa requires the help of prakrti in order to discriminate itself from the latter and thereby attain liberation. But how these two opposed and independent principles really come into contact? Because purusa is inactive and pure intelligence and Prakrti is active and material, non-intelligent and so can never be in real contact. The Sankhya realizes the difficulty and says that there is no real contact between them, but only the mere proximity of purusa (sannidhi-matra) is enough to disturb the equilibrium of the gunas for evolution. Another difficulty here the Samkhya fall into is; if purusas mere presence alone is enough for creation, then the purusa will always be near to Prakrti as purusa is inactive and cannot move. The consequence is evolution will never stop and pralaya would be never possible. Evolution then would be beginning less and the very conception of Prakrti as a state of equilibrium of three gunas would be impossible. Thus the Samkhya themselves caught between these two horns of dilemma; i.e. either no contact and hence no evolution or else no equilibrium and hence no Prakrti and no dissolution. In order to avoid this difficulty, the Samkhya uphold the theory of semblance of contact (samyogabhasa). 1.1.5.1. Samyogabhasa According to this theory, there is no real contact between purusa and Prakrti but only a semblance of a contact and it is this semblance that which is responsible for the evolution. How? Purusa is reflected in the intellect (buddhi) and wrongly identifies himself with his own reflection in the buddhi. This reflection is the contact established between purusa and Prakrti which is also responsible for the evolution. But here also a problem arises. What is buddhi or mahat into which purusa is reflected? The buddhi is the first evolute of Prakrti and therefore
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how can purusa be reflected into it before creation? The Samkhya defends this by saying that the purusa is reflected in the Prakrti itself. Now again the same problem comes in, if purusa is reflected in the Prakrti itself, then Prakrti being always there and to it being the essential nature of purusa to identify himself with reflection in the Prakrti, he would never get liberated and the very purpose for which evolution started gets defeated. Thus liberation and dissolution would never be possible. Moreover the reflection being always there, there would be no dissolution and so no equilibrium of the gunas and hence no Prakrti. And again if semblance of contact is enough for the evolution, then the effect or evolution itself would not be a real transformation (parinama) but an appearance (vivartha), of Prakrti, accepting which would contradict their basic position. Thus we can see that the Samkhya in order to defend its initial blunder of accepting purusa and Prakrti as absolute and independent realities commits blunders after blunders never being able to give a convincing solution. 1.1.5.2. The Process of Evolution The course of evolution is as follows. The first product of the evolution of prakrti is mahat or buddhi. It is in its cosmic aspect, the great germ of this vast world of objects and is accordingly called mahat or the great one. In its psychological aspect, i.e. as present in individual beings, it is called buddhi or the intellect. The special functions of buddhi are ascertainment and delusion. The understanding of the distinction between the subject and other objects, ones decision-making about things are all due to the power of the intellect. Buddhi arises out of the predominance of the element of sattva in prakrti. The natural function of buddhi is to manifest itself and other things. In its pure (sattvika) condition, therefore, it has such attributes as virtue (dharma), knowledge (jnana), detachment (vairiagya) and excellence (aisvaryya). But when vitiated by tamas, it has such contrary attributes as vice (adharma), ignorance (ajnana, attachment (asakti or avaragya) and imperfection (asakti or anais'varyya). Buddhi is different from purusa or the self which transcends all physical things and qualities. But it is the ground of all intellectual processes in all individual beings. It stands nearest to the self and reflects the consciousness of the self in such a way as to become apparently conscious and intelligent. While the senses and the mind function for buddhi or the intellect, the latter functions directly for the self and enables it, to discriminate between itself and prakrti. Ahankara or the ego is the second product of Prakrti, which arises directly out of mahat, the first manifestation. The function of ahankara is the feeling of ' I and mine' (abhimana). It is on account of ahankara that the self wrongly considers itself to be an agent or a cause of actions, a desirer of and striver for ends, and an owner of properties. According to the predominance of one or other of the three gunas, Abankara is classified into three kinds,.
1. It is called vaikarika or sattvika when the element of sattva predominates in it. From

this arise the eleven organs, namely, the five organs of perception (jnanendriya), the five organs of action (karmendriya), and the mind (manas). The five organs of perception (buddhindriya) are the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These perceive respectively the physical qualities of colour, sound, smell, taste and touch, and are developed from ahankrara for the enjoyment of the self. It is the self's desire to
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enjoy objects that creates both the objects of, and the organs for, enjoyment. The organs of action (karmendriya) are located in the mouth, hands, feet, anus and the sex organ. These perform respectively the functions of speech, apprehension, movement, excretion and reproduction. The real organs are not the perceptible external organs, like the eye-balls, earholes, skin, bands, feet, etc. There are certain imperceptible powers (sakti) in these perceptible end-organs which apprehend physical objects and act on them, and are, therefore, to be regarded as the organs (indriyas) proper. As such, an indriya cannot be sensed or perceived, but must be known by inference. The mind (manas) is the central organ which partakes of the nature of the organs of both knowledge and action. Without, the guidance of the manas neither of them can function in relation to their objects. The manas is a very subtle sense indeed, but it is made up of parts, and so can come into contact with several senses at the same time. The mind, the ego and the intellect (manas, ahankara and buddhi) are the three internal organs (antahkarana), while the senses of sight, hearing, etc. and the organs of action are called the external organs (bahyakarana). The vital breaths or processes are the functions of the internal organs. The ten external organs condition the function of the internal ones. The mind (manas) interprets the indeterminate sense-data supplied by the external organs into determinate perceptions; the ego owns the perceived objects as desirable ends of the self or dislikes them; and the intellect decides to act to attain or avoid those objects. The three internal and the ten external organs are collectively called the thirteen karanas or organs in, the Sunkhya philosophy. While the external objects are limited to present objects, the internal ones deal with the past, present and future. The Sankhya view of the manes and other organs has certain obvious differences from those of the other systems. According to the Nyaya- vaisesikas, manas is an eternal atomic substance which has neither parts nor any simultaneous contact with many senses. So we cannot have many experiences, many perceptions, desires and volitions at the same time. For the Sankhyas, the manas is neither atomic nor eternal, but a composite product of prakrti, and so subject to origin and destruction in time. It is also held by them that we may have many experiences-sensation, perception, feeling and volition-at the same time, although ordinarily our experiences come one after the other. The Nyaya-Vaisesikas admit only the manas and the five external senses as indriyas and hold that the external senses are derived from the physical elements (mahabhuta). The Sankhyas enumerate eleven indriyas e.g. the manas, the five sensory organs and five motor organs, and derive them all from the ego (ahankara), which is not recognized as a separate principle by the other systems. The Vedantins treat the five vital breaths (panca-prana) as independent principles, while the Sankhyas reduce them to the general functions of antahkarana.
2. It is called taijasa or rajasa when that of rajas predominates. This rajasa is concerned

in both the sattva and the tamasa, and supplies the energy needed for the change of sattva and tamas into their products.
3. It is called bhutaldi or tamasa when tamas predominates. From this tamasa ahankara

are derived the five subtle elements (tanmatras).

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The five tanmatras are the potential elements or generic essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. These are very subtle and cannot be ordinarily perceived. We know them by inference, although the yogins may have a perception of them. The gross physical elements arise from the tanmatras as follows : (i) From the essence of sound (sandaanmatra) is produced akasa with the quality of sound which is perceived by the ear. (ii) From the essence of touch (sparsatanmatra) combined with that of sound, arises air with the attributes of sound and touch. (iii) Out of the essence of colour (rupatanmatra) as mixed with those of sound and touch, there arises light or fire with the properties of sound, touch and colour. (iv) From the essence of taste (rasatanmatra) combined with those of sound, touch and colour is produced the element of water with the qualities of sound, touch, colour and taste. (v) The essence of smell (gandhatanmatra) combined with the other four gives rise to earth which jas all the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The five physical elements of akasa, air, light, water and earth have respectively the specific properties of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. In the order in which they occur here, the succeeding element has the special qualities of the preceding ones added to its own, since their essences go on combining progressively. The whole course of evolution from prakrti to the gross physical elements is distinguished into two stages, namely, the psychical (Pratyayasarga or buddhisarga) and the physical (tanmatrasarga or bhautika-sarga). The first is includes the developments of prakrti as buddhi, ahankara and the eleven sense-motor organs. The second is constituted by the evolution of the five subtle physical essences (tanmatra), the gross elements (mahi bhuta) and their products. The tanmatras, being supersensible and unenjoyable to ordinary beings, are called avisesa, i.e. devoid of specific perceptible characters. The physical elements aid their products, being possessed of specific characters, pleasurable or painful or stupefying, are designated as visesa or the specific. The visesas or specific objects are divided into three kinds, namely, the gross elements, the gross body born of parents (sthulasarira) and the subtle body (suksma or lingasarira). The gross body is composed of the five gross elements, although some think that it is made of four elements or of only one element. The subtle body is the combination of buddhi, ahankara, the eleven sense-motor organs and the five subtle elements (tanmatra). The gross body is the support of the subtle body, in so far as the intellect (buddhi), the ego (ahankara) and the senses cannot function without some physical basis. According to Vcaspati there are only these two kinds of bodies as mentioned before. Vijnanabhiksu, however, thinks that there is a third kind of body called the adhistana body which supports the subtle one when it passes from one gross body into another. The history of the evolved universe is a play of twenty four principles of which prakrti is the first, the five gross elements are the last, and the thirteen organs (karanas) and five tanmatras are the intermediate ones. But it is not complete in itself, since it has a necessary reference to the world of selves as the witnesses and enjoyers thereof. It is not the dance of blind atoms, nor the push and pull of mechanical forces which produce a world to no purpose. On the other hand, it serves the most fundamental ends of the moral, or better, the spiritual, life. If the spirit, be a reality, there must be proper adjustment between moral deserts, and the joys and sorrows of life.
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Again, the history of the world must be, in spite of all appearances to the contrary, the progressive realization of the life of spirit. In--the Sankhya, the evolution of prakrti into a world of objects makes it possible for spirits to enjoy or suffer according to their merits or demerits. But the ultimate end of the evolution of prakrti is the freedom (mukti) of self. It is through a life of moral training in the evolved universe that the self realizes its true nature. What that nature is and how it can be realized, we shall consider presently. The above order of development from ahankara is laid down in the Sankhya-karika and accepted by Vicaspati Misra. Vijnanabhiksu, however, gives a different order. According to him manas or the mind is the only sense which is pre-eminently sattvika or manifesting, and is, therefore, derived from sattvika ahankara. The other ten organs are developed from rajasa ahankara, and the five subtle elements from the tamasa. 1.2. The Sankhya Theory of Knowledge The Sankhya theory of knowledge is drawn mainly from its dualistic metaphysics. It accepts only three independent sources of valid knowledge (pramana). These are perception, inference and scriptural testimony (sabda). The other sources of knowledge, like comparison, postulation (arthapatti) and noncogniton (anupalabdhi), are included under these three and not recognized as separate sources of knowledge. Valid knowledge (prama) is a definite and an unerring cognition of some object through the modification of buddhi or the intellect which reflects the consciousness of the self in it. What we call the mind or the intellect is an unconscious material entity in the Sankhya philosophy. Consciousness or intelligence really belongs to the self. But the self cannot immediately apprehend the objects of the world. If it could, we should always know all objects, since the self in us is not finite and limited, but all-pervading. The self knows objects through the intellect; the manas, and the Senses. We have a true knowledge of objects when, through the activity of the senses and the manas, their forms are impressed on the intellect which, in its turn, reflects the light or consciousness of the self. In all valid knowledge there are three factors, namely, the subject (pramata), the object (pramey), and the ground or source of knowledge (pramana). The subject being a conscious principle is no other than the self as pure consciousness (suddha cetana). The modification of the intellect, through which the self knows an object, is called pramana. The object presented to the self through this modification is the prameya. Prama or valid knowledge is the reflection of the self in the intellect as modified into the form of the object, because without the self's consciousness the unconscious intellect cannot cognize anything. 1.2.1. Perception Perception is the direct cognition of an object through its contact with some sense. When an object comes within the range of your vision, there is contact between the object and your eyes. The object produces certain impressions or modifications in the sense organ, which are analyzed and synthesised by manas or the mind. Through the activity of the senses and the mind, buddhi or the intellect becomes modified and transformed into the shape of the object.
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The intellect, however, being, being an unconscious material principle, cannot by itself know the object, although the form of the object is present in it. But as the intellect has an excess of sattva, it reflects, like a transparent mirror, the consciousness of the self (purusa).With the reflection of the self's consciousness in it, the unconscious modification of the intellect into the form of the table becomes illumined into a conscious state of perception. Just as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and thereby manifests other things, so the material principle of buddhi being transparent and bright (sattvika), reflects the consciousness of the self and illuminates or cognizes the objects of knowledge. There are two different explanations given to this reflection theory of knowledge by Vacaspati Misra and vijnanabhikau. What we have discussed is the idea of Vacaspati Misra. Vijnanabhiksu presents another explanation to the same theory.12 Vacaspati thinks that the knowledge of an object takes place when there is reflection of the self in the intellect which has been modified into the form of the object. 1.2.2. Two Kinds of Perception There are two kinds of perception, namely, nirvikalpaka or the indeterminate and savikalpaka or the determinate. The first arises at the first moment of contact between a sense and its object, and is antecedent to all mental analysis and synthesis of the sense-data. It is accordingly called alocana or a mere sensing the object. In it there is cognition of the object as a mere something without any recognition of it as this or that kind of thing. It is an unverbalised experience like those of the infant and the dumb. Just as babies and dumb persons cannot express their experiences in words, so we cannot communicate this indeterminate perception of objects to other people by means of words and sentences. The second kind of perception is the result of the analysis, synthesis, and interpretation of sensedata by manas or the mind. So it is called vivecana or a judgment of the object. It is the determinate cognition of an object as a particular kind of thing having certain qualities and standing in certain relations to other things. The determinate perception of an object is expressed in the form of a subject-predicate proposition, e.g. this is a cow, that rose is red. 1.2.3. Inference Inference is the knowledge of one term of a relation, which is not perceived, through the other which is perceived and known to be invariably related to the first. In it what is perceived leads us on to the knowledge of what is unperceived through the knowledge of a
12

According to Vijnanabhiksu, the process of perceptual knowledge is like this: When any object comes in contact with its special sense organ, the intellect becomes modified into the form of the object. Then because of the predominance of sattva in it, the intellect reflects the conscious self and seems to be conscious, in the same way in which a mirror reflects the light of a lamp and becomes itself luminous and capable of manifesting other objects. But next, the intellect, which is thus modified into the form of the object, is reflected back in the self. That is, the object is presented to the self through a mental modification corresponding to the form of the object. Thus on Vicaspatis view, there is a reflection of the self in the intellect, but no reflection of the intellect back into the self. Vijnanabhiksu, on the other hand, thinks that there is a reciprocal reflection of the self in the intellect and of the intellect in the self. This view is accepted also in Vedavyasa's commentary on the YogaSutra. What induces Vijnanabhiksu to suppose that the modified intellect is reflected in the self is perhaps the necessity of explaining the self's experience of pleasure and pain. The self, being pure consciousness, free from all pleasure and pain, cannot be subjected to these experiences. It is the intellect which really enjoys pleasure and suffers pain. So, the apparent experiences of pleasure and pain to the self should be explained by some sort of reflection' of the intellect in the self.

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universal relation (vyapti) between the two. We get the knowledge of vyapti between two things from the repeated observation of their concomitance. One single instance of their relation is not, as some logicians wrongly think, sufficient to establish the knowledge of a universal relation between them. With regard to the classification of inference, the Sankhya adopts the Nyaya view, although in a slightly different form. Inference is first divided into two kinds, namely, vita and avita. It is called vita or affirmative when it is based on a universal affirmative proposition, and avita or negative when based on a universal negative propostion. The vita is subdivided into purvavat and samanyatodrsta. A purvavat inference is that which is based on the observed uniformity of concomitance between two things. This is illustrated when one infers the existence of fire from smoke because one has observed that smoke is always accompanied by fire. Samanyatodrsta inference, on the other hand, is not based on any observation of the concomitance between the middle and the major term, but on the similarity of the middle with such facts as are uniformly related to the major. How do we know that we have the visual and other senses? It cannot be by means of perception. The senses are supersensible. We have no sense to perceive our senses with. Therefore, we are to know the existence of the senses by an inference like this: All actions require some means or instruments, e.g. the act of cutting; the perceptions of colour, etc. are so many acts; therefore, there must be some means or organs of perception." It should be noted here that we infer the existence of organs from acts of perception, not because we have observed the organs to be invariably related to perceptive arts, but because we know that perception is an action and that an action requires a means of action. The other kind of inference, namely, avita is what some Naya-Vaisesikas call sesavat or parisesa inference. It consists in proving something to be true by the elimination of all other alternatives to it. This is illustrated when one argues that sound must be a quality because it cannot, be a substance or an activity or a relation or anything else. As regards the logical form of inference, the sankhyas admit, like the Nayayikas, that the fivemembered syllogism is the most convincing form of inferential proof. 1.2.4. Testimony The third pramana is sabda or testimony. It is constituted by authoritative statements (aptavacana), and gives usthe knowledge of objects which cannot be known by perception and inference. A statement is a sentence made up of words arranged in a certain way. A word is a sign which denotes something and its meaning (artha) is the thing, denoted by it (vacya). That is, a word is a symbol which stands for some object. The understanding of a sentence requires the understanding of the meanings of its constituent words. Sabda is generally said to be of two kinds, namely, laukika and vaidika. The first e is the testimony of ordinary trustworthy persons. This, however, is not recognized in the Sankhya as a separate pramana, since it depends on perception and inference. It is the testimony of Sruti or the Vedas that is to be admitted as the third independent pramana. The Vedas give us true knowledge about super-sensuous realities which cannot be known through perception and inference. As not made by any person, the Vedas are free from all defects and imperfections that must cling to the products of personal agencies. They are, therefore, infallible, and possess self evident validity. The Vedas embody the intuitions of enlightened seers (rsis).
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These intuitions, being universal and eternal, experiences, are not dependent on the will or consciousness of individual persons. As such, the Vedas are impersonal (apauruseya). Yet they are not eternal, since they arise out of the spiritual experiences of seers and saints, and are conserved by a continuous line of instruction from generation to generation. 1.3. The Doctrine Bondage and Liberation Our life on earth is a mixture of joys and sorrows. There are indeed many pleasures of life, and also many creatures that have a good share of them. But many more are the pains and sufferings of life, and all living beings are more or less subject to them. Even if it be possible for any individual being to shun all other pains and miseries, it is impossible for him to evade the clutches, of decay and death. Ordinarily, however, we are the victims of three kinds of kinds of pains, viz. the adhyatmika, adhibhautika and adhidaivika. The first is due to intraorganic causes like bodily disorders and mental affection. It includes both bodily and mental sufferings, such as fever and headache, the pangs of fear, anger, greed, etc. The second is produced by extra-organic natural causes like men, beasts, thorns, etc. Instances of this kind are found in cases of murder, snake-bite, prick of thorns and so forth. The third kind of suffering is caused by extra-organic supernatural causes, e.g. the pains inflicted by ghosts, demons, etc. Now all men earnestly desire to avoid every kind of pain. Moreover, they want, once for all, to put an end to all their sufferings, and have enjoyment at all times. But that is not to be. We cannot have pleasure only and exclude pain altogether. So long as we are in this frail body with its imperfect organs, all pleasures are bound to be mixed up with- pain or, at least, be temporary. Hence we should give up the hedonistic ideal of pleasure and rest content with the less attractive but more rational end of freedom from pain. In the Sankhya system, liberation is the absolute and complete cessation of all pain without a possibility of return. It is the ultimate end or the summum bonum of our life (apavarga or purusartha). How are we to attain liberation or absolute freedom from all pain and suffering? All the arts and crafts of the modern man and all the blessings of the modern science give us but temporary relief from pain or short-lived pleasures. These do not ensure a total and final release from all the ills to which our mind and body are subject. So the Indian philosopher wants some other more effective method of accomplishing the task, and this he finds in the right knowledge of reality (tattvajnana). It is a general rule that our sufferings are due to our ignorance. In the different walks of life we find that the ignorant and uneducated man comes to grief on many occasions because he does not know the laws of life and nature. The more knowledge we have about ourselves and the world we live in, the better fitted are we for the struggle for existence and the enjoyments of life. But the fact remains that we are not perfectly happy, nor even completely free from pain and misery. The reason for this is that we have not the perfect knowledge about reality. When we have that knowledge, we shall attain freedom from all suffering. Reality is, according to the Sankhya, a plurality of selves and the world of objects presented to them. The self is an intelligent principle which does not possess any quality or activity but is a pure consciousness free from the limitations of space, time and causality. It is the pure subject which transcends the whole world of objects
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including physical things and organic bodies, the mind and the senses, the ego and the intellect. All changes and activities, all thoughts and feelings, all pleasures and pains, all joys and sorrows belong to what we call the mind-body system. The self is quite distinct from the mind-body complex and is, therefore, beyond all the affections and afflictions of the psychical life. Pleasure and pain are mental facts which do not really colour the pure self. It is the mind, and not self, that feels pleasure or pain, and is happy or unhappy. So also, virtue and vice, merit and demerit, in short, all moral properties belong to the ego (ahankara) who is the striver and doer of all acts. The self is different from the ego or the moral agent who strives for good or bad ends, attains them and enjoys or suffers accordingly. Thus we see that the self is the transcendent subject whose very essence is pure consciousness, freedom, eternity and immortality. It is pure consciousness (jnanasvarupa) in the sense that the changing states and processes of the mind, which we call empirical consciousness, do not belong' to the self. The self is the subject or witness of mental changes as of bodily and physical changes but is as much distinct from the former as from the latter. It is freedom itself in so far as it is above the space-time and the cause-effect order of existence. It is eternal and immortal, because it is not produced by any cause and cannot be destroyed in any way. Pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow really belong to buddhi or the intellect and the mind. The purusa or self is by its nature free from them all. But on account of ignorance it, fails to distinguish itself from the mind and the intellect, and owns them as parts of itself so much so that it identifies itself with the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect. It becomes, so to say, somebody with a certain name, and a particular combination of talent temperament and character. As such, we speak of it as the material self, the 'social self,' the sensitive and appetitive self,' the ' imagining and desiring self,' or the ' willing and thinking self. According to the Sankhya, all these are not-self which reflects the pure self and apparently imparts its affections and emotions to the latter. The self considers itself to be happy or unhappy when the mind and the intellect, with which it identifies itself, become so, in the same way in which a father considers himself fortunate or unfortunate in view of his beloved son's good or bad luck, or a master feels insulted by an insult to his own servant. It is this want of discrimination or feeling of identity (aviveka) between the self and the mind-body that is the cause of all our troubles. We suffer pain and enjoy pleasure because the experiencing subject in us (drsta) wrongly identifies itself with the experienced objects (drsta) including pleasure and pain. The cause of suffering being ignorance (ajnana) in the sense of non-discrimination (aviveka) between the self and the not-self, freedom from suffering must come from knowledge of the distinction between the two (vivekajnana). But this saving knowledge is not merely an intellectual understanding of the truth. It must be a direct knowledge or clear realization of the fact that the self is not the body and the senses, the mind and the intellect. Once we realise or see that our self is the unborn and undying spirit in us, the eternal and immortal subject of experience, we become free from all misery and suffering. A direct knowledge of the truth is necessary to remove the illusion of the body or the mind as myself. Now I have a direct and an undoubted perception that I am a particular psycho-physical organism. The knowledge that the self is distinct from all this must be an equally direct perception, if it is to contradict
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and cancel the previous one. The illusory perception of snake in a rope is not to be sublated by any argument or instruction, but by another perception of the rope as such. To realize the self we require a long course of spiritual training with devotion to and constant contemplation of, the truth that the spirit is not the body, the senses, the mind or the intellect. When the self attains liberation, no change takes place in it and no new property or quality accrues to it. Liberation or freedom of the self does not mean the development from a less perfect to a more perfect condition. So also, immortality and eternal life are not to be regarded as future possibilities or events in time. If these were events and temporal acquisitions, they would be governed by the laws of time, space and causality, and, as such, the very opposite of freedom and immortality. The attainment of liberation means just the clear recognition of the self as a reality which is beyond time and space, and above the mind and the body, and, therefore, essentially free, eternal and immortal. When there is such realization, the self ceases to be affected by the vicissitudes of the body and the mind and rests in itself as the disinterested witness of physical and psychical changes. Just as the dancing girl ceases to dance after having entertained the spectators, so prakrti ceases to act and evolve the world after manifesting her nature to the self. It is possible for every self to realize itself in this way and thereby attain liberation in life in this world. This kind of liberation is known as jivanmukti or emancipation of the soul while living in this body. After the death of its body, the liberated self attains what is called videhamukti or emancipation of the spirit from all bodies, gross and subtle. This ensures absolute and complete freedom. Vijnana-bhiksu, however, thinks that the latter is the real kind of liberation, since the self cannot be completely free from the influence of bodily and mental changes so long as it is embodied. But all Sankhyas agree that liberation is only the complete destruction of the threefold misery (duhkhatraya-bhighata). It is not a state of joy as, conceived in the Vedanta. Where there is no pain, there can neither be any pleasure; because the two are relative and inseparable. 1.4. The Problem of God The attitude of the Sankhya towards theism has been the subject of controversy among its commentators and interpreters. While some of them clearly repudiate the belief in God, others take great pains to make out that the Sankhya is no less theistic than the Nyaya. The classical Sankhya argues against the existence of God on the following grounds: (a) That the world as a system of effects must have a cause is no doubt true. But God or Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. God is said to be the eternal and immutable self; and what is unchanging cannot be the active cause of anything. So it follows that the ultimate cause of the world is the eternal but everchanging (parinami) prakrti or matter. (b) It may be said that prakrti being non-intelligent must be controlled and directed by some intelligent agent to produce the world. The individual selves are limited in knowledge and, therefore, cannot" control the subtle material cause of the world. So there must be an infinitely wise being, i.e. God, who directs and guides prakrti. But this is untenable. God, as conceived by the theists, does not act or exert Himself in any way; but to control and guide prakrti is to act or do something. Supposing God is the controller of prakrti, we may ask: What induced God to control prakrti and thereby create the world? It cannot be any end of His own, for a perfect
42

being cannot have any unfulfilled desires and unattained ends. Nor can it be the good of His creatures. No prudent man bothers himself about the welfare of other beings without his own gain. As a matter of fact, the world is so full of sin and suffering that it can hardly be said to be the work of God who had the good of His creatures in view when He created. (c) The belief in God is inconsistent with the distinctive reality and immortality of individual selves (jiva). If the latter be included within God as His parts, they ought to have some of the divine powers, which, however, is not the case. On the other band, if they are created by god, they must be subject to destruction. The conclusion drawn from all this is that God does not exist and that prakrti is the sufficient reason for there being a world of objects. Prakrti creates the world unconsciously for the good of the individual selves (purusa) in the same way in which the milk of the cow flows unconsciously through her udder for the nourishment of the calf. According to another interpretation of the Sankhya, which is not generally accepted, this system is not atheistic. This is the view of Vijnanabhiksu and some modern writers. They hold that the existence of God as possessed of creative activity cannot be admitted. Yet we must believe in God as the eternally perfect spirit who is the witness of the world and whose mere presence (sannidhimatra) moves prakrti to act and create, in the same way in which the magnet moves a piece of iron. Vijnanabhiksu thinks that the existence of such a God is supported by reason as well as by the scriptures. CONCLUSION The Sankhya can be called a philosophy of dualistic realism. With the period of this system in the Indian philosophy we enter into a new chapter of Indian tradition namely from oral to the written tradition.13 Accordingly the Samkhya traces the whole course of the world to the interplay of two ultimate principles, purusa and prakrti. Prakrti is regarded as the ultimate cause of the world of objects including physical things, organic bodies and psychical products like the mind (manas), the intellect and the ego. Prakrti is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. It is active and ever-changing, but blind and unintelligent. On the other hand, the Sankhya admits another ultimate principle, viz. purusa or the self. The category of purusa includes a plurality of selves who are eternal and immutable principles of pure consciousness. These selves are intelligent but inactive and unchanging. It is in contact with such conscious and intelligent selves that the unconscious and unintelligent prakrti evolves the world of experience. In defending their dualism and pluralism the Samkhya obviously fail to provide valid explanations. The physical analogies given in the Sankhya are not sufficiently illuminating. Further, the existence of many selves (pluralism) is proved by the Sankhya from the difference in the nature, activity, birth and death, and sensory and motor endowments of different living beings. But all these differences pertain, not to the self as pure consciousness but to the bodies associated with it. So far as their intrinsic nature (i.e. pure consciousness) is concerned, there is nothing to distinguish between one self and another. So there seems to be no good ground for the Sankhya theory of many ultimate selves. It may be that the many selves, of which we speak, are the empirical individuals or egos dealt with in ordinary life and experience. From the speculative standpoint there seem to be certain gaps in
Surendranath Dasgupta and Surama Dasgupta, The history of Indian philosophy, Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1922. P.218.
13

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the Sankhya philosophy. Still we should not underrate its value as a system of self-culture for the attainment of liberation. So far as the practical end of attaining freedom from suffering is concerned, this system is as good as any other and enables the religious aspirant to realize the highest good of his life, viz. liberation.

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2.3. ADVAITIC VISION OF REALITY ANTO VARGHESE

1. Introduction Among the various schools of Indian philosophy, Vedanta occupies a prominent position, for its well-developed epistemology, ontology and metaphysics and its wonderful power to assimilate the best of other schools. Vedanta is not only philosophical thought but also a living faith. Sankarcharya of the Advaita Vedanta is one to be taken note of in this context of all counts. The main aim of Sankara was to defend the unity and oneness of Reality which is characterized in the upanisads as one without a second (Ekam eva advitiyam). His entire thought is oriented to establishing Brahman as the sole Reality with which the individual is essentially identical. The unity of the individual with Brahman remains unmanifested owing to Avidya or ajnana. Consequently, Reality is to be realized through the dispelling of all ignorance (avidya). Philosophy of Sankara is thus, rather an enquiry into what is ultimately Real. The aim of philosophy is the attainment of the higher wisdom, which is nothing other than the realization of Brahman, the ultimate Reality. In his eagerness to establish the nonduality of Brahman, he has to deny the existence of this world of multiplicity. He considers and maintains that the phenomenal world is a product of Maya or ignorance. We superimpose names and forms on the unitary, unsublatable Brahman because of our ignorance. The world is appearance and appearance is that which in principle can be sublated. The phenomenal world, though sublatable by Brahman, is not an object of our experience. In order to explain the relation of world to Brahman Sankara brings forth Ishvara, though ontologically Ishvara is of the same nature as Brahman. Further, Sankara elaborately discusses the concept of Maya, which is the creative power of Brahman, in explaining the status of the world. In our enquiry into the ultimate in the advaitic line of thought we will be looking at illusion as the starting point of our enquiry, critique of the world (categories), analysis of avidya, Reality as pure consciousness, levels of consciousness, the concept of liberation. 1.1The Basic Project of Advaita Advaita as the name implies, is a theory of non-dualism (a-dvaita).14 According to them reality is conceived as one without a second (sccidananda). The emphasis of the system is to remove all the differences rather than to establish the identity. The Upanishads declare that the Reality is Brahman, which is without a second and is Existence, consciousness and Bliss. It is the pure Being, the Thing in itself. It is indeterminate, characterless and beyond the territory of any kind of predication. The method followed by Advaita is via negativa here importance is given not to establish the oneness of reality rather to discard all differences.
14

Chandradhar Sharma, The Advaitic Tradition in Indian Philosophy,

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996, p.1.

45

The extreme absolutism of Advaita opens up a flood of problems. Our experience is an experience of a world of infinite complexity and variety. These distinctions cannot be explained by one unitary principle called Brahman. If Brahman is the Only Reality and is the material cause of the world, then, Brahman has to be endowed with conscious as well as unconscious natures. The effect has to be of the nature of the cause: if the world of our experience is real and many, its cause should also be real and many. Nevertheless, these assertions are inconsistent with the logic of Advaita. Ultimately, the issue is how to reconcile the doctrine of ONE with the experience of MANY. 1.2 Illusion as the Starting Point Of Philosophy The starting point of any philosophy should be from experience, from our existential situations. Logically we can visualize an unchanging, non-contradicted reality that is the ground of beings yet such a hypothetical reality does not have its feet firmly rooted on the ground but rather hangs in the thin air. The realists are right, therefore, in saying that perception is the most important valid means of knowledge and perception proves plurality. That is, when the sense organ is in touch with the object concerned we have knowledge of that object after the manner of that object. However, is our experience always true? Were we not mistaken at least once in our life? It is also possible that when a sense organ is in touch with an object the knowledge that is produced will not be of the nature of that object. For instance, when my sense organ may be in touch with a shell yet I may have the knowledge of the silver. This shows that in all cases the sense-object contact may not give us the right knowledge. Illusion is therefore, having the knowledge of something, which actually does not exist in front of us. The instances of illusion disprove the claims of the realists, for example, the knowledge of the snake is generated even when the sense-organ eye was in contact with the rope. The realist may try to explain away somehow this anomaly as a freak occurrence while the Advaitins perceive this as the point of departure for it gives us an insight into the hollowness of the nature of things as they appear. What does the illusion lay bare? Thus, the problem of error has the pivotal place in advaitism. Unless this world of multiplicity is rejected as devoid of ultimate reality, the non-dual doctrine of advaita Vedanta cannot be established. This rejection is possible only though the acceptance of this world as a case of adhyasa. We mistake Brahman as this world of plurality, even as we mistake a rope for a snake. Adhyasa covers the total field of empirical experience-subjective as well as objective. It is unconscious or transcendental comingling or coupling of the ultimate and the empirical, spirit and matter, eternal and temporal, true and false, real and ideal. Without presupposing it the presence of knowledge, knowing agent, known object and ways of knowing cannot be established. The state of bondage as well as the state of freedom is corollaries from the fundamental fact of adhyasa. What is the nature of this adhyasa? How does one thing appear as of the nature of another? This philosophical predicament is well explained through various khyativadas. 15

15

Surendra Kumar Shrivastava , The Essential Advaitism, B.N.Jaiswal Arun Press, 1980, pp.71-72.
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Varanasi:

1.2.1 Theories of Illusion Theories of error are one of the relevant topics in Indian philosophy. There are five nonadvaitic theories, which explain the perceptual error such as satkhyati, asatkhyati, atamakyati, anyathakhyati, akhyati. Basing themselves on their respective metaphysical and epistemological perspectives, every one of them explain away illusion. Their theories could be categorized under two heads: satkhyati and asatkyati. While the satkhyativadins believe that the object given in illusion is real, the asatkhyativadins believe that the object given in illusion is unreal. These are the only categories available. Either a thing exists or it does not exist at all. The counter relative of existence is non-existence. According to them, there is no possibility of a third category. The Realists had to accept the objects of illusion as real to justify their own metaphysical position, while the idealists could forgo the reality of the objects given in illusion. In spite of the ingenuity of their arguments, none could give a convincing, error-free answer to the problem of perceptual error.16 The Advaitins dared to go beyond these two categories: sat and asat. The objects of illusion is real, because it is given in direct experience; yet it is sublated later with the arrival of true knowledge. In that sense the object of illusion cannot be called real. The object of illusion cannot be labeled as unreal too. An unreal like the son of a barren woman can never be an object of experience whereas the object of illusion is given in experience. The advaitins, thus, conclude that the object of illusion is other than real as well as other than unreal. To explain this let us analyze the structure of illusion. 1.2.2 The Structure of Illusion In the complex structures of illusion, four strands could be clearly delineated. They are: adhisthana, avarana, viksepa and adhyasa.17 1.2.2.1 Adhisthana (substratum) In the shell-silver illusion, silver(illusory) has no existence of its own. It has only a borrowed existence. Whatever is said about the silver, actually, are the features of the shell. The silver is a parasite, masquerading under the borrowed plumes.18 The brightness, the size, the weight and everything else I describe about the silver in the shell-silver illusion, are merely the ascription of the shell. Silver in itself is a complete naught. Being a parasite, it can exist only on something else (the shell) that functions as its base. As Dr. A.K. Chatterjee says, There is no illusion without a ground, otherwise it would lack a locus standi or a platform, and could not even appear.19

16

Ibid., p.72.

17

A. k Chatterjee, The Concept of Saksi in Advaita Vedanta, in Indian council of philosophical Research, Vol. x , No.2, 1993. p.45

18 19

Ibid., p.53. Ibid., p.53.

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1.2.2.2 Avarana (Covering) Mere presence of Adhisthana though necessary is not sufficient condition for the occurance of illusion. All the shells do not appear as silver; often they are perceived only as shell. For misconstruing to occur, the shell should not be known as a shell; it should exist but should remain unknown, so that the silver could borrow its reality and character. It must go into hiding (avarana); there must be something that covers it and prevents it from being known.20 1.2.2.3 Viksepa (Projection) But mere unknownness of the shell is again not sufficient for the appearance of the silver. If something remains hidden, it is simply not known, but that by itself does not account for the emergence of a specious apperace. The mere obscuration of the shell does not help us in any way in the perception of the silver. In the shell-silver illusion we do not have the mere absence of the knowledge of the shell; instead the silver is cognized. In the place of the shell and silver is projected (viksepa). 21 1.2.2.4 Adhyasa (Superimposition) Even now the picture is not complete. What is projected cannot stand on its own legs, since it has no reality of its own. Shell and silver are not two distinct entities; the latter is nothing in itself and can exist only as imposed on or ascribed to (adhyasa) the shell.22 A closer scrutiny reveals the non-substanitiality of the silver. The silver that is projected has no existence of its own. The existence of the silver is only an apparent one, a borrowed one. It exists only as superimposed on the shell. When the illusion is sublated at the dawn of true knowledge we do not have two separate realities as shell and silver. One can only say that what we perceived was not the silver but the shell. The silver of the shell-silver illusion explodes into nothingness. Thus, there is a positive confusion, shell mistake for silver. Illusion as the structure reveals is a highly complex and unique experience. To begin with, it is a private experience. It is an experience, which should have not been there under normal circumstances; yet, it somehow appears. It has a sapatio-temporal pale, a territory of its own; yet a closer scrutiny would vouch for its utter non-existence. The silver was non-existent before the illusion, during the illusion after the illusion. Again, the silver that appears in illusion, though it has no empirical status, is ascribed with many empirical qualities. We say that the silver is bright, round in size etc. but all our descriptions of silver are in fact, descriptions of the shell. It is the colour, size, and weight of the shell that we are speaking of. Still it is surprising to note that what we run to get is not the shell but silver. The silver is present before us not elsewhere as claimed by the anyathakhyativadins. If the silver were not present before us we would not have run to get it. The illusory experience has no existence of

20 21 22

Ibid., p54. Ibid., p.54. Ibid., p.54.

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its own; yet it is arthakriyakari, causally efficient. When one sees a snake in the rope-snake illusion, out of fear he either runs away from the snake or takes a stick to kill it. Illusion, as the advaitins endorse, is mistaking something for another. It is the confusion caused by two terms. The terms are neither of the same status nor belong to the same level. The two terms between which the confusion obtains, do not however belong to the same level. . Then they would be merely different, but one would not be the falsity of the other . Confusion is not a physical process of two separate things being inextricably intertwined. When the confusion clears up, the two are not reinstated separately. 23One term is totally annihilated while the other term is retained. The silver disappears at the dawn of knowledge and the shell is presented to us as shell. Illusion also reveals the difference in the way we know the objects of illusion. Knowledge, as we know, reveals objects. An object exists whether known or unknown. Knowledge is only an adventitious episode in the life of an object. The object is not influenced by the fact that we know of it. On the other hand, the illusory object exists only as it is known. The other term (the object of illusion), however, is exhausted in the mistake situation and cannot be had independently.24 It can be known only as it is being known. It has no existence of its own, neither before, nor after. Illusion is thus an event which we know, yet unable to describe. It is by nature indescribable. 1.2.3 The Content of Illusion The content of illusion could be considered as real. It is given in experience. Only that which is real could be an object of experience. Yet it is sublated later at the arrival of knowledge. The really Real should persist at all the three times. In that sense it is not real as the really Real. Can the content of illusion be branded as unreal? By no means. An illusory object, therefore, is other than the real (sat), as well as other the unreal (asat). It is sadasadvilaksana and indescribable (anirvacaniya). This experience of illusion is an eye opener to the world illusion. Brahama satyam, jagat mityha, jiva Brahmaiva na aparah, is the oft quoted maxim of the advaitins. It says, Brahman alone is the Real, the world is an illusion, and the individual selves are not different from the Brahman. Is this world an illusion? Can the categories of the Realists stand the test of logic? 1.3 The World as Illusion The maxim of the Realists, whatever enters into the texture of our experience should have a counter part in the external world, is defeated by cognition in illusion. The object in illusion is not real, yet one perceives it. The experience of illusion is an eye-opener for every seeker to suspect any given experience. The snake in the rope-snake illusion is taken for real as long as one is in illusion. However, the real is negated as soon as one comes off his illusory
23

A. k Chatterjee, The Concept of Maya, in Indian council of philosophical Annual, Vol. 2, 1966, p.2.

24

Ibid., p.2.

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experience. Advaita makes use of illusion to explain the illusory character of the whole universe. The realists believe that objects in the world have a real and objective existence. They are real, as we perceive them to be. In Indian philosophy, we can churn out two main positons on the nature of Reality. The samkhya position is that nothing could come into existence from non-existence, and that what exists can never be non-existent. On the other hand, the Buddhists believe that reality comes off void, and resolves into void, without leaving any residue. The Naiyayikas tread a middle path in believing that the effect, which is altogether non-existent, comes into existence after the operation of the causes. 25According to the Naiyayikas, as D.N.Sastry rightly puts it, the effect is not produced out of the causes, but in the causes. For instance, the yarn continue to exist separately and simultaneously with the piece of cloth. The essence of the cloth is totally different. The question that naturally arises is, from where does the essence of ht effect come? The Naiyayikas believe that the essence of the effect is facilitated by the inhering of the cause in the effect. The essence of the cause continues to remain intact even after the production of the effect. This rather strange view had to be upheld by the Naiyayikas to account for their realism. On the other hand, if the effect possesses the same essence as that of the causes, as the samkhyans say, then, one cannot make a real distinction between the cause and its effect. One will have to reduce every object in the world to the essence of the cause, sacrificing in the process, all objectivity, plurality and reality to objects. 1.3.1 Critique of Categories According to advaitins the experience of illusion is an eye opener to the world illusion. World is understood in terms of the categories upheld by the realists such as substance, qualities, actions, causality etc. Advaitins in their turn would critically examine each categories to show their inadequacy and inherent contradictions. 1.3.1.1 Critique of Causality Theory of causation is the crux of every Indian school of philosophy. Every system in India developed a unique theory of causality to explain their own concept of reality. Causality is brought into focus in the context of change. In our common sense experience, we see changes taking place everywhere. That is, an object under certain conditions changes into another. In other words, an object from one form changes into another form. From a previous condition, an entity changes into a later condition: from the previous condition of being a seed, it changes into a plant. The previous condition is called the cause and the later is called the effect. Philosophers in India interpreted this phenomenon of change (causality) in various ways to suit their metaphysical position. (a) asatkaryavada The Naiyayikas, who are hardcore realists, believe in Asatkaryavada, a position where it is posed that, the effect does not exist in the material cause before its origination. If the effect already exists, they contend, then, the production of it is useless; secondly, if the effect is D.N. Sastri, The Critique of Indian Realism, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1964, p.126.
25

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not something new, having its own separate essence and existence, the realism itself would collapse, Asatkaryavada fails to explain the relation between cause and effect meaningfully. A relation is possible only between two existents; it is impossible between two non-existents, or between an existent and a non-existent. If an effect is purely non-existent in the cause, then, one cannot possibly suggest that a particular effect is caused by a particular cause. Consequently, if the effect is unrelated to the cause, any and every effect could be produced at random, because there is no essential relation between cause and effect. The arambhavada of the Nayayikas envisages an effect that is really different from its cause. Cause and effect are branded as real. In their obsession with realism, an effect could be designated as a cause at another occasion depending on the perspective from which it is looked at. The Naiyayikas who are aware of these problems try to bridge a realtion between the cause and effect by saying the material cause (samavayi karana) co-exists with the effect, though the cause does not transfer its essence to the effect. When the moderate position of the Nayayikas is pressed to the limit, one reaches the postion of the pratitya samudpada of the Buddhist. According to them cause and effect are absolutely different (svalaksana). The pratitya samudpada is no causation at all. Two absolutely unrelated things can never be relevant to each other, let alone, remain as the cause-effect conjecture. Thus according to Advaita both the positions of Naiyayikas and Buddhists are untenable to the test of logic.26 (b) Satkaryavada Having shown the Naiyayikas and the Buddhist the door, advaitins now turn against their own friends, the samkhya philosophers. They accept the theory of satkaryavada. The theory of satkaryavada is specifically meant to explain the relation between the world and its cause, prakrti. The world is the real transformation of prakrti. There is an essential unity between the cause and the effect. A critical look at the concept of prakrti poses various problems. From the perspective of value, prakrti has no significance of its own. It exists for the sake of others. Prakrti has no intrinsic value. Anything that has no significance in and for itself cannot be regarded as a value, or, on the contrary it should be seen as a worthless existence. Advaita though follows a similar methodology of the Samkhya especially the logic of the theory of causation (satkaryavada), yet there is a radical shift in its metaphysics. The worthless, valueless prakrti is modified into a sheer figment called avidya. The world process is not due to the transformation of the prakrti as the Samkyans hold, but due to the evolution of avidya (avidya parinama). Again, for the Samkyans, cause and effect are so similar so that one does not have its own identity or separate existence from its cause. The Advaitins take a gradual but a logical process towards his celebrated Vivartavada. The Satkaryavada of Samkhya stresses the essential unity of cause and effect; the difference between cause and effect is just phenomenal. The real is the cause; the effect is nothing but another form of the cause. This view of the Samkhyans gives Sankara to play his card, and paly it very well indeed, by
26

Uppamthadathil Emmanuel, Theories of Causality: Tools for Unfolding the Metaphysics-An Indian Philosophical Perspective In Suvidya Journal Of Philosophy And Religion, Vol.3, 2009, Pp.1-16.

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demonstrating the fact that in any cause-effect relation both the parties should be real and separate, and if this were not so, one has to forgo causation itself. The illogicality of the Satkaryavada prompted Sankara to switch to Satkaranavada, for, if one of the parties is absent, the marriage could not take place; if cause alone is real and effect is just another form of the cause, then, there need not be any relation between cause and effect. Finally, from Satkaranavada Sankara moves on to Vivartavada, for, if cause alone is real (sat) the effect has to be just an appearance. Thus, we see, Sankara taking a cautious march from Satkaryavada to Satkaranavada and finally land up in Vivartavada. Advaita takes the Samkhyan identity to its logical culmination and arrives at the extreme position of absolute identity. According to Advaita, every relation as well as difference presupposes an underlying unity.27 The theory of causation demands identity and difference. The Samkhyans and the Naiyayikas tread the path identity and difference or identity in difference except that there is a shift in emphasis: The Naiyayikas emphasize on difference while the Samkhyans emphasize on identity. When the moderate postion of the Naiyayikas pressed to the limit one reaches the postion of the Partitya Samudpada of the Buddhist. According to them the cause and effect are absolutely different. Sankara take the Samkhyan identity to its logical culmination and arrives at the extreme position of Absolute identity.28 Advaita, by endorsing Vivartavada, reduces effect as an appearance. Appearance has no independent existence but rather has a borrowed existence, an existence purely based on the substractum on which it appears. Since the appearance is indescribable (anivacaniya) it creates all sorts of things out of its own resources by the process of covering (avarana) and projection (viksepa). Due to this, the appearance, though belonging to the substratum (Brahman), is perceived yet as something else. They are called appearances because they appear at one point of time and disappear at a later point of time. Appearance and disappearance are the intrinsic nature of the false. The real neither appears nor disappears. Thus at the ontological level Advaita does not accept any form of causality. 1.3.1.2 Critique of Samavaya Having shown the inadequacy of the vaisesikas theory of causality Advaitins move on to refute their categories. There are two types of relation accepted by the Vaisesikas: samyoga and samavaya. Samyoga realation is the one that exists only between two substances. On the other hand samavaya is a relation which exists between a substance and a non-substance like quality, action, universal etc. we observe a kind of a relation that exists between a cloth and its colour. This relation cannot be samyoga because it exists only between two substances, hence, the Vaisesikas term such a relation the relation of inherence (samavaya). What we have to keep in mind is that samavaya is a single independent category, which exists independent of the things that are related. Due to this in a samvaya relation between two things for instance, between A and B, we have to suppose first, the A and its samavaya relation and then B and its samavaya relation. Then again the first samavaya relation is to be related with another samavaya relation which in turn is to be related with another samavaya relation and it goes on ad infinitum.29 To escape from this anomaly it cannot be stated that
27 28

Ibid., p.12-16. Ibid., p.12-16.

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relation of samavaya with samavayins is through svarupasambandha for it itself is untenable 30 . 1.3.1.1 Critique of Universal The Vaisesikas accept the universal as an eternal, independent category. It is the universal that makes a particular thing that it is. A pot is called a pot because potness inheres in it. Advaitins do not accept universal as a separate category. For them universals are only collective names. Moreover, even the Vaisesikas failed to explain the relation between the universal and other categories. They say satta exist in substance, quality and action in one way and in the rest of the categories in another way. They themselves do not have a uniform way of explaining the problem of universal.31 1.3.1.4 Refutation of Visesa In the ordinary experience, we see differences in things. Now the question is what about the eternal substances like paramaus etc? Are they all exactly the same? It may be reasonable to accept the paramanu of earth as different from the paramanu of the air. But how can one differentiate from two paramanus of the same class? It is in this context the vaisesikas accept the category called visesa (the ultimate differentiator). The ultimate Differentiators reside in eternal substances and are infinite in numbers. The vaisesikas hold that as many visesas are there, as many eternal substances too are there. These ultimate Differentiators differentiate the eternal substances. This is the ground for accepting the visesa as a category. The visesa is a differentiating factor which function as a visesana. X differentiates Y from other things but how is X itself distinguished? For instance, the blue cloth is differentiated from the yellow cloth. Here the substances (clothes) are differentiated mutually on the basis of their colour blue? It is because; the universal nilatva inheres in blue while it is absent in yellow. Now the question is, what is that distinguishes the visesa themselves? To avoid the possibility of anavastha the vaisesikas say that the visesa are self distinct (svatah vyavartah). With regard to this view advaitins answer is that, there is no need for a category called visesa, for the eternal substances themselves could be accepted as self distinct. Moreover, in the advaita

Manuel uppamthadathil, Advaitabrahmasiddhi: a comprehensive text on Advaita diss., Banaras Hindu University, 2006.p.92. 30 Svarupa sambandha is a Navya Nyaya concept of relation. In our experience we see that a thing exists in relation with another thing. They exist co-related. But a closer scrutiny would reveal that there is no such co-relation existing between them. That there is no relation in the form of the qualifier the qualified and the relation between them. In such cases one of the relata function as a relatum and as a relation. For example, X and y are seen to be co-related. But at closer scrutiny we dont see any proved relation existing between them. In this case. One of the relata ( X or Y) takes up the dual function as a relatum on the one hand and as a relation on the other. So as long as that given relata which fuctions as a relation besides its natural function as a relatum is known as Svarupasambadha. In sambandha that given relata function as a relation with two additional qualifications of time and space. (they last as long as we experience them as co-related). 31 Advaitins hold that by accepting one eternal principle (Brahman) they can explain the whole world while the vaisesikas have to accept many eternal principles like atoms, universal, etc. making the position of the Advaitins simple and easy to understand.
29

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philosophy, there is no other eternal substance that exists other than Brahman. When there is only one being there is no need for a visesa. The realists preoccupation was to objectify everything including the self. The things in the world are real. They have their own existence as well as essence. They can be known as they are. This contention of the realists is refuted by the Advaitins. The close examination of the categories throws light into the inherent contradictions within the categories. According to Advaita this inherent contradiction is a fact and it is due to Maya. It is Maya that causes the world illusion.32 1.4 Maya Having examined the thread bare the nature of empirical illusion and applying the same logic to empirical categories; we found that though these categories appear to be real and objective they do not fare any better than the empirical illusions. They too fall short of logical consistency and fail to give one a ready explanation of the state of affairs. The root cause of empirical and world illusion is avidya. Avidya is defined as something positive though intangible which cannot be described either as being or non-being, which is made of three qualities and is antagonistic to knowledge. Avidya is not real for it is destroyed by vidya. A real cannot be destroyed. Avidya too, is not unreal; it is the material cause of the world. An unreal thing like the horn of a hare cannot be the source of anything. A thing cannot be both real and unreal at the same time because contradictory qualities cannot be applied to anything. Thus, Avidya is neither real nor unreal. It is distinct from being as well as non-being. Advaita because of its absolutistic belief accepts only one reality yet to explain the empirical world they speak of two categories: Being and Non-being. The non-being could be classified in two levels: The false (anirvacaniya) and the utterly non-real (asat). The false could be further sub-divided into two stages. They are the empirically real (vyavaharika) and the illusory (pratibhasika). The Being can never be negated because what negates being also possesses being. The only being accepted by the Advaita is Brahman. Everything other than Brahman belongs to the Nonbeing class. Hence, a clear understanding of the concept of Maya is necessary for a proper appreciation of Advaitic thought.33 1.4.1 The Nature of Maya Maya can be studied from three different standpoints. The enlightened person considers Maya as unreal (tuccha), the philosopher regards it as indefinable ( anirvacaniya) and the layman takes it as real (vastavi). To the enlightened man, maya is nothing. The existence of the world is unreal and imaginary to him. If the world is unreal, what is the use of postulating Manuel uppamthadathil, Advaitabrahmasiddhi: a comprehensive text on Advaita diss., Banaras Hindu University, 2006.p.108.
32

33

Surendra Kumar Shrivastava , The Essential Advaitism, B.N.Jaiswal Arun Press, 1980, pp.119-120.

Varanasi:

54

a principle, which can account for this world? As against this, the average person does not doubt the reality of the world. He does not regard that as unreal, which he sees through his own eyes. The philosopher tries to understand Maya through his intellect and finds it as that which is neither real, nor unreal. What is unsublatable in all three times is real. What is not apprehended in all three times, like sky-flower etc. is unreal. Since Maya is sublatable by knowledge, it is not real and since it is apprehended until the knowledge dawns upon us, it is not unreal. The experience of Maya in the waking state, dream state and the state of dreamless sleep proves its existence in some form or the other. In the waking state, the experience like, I am ignorant is a proof for its apprehension. In dream, the apprehension of various objects, which are nothing but creations of Maya, is never doubted. After a dreamless sleep when one says that one slept happily and one did not experience anything at that time, one establishes the existence and apprehension of ajnana or Maya at that time. Thus, it is established that Maya is apprehended and is not unreal like the horn of a hare or the skyflower or the son of a barren women. Maya cannot be unreal. Contrary characters like reality and unreality cannot be simultaneously belong to the same thing. It should therefore be accepted that Maya is different from real-unreal. It is sadasadvilaksana. What is sadasadvilaksana is anirvacaniya or indefinable and what is undefinable is in the ultimate analysis, mithya or false. An ultimately false thing, that which is, not-that (Maya), i.e. which truly is not, but appears to be, cannot be kept at par with the ultimate reality. Hence, there is no dualism by accepting Maya in the advaitic system. By calling Maya anirvacaniya the Advaitins does not emphasis the total inexplicability of Maya to the human intellect. He emphasizes the positive nature of Maya. As the sublatable snake is positively apprehended in the rope, so is ajnana or Maya as the cause of that snake also positively apprehended. Maya is not negative as the Naiyayikas think. Positively Maya or Avidya does not prove it absolute reality, because it is cancelled later on. It is called positive simply, because it is not pure unreality like barren womans son. Being opposed to knowledge Maya is called ajnana or Avidya. However, it is to be noted that it is not opposed to pure consciousness. It is opposed to consciousness as reflected in the psychosis. Consciousness, which is the locus of avidya or maya, is not opposed to Avidya since existence and activity of Avidya can be understood only through consciousness. Thus, Maya is dependent on Brahman. However, it is not originated from that Brahman. How can non-relational Brahman be the cause of the origin of anything? If we accept Brahman as the cause of the origin of Maya, Brahman will be of changing nature. Moreover, once it is accepted that Maya originates from Brahman, Maya will be present in the state of liberation as well and thus all efforts for liberation will be useless. Hence, Maya is beginningless. Maya is the material cause of the world, which is nothing but a case of superimposition or adhyasa. Being the material cause of eh world, it is given the name, prkrti. However, it is not an independent reality like Prkrti in the Samkhya system. It is dependent on Brahman. This is why it is called sakti.34 1.4.2 The Function of Maya Maya is the composite of three gunas- sattva, rajas and tamas. The sattva guna is the cause of revelation, the rajas is the cause of activity and the tamas is the cause of veiling or darkness.
34

Ibid., p.120.

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Owning to these gunas, Maya functions in two ways. Firstly, it conceals Brahman and secondly it projects the world. This is why, is said to possess two kinds of powerconcealment and projection (avarana and viksepa). Through the former, it veils pure consciousness and through the latter, it projects the world. As the real nature of the rope is hidden and the illusory snake is caused to emerge and is apprehended, so the real nature of Brahman as pure consciousness is concealed and the world is projected. The existence and apprehension of the world cannot be explained without having recourse to a principle known as Maya.35 1.4.3 The Locus and Object of Maya While discussing the nature of Maya we have maintained that Maya is dependent on Brahman as pure consciousness. This shows that Maya has pure Brahman as its locus. The next question arises: What is the object of Maya? According to many Advaitins Brahman is considered as the locus and the object of Maya. As darkness depending on a particular house conceals that house, so does Maya depending on Brahman conceal Brahman. The experience, I am ignorant does not prove the individual self (jiva) is locus of Avidya. The fact is that both ahamkara (egoity) and Avidya are superimposed on Brahman as pure consciousness and thus they appear to be related to it. When a piece of red cloth and the face of a man are simultaneously reflected in a mirror, the face of man is also seen red. Similar is the case here. The illusory distinction between the jiva and Brahman is due to ajnana and hence ajanana should be prior in existence to this distinction. The prior ajnana cannot reside in the posterior jiva or isvara. So Brahman as pure consciousness should be admitted as the locus of ajnana. Here one may raise an objection by asking the vedantin a simple question, How does ajnana have Brahman as its locus as well as its object, because the locus and object are two different things? The vedantic answer is that since ajnana is not an active principle demanding change of place now and then, it does not require separate locus and object. To conclude our discussion of maya, we can say that Maya which is dependent on Brahman has immense power, because it tries to measure Brahman which is immeasurable. To the philosopher, it is a riddle, because it is indefinable. In the ultimate analysis, it is non-existent, because it is sublated. However, it is empirically real, as the root cause of world-illusion. Truly speaking, it is not-that which appears to be something. For an Advaitins, Avidya could be considered as the starting point as well as the central factor of our investigation. Appearance is all that is immediately given to us. It is through the deletion of the layers of appearance one reaches the Ultimate Truth, the Truth of all (satyasya satyam). As long as Avidya wields her power, the truth (paramarthika) is hindered and we become subjected to this world of empirical existence (vyavaharika). The absolute is true for all the times (trikalabadhita-satya), unfalsifiable, un-acquired by senses, trans-empirical and self-effulgent, self-pervading, and non-synthetic. Knowledge of the reality is through the realization of the identity. One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman. Avidya on the other
35

Ibid., p.121.

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hand, is the cause of the apprehension of all relations. Avidya has no existence of its own; it merely subsists on something else. The truth of the therefore is subjected to verification. The truth or falsity is contingent upon true belief. The sphere of Avidya is rationalization and not intuition. Avidya is real as long as it persists and unreal with the realization of Brahman. Though it is indescribable yet it is given in experience, in fact, it is only because of avidya we have the experience of this pluralistic universe.36 1.5 The Nature of Ultimate Reality The search for the Ultimate Reality has been the eternal quest of philosophy. Every system of philosophy has its own conception of Reality and it defines Reality in its own way. Most of the system of philosophy of both East and west define Reality in an apriori and dogmatic fashion. They take for granted that Reality is such and such and then give proofs for its existence. Advaitism does not start with any ready made definition of reality. Advaitism gets its definition of Reality by analyzing our experience of falsity. It is argued that it is universal experience that the false is what is sublated or what is sublated is false like the rope-snake. From this it follows that real must be what is sublated (trikalabadhita sat).37 Therefore, Reality is for advaitin what is eternal and non-sublatable. We have only to find out whether there is anything unsublatable and if so what is it? On the basis of the shruti as well as on the basis of the analysis of the different states of life it is maintained that it is the Self (Atma) which is ultimately unsublatable; everything other than the self is relative and false. The notself or the world of multiplicity and change is false; it is not absolute but relative and depends on the self. By rejecting the relative, we reach that which reality which transcends all diversities and is the underlying unity of the relative world of multiplicity. This is the ultimate Reality. As transcendent to the world of multiplicity, Reality, is called Brahman in advaitism. As immanent underlying unity of the relative world, Reality is called Atman, our very self. Thus, Reality is both transcendent and immanent.38 The Upanishads indicate it as not-this, not-this (neti, neti). All determination is negation. Therefore, the ultimate Reality is indeterminable or unspeakable. But this does not mean that Reality is unknowable. Unspeakability or indeterminability points toward the transcendent nature of Reality and not toward its unknowability. It is self-evident pure consciousness, which is our very self. How can that be unknown, which is self-evident and is the ground of all knowledge? 1.6 Different Levels of Reality Sankara and may other Advaitins commonly accepts unsublatability as the criterion of Reality. Following the advaitic tradition, he accepts three levels of Reality- the illusory (pratibhasika), the phenomenal (vyavaharika) and the ultimate (Paramarthika). Only pure consciousness is the ultimate realtiy. Objects which are rejected or sublated without the knowledge of the ultimate reality have illusory reality. For instance, when the silver apparent in the shell is rejected by the knowledge of the shell and without the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, the silver has illusory reality. All objects like the silver apparent in the shell
36 37 38

Ibid., p.122. Ibid., p.99. Ibid.

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are the transformation of tula avidaya (secondary nescience). They have only apparent reality. Dream objects also come under this category, since dream experience with its objects is also negated by the waking experience without the intuition of Brahman. Objects which are sublated by the intuition of Brahman have phenomenal Reality. This world of multiplicity, which we experience by our senses and which we know by our understanding, has phenomenal Reality. The objects of waking experience which are transformation of mula avidya or primary nescience) and are creations of Ishvara (god) has phenomenal reality. Birth, death, bondage, liberation-all these can be established only when we accept the phenomenal reality of this world of multiplicity. Since this world is negated, this has absolute Reality. But the negation of this phenomenal world points toward the ultimate Reality, which can never be negated. This is pure consciousness. Without presupposing pure consciousness as the ground and witness of this world, phenomenal reality and rejection are not possible. Pure consciousness cannot be negated. Pure consciousness is the foundational principle which underlies all states of empirical existence. This pure consciousness is the self- the atman. Nobody can deny its existence. Even in denial its existence is accepted. However, its nature is not understood correctly by other thinkers. 1.6.1 Brahman as Pure consciousness In the first place, in Advaita philosophy, there is the pure Being. Being is neutral, unchanging and pure awareness. At this stage there is no awareness of any object or subject. It is blind consciousness in itself. There is no duality of the subject or the object experienced here. This is a phase of the counsciousness where there is unqualified unity. There is no self awareness in pure consciousness because the very concept of self too does not exist here. This stage is beyond language, for language is needed only when there is distinction. This stage is called Brahman as pure consciousness.39 1.6.2 Brahman as Self-Conscious Such distinctionless, unitary consciousness does not warrant a world of our own. Then there would be no effort to obtain liberation, not even a need to start a philosophy to understand the mysteries of being. This pure consciousness is some how blurred due to ignorance and result of this is our universe with all its accessories. The second phase of Brahman is Isvara. He is Brahman associated with Maya. He is the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. Though he is a product of Maya, he is not under the spell of Maya. Hence he is always liberated, always the lord. He is the one who knows that he is identical with Brahman, which is the real nature of reality. He is the one who is at the possession of the knowledge of the real nature of reality as well as the play of illusion. To put it metaphorically, he is the one who knows the rope as well as the snake at the same time. In this sense, he is not only conscious of things but also self-conscious. At this stage, there is distinction between the

Chandradhar Sharma, The Advaitic Tradition in Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996, p.189.
39

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subject and object. This phase of the consciousness I would call Brahman as selfconscious. He knows his real nature as well as the nature of illusion.40 1.6.3 Brahman as Saksi (Witnessing Consciousness) Saksi, like Brahma, is Pure consciousness, self-luminous and self-proved being the presupposition of all knowledge and pure subject unknowable as an object. But while Brahma is unconditioned, saksi, unlike it is conditioned as it appears in association with the upadhi of Maya or avidya though it is not limited by this upadhi. It is called the witness self, a disinterested looker-on illuminating itself and everything presented to it as an object. Ishvara is full of qualities and is imminent in Maya as its object. Ishvara is full of qualities and is imminent in Maya as its controller, but saksi, unlike Him, is the pure self devoid of qualities and uninvolved in upadhi. Jiva is the subject-object complex; jiva is consciousness limited by antahkarana that is objective and is a product of Avidya. Jiva is empirical ego who is a doer of actions and enjoyer of their fruits. Saksi, unlike jiva, is the pure subject uninvolved in upadhi. Saksi is the pure eternal consciousness appearing in Ishvara as associated with Maya and in jiva as associated with antahkarana. The former is called Ishvara-saksi and the latter is called Jiva-saksi. Though the witnessing consciousness arises with the experience of object, it is not the result but the presupposition of this experience. Saksi is self self-luminous and illuminates all objects presented to it. Everything known and unknown is an object for saksi. Swami vidyaranya compares saksi with the lamp burning on the stage which illuminates equally the stage-manger, the actress and the audience and shines even in their absence. Ahankara is the sutradhara or the stage manager, buddhi s the dancing actress and objects are the audience. Saksi illuminates the modifications of chitta or antahkarana in the waking state and the mental states in dream, and it continues to shine even in deep sleep when there is no object and is responsible for the unity of the pre-sleep and post-sleep experience of jiva.41 The concept of saksi is one of the pivotal aspects in Advaita Vedanta. It is on this the whole of noetic experience revolves. What is saksi? What is its relation with Ishvara and Brahman? These are some of the issues that we will be dealing in this section. In spite of the crucial significance of the concept of saksi or witness self the earlier literature of Advaita does not have a systematic presentation of it. Not only that it is not presented in its technical sense but often they have confused it with many other related terms. The concept of saksi itself is intentional. It is not that saksi is another principle exisisting independently besides Brahman. It is Brahman in association with ignorance that exists only as long as it has a function of seeing, a function of knowing the subjects and the objects. In the Brahma realization, when there are no more a world of objects to be perceived saksi itself disappears. Thus, the problem of saksi is essentially a search into the constitutive structure of the selfhood, the knowing process and all the aspects related to it. 1.6.3.1 Various Approaches to the Concept of Saksi Two factors are every knowing: one that changes and the other that remains stable. All our experiences are a stream of consciousness they vary every moment. But on other hand, all
40 41

Ibid., pp. 189-190. Ibid.

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these atomic fragmentation of experiences are appropriated by a stable factor. This stable principle synthesizes the fragmented experiences and makes them as its own. This is the reason that we can say that it is my knowledge or I know it etc. It is this stable principle that notices change. Only a stable principle can observe change. It is the person standing at the bank of a river who can observe the movement of the boat and not the man inside the boat. According to Advaita, it is the principle of I that remains stable and appropriates the changing streams of consciousness. But this I that knows the changing streams of consciousness itself is empirical; this I do not have a continued existence through various stages of consciousness like the waking stage, dream state and deep sleep state. It appears, as though there are gaps in it. Yet a man does not get up from sleep as another person. Due to this we can posit a deeper self, an I beyond the I that was constant and witness to entire process of knowledge and reality. This I beyond the empirical I is the saksi. To consolidate this position let us elucidate various approaches to the concept of saksi. 1.6.3.1.1 Argument from Deep Sleep In deep sleep, the senses are dormant, mind dysfunctional, hence, none of the conditions that are required for experience and knowledge is available. Yet on waking the person says I slept well, I did not know anything. This knowledge that he acquires is not through inference for the data necessary for an inference is out of stock. This knowledge is considered as memory and no memory is possible without the primary experience. We presume therefore, that in deep sleep there was someone who really had witnessed the bliss and ignorance at the same time. This principle is Saksi. Saksi does not remove ignorance, only anthkarana vrtti removes avidya. Saksi remains indifferent to all that comes across it, remaining as the principle of revelation. It reveals the objects but does not turn back and reveal itself. It is not revealed by any other principle for that principle needs another one leading t infinite regress. Saksi is known only regressively as the principle or the foundation of all that is known. 42 1.6.3.1.2 Argument from Dream Consciousness In dream state, the senses are inactive. Mind is active and hence the dream objects are pulsations of the mind. Avidya or the mind modifies as dream objects. The objects of dream have no external reality; they exist only as they are dreamt. They have no past or any future. They have no history in the space-time milieu. In dream state the nature of consciousness as self-luminous is more pronounced for in the waking state there are other sources of revelation like the sunlight etc. when the external light is absent, we can presume that revelations of the dream objects are by none else but by the self itself. The self remains as the bare principle of revelation. This bare principle that reveals the objects and associated with these objects are called saksi. For more detail, refer to the previous section on levels of consciousness.43

42

A. k Chatterjee, The Concept of Saksi in Advaita Vedanta, in Indian council of philosophical Research, Vol. x , No.2, 1993. pp.49-50.

43

Ibid., pp.51-52.

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1.6.3.1.3 Argument from Illusion Illusion is a private experience. It is the appearance of something, which in the normal circumstances should not have been present. The illusory experience of snake on a rope though appears to have a space-time milieu, does not have a space-time history. Ontologically the snake was never there. It has no past, nor present not even a future existence. All the qualities of the illusory snake we saw were of rope. The snake had no descriptions of its own. To substantiate this claim let us analyse the strands of illusion. The contour of illusion has four main complex strands: they are adhisthana, avarana, viksepa and adhyasa. First of all, the illusory object has no existence of its own. It exists as a parasite on something else. Without a substractum there is no illusion. A substractum in itself is not a cause of illusion but due to some reasons the substractum is covered (avarana) and it is projected as something else (viksepa). It has to be projected as something else because a mere covering can only hide things from the ken of our perception and not reveal anything, real or illusory just like a purse kept in the cabinet. Hence the covered object has to be presented, not as itself, if then there is no illusion, but as something else. Now what is projected cannot stand in itself, for the projected snake has no real existence apart from the rope, hence the snake is superimposed (adhyasa) on the rope the substactum. In sublation we do not have two separate realities but the rope alone remain as the true, one reality. Illusion is thus a complex situation. It is not real as its content is unreal yet it is not completely unreal as it is presented to us and we know it. In the statement, this is a snake has two components the this and the snake. The this part is known through normal mental modification for it is a real object while the illusory snake cannot be known through any normal pramana hence anthakarana vrtti is unsuited here. The role of antahkarana vrtti is employed to obtain knowledge through reestablishing the lost identity due to ignorance. This vrtti removes ignorance and reveals the object by becoming that. An illusory object is never covered. It exists only as long as it is presented to us. Hence, antahkarana vrtti has no role here. The illusory object is known by some one else other than the pramata. Illusion is known by saksi through avidya vrtti.44 1.6.3.1.4 Argument from Waking Experience Advaita epistemology is realistic. Knowledge is like light which reveals objects. It can neither add up nor substract anything from the reality. Knowledge reveals objects, which were already in existence by removing the ignorance about it. The question is how can one positively say that the knowledge reveals a thing that is already in existence? In other words, to say that the knowledge reveals objects that are already in existence is to presume the existence of a thing as unknown. Pramata cannot know any thing as unknown; it is contradictory in terms, as he knows only as removing the ignorance about an object. There is no knowledge of the unknown existence of thing for him. Advaita accepts that things existed before it is revealed. This unknownness of the things is known by saksi. Saksi knows things as known and unknown. It does not remove ignorance, but only remains as the principle of revelation. 45
44 45

Ibid., pp.53-55.

Ibid., pp.56.
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1.6.3.3 The Relation between Saksi and Brahman What is the relation between Brahman and saksi? Are they one or two? In what way are they related? These are issues we have to deal with in this section. Advaita professes a hard-core non-dulaism where reality is one and that Reality is pure consciousness or Brahman. It is eternal and without a second. At this level there is no other reality to counter it. There is no distinction to be made as subjects and objects. It is pure consciousness in itself. Here one cannot make a distinction between the seer and the seen both coalesce into one. Pure consciousness does not choose, or make discriminative judgements. It is neither masculine nor feminine. It is referred with neuter prononun tat signifying the indescribability of its nature. It is utter beyond in fact unreachable. It is the ideal, the presupposition of everything else in the universe. It is not known as it is, but known as knowing the objects. It is unchanging (kootastha), inactive and eternal. Saksi is Brahman associated with avidya. It is the aspect of Brahman that sees everything. At this level distinction do not exist. Like Brahman, he too is indifferent. Yet unlike Brahman, he is the seer, seer of everything that comes across his ken of perception. He co-exists with avidya and reveals it as well as other things. Like Brahman he too non-discriminative, he does not make any judgement but is passive to everything he witnesses.46 1.6.3.3 Saksi and jiva Brahman is not the subject because at that level all duality disappears. But as far as the empirical ego is concerned saksi is the real self. It cannot be apprehended in its purity but always superimposed on the empirical ego. Saksi is the precondition of every noetic experience. As we have already seen earlier in the context of the discussion of the relation between the individual self and pure consciousness, the individual ego is the pure consciousness reflected on antahkarana. Hence, individual ego is not the self but it is imposed on the self. Saksi is the ground on which jiva is superimposed. Saksi reveals objects and when there are no objects to be revealed, it still continues to be self-illuminating as in the cases of dream an deep sleep experiences while jiva is like any other objects illumined by the transcendental self.47 1.6.4 Brahman as Ignorant Consciousness The central concern of advaitic philosophy is to establish oneness of Reality. The only Reality accepted by the advaitins is Brahman. It is quality-less (nirvisesa). The question now is, in the quality-less Brahman , how the world, individual selves etcare possible? In spite of Brahman being completely pure and devoid of any division into any multiplicity, the individual selves, isvara and the world are superimposed on Brahman. Due to the predominance of the satta quality in maya, the pure Brahman gets reflected , as a face gets reflected in a mirror. Thus, the paramesvara is reflected, and appears as qualified with properties like omniscience etc.Despite getting reflected and appering as many in the form of individual selves, the world etcBrahman remains untouched by the defects that are Manuel uppamthadathil, Advaitabrahmasiddhi: a comprehensive text on Advaita diss., Banaras Hindu University, 2006.pp.197.
46 47

Ibid., 198.

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inherent in the medium of reflection. The individual self is the refelection of pure consiouness, and therefore, getting associated with the degects inherent in the adjuncts it bcomes qualified with the qualities like knowingness etcThe division of Brahman into individual selves is beginningless. In the empirical sphere Advaita accepts two categories: the seer (drk) and seen (drsya). Drk (atman) alone is real (paramarthika), and is One (ekam). Inspite of being One and ever free is of its own nature, the self is apparently divided into the lord (isvara), individual selves (jivas) and the witness self (saksin) due to the adjunct. Advaita though believes in One reality,has to give a philosophical justification for the plurality of individual selves experienced by us. Pratbimbavada, avacchedavada and abhasavada are ways by which the advaitin try to solve issue of one self appearing as many. Whatever may be the theories of the individual self all these theories point to one fact that the individual self is either a reflection or limitation of the pure consciousness. Unlike Isvara, the individual self is under the spell of ignorance. At this level, the powers of Maya, the power of covering as well as the power of projection, is at work. Again, by the use of the metaphor of the rope-snake illusion, we can say that the individual self knows only the snake. He knows only the illusory world, the world of appearance. Of course, he has access to the scriptural injunctions where the truth of reality is well expressed yet it is something that stand far away from him. At this stage he experiences plurality, distinctions and considers his self as the most important thing and work for it. He fails to have a wider vision but rather all his activities are centered on his own empirical self. This phase of pure consciousness I would call Brahman as ignorant consciousness. 1.6.4.1 Pratibimbavada The concept of jiva is explained in three different ways by three different schools of Advaita. Pratimbimbavada is propounded by The vivarana school led by prakasatman. Pratibimbavada,also called theory of reflection, is one according to which jiva is a reflection of paramatman on the mirror of avidya or ignorance and as such it does not differ from paramatman in essence. Pratibimba is the reflectional appearance of the original which is separate and distinct from the original because of its being only a reflection. At the same time it is real, because the bimba, having no reality of its own, is identical with the original. According to pratibimbavada, the Jiva which is superimposed on Brahman, the pure consciousness, because of avidya receives the reflection of the latter, just like the mirror receiving the reflection of the face. The human face in the mirror, or the sun in the water, is not really different from the face or sun in front of it; and yet we maintain some sort of mental distinction between them. Though the face or the sun reflected in different kinds of mirrors or water is the same, differences can be observed in accordance with the clarity and shape of the media through which it is reflecteted. However, the defects of the image does not in any way affect the real sun or face. Similarily, the jiva refelected on the mirror of ignorance is not really different from its prototype, the paramatman, and yet continues to be a jiva unitl the mirror itself is removed. It is the refelction of the paramatman on the upadhis of the body that gives rise to jiva. The reflection may vary with the nature of the media on which the true or the real reflects. Thus the plurality of the jivas is due to the plurality of the

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upadhis, the antahkarana- the Real jiva is only One and is identical with Brahman (pure consciousness).48 1.6.4.2 Theory of Abhasa The theory propounded by suresvara and his followers is a variation of pratibimbavada of prakasatman and the vivarana school. The later theory holds that the individual and jivas are reflections of Brahman on antahkarana, i.e., on avidya as mirror with its samskaras. Mind is the prouduct of avidya, and reflection on it is jiva, on avidya itself is Isvara. The reflection is real as being identical with its original, since it has no separate reality of its own. Remove the original and the reflection vanishes. Abhasavada stresses the unreality of the reflection. Bondage is to be taken as real and liberation is the destruction of Abhasa. Further, Brahman is not the original (bimba) but Isvara is the original (bimba). Isvara is not a refelction but is the original of reflections (jivas). The reflection is different from the original and is a false phenomenon (aghasa). Jiva is unreal as it is different from the original. According to pratibimbavada, on the other hand, the pure consciousness reflected on the antahkarana is not a mere reflection but the caitanya itself. According to the vivarana school, the pratibimba is pure consciousness itself, but limited by conditions, like ajnana is the case of God (isvara); and the antahkarana in thecase of the individual selves. Hence, jiva is not a photo copy of the Original Consciouness, but That consciousness itself, though conditioned. Thus according to abhasavada, the nature of both jiva and isvara is unreal or false. Because both the jiva and isvara are of the nature of reflection. Here reflection is not real. It emerges all of a sudden in the mirror owing to the instrumentality of anivacaniya maya.49 1.6.4.3 The Limitation Theory (avacchedavada) Avacchdavada, the theory of limitation, attaches a somewhat greater empirical reality to the jiva than does pratibimbavada, the theory of reflection. While in the pratibimbavada our knowledge of the separate reality of jiva is due to a mere mistake, in the avacchedavada it is given a practical reality. The body, sense organs, etc., constitute the upadhis. Just as space is really one and is seen through limitations as if it were divided into particular spaces, the space in a pot or jar, so also the self is one but seen through limitations as if it were multiple. The all-pervasive space is conceived as being limited in a jar or room. The upadhis serve as the basis of such limitation or individuation.50 The upadhis like mind, intellect, external and intnernal senses, obstruct the jica to express its true nature, i.e. the Supreme Brahman. When these upadhis are removed, the jiva become one with the absolute self. When the jar is produced or destroyed, the space in it is not produced or destroyed. In the same manner atman is neither born nor die in accordance with the limiting adjuncts. The limitation theory, therefore, says that the atman is not separate from the Ultimate Realtiy in its final analysis. This is why Rande qualifies Avacchedavada as a
48

Surendra Kumar Shrivastava , The Essential Advaitism, B.N.Jaiswal Arun Press, 1980, pp.124.

Varanasi:

49 50

Ibid., p.125 Ibid.

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theory which maintains that jiva is a modification of Brahman. The individual self has in this case, a borrowed identity. Brahman is unchanging eternal consciousness, pure and undivided. But this one unchanging Brahman exhibits itself as divided, so to say, into many human souls through the media, i.e. body or the psycho-physical organism just as the universal ether is delimited, so to say, through the limiting upadhis such as pots, jugs and jars. All the above mentioned theories seek to explain reality of individual jiva, whether in terms of his being a reflection of the atman or limitation of the atman. Its essential status is that of unqualified reality, or identity with the absolute. 1.6.5 Brahman as Inert Consciousness Finally, the objects of the world too are nothing but the appearance of the Being. It is the consciousness limited by the object. The objects are neither conscious nor self-conscious. As Hegel calls it, the objects are self in its alienation. It is the alienated self. Though the consciousness is not manifested in the objects, they are still manifestations of the consciousness otherwise; there would be an absolute difference between the object and the subject, which would make the knowledge of the object impossible. The fact that we know the objects is the sign that the underlying reality of the object is consciousness itself. This phase of the consciousness I would call Brahman as inert consciousness. 1.7 The Status of the world Advaita proposes the thesis that the absolute in itself, without any distinctions, is the only reality. This reality is nothing but pure consciousness. But in empirical experience we find a variety of things and events, sometimes co-existing in harmony, and on some other occasions contradicting each other. If Reality is One, wherefrom these multiplicities arise? How is to justify the world appearances, which we do experience as real and objective. The Advaitins, therefore, will have to provide evidence for the process by which what is Bodiless becomes embodied, and what is pure and indistinguishable consciousness that is free from any duality, are surrounded by a variety of subjects and objects. The basic problem, therefore, is to explain the process of the embodiment of the pure consciousness as the jiva and the world. How did the pure self lost its essential nature, how did it get involved in the world of differences, so much so, it has forgotten itself and wanders in the territory of the profane. The world-process is due to some innate Mistake or Transcendental illusion. It is the illusion that underlies all our activities , physical and mental. Nature of illusion is the starting point in the understanding of the nature and status of the world. An illusion is stratified by four complex strands: Every illusion takes place on a given substratum (adhisthana). The substratum in itself is no reason for the illusion. Due to some reason the real nature of the object is covered (avarana) and at the same time the hidden object is presented (viksepa) as another object. A mere projection of the substratum as another object too would not sufficiently explain the illusory-experience. What is projected is superimposed (adhyasa) on the substratum. In the stock example of eh rope-snake illusion, the snake is presented and is positively identified with the substratum, rope. Thus,
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a person who is going through the illusory experience of the rope-snake does not at all perceive the rope, but the rope as snake. As long as the illusion persists he sees nothing but the snake. The analysis of illusion is an eye opener towards world illusion. The Advaitins consider the world as illusory because it is perceived; because it is inert; and because it is limited. The world is false because it is perceived like the silver in the shell. The illusory experiences like the snake on the rope, the silver superimposed on the shell etc. have reality only as they are perceived. Their percepi is their esse. The illusory snake has no existence prior to its being perceived; it does not have any future existence. If the person who saw the snake earlier, returns to the same place a little later and finds only the rope, he would not see the snake at all. Thus, the illusory snake had only an apparent existence when it was perceived to exist. Applying the same logic to the world, we reach the conclusion that the world has apparent existence as long as it is seen as the world. The Real does not appear, and what appears is not Real. The Real is beyond words and expressions. On the other hand, that which is expressed in any particular mode through concepts or words is mere appearance devoid of any intrinsic reality (drsya). Anything that is definitely expressed or expressible is false. In this sense everything in the world is expressed and expressible, defined and definable; every language and religion and tradition, god and man, are false. The Real cannot at all be expressed in any way. No expressions of Brahman affect Him at all, just as the ascriptions of the illusory snake do not at all affect the rope. Brahman remains in different and plurality. b) The world is false because it is inert (jadatvat). Jada could mean various things. It could be something that is in ignorance, or whose existence is due to ignorance or that which is devoid of consciousness (ajnanatva). Pure consciousness alone is Real; other than it everything else has no substantial existence (anatmatva); their existence is dependent on Brahman. In every knowledge situation, the subject is faced with an object-an other-, which functions as the object of consciousness. Jada is that which stands as the object of consciousness. Consciousness alone is self-revealing, while jada is evidenced by consciousness, as it is nonluminous. The Real is not an object of consciousness; yet, it remains as the immediate principle of every revelation. Without positing a conscious principle prior to the world of inert objects, one cannot explain meaningfully the revelatory function in the world. Otherwise, the world would be plunged into darkness. The Real is not known as an object. If it were to be known by another principle, that principle will have to be known by yet another principle, and so on, landing one in infinite regress. The Advaitins, therefore, maintain that the Real is elf evident and self-luminous; and jada, in contrast, is dependent on consciousness for its evidence, besides being inert. c) The world is false also because of finitude- it is limited by time, space and other objects. Due to special limitation we could say that an entity is here or there etc. The objects in the world are conditioned by their location in space; they are also limited by time. Because of this, we could locate events as happening now, then etc. objects are also limited by the contents of their entities. The self exists everywhere, at all times; which cannot be said of any
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other entity. Any entity other than the self exists at some time, is in some place; is determined by some other entity or entities. What is limited in time is subject to destruction at a little later; what is limited in space does not exist at some other space simultaneously; what is limited by other entities is an object of reciprocal negation. Because they are limited, they are all false. A limited entity, a finite entity is subject to destruction; and therefore cannot be real. Only the self is real, because it remains uncontradicted at all times. Reality is one. It is unchanging and eternal. To experience this One as Many in this multifarious, diversified world should be due to some reason or cause. Advaita pre-supposes Avidya as the cause of all illusory appearances of many-ness of the One and Only Real. Ignorance forces one to perceive the One as Many. In the rope-snake illusion, the snake is what the rope. The world, which is an illusory superimposition on Brahman, is nothing other than Brahman itself. The entire world is Brahman itself. All the descriptions of the illusory snake are in fact the descriptions of the rope. So too, everything we speak of the world is the superimposed ascriptions of Brahman. In this sense, Brahman is the world; and this does not bring Brahman under any real causal category. Thus we can conclude that the world real to the one who continues to be in the flight of illusion. Nevertheless, ontologically considered, the world is naught- the upanishadic statements, sarvam khalvidam brahma indicates this aspect of the Real.51

1.8 Levels of Appearance The non-dualistic system of Advaita eschews everything else as real and considers even that which confronts one as object of ones experience as unreal. The Real is Brahman, the Nondual Consciousness. Advaita cannot accept anything other than Brahman as Real; so much so, even the perception of illusion, which illusion itself is false, is said to be false. There is no gradation in Reality according to Advaita. If it is real, it is the Real; otherwise, it is unreal. Giving the world a greater reality than the illusory experiences like the superimposition of the snake on the rope, arises from the ignorance of the logic of Advaita. Ontologically the world is naught. Strictly speaking, there is only two categories: The Real and the unreal. The Real (paramarthika satta) is Brahman. However, the unreal has its shades of differences that are based, not on the higher or lesser unreality, but purely on their durability and practicality. The normal experience of the objects of the world is mere durable than that of illusory objects. The shades of the unreal are classified as: imaginary objects (alike); illusory objects (pratibhasika) and empirical objects (vyavaharika). Absolute non-existence (alike) is only a figment of imagination. Though it could be expressed through language (vikalpa), it never appears in the ken of ones experience. For instance, one can meaningfully express the idea of a golden mountain or the horns of a hare; but they do not have any existence in all the three times, past, present and future. The illusory objects not a mere figment of imaginationit has an objective ground on which it appears. The illusory object has no reality of its own; but has a parasitic existence, an existence dependent entirely on its substractum. The snake of the rope-snake illusion, exists purely because of the rope. The snake is superimposed on the rope. The illusory snake is presented to the perceiver, though the life span or the illusory
51 Manuel Uppamthadathil, Advaitabrahmasiddhi: a comprehensive text on Advaita diss., Banaras Hindu University, 2006.pp.202-204.

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snake lasts only as long as it is being perceived, it was the rope, and when the true knowledge of the substractum draws on the person under illusion, he sees it as the rope, which it ever was. Similarly, all the illusory as well as dream objects exist, or appear in ones mental experience, as they are perceived and as long as they are, perceived. Illusory objects are personal and private to the perceiver. Empirical objects (vyavaharika satta) too, are unreal in the ultimate analysis. Yet, they serve the needs of our practical life. The difference between the vyavaharika satta and the pratibhsika is based on their durability. Ontologically both are of the same order of unreality. Illusory objects are personal and private to the perceiver; they exist only when they are perceived and at the dawn of the knowledge of the substractum the illusion is removed. Empirical objects, on the other hand, have a longer period of existence they are removed only at Brahman-realisation. Until then the world, process is taken to be real. The realists question the possibility of having the cause-effect Relation between the world and its cause if the world propose to be false (mithya). Causal relation is possible only between two real entities. The Naiyayikas define cause as: That which invariability precedes the Effect. Now, the cause is called sat, because satta inheres in it. It is not sat by itself, because cause and sat are not identical. Hence, when satta is not included under cause (sat), then, cause is proved to be asat. The same argument raised by the realists boomerangs on them, because the cause of the world being thus proved to be asat, and the effect, the world, is considered to be real- a Cause-Effect Relation between them is not possible as one of the terms compared is non-existent. Thus according to Advaita though one cannot prove the cause-effect relation yet they are taken as true in our empirical sphere of existence. Thus, Advaita accepts world as real at the empirical level for practical concerns. The realists may, therefore, accuse the advaitins of violating the law of contradiction: How could the advaitins bestow the world with a pragmatic existence, if the world is unreal? That is , the world is categorized as naught as well as taken as existing, albeit empirically. x and its absence cannot co-exist- no entity can exist and not-exist simultaneously. According to the author of advaitabrahmasiddhi, non-existence (abhava) and its experience of silver on the shell continues to exist until the realization of the substratum, the shell. In reality, the silver (rajata) does not exist on the shell; what exists (there) is the absence of silver. The silver, however, has a superimposed existence on the shell in illusion. Hence, in illusion there is a coexistence of silver and its absence on the shell.52 1.9 Liberation Advaita orients its entire approach around the quest for liberation. It proposes a theory of liberation that is radically different from most of the Indian philosophical systems, yet is concerned with its own inner logic. As Advaita conceives, Liberation is not a new
52

Surendra Kumar Shrivastava , The Essential Advaitism, B.N.Jaiswal Arun Press, 1980, p.100.

Varanasi:

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acquisition: that is, something that is to be attained in the later part of ones life; nor is it going to some new state of life, like achieving heaven etc. One attains Liberation, when one realizes ones identity with the Absolute self. There is no difference whatever between the individual self and the Absolute self, Brahman. The difference experienced between them in the empirical order is mere appearance due to certain adjuncts (upadhis); once the upadhis are removed the self stands out shining. The process of Liberation is compared to a person, who, though wearing a necklace, forgot about it; later, once found, he realizes that he had not lost it, but was in possession of it all the time. Moksa, for Acharya shankara, is the immediate experience of the real nature of the self. It is absolute and eternal freedom. It is not freedom from something to be given up (e.g., this world), nor it is freedom to gain something worth achieving (e.g., liberation), nor it is freedom for someone (e.g., the empirical self); it is freedom itself, pure and eternal. There is no becoming in moksa; the individual self does not really become Brahma for it always is Brahma itself. there is nothing to be left or acquired here. As Buddha identifies nirvana with the absolute, so shankara identifies moksa with Brahma. He who knows Brahma becomes brahma means that brahma cannot be known by finite thought as an object, but is to be experienced directly by realizing ones unity with it. The shruti declares: This self is Brahma (ayam atma brahma) and That thou art ( tat tvam asi). Shankara gives the following three definitions of moksa which really mean the same thing: a) moksa is the realization of Brahma, b) moksa is the cancellation of avidya , and c) moksa is eternal unembodiedness. Realisation of Brahma and cancellation of avidya are the same for both reveal the Absolute as eternal consciousness and bliss. Unembodiedness means the utter unrelatedness of the self with the three types of bodies, gross body, subtle and causal. It is not the absence of the body, but the absence of the relationship with the body. Hence, jivan-mukti is admitted. 53 The self is really never bound and so the question of its real release does not arise. The self, through Avidya, is imagined to be finite, to be an agent and enjoyer, to be subject to the cycle of birth-and death, and this constitutes its bondage. When this Avidya is cancelled by immediate spiritual experience, the self is realized as infinite, ever-pure and ever-free, and this is said to be its release from bondage. But in fact the self neither bound nor released; it is only Avidya which appears and avidya which vanishes. The self is always pure, eternal and transcendetntal reality. Atma and Brahma are one. In the rope-snake illusion, the rope does not become a snake even during illusion when it is so mistaken, and does not shed off snakehood and regain its ropehood when this illusion is removed by knowledge of the rope. Moksa is the cancellation of the transcendental illusion by the immediate experience of the Real. Due to this very reason, advaita eschews action (karma), devotion (bhakti) and meditation (yoga) as the Means of Liberation; and forcefully switches on to its basic postion53

chandradhar Sharma, The Advaitic Tradition in Indian Philosophy,

Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996, pp.193-200.

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knowledge (jnana) alone is the Means of Liberation. Liberation is nothing but the awakening of the consciousness that the individual self is identical with the Absolute self, Brahman. Conclusion The search for the Ultimate Reality has been the eternal quest of philosophy. Every system of philosophy has its own conception of Reality and it defines Reality in its own way. Most of the system of philosophy of both East and west define Reality in an apriori and dogmatic fashion. They take for granted that Reality is such and such and then give proofs for its existence. Advaitism does not start with any readymade definition of reality. Advaitism gets its definition of Reality by analyzing our experience of falsity. It is argued that it is universal experience that the false is what is sublated or what is sublated is false like the rope-snake. From this it follows that real must be what is sublated (trikalabadhita sat). Therefore, Reality is for advaitin what is eternal and non-sublatable. Based on the shruti as well as on the basis of the analysis of the different states of life it is maintained that it is the Self (Atma) which is ultimately unsublatable; everything other than the self is relative and false. The not-self or the world of multiplicity and change is false; it is not absolute but relative and depends on the self. By rejecting the relative, we reach that which reality, which transcends all diversities and is the underlying unity of the relative world of multiplicity. This is the ultimate Reality. As transcendent to the world of multiplicity, Reality is called Brahman in advatism. As immanent underlying unity of the relative world, Reality is called Atman, our very self. Brahma satyam, jagat mityha, jiva Brahmaiva na aparah is the oft quoted maxim of the Advaitins. It says, Brahman alone is Real, the world is an illusion, and the individual selves are not different from Brahman. This is the sum and substance of advaitic philosophy. In conclusion, we should observe that the Advaita Vedanta in its different aspects is an attempt to follow out the upanishadic idea of unity of all existence to its logical culmination. With all its defects and excellence, it stands in the history of human thought as the most consistent system of thought. As I evaluate there is no other systems of thought unlike Advaita which gives the highest status to man. Secondly, the advaitic message of unity of existence is very much appealing in our world of celebrated differences and dehumanization. For Advaita, the self is real and it is the Only Real. It is the principle of identity and unity. There is a greater urgency to feel for every one for we are one. Every one is the expression of the self. Advaita thus encompasses every differences and distinctions, conflicts and divisions, varieties and plurality into itself. Thus, advatism with its logical acumen and spiritualism stands as the most consistent system of thought any genuine seeker can embrace. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Indich, W.M. Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980. Mahadevan, T.M.P. The Philosophy of Advaita, fourth edition, New Delhi: Arnold Heinnman Publishers, 1976.

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Rao, Srinivasa. Advaita: A critical Investigation, Bangalore: Indian philosophy Foundation. (Year of publication not mentioned). Rao, Srinivasa. Perceptual Error. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press; 1998. Sharma, C. The Advaitic Tradition in Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996. Sharma, C. A critical survey of Indian philosophy, London: Rider & Company, 1960. Shrivastava kumar, Surendra. The Essential Advaitism. Varanasi: B.N.Jaiswal Arun Press, 1980. Sastri , D.N. The Critique of Indian Realism, Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1964. Uppamthadathil, Manuel. Advaitabrahmasiddhi: A Comprehensive text on Advaita Diss. Banaras Hindu University, 2006. Articles Chatterjee, A. k, The Concept of Saksi in Advaita Vedanta, in Indian council of philosophical Research, Vol. x , 1993, p.45-62. Chatterjee, A. k, The Concept of Maya, in Indian council of philosophical Annual, Vol. 2 , 1966, p.2. Uppamthadathil, Emmanuel, Theories of Causality: Tools for Unfolding the Metaphysics-An Indian Philosophical Perspective In Suvidya Journal Of Philosophy And Religion, Vol.3, 2009, Pp.1-16.

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2.4. THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE ANTONY. B.O Definition and classification of knowledge Knowledge or cognition (jnana or budhi) is the manifestation of objects. Just as the light of a lamp reveals or shows physical things, so knowledge manifests all its objects. Knowledge is broadly divided into anubhava or presentative cognition and smrti or memory, i.e., representative cognition. Each of the two can be valid (yathartha) or non-valid (ayathartha). Valid presentative knowledge is called prama. It is divided into perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Non valid presentative knowledge (aprama) is divided into doubt (samsaya), error (bhrama or viparyyaya) and hypothetical argument (tarka). Thus valid presentative knowledge (prama) is a definite or certain (asandigha), faithful or unerring (yathartha), and non reproductive experience (anubhava) of the object. My visual perception of the table before me is such knowledge (prama) because in it the table is presented to me directly just as it really is, and I am certain about the truth of my cognition. Though memory is not prama, asit is non-presentative or a mere reproduction of past knowledge, it may also be valid or non-valid, according as it is a reproduction of some previous valid or non-valid presentative knowledge. Doubtful cognition cannot be called prama, because it is not certain knowledge. Error is undoubted knowledge indeed, and may also be presentative, but it is not true to the nature of its object. Sometimes we perceive a snake in a rope in the twilight and have then no doubt about the reality of what we see. Still this perception is erroneous, because it is not a true cognition of the object (yatharthanubhava). Tarka is not prama, since it does not give us any knowledge of objects. A tarka is like this: Looking out of the window of your classroom you see a mass of smoke rising from a distant house and say that the house has caught fire. A friend contradicts you and asserts that there is no fire. Now you argue: if there is no fire, there cannot be smoke. This argument, starting with an if, and exposing the absurdity of your friends position, and thereby indirectly proving your own, is tarka. It is not prama or valid presentative knowledge, because to argue like this is not to know the fire, but to confirm your previous inference of fire from smoke. That there is free, you know by inference. To argue that if there is no fire there cannot be smoke is not to know the fire as a real fact either by way of perception or by that of inference. The next question is: how is true knowledge distinguished from false knowledge? Knowledge is true when it agrees with or corresponds to the nature of its object, otherwise it becomes false. Your knowledge of the rose as red is true, if the rose has really a red colour as you judge it to have (tadvati tatprakaraka). On the contrary, your impression of the crow as white is false, since the white colour does not really belong to the crow; the white colour is ascribed to the crow in which it is absent (tadabhavavati tatprakaraka). But then it may be asked: how do we know that the first knowledge is true and the second false?

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In other words: How do we test the truth or falsity of knowledge? The Naiyayikas (also Vaisesikas, Jainas and Buddhas) explain it in the following manner: suppose you want a little more sugar for your morning tea and take a spoonful of it from the cup before you and put it into your tea. Now the tea tastes sweeter than before and you know that your previous perception of sugar was true. Sometimes, however, it happens that while looking for sugar, you find some white powdered substance and put a pinch of it into your mouth under impression that it is sugar. But to your surprise and disappointment, you find that it is salt and not sugar. Here then we see that the truth and falsity of knowledge consist respectively in its correspondence and non- correspondence to facts. But the test of its truth or falsity consist in inference form the success or failures of our practical activities in relation to its object (pravrttisamarthya or pravrttivismvada). True knowledge leads to successful practical activity, while false knowledge ends in failure and disappointment.

The sources of knowledge

The Carvakas accept perception is the only valid source of knowledge. They point out that all non-perceptual or indirect source of knowledge like inference, the testimony of other persons, etc., are unreliable and seldom prove misleading. Therefore believe in anything except that is immediate known through perception. The Buddhist admits perception and inference as the sources of knowledge. The Jainas and Sankhya system admit perception, inference, and testimony as the source of knowledge. Nyaya and Vaisesika system accept perception, inference, comparison and testimony as the sources of knowledge. Mimamsa school of Prabhakara accepts five sources of knowledge Postulation in addition to the above four and where as the Mimamsa of Kumarila accepts six sources of knowledge, nonperception (anupalabdhi) in addition to the other five sources of knowledge. 1. Perception In western logic, the problem of perception as a source of knowledge has not been properly discussed. The reason probably is this. We generally believe, that what is given in perception must be true. Ordinarily, no man questions the truth of what he perceives by his senses. So it is thought that it is unnecessary, if not ridiculous, to examine the validity of perception, or to determine the conditions of perception as a source of valid knowledge. Indian thinkers are more critical than dogmatic in this respect, and make a thorough examination of perception in almost the same way as western logicians discuss the problem of inference. 1.1 Definition of perception In logic perception is to be regarded as a form of true cognition. Taking it in this sense, some Naiyayikas define perception as a definite cognition which is produced by sense-object contact and is true or unerring. The perception of the table before me is due to the contact of my eyes with the table, and I am definite that the object is a table. The perception of a distant figure as either a man or a post is a doubtful and indefinite cognition, and, therefore, not a true perception. The perception of a snake in a piece of rope is definite but false; and so it is different from valid perception.
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The definition of perception as a cognition due to the stimulation of our sense organs by the perceived object is generally accepted by us. It is accepted also by many systems of philosophy, Indian and western. Some Niyayikas, the Vedantins and others, however, reject it on the ground that there may be perception without sense-object contact. God, we are told, perceive all things, but has no senses. When I see a snake in rope, there is really no snake to come in contact with my eyes. Mental states like the feelings of pleasure and pain are directly cognized or perceived by us without the help of any sense organ. All this shows that senseobject contact is not common to, and cannot, therefore, be a defining character of, perceptions. What, however, is really common to, and distinctive of, all perceptions is a feeling of directness or immediacy of the knowledge given by them. We are said to perceive an object, if and when we know it directly, i.e., without taking the help of previous knowledge or any reasoning process (jnana-karanka). If a midday you turn your eyes overhead, you see the sun directly, and not by means of ay process of inference or reasoning, there is neither any necessity nor any time for you to think and reason before the perception of the sun arises in your mind. So some Indian logicians propose to define perception as immediate cognition (saksat pratiti), although they admit that perception is in almost all cases conditioned by sense-object contact. 1.2 Classification of Perception There are different ways of classifying perception. First we have the distinction between laukika or ordinary and alaukika or extraordinary perceptions. This distinction depends on the way in which the sense comes in contact with their objects. We have laukika perception when there is the usual sense-contact with objects present to sense. In alaukika perception, however, the object is such as is not ordinarily present to sense, but is conveyed to sense through an unusual medium. Perception again is of two kinds, namely, external (bahya) and internal (manasa). The former is due to the external senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. The latter is brought about by the minds contact with psychical states and processes. Thus we have six kinds of laukika or ordinary perceptions, namely, the visual (caksusa), auditory (srautra), tactual (sparsana), gustatory (rasana), olfactory (ghranaja), and the internal or mental (manasa) perception, Alaukika or extraordinary perception is of three kinds, namely, samanyalaksana, jnanalaksana and yogaja. According to the Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa and Jaina there are six organs of knowledge. Of these, five are external and one is internal. The five external senses are the organs of smell (ghrana), taste (rasana), sight (cakush), touch (tvak), and hearing (srotra). These perceive respectively the physical qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. They are physical in nature and each of them is constituted by that very same physical element whose qualities are sensed by it. This seems to be suggested by the fact that in many cases we use the same name for both the sense organ and the physical quality sensed by it. It is probably based on the principle that only like can perceive like. Mind (manas) is the internal organ which perceives such qualities of the soul as desire (iccha), aversion (dvesa), striving or willing (prayatna), pleasure (sukha) pain (duhkha) and cognition. It is not made of the material elements (bhutas) like the external senses. It is not limited to the knowledge of any particular class of things or qualities but functions as a central and common organ in all kinds of
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knowledge. The Nyaya view of mind as an internal sense (antarindriya) is accepted by the Vaisesikas, the Sankhyas, the Mimamsakas and others. But some Vedantins criticize and reject the Nyaya view of mind as an inner sense. Extraordinary Perception Alaukika or extraordinary perception is of three kinds. The first is called samanyalaksana; when we ask whether all men are mortal, the question raised is as to whether mortality is true, not of this or that man only, nor of all men who are dead and gone, but of all men in the past, present and future. But such a query presupposes some knowledge of the class of men. But the question is: how do we know the whole class of men? We cannot know it by ordinary perception, since all men cannot be physically present to our sense. Yet we must somehow know all men. The Naiyayikas explains this knowledge of the class by extraordinary perception, in which the class men is presented through the class essence or the universal manhood. When I perceive a man as man, I do perceive the manhood in him; otherwise I cannot directly recognize him as man. Now this direct knowledge or perception of the universal manhood is the medium through which I perceive all men or the class of men. To perceive manhood is to perceive all men so far as they are possessed of the universal manhood. In short, to perceive manhood is to perceive all men as the individuals in which the universal manhood inheres. This perception of the class of men, being due to the perception of the universal (samanya), is called samanyalaksana perception and is marked off as extraordinary (alaukika) on account of its obvious difference from our ordinary perception. The second kind of extraordinary perception is called jnanalaksana. We often use such expressions as ice looks cold, the stone looks hard, and the grass looks soft and so on. This means that the coldness of ice the hardness of a stone, the softness of grass are perceived by us with our eyes. But the question is: how can the eyes perceive touch qualities, like hardness the softness, which can ordinarily be sensed only by the sense of touch? Among western psychologists explain such perceptions by complication, a process by which sensations or perceptions of different senses become so closely associated as to become integral parts of a single perception. Similarly, when on seeing something one says, I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood, one has a perception of its fragrance by means of ones eyes. How can we explain this visual perception of fragrance which can be ordinarily sensed only by the sense of smell? The Naiyayikas says that here our past olfactory experience of fragrance as closely associated with the visual appearance of sandalwood (since every time we smelt it we saw its colour, unless that was in a dark room) is vividly revived and brings about the present visual perception of fragrance simultaneously with that of its colour. This present perception of fragrance, being due to the revived past knowledge of fragrance (sautrabhajnana), has been called jnanalaksana perception, which is also extraordinary in the sense that it is brought about by a sense organ which is not ordinarily capable of perceiving fragrance. The Naiyayikas also explain illusion, eg., of a snake in a rope, as a case of jnanalaksana perception.

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The third kind of extraordinary perception is called yogaja. It is the intuitive perception of all objects past and future hidden and infinitesimal by one who possesses some supernatural power generated in the mind by devout meditation (yogabhyasa). In the case of those who have attained spiritual perfection (yukta), such intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant and spontaneous. In the case of others who are on the way to perfection (yunjana), it requires the help of concentration as an auxiliary condition. Three modes of ordinary perception According to another classification, ordinary perception is of two kinds, namely, nirvikalapaka or the indeterminate and savikalpaka or the determinate. Here the principle of classification is the more or less developed character of perceptual knowledge. To these two we may add pratyabhinjna or recognition. Keeping in view the nature of perception, the Naiyayikas distinguish thus between three modes of ordinary perception. Extraordinary perception is always determinate, since it is definite and explicit knowledge. Nirvikalapaka or indeterminate perception is the primary cognition of an object and its diverse characters without any judgment to inter-relate them. Suppose you look at an orange placed on the other side of your table. Immediately after the first glance, or after the first moment of contact between your eyes and the object, you apprehend something, its colour, shape, etc., along with a general character called orangeness. But at first sight, you do not think of it as yellow or round, or as an orange. This kind of primary perception is called indeterminate perception. Suppose on the first day of your examination you enter the bathroom engrossed in thinking about the possible questions and their answers, it is not unlikely that you may finish your bath without thinking of the water used by you as water, as cold, etc. yet it cannot be said that you did not perceive the water. But for a very real perception of it, you act of bathing cannot be explained. This perception of water and its characters, without any thought or judgment of it as water, as liquid, as cold, etc., is the nirvikalapaka or indeterminate perception of it. Savikalpaka perception is the cognition of an object as possessed of some character. While nirvikalpaka is the cognition of the existence of a thing as such, savikalpaka may be said to be the recognition of its nature. Thus, when looking at the orange, I judge within myself this is an orange; this is round, red, etc. I do not only cognize the unrelated elements as such, but also explicitly relate them, here the existent fact, this becomes the subject of proposition and orangeness, etc., are related to it as predicates. Thus we may say that nirvikalapaka is an indeterminate apprehension, and savikalpaka a determinate, predicative judgment. There could not be any savikalpaka perception of an object without a previous nirvikalapaka perception of it. Unless we first knew the unrelated elements as such, we could not possible know them as related. Unless I first perceive water, coldness, liquidity, etc., I cannot come to know it as water or as cold, or as liquid, etc. Pratyabhijna is recognition in its literal meaning. It is recognition of some object, i.e., cognition of it as that which was cognized before. In it we know immediately that the thing which we now cognize is the same as that which was cognized before, as when one say: this must be the same man who helped me into the tram-car yesterday. It should be remarked
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here that the distinctions of nirvikalapaka perception, savikalpaka perception, and pratyabhijna have not been recognized in the same way, in all the systems of Indian philosophy. While the Vaisesika, the Sankhya and the Mimamsa systems accept, on the whole, the Nyaya view as explained here, the Buddhist and the Advaita Vedanta systems reject it and hold very different views. 2. Inference Definition of inference After perception comes anumana or inference. Anumana (anu-after, mana-knowledge) literally means a cognition or knowledge which follows some other knowledge. Take the following illustrations: The hill is fiery, because it smokes and whatever smokes is fiery; Devadatta is mortal, because he is a man, and all men are mortal. In the first example, we pass from the perception of smoke in the hill to the knowledge of the existence of fire in it, on the ground of our previous knowledge of the universal relation between smoke and fire. In the second example, we know the mortality of Devadatta, which is not now perceived, from the presence of manhood in him. Thus we see that inference is a process of reasoning in which we pass from the apprehension of some mark (linga) to that of something else, by virtue of a relation of invariable concomitance (vyapti) between the two. Thus we can say anumana (inference) is the process of ascertaining, not by perception or direct observation, but through the instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a certain character. The Constituent of Inference From the definition of inference it will appear that an inference must have as its constituents three terms and at least three propositions. In inference we arrive at the knowledge of some character of a thing through the knowledge of some mark and that of its universal relation to the inferred character. Thus in the above inference of fire we know the unperceived fire in the hill through the perception of smoke in it and the knowledge of an invariable relation between smoke and fire. There is, first, the knowledge or apprehension of smoke as a mark in the hill. Secondly, there is a recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, as we have observed it in the past. Thirdly, we have the resulting knowledge of the existence of the unperceived fire in the hill. Now in this inference the hill is the paksa (minor term), since it is the subject under consideration in the course of the inferential reasoning. Fire is the sadhya (major term), as that is something which we want to prove or establish in relation to the hill by means of this inference. Smoke is the linga (middle term), as it is the mark or sign which indicates the presence of fire. It is also called the hetu or sadhana, i.e., the reason or ground of inference. Thus corresponding to the minor, major and middle terms of the syllogism, inference, in Indian logic, contains three terms, namely, paksa, sadhya, and hetu. The paksa is the subject with which we are concerned in any inference. The sadhya is the object which we want to know in relation to the paksa or the inferable character of the paksa. The hetu is the reason for our relating the sadhya to the paksa. It is the ground of our knowledge of our knowledge of the sadhya as related to the paksa.
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In order of the event which take place when a certain thinker is inferring; the first step in inference is the apprehension of the hetu (smoke) the paksa (hill), the second, recollection of the universal relation between hetu and sadhya (smoke and fire), and the last is the cognition of the sadhya (fire) as related to the paksa (hill). But as a matter of a formal statement or verbal expression, the first step in inference is the predication of the sadhya with regard to the paksa, eg., The hill is fiery the second is the affirmation of the hetu as related to the paksa, eg., because the hill is smoky. The third is the affirmation of the hetu as invariably related to the sadhya, eg., wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen. Thus in inference we must have at least three propositions, all of which are categorical and one must be affirmative and the others may be affirmative or negative. The proposition corresponds to the conclusion of the syllogism, the second to the minor premise, and the third to the major premise. Thus inference, in Indian logic, may be said to be a syllogism consisting of three categorical propositions. But the order of the propositions is reversed in Indian logic, insofar as it puts the conclusion of the syllogism first, and its usual major premise last, in the formal statement of an inference. Indian logicians are agreed that so far as inference is svatha or for oneself, it requires no formal statement by way of a number of propositions. It is only in the case of inference which is parartha, ie., meant to prove or demonstrate some truth, that we require to state an inference in the form of a rigorous chain of argument without any gap. This is the logical form of an inference. We may say that in Indian logic inference corresponds roughly, in respect of its form, to the categorical syllogism of western logic. But there are certain important differences between the Indian and western forms of the syllogism. In western logic, the syllogism is generally stated in the form of three propositions, of which the first is the major premise, the second is the minor premise, and the last is the conclusion. According to the Naiyayikas, however, inference as a conclusive proof, must be stated in the form of five propositions, called its avayavas or members. Therese are pratijna, hetu, udaharana, upanaya, and nigamana. The five-membered syllogism may be thus illustrated:

Ram is mortal (pratinjan) Because he is a man (hetu) All men are mortal (udaharana) Ram also is a man (upanaya) Therefore he is mortal (nigamana)

The pratijna is the first proposition, which asserts something. The hetu is the second proposition, which states the reason for this assertion. The udaharana is the universal proposition, showing the connection between the reason and the asserted fact, as supported by known instances. Upanaya is the application of the universal proposition to the present case. Nigamana is the conclusion which follows from the preceding propositions. The grounds of inference
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Now we come to the consideration of vyapti or invariable concomitance between the middle term and the major term, which is the logical ground of inference. In inference our knowledge of the sadhya (fire) as related to the paksa (hill) depends on the previous knowledge of the hetu (smoke) as connected with the paksa on the one hand, and universally related to the sadhya on the other. We infer that there is fire in the hill, because we see that there is smoke in the hill and know that smoke is always accompanied by fire. It appears, therefore, that an inference has two conditions. The first is a cognition of the hetu or middle term (smoke) in the paksa or minor term (the hill). The second is the relation of invariable concomitance between the middle and the major terms. That there is fire in the hill is a conclusion which we can justify only if we know that there is an invariable concomitance between the hill smoke and fire. This relation of invariable concomitance between the hetu and the sadhya, or the middle term and the major term of inference is technically called vyapti, and is regarded as the logical ground of inference, since it guarantees the truth of the conclusion. So the questions we are to consider now, are; what is vyapti? How is vyapti known by us? With regard to the first question, we have to say that vyapti literally means the state of pervasion. It implies a correlation between two facts, of which one is pervaded (vyapya), and the other pervades (vyapaka). A fact is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. A fact is said to the pervaded by another when it is always accompanied by the other. In this sense, smoke is pervaded by fire since it is always accompanied by fire, or all smoky objects are fiery. But while all smoky objects are fiery, all fiery objects are not smoky, eg., the red-hot iron ball. A vyapti between terms of unequal extension, such as smoke and fire, is called asamavyapti or visamavyapti. It is a relation of non-equipollent concomitance between two terms, from one of which we may infer the other, but not vice versa. We may infer fire from smoke, but not smoke from fire. As distinguished from this, a vyapti between two terms of equal extension is called samavyapti or equipollent concomitance. Here the vyapti holds between two terms which are co-extensive, so that we may infer either of them from the other, eg., nameable and knowable. Whatever is nameable is knowable, and vice versa. For any inference, the minimum condition is some kind of vyapti between the middle and the major terms. This satisfies the fundamental law of syllogistic inference that one of the premises must be universal. Now the vyapti between the middle and the major term means generally a relation of co-existence (sahacarya) between the two, eg., Wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Every case of co-existence, however, is not a case of vyapti. In many instance fire may co-exist with smoke. Still there is no vyapti or universal relation between fire and smoke, since there may be fire without smoke. The reason is that in such cases the relation of co-existence is dependent on certain conditions (upadhi) other than the terms related. Thus the presence of smoke in fire is conditioned by wet fuel (ardrendhana). So we are to say that vyapti is that relation of coexistence between the middle and the major term which is independent of all conditions. It is an invariable and unconditional relation of concomitance (nitya anaupadhika sambandha) between the middle and the major terms.

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The second question is: how is vyapti known? How do we get a universal proposition like all smoky objects are fiery, or all men are mortal? This is the problem of induction. For the Carvakas, who are radical empiricists, there is no problem because there is no inference as a source of true knowledge. All the other system of Indian philosophy which admits the validity of inference tries to solve this problem in one way or the other. The Buddhist base the knowledge of universal propositions on the principles of causality and essential identity, which, they regard as a priori and necessary principles of human thought and action. If two things are related as cause and effect, we know that they are universally related, for there cannot be any effect without its cause. To determine the causal relation between them, the Buddhists adopt the method of pancakarani which is as follows: a) neither the cause nor the effect is perceived, b) the cause is perceived, c) immediately, the effect is perceived, d) the cause disappears, e) immediately, the effect disappears. Similarly, if two things are essentially identical, (ie., possess a common essence) they must be universally related. All men are animals, because animality belongs to the essence of both, and men without animality will not be men. The Vedantins hold that vyapti or the universal proposition is the result of an induction by simple enumeration. It is derived from the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence between two things. When we find that two things go together or co-exist, and that there is no exception to their relation (vyabhicaradarsane sati sahacaradarsanam) we may take them as universally related. The Naiyayikas agree with the Vedantins in holding that vyapti is established by the uncontradicted experience of the relation between two things, and not on any a priori principle like causality or essential identity. They, however, go further than the Vedantins and supplement uncontradicted experience of the relation between two facts by tarka or indirect proof and by samanylaksana perception. The Nyaya method of induction or generalization may be analyzed into the following steps: first we observe that there is a relation of agreement in presence (anvaya) between two things, or that in all cases in which one is present, the other also is present, eg., wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Secondly, we see that there is uniform agreement in absence (vyatireka) between them, eg., wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke. These two steps taken together correspond very well to Mills Joint Method of Agreement in presence and in absence. Thirdly, we do not observe any contrary instance in which one of them is present without the other (vyabhicaragraha). From this we may conclude that there must be a natural relation of invariable concomitance between the two things. Still we cannot be sure if the relation in question is unconditional or free from upadhis, which a real vyapti must be. Hence the fourth step of the inductive method is elimination of upadhis or conditions on which the relation may possible be dependent (upadhinirasa). I put on the switch and there is light; if I do not, there is no light. From this if anybody concludes that there is a vyapti or invariable relation between switching on and lighting the room, then he would commit the mistake or ignoring the uapdhi or condition, viz, the electric current, in the presence of which alone there can be light. This upadhi, viz, electric current, must be present when there is light, but it may not be present wherever there is switching on. So an
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upadhi is defined as a term which is co-extensive with the major (sadhyasamavyapta) but not with the middle term of an inference (avyaptasadhana). Taking the stock example, when one infers the existence of smoke from fire, one relies on the conditional relation of fire to smoke, since fire is attended with smoke on the condition of its being fire from wet fuel. It will be seen here that the condition wet fuel is always related to the major term smoky, but not so related to the middle term fire, as there are cases of fire without wet fuel . Hence to eliminate the suspected conditions of an invariable relation between two things, we must make repeated observation (bhuyodarsana) of their agreement in presence and in absence under varying circumstance. If in the course of this process we see that there is no material circumstance which is present or absent just when the major term is present or absent, we are to understand that its concomitance with the middle term is unconditional. In this way we can exclude all the suspected conditions of a relation of invariable concomitance between the middle and the major terms and say that it is a relation of vyapti or invariable and unconditional concomitance. But there is still room for a skeptical doubt about the vyapti or universal proposition thus arrived at. It may be urged by a skeptic like Hume or the Carvakas that so far as our past and present experience is concerned, there is no exception to the uniform relation of concomitance between smoke and fire. But there is no knowing whether this relation holds good in distant regions, like the planets, or will hold good in the remote future. To end this skeptical doubt, the Nyayikas try next to fortify the induction by tarka. The proposition all smoky objects are fiery must be true. This means that there may be smoke without fire. But this supposition is contradicted by the law of universal causation, for, to say that there may be smoke without fire is just to say that there may be an effect without a cause (since fire is the only known cause of smoke). If anyone has the obstinacy to say that sometimes there may be effects without causes, he must be silence by reference to the practical contradictions (vyaghata) involved in his position. If there can be an effect without a cause, why seek for fire to smoke your cigar or to cook our food? This process of indirect proof in the Nyaya may be said to correspond roughly to the method of reduction ad absurdum in western logic. Although the Naiyayikas take great pains to establish vyapti or universal proposition on the ground of the observation of particular facts, still they feel that a generalization from particulars as mere particulars cannot give us that certainty which we claim when we lay down a general proposition like all men are mortal. The proposition all crows are black is not so certain as the proposition all men are mortal. We find it less difficult to think of a crow which is not black, than to think of a man who is not mortal. Just as a cuckoo may be black or grey and spotted, so crows may be black or dark, grey or brown. We cannot, however, seriously and honestly think of ourselves as immortal, and regulate our practical activities accordingly. Why this difference in the sees of security of certainty? The answer that naturally suggests itself and that not unreasonably is that while there is nothing in the nature of a crow to prevent it from being grey or brown, there seems to be something in the nature of man that makes him mortal. We say that all crows are black, not because they cannot be otherwise, but because they happen to be so, as far as we have seen. On the other hand, we say that all men are mortal because they are men, ie., because they possess some
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essential nature, manhood, which is related to mortality. This becomes clear when we say, A,B,C are mortal, not because they are A,B,C but because they are men. It follows from this that an inductive generalization must be ultimately based on the knowledge of the essential nature of things, ie., the class-essence or the universal in them. Hence it is that the Naiyayikas finally establish an induction by samanyalaksana perception. They hold that a universal proposition like all men are mortal, or all smoky objects are fiery, must be due to the perception of the universal manhood as related to morality, or that of smokness as related to fireness. It is only when we perceive manhood as related to fireness. It is only when we perceive manhood as related to mortality that we can say that all men are mortal, for to perceive manhood is to perceive all men so far as they are man-as-such, and not this or that man. So we may say that the essence of induction is not an inference of the form some men are mortal; therefore, all men are mortal. This is not logically valid inference, because there is an obvious illicit distribution of the subject term men. On the other hand, induction is a process of generalization from the particulars of experience through the knowledge of the class essences or universals underlying such particulars. 3. Upamana or Comparison Upamana is the third source of valid knowledge accepted by the Nyaya. It is the source of our knowledge of the relation between a name and things so named or between a word and its denotation (sanjnasanjnisambandha). We have such knowledge when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes a class of objects of a certain description and then, on the basis of the given description, apply the word to some object or objects which fit in with that description, although we might not have seen them before. For example, a man, who does not know what a gavya or wild cow is, may be told by a forester that it is an animal like the cow. If subsequently he happens to meet with such an animal in the forest and knows or recognizes it as a gavaya, then his knowledge will be due to upamana or comparison. A boy who does not know what a jackdaw is, may be told by you that it is like a crow, but of bigger size and glazy back colour. When next he sees a jackdaw and says, this must be a jackdaw, we know that he has learnt the denotation of the word. To take another example from Dr. L.S. Stebbing, suppose you do not know what saxophone means. You may be told by a musician: A saxophone is a musical instrument something like a U shaped trumpet. If, one subsequently seeing a saxophone, you are able to give its name, it will be clear that you understand what saxophone means. Now, upamana is just this way of knowing the denotation of words, or the relation between names and the objects denoted by them. The grounds of our knowledge in upamana are a given description of the objects to be known and perception of their similarity, etc. to the familiar objects mentioned in the description. A man recognizes a gavaya as such just when he perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the description, the gavya is an animal resembling the cow. That upamana or comparison, as explained by the Naiyayikas, is a distinct source of valid knowledge, has not been recognized in the other systems of Indian philosophy. The Carvakas contend that upmana is not pramana at all, since it cannot give us any true knowledge about the denotation of words as maintained by the Naiyayikas. The Buddhists logicians recognize upmana as a form of valid knowledge, but they reduce it to perception and testimony so we
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do not require a separate source of knowledge like upamana. So also, Vaisesika and the Sankhya system explain upmana as a form of inference, and therefore, neither a distinct type of knowledge nor an independent way of knowing. The Jainas reduce upamana to pratyabhijna or recognition. Comparison in Mimamsa system Nyaya admits comparison as a unique source of knowledge. But Mimamsa, though accepting comparison as an independent source, accept it in quite a different sense. According to it, knowledge arises from comparison when, on perceiving a present object to be like an object perceived in the past, we come to know that the remembered object is like the perceived one. On seeing a rat one perceives that it is like a mouse perceived in the past, and then he gets the knowledge that the remembered mouse is like the perceived rat. This knowledge, namely, that mouse, perceived in the past, is like this rat, is obtained from comparison, or from the knowledge of a similarity of the rat to the mouse. Similarly one who has seen a cow previously at home goes to a forest and finds a gavaya (nilgai) and perceives its similarity to the cow at home. He may then obtain by comparison (ie., by the knowledge of this similarity) the further knowledge that the cow at home is like the gavaya. Such knowledge cannot be classified under perception. For, the object (the mouse or cow) known to be similar is not perceived then. It does not come under memory, because though the object was perceived in the past, its similarity to the present object was not then known, and, therefore, this similarity cannot be said to be simply remembered. It is not also an inference. From a knowledge like this gavaya is like the cow at home we cannot infer the cow at home is like this gavaya, unless we have another premise like all things are similar to other things which are similar to them. And such a universal premise containing an invariable concomitance between two terms is not really used in the above case where one arrives at the knowledge of the absent cows similarity to the present gavaya, from the perception of the gavaya being similar to the cow. Again, such knowledge does not obviously arise from verbal testimony or authority. Hence it is given an independent place. The Nyaya holds that on learning from an authority that a gavaya is like a cow, a person goes to a forest, perceives some animal like the cow and then he has by upamana or comparison the knowledge that such an animal is a gavaya. Against this Nyaya view it is pointed out by Mimamsaka writer that the knowledge that the particular animal perceived is like the cow is derived from perception and the knowledge that such an animal looking like the cow is a gavaya is obtained through recollection of what was previously learned from some authority. Lastly, the knowledge that this particular animal is a gavaya, is a mere inference from the last knowledge. Hence what the Nyaya considers to be derived from a new source, namely comparison, is not really so. It may be noted here that though the account given above is the one generally accepted by later Mimamsakas, Sabarasvami seems to understand upamana, as, what is called in Western logic analogical argument. The existence of another self is proved, he remarks, by an argument like this. Just as you felt the existence of your own self, similarly by analogy you can believe that others also feel the existence of their own selves. Such an argument he calls upamana. Sabaras definition of upamana as knowledge of an

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unperceived object as being similar to some known object is not incompatible with the suggestion that he takes upamana as analogical argument. It should also be remembered that similarity (sadrsya), which is the object of upamana is regarded by the Mimamsa as an independent category of reality. It is pointed out that similarity cannot be called a quality (guna), because a quality cannot be possessed by another quality; but similarity is possessed by qualities even. It cannot be treated as a universal (samanya or jati). Because a universal means something which is exactly identical in many individuals (eg, cowness in cows). Similarity does not mean any completely identical character. 4. Sabda or Testimony The nature and classification of Sabda Literally sabda means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid. It consist s in the assertion of a trust worthy person. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of another person. But it is a matter of common observation that a sentence or statement is not by itself sufficient to give us any knowledge of things. Nor again does the mere perception of the words of a sentence leads to any knowledge about objects. It is only when one perceives the words and understands their meanings that he acquires any knowledge from a verbal statement. Hence while the validity of verbal knowledge depends on its being based on the statement of a trustworthy person, its possibility depends on the understanding of the meaning of that statement. Hence sabda or testimony, as a source of valid knowledge, consist in understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person. There are two ways of classifying sabda or verbal knowledge. According to the one, there are two kinds of sabda, namely, that relating to perceptible objects (drstartha), and that relating to imperceptible objects (adrstartha). Under the first head we are to include the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons, the saints and the scriptures insofar as they bear on the perceptible objects of the world, eg, the evidence given by witnesses in the law courts , the statements of a reliable farmer about plants, the scriptural injunctions to perform certain rites to bring about rainfall, etc. the second will include all the trustworthy assertions or ordinary persons, saints, prophets and the scriptures insofar as they bear on supersensible realities, eg., the scientists assertions about atoms, either, electrons, vitamins, etc., the prophets instructions about virtue and vice, the scriptural texts on god, freedom and immortality. According to another classification, there are two kinds of testimony, the scriptural (vaidika) and the secular (laukika). In vaidika testimony we have the words of god. Vaidika or scriptural testimony is thus perfect and infallible by its very nature. But laukika or secular testimony is not all valid. It is the testimony of human beings and may, therefore, be true or false. Of laukika testimony, only that which proceeds from trustworthy persons is valid, but not the rest. It will be observed here that the first classification of testimony (sabda) has
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reference to the nature of the objects of knowledge, the second to the nature of the source of knowledge. But the two classifications agree in implying that testimony must always be personal, i.e., based on the words of some trustworthy person, human or divine. In respect of their truth, however, there is no difference among the trustworthy statements of an ordinary person, a saint, a prophet, and the scriptures as revealed by god. The logical structure of a sentence Sabda or testimony gives us knowledge about certain things through the understanding of the meaning of sentences, either spoken or written by some authoritative person. Hence the question is: what is a sentence and how does it become intelligible? A sentence is a group of words (pada) arranged in a certain way. A word again is a group of letters arranged in a fixed order. The essential nature of a word lies in its meaning. A word is that which has a fixed relation to some object, so as to recall it whenever it is heard or read, i.e., it means as object. So we may say that words are significant symbols. This capacity or words to mean their respective objects is called their sakti or potency, and it is said to be due to the will of god. That a word has a fixed and an unalterable relation to certain things only, or that this word always means this object and not others, is ultimately due to the Supreme Being who is the ground and reason of all the order and uniformity that we find in the world. A sentence (vakya) is a combination of words having a certain meaning. Any combination of words does not make a significant sentence. The construction of an intelligible sentence must conform to four conditions. These are akanksa, yogyata, sannidhi and tatparya. A akanksa or expectancy is meant that qualify of the words of a sentence by which they expect or imply one another. Generally speaking, a word cannot by itself convey a complete meaning. It must be bought into relation with other words in order to express a full judgment. When one hears the word bring, he at once asks: what? The verb bring has a need for some other words denoting some objects or objects, eg., the jar. Akanksa is this mutual need that the words of a sentence have for one another in order to express a complete sense. The second condition of the combination of words in a sentence is their yogyata or mutual fitness. It consists in the absence of contradiction in the relation of objects denoted by a sentence. When the meaning of a sentence is not contradicted, there is yogyata or fitness between its constituent words. The sentence moisten with fire is devoid of meaning, because there is a contradiction between fire and moistening. Sannidhi or asatti is the third condition of verbal knowledge. It consists in the juxtaposition or proximity between the different words of a sentence. If there is to be an intelligible sentence then its constituent words must be continuous with one another in time or space. Spoken words cannot make a sentence when separated by long intervals of time. Similarly, written words cannot construct a sentence when they are separated by long intervals of space. Thus the words bring a cow will not make a sentence when uttered on three days or written on three pages, even though they possess the first two marks of akanksa or expectancy and yogyata or fitness.

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Tatparya as a condition of verbal knowledge stand for the meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence. A word may mean different things in different cases. Whether it means this or that thing in a particular case depends on the intention of the person who uses the word. To understand the meaning of a sentence, therefore, we must consider the intention of the writer or the speaker who uses it. Thus when a man is asked to bring a bat he is at a loss to understand whether he is told to bring a particular kind of animal or a playing implement, for the word means both. This can be ascertained only if we know the intention of the speaker. Hence the understanding of sentence depends on the understanding of its tatparya or intended meaning. In the case of ordinary sentences used by human beings, we can ascertain their tatparya from the context (prakarana) in which they are used. For the understanding of the Vedic texts, we are to take the help of the various rules of interpretation systematized by the Mimamsa. Mimamsa pays the greatest attention to this source of knowledge, because it has to justify the authority of the Vedas. An intelligible sentence yields knowledge except when it is known to be the statement of an unreliable person (anaptavakya). This is known as verbal testimony or simply testimony (sabda) or authority. There are two kinds of authority personal (pauruseya) and impersonal (apauruseya). The first consists in the written or spoken testimony of some person. The second denotes the authority of the Vedas. Again, authority may either give information as to the existence of objects (siddharthavakya) or give directions for the performance of some action (vidhayaka vakya). The Mimamsa is interested primarily in the impersonal authority of the Vedas and that again, because the Vedas give directions for performing the sacrificial rites. The Vedas are looked upon as the book of commandments; and therein lies their value. The Mimamsa even holds that as the sole use of the Vedas lies in directing rituals, any part of them which does not contain such direction but gives information about the existence of anything is useless, unless it can be shown at least to serve the purpose of persuading persons to follow the injunctions for performing rituals. The attempt is constantly made, therefore, to show all existential sentences regarding the soul, immortality, etc,) as indirectly connected with some commandment, by way of persuading people to perform some ritual or dissuading them form forbidden activity. This attitude of the Mimamsa reminds us of modern pragmatism which holds that every type of knowledge ordinary, scientific or philosophical is valuable only in so far as it leads to some practical activity. The Mimamsa philosophy may be called ritualistic Pragmatism, for according to it the value of Vedic knowledge is for ritualistic activity. According to most of the pro-Vedic schools, the authority of the Vedas lies in their being the words of god. But the Mimamsa which does not believe in any creator or destroyer of the world, believes that the Vedas, like the world, are eternal. They are not the work of any person, human or divine. Hence the authority of the Vedas is said to be impersonal. Elaborate arguments are advanced to support this view. If the Vedas had any author, his name would have been known and remembered; for, the Vedic lore has been passed down by an unbroken series of successive generations of teachers and learners from unknown antiquity. But no such name is remembered. Even those (among the ancient Indian thinkers) who believe that the Vedas are not eternal, but produced, are not unanimous as to their origin. Some ascribe
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them to god, some to Hiranyagarbha, and some to Prajapati. The fact is that they think vaguely, on the analogy of ordinary books, that the Vedas also must have some author, but do not know precisely who the author is. The names of certain persons are of course cited along with the Vedic hymns. But they are the seers (rsis) to whom the hymns were revealed, or the expositors or the founders of the different Vedic schools (sampradayas). So the Vedas are not the works of any person. But are not the Vedas composed of words and are not words produced and non-eternal? In reply to this question, the Mimamsakas propound the theory that word (sabdas) are not really the perceived sounds (dhvanis). The sounds produced by the speaker and perceived by the hearer are only the revealers of the words which are not themselves produced. Words are really the letters which are partless and uncaused. A letter, like k is pronounced (and revealed) by the different persons at different places and times in different ways. Though these letter-sounds vary, we recognize that the same letter is pronounced by all of them. This identity of the letter shows that it is not produced at any time and place, but transcends them. So the words as letters may be regarded as eternal, that is, as having existence, but being uncaused. Another argument in support of the theory that the Vedas are not the works of any person is that they enjoin some ritual duties and declare that fruits (like attainment of heaven) depend on how devotedly the rituals have been performed. The connection between the actions and such fruits is not such as can be said to have been observed by any person (like the connection between the taking of a prescribed medicine and the cure of a disease). So no person can be said to be the author of the Vedas. It is also not reasonable to hold that the author may be a cunning deceiver (as the Carvakas suggest). For had it been so, no one would care to study such deceptive works and hand them down to posterity. The infallibility of the authority of the Vedas rests on the fact that they are not vitiated by any defects to which the work of imperfect persons is subject. But in addition to the impersonal Vedic authority, the testimony of the reliable person (apta) also is accepted by the Bhattas as a valid source of knowledge. There, however, a special value is attached to Vedic authority, because the knowledge of the commandments (dharma) which we have form it is not to be obtained from any other source, such as perception and inference. While the knowledge that personal authority may impart to us can be sometimes obtained otherwise by perception, inference, etc., and is itself based on such previous knowledge, the knowledge derived from the Vedas is neither obtainable otherwise nor dependent on any previous knowledge, the Vedas being eternal. But the Prabhakaras, like the Vaisesikas, hold that the statement of a non-Vedic authority yields knowledge through inference based on the reliability of the authority. In reply to those who try to reduce all knowledge derived from testimony to inference on the ground that the validity of such knowledge is ascertained by inference based on the reliability of authority, the Mimamsa makes an important reply. It asserts that the validity of every knowledge is assured by the conditions which generate that knowledge, so that the
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knowledge imparted by authority, like every other knowledge, carries with itself such assurance of its own truth.

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5. Postulation (arthapatti) Postulation (arthapatti) is the necessary supposition of an unperceived fact which alone can explain a phenomenon that demands explanation. When a given phenomenon is such that we cannot understand it in any way without supposing some other fact, we have to postulate this other fact by way of explaining the phenomenon. This process of explaining an otherwise inexplicable phenomenon by the affirmation of the explaining fact is called arthapatti. Thus when a man, who is growing fat, is observed to fast during the day, we find an apparent contradiction between his growing fatness and his fasting. We cannot in any way reconcile these two facts, namely, fatness and fasting, unless we admit that the man eats at night. That the man must eat at night explains the complex whole of apparently conflicting facts, namely, fasting attended with increasing fatness. Knowledge obtained in this way is distinctive because it is not reducible to perception or inference: and it is not, of course, a case of testimony or comparison. Such knowledge cannot be explained as perception since we do not see the man eat at night. Nor is it a case of inference, because there is no invariable concomitance (vyapti) between fatness and eating at night, so that we cannot say that whenever there is fatness there is eating at night, as we can say that wherever there is smoke there is fire. Though we are not ordinarily aware of it, we employ this method of arthapatti very often in daily life. Some examples will make this clear. When we call on a friend and do not find him at home, though we are sure that he is alive, we say: He must be somewhere outside home. This last supposition is made by us because this alone can explain how a man who is alive cannot be at home. This method is also largely used by us in the interpretation of language. When some words are omitted in a sentence, we suppose those words without which the meaning implied by the context cannot be explained. On reading or hearing a sentence like shut up, we supply (by arthapatti) the words your lips, because without them the meaning is incomplete. Similarly, when the primary meaning of a word does not suit the context, we suppose a secondary or figurative meaning which alone can explain the sentence. For example, when we are told, Industry is the key to success, we suppose that the meaning of key here must be means and not the real key. Mimamsakas distinguish between two kinds of postulation, that which is employed to explain something which is perceived (drstarthapatti), such as fatness in a man who is fasting by day, and that which is used to explain the meanings of words heard (srutarthapatti), such as those cited above. It will be found that arthapatti resembles a hypothesis as understood in western logic. It appears to be like an explanatory hypothesis. But the difference is that it lacks the tentative or provisional character of a hypothesis. What is known by arthapatti is not simply hypothetically supposed or entertained, but is believed in as the only possible explanation. As arthapatti arises out of a demand for explanation, it is different form a syllogistic

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inference the object of which is to conclude from given facts, and not to explain given facts. Arthapatti is a search for grounds whereas an inference is a search for consequents. 6. Anupalabdhi or non-perception According to the Bhatta Mimamsa and the Advaita Vedanta, non perception (anupalabdhi) is the source of our immediate cognition of the non-existence of an object. The question here is: How do I know the non- existence, say, of a jar on the table before me? It cannot be said that I perceive it with my senses, because non-existence is a negative fact which cannot stimulate any sense as a positive fact like the table can. The Bhattas and the Advaitins hold, therefore, that the non-existence of the jar on the table is known from the absence of its cognition, that is, from its non-perception (anupalabdhi). I judge that the jar does not exist on the table because it is not perceived. It cannot be said that the non-existence of the jar is inferred from its non-perception. For, such an inference is possible, if we already possess the knowledge of a universal relation between non-perception and non-existence, that is, if we know that when an object is not perceived it does not exist. Thus it would be begging the question or assumption of the very thing which was sought to be proved by inference. Nor can we explain the knowledge of the jars non-existence by comparison or testimony, since it is not due to any knowledge of similarity or of words and sentences. Hence to explain the direct knowledge of the jars non-existence, we have to recognize non-perception (anupalabdhi) as a separate and an independent source of knowledge. It should, however, be remarked here that all non-perception does not mean the non-existence of what is not perceived. We do not see a table in the dark, nor do we perceive any such supersensible entities as atoms, ether, virtue, vice. Yet we do not judge them to be nonexistent. If a thing should have been perceived under certain circumstances, then only its nonperception under those circumstances would give the knowledge of its non-existence. It is such appropriate non-perception (yogyanupalabdhi) that is the source of our knowledge of non-existence.

II. Theory of perceptual error

The word kyati could be interpreted as wrong knowledge, error of illusion. According to the realist, perception is the strongest because it is immediate and direct. That is, when the sense organ is in touch with the object concerned we have knowledge of that object after the manner of that object. It is also possible that when a sense organ is in touch with an object the knowledge that is produced may not be of the nature of that object. For instance, when my sense organ may be in touch with rope yet I may not have the knowledge of rope. This shows that in all cases the sense-object contact may not give us the right knowledge. Illusion is therefore, having the knowledge of something, which actually does not exist in front of us. This philosophical predicament is well explained through various khyativadas. Khyativada in this particular context could be considered as perceptual error or illusion. Here, I throw lights into four theories of error namely, Anyathakhyati - Nyaya theory of perceptual error, Viparitakhyati - Mimamsa theory of perceptual error, Akhyati Mimamsa theory of perceptual error, and Anirvacaniyaakhyati Advaita theory of perceptual error.
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1. Anyathakhyati - Nyaya theory of perceptual error It is the theory which is supposed to hold that in perceptual error an internal cognition is mistaken for an external object. This theory of illusion is accepted by the Naiyayikas. Anyathakhyati means, superimposition of the attributes of one entity on those of another entity (Brahma sutra catuhsutri, p.8). Vatsyayana defines error as cognizing what is not-that (atat), in that (tat). Perceiving a pillar as a pillar is valid cognition. Only when there is such a valid cognition, there is the possibility or wrong cognition, i.e., perceiving a pillar (tat) as a man (atat). The term atat could be interpreted as unreal or non-real or nonexistent, which would be twisted dangerously close to the Buddhist idealism. Hence, Gangesa comes up with a re-modified definition of error. This definition says, Where something is present, the cognizing of that something is prama. It is also cognition after the manner of the object. Where something is not present, the knowledge of it there, the knowledge after the manner of something not present is aprama. For instance, the illusory cognition, This is silver, as far as the this-ness is concerned it is valid, because it is experienced; but it is illusory, because the knowledge one has is not after the manner of silver. This imposition of the Niyayikas leads to two major problems. First, both kinds of cognitions, valid and invalid, produce the same kind of knowledge the knowledge of silver. Second, according to them the sense-object content is an important element in perceptual knowledge. But, in the shell-silver illusion, we have the knowledge of silver from the sense-contact with the shell that is present before us. This would mean, when the sense is in contact with one object, the knowledge of an entirely different object could arise. That is trespassing into the idealist parlor, which is an unwelcome thing to the hard-core realists. If a non-existent object could cause knowledge, then, it could make all cognitions equal, denying the distinction between valid and invalid cognition. This conceding to idealism. The Naiyayikas were aware of the problem, and the way out was, to show that the silver in the illusion is not non-existent (asat rajata), but an absent silver (abhava rajata). It is absent in front of us, but is present elsewhere. This shift in position would cover the realistic stand that, every cognition should have a corresponding reality out there in the world. Now, the Naiyayikas have to explain, how the absent silver is perceived right here. For this, a new concept call jananlakshana pratyasatti is invented. Jnanalaksana is the perception of an object that is in contact with the sense through a previous cognition itself. The cognition itself functions as a sannikarsa between the sense organs and the objects of cognition. For example, when one sees a mango from a far, he says, this mango is tasty, or seeing a piece of sandalwood he says, I see a piece of fragrant sandal wood, even without the senses of taste and fragrance coming in contact with their
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respective objects. He has an immediate perception of the taste, or fragrance. The Naiyayikas explain this strange phenomenon through a still stranger concept called Jnanalaksana. The process is as follows: The memory of fragrance could be established by seeing the sandalwood from afar. The memory of the fragrance acts as the contact between the sense organ of smell and the locus of the fragrance. The Naiyayikas explain the contact of a sense organ with an illusory object, too, through the same concept of Jnanalaksana. The illusory silver is perceived, because it is presented through our previous knowledge of silver as seen at some other time, and in some other place. The struggle of the Naiyayikas is, to emphasize the fact that in the shell-silver illusion the silver is directly and immediately perceived through an extraordinary perception called jnanalaksana. It is neither remembered, as held by Prabhakara, nor imagined, as held by Buddhist Idealism. The extraordinary perception of silver on shell is explained in the following way: When the sense come into contact with the object(shell), there is an indeterminate cognition in which the bright lustrous quality of the shell is grasped - a quality that the shell possess in common with silver. This grasping leads to the arousal of the impression of silver left behind by earlier perceptions of silver, which in turn, leads to an extraordinary contact with the silver that is elsewhere. The memory does not itself present the silver but leads to an extraordinary cognition, which presents the silver in question. In the indeterminate that precedes the definite, determinate cognition of silver, the this (shell), which is before oneself is only generically cognized, and since there are also the features of silver the memory impression of silver is naturally aroused. This arousal leads to a determinate and specific cognition of silver through an extraordinary sense-contact with the silver elsewhere. Through this, the Naiyayikas could justifiably safeguard their patent concern for realism. What is presented to the senses must be present. To say that the presented is nonexistent is absurd. Hence, they would say that the silver in illusion carries the same definiteness and certainty of a valid cognition. Despite the ingenuity of the explanation of illusion, it is not fool proof. What happens in illusion? First, one experiences silver on a shell and runs to get it. Later, he himself contradicts his earlier knowledge by saying, This is not silver. After analyzing this contradiction, one knows that what is contradicted is rajata (silver) itself. But, if silver is not present there, one cannot deny its presence. Hence, at the time of illusion one has to accept the co-existence of both the silver and the shell. It is precisely because of this reason; the sublating cognition, this is not silver could be used in the nominative case. The anyathakhyativadins cannot use the pronoun and the silver in the apposition. They can possibly use na atra rjatam or na tatra rajatam, since the silver exists elsewhere. The pronoun and the silver are used in two different cases. This is against our experience. Again denial itself is a type of abhava (negation) and if, the silver does not really exist here, why should one deny it. The very possibility of jnanalaksana is in question: For instance, the fragrance in sandalwood was previously experienced. This enables jnanalaksana possible. But the silver in the illusion was never known to have existed in the locus of the shell. Without the past impression in the form of memory, the silver could not be perceived in the locus of the shell
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by means of jnanalaksana. It is believed that the past impressions of the object (silver) act as a relation between the eye and the object existing elsewhere. But, that which is caused by the impression is only a memory. Therefore, the silver does not become an object of perception. 2. Viparitakhyati - Mimamsa Theory of Perceptual Error The Bhatta School of Mimamsakas adopting a similar type of perceptual error (viparaitakhyati) as that of the Nyayaikas (anyathakhyati). Like the Nyaya realists, the Mimamsakas too were anti-Buddhist from the earlier stages. Mimamsakas believed in the supreme authority of the Vedas. The Vedas are self-validated, because they are not produced by any person human or divine (apauruseya). They are to be accepted as infalliable. On the philosophical front they cultivated realism. They upheld the existence of an independent external world and a permanent self. In contrast to this the Buddhists developed idealism, and believed in the anatama (non-soul) theory. They refused to accept the authority of the Vedas. At this juncture the Mimamsakas considered their realism as an effective antidote to the Buddhist idealism. Both Nyayaikas and Mimamsakas agree that in the first place the eyes come in contact with the shell in the illusion. They also agree that in the cognition that arises from the sense-object contact, the shell is not apprehended in its specific nature but only in a general way. The third stage too is agreed on commonly by them, that the cognition of the general nature of the shell arouses the memory of the silver (because of their similarity) apprehended in the past. In the last stage they differ radically. The Naiyayikas say that this memory of silver leads to have contact with the silver existing elsewhere through an extraordinary perception known as jnanalaksana pratyasatti. Kumarila Bhatta does not say that in illusion the silver is perceived, though the silver is a real existent. The reason, according to him, is, that no knowledge is genuinely perceptual and yet erroneous. To make this point a little more clear, it is apt here to analyze the nature of perception and perceptual knowledge as held by the Mimamsakas. According to Sabara, Perception is a cognition which a man has when his sense-organs are in contact with the object cognized; it is the cognition of an object which is actually present at that time. The context of this definition is to show that perceptual knowledge is not adequate in knowing Dharma, because dharma is something beyond the present. Dharma is not present at the time for the senseobject contact. Perception depends on sense-object contact, and such contact is not possible in this case, because while the senses are there to have contact the object is not there to be contacted. Thus, we can see that genuine perceptual knowledge is knowledge of the object born of sense-object contact when the object is actually present at the time of perception. Such perceptual knowledge cannot be erroneous. As Sabara himself says, what is a real perception is never wrong and what is wrong is not real perception. Only that which comes under the ken of sense-object contact could really be called an entity that is perceived. In this sense, the silver of illusory experience, though cognized is not perceived, because what is in contact with the sense is shell and not silver. The Bhatta School concedes the possibility of wrong and right cognition. Only right cognition can be labeled as perception. Thus, perception can never be erroneous. In this
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context, it is worth briefly to discussing about the theory of validity of knowledge (pramanyavada). The Mimamsaks hold, that all knowledge by nature is self-valid (svatahpramanya). The sva in svatah means, what is instrumental in cognizing the cognition, and svatah itself means, One and the same instrument is effective in cognizing its cognition as well as its validity. The Naiyayikas accept paratah pramanyavada. Para in this context means what is different from that, and paratah means, one instrument is effective in cognizing its cognition and another instrument is cognizing its validity. For Kumara Bhatta, every cognition is basically valid. It is by means of postulation (arthapatti) one knows the cognition and the validity that belongs to that cognition. The Prabhakara School, too, accepts that all cognitions are naturally valid. Knowledge according to Prabhakara is, self-illuminating (svaprakasaka). The cognition itself by illuminating itself illuminates its validity as well. The Naiyayikas take a different view. For them, some cognitions are basically valid, while some are basically invalid. In the beginning we do not know that whether they are valid or invalid. It is through the fruitful activity (when pravrtti is saphala), one knows that the cognition is valid. If pravrtti is viphala (unfruitful) the cognition is invalid. Hence, it is the inference that arises after the pravrtti (activity) that is instrumental in knowing the validity. Having said all these, one can say that the Mimamsakas do accept all knowledge as valid. Kumarila himself says, such knowledge is firm, and having arisen, does not stand in need of corroboration form cognition; such cognition is to be known as a valid cognition. This would mean that only such knowledge (Vijnana) as explained in the definition, and not every knowledge, is called pramana. Therefore, when the Mimamsakas state that all pramanas are self-valid, one should understand that it is the self-validity of all knowledge as such. Returning to our discussion on perception, we may argue like this: if cognition is perceptual, it cannot be invalid; if it is invalid, it cannot be perceptual, because the term perception stands for valid knowledge. All valid knowledge is self-valid, therefore, pratyaksa, being valid knowledge, it is self-valid. Pratyaksa cannot be erroneous, if any cognition is erroneous, it is very much cognition but it cannot be perception. The knowledge of silver in the shell-silver illusion is not a perception, but it is cognition. Now, one can clearly notice the advancement the Mimamsakas taken over the Naiyayika position. For the Mimamsakas, it is absurd to hold the view that in the shell-silver illusion, the silver is perceived, yet the perception is invalid. This is incoherent with the Theory of Perception and the Theory of Self-validity of valid knowledge held by the Mimamsakas. Kumaraila Bhatta makes a clear distinction between cognition and perception, which the Naiyayikas do not. For the Naiyayikas if there is cognition, there must be a perception too. Kumarila, however, says that in the shell-silver illusion, the cognition of silver takes place even when the sense is not in contact with the object (silver). The real contact of the sense with the silver is needed only if the silver is perceived, and in such a case, there would not be any illusion. Thus, Kumarila dispenses with the two basic stands of the Naiyayikas. One, that the silver of the shell-silver illusion is perceived, and second, the need of an eccentric theory called Extraordinary Perception (jnanalaksana pratyasatti). Moreover, if the Naiyayikas accept the silver of the shell-silver illusion as real, and as perceived because one
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has the knowledge of the silver they also will have to concede to the non-existence of the shell as well, because the shell is not in contact with the sense, for, one does not have the knowledge of the shell in the shell-silver illusion. This would corrode eventually the basic metaphysical stand of the Naiyayikas! Sabara gives three reasons why one fails to have the perception of the object even when the sense is in contact with the object (as in the case of the shell in the shell-silver illusion). Cognition is wrong (a) when the mind is affected by some sort of derangement, or (b) when the sense-organ concerned is beset by debilities, or (c) when the object itself suffers from such debilities. These are termed as the manodosa, indriya dosa and the visaya dosa, respectively. When these dosas are present there could be cognition, but there can never be perception. In the absence of these dosas (defects) alone the o ject is perceived. Thus it is clear that when the defect is removed, a wrong cognition can become a perception. Illusion takes place when a weak sense is in contact with a defective object. The process is as follows The shell, on account of its contact with the sense of sight, is grasped in the form of lustrousness etc., which it has in common with silver. The specific characteristics like shellness etc., are not grasped owing to the weakness of the sense. Then, owing to the arousal of residual impression (of past perception of silver) silver is remembered. Thereupon, owing to defect, the shell is grasped as being identical with silver, and therefore, the knowledge of silver is not born of sense-object contact. From this it is clear that the relation (shell and silver) are real, but only the relation between them that appears in our knowledge is nonexistent. Silver is real because only a real object is capable of producing memory. So, even though the silver does not exist in the locus wherein it is cognized, it is real. Bhatta thus denied that the silver is perceived but at the same time does not deny its reality. If he had done so, the reality of the shell too would have to be denied, because the shell too is not perceived in the illusion. 3. Akhyati Mimamsa Theory of Perceptual Error : This theory of illusion is subscribed to by the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa. According to this view, Error results from the non-discrimination of two cognitions experience and memory in an act of cognition. According to Akhyati, error is due to losing sight of the fact that the presentative and the representative factors stand apart unrelated. Ray Chaudhari would say, Error is due to nondiscrimination of different cognitions and of their respective contents. In the shell-silver illusion, Prabhakara says that there are two cognitions; one is perception, the perception of this (idam) and the other is the memory of silver (rajatam). But, one, fails to discriminate these two (viveka agraha). It was disturbing for Prbhakara to hold a view, which says that in illusion real silver is cognized. When there is a real piece of silver and if one perceives that as silver, then, the perception is valid. Now, if a shell is mistaken for silver and that silver also is taken as real and cognized, what would be the distinction between the genuine perception of silver and the shell appearing as silver? If valid and invalid cognitions have something real as object, then, all cognitions could be equal to one another as cognitions. Discrimination between them as valid and invalid are arbitrary. Moreover, Prabhakara felt that this view of Bhatta amounts to
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playing back into the hands of the enemy. The reason is, the vijnanavadin held the view that cognitions alone are true. The objects of the waking state are as erroneous as the object of the dream state. If the silver in the illusion is held to be real, but the cognition of its erroneous, it is sinking into the territory of the vijnanavadins. Even the hasty adjustment made by Bhatta by affirming that the cognition of silver in the illusion is not valid because it is not in contact with the sense does not help in any way. That is, only when the silver is in contact with the sense organ, the cognition becomes valid. But in dreams we do perceive objects. The objects perceived in a dream are capable of producing causal efficiency as they do in the waking state. The perception of objects in dream too, is similar to that of the waking state. Hence, the claim that, mere contact of the object with the sense organ, would not make the object real. There could be cognition of the object that is in contact with the sense organ; yet the object may not be real. Bhatta himself was aware of this grave consequence and even took a bold step in stating that ones own decapitation appearing in dream is real, because it may have happened in a past life! Dream objects are as real as the objects in illusion. If sense object contact is the only criterion to differentiate between valid cognitions and cognitions in dreams and illusions as held by Kumarila, then distinguishing valid and invalid cognitions had been rendered a hopeless task. Prabhakara, as a protagonist of realism, cannot deny the reality of the silver in illusion, but can deny that the silver in illusion as cognized. The silver is not cognized, but remembered. According to Prabhakara all cognitions are valid except memory. Salikanatha, a commentator of Prabhakara, defines valid knowledge as experience. Valid knowledge is experience, and it is something different from memory which is the name of that cognition which arises solely from the impression left by some previous experience. Prabhakara accepts continuous cognition, recognition etc also as valid. Memory is considered as invalid because it depends on a former experience. Memory cannot determine an object independently. Thus, we can see, that for Prabhakara all cognitions except memory are valid. The contention of Kumarila that the silver in illusion is cognized, and yet is erroneous, is selfcontradiction, because, for Prabhakara, all cognitions are valid in themselves. If silver is cognized, then, the cognition cannot be an erroneous one. To save the crisis, Prabhakara says that the silver in the shell-silver illusion is not cognized but remembered. But memory, as we saw, is an invalid knowledge. All cognitions, if they are cognitions of a real object, are automatically valid. As cognitions, the cognition of a real object (the silver in illusion), are valid. The validity of cognition does not depend on the presence or absence of sense-object contact. For instance, in the sublation of an illusory experience, it is not the cognition that is sublated but the silver presented in the cognition. At sublation what is said is, The silver was not there, and not, The silver is not cognized. That is, if and when the cognition of silver arises, ipso facto it is a valid cognition. The validity of any cognition as cognition is self established. Another contention of Kumarila was that in error one object appears as another (viparita khyati). Prabhakara says that this is impossibility. If an object can appear as another, then, which is the object that is cognized? For instance, if one has the cognition of real silver from an object made of silver (silver as silver), as well as the cognition of illusory silver (a shell
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appearing as silver), one will not be able to determine the object of cognition. Even senseobject contact cannot be the distinguishing mark of valid perception from illusory perception as claimed by Kumarila, because, even when a sense is in contact with its object the object is perceived as well as not perceived. In illusion, even when the eyes are in contact with the shell, the shell is not perceived; whereas, in real perception, when the eyes are in contact with shell, the shell is perceived. This forced the Prabhakaras to re-modify their concept of perception in terms of immediacy. Salikantha defines perception as direct apprehension. The cognition of silver in illusion, being direct and unitary, cannot be erroneous. We have already seen that all cognitions except memory are valid. How does Prabhakara account for error in the case of illusion? Error consists in the failure to discriminate two cognitions. An illusion is not a unitary cognition but a combination of two cognitions. The cognition of this is presentative (experience) which is a valid cognition and the cognition of silver, which is born of memory, is an invalid cognition. In illusion one fails to grasp this distinction. Illusion is negative non-apprehension rather than positive misapprehension. Prabhakara thus, shifts the very concept of error. Traditionally error is seen as mistaking one thing for another, while for him, error consists in non-apprehension of the distinction between two cognitions. The process of illusion according to this theory is as following: the cognition of bare this gives us only the general characteristics like brightness etc which arouse the memory of the preciously cognized silver. The silver of memory is invalid, because it merely depends on a former experience. it is only apprehending what has already been apprehended; but in error, memory is cognized as apprehended robbed of the element of what has already been apprehended. That is, memory is grasped shorn of its representative character. The this is grasped in a general way without its specification (thatness). In error one fails to distinguish these two cognitions. Making use of the concept of memory, Prabhakara explains illusion, without sacrificing the validity of all cognitions. 4. Anirvacaniyaakhyati Advaita Theory of Perceptual Error The above theories (Anyathakhyati, Viparitakhyati and Akhyati) could be gathered under two heads: satkhyati and asatkhyati. While the satkhyativadins believe that the object given in illusion is real, the asatkhyativadins believe that the object given in illusion is unreal. These are the only categories available. Either a thing exists or it does not exist at all. The counter relative of existence is non-existence. According to them there is no possibility of a third category. The realist had to accept the object of illusion as real to vindicate their own metaphysical position, while the idealists could sacrifice the reality of the object given in illusion. In spite of the ingenuity of their arguments none could give a convincing, error-free answer to the problem of perceptual error. The Advaitins dared to go beyond these two categories: sat and asat. The object of illusion is real, because it is given in direct experience; yet it is sublated later with the arrival of true knowledge. In that sense the object of illusion cannot be called real. The object of illusion cannot be labeled as unreal too. An unreal like the son of a barren woman can never be an object of experience whereas the object of illusion is given in experience. The Advaitins, thus, conclude that the object of illusion is other than real as well as other than unreal.
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To explain this let us analyze the structure of illusion. In the complex structure of illusion, four strands could be clearly delineated. They are: Adhisthana, avarana, viksepa and adhyasa. In the shell-silver illusion, silver has no existence of its own. It has only a borrowed existence. Whatever is said about the silver, actually, are the features of the shell. The silver is a parasite, masquerading under the borrowed plumes. The brightness, the size, the weight and everything else I describe about the silver in the shell-silver illusion, are merely the ascriptions of the shell. Silver in itself is a complete naught. Being a parasite, it can exist only on something else (the shell) that functions as its base. Mere Adhisthana would not suffice an illusion. All the shells do not appear as silver; often they are perceived only as shell. Due to certain factors the shell is covered (avarana); it exists; yet it exists as being unknown. It goes into hiding. The next feature of illusion is viksepa (projection). The mere obscuration of the shell does not help us in any way in the perception of the silver. The obscuration of the shell only means that it could remain unknown to anyone. The avarana of the shell does not account for the emergence of a specious appearance. In the shell-silver illusion we do not have the mere absence of the knowledge of the shell; instead the silver is cognized. In the place of the shell and silver is projected (viksepa). A closer scrutiny reveals the non-substantiality of the silver. The silver that is projected has no existence of its own. The existence of the silver is only an apparent one, a borrowed one. It exists only as superimposed on the shell. When the illusion is sublated at the dawn of true knowledge we do not have two separate realities as shell and silver. One can only say that what we perceived was not the silver but the shell. The silver of the shell-silver illusion explodes into nothingness. Thus, there is a positive confusion, shell mistaken for silver. Illusion as the structure reveals is a highly complex and unique experience. To begin with, it is a private experience. It is an experience, which should have not been there under normal circumstances; yet, it somehow appears. It has a spatio-temporal pale, a territory of its own; yet a closer scrutiny would vouch for its utter non-existence. The silver was non-existent before the illusion, during the illusion and after the illusion. Again, the silver that appears in illusion, though it has no empirical status, is ascribed with many empirical qualities. We say that the silver is bright, round in size etc., but all our descriptions of silver are in fact, descriptions of the shell. It is the colour, size, and weight of the shell that we are speaking of. Still it is surprising to note that what we run to get is not the shell but silver. The silver is present before us not elsewhere as claimed by the anyathakhyativadins. If the silver were not present before us we would not have run to get it. The illusory experience has no existence of its own; yet it is arthakriyakari, causally efficient. When one sees a snake in the ropesnake illusion, out of fear he either runs away from the snake or takes a stick to kill it. Illusion, as the Advaitins endorse, is mistaking something for another. It is the confusion caused by two terms. The terms are neither of the same status nor belong to the same level. The two terms between which the confusion obtains, do not however belong to the same level. Then they would be merely different, but one would not be the falsity of the other.
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Confusion is not a physical process of two separate things being inextricably intertwined. When the confusion clears up, the two are not reinstated separately. One term is totally annihilated while the other term is retained. The silver disappears at the dawn of knowledge and the shell is presented to us as shell. Illusion also reveals the difference in the way we know the objects of illusion. Knowledge, as we know, reveals objects. An object exists whether known or unknown. Knowledge is only an adventitious episode in the life of an object. The object is not influenced by the fact that we know of it. On the other hand, the illusory object exists only as it is known. The other term (object of illusion), however, is exhausted in the mistake situation and cannot be had independently. It can be known only as it is being known. It has no existence of its own, neither before, nor after. Illusion is thus an event which we know, yet unable to describe. It is by nature indescribable. Let us analyse the content of illusion. The content of illusion could be considered as real. It is given in experience. Only that which is real could be an object of experience. Yet it is sublated later at the arrival of knowledge. The really Real should persist at all the three times. In that sense it is not real as the really Real. Can the content of illusion be branded as unreal? By no means. An unreal, like the son of a barren woman, can never enter the ken of experience. An illusory object, therefore, is other than the real (sat), as well as other than the unreal (asat). It is sadasadvilaksana and indescribable (anirvacaniya). Asatkhyativada Asatkhyativada is subscribed to by the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. It is the theory for which the object of an erroneous cognition is supposed to be unreal. Something that does not really exist (asat) is mistakenly held to be an existent. In error an utterly non-existent entity appears to exist. This theory says that what appears in illusion as real is actually a nonexistent, because the sublating cognition is, this is not silver. Something that is real cannot be sublated. According to sunyvada, nissvabhava is the nature of things. This means objects lack a nature of their own. The empirical objects lack a nature of their own, not because there is higher reality that renders their svabha, but because nissvabhava itself is the highest truth. There is nothing that is eternal and non-dependently originated. Thus, in illusion is such an unreal (asat) object (silver) appearing as real (sat). This explanation of illusion is unjustifiable. A non-existent is defined as, something, which can never be experienced. In contrast to this the real (sat) is defined as, the pratiyogin of atyantabhava in all three times, and in all places. Hence, a non-existent is not identical with the real. If silver is considered as unreal, the silver could never be experienced. The proponents of this theory may claim that the unreal (alika) has its own existence, because it could be verbally expressed. But as Patanjali says a non-existent, though could be verbally expressed (vikalpa), is devoid of any reality. Moreover an alika cannot be real for it does not come under the region of any of the accepted definitions of the real. Even granting
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sattva to an absolutely unreal object, the question is whether this unreal object is capable of being perceived. The perception of it externally is not possible, for an unreal is not a substance or a quality. Perception of it by the internal sense organ too is not possible, for only the self and its qualities are internally perceived. Cognition of the unreal cannot be perceived even by inference because inference cannot generate paksa jnana due to the lack of vyapti jnana. Thus the unreal cannot be known either by paroksajnana or by aparoksajnana. It could be argued that the totally non-existent appears in illusion due to the capacity of cognition (jnanasamarthya). Cognition is distinguished by its own peculiar intrinsic nature (svabhava bheda) that the non-existent is manifested. For instance, in the shell-silver illusion there is no silver, nor is there any sense-object contact; yet there is the origination of the cognition of the silver because of the internally differentiated residual impressions. In sublation the non-existent is perceived in its own form (as non-existent). The existent cannot manifest itself as illusory and sublated later. Thus, the non-existent alone appears as existent. According to the Sunyavadins, unreality is ultimate (sarva sunyam). It is not only rajata that is unreal even the suktika is unreal. There is no substrate for delusive as well as the valid cognitions. Substateless delusion is possible as in the case of the appearance of white wolly mass (kesondraka) when the closed eye is pressed with fingertip. Nullity appears first as sukti and then is apprehended as rajata. Rajata, which is unreal, appears in delusion. But cognition of the non-existent is an impossibility because there can be no cognition without a substrate. According to the Sunyavadins, the sublater of the cognition of silver in illusion is the cognition of the unreality of the silver. The Sunyavadins believe in a limitless sublation. But all negation is a significant negation. The sublation in the form of This is not silver culminates in the cognition of the shell. It is the perception of the shell that functions as the sublater of the illusory cognition of the silver. The illusory silver had only a parasitic existence on the real shell. Atmakhyati The vaibhasika, Sautrantika and the Yogacara schools of Buddhism accepts Atmakhyati. The object of illusion according to the Sautrantika though real, cannot be perceived directly. In the illusory cognition, this is silver, the this is of determinate cognition, and therefore, is not an o ject of perception. It is merely inferred. Since the silver is not present in the shellsilver illusion, the cognition of silver does not have a corresponding external object. The substrata of the illusion of this as well as the silver have their own content. The content of silver is generated by the beginingless impressions of silver, while the this imprints its likeness on it and becomes the content of the cognition of this. In the sublating cognition, this is not silver; the content is not denied but only that of its external appearance as this. Thus, at the dawn of true knowledge, the silver, which was only an internal cognition, retains its real position. The Yogacara School goes a step further. According to it, what is cognized is identical with the cognition, because, cognition and its objects are apprehended together. For instance, the
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blue and the consciousness of blue are identical. Cognition and the objects are non-distinct. The real, the Yogacara school, is devoid of the perceiving subject and the perceived object. It is known as the pure non-dual consciousness, vijnaptimatrata. Perceptual error is internal cognition mistaken for an external object. There is no genuinely external objects, it is but the internally known from that appears as if it is external. In an illusion the cognition itself is superimposed on the unreal external object due to the beginning lessness. The Yogacara description of illusion is left with many contradictions. If one follows this explanation, the corrective cognition should be in the form of antararajatam na bahih (the silver is internal and not external), but in reality its form is, this is not silver. Again, the claim of the yogacarins that in illusion the object is nothing but a mere cognition is not proved. The object of the cognition is not just mental. The sublating cognition, this is not silver, proves merely the distinction of the illusory experience of the identity of the silver and the this. Atmakhyativadins are satkhyativadins. They do not reject the silver as nonexistent but merely the externality of the silver. If the silver exists but not externally, then, it must be existing internally. Even this argument is not justified, for, the silver could be existing else where as the anyathakhyativadins hold. The internality of the silver is proved again by them by arguing that the experience of silver is not by means of perception. And perception is defined as, the knowledge arising from sense-object contact. In illusion there is no perception of silver through sense-object contact. But perception is not merely through sense- object contact. For instance, the experience of pleasure, pain etc., are not experienced through sense-object contact though they have objective contents. Pain, pleasure etc., are not mere consciousness, for, consciousness as such is without any distinction, while we have the different experience like the awareness of pain, awareness of pleasure etc., which show they have objective contents like silver. The assumption that identity necessarily accompanies invariable cognitive concomitance is wrong. For example, in the knowledge of the absence of an entity like a pot, one has to have the knowledge of the negation as well as its pratiyogin (the knowledge of the absence of pot as well as the pot itself). In this case, though there is invariable cognitive concomitance, the negation and the pratiyogin of the negation, are clearly distinct. This is so in the case of light as the manifester and as the object manifested; though they are distinct entities, they are always cognized concomitantly. The object and the cognition of it are not the same on the ground that while the o ject remains the same the cognition of it may vary. Cognition is located in the ego, while the object is located in the external space. Again, the object exists prior to its being cognized. Thus, spatially and temporally the object and the cognition of it are distinct and separate. Cognition and its object are different; for example, while actual fire burns, the idea of fire does not. According to the Yogacarins, knowledge is self-revealing and exists only for a moment. Given this position error as well as sublation of error will not at all be possible. Error is not possible, because every knowledge is self-revealing. Sublation of error too cannot take place, because it involves a later cognition to cognize the former cognition; and the Theory of Momentariness does not permit that.

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If the erroneous cognition could arise without any counter-part, this will make our very experiences doubtful. There will be universal uncertainty of knowledge. The external world would be a figment of imagination. The Vijnanavadins accept the origination of citta (intellect) and caitya (the product of intellect) dependent on four kinds of causes. But none of these causes explains the origination of cognition in the form of the silver of the shell-silver illusion. The sahakari pratyaya, like light, merely enables the manifestation of the object. The responsibility of the adhipatipratyaya, like that of the sense organs, is to restrict the content, which already exists. For instance, the sense of sight characterizes the object as a visible thing and does not generate it. Samanantara Prayaya, the immediately antecedent cause, which is the prior cognition, cannot originate the form of the silver, for, this prior cognition could be of any other object. The substrate cause too cannot originate the silver because the Vijnanavadins do not accept anything extra-mental. According to the Vijnanavadins the knowledge exists in two stages: the pure indeterminate knowledge (free from vasanas) and the knowledge contaminated by vasana. The first type of knowledge cannot produce illusory silver because it exists only in liberation. Since everything is momentary, the determinate, invalid cognition cannot be the means by which the illusory silver is apprehended. Because when the silver is cognized the cause, the defective cognition, disappears. To cognize anything, the revealed by some other knowledge which is other than the defective knowledge, then everyone should know the silver because, such a cognition is available everyone, it cannot be private to an individual only. On the other hand if the silver is produced, then it must be either eternal, which would go against their Theory of Momentariness, or absolutely unreal (alika), which they definitely deny. The unreal can never be perceived. The refutation of subjective metaphysics itself renders the theory of illusion accepted by them as illogical and unjustified. Bibliography Chatterjee, Satischandra and Datta, Dhirendramohan: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, New Delhi: Rupa. Co., 2007. Sharma, Chandradhar: A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Delhi: Motilal Canarsidass Publishers, 1994. Rao, Srinivasa: Perceptual Error the Indian Theories, United States of America: University of Hawaii Press, 1998. Uppamthadathil, Emmanuel: Theories of Causality: Tools for understanding the Metaphysics An Indian Philosophical Perspective, in: Suvidya Journal of Philosophy and Religion Vol. 3. No.2, December 2009. *************************************

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2.5. PHILOSOPHY OF JAINISM (CLASS NOTES-BY FR. EMMANUEL) In the history of philosophy, there are two main traditions. Such as Absolutism- the philosophy of self. There is only one Reality. For them there is only One Reality-Self. This is everlasting being, eternal. This is also found in Hindu traditions in Upanishads. They are Orthodox in nature looking in views as Substance as foundational, reaching its culmination in Advaita. On the other hand, there is also another, yet important tradition in Buddhism. This is called non-substance view of philosophy. For them reality is in the manner of becoming. In this process they deny such concept as Self, Universal etc. Thus these two substance view and non-substance view are the two extreme positions of philosophy. Jainism stands as the third alternative. Jainism What is the nature of reality according to Jainism? According to Jainism reality is beyond human comprehension. Every reality has multipledimension. According to (Hindu and Buddhist) philosophy is looking at reality from One perspective. i.e. Ekanta Vada-one sidedness. But the real nature of reality is Anekanta Vada- manyness, which the Jainism also holds. Philosophy begins with experience. Our experience is an experience of permanence and change. It is the mixture of both change and Stability. For them philosophy is manysidedness; for instance five people describing the elephant. For Jaina, reality is changing, but cant say that reality is only changing. What is an object according to Jainism? It is constituted of three things, substance-dravya , quality-guna and modes-Paryaya. According to them substance is the principle of unity. Some essential qualities are permanent e.g. number. These both remain permanent without change. The accidental qualities change like colour etc. this is called modes-paryaya. Thus for Jainism substance and quality is that which account for permanence. And modes account for change. Thus they reach the basic position i.e. Reality is both change and permanence. If reality is Anekantavada (manysidedness). How can we speak of Reality? We can only speak that, may be from this point of view; e.g. this table- is it right or wrong? From this perspective it is right. Hence there is no absolute statement. Only those who have complete knowledge can make a absolute statement. Therefore from Anekantavada , they reach another theory called Syad Vada- may be. The word syadvada comes from two roots. Syat means "may be", whereas vada means "assertion". Placed together sydvda becomes the assertion of what may be, the assertion of possibilities. According to them we can look at reality logically from seven perspectives. Syad Vada is also called as Saptabhangi Vada. 1. Syd-asti "in some ways it is" 2. Syd-nsti "in some ways it is not"
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3. Syd-asti-nsti "in some ways it is and it is not" 4. Syd-asti-avaktavya "in some ways it is and it is indescribable" 5. Syd-nsti-avaktavya "in some ways it is not and it is indescribable" 6. Syd-asti-nsti-avaktavya "in some ways it is, it is not and it is indescribable" 7. Syd-avaktavya "in some ways it is indescribable" When we make a judgement then a proposition can have the above levels. This theory is also called the theory of relativism. Metaphysics Entire universe is divided into two Jiva and A-Jiva. Jiva is the principle of consciousness (consciousness belongs to Jiva). Dimension of Jiva. According to Jainism self (jiva) is of medium dimension. Self is the source of consciousness. Wherever there is consciousness, there is self also present. It has no shape. It takes the shape of a container. E.g. in human being it is human being. In water.. it is a glass. etc... They believe in transmigration e.g. Ant taking elephant in the next life. If salvation is eternal then it cant be destroyed, but in medium dimension, if I cut finger... my self also will be cut. Self is not everywhere. It is One to its power. There are different kinds of Jiva
(1) One sensed Beings (Ekendriya Jiva):

Jivas having only one sense, the sense of touch are called Ekendriya.Roots such as potatoes, carrots, onions, garlic, beats, etc., belong to this category. (2) Two Sensed Beings (Beindriya Jiva): Two sensed beings have the senses of touch and taste. Examples are shells, worms, insects, microbes in stale food, termites, etc. (3) Three Sensed Beings (Treindriya Jiva): Three sensed beings have the senses of touch, taste, and smell. Examples are bugs, lice, white ants, moths, insects in wheat, grains, and centipedes, etc. (4) Four Sensed Beings (Chaurindriya Jiva): Four sensed beings have the senses of touch, taste, smell and sight. Examples are scorpions, crickets, spiders, beetles, locusts, flies, etc. (5) Five Sensed Beings (Panchendriya Jiva): Five sensed beings have all the five senses of touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing. Examples are human beings, cow, lions, fish, birds, etc. A Jiva The non-soul substances are of five kinds, viz., 1. Pudgala, i.e., matter, 2. Dharma, i.e., medium of motion,
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3. Adharma, i.e., medium of rest, 4. Akasa, i.e., space, and 5. Kala i.e., time (Something added from here ) Metaphysics in Jain philosophy The methaphysical principle in Jainism is solely pivoted around the soul and its characteristics, its properties, its way of action, and the final path to salvation. Firstly, the limitless soul is divided into the categories of liberated and non-liberated. A soul can only achieve the status of liberation, when it has becomes successful to break free from the restraints of karma. The incarnated soul is thus found to reside in four respective territories. Secondly, metaphysics states that the soul can never be governed by outside agents, it is the master of its own entity. The final state, states about the nine measures through which a soul can achieve its liberated status and become free worldly karma. Morality and Ethics in Jain philosophy Morality and ethics amongst the Jainas is based on a common thought that a layman can accomplish, provided he follows in the stated path of fivefold vows. The five vows comprise - non-violence, non-possession, non-stealing, truth and celibacy. In order to differentiate between right and wrong or to have a good conduct, one need not have to fear the Almighty or the community. It is actually for one`s own well-being and triumph that austerity is necessary. Karma: Law of Causation in Jain philosophy Standing at a major difference from the other thoughts of philosophy, karma in Jain philosophy fetches an entirely novel concept. Karma is not an overriding force that destroys every person, but a materialistic complex of fine matter that resides within the soul. A moral action is normal to carry its consequences, which implies that a consequence occurs when one commits an act of sacrilege. Due to the Jain disbelief in God, they are of the faith that such actions are brought about by an inner activity of karma in accordance with the soul. Due to dissatisfaction in a current life, the karmic desires are carried over to the next life. Nature of Divinity and God in Jain philosophy Jains are famous for their studies and theories on the fact that there is nobody called the Supreme creator or God, who is responsible for all creation. According to them, a spiritual and devoted life can be led, following the 24 Jinas and their way of life. Jains consider these scholarly men as the godlike beings. The path to Moksha in Jain philosophy
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The Jains lay enormous stress on the liberation or freedom of the soul from every kind of karmic materialistic bondage, otherwise termed as moksha. In fact, this is the basis of Jain philosophy. Moksha is a blissful state, where the soul is known to finally gain the knowledge of the infinite. Although, this is not so easy as is said. One needs to strive hard to achieve moksha, contrary to which one is termed a non-believer in the fundamental Jain path. -------------------------------

(Additional Material)
PHILOSOPHY OF JAINISM Jainism emphatically asserts that every soul is capable of attaining perfection if it willfully exerts in that direction. But the real situation is that from time eternal the soul is bound with matter and it is the aim of every person to get the soul rid of matter so that soul can assume its true state. This spiritual emancipation requires the knowledge of the beatific condition and of the causes which stand in the way of its attainment. To find out these causes it is necessary to understand what are the existing elements or substances of nature and mode of their interaction. Jainism believes that the whole universe can be divided into two categories, viz., Jiva, i.e., soul and Ajiva, i. e. non-soul. These two - Jiva and Ajiva - exhaust between them all that exists in the universe and Jaina philosophy is based on the nature and interaction of these two elements. It can be said in short that the living and the non-living, by coming into contact with each other, forge certain energies which bring about birth, death and various experiences of life; this process could be stopped, and the energies already forged destroyed, by a course of discipline leading to salvation. A close analysis of this brief statement shows that it involves following seven propositions. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Firstly, that there is something called the living. Secondly, that there is something called the nonliving. Thirdly, that the two (i. e. the living and nonliving) come into contact with each other. Fourthly, that the contact leads to the production of some energies. Fifthly, that the process of this contact could be stopped. Sixthly, that the existing energies could also be exhausted; and Lastly, that salvation could be achieved.

These seven propositions are called the seven tattvas or realities in Jainism. These seven tattvas are termed as follows: 1. Jiva (i. e. Living substance) 2. Ajiva (i. e. matter or non-living substance) 3. Asrava (i. e., the influx of Karmic matter in the soul
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4. 5. 6. 7.

Bandha (i. e., bondage of soul by Karmic matter) Samvara (i. e., the stopping of Asrava) Nirjara (i. e., the gradual removal of Karmic matter). Moksha (i. e., the attainment of perfect freedom or salvation).

It is clear that the first two of the tattvas deal with the nature and enumeration of the external substances of nature and the remaining five tattvas deal with the interaction between these two substances, viz., Jiva, i. e., spirit and Ajiva, i. e., matter. Further, much importance has been given to these seven tattvas as every would be aspirant for Moksha has to understand the nature of these tattvas. Again, out of these seven tattvas the substances are really two viz., soul and non-soul, and among these two, the non-soul is all that is not soul, i. e., devoid of sentiency. Therefore, among these two substances, the really sentient object is the Jiva, i.e., the soul. Naturally, the living substance, viz. Jiva, assumes highest importance in the context of Ahimsa. Jiva: As regards the characteristics of Jiva, i.e., the soul, it is stated that there is an infinite number of souls; in fact, the whole world is literally filled with them. The souls are substances and as such they are eternal. Again, their characteristic mark is intelligence, which can never be destroyed. Further, the soul is ever all perfect, all powerful; but by ignorance it identifies itself with the matter and hence its degradation and troubles start. Furthermore, souls are of two kinds, viz., 1. Samsari, i. e., mundane souls and 2. Siddha or Mukta, i. e. liberated souls. Out of these, the samsari jivas, i. e. the mundane souls, are the embodied souls of living beings in the world and are still subject to the cycle of Births and Deaths and the Siddha or Mukta Jivas are the liberated souls and as such 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. they will not be embodied in future, they have accomplished absolute purity, they dwell in the state of perfection at the top of the universe, they have no more to do with worldly affairs, they have reached Mukti or Nirvana or Nivrtti, i. e. liberation, and in their condition they have four enjoyments, viz., Ananta-darsana, i.e.,. unlimited perception, Anantajnana, i. e., perfect knowledge, Ananta-Virya, i.e., infinite power, and Ananta- sukha, i.e., unbounded happiness.

In addition, from the Metaphysical point of view the difference between the Samsari-Jiva, i.e., the mundane soul, and the Mukta Jiva i.e. the liberated soul, consists in the fact that the
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former is permeated with subtle matter known as Karma, while the latter is absolutely pure and free from any material alloy. Moreover, the mundane or embodied souls, i.e. the Samsari Jivas, are further classified in different ways and this classification is a subject not only of theoretical but also of great practical interest to the Jainas. As their highest duty is not to injure any living beings, it becomes incumbent on them to know the various forms which life may assume. 1. Samanska and Amanaska Jivas 2. The mundane souls are divided into two groups, viz., `Sthavara Jivas', i. e. those who have a mind (i.e., the faculty of distinguishing right or wrong) and `Amanaska Jivas' i.e., those who have no mind. 3. Sthavara and Trasa Jivas The mundane souls are also divided into two groups from another point of view, viz. `Sthavara Jivas' are the immobile or one-sensed souls, that is, having only one sense, i.e. the sense of touch; and `Trasa Jivas' are the mobiles, many- sensed souls, that is, having a body with more than one sense. Again, the mobile souls are those which being in fear have the capacity of moving away from the object of fear, and immobile souls do not have this capacity. The Sthavara, i.e., the immobile or one-sensed souls are further divided into following five kinds : 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Prthvikaya, i.e., earth-bodied souls, Apkaya, i.e., water-bodied souls, Tejahkaya, i.e., fire-bodied souls, Vayukaya, i.e., air-bodied souls; and Vanaspatikaya, i.e., vegetable-bodied souls.

The Trasa, i.e., the mobile or many-sensed souls are also further divided into four classes according to the possession of two or more of the five senses of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing : 1. Dvi-indriya Jivas, i.e., those which have the first two senses of touch and taste, for example, worms, etc., 2. Tri-indriya Jivas, i.e., those which have the first three senses of touch, taste and smell, for example, ants, etc. 3. Chatur-indriya Jivas, i.e., those which have first four senses of touch, taste, smell & sight, e. g. humble-bee 4. Pancha-indriya Jivas, i.e., those which have five senses of touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing, for example, man, etc. Thus, in this classification each class has one sense more than the preceding it.
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Ajiva: Jaina philosophy starts with a perfect division of the universe into living and non-living substances, Jiva and Ajiva. The non-soul substances are of five kinds, viz., 6. Pudgala, i.e., matter, 7. Dharma, i.e., medium of motion, 8. Adharma, i.e., medium of rest, 9. Akasa, i.e., space, and 10. Kala i.e., time These six living and non-living substances are called Dravyas in Jaina Philosophy. A Dravya has got three characteristics. First, Dravya has the quality of existence. Secondly, it has the quality of permanence through origination and destruction. Thirdly, it is the substratum of attributes and modes. The Dravya is thus un-created and indestructible, its essential qualities remain the same and it is only its Paryaya or mode or condition, that can and does change. Asrava : The third principle Asrava signifies the influx of Karmic matter into the constitution of the soul. Combination of Karmic matter with Jiva is due to Yoga. Yoga is the activity of mind, speech and body. Thus Yoga is the channel of Asrava. The physical matter which is actually drawn to the soul cannot be perceived by the senses as it is very fine. Bandha : When the Karmic matter enters the soul, both get imperceptibly mixed with each other. Bandha or bondage is the assimilation of matter which is fit to form Karmas by the soul as it is associated with passions. The union of spirit and matter does not imply a complete annihilation of their natural properties, but only a suspension of their function, in varying degree, according to the quality and quantity of the material absorbed. Thus, the effect of the fusion of the spirit and matter is manifested in the form of a compound personality which partakes of the nature of both, without actually destroying either. Samvara : Effective states of desire and aversion, and activity of thought, speech or body are the conditions that attract Karmas, good and bad, towards the soul. When those conditions are removed, there will be no Karmas approaching the Jiva, that is complete Samvara -- a sort of protective wall shutting out all the Karmas is established round the self.

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Thus Samvara is the stoppage of inflow of Karmic matter into the soul. There are several ways through which the stoppage could be effected. Nirjara : Nirjara means the falling away of Karmic matter from the soul. The soul will be rendered free by the automatic falling out of the Karmas when they become ripe. But this is a lengthy process. The falling away may be deliberately brought through the practice of austerities. Thus, Nirjara is of two kinds. The natural maturing of a Karma and its separation from the soul is called Savipaka Nirjara and inducing a Karma to leave the soul, before it gets ripened by means of ascetic practices is called Avipaka Nirjara. Moksha : Moksha or liberation is the freedom from all Karmic matter, owing to the non-existence of the cause of bondage and the shedding of all the Karmas. Thus complete freedom of the soul from Karmic matter is called Moksha. Moksha is attained when the soul and matter are separated from each other. The separation is effected when all the Karmas have left the soul, and no more Karmic matter can be attracted towards it. http://www.iep.utm.edu/jain/

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