Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987 ALFREDO M.

DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners, vs. HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G. MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal; That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987; That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE. Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987. Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors. On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which provided: SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25,1986. By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution. Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events mentioned. 1 Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal. As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment. In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government." Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality. That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which read: xxx xxx xxx That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;

But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading. SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the 2 autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political 3 subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general 4 supervision" over local governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constitution further provides in part: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ... Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of 5 office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern. Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs. SO ORDERED. Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967

number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the Philippine Constitution Association hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until after a 1 substantially identical case brought by said organization before the Commission on Elections, which was expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court had been submitted thereto for final determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review by certiorari of the resolution of the 2 Commission on Elections dismissing the petition therein. The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L-28224. Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case. The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely 3 political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito. Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void." JURISDICTION

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents. G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. No. 28196: Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner. Juan T. David as amicus curiae Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. No. 28224: Salvador Araneta for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. CONCEPCION, C.J.: G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. Petitioner therein prays for judgment: 1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing in audit any disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and 2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void. The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the

As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission, this Court speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs. 5 Lopez Vito, this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of 6 this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 7 8 9 Avelino vs. Cuenco, Taada vs. Cuenco, and Macias vs. Commission on Elections. In the first, we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review. Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included 10 in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the 11 people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the 12 Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, 13 when performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself . Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such 14 rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, 15 the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. 16 Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point. THE MERITS Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:

The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because: 1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen; 2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention at the same time; 3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and 4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments. Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory. It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto

Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void. It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act 17 No. 3040, purporting to make said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made 18 according to the number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines. Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Representatives are de facto officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers. It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to which: . . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . . The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said period. It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first elections to be held 19 after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938. The assumption, is, however, unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938. What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known that the three-year period therefor would expire after the elections scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941. Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and the effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.

Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question, therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their respective offices, and were de facto officers. Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect. Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said elections remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period aforementioned. Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the VicePresident, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable 20 violation of the Constitution, the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their main function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic. Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished from the officer in question is 21 concerned. Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the Government would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before dealing with them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or 22 employments. One can imagine this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be 24 questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
23

It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is 25 untenable. It is inconsistent with Tayko vs. Capistrano. In that case, one of the parties to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the objection could not be entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection therewith. The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is untenable. Available Alternatives to Congress Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances and none has brought to our attention supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, 26 when the spirit or context of the law warrants it. It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the same time. In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day. Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to permit Members of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice. On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court. May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?

Article XV of the Constitution provides: . . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite." Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials. This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation. The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise. Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution?

It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides: (1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;" (2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;" (3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day;" (4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;" (5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distributing:" and (6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967. We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of the amendment sought to be made. These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides: Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and a printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the termination of the election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior shall also be kept in each polling place. The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading: Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein continually

until after the termination of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place. Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 amendments, is of the following tenor: The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least ten copies of said amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept therein. As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that: The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office building and in every polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least, ten copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place. The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the Constitution except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law. Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the case, constitute the minority upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is under R. B. H. No. 1 the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and under R. B. H. No. 3 the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in

Congress. We who constitute the minority believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional. A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will use. It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the authority of Congress to approve the same. The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme within its own sphere. The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution. Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur. Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of jurisdiction.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code. After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2. On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those 1 required of members of the House of Representatives," "and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing legislation: Provided, that it 2 shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Resolution." On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 3 4914. Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds advanced by petitioner Gonzales. I The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of 4 Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. II Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because 1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote. 2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970 MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner, vs. JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members thereof, respondents. G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970 IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COMELEC, respondent. Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf. Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents. Lorenzo Taada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.: These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. After the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator Lorenzo Taada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally. It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of

of necessary implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds. 3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they are valid. 4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4. 5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required implementing details. III Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides. Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each representative district, they would have done so in so many words as they 5 did in relation to the apportionment of the representative districts. The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a

representative district. The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for such apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to effect the desired proportional representation. The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the preliminary count of the population, we have computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at the session of the SenateHouse Conference Committee meeting last night, we are submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of the above-stated method." Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for 6 such apportionment. The fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population very much less than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is not required and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate nor complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the constant movement of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a minimum of two delegates for a congressional district. While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence submitted to Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation formula adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional representation. In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a province with less population than the provinces with more inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is allotted only two delegates, which number is equal to the number of delegates accorded other provinces with more population. The present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra. The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that the apportionment of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely proportional representation with mathematical precision or exactitude. IV

Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the government government until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention." That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the disqualification is not permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention which may not extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its task in approximately seven months from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935. As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision prohibiting a member of Congress, during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to any civil office which may have been created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.) As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.) Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is 7 germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class. The function of a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.

As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice. Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970. V Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State 8 and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests. In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine whether a statute which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a 9 legitimate exercise of police power. Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits: 1. any candidate for delegate to the convention (a) from representing, or (b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and 2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from (a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or (b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election. The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will be violated. The right of a member of any political party

or association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts individually. The very party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or constitutional proposals for amendments. It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners. In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity of the limitation on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus: The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political party, political committee, or political group to nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days immediately preceding an election. The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such 10 a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so unanimously. In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an election campaign or partisan political activity may be limited without offending the aforementioned constitutional guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear and 11 present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other group of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and (c) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed 12 or remedied. To assert otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the situation." ; Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to muster the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a) making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. 13 (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880.

The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major compelling interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave "due recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if possible, render 14 spotless, the electoral process," impressed as it was by the explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Taada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility. Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or 15 disregarded." But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as conceded by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by according 16 them equality of chances. The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion, predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. 17 Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all 18 organization support." The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test. In the apt words of the Solicitor General: It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic, social and political problems besetting the country. Instead of directly proposing the amendments Congress has chosen to call a Constitutional Convention which shall have the task of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals of the people. Because what is to be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be composed of delegates truly representative of
19

the people's will. Public welfare demands that the delegates should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of people, be they religious, political, civic or professional in character. Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that "the function of a constitution is not to represent anyone in interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at the expense or disadvantage of the candidates but to encompass all the interests that exist within our society and to blend them into one harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means, not the predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof." So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is necessary that the delegatee thereto be independent, beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience. xxx xxx xxx The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates who, because they have been chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, cannot be expected to be sufficiently representative of the people. Such delegates could very well be the spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic interest and not of the great majority of the 20 people. We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their machinery and other facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization support, does not have. The fact that the other civic of religious organizations cannot have a campaign machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does not vary the situation; because it still has that much built-in advantage as against the individual candidate without similar support. Moreover, these civic religious and professional organization may band together to support common candidates, who advocates the reforms that these organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17, 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa" group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and two others as their candidates for the convention, which organized support is nullified by the questioned ban, Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and working in joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and supervision over our leaders the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they "could have presented a solid front with very bright chances of capturing all seats." The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be exempted from the ban; because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of the campaign machineries which they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization engages in a political activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact that the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional

associations usually prohibit the association from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office. Hence, they must likewise respect the ban. The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected. Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Taada for the invalidation of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of our civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain the belief that the challenged ban transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities. WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs. Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur. Makalintal, J., concurs in the result. Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's action. For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case. The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows: SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives. xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors. Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf. Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.: Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution. Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2. After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: . CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1 A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18

BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention: Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971. Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution. Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem. By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads: September 28, 1971 The Commission on Elections Manila Thru the Chairman Gentlemen: Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows: xxx xxx xxx (see above) Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:

Sincerely, ) DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL President On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that: (a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense; (b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment of said ballots and election forms; and (c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971. What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal: The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution. This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then transmitted them to the Commission on Elections. The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8Memorandum). RECESS RESOLUTION In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively). RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of

the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said implementation. Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one. Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context. There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: . As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor

of a proposed amendment to the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Taada v. Cuenco, (L10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review. Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people as the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of government including the Constitution itself. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power. In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.

No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides: ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of threefourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the taking of private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution. It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it, according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to confess that the integrated system of government established by our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and craftsmanship in constitution-making.

We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading: ... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof. As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution. The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary does not

pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the authority of their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers. In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld. Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written

constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." . As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular departments of the government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present Constitution.. Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present case. It goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have joined in this case. II The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the

Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the Convention? At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended section or on other portions of the entire Constitution." In other words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue of whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection. Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino people is committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other departments of the government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.

During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that regard. In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention came into being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any

subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they are as powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts. Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be. The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void. We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons: 1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. (2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts.. A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can

assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability. This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal? But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea? We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission". III The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called

to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory. No costs. Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE HONORABLE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE HONORABLE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents. Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Josue Javellana. Lorenzo M. Taada and Associates for petitioners Vidal Tan, et al.

G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973 JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents. G.R. No. L-36164 March 31, 1973 Arturo M. Tolentino for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy. VIDAL TAN, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, ALEJANDRO ROCES, MANUEL CRUDO, ANTONIO U. MIRANDA, EMILIO DE PERALTA AND LORENZO M. TAADA, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE , THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF LAND REFORM, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE AUDITOR GENERAL, THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE CHAIRMAN OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON REORGANIZATION, THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, respondents. G.R. No. L-36165 March 31, 1973. GERARDO ROXAS, AMBROSIO PADILLA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, SALVADOR H. LAUREL, RAMON V. MITRA, JR. and EVA ESTRADA-KALAW, petitioners, vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Secretary of National Defense; General ROMEO ESPINO, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; TANCIO E. CASTAEDA, in his capacity as Secretary General Services; Senator GIL J. PUYAT, in his capacity as President of the Senate; and Senator JOSE ROY, his capacity, as President Pro Tempore of the of the Senate, respondents. G.R. No. L-36236 March 31, 1973 EDDIE B. MONTECLARO, [personally and in his capacity as President of the National Press Club of the Philippines], petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE AUDITOR GENERAL, THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER & THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. G.R. No. L-36283 March 31, 1973 NAPOLEON V. DILAG, ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., LEONARDO ASODISEN, JR., and RAUL M. GONZALEZ, petitioners, Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno for other respondents. RESOLUTION Taada, Salonga, Ordoez, Rodrigo, Sanidad, Roxas. Gonzales and Arroyo for petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et al. Joker P. Arroyo and Rogelio B. Padilla for petitioner Eddie Monteclaro. Raul M. Gonzales and Associates for petitioners Napoleon V. Dilag, et al.

CONCEPCION, C.J.: The above-entitled five (5) cases are a sequel of cases G.R. Nos. L-35925, L-35929, L-35940, L-35941, L-35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961, L-35965 and L-35979, decided on January 22, 1973, to which We will hereafter refer collectively as the plebiscite cases. Background of the Plebiscite Cases. The factual setting thereof is set forth in the decision therein rendered, from which We quote: On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and

appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973. Soon after, or on December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case G.R. No. L-35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed, on December 8, 1972, by Pablo C. Sanidad against the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L- 35929) on December 11, 1972, by Gerardo Roxas, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the Director of Printing, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. L-35940), by Eddie B. Monteclaro against the Commission on Elections and the Treasurer of the Philippines (Case G.R. No. L-35941), and by Sedfrey Ordoez, et al. against the National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35942); on December 12, 1972, by Vidal Tan, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35948) and by Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino against the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35953); on December 14, 1972, by Jacinto Jimenez against the Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Director of the Bureau of Printing (Case G.R. No. L-35961), and by Raul M. Gonzales against the Commission on Elections, the Budget Commissioner, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35965); and on December 16, 1972, by Ernesto C. Hidalgo against the Commission on Elections, the Secretary of Education, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35979). In all these cases, except the last (G.R. No. L-35979), the respondents were required to file their answers "not later than 12:00 (o'clock) noon of Saturday, December 16, 1972." Said cases were, also, set for hearing and partly heard on Monday, December 18, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. The hearing was continued on December 19, 1972. By agreement of the parties, the aforementioned last case G.R. No. L-35979 was, also, heard, jointly with the others, on December 19, 1972. At the conclusion of the hearing, on that date, the parties in all of the aforementioned cases were given a short period of time within which "to submit their notes on the points they desire to stress." Said notes were filed on different dates, between December 21, 1972, and January 4, 1973. Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action

to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. "In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." It was alleged in said motion, inter alia: "6. That the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public questions [Bulletin Today, January 1, 1973]; "7. That thereafter it was later announced that "the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new dates given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law." [Bulletin Today, January 3, 1973.] "8. That it was later reported that the following are to be the forms of the questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies: [1] Do you approve of the New Society?

[2] Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law? [3] Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session? [4] How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to be held? [Bulletin Today, January 5, 1973]. "9. That the voting by the so-called Citizens Assemblies was announced to take place during the period from January 10 to January 15, 1973; "10. That on January 10, 1973, it was reported that on more question would be added to the four (4) question previously announced, and that the forms of the question would be as follows: [1] Do you like the New Society? [2] Do you like the reforms under martial law? [3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions? [4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later? [5] Do you like the way President Marcos running the affairs of the government? [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; emphasis an additional question.] "11. That on January 11, 1973, it was reported that six (6) more questions would be submitted to the so-called Citizens Assemblies: [1] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of national interests? [2] Do you approve of the new Constitution? [3] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution? [4] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution? [5] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called? [6] Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973; emphasis supplied]

"12. That according to reports, the returns with respect to the six (6) additional questions quoted above will be on a form similar or identical to Annex "A" hereof; "13. That attached to page 1 of Annex "A" is another page, which we marked as Annex "A-1", and which reads: COMMENTS ON QUESTION No. 1 In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation in government. QUESTION No. 2 But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is to be convened at all, it should not be done so until after at least seven (7) years from the approval of the New Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies. QUESTION No. 3 The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered the plebiscite on the New Constitution. If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new Constitution should be deemed ratified. QUESTION No. 4 We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with politics, of so many debates and so much expenses. QUESTION No. 5 Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections will be enough for stability to be established in the country, for reforms to take root and normalcy to return. QUESTION No. 6 We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him to exercise his powers with more authority. We want him to be strong and firm so that he

can accomplish all his reform programs and establish normalcy in the country. If all other measures fail, we want President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government along the lines of the new Constitution without the ad interim Assembly." "Attention is respectfully invited to the comments on "Question No. 3," which reads: QUESTION No. 3 The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered the plebiscite on the New Constitution. If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the new Constitution should be deemed ratified. This, we are afraid, and therefore allege, is pregnant with ominous possibilities. 14. That, in the meantime, speaking on television and over the radio, on January 7, 1973, the President announced that the limited freedom of debate on the proposed Constitution was being withdrawn and that the proclamation of martial law and the orders and decrees issued thereunder would thenceforth strictly be enforced [Daily Express, January 8, 1973]; 15. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore state, that the question added in the last list of questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies, namely: Do you approve of the New Constitution? in relation to the question following it: Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?" would be an attempt to by-pass and short-circuit this Honorable Court before which the question of the validity of the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution is now pending; "16. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore allege, that if an affirmative answer to the two questions just referred to will be reported then this Honorable Court and the entire nation will be confronted with a fait accompli which has been attained in a highly unconstitutional and undemocratic manner;

"17. That the fait accompli would consist in the supposed expression of the people approving the proposed Constitution; "18. That, if such event would happen, then the case before this Honorable Court could, to all intents and purposes, become moot because, petitioners fear, and they therefore allege, that on the basis of such supposed expression of the will of the people through the Citizens Assemblies, it would be announced that the proposed Constitution, with all its defects, both congenital and otherwise, has been ratified; "19. That, in such a situation the Philippines will be facing a real crisis and there is likelihood of confusion if not chaos, because then, the people and their officials will not know which Constitution is in force. "20. That the crisis mentioned above can only be avoided if this Honorable Court will immediately decide and announce its decision on the present petition; "21. That with the withdrawal by the President of the limited freedom of discussion on the proposed Constitution which was given to the people pursuant to Sec. 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73, the opposition of respondents to petitioners' prayer at the plebiscite be prohibited has now collapsed and that a free plebiscite can no longer be held." At about the same time, a similar prayer was made in a "manifestation" filed by the petitioners in L-35949, "Gerardo Roxas, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.," and L-35942, "Sedfrey A. Ordoez, et al. v. The National Treasurer, et al." The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents," praying "... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."

In support of this prayer, it was alleged "3. That petitioners are now before this Honorable Court in order to ask further that this Honorable Court issue a restraining order enjoining herein respondents, particularly respondent Commission on Elections as well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; and their deputies, subordinates and/or substitutes, from collecting, certifying, announcing and reporting to the President the supposed Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period between January 10 and January 15, 1973, particularly on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion; "4. That the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies are illegal, null and void particularly insofar as such proceedings are being made the basis of a supposed consensus for the ratification of the proposed Constitution because: [a] The elections contemplated in the Constitution, Article XV, at which the proposed constitutional amendments are to be submitted for ratification, are elections at which only qualified and duly registered voters are permitted to vote, whereas, the so called Citizens' Assemblies were participated in by persons 15 years of age and older, regardless of qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed in the Election Code; [b] Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution have provisions for the secrecy of choice and of vote, which is one of the safeguards of freedom of action, but votes in the Citizens' Assemblies were open and were cast by raising hands; [c] The Election Code makes ample provisions for free, orderly and honest elections, and such provisions are a minimum requirement for elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional amendments, but there were no similar provisions to guide and regulate proceedings of the so called Citizens' Assemblies; [d] It is seriously to be doubted that, for lack of material time, more than a handful of the so called Citizens' Assemblies have been actually formed, because the mechanics of their organization were still being discussed a day or so before the day they were supposed to begin functioning: "Provincial governors and city and municipal mayors had been meeting with barrio captains and community leaders since last Monday [January 8, 1973) to

thresh out the mechanics in the formation of the Citizens Assemblies and the topics for discussion." [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973] "It should be recalled that the Citizens' Assemblies were ordered formed only at the beginning of the year [Daily Express, January 1, 1973], and considering the lack of experience of the local organizers of said assemblies, as well as the absence of sufficient guidelines for organization, it is too much to believe that such assemblies could be organized at such a short notice. "5. That for lack of material time, the appropriate amended petition to include the additional officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion could not be completed because, as noted in the Urgent Motion of January 12, 1973, the submission of the proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies was not made known to the public until January 11, 1973. But be that as it may, the said additional officials and agencies may be properly included in the petition at bar because: [a] The herein petitioners have prayed in their petition for the annulment not only of Presidential Decree No. 73, but also of "any similar decree, proclamation, order or instruction. so that Presidential Decree No. 86, insofar at least as it attempts to submit the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite by the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, is properly in issue in this case, and those who enforce, implement, or carry out the said Presidential Decree No. 86. and the instructions incidental thereto clearly fall within the scope of this petition; [b] In their petition, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining not only the respondents named in the petition but also their "agents" from implementing not only Presidential Decree No. 73, but also "any other similar decree, order, instruction, or proclamation in relation to the holding of a plebiscite on January 15, 1973 for the purpose of submitting to the Filipino people for their ratification or rejection the 1972 Draft or proposed Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention on November 30, 1972"; and finally, [c] Petitioners prayed for such other relief which may be just and equitable. [p. 39, Petition]. "Therefore, viewing the case from all angles, the officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion, can lawfully be reached by the processes of this Honorable Court by reason of this petition, considering, furthermore, that the Commission on Elections has under our laws the power, among others, of:

(a) Direct and immediate supervision and control over national, provincial, city, municipal and municipal district officials required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections on matters pertaining to the enforcement of the provisions of this Code ..." [Election Code of 1971, Sec. 3]. "6. That unless the petition at bar is decided immediately and the Commission on Elections, together with the officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion are restrained or enjoined from collecting, certifying, reporting or announcing to the President the results of the alleged voting of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, irreparable damage will be caused to the Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino people, the cause of freedom an democracy, and the petitioners herein because: [a] After the result of the supposed voting on the questions mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof shall have been announced, a conflict will arise between those who maintain that the 1935 Constitution is still in force, on the one hand, and those who will maintain that it has been superseded by the proposed Constitution, on the other, thereby creating confusion, if not chaos; [b] Even the jurisdiction of this Court will be subject to serious attack because the advocates of the theory that the proposed Constitution has been ratified by reason of the announcement of the results of the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies will argue that, General Order No. 3, which shall also be deemed ratified pursuant to the Transitory Provisions of the proposed Constitution, has placed Presidential Decree Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the reach and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor: "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES "PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. "WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventyone Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people; "WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary; "WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues; "WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution? "WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite; "WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people; "NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three. ( S g d . ) F E R D I N A N D E . M A R C O S "By the President: "ALEJANDRO MELCHOR "Executive Secretary" Such is the background of the cases submitted determination. After admitting some of the allegations made in the petition in L-35948 and denying the other allegations thereof, respondents therein alleged in their answer thereto, by way affirmative defenses: 1) that the "questions raised" in said petition "are political in character"; 2) that "the Constitutional Convention acted freely and had plenary authority to propose not only amendments but a Constitution which would supersede the present Constitution"; 3) that "the President's call for a plebiscite and the appropriation of funds for this purpose are valid"; 4) that "there is not an improper submission" and "there can be a plebiscite under Martial Law"; and 5) that the "argument that the Proposed Constitution is vague and incomplete, makes an unconstitutional delegation of power, includes a referendum on the proclamation of Martial Law and purports to exercise judicial power" is "not relevant and ... without merit." Identical defenses were set up in the other cases under consideration. Immediately after the hearing held on January 17, 1973, or since the afternoon of that date, the Members of the Court have been deliberating on the aforementioned cases and, after extensive discussions on the merits thereof, have deemed it best that each Member write his own views thereon and that thereafter the Chief Justice should state the result or the votes thus cast on the points in issue. Hence, the individual views of my brethren in the Court are set forth in the opinions attached hereto, except that, instead of writing their separate opinions, some Members have preferred to merely concur in the opinion of one of our colleagues.

" P r e s i Then the writer d said decision expressed his own opinion on the issues involved therein, after of e which he recapitulated the views of the Members of the Court, as follows: n t 1. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73. o f t h e P h i l i p p i n

2. On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and myself, or six (6) Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. 3. On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justices Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and myself have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention.

4. Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. 5. On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that issue involves questions of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom, for the purposes contemplated. 6. On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: a. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and myself are of the opinion that the question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. b. Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed Constitution ... based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, ... the new Constitution is legally recognizable and should be recognized as legitimately in force." c. Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. d. Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact. 7. On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee, and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners

therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Accordingly, the Court acting in conformity with the position taken by six (6) of its members, 2 with three (3) members dissenting, with respect to G.R. No. L-35948, only and another member 3 dissenting, as regards all of the cases dismissed the same, without special pronouncement as to costs. The Present Cases Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." Similar actions were filed, on January 23, 1973, by Vidal Tan, J. Antonio Araneta, Alejandro Roces, Manuel Crudo, Antonio U. Miranda, Emilio de Peralta and Lorenzo M. Taada, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries of Finance, Justice, Land Reform, and National Defense, the Auditor General, the Budget Commissioner, the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Reorganization, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Commission on Elections 4 and the Commissioner of Civil Service on February 3, 1973, by Eddie Monteclaro, personally and as President of the National Press Club of the Philippines, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Public Information, the Auditor General, the Budget Commissioner and the 5 National Treasurer and on February 12, 1973, by Napoleon V. Dilag, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., 6 Leonardo Asodisen, Jr. and Raul M. Gonzales, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Budget Commissioner and the Auditor General. Likewise, on January 23, 1973, Gerardo Roxas, Ambrosio Padilla, Jovito R. Salonga, Salvador 7 H. Laurel, Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. and Eva Estrada-Kalaw, the first as "duly elected Senator and Minority Floor Leader of the Senate," and others as "duly elected members" thereof, filed Case G.R. No. L-36165, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Secretary of General Services, the President and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. In their petition as amended on January 26, 1973 petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et al. allege, inter alia, that the term of office of three of the 8 9 aforementioned petitioners would expire on December 31, 1975, and that of the others on December 31, 1977; that pursuant to our 1935 Constitution, "which is still in force Congress of the Philippines "must convene for its 8th Session on Monday, January 22, 1973, at 10:00 A.M., which is regular customary hour of its opening session"; that "on said day, from 10:00 A.M. up to the afternoon," said petitioner "along with their other colleagues, were unlawfully prevented from using the Senate Session Hall, the same having been closed by the authorities in physical possession and control the Legislative Building"; that "(a)t about 5:00 to 6:00 P.M. the said day,
1

the premises of the entire Legislative Building were ordered cleared by the same authorities, and no one was allowed to enter and have access to said premises"; that "(r)espondent Senate President Gil J. Puyat and, in his absence, respondent President Pro Tempore Jose Roy we asked by petitioning Senators to perform their duties under the law and the Rules of the Senate, but unlawfully refrained and continue to refrain from doing so"; that the petitioners ready and willing to perform their duties as duly elected members of the Senate of the Philippines," but respondent Secretary of National Defense, Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff, "through their agents and representatives, are preventing petitioners from performing their duties as duly elected Senators of the Philippines"; that "the Senate premise in the Congress of the Philippines Building ... are occupied by and are under the physical control of the elements military organizations under the direction of said respondents"; that, as per "official reports, the Department of General Services ... is now the civilian agency in custody of the premises of the Legislative Building"; that respondents "have unlawfully excluded and prevented, and continue to so exclude and prevent" the petitioners "from the performance of their sworn duties, invoking the alleged approval of the 1972 (1973) Constitution of the Philippines by action of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies on January 10, 1973 to January 15, 1973, as stated in and by virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 signed and issued by the President of the Philippines"; that "the alleged creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as instrumentalities for the ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" is inherently illegal and palpably unconstitutional; that respondents Senate President and Senate President Pro Tempore "have unlawfully refrained and continue to refrain from and/or unlawfully neglected and continue to neglect the performance of their duties and functions as such officers under the law and the Rules of the Senate" quoted in the petition; that because of events supervening the institution of the plebiscite cases, to which reference has been made in the preceding pages, the Supreme Court dismissed said cases on January 22, 1973, by a majority vote, upon the ground that the petitions therein had become moot and academic; that the alleged ratification of the 1972 (1973) Constitution "is illegal, unconstitutional and void and ... can not have superseded and revoked the 1935 Constitution," for the reasons specified in the petition as amended; that, by acting as they did, the respondents and their "agents, representatives and subordinates ...have excluded the petitioners from an office to which" they "are lawfully entitled"; that "respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy have unlawfully refrained from convening the Senate for its 8th session, assuming general jurisdiction over the Session Hall and the premises of the Senate and ... continue such inaction up to this time and ... a writ of mandamus is warranted in order to compel them to comply with the duties and functions specifically enjoined by law"; and that "against the above mentioned unlawful acts of the respondents, the petitioners have no appeal nor other speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except by invoking the equitable remedies of mandamus and prohibition with the provisional remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction." Premised upon the foregoing allegations, said petitioners prayed that, "pending hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondents Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the ... Secretary of General Service, as well as all their agents, representatives and subordinates to vacate the premises of the Senate of the Philippines and to deliver physical possession of the same to the President of the Senate or his authorized representative"; and that hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null and Proclamation No. 1102 ... and any order, decree, proclamation having the same import and objective, issuing writs of prohibition and mandamus, as prayed for against above-mentioned respondents, and making the writ injunction permanent; and that a writ of mandamus be issued against the respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy directing them to comply with their duties and functions as President and President Pro Tempore, respectively, of the Senate of Philippines, as provided by law and the Rules of the Senate." Required to comment on the above-mentioned petitions and/or amended petitions, respondents filed, with the leave Court first had and obtained, a consolidated comment on said petitions and/or amended petitions, alleging that the same ought to have been dismissed outright; controverting petitioners' allegations concerning the alleged lack impairment of the freedom of the 1971 Constitution Convention to approve the proposed Constitution, its alleged lack of

authority to incorporate certain contested provisions thereof, the alleged lack of authority of the President to create and establish Citizens' Assemblies "for the purpose submitting to them the matter of ratification of the new Constitution," the alleged "improper or inadequate submiss of the proposed constitution," the "procedure for ratification adopted ... through the Citizens Assemblies"; a maintaining that: 1) "(t)he Court is without jurisdiction to act on these petitions"; 2) the questions raised therein are "political in character and therefore nonjusticiable"; 3) "there substantial compliance with Article XV of the 1 Constitution"; 4) "(t)he Constitution was properly submitted the people in a free, orderly and honest election; 5) "Proclamation No. 1102, certifying the results of the election, is conclusive upon the courts"; and 6) "(t)he amending process outlined in Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is not exclusive of other modes of amendment." Respondents Puyat and Roy, in said Case G.R. No. L-36165, filed their separate comment therein, alleging that "(t)he subject matter" of said case "is a highly political question which, under the circumstances, this ...Court would not be in a position to act upon judicially," and that, in view of the opinions expressed by three members of this Court in its decision in the plebiscite cases, in effect upholding the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, "further proceedings in this case may only be an academic exercise in futility." On February 5, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents in L-36236 to comment on the petition therein not later than Saturday, February 10, 1973, and setting the case for hearing on February 12, 1973, at 9:30 a.m. By resolution dated February 7, 1973, this Court resolved to consider the comments of the respondents in cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, and L-36165, as motions to dismiss the petitions therein, and to set said cases for hearing on 10 the same date and time as L-36236. On that date, the parties in G.R. No. L-36283 agreed that the same be, likewise, heard, as it was, in fact, heard jointly with the aforementioned cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165 and L-36236. The hearing, which began on February 12, 1973, shortly after 9:30 a.m., was continued not only that afternoon, but, also, on February 13, 14, 15 and 16, morning and afternoon, after which the parties were granted up to February 24, 1973, noon, within which to submit their notes of oral arguments and additional arguments, as well as the documents required of them or whose presentation was reserved by them. The same resolution granted the parties until March 1, 1973, to reply to the notes filed by their respective opponents. Counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 and L-36165 filed their aforementioned notes on February 24, 1973, on which date the Solicitor General sought an extension of time up to March 3, 1973, within which to file his notes, which was granted, with the understanding that said notes shall include his reply to the notes already filed by the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 a L-36165. Counsel for the petitioners, likewise, moved and were granted an extension of time, to expire on March 10, 1973, within which to file, as they did, their notes in reply to those submitted by the Solicitor General on March 3, 1973. On March 21, 1973, petitioners in L-36165 filed a "Manifestation a Supplemental Rejoinder," whereas the Office of the Solicitor General submitted in all these cases a "Rejoinder Petitioners' Replies." After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own opinion and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the Court discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon. Such individual opinions are appended hereto. Accordingly, the writer will first express his person opinion on the issues before the Court. After the exposition his aforesaid opinion, the writer will make, concurrently with his colleagues in the Court, a resume of summary of the votes cast by them in these cases. Writer's Personal Opinion I. Alleged academic futility of further proceedings in G.R. L-36165.

This defense or theory, set up by counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy in G.R. No. L-36165, and, also, by the Solicitor General, is predicated upon the fact that, in Our decision in the plebiscite cases, Mr. Justice Barredo had expressed the view that the 1935 Constitution had "pro tanto passed into history" and "been legitimately supplanted by the Constitution now in force by virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 ..."; that Mr. Justice Antonio did not feel "that this Court competent to act" in said cases "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards" and because "the access to relevant information is insufficient to assure the correct determination of the issue," apart from the circumstance that "the new constitution has been promulgated and great interests have already arisen under it" and that the political organ of the Government has recognized its provisions; whereas, Mr. Justice Esguerra had postulated that "(w)ithout any competent evidence ... about the circumstances attending the holding" of the "referendum or plebiscite" thru the Citizens' Assemblies, he "cannot say that it was not lawfully held" and that, accordingly, he assumed "that what the proclamation (No. 1102) says on its face is true and until overcome by satisfactory evidence" he could not "subscribe to the claim that such plebiscite was not held accordingly"; and that he accepted "as a fait accompli that the Constitution adopted (by the 1971 Constitutional Convention) on November 30, 1972, has been duly ratified. Counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy goes on to say that, under these circumstances, "it seems remote or improbable that the necessary eight (8) votes under the 1935 Constitution, and much less the ten (10) votes required by the 1972 (1973) Constitution, can be obtained for the relief sought in the Amended Petition" in G.R. No. L-36165. I am unable to share this view. To begin with, Mr. Justice Barredo announced publicly, in open court, during the hearing of these cases, that he was and is willing to be convinced that his aforementioned opinion in the plebiscite cases should be reconsidered and changed. In effect, he thus declared that he had an open mind in connection with the cases at bar, and that in deciding the same he would not necessarily adhere to said opinion if the petitioners herein succeeded in convincing him that their view should be sustained. Secondly, counsel for the aforesaid respondents had apparently assumed that, under the 1935 Constitution, eight (8) votes are necessary to declare invalid the contested Proclamation No. 1102. I do not believe that this assumption is borne out by any provision of said Constitution. Section 10 of Article VIII thereof reads: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court in banc, and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two thirds of all the members of the Court. Pursuant to this section, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Supreme Court is required only to declare "treaty or law" unconstitutional. Construing said provision, in a resolution dated September 16, 1949, then Chief Justice Moran, voicing the unanimous view of the Members of this Court, postulated: ... There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were included among those that required for their nullification the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulation" were later deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority of 11 six members of this Court is enough to nullify them.

The distinction is not without reasonable foundation. The two thirds vote (eight [8] votes) requirement, indeed, was made to apply only to treaty and law, because, in these cases, the participation of the two other departments of the government the Executive and the Legislative is present, which circumstance is absent in the case of rules, regulations and executive orders. Indeed, a law (statute) passed by Congress is subject to the approval or veto of the President, whose disapproval cannot be overridden except by the vote of two-thirds (2/3) 12 of all members of each House of Congress. A treaty is entered into by the President with the 13 concurrence of the Senate, which is not required in the case of rules, regulations or executive orders which are exclusive acts of the President. Hence, to nullify the same, a lesser number of votes is necessary in the Supreme Court than that required to invalidate a law or treaty. Although the foregoing refers to rules, regulations and executive orders issued by the President, the dictum applies with equal force to executive proclamation, like said Proclamation No. 1102, inasmuch as the authority to issue the same is governed by section 63 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provides: Administrative acts and commands of the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the districts, divisions, parts or ports of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines and all acts and commands governing the general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern shall be made effective in executive orders. Executive orders fixing the dates when specific laws, resolutions, or orders are to have or cease to (have) effect and any information concerning matters of public moment determined by law, resolution, or executive orders, may be promulgated in an executive proclamation, with all the force 14 of an executive order. In fact, while executive order embody administrative acts or commands of the President, executive proclamations are mainly informative and declaratory in character, and so does counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy maintain in G.R. No. 15 L-36165. As consequence, an executive proclamation has no more than "the force of an executive order," so that, for the Supreme Court to declare such proclamation unconstitutional, under the 1935 Constitution, the same number of votes needed to invalidate an executive order, rule or regulation namely, six (6) votes would suffice. As regards the applicability of the provisions of the proposed new Constitution, approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, in the determination of the question whether or not it is now in force, it is obvious that such question depends upon whether or not the said new Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution, upon the authority of which said Constitutional Convention was called and approved the proposed Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the Constitution should be settled by applying the provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged 16 ratification, or the old Constitution. II Does the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the nature of a political, and, hence, non-justiciable question? The Solicitor General maintains in his comment the affirmative view and this is his main defense. In support thereof, he alleges that "petitioners would have this Court declare as invalid the New

Constitution of the Republic" from which he claims "this Court now derives its authority"; that "nearly 15 million of our body politic from the age of 15 years have mandated this Constitution to be the New Constitution and the prospect of unsettling acts done in reliance on it caution against interposition of the power of judicial review"; that "in the case of the New Constitution, the government has been recognized in accordance with the New Constitution"; that "the country's foreign relations are now being conducted in accordance with the new charter"; that "foreign governments have taken note of it"; that the "plebiscite cases" are "not precedents for holding questions regarding proposal and ratification justiciable"; and that "to abstain from judgment on the ultimate issue of constitutionality is not to abdicate duty." At the outset, it is obvious to me that We are not being asked to "declare" the new Constitution invalid. What petitioners dispute is the theory that it has been validly ratified by the people, especially that they have done so in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. The petitioners maintain that the conclusion reached by the Chief Executive in the dispositive portion of Proclamation No. 1102 is not borne out by the whereases preceding the same, as the predicates from which said conclusion was drawn; that the plebiscite or "election" required in said Article XV has not been held; that the Chief Executive has no authority, under the 1935 Constitution, to dispense with said election or plebiscite; that the proceedings before the Citizens' Assemblies did not constitute and may not be considered as such plebiscite; that the facts of record abundantly show that the aforementioned Assemblies could not have been held throughout the Philippines from January 10 to January 15, 1973; and that, in any event, the proceedings in said Assemblies are null and void as an alleged ratification of the new Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, not only because of the circumstances under which said Assemblies had been created and held, but, also, because persons disqualified to vote under Article V of the Constitution were allowed to participate therein, because the provisions of our Election Code were not observed in said Assemblies, because the same were not held under the supervision of the Commission on Elections, in violation of section 2 of Article X of the 1935 Constitution, and because the existence of Martial Law and General Order No. 20, withdrawing or suspending the limited freedom to discuss the merits and demerits of said proposed Constitution, impaired the people's freedom in voting thereon, particularly a viva voce, as it was done in many instances, as well as their ability to have a reasonable knowledge of the contents of the document on which they were allegedly called upon to express their views. Referring now more specifically to the issue on whether the new Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is a political question or not, I do not hesitate to state that the answer must be in the negative. Indeed, such is the position taken by this Court, 17 in an endless line of decisions, too long to leave any room for possible doubt that said issue is inherently and essentially justiciable. Such, also, has been the consistent position of the courts of the United States of America, whose decisions have a persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, our constitutional system in the 1935 Constitution being patterned after that of the United States. Besides, no plausible reason has, to my mind, been advanced to warrant a departure from said position, consistently with the form of government established under said Constitution.. Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With identical 19 unanimity, We overruled the respondents' contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 20 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelona v. Baker and Montenegro v. 21 Castaeda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in 22 Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag v.
18

Lopez Vito. Hence, respondents herein urge Us to reconsider the action thus taken by the Court and to revert to and follow the views expressed in Barcelon v. Baker and Mabanag v. 24 Lopez Vito. The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support of the political-question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence, Our decision in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis, which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration in the plebiscite cases. The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of separation of powers characteristic of the Presidential system of government the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely: 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerned mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice. Within its own sphere but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments provided that such acts, measures or 25 decisions are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution. This principle of separation of powers under the presidential system goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which each department is vested by the Fundamental Law with some powers to forestall, restrain or arrest a possible or actual misuse or abuse of powers by the other departments. Hence, the appointing power of the Executive, his pardoning power, his veto power, his authority to call the Legislature or Congress to special sessions and even to prescribe or limit the object or objects of legislation that may be taken up in such sessions, etc. Conversely, Congress or an agency or arm thereof such as the commission on Appointments may approve or disapprove some appointments made by the President. It, also, has the power of appropriation, to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," as well as that of impeachment. Upon the other hand, under the judicial power vested by the Constitution, the "Supreme Court and ... such inferior courts as may be established by law," may settle or decide with finality, not only justiciable controversies between private individuals or entities, but, also, disputes or conflicts between a private individual or entity, on the one hand, and an officer or branch of the government, on the other, or between two (2) officers or branches of service, when the latter officer or branch is charged with acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or in violation of law. And so, when a power vested in said officer or branch of the government is absolute or unqualified, the acts in the exercise of such power are said to be political in nature, and, consequently, non-justiciable or beyond judicial review. Otherwise, courts of justice would be arrogating upon themselves a power conferred by the Constitution upon another branch of the service to the exclusion of the others. 26 27 Hence, in Taada v. Cuenco, this Court quoted with approval from In re McConaughy, the following: "At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided

23

contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled. xxx xxx xxx "... What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, N.W. 724, 15 L.R.A. 561; In re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L.R.A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16 C.C.A. 516, 30 L.R.A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle 151 Ill. 41, 37 N.E. 683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political questions, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws act within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a politics nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under constitutional government must act accordingly to law and subject its restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must subject him to that restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary; for it must be remembered that the people act through courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end that the government may be one of laws and not of men" words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (Emphasis supplied.) and, in an attempt to describe the nature of a political question in terms, it was hoped, understandable to the laymen, We added that "... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy" in matters concerning the government of a State, as a body politic. "In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it.

This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended as it is in our 1935 Constitution "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the 29 amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments" of the 30 government. The Solicitor General has invoked Luther v. Borden in support of his stand that the issue under consideration is non-justiciable in nature. Neither the factual background of that case nor the action taken therein by the Federal Supreme Court has any similarity with or bearing on the cases under consideration. Luther v. Borden was an action for trespass filed by Luther with the Circuit Court of the United States against Borden and others for having forcibly entered into Luther's house, in Rhode Island, sometime in 1842. The defendants who were in the military service of said former colony of England, alleged in their defense that they had acted in obedience to the commands of a superior officer, because Luther and others were engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by force and the state had been placed by competent authority under Martial Law. Such authority was the charter government of Rhode Island at the time of the Declaration of Independence, for unlike other states which adopted a new Constitution upon secession from England Rhode Island retained its form of government under a British Charter, making only such alterations, by acts of the Legislature, as were necessary to adapt it to its subsequent condition as an independent state. It was under this form of government when Rhode Island joined other American states in the Declaration of Independence and, by subsequently ratifying the Constitution of the United States, became a member of the Union. In 1843, it adopted a new Constitution. Prior thereto, however, many citizens had become dissatisfied with the charter government. Memorials addressed by them to the Legislature having failed to bring about the desired effect, meetings were held and associations formed by those who belonged to this segment of the population which eventually resulted in a convention called for the drafting of a new Constitution to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. The convention was not authorized by any law of the existing government. The delegates to such convention framed a new Constitution which was submitted to the people. Upon the return of the votes cast by them, the convention declared that said Constitution had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the people and became the paramount law and Constitution of Rhode Island. The charter government, which was supported by a large number of citizens of the state, contested, however, the validity of said proceedings. This notwithstanding, one Thomas W. Dorr, who had been elected governor under the new Constitution of the rebels, prepared to assert authority by force of arms, and many citizens assembled to support him. Thereupon, the charter government passed an Act declaring the state under Martial Law and adopted measures to repel the threatened attack and subdue the rebels. This was the state of affairs when the defendants, who were in the military service of the charter government and were to arrest Luther, for engaging in the support of the rebel government which was never able to exercise any authority in the state broke into his house. Meanwhile, the charter government had taken measures to call its own convention to revise the existing form of government. Eventually, a new constitution was drafted by a convention held
31

28

under the authority of the charter government, and thereafter was adopted and ratified by the people. "(T)he times and places at which the votes were to be given, the persons who were to receive and return them, and the qualifications of the voters having all been previously authorized and provided for by law passed by the charter government," the latter formally surrendered all of its powers to the new government, established under its authority, in May 1843, which had been in operation uninterruptedly since then. About a year before, or in May 1842, Dorr, at the head of a military force, had made an unsuccessful attempt to take possession of the state arsenal in Providence, but he was repulsed, and, after an "assemblage of some hundreds of armed men under his command at Chepatchet in the June following, which dispersed upon approach of the troops of the old government, no further effort was made to establish" his government. "... until the Constitution of 1843" adopted under the auspices of the charter government "went into operation, the charter government continued to assert its authority and exercise its powers and to enforce obedience throughout the state ... ." Having offered to introduce evidence to prove that the constitution of the rebels had been ratified by the majority of the people, which the Circuit Court rejected, apart from rendering judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff took the case for review to the Federal Supreme Court which affirmed the action of the Circuit Court, stating: It is worthy of remark, however, when we are referring to the authority of State decisions, that the trial of Thomas W. Dorr took place after the constitution of 1843 went into operation. The judges who decided that case held their authority under that constitution and it is admitted on all hands that it was adopted by the people of the State, and is the lawful and established government. It is the decision, therefore, of a State court, whose judicial authority to decide upon the constitution and laws of Rhode Island is not questioned by either party to this controversy, although the government under which it acted was framed and adopted under the sanction and laws of the charter government. The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates, altogether, to the constitution and laws of that State, and the well settled rule in this court is, that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State. Upon what ground could the Circuit Court of the United States which tried this case have departed from this rule, and disregarded and overruled the decisions of the courts of Rhode Island? Undoubtedly the courts of the United States have certain powers under the Constitution and laws of the United States which do not belong to the State courts. But the power of determining that a State government has been lawfully established, which the courts of the State disown and repudiate, is not one of them. Upon such a question the courts of the United States are bound to follow the decisions of the State tribunals, and must therefore regard the charter government as 32 the lawful and established government during the time of this contest. It is thus apparent that the context within which the case of Luther v. Borden was decided is basically and fundamentally different from that of the cases at bar. To begin with, the case did not involve a federal question, but one purely municipal in nature. Hence, the Federal Supreme Court was "bound to follow the decisions of the State tribunals" of Rhode Island upholding the constitution adopted under the authority of the charter government. Whatever else was said in that case constitutes, therefore, an obiter dictum. Besides, no decision analogous to that

rendered by the State Court of Rhode Island exists in the cases at bar. Secondly, the states of the Union have a measure of internal sovereignty upon which the Federal Government may not encroach, whereas ours is a unitary form of government, under which our local governments derive their authority from the national government. Again, unlike our 1935 Constitution, the charter or organic law of Rhode Island contained no provision on the manner, procedure or conditions for its amendment. Then, too, the case of Luther v. Borden hinged more on the question of recognition of government, than on recognition of constitution, and there is a fundamental difference between these two (2) types of recognition, the first being generally conceded to be a political question, whereas the nature of the latter depends upon a number of factors, one of them being whether the new Constitution has been adopted in the manner prescribed in the Constitution in force at the time of the purported ratification of the former, which is essentially a justiciable question. There was, in Luther v. Borden, a conflict between two (2) rival governments, antagonistic to each other, which is absent in the present cases. Here, the Government established under the 1935 Constitution is the very same government whose Executive Department has urged the adoption of the new or revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and now alleges that it has been ratified by the people. In short, the views expressed by the Federal Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden, decided in 1849, on matters other than those referring to its power to review decisions of a state court concerning the constitution and government of that state, not the Federal Constitution or Government, are manifestly neither, controlling, nor even persuasive in the present cases, having as the Federal Supreme Court admitted no authority whatsoever to pass upon such matters or to review decisions of said state court thereon. In fact, referring to that case, the Supreme Court of Minnessota had the following to say: Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581, is always cited by those who assert that the courts have no power to determine questions of a political character. It is interesting historically, but it has not the slightest application to the case at bar. When carefully analyzed, it appears that it merely determines that the federal courts will accept as final and controlling a decision of the highest court of a state upon a question of the construction 33 of the Constitution of the state. ... . Baker v. Carr, cited by respondents, involved an action to annul a Tennessee statute apportioning the seats in the General Assembly among the counties of the State, upon the theory that the legislation violated the equal protection clause. A district court dismissed the case upon the ground, among others, that the issue was a political one, but, after a painstaking review of the jurisprudence on the matter, the Federal Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and held that said issue was justiciable and non-political, inasmuch as:"... (d)eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution ... ." Similarly, in Powell v. McCormack, the same Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Warren, reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York affirming that of a Federal District Court, dismissing Powell's action for a declaratory judgment declaring thereunder that he whose qualifications were uncontested had been unlawfully excluded from the 90th Congress of the U.S. Said dismissal was predicated upon the ground, inter alia, that the issue was political, but the Federal Supreme Court held that it was clearly a justiciable one.
35 34

The Supreme Court of Minnessota undertook a careful review of American jurisprudence on the matter. Owing to the lucidity of its appraisal thereof, We append the same to this opinion as Annex A thereof. After an, exhaustive analysis of the cases on this subject, the Court concluded: The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing Constitution is a judicial question. There can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine whether the Constitution has been amended in the manner required by the Constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the 36 organic law. ... . In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution prescribes the method or procedure for its amendment, it is clear to my mind that the question whether or not the revised Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable one and non-political in nature, and that it is not only subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's bounden duty to decide such question. The Supreme Court of the United States has meaningfully postulated that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' " because it allegedly involves a political question "a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated "political" exceeds constitutional authority."
37

Petitioner in L-36236 added, as arguments in support of the negative view, that : 1) "(w)ith a government-controlled press, there can never be a fair and proper submission of the proposed Constitution to the people"; and 2) Proclamation No. 1102 is null and void "(i)nasmuch as the ratification process" prescribed "in the 1935 Constitution was not followed." Besides adopting substantially some of the grounds relied upon by the petitioners in the abovementioned cases, the petitioners in L-36283 argue that "(t)he creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as the vehicle for the ratification of the Constitution was a deception upon the people since the President announced the postponement of the January 15, 1973 plebiscite to either 38 February 19 or March 5, 1973." The reasons adduced by the petitioners in L-36165 in favor of the negative view have already been set forth earlier in this opinion. Hence, it is unnecessary to reproduce them here. So it is, with respect to the positions taken in L-36165 by counsel for therein respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy although more will be said later about them and by the Solicitor General, on behalf of the other respondents in that case and the respondents in the other cases. 1. What is the procedure prescribed by the 1935 Constitution for its amendment? Under section 1 of Art. XV of said Constitution, three (3) steps are essential, namely: 1. That the amendments to the Constitution be proposed either by Congress or by a convention called for that purpose, "by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives voting separately," but "in joint session assembled"; 2. That such amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification" at an "election"; and

III 3. That such amendments be "approved by a majority of the votes cast" in said election. Has the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified conformably to said Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution? Petitioners in L-36142 maintain the negative view, upon ground: 1) that the President "is without authority to create the Citizens' Assemblies" through which, respondents maintain, the proposed new Constitution has been ratified; that said Assemblies "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution"; 3) that the President "is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and 4) that "the election held (in the Citizens' Assemblies) to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void." Apart from substantially reiterating these grounds support of said negative view, the petitioners in L-36164 contend: 1) that the President "has no power to call a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection" of the proposed new Constitution or "to appropriate funds for the holding of the said plebiscite"; 2) that the proposed new or revised Constitution "is vague and incomplete," as well as "contains provisions which are beyond the powers of the 1971 Convention to enact," thereby rendering it "unfit for ... submission the people;" 3) that "(t)he period of time between November 1972 when the 1972 draft was approved and January 11-15, 1973," when the Citizens' Assemblies supposedly ratified said draft, "was too short, worse still, there was practically no time for the Citizens' Assemblies to discuss the merits of the Constitution which the majority of them have not read a which they never knew would be submitted to them ratification until they were asked the question "do you approve of the New Constitution?" during the said days of the voting"; and that "(t)here was altogether no freedom discussion and no opportunity to concentrate on the matter submitted to them when the 1972 draft was supposedly submitted to the Citizens' Assemblies for ratification." Compliance with the first requirement is virtually conceded, although the petitioners in L-36164 question the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to incorporate certain provisions into the draft of the new or revised Constitution. The main issue in these five (5) cases hinges, therefore, on whether or not the last two (2) requirements have been complied with. 2. Has the contested draft of the new or revised Constitution been submitted to the people for their ratification conformably to Art. XV of the Constitution? In this connection, other provisions of the 1935 Constitution concerning "elections" must, also, be taken into account, namely, section I of Art. V and Art. X of said Constitution. The former reads: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question. Sections 1 and 2 of Art. X of the Constitution ordain in part:

Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and two other Members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed. ... xxx xxx xxx Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring fee, orderly, and honest elections. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court. xxx xxx xxx
39

The third recommendation on "compulsory" voting was, also debated upon rather extensively, 42 after which it was rejected by the Convention. This accounts, in my opinion, for the permissive language used in the first sentence of said Art. V. Despite some debates on the age qualification amendment having been proposed to reduce the same to 18 or 20, which were rejected, and the residence qualification, as well as the disqualifications to the exercise of the right of suffrage the second recommendation limiting the right of suffrage to those who could "read and write" was in the language of Dr. Jose M. Aruego, one of the Delegates to said Convention "readily approved in the Convention without any dissenting vote," although there was some debate on whether the Fundamental Law should specify the language or dialect that the voter 43 could read and write, which was decided in the negative. What is relevant to the issue before Us is the fact that the constitutional provision under consideration was meant to be and is a grant or conferment of a right to persons possessing the qualifications and none of the disqualifications therein mentioned, which in turn, constitute a limitation of or restriction to said right, and cannot, accordingly, be dispensed with, except by constitutional amendment. Obviously, every such constitutional grant or conferment of a right is necessarily a negation of the authority of Congress or of any other branch of the Government to deny said right to the subject of the grant and, in this sense only, may the same partake of the nature of a guarantee. But, this does not imply not even remotely, that the Fundamental Law allows Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage. At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the committee on suffrage responsible for the adoption of section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution was "strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in the Philippines." Our first Election Law was Act 1582, passed on January 9, 1907, which was partly amended by Acts 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768, and incorporated into the Administrative Code of 1916 Act 2657 as chapter 20 thereof, and then in the Administrative Code of 1917 Act 2711 as chapter 18 thereof, which, in turn, was amended by Act 3387, approved on December 3, 1927. Sections 431 and 432 of said Code of 1917, prescribing, respectively, the 44 qualifications for and disqualifications from voting, are quoted below. In all of these legislative acts, the provisions concerning the qualifications of voters partook of the nature of a grant or recognition of the right of suffrage, and, hence, of a denial thereof to those who lacked the requisite qualification and possessed any of the statutory disqualifications. In short, the history of section 1, Art. V of the Constitution, shows beyond doubt than the same conferred not guaranteed the authority to persons having the qualifications prescribed therein and none of disqualifications to be specified in ordinary laws and, necessary implication, denied such right to those lacking any said qualifications, or having any of the aforementioned disqualifications. This view is further bolstered by the fact that the 1971 Constitutional Convention sought the submission to a plebiscite of a "partial amendment" to said section 1 of Art. V of the 1935 Constitution, by reducing the voting age from twenty-one (21) years to eighteen (18) years, which, however, did not materialize on account of the decision of this Court in Tolentino v. 45 Commission on Elections, granting the writs, of prohibition and injunction therein applied for, upon the ground that, under the Constitution, all of the amendments adopted by the Convention should be submitted in "an election" or a single election, not separately or in several or distinct elections, and that the proposed amendment sought to be submitted to a plebiscite was not even a complete amendment, but a "partial amendment" of said section 1, which could be amended further, after its ratification, had the same taken place, so that the aforementioned partial amendment was, for legal purposes, no more than a provisional or temporary amendment. Said partial amendment was predicated upon the generally accepted contemporary construction that, under the 1935 Constitution, persons below twenty-one (21) years of age could not exercise the right of suffrage, without a previous amendment of the Constitution. Upon the other hand, the question, whether 18-year-old members of barrio assemblies may vote in barrio assembly plebiscites is, to say the least, a debatable one. Indeed, there seems to be a 46 conflict between the last paragraph of said section 6 of Rep. Act No. 3590, pursuant to which

a. Who may vote in a plebiscite under Art. V of the Constitution? Petitioners maintain that section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution is a limitation upon the exercise of the right of suffrage. They claim that no other persons than "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election," may exercise the right of suffrage in the Philippines. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that said provision merely guarantees the right of suffrage to persons possessing the aforementioned qualifications and none of the disqualifications, prescribed by law, and that said right may be vested by competent authorities in persons lacking some or all of the aforementioned qualifications, and possessing some of the aforesaid disqualifications. In support of this view, he invokes the permissive nature of the language "(s)uffrage may be exercised" used in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, and the provisions of the Revised Barrio Charter, Republic Act No. 3590, particularly sections 4 and 6 thereof, providing that citizens of the Philippines "eighteen years of age or over," who are registered in the list of barrio assembly members, shall be members thereof and may participate as such in the plebiscites prescribed in said Act. I cannot accept the Solicitor General's theory. Art. V of the Constitution declares who may exercise the right of suffrage, so that those lacking the qualifications therein prescribed may not exercise such right. This view is borne out by the records of the Constitutional Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution. Indeed, section 1 of Art. V of the 1935 Constitution was largely based on the report of the committee on suffrage of the Convention that drafted said Constitution which report was, in turn, "strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in the Philippines 40 ... ." " Said committee had recommended: 1) "That the right of suffrage should exercised only by male citizens of the Philippines." 2) "That should be limited to those who could read and write." 3) "That the duty to vote should be made obligatory." It appears that the first recommendation was discussed extensively in the Convention, and that, by way of compromise, it was eventually agreed to include, in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, the second sentence thereof imposing upon the National Assembly established by the original Constitution instead of the bicameral Congress subsequently created by amendment said Constitution the duty to "extend the right of suffrage women, if in a plebiscite to, be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand 41 women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question."

the "majority vote of all the barrio assembly members" (which include all barrio residents 18 years of age or over, duly registered in the list of barrio assembly members) is necessary for the approval, in an assembly plebiscite, of "any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax ordinances," whereas, according to the paragraph preceding the penultimate one of said 47 section, "(a)ll duly registered barrio assembly members qualified to vote" who, pursuant to section 10 of the same Act, must be citizens "of the Philippines, twenty-one years of age or over, able to read and write," and residents the barrio "during the six months immediately preceding election, duly registered in the list of voters" and " otherwise disqualified ..." just like the provisions of present and past election codes of the Philippines and Art. V of the 1935 Constitution "may vote in the plebiscite." I believe, however, that the apparent conflict should resolved in favor of the 21-year-old members of the assembly, not only because this interpretation is in accord with Art. V the Constitution, but, also, because provisions of a Constitution particularly of a written and rigid one, like ours generally accorded a mandatory status unless the intention to the contrary is manifest, which is not so as regards said Art. V for otherwise they would not have been 48 considered sufficiently important to be included in the Fundamental Law of the land. Besides, it would be illogical, if not absurd, believe that Republic Act No. 3590 requires, for the most important measures for which it demands in addition to favorable action of the barrio council the approval of barrio assembly through a plebiscite, lesser qualifications than those prescribed in dealing with ordinary measures for which such plebiscite need not be held. It is similarly inconceivable that those who drafted the 1935 Constitution intended section 1 of Art. V thereof to apply only to elections of public officers, not to plebiscites for the ratification of amendments to the Fundamental Law or revision thereof, or of an entirely new Constitution, and permit the legislature to require lesser qualifications for such ratification, notwithstanding the fact that the object thereof much more important if not fundamental, such as the basic changes introduced in the draft of the revised Constitution adopted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, which a intended to be in force permanently, or, at least, for many decades, and to affect the way of life of the nation and, accordingly, demands greater experience and maturity 49 on the part of the electorate than that required for the election of public officers, whose average term ranges from 2 to 6 years. It is admitted that persons 15 years of age or over, but below 21 years, regardless of whether or not they possessed the other qualifications laid down in both the Constitution and the present 50 Election Code, and of whether or not they are disqualified under the provisions of said 51 52 Constitution and Code, or those of Republic Act No. 3590, have participated and voted in the Citizens' Assemblies that have allegedly ratified the new or revised Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. In fact, according to the latest official data, the total number of registered voters 21 years of age or over in the entire Philippines, available in January 1973, was less than 12 million. Yet, Proclamation No. 1102 states that 14,976,56 "members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against ... 743,869 who voted for its rejection," whereas, on the question whether or not the people still wanted a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, "... 14,298,814 answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite." In other words, it is conceded that the number of people who allegedly voted at the Citizens' Assemblies for exceeded the number of registered voters under the Election Code in force in January 1973. It is thus clear that the proceedings held in such Citizens' Assemblies and We have more to say on this point in subsequent pages were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years

of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the 53 Citizens' Assemblies must be considered null and void. It has been held that "(t)he power to reject an entire poll ... should be exercised ... in a case where it is impossible to ascertain with reasonable certainty the true vote," as where "it is 54 impossible to separate the legal votes from the illegal or spurious ... ." In Usman v. Commission on Elections, et al.,
55

We held:

Several circumstances, defying exact description and dependent mainly on the factual milieu of the particular controversy, have the effect of destroying the integrity and authenticity of disputed election returns and of avoiding their prima facie value and character. If satisfactorily proven, although in a summary proceeding, such circumstances as alleged by the affected or interested parties, stamp the election returns with the indelible mark of falsity and irregularity, and, consequently, of unreliability, and justify their exclusion from the canvass. Then, too, the 1935 Constitution requires "a majority of the votes cast" for a proposed amendment to the Fundamental Law to be "valid" as part thereof, and the term "votes cast" has a well-settled meaning. The term "votes cast" ... was held in Smith v. Renville County Commissioners, 65 N.W. 956, 64 Minn. 16, to have been used as an 56 equivalent of "ballots cast." The word "cast" is defined as "to deposit formally or officially."
57

It seems to us that a vote is cast when a ballot is deposited indicating a "choice." ... The word "cast" means "deposit (a ballot) formally or officially ... . ... In simple words, we would define a "vote cast" as the exercise on a ballot 58 of the choice of the voter on the measure proposed. In short, said Art. XV envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally or by raising by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. And the 1935 Constitution has been consistently interpreted in all plebiscites for the ratification rejection of proposed amendments thereto, from 1935 to 1967. Hence, the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies was and is null and void ab initio. b. How should the plebiscite be held? (COMELEC supervision indispensable; essential requisites) Just as essential as compliance with said Art. V of the 19 Constitution is that of Art. X thereof, particularly its sections 1 and 2. Indeed, section 1 provides that "(t)here shall be an independent Commission on Elections ... ." The point to be stressed here is the term "independent." Indeed, why was the term used?

In the absence of said constitutional provision as to the independence of the Commission, would it have been depends upon either Congress or the Judiciary? The answer must be the negative, because the functions of the Commission "enforcement and administration" of election laws are neither legislative nor judicial in nature, and, hence, beyond the field allocated to either Congress or courts of justice. Said functions are by their nature essentially executive, for which reason, the Commission would be under the "control" of the President, pursuant to section 10, paragraph (1) of Art. VII of the Constitution, if Art. X thereof did not explicitly declare that it (the Commission) is an "independent" body. In other words, in amending the original 1935 Constitution, by inserting therein said Art. X, on the Commission on Elections, the purpose was to make said Commission independent principally of the Chief Executive. And the reason therefor is, also, obvious. Prior to the creation of the Commission on Elections as a constitutional organ, election laws in the Philippines were enforced by the then Department of the Interior, through its Executive Bureau, one of the offices under the supervision and control of said Department. The same like other departments of the Executive Branch of the Government was, in turn, under the control of the Chief Executive, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, and had been until the abolition of said Department, sometime ago under the control of the President of the Philippines, since the effectivity of said Fundamental Law. Under the provisions thereof, the Executive could so use his power of control over the Department of the Interior and its Executive Bureau as to place the minority party at such a great, if not decisive, disadvantage, as to deprive it, in effect, of the opportunity to defeat the political party in power, and, hence, to enable the same to perpetuate itself therein. To forestall this possibility, the original 1935 Constitution was amended by the establishment of the Commission on Elections as a constitutional body independent primarily of the President of the Philippines. The independence of the Commission was sought to be strengthened by the long term of office 59 of its members nine (9) years, except those first appointed the longest under the 60 Constitution, second only to that of the Auditor General ; by providing that they may not be removed from office except by impeachment, placing them, in this respect, on the same plane as the President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General; that they may not be reappointed; that their salaries, "shall be neither increased nor diminished during their term of office"; that the decisions the Commission "shall be subject to review by the 61 Supreme Court" only ; that "(n)o pardon, parole, or suspension sentence for the violation of 62 any election law may be granted without the favorable recommendation of the Commission" ; and, that its chairman and members "shall not, during the continuance in office, engage in the practice of any profession or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the management or control of any private enterprise which in anyway may affected by the functions of their office; nor shall they, directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any 63 subdivision or instrumentality thereof." Thus, the framers of the amendment to the original Constitution of 1935 endeavored to do everything possible protect and insure the independence of each member of the Commission. With respect to the functions thereof as a body, section 2 of said Art. X ordains that "(t)he Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration all laws relative to the conduct of elections," apart from such other "functions which may be conferred upon it by law." It further provides that the Commission "shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative question affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials." And, to forests possible conflicts or frictions between the Commission, on one hand, and the other offices or agencies of the executive department, on the other, said section 2 postulates that "(a)ll law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections." Not satisfied with this, it declares, in effect, that "(t)he decisions, orders, and ruling of the Commission" shall not be subject to review, except by the Supreme Court.

In accordance with the letter and spirit of said Art. X of the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 6388, otherwise known as the Election Code of 1971, implements the constitutional powers of the Commission on Elections and grants additional powers thereto, some of which are enumerated 64 in sections 5 and 6 of said Act, quoted below. Moreover, said Act contains, inter alia, detailed provisions regulating contributions and other (corrupt) practices; the establishment of election precincts; the designation and arrangement of polling places, including voting booths, to protect the secrecy of the ballot; formation of lists of voters, the identification and registration of voters, the proceedings therefor, as well as for the inclusion in, or exclusion or cancellation from said list and the publication thereof; the establishment of municipal, provincial and files of registered voters; the composition and appointment of board of election inspectors; the particulars of the official ballots to be used and the precautions to be taken to insure authenticity thereof; the procedure for the casting of votes; the counting of votes by boards of inspectors; the rules for the appreciation of ballots and the preparation and disposition of election returns; the constitution and operation of municipal, provincials and national boards of canvassers; the presentation of the political parties and/or their candidates in each election precinct; the proclamation of the results, including, in the case of election of public officers, election contests; and the jurisdiction of courts of justice in cases of violation of the provisions of said Election Code and the penalties for such violations. Few laws may be found with such meticulous and elaborate set of provisions aimed at "insuring free, orderly, and honest election," as envisaged in section 2 of Art. X of the Constitution. Yet, none of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions was followed by the so-called Barangays or Citizens' Assemblies. And no reasons have been given, or even sought to be given therefor. In many, if not most, instances, the election were held a viva voce, thus depriving the electorate of the right to vote secretly one of the most, fundamental and critical features of our election laws from time immemorial particularly at a time when the same was of utmost importance, owing to the existence of Martial Law. In Glen v. Gnau, involving the casting of many votes, openly, without complying with the requirements of the law pertinent thereto, it was held that the "election officers" involved "cannot be too strongly condemned" therefor and that if they "could legally dispense with such requirement ... they could with equal propriety dispense with all of them, including the one that the vote shall be by secret ballot, or even by ballot at all ... ." Moreover, upon the formal presentation to the Executive of the proposed Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, or on December 1, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 73 (on the validity of which which was contested in the plebiscite cases, as well as in the 1972 66 habeas corpus cases We need not, in the case of bar, express any opinion) was issued, calling a plebiscite, to be held on January 15, 1973, at which the proposed Constitution would be submitted to the people for ratification or rejection; directing the publication of said proposed Constitution; and declaring, inter alia, that "(t)he provision of the Election Code of 1971, insofar as they are not inconsistent" with said decree excepting those "regarding right and obligations of political parties and candidates" "shall apply to the conduct of the plebiscite." Indeed, section 2 of said Election Code of 1971 provides that "(a)ll elections of public officers except barrio officials and plebiscites shall be conducted in the manner provided by this Code." General Order No. 20, dated January 7, 1973, postponing until further notice, "the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973," said nothing about the procedure to be followed in plebiscite to take place at such notice, and no other order or decree has been brought to Our attention, expressly or impliedly repealing the provisions of Presidential Decree 73, insofar as said procedure is concerned. Upon the other hand, said General Order No. 20 expressly suspended "the provisions of Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 73 insofar as they allow free public discussion of proposed Constitution ... temporarily suspending effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for the purposes of free open dabate on the proposed Constitution ... ." This specific mention of the portions of the
65

decrees or orders or instructions suspended by General Order No. 20 necessarily implies that all other portions of said decrees, orders or instructions and, hence, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 73 outlining the procedure to be followed in the plebiscite for ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution remained in force, assuming that said Decree is valid. It is claimed that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 86-A the text of which is quoted below the Executive declared, inter alia, that the collective views expressed in the Citizens' Assemblies "shall be considered in the formulation of national policies or programs and, wherever practicable, shall be translated into concrete and specific decision"; that such Citizens' Assemblies "shall consider vital national issues ... like the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution ... and others in the future, which shall serve as guide or basis for action or decision by the national government"; and that the Citizens' Assemblies "shall conduct between January 10 and 15, 1973, a referendum on important national issues, including those specified in paragraph 2 hereof, and submit the results thereof to the Department of Local Governments and Community Development immediately thereafter, ... ." As in Presidential Decree No. 86, this Decree No. 86-A does not and cannot exclude the exercise of the constitutional supervisory power of the Commission on Elections or its participation in the proceedings in said Assemblies, if the same had been intended to constitute the "election" or Plebiscite required Art. V of the 1935 Constitution. The provision of Decree No. 86-A directing the immediate submission of the result thereof to the Department of Local Governments Community Development is not necessarily inconsistent with, and must be subordinate to the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to exercise its "exclusive authority over the enforcement and administration of all laws to the conduct of elections," if the proceedings in the Assemblies would partake of the nature of an "election" or plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution. We are told that Presidential Decree No. 86 was further amended by Presidential Decree No. 86-B, dated 1973, ordering "that important national issues shall from time to time; be referred to the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) for resolution in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 86-A dated January 5, 1973 and that the initial referendum include the matter of ratification of the Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention" and that "(t)he Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development shall insure the implementation of this order." As in the case of Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A, the foregoing directives do not necessarily exclude exercise of the powers vested by the 1935 Constitution in the Commission on Elections, even if the Executive had the authority to repeal Art. X of our Fundamental Law which he does not possess. Copy of Presidential Decree No. 86-B is appended hereto as Annex B hereof. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the Commission on Elections, and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. What is more, they were held under the supervision of the very officers and agencies of the Executive Department sought to be excluded therefrom by Art. X of the 1935 Constitution. Worse still, said officers and agencies of the 1935 Constitution would be favored thereby, owing to the practical indefinite extension of their respective terms of office in consequence of section 9 of the Transitory Provisions, found in Art. XVII of the proposed Constitution, without any elections therefor. And the procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns files by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Art. of the Constitution which can hardly be sanctioned. And, since the provisions of this article form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will, the aforementioned violation thereof renders null and void the contested proceedings or alleged plebiscite in the Citizens' Assemblies, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention. "... (a)ll the authorities agree that the legal definition of an election, as well as that which is usually and ordinarily understood by the term, is a choosing or as election by those having a right to participate (in the selection) of those who shall fill the
67

offices, or of the adoption or rejection of any public measure affecting the territory involved. 15 Cyc. 279; Lewis v. Boynton, 25 Colo. 486, 55 Pac. 732; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; Seaman v. Baughman, 82 Iowa 216, 47 N.W. 1091, 11 L.R.A. 354; State v. Hirsh, 125 Ind. 207, 68 24 N.E. 1062, 9 L.R.A. 170; Bouvier's Law Dictionary. IV Has the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of the people in Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines? Respondents maintain the affirmative, relying upon Proclamation No. 1102, the validity of which is precisely being contested by petitioners herein. Respondents claim that said proclamation is "conclusive" upon this Court, or is, at least, entitled to full faith and credence, as an enrolled bill; that the proposed Constitution has been, in fact, ratified, approved or adopted by the "overwhelming" majority of the people; that Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution has thus been "substancially" complied with; and that the Court refrain from passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, not only because such question is political in nature, but, also, because should the Court invalidate the proclamation, the former would, in effect, veto the action of the people in whom sovereignty resides and from its power are derived. The major flaw in this process of rationalization is that it assumes, as a fact, the very premise on which it is predicated, and which, moreover, is contested by the petitioners. As the Supreme Court of Minnessota has aptly put it ... every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject to its restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must subject him to the restraining and controlling of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary; for it must be remembered that the people act through courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. ... . Accordingly, the issue boils downs to whether or not the Executive acted within the limits of his authority when he certified in Proclamation No. 1102 "that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines and has thereby come into effect." In this connection, it is not claimed that the Chief Executive had personal knowledge of the data he certified in said proclamation. Moreover, Art. X of the 1935 Constitution was precisely inserted to place beyond the Executive the power to supervise or even exercise any authority whatsoever over "all laws relative to the conduct of elections," and, hence, whether the elections are for the choice or selection of public officers or for the ratification or rejection of any proposed amendment, or revision of the Fundamental Law, since the proceedings for the latter are, also, referred to in said Art. XV as "elections". The Solicitor General stated, in his argument before this Court, that he had been informed that there was in each municipality a municipal association of presidents of the citizens' assemblies for each barrio of the municipality; that the president of each such municipal association formed part of a provincial or city association of presidents of such municipal associations; that the president of each one of these provincial or city associations in turn formed part of a National

Association or Federation of Presidents of such Provincial or City Associations; and that one Francisco Cruz from Pasig, Rizal, as President of said National Association or Federation, reported to the President of the Philippines, in the morning of January 17, 1973, the total result of the voting in the citizens' assemblies all over the country from January 10 to January 15, 1973. The Solicitor General further intimated that the said municipal associations had reported the results of the citizens' assemblies in their respective municipalities to the corresponding Provincial Association, which, in turn, transmitted the results of the voting in the to the Department of Local Governments and Community Development, which tabulated the results of the voting in the citizens' assemblies throughout the Philippines and then turned them over to Mr. Franciso Cruz, as President or acting President of the National Association or Federation, whereupon Mr. Cruz, acting in a ceremonial capacity, reported said results (tabulated by the Department of Governments and Community Development) to the Chief Executive, who, accordingly, issued Proclamation No. 1102. The record shows, however, that Mr. Cruz was not even a member of any barrio council since 1972, so that he could possibly have been a member on January 17, 1973, of a municipal association of presidents of barrio or ward citizens' assemblies, much less of a Provincial, City or National Association or Federation of Presidents of any such provincial or city associations. Secondly, at the conclusion of the hearing of these cases February 16, 1973, and in the resolution of this Court of same date, the Solicitor General was asked to submit, together with his notes on his oral argument, a true copy of aforementioned report of Mr. Cruz to the President and of "(p)roclamation, decree, instruction, order, regulation or circular, if any, creating or directing or authorizing creation, establishment or organization" of said municipal, provincial and national associations, but neither a copy of alleged report to the President, nor a copy of any "(p)roclamation, decree, instruction, order, regulation or circular," has been submitted to this Court. In the absence of said report, "(p)roclamation, decree, instruction," etc., Proclamation No. 1102 is devoid of any factual and legal foundation. Hence, the conclusion set forth in the dispositive portion of said Proclamation No. 1102, to the effect that the proposed new or revised Constitution had been ratified by majority of the votes cast by the people, can not possibly have any legal effect or value. The theory that said proclamation is "conclusive upon Court is clearly untenable. If it were, acts of the Executive and those of Congress could not possibly be annulled or invalidated by courts of justice. Yet, such is not the case. In fact, even a resolution of Congress declaring that a given person has been elected President or Vice-President of the Philippines as provided in the 69 Constitution, is not conclusive upon the courts. It is no more than prima facie evidence of what 70 is attested to by said resolution. If assailed directly in appropriate proceedings, such as an election protest, if and when authorized by law, as it is in the Philippines, the Court may receive 71 evidence and declare, in accordance therewith, who was duly elected to the office involved. If prior to the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, no such protest could be filed, it was not because the resolution of Congress declaring who had been elected President or VicePresident was conclusive upon courts of justice, but because there was no law permitting the filing of such protest and declaring what court or body would hear and decide the same. So, too, a declaration to the effect that a given amendment to the Constitution or revised or new Constitution has been ratified by a majority of the votes cast therefor, may be duly assailed in court and be the object of judicial inquiry, in direct proceedings therefor such as the cases at bar and the issue raised therein may and should be decided in accordance with the evidence presented. The case of In re McConaughy is squarely in point. "As the Constitution stood from the organization of the state" of Minnessota "all taxes were required to be raised under the system known as the 'general property tax.' Dissatisfaction with the results of this method and the development of more scientific and satisfactory methods of raising revenue induced the Legislature to submit to the people an amendment to the Constitution which provided merely that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. This proposed amendment was
72

submitted at the general election held in November, 1906, and in due time it was certified by the state canvassing board and proclaimed by the Governor as having been legally adopted. Acting upon the assumption that the amendment had become a part of the Constitution, the Legislature enacted statutes providing for a State Tax Commission and a mortgage registry tax, and the latter statute, upon the same theory, was held constitutional" by said Court. "The district court found that the amendment had no in fact been adopted, and on this appeal" the Supreme Court was "required to determine the correctness of that conclusion." Referring to the effect of the certification of the State Board of Canvassers created by the Legislature and of the proclamation made by the Governor based thereon, the Court held: "It will be noted that this board does no more than tabulate the reports received from the various county board and add up and certify the results. State v. Mason, 45 Wash. 234, 88 Pac. 126, 9 L.R.A. (U.S.) 1221. It is settled law that the decisions of election officers, and canvassing boards are not conclusive and that the final decision must rest with the courts, unless the law declares that the decisions of the board shall be final" and there is no such law in the cases at bar. "... The correctness of the conclusion of the state board rests upon the correctness of the returns made by the county boards and it is inconceivable that it was intended that this statement of result should be final and conclusive regardless of the actual facts. The proclamation of the Governor adds nothing in the way of conclusiveness to the legal effect of the action of the canvassing board. Its purpose is to formally notify the people of the state of the result of the voting as found by the canvassing board. James on Const. Conv. (4th Ed.) sec. 523." In Bott v. Wartz, the Court reviewed the statement of results of the election made by the canvassing board, in order that the true results could be judicially determined. And so did the 74 court in Rice v. Palmer. Inasmuch as Art. X of the 1935 Constitution places under the "exclusive" charge of the Commission on Elections, "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive, and there is not even a certification by the Commission in support of the alleged results of the citizens' assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102 apart from the fact that on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines it follows necessarily that, from a constitutional and legal viewpoint, Proclamation No. 1102 is not even prima facie evidence of the alleged ratification of the proposed Constitution. Referring particularly to the cases before Us, it will be noted that, as pointed out in the discussion of the preceding topic, the new or revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not ratified in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution. In fact, it has not even been, ratified in accordance with said proposed Constitution, the minimum age requirement therein for the exercise of the right of suffrage being eighteen (18) years, apart from the fact that Art. VI of the proposed Constitution requires "secret" voting, which was not observed in many, if not most, Citizens' Assemblies. Besides, both the 1935 Constitution and the proposed Constitution require a "majority of the votes cast" in an election or plebiscite called for the ratification of an amendment or revision of the first Constitution or the effectivity of the proposed Constitution, and the phrase "votes cast" has been construed to mean 75 "votes made in writing not orally, as it was in many Citizens' Assemblies. Even counsel for Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy, as respondents in L-36165, asserts openly that Art. XV of the Constitution has not been complied with, and since the alleged substantial compliance with the requirements thereof partakes of the nature of a defense set up by the other respondents in these cases, the burden of proving such defense which, if true, should be within their peculiar knowledge is clearly on such respondents. Accordingly, if despite the extensive notes and documents submitted by the parties herein, the members of the Court do not know or are not prepared to say whether or not the majority of the people or of those who
73

took part in the Citizens' Assemblies have assented to the proposed Constitution, the logical step would be to give due course to these cases, require the respondents to file their answers, and the plaintiffs their reply, and, thereafter, to receive the pertinent evidence and then proceed to the determination of the issues raised thereby. Otherwise, we would be placing upon the petitioners the burden of disproving a defense set up by the respondents, who have not so far established the truth of such defense. Even more important, and decisive, than the foregoing is the circumstance that there is ample reason to believe that many, if not most, of the people did not know that the Citizens' Assemblies were, at the time they were held, plebiscites for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution. Hence, in Our decision in the plebiscite cases, We said, inter alia: Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution. In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. And, apparently, the parties in said cases entertained the same belief, for, on December 23, 76 1972 four (4) days after the last hearing of said cases the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite scheduled by Presidential Decree No. 73 to be held on January 15, 1973, after consultation with the Commission on Elections and the leaders of Congress, owing to doubts on the sufficiency of the time available to translate the proposed Constitution into some local dialects and to comply with some pre-electoral requirements, as well as to afford the people a reasonable opportunity to be posted on the contents and implications of said transcendental document. On January 7, 1973, General Order No. 20 was issued formally, postponing said plebiscite "until further notice." How can said postponement be reconciled with the theory that the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies scheduled to be held from January 10 to January 15, 1973, were "plebiscites," in effect, accelerated, according to the theory of the Solicitor General, for the ratification of the proposed Constitution? If said Assemblies were meant to be the plebiscites or elections envisaged in Art. XV of the Constitution, what, then, was the "plebiscite" postponed by General Order No. 20? Under these circumstances, it was only reasonable for the people who attended such assemblies to believe that the same were not an "election" or plebiscite for the ratification or adoption of said proposed Constitution.

And, this belief is further bolstered up by the questions propounded in the Citizens' Assemblies, namely: [1] Do you like the New Society? [2] Do you like the reforms under martial law? [3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions? [4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later? [5] Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the government? [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; emphasis an additional question.] [6] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to decide issues of national interests? [7] Do you approve of the new Constitution? [8] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution? [9] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution? [10] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be called? [11] Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973] To begin with, questions nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 are not proper in a plebiscite for the ratification of a proposed Constitution or of a proposed amendment thereto. Secondly, neither is the language of question No. 7 "Do you approve the new Constitution?" One approves "of" the act of another which does not need such approval for the effectivity of said act, which the first person, however, finds to be good, wise satisfactory. The approval of the majority of the votes cast in plebiscite is, however, essential for an amendment to the Constitution to be valid as part thereof. Thirdly, if the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies constituted a plebiscite question No. 8 would have been unnecessary and improper, regardless of whether question No. 7 were answered affirmatively or negatively. If the majority of the answers to question No. 7 were in the affirmative, the proposed Constitution would have become effective and no other plebiscite could be held thereafter in connection therewith, even if the majority of the answers to question No. 8 were, also, in the affirmative. If the majority of the answers to question No. 7 were in the negative, neither may another plebiscite be held, even if the majority of the answers to question No. 8 were in the affirmative. In either case, not more than one plebiscite could be held for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution. In short, the insertion of said two (2) questions apart from the other questions adverted to above indicates strongly that the proceedings therein did not partake of the nature of a plebiscite or election for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution. Indeed, I can not, in good conscience, declare that the proposed Constitution has been approved or adopted by the people in the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines, when it is,

to my mind, a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizens' assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. In a letter of Governor Efren B. Pascual of Bataan, dated January 15, 1973, to the Chief Executive, the former reported: ... This report includes a resumee (sic) of the activities we undertook in effecting the referendum on the eleven questions you wanted our people consulted on and the Summary of Results thereof for each municipality and for the whole province. xxx xxx xxx ... Our initial plans and preparations, however, dealt only on the original five questions. Consequently, when we received an instruction on January 10 to change the questions, we urgently suspended all scheduled Citizens Assembly meetings on that day and called all Mayors, Chiefs of Offices and other government officials to another conference to discuss with them the new set of guidelines and materials to be used. On January 11, ... another instruction from the top was received to include the original five questions among those to be discussed and asked in the Citizens' Assembly meetings. With this latest order, we again had to make modifications in our instructions to all those managing and supervising the holding of the Citizens' Assembly meetings throughout the province. ... Aside from the coordinators we had from the Office of the Governor, the splendid cooperation and support extended by almost all government officials and employees in the province, particularly of the Department of Education, PC and PACD personnel, provided us with enough hands to trouble shoot and implement sudden changes in the instructions anytime and anywhere needed. ... ... As to our people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their preference and readiness to accept this new method of government to people consultation in shaping up government policies. Thus, as late as January 10, 1973, the Bataan officials had to suspend "all scheduled Citizens' Assembly meetings ..." and call all available officials "... to discuss with them the new set of guidelines and materials to be used ... ." Then, "on January 11 ... another instruction from the top was received to include the original five questions among those be discussed and asked in the Citizens' Assembly meetings. With this latest order, we again had to make modifications in our instructions to all those managing and supervising holding of the Citizens' Assembly meetings throughout province. ... As to our people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their preference and readiness to accept the new method of government to people consultation in shaping up government policies." This communication manifestly shows: 1) that, as late a January 11, 1973, the Bataan officials had still to discuss not put into operation means and ways to carry out the changing instructions from the top on how to organize the citizens' assemblies, what to do therein and even what questions or topics to propound or touch in said assemblies; 2) that the assemblies would involve no more than consultations or dialogues between people and government not decisions be made by the people; and 3) that said consultations were aimed only at "shaping up government policies" and, hence could not, and did not, partake of the nature of a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of a proposed amendment of a new or revised Constitution for the latter does not entail the formulation of a policy of the Government, but the making of decision by

the people on the new way of life, as a nation, they wish to have, once the proposed Constitution shall have been ratified. If this was the situation in Bataan one of the provinces nearest to Manila as late as January 11, 1973, one can easily imagine the predicament of the local officials and people in the remote barrios in northern and southern Luzon, in the Bicol region, in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. In fact, several members of the Court, including those of their immediate families and their household, although duly registered voters in the area of Greater Manila, were not even notified that citizens' assemblies would be held in the places where their respective residences 77 were located. In the Prohibition and Amendment case, attention was called to the "duty cast upon the court of taking judicial cognizance of anything affecting the existence and validity of any law or portion of the Constitution ... ." In line with its own pronouncement in another case, the Federal Supreme Court 78 of the United States stressed, in Baker v. Carr, that "a court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared." In the light of the foregoing, I cannot see how the question under consideration can be answered or resolved otherwise than in the negative. V Have the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution? It is urged that the present Government of the Philippines is now and has been run, since January 17, 1971, under the Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention; that the political department of the Government has recognized said revised Constitution; that our foreign relations are being conducted under such new or revised Constitution; that the Legislative Department has recognized the same; and that the people, in general, have, by their acts or omissions, indicated their conformity thereto. As regards the so-called political organs of the Government, gather that respondents refer mainly to the offices under the Executive Department. In a sense, the latter performs some functions which, from a constitutional viewpoint, are politics in nature, such as in recognizing a new state or government, in accepting diplomatic representatives accredited to our Government, and even in devising administrative means and ways to better carry into effect. Acts of Congress which define the goals or objectives thereof, but are either imprecise or silent on the particular measures to be resorted to in order to achieve the said goals or delegate the power to do so, expressly or impliedly, to the Executive. This, notwithstanding, the political organ of a government that purports to be republican is essentially the Congress or Legislative Department. Whatever may be the functions allocated to the Executive Department specially under a written, rigid Constitution with a republican system of Government like ours the role of that Department is inherently, basically and fundamentally executive in nature to "take care that 79 the laws be faithfully executed," in the language of our 1935 Constitution. Consequently, I am not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote a recognition thereof o an acquiescence thereto. Whether they recognized the proposed Constitution or acquiesce thereto or not is something that cannot legally, much less necessarily or even normally, be deduced from their acts in accordance therewith, because the are bound to obey and act in conformity with the orders of the President, under whose "control" they are, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. They have absolutely no other choice, specially in view of Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under Martial Law. Besides, by virtue of the very decrees, orders and instructions issued by the President thereafter, he had assumed all powers of Government although some question his authority to do so and, consequently, there is hardly anything he has done since the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102, on January 17, 1973 declaring that

the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified by the overwhelming majority of the people that he could not do under the authority he claimed to have under Martial Law, since September 21, 1972, except the power of supervision over inferior courts and its personnel, which said proposed Constitution would place under the Supreme Court, and which the President has not ostensibly exercised, except as to some minor routine matters, which the Department of Justice has continued to handle, this Court having preferred to maintain the status quo in connection therewith pending final determination of these cases, in which the effectivity of the aforementioned Constitution is disputed. Then, again, a given department of the Government cannot generally be said to have "recognized" its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Accordingly, when a subordinate officer or office of the Government complies with the commands of a superior officer or office, under whose supervision and control he or it is, the former merely obeys the latter. Strictly speaking, and from a legal and constitutional viewpoint, there is no act of recognition involved therein. Indeed, the lower officer or office, if he or it acted otherwise, would just be guilty of insubordination. Thus, for instance, the case of Taylor v. Commonwealth cited by respondents herein in support of the theory of the people's acquiescence involved a constitution ordained in 1902 and "proclaimed by a convention duly called by a direct vote of the people of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of 1869. The result of the work of that Convention has been recognized, accepted and acted upon as the only valid Constitution of the State" by 1. The "Governor of the State in swearing fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby"; 2. The "Legislature in its formal official act adopting a joint resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the Constitution ordained by the Convention ..."; 3. The "individual oaths of its members to support it, and by its having been engaged for nearly a year, in legislating under it and putting its provisions into operation ..."; 4. The "judiciary in taking the oath prescribed thereby to support it and by enforcing its provisions ..."; and 5. The "people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it, by registering as voters under it to the extent of thousands throughout the State, and by voting, under its provisions, at a general election for their representatives in the Congress of the United States." Note that the New Constitution of Virginia, drafted by a convention whose members were elected directly by the people, was not submitted to the people for ratification or rejection thereof. But, it was recognized, not by the convention itself, but by other sectors of the Government, namely, the Governor; the Legislature not merely by individual acts of its members, but by formal joint resolution of its two (2) chambers; by the judiciary; and by the people, in the various ways specified above. What is more, there was no martial law. In the present cases, none of the foregoing acts of acquiescence was present. Worse still, there is martial law, the strict enforcement of which was announced shortly before the alleged citizens' assemblies. To top it all, in the Taylor case, the effectivity of the contested amendment was not contested judicially until about one (1) year after the amendment had been put into operation in all branches of the Government, and complied with by the people who participated in the elections held pursuant to the provisions of the new Constitution. In the cases under consideration, the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, was impugned as early as December 7, 1972, or five (5) weeks before the
80

scheduled plebiscite, whereas the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 declaring on January 17, 1973, that the proposed Constitution had been ratified despite General Order No. 20, issued on January 7, 1972, formally and officially suspending the plebiscite until further notice was impugned as early as January 20, 1973, when L-36142 was filed, or three (3) days after the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102. It is further alleged that a majority of the members of our House of Representatives and Senate have acquiesced in the new or revised Constitution, by filing written statements opting to serve in the Ad Interim Assembly established in the Transitory Provisions of said Constitution. Individual acts of recognition by members of our legislature, as well as of other collegiate bodies under the government, are invalid as acts of said legislature or bodies, unless its members have performed said acts in session duly assembled, or unless the law provides otherwise, and there is no such law in the Philippines. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers, and no plausible reason has been adduced to warrant departure 81 therefrom. Indeed, if the members of Congress were generally agreeable to the proposed Constitution, why did it become necessary to padlock its premises to prevent its meeting in session on January 22, 1973, and thereafter as provided in the 1935 Constitution? It is true that, theoretically, the members of Congress, if bent on discharging their functions under said Constitution, could have met in any other place, the building in which they perform their duties being immaterial to the legality of their official acts. The force of this argument is, however, offset or dissipated by the fact that, on or about December 27, 1972, immediately after a conference between the Executive, on the one hand, and members of Congress, on the other, some of whom expressed the wish to meet in session on January 22, 1973, as provided in the 1935 Constitution, a Daily Express columnist (Primitivo Mijares) attributed to Presidential Assistant Guillermo de Vega a statement to the effect that "'certain members of the Senate appear to be missing the point in issue' when they reportedly insisted on taking up first the question of convening Congress." The 82 Daily Express of that date, likewise, headlined, on its front page, a "Senatorial Plot Against 'Martial Law Government' Disclosed". Then, in its issue of December 29, 1972, the same paper imputed to the Executive an appeal "to diverse groups involved in a conspiracy to undermine" his powers" under martial law to desist from provoking a constitutional crisis ... which may result in the exercise by me of authority I have not exercised." No matter how good the intention behind these statement may have been, the idea implied therein was too clear an ominous for any member of Congress who thought of organizing, holding or taking part in a session of Congress, not to get the impression that he could hardly do so without inviting or risking the application of Martial Law to him. Under these conditions, I do not feel justified in holding that the failure of the members of Congress to meet since January 22, 1973, was due to their recognition, acquiescence in or conformity with the provisions of the aforementioned Constitution, or its alleged ratification. For the same reasons, especially because of Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law, neither am I prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects issued subsequently thereto amounts, constitutes or attests to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. In the words of the Chief Executive, "martial law connotes power 83 of the gun, meant coercion by the military, and compulsion and intimidation." The failure to use the gun against those who comply with the orders of the party wielding the weapon does not detract from the intimidation that Martial Law necessarily connotes. It may reflect the good, reasonable and wholesome attitude of the person who has the gun, either pointed at others, without pulling the trigger, or merely kept in its holster, but not without warning that he may or would use it if he deemed it necessary. Still, the intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence. This is specially so when we consider that the masses are, by and large, unfamiliar with the

parliamentary system, the new form of government introduced in the proposed Constitution, with the particularity that it is not even identical to that existing in England and other parts of the world, and that even experienced lawyers and social scientists find it difficult to grasp the full implications of some provisions incorporated therein. As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and attested to by the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary of the House of Representatives, concerning legislative measures approved by the two Houses of Congress. The argument of the Solicitor General is, roughly, this: If the enrolled bill is entitled to full faith and credence and, to this extent, it is conclusive upon the President and the judicial branch of the Government, why should Proclamation No. 1102 merit less consideration than in enrolled bill? Before answering this question, I would like to ask the following: If, instead of being certified by the aforementioned officers of Congress, the so-called enrolled bill were certified by, say, the President of the Association of Sugar Planters and/or Millers of the Philippines, and the measure in question were a proposed legislation concerning Sugar Plantations and Mills sponsored by said Association, which even prepared the draft of said legislation, as well as lobbied actually for its approval, for which reason the officers of the Association, particularly, its aforementioned president whose honesty and integrity are unquestionable were present at the deliberations in Congress when the same approved the proposed legislation, would the enrolled bill rule apply thereto? Surely, the answer would have to be in the negative. Why? Simply, because said Association President has absolutely no official authority to perform in connection therewith, and, hence, his certification is legally, as good as non-existent. Similarly, a certification, if any, of the Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and Community Development about the tabulated results of the voting in the Citizens Assemblies allegedly held all over the Philippines and the records do not show that any such certification, to the President of the Philippines or to the President Federation or National Association of presidents of Provincial Associations of presidents of municipal association presidents of barrio or ward assemblies of citizens would not, legally and constitutionally, be worth the paper on which it is written. Why? Because said Department Secretary is not the officer designated by law to superintend plebiscites or elections held for the ratification or rejection of a proposed amendment or revision of the Constitution and, hence, to tabulate the results thereof. Worse still, it is the department which, according to Article X of the Constitution, should not and must not be all participate in said plebiscite if plebiscite there was. After citing approvingly its ruling in United States v. Sandoval, the Highest Court of the United States that courts "will not stand impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly 85 unauthorized exercise of power." I cannot honestly say, therefore, that the people impliedly or expressly indicated their conformity to the proposed Constitution. VI Are the Parties entitled to any relief? Before attempting to answer this question, a few words be said about the procedure followed in these five (5) cases. In this connection, it should be noted that the Court has not decided whether or not to give due course to the petitions herein or to require the respondents to answer thereto. Instead, it has required the respondents to comment on the respective petitions with three (3) members of the voting to dismiss them outright and then considers comments thus
84

submitted by the respondents as motions to dismiss, as well as set the same for hearing. This was due to the transcendental nature of the main issue raised, the necessity of deciding the same with utmost dispatch, and the main defense set up by respondents herein, namely, the alleged political nature of said issue, placing the same, according to respondents, beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry and determination. If this defense was sustained, the cases could readily be dismissed; but, owing to the importance of the questions involved, a reasoned resolution was demanded by public interest. At the same time, respondents had cautioned against a judicial inquiry into the merits of the issues posed on account of the magnitude of the evil consequences, it was claimed, which would result from a decision thereon, if adverse to the Government. As a matter of fact, some of those issues had been raised in the plebiscite cases, which were dismissed as moot and academic, owing to the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102 subsequently to the filing of said cases, although before the rendition of judgment therein. Still one of the members of the Court (Justice Zaldivar) was of the opinion that the aforementioned issues should be settled in said cases, and he, accordingly, filed an opinion passing upon the merits thereof. On the other hand, three (3) members of the Court Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra filed separate opinions favorable to the respondents in the plebiscite cases, Justice Barredo holding "that the 1935 Constitution has pro tanto passed into history and has been 86 legitimately supplanted by the Constitution in force by virtue of Proclamation 1102." When the petitions at bar were filed, the same three (3) members of the Court, consequently, voted for the dismissal of said petitions. The majority of the members of the Court did not share, however, either view, believing that the main question that arose before the rendition of said judgment had not been sufficiently discussed and argued as the nature and importance thereof demanded. The parties in the cases at bar were accordingly given every possible opportunity to do so and to elucidate on and discuss said question. Thus, apart from hearing the parties in oral argument for five (5) consecutive days morning and afternoon, or a total of exactly 26 hours and 31 minutes the respective counsel filed extensive notes on their or arguments, as well as on such additional arguments as they wished to submit, and reply notes or memoranda, in addition to rejoinders thereto, aside from a sizeable number of document in support of their respective contentions, or as required by the Court. The arguments, oral and written, submitted have been so extensive and exhaustive, and the documents filed in support thereof so numerous and bulky, that, for all intents and purposes, the situation is as if disregarding forms the petitions had been given due course and the cases had been submitted for decision. Accordingly, the majority of the members of the Court believe that they should express their views on the aforementioned issues as if the same were being decided on the merits, and they have done so in their individual opinion attached hereto. Hence, the resume of the votes cast and the tenor of the resolution, in the last pages hereof, despite the fact that technically the Court has not, as yet, formally given due course to the petitions herein. And, now, here are my views on the reliefs sought by the parties. In L-36165, it is clear that we should not issue the writ of mandamus prayed for against Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy, President and President Pro Tempore respectively of the Senate, it being settled in our jurisdiction, based upon the theory of separation of powers, that the judiciary will not issue such writ to the head of a co-equal department, like the aforementioned officers of the Senate. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, as well as in cases L36142, L-36164, L-36236 and L-36283, my vote is that the petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in

force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite. Perhaps others would feel that my position in these cases overlooks what they might consider to be the demands of "judicial statesmanship," whatever may be the meaning of such phrase. I am aware of this possibility, if not probability; but "judicial statesmanship," though consistent with Rule of Law, cannot prevail over the latter. Among consistent ends or consistent values, there always is a hierarchy, a rule of priority. We must realize that the New Society has many achievements which would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish under the old dispensation. But, in and for the judiciary, statesmanship should not prevail over the Rule of Law. Indeed, the primacy of the law or of the Rule of Law and faithful adherence thereto are basic, fundamental and essential parts of statesmanship itself. Resume of the Votes Cast and the Court's Resolution As earlier stated, after the submittal by the members of the Court of their individual opinions and/or concurrences as appended hereto, the writer will now make, with the concurrence of his colleagues, a resume or summary of the votes cast by each of them. It should be stated that by virtue of the various approaches and views expressed during the deliberations, it was agreed to synthesize the basic issues at bar in broad general terms in five questions for purposes of taking the votes. It was further agreed of course that each member of the Court would expound in his individual opinion and/or concurrence his own approach to the stated issues and deal with them and state (or not) his opinion thereon singly or jointly and with such priority, qualifications and modifications as he may deem proper, as well as discuss thereon other related issues which he may consider vital and relevant to the cases at bar. The five questions thus agreed upon as reflecting the basic issues herein involved are the following: 1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-justiciable, question? 2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions? 3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people? 4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? and 5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force? The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the members of the Court in their respect opinions and/or concurrences, are as follows:

1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry." 2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only 87 by qualified and duly registered voters. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification. 3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution." Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the 88 absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media

vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the 89 people have accepted the Constitution." 4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this 90 91 Court, are relevant and unavoidable." Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions. 5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force: Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force. ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered. Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976 VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976 RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. MARTIN, J,: The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened. On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.1 Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2 On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The questions ask, to wit: (1) Do you want martial law to be continued?

(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS: 1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law. 2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution. 3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution. 4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary. 5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. 6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land. 7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and composition may be altered by law. Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest. 8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and effect. 9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976. Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization. On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3 Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above. We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit. I Justiciability of question raised. 1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present

case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into. 2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10 We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people. Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases 12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it

partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration." II The amending process as laid out in the new Constitution. 1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains: SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election. SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision. In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads: SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof. There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,. 2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions,

they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it. 3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. 17 Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19 III Concentration of Powers in the President during crisis government. 1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.

2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23 The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution. All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly. "It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25 IV Authority of the incumbent President t to propose amendments to the Constitution. 1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to

propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26 2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 . 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. V The People is Sovereign 1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them .30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35 2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body. VI Referendum-Plebiscite not

rendered nugatory by the participation of the 15-year olds. 1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued? is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendumplebiscite shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38 2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President. 39 It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect. VII 1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendumplebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44 VIII Time for deliberation is not short. 1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without

counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45 2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body IN RESUME The three issues are 1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable? 2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people? 3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission? Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political. Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments. Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his

concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702). Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions. ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Aquino, J, in the result.

x------------------------------------------------------ x ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor. x--------------------------------------------------------x BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors. x--------------------------------------------------------x LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROSBARAQUEL, Intervenors. x--------------------------------------------------------x ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor. x ------------------------------------------------------- x

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor. x---------------------------------------------------------x LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.

G.R. No. 174153

October 25, 2006 x ------------------------------------------------------- x

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. x--------------------------------------------------------x ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor. x ------------------------------------------------------ x ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors. x ------------------------------------------------------- x RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors. x -------------------------------------------------------- x

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors. x -------------------------------------------------------- x SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor. x ------------------------------------------------------- x SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor. x ------------------------------------------------------- x JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors. x -------------------------------------------------------- x INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors. x --------------------------------------------------------x SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors. x -----------------------------------------------------x JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors. x -----------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006

CARPIO, J.: The Case These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. Antecedent Facts On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. 1 Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their 3 2 initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 4 5 of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) 6 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification: DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC 7 indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. The Ruling of the COMELEC On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the 8 Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the 9 Constitution. In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.

DECISION

binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people." In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention. In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative." Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the 10 Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the 11 opposing intervenors hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an 12 initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject. The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution. The Issues The petitions raise the following issues: 1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative; 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution; and 3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition. The Ruling of the Court There is no merit to the petition. The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus: MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign? MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President. MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft? MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President. MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment. MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass 13 it around for signature. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature." The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing. The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed the concept of people's initiative from the United States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all 15 States which allow initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the 16 proposed amendments. The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus, in Capezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
14

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in 17 seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury, the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
18

The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied) Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative 19 void. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories." The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a 20 signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature 21 sheet attached to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra. The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full: Province: Legislative District: City/Municipality: Barangay: Verified Signatures: No. of

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?" I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.

Precinct Number

Name Last Name, First Name, M.I.

Address

Birthdate MM/DD/YY

Signature

Verification

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 _________________ Barangay Official (Print Name and Sign) _________________ Witness (Print Name and Sign) __________________ Witness (Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition. The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:

I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied) The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines" text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
22

has posted the full

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02 RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change; WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005; WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December 2005; WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution; WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same; WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;

DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 23 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila. (Underscoring supplied) ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of 24 amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the Consultative Commission are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC. For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions. The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes. In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared: After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments. The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-

gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments." The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets. It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus: [T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis supplied) The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006. The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself. Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet. It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition. During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.

Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies. Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 25 100,000 copies of the petition for initiative x x x." This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets. Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000. With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets. In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution. For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are: 1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members 26 of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely; 2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the 27 expiration of their own term of office; 3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the 28 Constitution. These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were

proposing these amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets. During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this. The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states: Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year. Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future local elections. Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation. This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections. The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides: Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)

During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative. Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable. Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and 29 not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone, the Supreme Court of Florida declared: Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied) Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine, the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling: Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the singlesubject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-byinitiative process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
30

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes. There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states: Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010. The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators. The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of Representatives. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition. In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides: ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (2) A constitutional convention. Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2: The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters. This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x xxxx MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c)

of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a selfexecuting provision? MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee. MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments? MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President. xxxx MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"? MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. (Emphasis supplied) There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in 32 McFadden v. Jordan, the Supreme Court of California ruled: The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a
31

constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:
33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x. While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x. To call it an amendment is a misnomer. Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself. As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:
34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied) This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.

The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner: [T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an 35 improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. (Emphasis supplied) Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or 36 alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes 37 in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the 38 fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of 39 check and balances." Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 40 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes: An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral 41 system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied) In Adams v. Gunter, an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows: The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry on government. xxxx We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer. The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to
42

eliminate inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition 43 here. (Emphasis supplied) The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the executive department. In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected 44 based on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor. Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum: 99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions. 100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing supplied) The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.

The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution 45 are clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection. The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions 46 have attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling, the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus: Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people. Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature. We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said: "From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution. We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and

difficulties arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment 47 and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass 48 media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is 49 an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located. However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or 50 "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-andbalances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states: Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect

is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment. Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that. The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of government." Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government? This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution. In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution. This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a 51 statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds. Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present

initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735. Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories." The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid. The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail. 4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action 52 (PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA: The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997. 5. Conclusion The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution itself. To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.

An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes 53 cast approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution. No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extraconstitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people. Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability. The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative. This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

The Solicitor General for the Civil Service Commission. Domingo A. Santiago, Jr. for Philippine National Bank.

PADILLA, J.: This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing Resolution No. 92-201 of the respondent Civil Service Commission, which upheld the petitioner's separation from the Philippine National Bank(PNB) as a result of the abolition of the Fund Transfer Department pursuant to a reorganization under Executive Order No. 80, dated 3 December 1986. Petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the Philippine National Bank on 20 September 1972 as special assistant with the rank of Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office of the PNB President. After several promotions, she was appointed in 1983 Senior Vice President assigned to the Fund Transfer Department. Starting 1 April 1986 up to 20 February 1987, petitioner filed several applications for leave of absence (due to medical reasons) which were duly approved. While she was on leave, Executive Order No. 80 (Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved on 3 December 1986. Said executive order authorized the restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant to the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer Department was abolished and its functions transferred to the International Department. Consequently, petitioner was notified of her separation from the service in a letter dated 30 January 1987, thus: Pursuant to the Transitory Provision of the 1986 Revised Charter of the Bank, please be informed that Management has approved your separation from the service effective February 16, 1986. You shall be entitled to the regular benefits allowed under existing law. (emphasis supplied) Please be informed further that under Sec. 37 of the Bank's 1986 Revised Charter, any officer or employee who feels aggrieved by any matter treated above may submit his case to the Civil Service 1 Commission. This letter was received by petitioner's secretary at the PNB head office on 16 February 1987. EN BANC Petitioner's first recorded appeal to the Civil Service Commission questioning her separation is a letter dated 4 August 1989. Then CSC Chairman Samilo N. Barlongay upheld the validity of her separation from the service in a letter/opinion dated 30 August 1989 (this was allegedly received by petitioner only on 26 February 1990) stating thus: xxx xxx xxx It may be mentioned in this connection, that inasmuch as you did not avail of the ERIP/Supplementary Retirement Plans adopted by the PNB in 1986, you have therefore lost your right thereto. Moreover, since you lack the

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

G.R. No. 104226 August 12, 1993 CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP, petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents. Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

required number of years of service to entitle you to retirement benefits under existing laws, you may be entitled to the return of your GSIS personal contributions. Considering further that you have exhausted all your accumulated leave credits as you went on leave of absence for the period from April 1, 1986 to February 20, 1987, there is no legal or valid basis to entitle you to payment of terminal leave. Finally, pursuant to Section 16, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, you may be entitled to payment of 2 separation subject to auditing rules and regulations. In her motion for reconsideration with the Civil Service Commission, dated 5 March 1990, questioning Chairman Barlongay's ruling, petitioner claimed: 1. The opinion/ruling was not fully supported by the evidence on record; 2. Errors of law prejudicial to the interest of the movant have been committed. She argued: . . . that her separation from the service was illegal and was done in bad faith considering that her termination on February 16, 1986 was made effective prior to the effectivity of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986, which law authorized the reorganization of the PNB, and even before February 25, 1986, when President Corazon C. Aquino came into power. She further claims that although the notice of termination was dated January 30, 1987 it was only served upon her on February 16, 1987 when the new Constitution which guarantees security of tenure to public employees was 3 already in effect. xxx xxx xxx . . . the bad faith in her separation from the service in 1987 was evident from the recent restoration of the Fund Transfer Department as a separate and 4 distinct unit from the International Department . . . Denying the motion for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission in its aforecited Resolution No. 92-201, dated 30 January, 1992, ruled: Sec. 33 of EO 80 (1986 Revised Charter of the PNB) provides: Sec. 33. Authority to Reorganize. In view of reduced operations contemplated under this charter in pursuance of the national policy expressed in the "Whereas" clause hereof, a reorganization of the Bank and a reduction in force are hereby authorized to achieve greater efficiency and economy in operations, including the adoption of a new staffing pattern to suit the reduced operations envisioned. The program of reorganization shall begin immediately after the approval of this Order, and shall be completed within six (6) months and shall be fully implemented within eighteen (18) months thereafter." Clearly; as aforequoted, PNB was authorized to undergo reorganization and to effect a reduction in force to "achieve greater efficiency and economy in operations". It cannot, be disputed that reduction in force necessitates, among others, the abolition of positions/offices. The records show that prior to its reorganization, PNB originally had 7,537 positions which were reduced to 5,405 after the reorganization. Indeed,

2,132 positions were abolished, that is, the original positions in PNB were reduced by 28%. This reduction in force likewise included the senior officer positions, in PNB, which were reduced, thus: Positions Incumbents Proposed Position President 1 1 1 Sr. Exec. VP 1 1 0 Exec. VP 3 2 2 Senior VP 12 11 7 Vice Pres. 33 27 15 The position of movant Yap (SVP) was one among the original twelve (12) SVP positions. It was one among the five (5) SVP positions which were abolished. In fact, the FTD of which she was then the incumbent SVP, was merged with the International Department to which its functions were closedly related. It should be noted that as ruled by the Supreme Court in Dario vs. Mison (G.R. NO. 81954): Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. . . . . . . . Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime is judged from the facts of each case. In the instant case, therefore, this Commission is inclined to believe that the reorganization of PNB was done in good faith. For indeed, the reorganization was pursued to achieve economy. It undertook reduction in force as a means to streamline the numbers of the workforce. It was incidental that movant Yap's position was one among those abolished. Movant Yap failed to substantiate her claim by clear and convincing evidence that the abolition of her position was a result of her close identification with the previous regime, being a sister of former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos. This being so, and pursuant to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions, the abolition of movant Yap's position should be upheld. PNB, in the instant case, has clearly proved by substantial evidence that its act in terminating the services of 5 some of its employees was done in good faith. Overruling her imputation of bad faith, i.e. her separation was illegal because it took effect on 16 February 1986 or even before the promulgation of EO No. 80 on 3 December 1986, the CSC noted that the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation from the service was a typographical error. PNB submitted documents (p. 6 of Resolution No. 92-201) supporting its stand that the separation actually took effect on 16 February 1987.

On the issue of bad faith as related to the later restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, the subject CSC resolution adds: xxx xxx xxx It may be mentioned that the recent restoration of the Fund Transfer Department, actually was a merger of the Fund Transfer Group, the Foreign Remittance Development and Coordinating Unit based on board Resolution No. 60 of March 12, 1991, or after the lapse of over four (4) years from the date it was abolished in 1987. Moreover, the restoration of the Fund Transfer Department and other offices in the PNB was primarily caused by the improved financial capability and present needs of the Bank. This improved financial condition of the PNB is evident from the 1990 Annual Report it submitted. It may be further stated that the re-established FTD is headed by a Vice President, a position much lower in rank than the former department headed by a Senior Vice President. Furthermore, it should be noted that granting arguendo that movant Yap's termination from the service was tainted with bad faith, she however, is now barred from assailing the same as she did not seasonably assert her right thereto. Records show that she was separated from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989 or about 2 years thereafter when she brought this matter to this Commission. By her inaction in questioning her termination within a period of one year, she is considered to have acquiesced to her separation from the service and abandoned her right to 6 the position. In the present petition before the Court, the following issues are raised: 1. Existence of bad faith in the reorganization of the Philippine National Bank resulting in the separation from the service of petitioner. 2. Erroneous application of the Dario v. Mison doctrine vis-a-vis PNB's reorganization. 3. Erroneous application of the one (1) year prescriptive period for quo warranto proceedings in petitioner's case. Dario v. Mison laid down the requirement of good faith in the reorganization of a government bureau wherein offices are abolished. It says: . . . Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in
7

the course of a reorganization in good faith is still removal "not for cause" if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary action. Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each case. In Petitioner's case, the following instances are cited by her as indicia of bad faith: 1. The abolished department was later restored and the number of senior vice presidents was increased. 2. PNB did not follow the prescribed sequence of separation of employees from the service contained in Rep. Act No. 6656 which is: Sec. 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following order of removal shall be followed: (a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service; (b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service; (c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and (d) Employees holding permanent appointments: Provided, That those in the same category as enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid off first, length of service notwithstanding. 3. Petitioner was not extended preference in appointment to the positions in the new staffing pattern as mandated by Sec. 4 of Rep. Act 6656, her qualification and fitness for new positions were never evaluated or considered in violation of Sec. 27 of P.D. 807 which was incorporated as Sec. 29 Ch. 5 Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. 4. Lack of notice and bearing before separation from the service. 5. Petitioner was forced to take a leave of absence and prevented from reporting for work. 6. There is a discrepancy in the date of her separation from the service and the effectivity thereof.

7. PNB employees in the Fund Transfer Department identified with her were reassigned or frozen. 8. She is listed as having resigned instead of being separated or dismissed which was what actually happened. 9. The dismissal was politically motivated, she being a sister of Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, wife of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. Executive Order No. 80 conferred upon the PNB the authority to reorganize. The order was issued by then Pres. Corazon Aquino on 3 December 1986 while she was exercising the powers vested in the President of the Philippines by the Freedom Constitution. After 3 December 1986, what remained to be done was the implementation of the reorganization. There is no doubt as to the legal basis for PNB's reorganization. The real question is: was it done in good faith, tested by the Dario v. Mison doctrine? To start with it is almost absurd for petitioner to insist that her termination from the service was antedated to 16 February 1986. At that time, the reorganization of PNB had not even been conceived. In most of PNB's pleadings, it has documented and supported its stand that the year of petitioner's separation is 1987 not 1986. The antedating of the termination date, aside from being clearly a typographical error, is a periphernal issue. The real issue is existence of bad faith consisting of tangible bureaucratic/management pressures exerted to ease her out of office. Bad faith has been defined as a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some 8 motive of self interest or ill will or for an ulterior purpose. It is the performance of an act with the knowledge that the actor is violating the fundamental law or right, even without willful intent to 9 injure or purposive malice to perpetrate a damnifying harm. PNB's reorganization, to repeat, was by virtue of a valid law. At the time of reorganization, due to the critical financial situation of the bank, departments, positions and functions were abolished or merged. The abolition of the Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was deemed necessary. This, to the Court's mind, was a management prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. At this point, a distinction can be made in ruling on the validity of a reorganization between a government bureau or office performing constituent functions (like the Customs) and a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions (like the PNB). Constituent function are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; ministrant functions are those undertaken by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. Commercial or universal banking is, ideally, not a governmental but a private sector, endeavor. It is an optional function of government. . . . The principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do those things which by its very, nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20) From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the

government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal characteristics of a private corporation under the Corporation Law. (Bacani vs. Nacoco, No, L-9657, November 29, 1956, 100 Phil. 468) But a reorganization whether in a government bureau performing constituent functions or in a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions must meet a common test, the test of good faith. In this connection, the philosophy behind PNB's reorganization is spelled out in the whereas clauses of Executive Order No. 80: WHEREAS, within the context of the general policy there nevertheless exists a clear role for direct government-participation in the banking system, particularly in servicing the requirements of agriculture, small and medium scale industry, export development, and the government sector. WHEREAS, in pursuit of this national policy there is need to restructure the government financial institutions, particularly the Philippine National Bank, to achieve a more efficient and effective use of available scarce resources, to improve its viability, and to avoid unfair competition with the private sector, and WHEREAS, the reorganization and rehabilitation of the Philippine National Bank into a similar but stronger and more operationally viable bank is an important component of the nationalization programs for both the financial system and the government corporation sector; . . . . Whether there was a hidden political agenda to persecute petitioner due to her consanguinial relation to Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the widow of former President Marcos, is not clearly shown. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that, precisely because of such consanguinial relation, petitioner may have been the object of deferential, if not special treatment under the Marcos regime. It is part of the Filipino culture to extend such deferential, if not special treatment to close relatives of persons in power. Many times this is carried to unwholesome extremes. But a discontinuance of such deferential or special treatment in the wake of a change in government or administration is not bad faith per se. It may be merely putting things in their proper places. Due to the restructuring and this is empirically verifiable PNB became once more a viable banking institution. The restoration of the FTD four years after it was abolished and its functions transferred to the International Department, can be attributed to the bank's growth after reorganizations, thereby negating malice or bad faith in that reorganization. The essence of 10 good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right. It consists of an honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another, its absence 11 should be established by convincing evidence. The records also clearly indicate that starting April 1986 to February 1987, petitioner went on leave of absence for medical reasons. While she was not reporting to the office, the bank's reorganization got underway. She continued, however, receiving her salaries, allowances, emoluments, honoraria and fees up to March 1987. Employees who were affected by the reorganization had the option to avail of the bank's Separation Benefits Plan/Early Retirement Plan (SBP/ERIP). Petitioner opted not to avail of such plan and instead submitted to the result of the bank's ongoing reorganization and management's discretion. If petitioner had the desire for continued employment with the bank, she could have asserted it for management's consideration. There is no proof on record that she affirmatively expressed willingness to be employed. Since she cannot rebut the CSC finding that her earliest appeal was made on 4

August 1989, there is no reason for this Court to hold that she did not sleep on her rights. On the contrary, her present argument that bad faith existed at the time of the abolition of the FTD because it was restored four years later is a little too late. Who could have predicted in 1986 or 1987 that PNB would be able to rise from its financial crisis and become a viable commercial bank again? The decision to abolish the FTD at the time it was abolished, to repeat, was a business judgment made in good faith. PNB for its part submits that its reorganization was effected in good faith because a) There was not only a perceptible but substantial restructuring of the PNB hierarchy showing reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices and abolition of positions. b) Two thousand one hundred thirty two (2,132) positions were abolished during the period from February 16, 1986 to January 14, 1987 leaving a lean workforce of five thousand four hundred five (5,405) as of latter date per B.R. No. 34 hereto attached as Annex "R". c) The number of senior officers, including Senior Vice Presidents, was accordingly reduced. Another issue raised by petitioner is PNB's alleged non-compliance with the mandate of Sections 2 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6656. These Sections provide: Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party. (a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof. xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Officers and employees holding permanent, appointments shall be given preference for appointment to the new position in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank. No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature. In the first place, Rep. Act No. 6656 cannot be invoked by petitioner because it took effect on 15 June 1987, or after PNB's reorganization had already been implemented. But assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it is applicable here and petitioner must be accorded preferential right to appointment in the bank, PNB in its rejoinder impressively asserts: Needless to say, there were various committees that were created in the implementation of the organizational restructuring of the Bank based on the foregoing policy guidelines. Each personnel to be retained was evaluated in terms of relative fitness and merit along with the other personnel of the Bank. Thus, when then SVP Federico Pascual was chosen to head the International Department from among other officers of the Bank, including Ms. Yap, his qualifications far exceeded those of the other candidates for the position. We attach hereto as Annexes "G-1" and "G-2" the service records of Mr. Federico Pascual and Petitioner Ms. Yap, respectively, which clearly show that the qualifications of Mr. Pascual far exceed those of Petitioner Yap. Aside from being a lawyer having been a law graduate from the University of the Philippines, he is also a Bachelor of Arts degree holder from Ateneo de Manila and a Master of Laws graduate o Columbia Law School. He had studied Masteral Arts in Public Administration at the London School of Economics and had undergone extensive seminars since 1974 at the International Department and had been assigned in several foreign branches of the Bank. Before he resigned from the Bank, he held the second highest position of Executive Vice President and served as Acting President of the Bank before the incumbent president, President Gabriel Singson assumed his position. On the other hand, the service record of Petitioner Yap will show that she only holds a Bachelor of Science in Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and has undergone only one seminar on Management and Leadersbip Training Program. She entered the Bank service in 1972. (Rollo at pp. 312 to 313) xxx xxx xxx The prayer in the petition at bar seeks petitioner's immediate reinstatement to her former position as senior vice president and head of the Fund Transfer Department, or reappointment to a position of comparable or equivalent rank without loss of seniority rights and pay, etc., under the bank's new staffing pattern.

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action for quo warranto (Rule 66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court). The petitioner therein must show a clear legal right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by 12 another. An action for quo warranto should be brought within one (1) year after ouster from office; the failure to institute the same within the reglementary period constitutes more than a sufficient 14 basis for its dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a public office be subjected to continued 15 uncertainty . . . An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure to file the action can be attributed to the acts of a responsible government officer and not of the dismissed 16 employee. Measured by the above jurisprudence, petitioner's action may be said to be one for quo warranto, seeking reinstatement to her former position which at present is occupied by another. 17 She cannot invoke De Tavera v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc., et. al. and contend that there is no claim of usurpation of office, and that quo warranto may be availed of to assert one's right to an office in the situation obtaining in the case at bar. Santos v. CA, et. al. and Magno v. PNNC Corp. are invoked by petitioner to illustrate that this action is one for separation without just cause, hence, the prescriptive period is allegedly 20 four (4) years in accordance with Article 1146 of the Civil Code. We do not agree. Petitioner's separation from the service was due to the abolition of her office in implementation of a valid reorganization. This is not the unjustifiable cause which results in injury to the rights of a person contemplated by Article 1146. The abolition of the office was not a whimsical, thoughtless move. 21 It was a thoroughly evaluated action for streamlining functions based on a rehabilitation plan. At the time of the abolition of the Fund Transfer Department in 1986, foreign exchange losses of 22 the bank amounted to P81.1 Million. The head of office was a Senior Vice President. At the time of restoration of the department in 1991, it was headed by a vice president (lower in rank) 23 and showed earnings of P2,620.0 Million. Other departments abolished in 1986 were also subsequently restored. Restoring petitioner to her previous position with backwages would be unjust enrichment to her, considering that she had abandoned or showed lack of interest in reclaiming the same position when the bank was not yet fully rehabilitated and she only insisted on reinstatement in August 1989 or two (2) years after her alleged unjustified separation. To those who feel that their unjustified separation from the service is for a cause beyond their control, the aforecited Magno case teaches: . . . while We fully recognize the special protection which the Constitution, labor laws, and social legislation accord the workingman, We cannot, however, alter or amend the law on prescription to relieve him of the consequences of his inaction. Vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt (Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping). His explanation that he could not have filed the complaint earlier because "he was prevented to do so beyond his control for the simple reason that private respondent have (sic) tried to circumvent the law by merely floating" him is very flimsy and does not even evoke sympathetic consideration, if at all it is proper and necessary. We note that petitioner herein is not an unlettered man; he seems to be educated and assertive of his rights and appears to be familiar with judicial procedures. He filed a motion for extension of time to file the petition and the petition itself without the assistance of counsel. We cannot believe that if indeed he had a valid
18 19 13

grievance against PNCC he would not have taken immediate positive steps for its redress. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed CSC resolution is AFFIRMED. The petition is DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of said CSC in rendering the questioned resolution. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.

About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed and makes the following assignment of errors: 1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the action taken by the former government. 2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being at present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros. 3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June 3, 1863, in these Island. 4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912, is unconstitutional. 5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given to it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands. 6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in the sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant. William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant. Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government in what manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed toward the donors. The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which reads: Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia. Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the sum of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between today and day after tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the credit of the establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third: That your Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board over $1090,000 which was deposited in the said treasury by order of your general Government, it having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. fifth: That in the straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to the Monte de Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any reason, either because of the failure of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the application to the needs of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. This is an urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the present crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and that of the other officials who have take part in the transaction. The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows: GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. MANILA, February 1, 1883. In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated that the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats the general Government that, in pursuance of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for any

reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient an institution; and in view of the report upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a much greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury; and Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated, and that the great and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is not granted, since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit of the Monte de Piedad; and Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting from the late calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained, for the funds in question are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this general Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as follows: First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands obtained from the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its needs may require, in installments of $20,000. Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution. Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the necessary papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de Piedad of having to suspend its operations may be averted. H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net (Signed) P. DE RIVERA. By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your

general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants, whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall identify themselves, without regard to their financial status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the relief board and your general Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General dated June 28, 1893, reads: Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines) Excellency. By Royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year 1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the rules specified in the said royal order, one of them being that before making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall be reduced to money. These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable institutions and another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the purposes desired (that is, for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way from that intended by the donors) and this Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of your general Government of the date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the (Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the delivery. On this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years during which it has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This Intendencia also supposed that the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far from investing it in beneficient transactions, it had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this operation being that the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated demands refused to return the money on the ground that only your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order the reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, the fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not

received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion of this Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the apportionment of the amount of the subscription raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation whatever could be made of funds derived from a private subscription raised for a specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and the names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it owes, and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency that the said pious establishment, during the last few days and after demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the general deposit funds. The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the Philippine Government or the Spanish Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad. In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883, $20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan, and without interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The abovementioned journal entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two account which on this date are united in accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these institutions, $95,000." On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status of the $80,000 and received the following reply: MANILA, March 31, 1902. To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands. SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this office as to when and for what purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be useful for the report which your office is called upon to furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have been consulted for the purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a reimbursable loan and without interest, twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with their own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12, April 14 and June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received and turned into their

funds a like sum of twenty thousand pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. (Signed) Emilio Moreta. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions. Manila, November 19, 1913 (Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI, Secretary (Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA, Managing Director. The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the Government of Spain and the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General, after reciting the substance of the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time the word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without interest, but that Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when considered in connection with the report of the Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the $80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and subscription account." Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely without foundation. Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:

The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and his deputy the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a charitable purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority, if not in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government though Christian, was not Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately maintained a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers. In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the American Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter to the Monte de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over such things would result in great inconvenience to the American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for the reason that it affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise thereof to a Government like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.) It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this regard; and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but became impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the contract has been cleared thereof. The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity founded by the donations for the earthquake sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first proposition has already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose the relief of the earthquake sufferers and for no other purpose. The money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including the King of Spain and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an institution under the control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as such and not in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine

Government, because the right to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was completely separated with the change of sovereignty. And in their supplemental brief counsel say: By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no time was the owner of the fund. Not being the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly never has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United States, as a Government, have accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change of sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force at the time there transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34) The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some other charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as they were necessary for the specific purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for which they were contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised these powers and duties through the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors.

It will this be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund. It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs. Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said: That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same public law that the great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701). Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. In Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said: The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave their Acts the same force and effect. In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:

When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae. Chancelor Kent says: In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508, note.) The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations, said: This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves. The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts, idiots, insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said: These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever. In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge & C. C., 417): Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.) It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this

Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined. The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future. As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature. In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of the old city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the old debt, said: The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities. In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and (c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was revived by Act No. 2109.

The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad in June, 1893, to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No. 2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year. Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels' theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after March 31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.) Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said: It is settled beyond doubt or controversy upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14 Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.) In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said: It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the King, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy, that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and servants. The principle is applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of the interests and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and thing over which the State has jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes. In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows: In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a

nature that the state must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party. In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the owner of such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B., 397].) These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable to the Philippine Government. Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor do they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine currency. For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur. Moreland, J., did not sign.

FERNANDO, J.:p The disputants in this appeal from a question of law from a lower court decision are the mother and the uncle of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued on the life of her deceased father. The dispute centers as to who of them should be entitled to act as trustee thereof. The lower court applying the appropriate Civil Code provisions decided in favor of the mother, the plaintiff in this case. Defendant uncle appealed. As noted, the lower court acted the way it did following the specific mandate of the law. In addition, it must have taken into account the principle that in cases of this nature the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It is not an unreasonable assumption that between a mother and an uncle, the former is likely to lavish more care on and pay greater attention to her. This is all the more likely considering that the child is with the mother. There are no circumstances then that did militate against what conforms to the natural order of things, even if the language of the law were not as clear. It is not to be lost sight of either that the judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State as parens patriae, with an even greater stress on family unity under the present Constitution, did weigh in the balance the opposing claims and did come to the conclusion that the welfare of the child called for the mother to be entrusted with such responsibility. We have to affirm. The appealed decision made clear: "There is no controversy as to the facts. " The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms 2 of the insurance policy. After trial duly had, the lower court in a decision of May 10, 1965, rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the proceeds of the policy in question to plaintiff. Its main reliance was on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give 3 a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." The latter states: "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under 4 whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives; ... Conformity to such explicit codal norm is apparent in this portion of the appealed decision: "The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is a minor under the custody and parental authority of the plaintiff, her mother. The said minor lives with plaintiff or lives in the company of the plaintiff. The said minor acquired this property by lucrative title. Said property, therefore, belongs to the minor child in ownership, and in usufruct to the plaintiff, her mother. Since under our law the usufructuary is entitled to possession, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the insurance proceeds. The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. 5 Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00." It is very clear, therefore, considering the above, that unless the applicability of the two cited Civil Code provisions can be disputed, the decision must stand. There is no ambiguity in the language employed. The words are rather clear. Their meaning is unequivocal. Time and time again, this Court has left no doubt that where codal or statutory norms are cast in categorical 6 language, the task before it is not one of interpretation but of application. So it must be in this case. So it was in the appealed decision.
1

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974 MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant. Seno, Mendoza & Associates for plaintiff-appellee. Emilio Benitez, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

1. It would take more than just two paragraphs as found in the brief for the defendant-appellant to blunt the force of legal commands that speak so plainly and so unqualifiedly. Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount, as mentioned at the outset, is the welfare of the child. It is in consonance with such primordial end that Articles 320 and 321 have been worded. There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle. Manresa, commenting on Article 159 of the Civil Code of Spain, the source of Article 320 of the Civil Code, was of that view: Thus "El derecho y la obligacion de administrar el Patrimonio de los hijos es una consecuencia natural y lgica de la patria potestad y de la presuncin de que nadie cuidar de los bienes de acqullos con mas cario y solicitude que los padres. En nuestro Derecho antiguo puede decirse que se hallaba reconocida de una manera indirecta aquelia doctrina, y asi se desprende de la sentencia del Tribunal Supremeo de 30 de diciembre de 1864, que se refiere a la ley 24, tit. XIII de la Partida 5. De la propia suerte aceptan en general dicho principio los Codigos extranjeros, con las limitaciones y requisitos de 8 que trataremos mis adelante." 2. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, as it did occur here, that family relations may press their respective claims. It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot 9 remain insensible to the validity of her plea. In a recent case, there is this quotation from an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State 10 shall strengthen the family as a basic social institution." If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did. WHEREFORE, the decision of May 10, 1965 is affirmed. Costs against defendant-appellant. Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur. Barredo, J., took no part.

According to the pleadings, the petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested in Camarines Sur in May, 1945, by the United States Army, and was interned, under a commitment order "for his active collaboration with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation," but in September, 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of Prisons. The legality of the prisoner's arrest and detention by the military authorities of the United States 1 is now beyond question. His present incarceration, which is merely continuation of his previous apprehension, has lasted "more than six hours" counted from his delivery to the respondent; but section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 provides in part as follows: Upon delivery by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines of the persons detained by him as political prisoners, to the Commonwealth Government, the Office of Special Prosecutors shall receive all records, documents, exhibits, and such other things as the Government of the United States may have turned over in connection with and/or affecting said political prisoners, examine the aforesaid records, documents, exhibits, etc., and take, as speedily as possible, such action as maybe proper: Provided, however, . . .. And, provided, further, That, in the interest of public security, the provisions of article one hundred twenty-five of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be deemed, as they are hereby, suspended, insofar as the aforesaid political prisoners are concerned, until the filing of the corresponding information with the People's Court, but the period of suspension shall not be more than six (6) months from the formal delivery of said political prisoners by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines to the Commonwealth Government. In view of the provision, and the statement of the Solicitor General that even on the date the petition was presented his office had, ready for filing, an information charging herein petitioner with treason, we fail to see how petitioner's release may now be decreed. However, he contends that the aforesaid section violates our Constitution, because it is (a) discriminatory in nature; (b) unlawful delegation of legislative powers; and (c) retroactive in operation. (a) It is first argued that the suspension is not general in application, it being made operative only to "the political prisoners concerned," that other citizens are not denied the six-hour limitation in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, that such discrimination is unexcusable and amounts to denial of the equal protection of the laws. It is accepted doctrine in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall 2 operate so long as the classification is not unreasonable. Instances of valid classification are numerous. The point to be determined then, is whether the differentiation in the case of the political prisoner is unreasonable or arbitrary. One of the proclamations issued by General MacArthur upon his arrival in Leyte (December 29, 1944) referred to those Filipino citizens who had voluntarily given aid, comfort and sustenance to the Japanese. It announced his purpose to to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war, "whereafter they shall be turned over to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their respective cases." When active hostilities with Japan terminated, General MacArthur ordered the delivery of the Commonwealth of all the prisoners theretofore taken under his said proclamation. There was 6,000 in round numbers. The problem problem was momentous and urgent. Criminal informations against all, or a majority, or even a substantial number of them could not be properly filed in the six-hour period. They could not obviously be turned loose, considering the conditions of peace and order, and the safety of the prisoners themselves. So the President, by

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-200 March 28, 1946

ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, as Director of Prisons, respondent. Sulpicio V. Cea for petitioner. First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr. for respondent. Arturo A. Alafriz as amicus curiae. BENGZON, J.: Anastacio Laurel demands his release form Bilibid Prison, mainly asserting that Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating the People's Court, specially section 19, under which he is detained as a political prisoner, is unconstitutional and void. The Solicitor General, meeting the issue, sustains the validity of the whole law.

virtue of his emergency powers, promulgated Executive Order No. 65 suspending article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, for not more than thirty days, with regard to said detainees or internees, having found such suspension necessary to "enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to adopt temporary measures in relation with their custody and the investigation, prosecution and disposal of their respective cases." The Order added that it shall be in force and effect until the Congress shall provide otherwise. Congress later approved Commonwealth Act. No. 682, establishing the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors for the prosecution and trial of crimes against national security committed during the second World War. It found the thirty-day period too short compared with the facilities available to the prosecution, and set the limit at six months. Considering the circumstances, we are not prepared to hold the extension of the period for the political detainees was unreasonable. The Legislature chose to give the prosecutor's office sufficient time to investigate and to file the proper charge or to discharge those whom it may find innocent. If time had not been granted, the prosecutor would perhaps have been forced to indict all the detainees indiscriminately; reserving, of course, its right subsequently to request the liberation of those it may think not guilty. But such wholesale indictment was obviously neither practical nor desirable. We will allow that there may be some dispute as to the wisdom or adequacy of the extension. Yet the point is primarily for the Legislature to decide. The only issue is the power to promulgate special rules for the custody and investigation of active collaborationists, and so long as reasons exist in support of the legislative action courts should be careful not to deny it. In this connection, it must be stated there can really be no substantial ground to assail the sixmonth extension, in view of the provisions authorizing the release under bail. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on bail. Commonwealth Act No. 682 gives no occasion to such abuse. The political prisoners know, or ought to know, they are being kept for crimes against national security. And they are generally permitted to furnish bail bonds. (b) There is hardly any merit to the argument that as "the duration of the suspension of article 125 is placed in the hands of the Special Prosecutor's Office," the section constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative powers; for as explained by the Solicitor-General, the result some informations filed before, others afterwards is merely the "consequence of the fact that six thousand informations could not be filed simultaneously, and that some one had to be first or some one else, necessarily the last." The law, in effect, permitted the Solicitor-General to file the informations within six months. And statutes permitting officers to perform their duties within certain periods of time may not surely be declared invalid delegations of legislative power. (c) Nor is the position correct that section 19 is retroactive in its operation. It refers to detention after its passage not before. Incidentally, there is no constitutional objection to retroactive 3 statutes where they relate, to remedies or procedure. The argument is advanced that when he was arrested, (May, 1945), article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, and petitioner could have asked for release after six hours and, therefore, Commonwealth Act No. 682 that takes away that right is ex post facto, retroactive and fundamentally objectionable. The premises are incorrect. In May, 1945, he could not have asked for release after six hours. In other words, he would not have been discharged from the custody. (Raquiza vs. Branford, supra.) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was in force, it is true; but not as to him. The laws of the Commonwealth were revived in Camarines Sur by operation of General MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944, upon its liberation from enemy control; but subject to his reservation to hold active collaborationists in restraint "for the duration of the war." So, persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable collaboration, could not necessarily invoke the benefits of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Undoubtedly the Legislature could validly repeal section 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Had it done so, herein petitioner would have no ground to protest on constitutional principles, as he 4 could claim no vested right to the continued enforcement of said section. Therefore, a fortiori he may not complain, if, instead of repealing that section, our lawmaking body merely suspended its operation for a definite period of time. Should he counter that such repeal or suspension must be general to be valid, he will be referred to the preceding considerations regarding classification and the equal protection of the laws. Wherefore, we perceive no irreconcilable conflict between the Constitution and the challenged portions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682. The other features of the People's Court Act which are the subject of denunciation by petitioner do not, in our opinion, require specific elucidation at this time, because he has not as yet been held into that court, and the issues appear to have no important or necessary connection with his 5 current deprivation of liberty. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus will be denied. With costs. Moran, C.J., Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Victoriano Dinglasan, and the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court Martial be ordered certified to this court for review. The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed. In their memorandum they have raised an additional question of law that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional. An outline of the petitioner's previous connection with the Philippine Army, the Philippine Constabulary, and/or with guerrilla organizations will presently be made. This outline is based on allegations in the petition and the answer, and on exhibits attached thereto and to the parties' memoranda, exhibits which were offered in the course of the oral argument and admitted without objection. The said exhibits are public documents certified by the officials who had them in custody in their official capacity. They are presumed to be authentic, as we have no doubt they are. It appears that at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon Ruffy was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary garrison stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L. Garcia, the last then a civilian joined Major Ruffy's organization towards the latter part of 1942, while Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan, then likewise civilians, became its members some time in 1943.. Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant colonel of the Philippine Army, also took to the hills of Panay and led the operation of the 6th Military District, one of the districts into which the Philippine Army had been divided before the war. About November, 1942, Colonel Peralta succeeded in contacting the General Headquarters of General MacArthur in Australia as the result of which on February 13, 1943, the 6th Military District was recognized by the Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area as a military unit and part of its command. Even before General MacArthur's recognition of the 6th Military District Colonel Peralta had extended its sphere of operation to comprise Mindoro and Marinduque, and had, on January 2, 1943, named Major Ruffy as Acting Commander for those two provinces and Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 66 Infantry 61st Division, Philippine Corps. After the recognition, 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco, by virtue of Special Orders No. 99, dated November 2, 1943, and signed by Enrique L. Jurado, Major, OSE, Commanding, was assigned as S-3 in the Bolo Area. Major, later Lieut. Col., Jurado, it should be noted, had been dispatched by the 6th Military District to Mindoro to assume operational control supervision over the Bolo Area unit and to make and direct the necessary report to the Headquarters, 6th Military District, in Panay. On April 26, 1944, by General Orders No. 40 of the 6th Military District, 2d Lieutenant Francisco was promoted to the rank of 1st Lieutenant (Brevet), effective April 15, 1944, subject to approval by the President of the Philippines, and was re-assigned to the Bolo Area. As to Andres Fortus he was assigned to the same Bolo Area as probationary 3d lieutenant for two-month probationary training, by the Headquarters of the 6th Military District, as per Special Orders No. 70, dated May 15, 1944. According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, 6th Military District, dated January 1943, and signed by L.R. Relunia, Lieut. Col., CE, Chief of Staff, Jose L. Garcia and Dominador Adeva were appointed 3d lieutenants, infantry as of December 31, 1942. Garcia later was promoted to the rank of captain, effective March 15, 1943, as per Special Orders No. 82, issued in the field, 6th Military District, and dated August 28, 1943. On May 24, 1943, Jose L. Garcia took his oath

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946

RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents. Placido C. Ramos for petitioners. Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro and Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, JAGS, PA., for respondents. TUASON, J.: This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another,

before Captain Esteban P. Beloncio, then Acting Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment, 61st Division, 6th Military District. As has been said, the 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. Jurado to be Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro and to undertake other missions of Military character. Pursuant to instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943, assigned Major Ruffy as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador Adeva and 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco as members of his staff and Victoriano Dinglasan as Finance Officer, as per Special Orders No. 99 dated November 2, 1943. In a memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major Ruffy bearing date 25 June, 1944, it was stated that Captain Garcia had been given P5,000 for palay and Lieut. Francisco P9,000, P5,000 for palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B. Company. A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged, seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now being contested. On July 26, 1941, the President of the Untied States issued a military order the pertinent paragraph of which stated: ". . . as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States Army, for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of the general officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War, from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth." Following the issuance of President Roosevelt's order General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East. It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that "by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence of the Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent occupation." The paragraph quoted in the petitioner's memorandum from Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents and the subsequent paragraph which has been omitted furnish a complete answer to petitioner's contention of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine Army did not cease to be fully in the service, though in a measure,' only in a measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were not active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a breach of the discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty, or disobedience of orders, or mutiny, or subject to a military trial therefor; but for an act unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which constitutes an offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of War, they may in general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial. "So a prisoner of war, though not subject, while held by the enemy, to the discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged of paroled, be not exempt from liability for such offenses as criminal acts or injuriuos conduct committed during his captivity against other officers or soldiers in the same status." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, pp. 91, 92.) The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should readily manifest itself. Under the petitioner's theory the forces of resistance operating in an occupied territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own

existence. They would be stripped of the very life-blood of an army, the right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof. The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does not profit the petitioner's who were former members of the Philippine Constabulary any more than does the rule of war or international law they cite. The fall of Bataan and Corregidor did not end the war. It did not, legally or otherwise, keep the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines from organizing a new army, regular or irregular, out of new men and men in the old service who had refused to surrender or who having surrendered, had decided to carry on the fight through other diverse means and methods. The fall of Corregidor and Bataan just marked the beginning of the gigantic preparation for the gigantic drive that was to fight its way to and beyond the Philippines in fulfillment of General MacArthur's classic promise, "I shall return." The heroic role which the guerrillas played in that preparation and in the subsequent liberation of the Philippines is now history. Independently of their previous connection with the Philippine Army and the Philippine Constabulary, Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus as well as Major Garcia and Lieutenant Adeva were subject to military jurisdiction. The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to military law as follows: Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles: (a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to obey the same; (b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants; (c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to these articles; (d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial. It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the general application of the clause in subparagraph (a); "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contigent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies and funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army. The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect the military status of guerrillas who had been called into the service of the Philippine Army. If the invaders refused to look upon guerrillas, without distinctions, as legitimate troops, that did not stop the guerillas who

had been inducted into the service of the Philippine Army from being component parts thereof, bound to obey military status of guerrillas was to be judged not by the concept of the army of the country for which they fought. The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article ordains "that any person subject to military law who commits murder in time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment is for life imprisonment or death", it violates Article VIII, section 2, paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which provides that "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority for their creation. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for the government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as follows: "These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of each other." "Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the British law: "It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army." (Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition.) Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it should be dismissed with costs. It is so ordered. Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla, JJ., concur.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXIX, at San Pablo City, finding Perfecto Coronado guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, and Angel Coronado guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as an accomplice, of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Perfecto Coronado guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal and accused Angel Coronado guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice of the crime of murder, and there being no circumstance to appreciate either for or against the accused, the accused Perfecto Coronado is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua; the accused Angel Coronado is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal Angel Coronado shall be entitled to full credit for the time he was under preventive imprisonment. Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. Only Perfecto Coronado appealed from the decision of the trial court. The appellant raised the following assignments of errors: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS CONVICTION ON MATTERS TAKEN JUDICIAL NOTICE OF WHICH ARE IMPROPER FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED. II ON ACCOUNT OF THE ERRONEOUS 'FACT' JUDICIALLY NOTICED, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO ACCUSED'S CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ACCUSED TO HAVE BEEN AT THE PLACE WHERE THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED AT THE TIME OF ITS COMMISSION. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IdENTIFIED AS THE ASSAILANT OF ANDRES BARBA. IV THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE TESTIMONY ARE NOT CREDIBLE. It is not disputed that Andres Barba was killed by a gunshot wound on January 16, 1979, at around 9:00 p.m. in Bo. Kanluran Lasaan, Nagcarlan, Laguna. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p The evidence for the prosecution reveals that on the above date and time, Leonardo de Vera was in the second floor of the house of Simplicio Urriza, his father-in-law, in Barangay Kanluran

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-68932 October 28, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PERFECTO CORONADO and ANGEL CORONADO, accused-appellants. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Victor P. Lazatin counsel de oficio for accused-appellants.

Lasaan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, resting by the window. From where he was resting, he saw two men emerge from underneath the house of Ador Bituin which was only 13 meters away from Simplicio Urriza's house. Since it was a moonlit night, he recognized the two men to be Perfecto Coronado and Angel Coronado. Both men carried long firearms and headed toward the back of Simplicio Urriza's house. Perfecto went to the direction of the ceramic wall of the house while Angel positioned himself under a lucban tree. De Vera saw Perfecto cock his rifle and then aim it towards the house. Recalling that the two men were known to have a grudge against Andres Barba, who was in the ground floor of the house, De Vera thought of warning him but while going down the house he heard the sound of gunfire from the rear of the house. He beamed his flashlight at the place and saw Perfecto run, followed by Angel, towards the west. At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, on the same date, Pedro Advincula was also in the house of Simplicio Urriza at Bo. Kanluran Lasaan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, upon invitation of Andres Barba and the latter's wife to attend a wedding the following day. After eating their supper, he, together with Faustino Coronado and Andres Barba, imbibed some lambanog up to about 9:00 o'clock in the evening. Advincula then asked permission to leave and went to the barangay hall which is about five to six meters away from the house of Simplicio Urriza. While he was inside the barangay hall, he saw Perfecto Coronado and Angel Coronado, both carrying long firearms, emerge from underneath the house of Ador Bituin and proceed towards the rear of the house of Simplicio Urriza. Advincula became suspicious and hastened to warn Andres Barba but just as he entered the house of Simplicio Urriza he heard the loud report of a gun from the rear of the same house. He went to the rear door of the house and brought into focus his flashlight outside and saw Perfecto Coronado running towards the west followed by Angel Coronado. He then saw Andres Barba slumped on the table, where earlier they had been drinking, with blood oozing from his face. Advincula told Lydia Barba of what he saw but he kept silent on the matter when the policemen arrived to interrogate witnesses because he, Lydia Barba, and Leonardo de Vera had agreed that the death of Andres Barba would be avenged since the latter's family did not have money to prosecute the accused. However, three weeks after the incident, he and Leonardo de Vera went to the Fiscal at Nagcarlan, Laguna, where he gave his statement concerning the shooting of Andres Barba. Lydia Barba, the widow of the deceased, testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 16, 1979, she was on the upper floor of the house of Simplicio Urriza at Kanluran Lasaan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with Leonardo de Vera and others. She heard a loud shot from behind the house. She then went to the ground floor of the house with Leonardo de Vera and saw her husband Andres Barba slumped on the table with blood oozing from his temple. She spent P10,000.00 for the funeral and wake expenses. Pedro Advincula told her that he saw the person who shot her husband but they agreed not to tell the police about it and instead wait for the time to avenge the death of her husband. Later, she was persuaded to bring the case to the authorities. On the other hand, the appellant interposed alibi as his principal defense. Alibi is also the primary argument raised in this appeal. Coronado maintained that it could not be possible for him and his son Angel to be physically present in Kanluran Lasaan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 16, 1979. According to him, he and his son Angel were in the house of his sister-in-law Celia Fernandez at Victoria, Laguna, on January 16, 1979. At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the same date, he, together with his wife and son Angel, was accompanied by Celia Fernandez to the home of judge Perlez to seek legal advice concerning the problem of his son Angel. They left the house of Judge Perlez at 8:30 o'clock in the evening and went back to the house of Celia Fernandez arriving thereat at 9:00 p.m. where they spent the night. At 5:00 a.m. the following day, they left for Nagcarlan and arrived at their place in Kanluran Lasaan at 8:30 a.m. Appellant's testimony that he and his son Angel were accompanied by Celia Fernandez to the house of Judge Perlez at about 7:30 p.m. on January 16, 1979, and left the latter's house at 8:30 p.m. was corroborated by Celia Fernandez and Judge Leonides Perlez.

Judge Perlez testified further that he used to travel between Victoria and Nagcarlan by jeep and the trip between these two towns, taking the shorter route via Calumpang road, takes about 45 minutes or more, as the road by that time was not very good. (Tsn, Nov. 17, 1981, p. 13). On cross-examination, this witness admitted that before January 16, 1979, a portion of the road going to Nagcarlan passing through Calumpang was already cemented. (Tsn, Nov. 17, 1981, p. 22). It has been the consistent view of this Court that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy of fabrication. (People v. Ragas, 44 SCRA 152; People v. Mar; 55 SCRA 382; People v. Dereje, 56 SCRA 554; and People v. Zapatero, 58 SCRA 450). For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere when the crime was committed but that he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. (People v. Benaraba, 129 SCRA 266; People v. Esmael, 37 SCRA 601; People v. Diaz, 55 SCRA 178; People v. Turalba, 55 SCRA 697; People v. Baylon, 57 SCRA 114; and People v. Cortez, 57 SCRA 308). In the instant case, granting that the appellant was really in the house of Perlez at 7:30 p.m. and left exactly one hour later, we cannot disregard the possibility that the appellant and his son could have been physically present at the scene of the crime. The distance between Victoria and Nagcarlan, according to the trial court is only 30 'kilometers. Portions of the road had already been paved with concrete and could easily be negotiated within thirty minutes. It is of common knowledge that traffic in the provinces at night is quite light. Seldom can there be more than two or three vehicles cruising together along provincial highways from 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Moreover, the guilt or innocence of the appellant does not depend alone on whether or not public transportation and walking on foot were used to return home. More important is whether or not they were really in Victoria at the time stated in their alibi. The defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility. It depends greatly on the credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it. In this respect, the relative weight which the trial judge assigns to the testimonies of the witnesses, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on the record, must be accepted. (People v. Berdiba, 17 SCRA 520). Evidence was presented by the prosecution to show that in the early evening of January 16, the appellant was in Kanluran Lasaan. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification of prosecution witnesses. (People v. Manalo, 135 SCRA 84; People v. Nepomuceno, 136 SCRA 556; People v. Jones, 137 SCRA 166; People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 24; People v. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141; People v. Sinaw-ay, 138 SCRA 221; and People v. Gani, 139 SCRA 301). The appellant was distinctly and positively Identified by eyewitnesses. It is also argued by the appellant that the conduct of the eyewitnesses in concealing the truth when investigated by the police for the reason that they preferred to take their revenge against the assailants instead of prosecuting them in accordance with law is a clear indication that they had the propensity and capacity to obstruct justice. Their desire for vengeance prevented the accused from proving his innocence by a paraffin test which could have established that he did not fire any firearm. Due to this conspiracy to conceal the truth and their belated identification, he states that their testimony should not be given credence. This contention is without merit. The failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime they had witnessed should not be taken against them. It is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. (People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158). It is also not uncommon for some people, especially in rural areas to prefer more "summary" solutions than lengthy and expensive trials, solutions such as ambushing the assailants or calling on dissident bands to dispense "justice" in their villages.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is increased to THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00). Costs against the appellant. SO ORDERED. Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

necessaries as defined in section 1 of Act No. 9 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, was prosecuted for the crime of robbery as defined and penalized by section 2 (a) of Act No. 65 of the same Assembly. He was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August 21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial was the summary one established in Chapter II of Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of the United States of America, and therefore, null and void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No. 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that the petitioner herein is being punished by a law created to serve the political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code." The Solicitor General, in his answer in behalf of the respondent, states that, in his own opinion, for the reasons expressed in his brief in the case of People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Benedicto Jose y Santos, defendant-appellee, G. R. No. L-22 (p. 612, post), the acts and proceedings taken and had before the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which resulted in the conviction and imprisonment of the herein petitioner, should now be denied force and efficacy, and therefore the petition for habeas corpus should be granted. The reasons advanced by the Solicitor General in said brief and in his reply memorandum in support of his contention are, that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the summary procedure prescribed therefor, by said Ordinance No. 7 in connection with Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the Executive Commission are tinged with political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the Constitutional rights of accused persons under their legitimate Constitution. And he cites, in support of this last proposition, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of Texas vs. White (7 Wall., 700, 743); Horn vs. Lockart (17 Wall., 570, 581); United States vs. Home Insurance Co. (22 Wall., 99, 104); Sprott vs. United States (20 Wall., 459). The City Fiscal of Manila appeared before this Court as amicus curiae. In his memorandum he submits that the petition for habeas corpus be denied on the following grounds: That the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the Acts, Ordinances and Executive Orders, creating it are not of a political complexion, for said Court was created, and the crimes and offenses placed under its jurisdiction were penalized heavily, in response to an urgent necessity, according to the preamble of Ordinance No. 7; that the right to appeal in a criminal case is not a constitutional right; and that the summary procedure established in said Ordinance No. 7 is not violative of the provision of Article III, section 1 (18) of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, to the effect that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor of the provision of section 1 (1) of the same Article that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The features of the summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, assailed by the petitioner and the Solicitor General as impairing the constitutional rights of an accused are: that court may interrogate the accused and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it appears that the defendant is guilty, he

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-49 November 12, 1945

WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. William F. Peralta in his own behalf. Office of the Solicitor General Taada for respondent. City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curiae. FERIA, J.: Petitioner-defendant, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of Manila charged with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of goods and other

may be immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the Supreme Court composed of three Justices. Before proceeding further, and in order to determine the law applicable to the questions involved in the present case, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature and status of the government established in these Islands by the Japanese forces of occupation under the designation of Republic of the Philippines. In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, pp. 113, 127, ante), recently decided, this Court, speaking through the Justice who pens this decision, held: In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippines Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tanpico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "the government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (vol. 2 p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals is of no consequence. And speaking of the so-called Republic of the Philippines in the same decision, this Court said: The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the peoples" will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.' Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government of the second kind (of paramount force), as the government established in Castine, Maine, during its occupation by the British forces and as that of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with that the country by the United State Army, the question involved in the present case cannot be decided in the light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government; because the belligerent occupant was totally independent of the constitution of the occupied territory in carrying out the administration over said territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases involving the validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States, considered as de facto governments of the third kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Republic of

the Philippines which is a de facto government of paramount force. The Constitution of the socalled Republic of the Philippines can neither be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. In the case of United States vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 246), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, by the military occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the United States in the territory was, of course, suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest and must be promoted under all circumstances or conditions. (Vol. II, Sixth Edition, Revised, 1944, p. 342.) The doctrine laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States (in the cases of Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700; Horn vs. Lockart, 17 Wall., 570; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U. S., 176 United States vs. Home Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 249; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459, and others) that the judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate States which impaired the rights of the citizens under the Constitution of the United States or of the States, or were in conflict with those constitutions, were null and void, is not applicable to the present case. Because that doctrine rests on the propositions that "the concession (of belligerency) made to the Confederate Government . . . sanctioned no hostile legislation . . . and it impaired in no respect the rights of loyal and citizens as they existed at the commencement of hostilities" (Williams vs. Bruffy, supra);that the Union is perpetual and indissoluble, and the obligation of allegiance to the to the estate and obedience to her laws and the estate constitution, subject to the Constitution of the United States, remained unimpaired during the War of Secession (Texas vs. White, supra) and that the Confederate States "in most, if not in all instances, merely transferred the existing state organizations to the support of a new and different national head. the same constitution, the same laws for the protection of the property and personal rights remained and were administered by the same officers." (Sprott vs. United States, supra). In fine, because in the case of the Confederate States, the constitution of each state and that of the United States or the Union continued in force in those states during the War of Secession; while the Constitution of the Commonwealth Government was suspended during the occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces of the belligerent occupant at regular war with the United States. The question which we have to resolve in the present case in the light of the law of nations are, first, the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court; secondly, the validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; and thirdly, if they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. (1) As to the validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the only factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or ordinance. It is well established in International Law that "The criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted either through special tribunals, whose authority and procedure is defined in the military code of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and authorities of the occupied district." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a governmental

instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a governmental agency charged with the duty of applying the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be of political complexion, or not depending upon the nature or character of the law so applied. There is no room for doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question. With respect to the Summary procedure adopted by Ordinance No. 7, and followed in the trial of the case which resulted in the conviction of the herein petitioner, there is also no question as to the power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the summary punishment of any one doing such acts." (Hall's International Law, seventh ed., p. 5000). A belligerent "occupant may where necessary, set up military courts instead of the ordinary courts; and in case, and in so far as, he admits the administration of justice by the ordinary courts, he may nevertheless, so far as is necessary for military purposes, or for the maintenance of public order and safety temporarily alter the laws, especially the Criminal Law, on the basis of which justice is administered as well as the laws regarding procedure." (Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. II, sixth edition, 1944, p.349.) No objection can be set up to the legality of its provisions in the light of the precepts of our Commonwealth Constitution relating to the rights of accused under that Constitution, because the latter was not in force during the period of the Japanese military occupation, as we have already stated. Nor may said Constitution be applied upon its revival at the time of the reoccupation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminium because "a constitution should operate prospectively only, unless the words employed show a clear intention that it should have a retrospective effect" (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 97, and cases quoted and cited in the footnote), especially as regards laws of procedure applied to cases already terminated completely. The only restrictions or limitations imposed upon the power of a belligerent occupant to alter the laws or promulgate new ones, especially the criminal law as well as the laws regarding procedure, so far as it is necessary for military purposes, that is, for his control of the territory and the safety and protection of his army, are those imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. It is obvious that the summary procedure under consideration does not violate those precepts. It cannot be considered as violating the laws of humanity and public conscience, for it is less objectionable, even from the point of view of those who are used to the accusatory system of criminal procedure than the procedural laws based on the semi-inquisitorial or mixed system prevailing in France and other countries in continental Europe. (2) The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction which imposes life imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65 which punishes the crime of which said petitioner was convicted. Westlake says that Article XLIII, Section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 "indicates that the laws to be enforced by the occupant consist of, first, the territorial law in general, as that which stands to the public order and social and commercial life of the district in a relation of mutual adaptation, so that any needless displacement of it would defeat the object which the invader is enjoined to have in view, and secondly, such variations of the territorial law as may be required by real necessity and are not expressly prohibited by any of the rules which will come before us. Such variations will naturally be greatest in what concerns the relation of the communities and individuals within the district to the invading army and its followers, it being necessary for the protection of the latter, and for the unhindered prosecution of the war by them, that acts

committed to their detriment shall not only lose what justification the territorial law might give them as committed against enemies, but shall be repressed more severely than the territorial law would repress acts committed against fellow subjects. Indeed the entire relation between the invaders and the invaded, so far as it may fall within the criminal department whether by the intrinsic nature of the acts done or in consequence of the regulations made by the invaders, may be considered as taken out of the territorial law and referred to what is called martial law." (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, p. 96.) According to Hyde (International Law, Vol. II, p. 386), the term "martial law," in so far as it is used to describe any fact in relation to belligerent occupation, does not refer to a particular code or system of law, or to a special agency entrusted with its administration. The term merely signifies that the body of law actually applied, having the sanction of military authority, is essentially martial. All law, by whomsoever administered, in an occupied district martial law; and it is none the less so when applied by civil courts in matters devoid of special interest to the occupant. The words "martial law" are doubtless suggestive of the power of the occupant to share the law as he sees fit; that is, to determine what shall be deemed lawful or unlawful acts, to establish tests for ascertaining the guilt of offenders, to fix penalties, and generally to administer justice through such agencies as the found expedient. And the United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such new laws and regulations as military necessity demands, and in this class will be included those laws which come into being as a result of military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the protection of the army, for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading army and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. (Pub. 1940, pp. 76, 77.) From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. The criminal acts penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order that, in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did, and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and subsistence (Art. LII, Sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country. The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 as well as the crimes against national security and the law of nations, to wit: treason, espionage, inciting war, violation of neutrality, correspondence

with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, piracy; and the crimes against public order, such as rebellion, sedition and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms and other, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and placed under jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are all of a political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. While it is true that these offenses, when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government, are defined and also penalized by the territorial law Revised Penal Code, they became inapplicable as crimes against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese forces. And they had to be taken out of the territorial law and made punishable by said Ordinance No. 7, for they were not penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the belligerent occupant or the government established by him in these Island. They are also considered by some writers as war crimes in a broad sense. In this connection Wheaton observes the following: "Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite, depending as they do on the acts from time to time ordered to be done or forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the invading or occupying commander. Thus, in the Anglo-Boer war, the British military authorities proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law; Being in possession of arms, ammunition, etc.; traveling without a permit; sending prohibited goods; holding meetings other than those allowed; using seditious language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for goods; wearing uniforms without due authority; going out of doors between certain hours; injuring military animals or stores; being in possession, without a permit, of horses, vehicles, cycles, etc.; hindering those in execution of military orders; trespassing on defense works. Such offenses, together with several others, were specified in the Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war." (Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 242.) It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted. (3) The last question is the legal effect of the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government; that is whether or not, by the principle of postliminy, the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fell through or ceased to be valid from that time. In order to resolve this last question, it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on the matter. It is sufficient to quote the opinion on the subject of several international jurists and our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra. Hall, commenting on the effect of the principle of postliminy upon sentences of the tribunals continued or created by the belligerent occupant, opines "that judicial acts done under this control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. . . . Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course, whether they introduce any positive change into the organization of the country, or whether they only suspend the working of that already in existence. The execution also of punitive sentences ceases as of course when they have had reference to acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state, such for example as acts directed against the security or control of the invader." (Hall's International Law, seventh edition, p. 518.)

Westlake, speaking of the duration of the validity of punitive sentences for offenses such as the one in question, which is within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to punish, says that: "To the extent to which the legal power of the occupant is admitted he can make law for the duration of his occupation. Like any other legislator he is morally subject to the duty of giving sufficient notice of his enactments or regulations, not indeed so as to be debarred from carrying out his will without notice, when required by military necessity and so far as practically carrying out his will can be distinguished from punishment, but always remembering that to punish for breach of a regulation a person who was justifiably ignorant of it would be outrageous. But the law made by the occupant within his admitted power, whether morally justifiable or not, will bind any member of the occupied population as against any other member of it, and will bind as between them all and their national government, so far as it produces an effect during the occupation. When the occupation comes to an end the authority of the national government is restored, either by the progress of operations during the war or by the conclusion of a peace, no redress can be had for what has been actually carried out but nothing further can follow from the occupant's legislation. A prisoner detained under it must be released, and no civil right conferred by it can be further enforced. The enemy's law depends on him for enforcement as well as for enactment. The invaded state is not subject to the indignity of being obliged to execute his commands. (Westlake, International Law, Part II, War, pp. 97, 98.) And Wheaton, who, as above stated, considers as war crimes such offenses as those penalized in Ordinance No. 7 and Act No. 65, says: "In general, the cast of the occupant possess legal validity, and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent government. But this rule does not necessarily apply to acts that exceed the occupant's power (e.g., alienation of the domains of the State or the sovereign), to sentences for 'war treason' and 'war crimes,' to acts of a political character, and to those that beyond the period of occupation. When occupation ceases, no reparation is legally due for what has already been carried out." (Wheaton's International Law, supra, p. 245.) We have already held in our recent decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all judgments of political complexion of the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the present case, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur. It may not be amiss to say in this connection that it is not necessary and proper to invoke the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur declaring null and void all laws, among them Act No. 65, of the so-called Republic of the Philippines under which petitioner was convicted, in order to give retroactive effect to the nullification of said penal act and invalidate sentence rendered against petitioner under said law, a sentence which, before the proclamation, had already become null and of no effect. We therefore hold that the punitive sentence under consideration, although good and valid during the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, ceased to be good and valid ipso facto upon the reoccupation of these Island and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government. In view of all the foregoing, the writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby granted and it is ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur. Moran, C.J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 183752

October 14, 2008

CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008

THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary. respondents. x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and dulyappointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, st HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1 Congressional District, HON. rd CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3 Congressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING

PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x

MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x DECISION

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention. CARPIO MORALES, J.: x--------------------------------------------x SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-intervention, x--------------------------------------------x THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention. x-------------------------------------------x RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the 2 peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRPMILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the 1 manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the 4 GRP. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF 5 thereafter suspended all its military actions. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's 6 position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the 9 Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and
8 7

to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOAAD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the 10 MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for 11 12 Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the City of Zamboanga, Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void. By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the 13 MOA-AD. The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners 14 15 the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD, to which she complied. Meanwhile, the City of Iligan filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis 18 Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for 19 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD. On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition 20 for Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal. Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former 21 Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela and Mayor 22 Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the 23 Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte, Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention. By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies. Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.
17 16

The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic (i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and (ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments 24 of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time. III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-inintervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA. The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF. Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos. The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous 26 25 Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), and several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others. The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device." During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or 27 ineffective. This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of nations. As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and intergovernmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving nonMuslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though 28 not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ulmua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties 29 which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."

The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body. The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and 30 their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses. Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only 31 "Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is 32 vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public 33 domain. The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state 34 in the modern sense. The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each 35 ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the 36 plural "First Nations." To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term. The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the 37 Bangsamoro. B. TERRITORY

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the 38 atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte 39 that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following 40 the signing of the MOA-AD. Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a 41 separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact. The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the 42 coastline of the BJE area; that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, 43 authority and management over all natural resources. Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint." The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and 44 economic cooperation agreement. The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety 45 measures. There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE. C. RESOURCES The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression 46 against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or 47 between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central

Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by 48 both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources. The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to 49 natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is 50 to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties. The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted 51 by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM. D. GOVERNANCE The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in 52 any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact. The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision. The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact. As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of 53 the negotiating panels. In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign

Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008. Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY. IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES A. RIPENESS The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue 55 advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not 56 intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and 57 enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is 58 submitted for judicial determination. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect 59 on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a 60 court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate 61 or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act 62 complained of. The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x xxxx In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)
54

The Solicitor General cites

63

the following provisions of the MOA-AD: TERRITORY

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led 68 under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face. That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in 69 New York v. United States, decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to 70 avoid the provision's consequences. The present petitions pray for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or 72 with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or 73 office to which such other is entitled. Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of 74 legislative and executive officials. The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), 75 issued on February 28, 2001. The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for 76 carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order." The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later. As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in 77 fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. B. LOCUS STANDI For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 78 upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
71

67

xxxx 2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations: xxxx d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD. xxxx GOVERNANCE xxxx 7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to nonderogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in 64 the Comprehensive Compact. (Underscoring supplied) The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade. Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In 65 Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held: x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. xxxx By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the 66 laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.

Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional 79 question raised. When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected 80 to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the 81 execution of the laws. For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through 82 the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. The Court retains discretion whether or 83 not to allow a taxpayer's suit. In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain 84 inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the 86 duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an 87 interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the 88 requirements of the law authorizing intervention, such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties. In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given 89 the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in 90 view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights. In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside 91 technical rules of procedure. In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
85

In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions. With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor. With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3 district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand. Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing. B. MOOTNESS Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not 92 sign the MOA." In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had 93 already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, 95 otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 96 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the 97 98 bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal
94 rd

of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the 99 violation. The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as 100 they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo and Manalo v. 101 Calderon where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding. Petitions not mooted

In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001. Need to formulate principles-guidelines

Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE. In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, 102 been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD, the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding. Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity. Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole." The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy. The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
103

Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain. Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio 104 Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked. The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications 105 and raises questions that need to be resolved. At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine 106 immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD. V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:

1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD? 2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws? ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such 107 limitations as may be provided by law. As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 109 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either 111 process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision112 making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes 113 desired by the people. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public 115 concern. In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions 116 entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various 117 118 laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds 119 allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten 120 121 wealth, and the identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern.
114 110 108

Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled: x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public 122 interest." (Emphasis and italics in the original) Intended as a "splendid symmetry" to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public 124 interest. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 125 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a 126 mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times 127 accountable to the people. Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose: MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it. MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding 128 Officer.
123

The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening. MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement? MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law" MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest? MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking 129 this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy. (Emphasis supplied) Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self130 executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive 131 and be responsive to the people's will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational mechanisms. MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways. xxxx MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence? I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or

credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the 132 making. (Emphasis supplied) The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by 133 E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but 134 by all Filipinos as one community." Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and 135 process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process." Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more 136 than sufficient consultation." Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and 137 timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process." E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and 138 initiatives." In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions 139 within the authority granted by the President. Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct 140 toward token provisos that border on classic lip service. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP 141 makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions. It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue. AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam. Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective 142 jurisdictions" is well-taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy: Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance 143 with the provisions of the Constitution. (Italics and underscoring supplied) In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao, the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a 145 particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. The MOAAD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast 146 territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in 147 matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies. The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms 148 ordained in said Act, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs. Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring
144

changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section. Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, 149 with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD. Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain

responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between 150 integration and independence. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 151 Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership. According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government. In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes. It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of 152 independence. In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become 153 independent states. Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all 154 but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied) As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao

del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied) Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. 155 Pimentel v. Executive Secretary instructs: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole

representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with 156 prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, 157 and the IPRA. Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states: 1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows: "As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are: (a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and (b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions." Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime,

terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region." Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof: SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures: xxxx b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs; c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned; d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents: 1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions; 2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution; 3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages; 4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs; 5) Survey plans and sketch maps; 6) Anthropological data; 7) Genealogical surveys; 8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds; 9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and

10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community. e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein; f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP; g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available; h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below. xxxx To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had 159 not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals. International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian
158

Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond convention' and is considered a general principle of international law." Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 162 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive: "(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination 126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to selfdetermination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal selfdetermination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external selfdetermination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added) 127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to selfdetermination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states. x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external selfdetermination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal selfdetermination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
161

160

The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND 163 ISLANDS QUESTION. There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows: x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations. Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups 164 that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest. Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada. As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have 165 a general right to independence or secession from those states under international law, but

they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal selfdetermination. In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit: Article 3 Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Article 4 Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. Article 5 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has 166 been understood as equivalent to "internal self-determination." The extent of selfdetermination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder: Article 8 1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. 2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; (c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. Article 21 1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. 2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities. Article 26 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. Article 30 1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned. 2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities. Article 32 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. Article 37 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. 2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. Article 38 States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States. There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows: 1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.

It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience: 7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution. Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing. Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below. The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations. It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional 167 amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125, states: SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued

simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments. The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a). The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In 168 Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, in issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus: "In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's . . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more 169 specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit: x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies. The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework 170 setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate. In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional 171 structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions. In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the 172 Constitution on autonomous regions is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari. MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions. I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new? MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state 173 policy. (Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. In Sanidad v. COMELEC, in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side. Justice Teehankee's dissent, in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined: "Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom 176 the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis." (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.
175 174

Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative. These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated 177 in Lambino v. COMELEC: "The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their people's' initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of people's voice' or sovereign will' in the present initiative." It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes 179 - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President. The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested. Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact."
178

Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that, By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation. What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework. Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional. A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive. As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM. The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law." Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law, however. The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion. The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty (the Lom Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
180

Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN. On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began. In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction. "37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. xxxx 40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement. 41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain international crimes. 42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lom Agreement created neither rights nor obligations

capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lom Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States. The Lom Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. 181 France, also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the 182 case. Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective. Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in issuing its public statements, viz: 43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.

44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for. xxxx 51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances. The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided 183 by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali, also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso. Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit: 40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from

manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States. In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international law. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so 184 long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens. Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision. SUMMARY

The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda. One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clearcut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. SO ORDERED.

SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC). On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate an a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits. On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits (Rollo, p. 153). Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex "C" of Petition for Certiorari). Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent. A formal hearing was conducted whereby private respondent alleged that the non-issuance of the clearances by the petitioners was politically motivated and in bad faith. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that private respondent has property accountability and an outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD in the amount of P27,532.11. Furthermore, private respondent is not entitled to accrued sick leave benefits amounting to P44,000.00 due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment with the SEAFDEC-AQD (Annex "D", Id.). On January 12, 1988, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents: 1. To pay complainant P126,458.89, plus legal interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits; 2. To pay complainant actual damages in the amount of P50,000, plus 10% attorney's fees. All other claims are hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 51, Annex "E")

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992 SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE OFFICER), petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL LAZAGA, respondents. Ramon Encarnacion for petitioners. Caesar T. Corpus for private respondent.

NOCON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the July 26, 1988 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein petitioners Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD), Dr. Flor Lacanilao, Rufil Cuevas and Ben de los Reyes liable to pay private respondent Juvenal Lazaga the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits, and the resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said decision dated January 9, 1989. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On July 26, 1988, said decision was affirmed by the Fifth Division of the NLRC except as to the award of P50,000.00 as actual damages and attorney's fees for being baseless. (Annex "A", p. 28, id.) On September 3, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "G", id.) which was denied on January 9, 1989. Thereafter, petitioners instituted this petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent Lazaga's complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent. The petition is impressed with merit. Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDECAQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia. Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam (Annex "H", Petition). The Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on January 16,1968. Its purpose is as follows: The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the Center, hereinafter called the "Members", and through collaboration with international organizations and governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1; Annex "H" Petition) (p.310, Rollo) SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of the principal departments of SEAFDEC (Annex "I", id.) to be established in Iloilo for the promotion of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC mandates: 1. The Council shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be vested in the Council. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap stated in their book, Public International Law (p. 83, 1956 ed.): Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading

authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own." (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.]) Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1, Annex "H", ibid.) and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11, ibid.). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section 2, P.D. No. 292). The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 4. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. In the case at bar, for instance, the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations, jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id.; See also Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, pp. 284-1285). Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court held: A rule, that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which it stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general

rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. (Calimlim vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, 118 SCRA 399; [1982]) Respondent NLRC'S citation of the ruling of this Court in Lacanilao v. De Leon (147 SCRA 286 [1987]) to justify its assumption of jurisdiction over SEAFDEC is misplaced. On the contrary, the Court in said case explained why it took cognizance of the case. Said the Court: We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants to the same position; this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer or employee, or a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand. There is before us no question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no plea for such immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with the consent of SEAFDEC (Id., at 300; emphasis supplied). WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex "A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not involved in the case could hear." On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly corning from petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction," presumably of Moreau. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988 DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners, vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents. On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed in the Court of First Instance 8 of Olongapo City a for damages against the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976. The plaintiffs claimed that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary rights. The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion was denied in an order dated 9 March 8, 1977, on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau, who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, 1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, 1977. This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that the above-narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages. It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These wellsettled principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.

CRUZ, J.: The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it already has. Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, the special services 1 director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City. Petitioner Moreau was the 2 commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. Private 3 respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in the Philippines, as so 4 was private respondent Wyer, who died two years ago. They were both employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having 5 been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been 6 converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that "Special Services management practices an autocratic 7 form of supervision."

The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26, 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in the court a quo. In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted. Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable inconvenience. Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on behalf of the American government. The United States had not given its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v. Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the name of the American government. The United States had also not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United States 12 of America v. Ruiz, we set aside the denial by the lower court of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and certainly not personal. 13 In these and several other cases the Court found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity. It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information 14 regarding the case of the private respondents. Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticismin effect a direct attack against him-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision." As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private respondents' type of employment even before the grievance proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it. Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover
10

the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent. There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the 15 jurisdiction of our courts. The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right 16 against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly 17 vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, 18 say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; or to restrain a Cabinet member, for 19 example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; or to compel the national 20 treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; or the commissioner 21 of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice."
22

This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, where the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act. The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad 24 25 faith. This, to, is well settled . Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters 26 come under the concept of privileged communications and are not punishable, let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have overstated their case.

23

A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base. The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with citations of American cases, as if they were arguing before a court of the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a people, particularly since we became independent in 1946. We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only from the United States but also from Spain and other countries from which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE. The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O. Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made PERMANENT. No costs. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Gancayco, Grino-Aquio and Medialdea, JJ., Concur.

"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines. "During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose Iigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in defendants own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted. "It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised to see plaintiff again. "On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was again focused on politics and business. "On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.1awphi1.nt "At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attach case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant,

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003

KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents. DECISION VITUG, J.: Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused. On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumpedup charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. "The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.

but the defendant told him to `shut up. He was nevertheless told that he would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him. "The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house. "That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news. "After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame handcuffed 1 together, where they were detained for three days without food and water." During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States government, as well as its agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989. Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned judgment. Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minuchers failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug

Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation. Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this Courts resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzos diplomatic immunity could not be taken up. The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged: "WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in the manner following: "`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs. `The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case 2 instituted this action as a pauper litigant." While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving the

appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, 3 subject matter and causes of action. Even while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation "It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair 4 resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity." Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents 1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990; 2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990; 3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991; 4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and 5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988. 6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court); 7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and 8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed 5 to the Chief Justice of this Court. The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the United States

Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial court of Scalzos diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his 6 previous counsel to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held 7 sacrosanct. By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary 8 international law. Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the 9 receiving state. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) ambassadors or 11 10 nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to 12 13 the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear

stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attach belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or 14 departments in the home government. These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally designated as having diplomatic rank. In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz: "While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. "x x x x x x x x x "And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed. "x x x x x x x x x "There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is arbitrary."

A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attach of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence. Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch 15 of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the 16 exercise of territorial jurisdiction. The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an 17 acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature." Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of 18 age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each individual to 19 the appropriate functional category. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign 20 sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its 21 sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign 22 equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been 23 formally impleaded. In United States of America vs. Guinto, involving officers of the United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled 24

"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who 25 were] responsible for their acts." This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals elaborates:
26

tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buybust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit. WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur

"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. "x x x x x x x x x "(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and 27 jurisdiction." A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has

containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 42. After due hearing where the parties presented their respective appraisal reports regarding the value of the property, respondent RTC judge rendered a decision on June 4, 1987, fixing the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordering petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. After this decision became final and executory, private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This motion was granted by respondent RTC judge. After issuance of the writ of execution, a Notice of Garnishment dated January 14, 1988 was served by respondent sheriff Silvino R. Pastrana upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However, respondent sheriff was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner. As a result of this, private respondent filed a motion dated January 27, 1988 praying that an order be issued directing the bank to deliver to respondent sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision. Private respondent filed its opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20, 1988 a "Manifestation" informing the court that private respondent was no longer the true and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the property had been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB) Respondent RTC judge issued an order requiring PSB to make available the documents pertaining to its transactions over the subject property, and the PNB Buendia Branch to reveal the amount in petitioner's account which was garnished by respondent sheriff. In compliance with this order, PSB filed a manifestation informing the court that it had consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After several conferences, PSB and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation proceedings. Respondent trial judge subsequently issued an order dated September 8, 1988 which: (1) approved the compromise agreement; (2) ordered PNB Buendia Branch to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the appraised value of the subject property under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, from the garnished account of petitioner; and, (3) ordered PSB and private respondent to execute the necessary deed of conveyance over the subject property in favor of petitioner. Petitioner's motion to lift the garnishment was denied. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was duly opposed by private respondent. On the other hand, for failure of the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch to comply with the order dated September 8, 1988, private respondent filed two succeeding motions to require the bank manager to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. During the hearings conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the PNB Buendia Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed the court that he was still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling him to make a disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its part, petitioner contended that its funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio [G.R. No. L-20322, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 899]. Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21, 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the doctrine enunciated in Republic v. Palacio did not apply to the case because petitioner's PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened for the expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 89898-99 October 1, 1990 MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR P. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Judge RTC of Makati, Branch CXLII ADMIRAL FINANCE CREDITORS CONSORTIUM, INC., and SHERIFF SILVINO R. PASTRANA, respondents. Defante & Elegado for petitioner. Roberto B. Lugue for private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors' Consortium, Inc. RESOLUTION

CORTS, J.: The present petition for review is an off-shoot of expropriation proceedings initiated by petitioner Municipality of Makati against private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo, involving a parcel of land and improvements thereon located at Mayapis St., San Antonio Village, Makati and registered in the name of Arceli P. Jo under TCT No. S-5499. It appears that the action for eminent domain was filed on May 20, 1986, docketed as Civil Case No. 13699. Attached to petitioner's complaint was a certification that a bank account (Account No. S/A 265-537154-3) had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under petitioner's name

Decree No. 42. Respondent RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8, 1988, and thus ordered his arrest and detention until his compliance with the said order. Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which were eventually consolidated. In a decision promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed both petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of respondent RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's PNB Account No. 265-537154-3, and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner now files the present petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction. On November 20, 1989, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent RTC judge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing and/or carrying out the RTC order dated December 21, 1988 and the writ of garnishment issued pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment to the petition, while petitioner filed its reply. Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its petition before the Court of Appeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has actually two accounts with the PNB Buendia Branch, to wit: xxx xxx xxx (1) Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property, with an outstanding balance of P99,743.94. (2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 for statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government, with a balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989. xxx xxx xxx [Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 11-12.] Because the petitioner has belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of two bank accounts, it may fairly be asked whether the second account was opened only for the purpose of undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge and the decision of the Court of Appeals, and strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as enunciated in Republic v. Palacio [supra.] At any rate, the Court will give petitioner the benefit of the doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues presented based on the factual circumstances thus alleged by petitioner. Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the levy under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94. However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds earmarked for the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law.

There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB Account No. S/A 263530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute [Republic v. Palacio, supra.; The Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, G.R. No. L-30098, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 616]. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 52 (1926): The Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629 (1950); Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 61744, June 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 56]. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor [See Viuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra; Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil. 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil. 247 (1960)]. In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not disputed by petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that, within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, . . . [j]ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss [Cosculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. de Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291]. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to immediately pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount of P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a report of its compliance with the foregoing

order within a non-extendible period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of receipt of this resolution. The order of respondent RTC judge dated December 21, 1988, which was rendered in Civil Case No. 13699, is SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on November 20, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities. The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads thus: . . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132) Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position. Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court. The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989 SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents. G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989 NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant, vs. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees. Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla. Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.

PARAS, J.: In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in the resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.

Petitioners allege: 1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New Civil Code which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Should moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of petitioners-spouses individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental and depth of intensity of the same, which should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.

2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that respondent National Irrigation Administration acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver to stop in order to give assistance to the, victims. Thus, by reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled to exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code. 3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount of which (20%) had been sufficiently established in the hearing of May 23, 1979. 4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower court upon which the disallowance of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees was based and not for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation Administration, contends thus: 1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent National Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The focal issue raised in respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the question as to whether or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. It thus becomes necessary that before petitioners' claim for moral and exemplary damages could be resolved, there should first be a finding of negligence on the part of respondent's employee-driver. In this regard, the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does not categorically contain such finding. 2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief" dated December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R. No.61045) of the respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an explicit admission of said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent procedures are manifest because while petitioners question the findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the questions of law before this Court which posture confirms their admission of the facts. 3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the vehicular accident involves a question of fact which petitioners should have brought to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court has become final as to the petitioners and for this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed. 4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and in conformity with the law. 5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason of the shock and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their son. Respondent National Irrigation Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an agency of the State performing governmental functions and

driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for the tortious act should. not be borne by respondent government agency but by driver Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act. 6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National Irrigation Administration in exercising due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, the matter of due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a regular driver of the vehicle. The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of theNew Civil Code. Art. 2176 thus provides: Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable. The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ). In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private

individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.) Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides: Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business. Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. ThusSec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives: (a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and (d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision. At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.

It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of the road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo] The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo] It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group. Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable. (Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597). Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be traversed constitutes negligence. Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award. SO ORDERED. Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur. Melencio- Herrera (Chairperson,), J., is on leave.

steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila. To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918. Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13,

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. City Fiscal Diaz for respondents. MALCOLM, J.: The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the

1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision. Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record. In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so. One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents. With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women despite their being in a sense lepers

of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence. In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen. Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands. What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us. As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides: Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.) We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty. Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court. The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right. Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded. It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature. A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted: I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . . The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . . The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.) The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.) The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said: A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse.

Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.) A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.) We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus. There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged. The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named. For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number

either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents. The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong. In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings. Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done. The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila. The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.) With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating

circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged. It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive such an amount is P100. In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered. In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment. Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur. Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments: 1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution; 2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and 3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines. Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit. We deny the motion for reconsideration. 1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court. 2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision. The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.] 3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents. RESOLUTION

EN BANC: In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said: In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches. Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution... In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).] And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides: Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land, There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of legislation. 4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear

showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

aggravated soon enough. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in 2 a number of casualties. The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and 3 several rounds of ammunition found in the premises. On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right 4 against self-incrimination. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-69401 June 23, 1987 RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI, WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN, MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE FEROLINO, petitioners, vs. MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE) AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition on the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said 7 report and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance. Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the incident in question, provided as follows: Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) thatSec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required such warrant, sought to justify 8 their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders. There was also the suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order 9 problem generated by the assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco. Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan: 10 The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer for the return of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized, referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the 5 regional trial court, Zamboanga City. After receiving the testimonial and documentary evidence 6 of the parties, he submitted the report and recommendations on which this opinion is based.

CRUZ, J.: On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. 1 The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last part is not included in the modern refinement). The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in incidents like this, the situation

and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the petitioners. It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and deserved the arbitrary treatment they received to take them into custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated reports that they were stockpiling weapons. The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by the military. Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, a majority of one. If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them, especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage rather than undermine respect for the law, which it was their duty to uphold. In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. 11 In the instant case, the respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to make the raid without a search warrant on their own unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt. The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why they should disregard the orderly processes required by the Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military invasion. Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga City, 12 they instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed, even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a man's house is his castle. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All the forces of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 13 If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos. 14 If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. 15 As Judge Learned Hand observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. 16 Pending determination of the legality of such articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the corresponding courts may decide. 17 The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other dreaded operations should remain in the past, banished with the secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We must be done with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement. Those who are supposed to uphold the law must not be the first to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, 19 "It is time that the martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and that there be a return to the force and rule of law." All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the basest of criminals. WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 128777 October 7, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ERNESTO LARIN y BONDAD, accused-appellant. PANGANIBAN, J.: Republic Act. No. 7610 penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses. It was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to "provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse." The Court thus applies this law to the present case and grants the victim the full vindication and protection that RA 7610 accords to this helpless sector of society. Statement of the Case

( This portion is not available to protect the interest of the parties. )

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.

that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, 3 on May 26, 1991. It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not 4 accepting married women for employment. In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately 5 hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. 6 Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for nonpayment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of facts between the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections. She then executed a promissory 7 note for that amount in favor of petitioner . All of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties and/or their counsel. On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA, was correspondingly ordered, the labor arbiter being of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon by petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was apparent that she had been discriminated against on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and, in its decision dated April 29, 1994, it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT & T. However, the decision of the labor arbiter was modified with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months in view of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. In all other respects, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter, including the order for the reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT & T. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was rebuffed by respondent NLRC in its resolution of November 9, 1994, hence this special civil action assailing the aforestated decisions of the labor arbiter and respondent NLRC, as well as the denial resolution of the latter. 1. Decreed in the Bible itself is the universal norm that women should be regarded with love and respect but, through the ages, men have responded to that injunction with indifference, on the hubristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex. Nowhere has that prejudice against womankind been so pervasive as in the field of labor, especially on the matter of equal employment opportunities and standards. In the Philippine setting, women have traditionally been considered as falling within the vulnerable groups or types of workers who must be safeguarded with preventive and remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring, training, benefits, promotion and retention.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997 PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.: Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT & T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT & T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code. Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. 1 Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in 2 replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated. On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the 8 primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 9 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial 10 security of all workers. Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential. 2. Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the 11 Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training 13 opportunities; Republic Act No. 6955 which bans the "mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women 14 workers; Republic Act No. 7192 also known as the "Women in Development and Nation Building Act," which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police; 15 Republic Act No. 7322 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private 16 sector; Republic Act No. 7877 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the 17 workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, or the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where 18 their rights are secure. Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code, women's rights in the field of civil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded. In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138 thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to ensure their health and safety. For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article 135, on the other hand, recognizes a woman's right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of employment on account simply of sex. Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. 3. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one's labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and 19 recall of employees. As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his
12

discretion and best business judgment, all aspects of employment, "from hiring to firing," except 20 in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial, the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was 21 verbally instructed to you." Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's policy against marriage ("and even told you that married women 22 employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company.") Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its highest ranking officers who 23 would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation. Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for 24 termination of employment, it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty 25 committed by the employee and not on the employer's caprices. Furthermore, it should never 26 be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. In the present controversy, petitioner's expostulations that it dismissed private respondent, not because the latter got married but because she concealed that fact, does have a hollow ring. Her concealment, so it is claimed, bespeaks dishonesty hence the consequent loss of confidence in her which justified her dismissal. Petitioner would asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes umbrage over the concealment of that fact. This improbable reasoning, with interstitial distinctions, perturbs the Court since private respondent may well be minded to claim that the imputation of dishonesty should be the other way around. Petitioner would have the Court believe that although private respondent defied its policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could be an act of insubordination was inconsequential. What it submits as unforgivable is her concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial matter to which it supposedly has no objection. In other words, PT & T says it gives its blessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves and other benefits it would consequently respond for and which obviously it would have wanted to avoid. If that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will be no sanction; but if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the confessional, she will be dismissed. This line of reasoning does not impress us as reflecting its true management policy or that we are being regaled with responsible advocacy.

This Court should be spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments. Indeed, petitioner glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, both on the aspects of qualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal her supervenient marriage. It was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause of private respondent's secretive conduct now complained of. It is then apropos to recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused. Finally, petitioner's collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat insincere and self-serving. Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of her collections, but that is an altogether different story. The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds. That the labor arbiter would thus consider petitioner's submissions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought, just to bolster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion born of experience in labor cases. For, there was no showing that private respondent deliberately misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave. In fact, it was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the labor case. Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on January 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from 27 earning security of tenure. On the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undoubtedly those of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and business of PT & 28 T. The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the 29 employer. As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary 30 equivalent. However, as she had undeniably committed an act of dishonesty in concealing her status, albeit under the compulsion of an unlawful imposition of petitioner, the three-month suspension imposed by respondent NLRC must be upheld to obviate the impression or inference that such act should be condoned. It would be unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally justified. Thus, her entitlement to back wages, which shall be computed from the time her compensation was withheld up to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall be reduced by deducting therefrom the amount corresponding to her three months suspension. 4. The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT & T. The Labor Code state, in no uncertain terms, as follows: Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.

This provision had a studied history for its origin can be traced to Section 8 of Presidential 31 Decree No. 148, better known as the "Women and 32 Child Labor Law," which amended paragraph (c), Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, entitled "An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and Children, to Provide Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes." The forerunner to Republic Act No. 679, on the other hand, was Act No. 3071 which became law on March 16, 1923 and which regulated the employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and mercantile establishments and other places of labor in the then Philippine Islands. It would be worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationalization in Zialcita, et al. vs. 33 Philippine Air Lines, a decision that emanated from the Office of the President. There, a policy of Philippine Air Lines requiring that prospective flight attendants must be single and that they will be automatically separated from the service once they marry was declared void, it being violative of the clear mandate in Article 136 of the Labor Code with regard to discrimination against married women. Thus: Of first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent's policy or regulation with the codal provision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article 136 of the Labor Code applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and that the prohibition against marriage of women engaged in extraordinary occupations, like flight attendants, is fair and reasonable, considering the pecularities of their chosen profession. We cannot subscribe to the line of reasoning pursued by respondent. All along, it knew that the controverted policy has already met its doom as early as March 13, 1973 when Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated. But for the timidity of those affected or their labor unions in challenging the validity of the policy, the same was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. A close look at Section 8 of said decree, which amended paragraph (c) of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 679, reveals that it is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on May 1, 1974 to take effect six (6) months later, or on November 1, 1974. It cannot be gainsaid that, with the reiteration of the same provision in the new Labor Code, all policies and acts against it are deemed illegal and therefore abrogated. True, Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, but that is precisely the factor that militates against the policy of respondent. The standards have not yet been established as set forth in the first paragraph, nor has the Secretary of Labor issued any regulation affecting flight attendants. It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides: Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employees. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization,

collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work . . . . Moreover, we cannot agree to the respondent's proposition that termination from employment of flight attendants on account of marriage is a fair and reasonable standard designed for their own health, safety, protection and welfare, as no basis has been laid therefor. Actually, respondent claims that its concern is not so much against the continued employment of the flight attendant merely by reason of marriage as observed by the Secretary of Labor, but rather on the consequence of marriage-pregnancy. Respondent discussed at length in the instant appeal the supposed ill effects of pregnancy on flight attendants in the course of their employment. We feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately explained by the Secretary of Labor in his decision of May 2, 1976. In a vain attempt to give meaning to its position, respondent went as far as invoking the provisions of Articles 52 and 216 of the New Civil Code on the preservation of marriage as an inviolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution, respectively, as bases for its policy of nonmarriage. In both instances, respondent predicates absence of a flight attendant from her home for long periods of time as contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure conjecture not based on actual conditions, considering that, in this modern world, sophisticated technology has narrowed the distance from one place to another. Moreover, respondent overlooked the fact that married flight attendants can program their lives to adapt to prevailing circumstances and events. Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of nondiscrimination on the employment of women. The judgment of the Court of Appeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining & Industrial 34 Corporation considered as void a policy of the same nature. In said case, respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm to consider female employees in the project it was undertaking as separated the moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women. Respondent further claimed that complainant was employed in the project with an oral understanding that her services would be terminated when she gets married. Branding the policy of the employer as an example of "discriminatory chauvinism" tantamount to denying equal employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil Code, Presidential Decree No. 148 and the Constitution. Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a "sex-plus" discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job discrimination laws. Employment rules that forbid or restrict the employment of married women, but do not apply to married men, have been held to violate Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main federal statute prohibiting job discrimination 35 against employees and applicants on the basis of, among other things, sex. Further, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women but just against married women. And, where the employer discriminates against married women, but not against married

men, the variable is sex and the discrimination is unlawful. Upon the other hand, a requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be justified as a "bona fide occupational qualification," or BFOQ, where the particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. Thus, in one case, a no-marriage rule applicable to both male and female flight attendants, was regarded as unlawful since the 37 restriction was not related to the job performance of the flight attendants. 5. Petitioner's policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in 38 the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, 39 the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner's policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they 40 are with so much public interest that the same should yield to the common good. It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor impair 41 the interest or convenience of the public. In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT & T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the 42 foundation of the nation. That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required. ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, with double costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

36

impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced. On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State. It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to 5 promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. "Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions 6 and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been 7 8 credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." "The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare 9 of society." It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure 10 communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the 11 greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is 12 a clear misuse of the power. In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
13

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988 PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents. Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas 1 placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the 2 measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all 3 Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights 4 and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. 14 There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that 15 "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not 16 confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions. As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified. As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban. There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the 17 protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review 18 of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ." ), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of

permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides: 9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are: 1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or, 2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the 19 welfare and protection of Filipino workers. The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic 20 overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A 21 and gives it to B." It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract 22 and needless to state, an invalid act. (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult 23 to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.) It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote: 5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension. 5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government; 5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and 5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international organizations. 5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding.

xxx xxx xxx 7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines. xxx xxx xxx 9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are: 1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or, 2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of 24 Filipino workers. xxx xxx xxx

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment. The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General. The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier 31 purposes targetted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life. This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be 25 provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in 26 particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent 27 Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the 28 enforcement whereof. The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and 29 decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. The Constitution declares that: Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of 30 employment opportunities for all.

SO ORDERED. Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.

Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidates bio-data and his program of government. First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved. Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally 2 considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies 3 a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise 4 to any cause of action before the courts. An inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State 6 shall broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise: I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet 7 offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden." (emphasis supplied) Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
5

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004

REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy. On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired. In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987

Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of 8 claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced. As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found 9 in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC 10 Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create. Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be accorded due weight. Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is misplaced. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held: [T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception 11 and even frustration of the democratic [process]. The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the COMELECs Comment: There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the government. For the official

ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00). xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how 12 slim. The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates 13 for public office, such as watchers in every polling place, watchers in the board of 14 15 canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election. Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State. Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings." The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The 16 COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration of elections and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, 17 orderly and honest elections. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide 18 candidates for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. The determination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code. Now, the needed factual premises. However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions. Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended any document to their respective Comments.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process. As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other election laws. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug , Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
*

(G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right to information provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]). The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states: Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development." The new provision reads: Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law. These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one. The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks. 1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.

CORTES, J.: The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information. This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al.,

In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3). But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that: * * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36). From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right. The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court: * * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. *** (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at p. 387). The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit. 2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley, supra, at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion. In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28). In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty: * * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at 39). (Emphasis supplied). The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra: Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. *** (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied). It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to: * * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387) Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the manner of examining the public records were reasonable.

In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetal supra). Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. 3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. The public concern invoked in the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra, the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution. The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that: Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]). Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies. WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi. Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied. Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records. On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members. Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment. Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22, 1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial." Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board). After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42). The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to ignore it. Hence, this petition anchored on the following: A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila G.R. No. 92541 November 13, 1991 MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents. Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner. Francisco Ma. Chanco for respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p At issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution. In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly. Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.

C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF 1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD FAITH, IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film. Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary. Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989], citing Aguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans' Backpay Commission [1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]). The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail. Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve the issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers

pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied) As We held in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission (150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]). Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned. The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., supra.) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts. Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. As stated by this Court in Subido v. Ozaeta (80 Phil. 383 [1948]): Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. (emphasis supplied)

It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra, upheld the right to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right, now constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law mandates. The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra). We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed especially those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree provides: Sec 4. Decision. The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving for exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, television program, still and other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination and preview must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days which shall be counted from the date of receipt by the BOARD of an application for the purpose . . . For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a subcommittee composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake the work of review. Any disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt of the written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall designate a subcommittee of five BOARD members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members so designated and present at the second review session. This second review session shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered within five (5) days from the date of receipt of the motion for reconsideration. Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion picture intended for exhibition at the moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its entirety. The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or television program in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines, who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by an ad hoe committee he may create or by the Appeals Committee herein created.

An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby created composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to the President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals Committee. The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be final. Implementing Rules and Regulations Sec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. a) A proper application having been filed, the Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit, designate a Sub-Committee of at least three Board Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant, within ten days from receipt of the completed application. The Sub-Committee shall then preview the motion picture subject of the application. b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await the results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After reaching a decision, the Sub-Committee shall summon the applicant or his representative and inform him of its decision giving him an opportunity either to request reconsideration or to offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a better classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in case of disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired or both, the reason or reasons for such disapproval or denial and the classification considered by the Sub-Committee member dissenting from the majority opinion may express his dissent in writing. c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the Chairman of the Board for transmission to the applicant. Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. Within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the Sub-Committee referred to in the preceding section, the applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing of that decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board Members which shall consider the motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion, conduct a second preview of the film. The review shall, to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the preceding section. Sec 13. Reclassification. An applicant desiring a change in the classification rating given his film by either the Sub-Committee of Three? or Committee of Five mentioned in the immediately preceeding two sections may re-edit such film and apply anew with the Board for its review and reclassification. Sec 14. Appeal. The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the second review shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines who may himself decide the appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the Office of the President for adjudication.

On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of the same decree as follows: Sec. 5. Executive Officer. The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the BOARD. He shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties: (a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by the BOARD; (b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD; (c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate personnel; and (d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the BOARD. It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or television programs. The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari a delegated power cannot be delegated. And since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more reason the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of delegation. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

On May 4, 1960, Tuason filed Civil Case No. 6104 with the same court (Caloocan City Branch) against Limos. After almost ten years, or on July 19, 1969, a decision was promulgated by the trial court dismissing Tuason's complaint and ordering him to vacate the premises and to surrender their possession to Limos. Tuason received notice of the decision on August 7, 1969, and therefore had up to September 6, 1969, within which to perfect an appeal. On August 18, Tuason filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond. On August 29, he filed a first motion for extension of twenty days within which to file a record on appeal. The motion was granted. On September 26, a second motion for extension of ten days was filed. On October 3, believing that Tuason had filed his second motion for extension one day late, Limos filed a motion to dismiss Tuason's appeal. On October 4, the trial court granted the second motion for extension of time, to expire on October 6. On October 7, Tuason filed a third motion for extension of ten days. On October 10, Limos filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that when Tuason filed his third motion for extension on October 7, the decision had already become final; hence, the period for filing a record on appeal was no longer extendible. In the meantime, the court granted the third motion for extension in an order dated October 8. On October 15, Tuason filed a record on appeal. On the same date, Limos filed a motion to reconsider the order of October 8 granting Tuason's third motion for extension. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC On November 19, 1969, the court issued an order dismissing Tuason's appeal on the ground that "[i]t appears from an examination of the record that when the plaintiff filed his "Urgent Motion for Last Extension to File Record on Appeal" on October 7, 1969, the period within which he should have filed the same, to wit, on October 6, 1969, has already elapsed and, therefore, there was nothing more to extend." Tuason moved to reconsider, but on December 17, 1969, the court issued an order denying his motion and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution. Tuason went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari. As already stated, that court denied the petition. Hence this appeal. Petitioner-appellant's arguments in the present appeal boil down to the following: (1) On October 6, 1969, the last day for the filing of a record on appeal, he arrived at the court a few minutes after 4:00 P.M. to file his third motion for extension. The cause of his delay was the unusually heavy traffic from San Juan, Rizal, to Caloocan City. A clerk in the court advised him to return the next day. Accordingly, on October 7, 1969, at 9:10 A.M., he filed the motion. He therefore incurred a delay of only nine hours and ten minutes, and considering that the delay was caused by misfortune, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, the trial court should not have denied his third motion. (2) The trial court having granted petitioner-appellant' motion for extension in its order of October 8, 1969, and petitioner-appellant having, pursuant to said order, already filed a record on appeal on October 15, 1969, the court could no longer recall or reconsider its October 8 order on November 19, 1969, or after the lapse of one month and eleven days. (3) The record on appeal was filed within the reglementary period, because the three motions of respondentappellee Limos (motion to dismiss the appeal filed on October 3, 1969, supplemental motion filed on October 10 and motion for reconsideration filed on October 15) were resolved only on November 19, 1969; hence, the period for filing the record on appeal was suspended from October 3 to November 19, 1969, and because of this the filing thereof on October 15, 1969, was seasonable. The appeal is without merit. Petitioner-appellant's filing on October 7, 1969, of his third motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal, was one day late, because the original period, as twice extended, expired the day before. An application for extension of time must be filed prior to the expiration of the period sought to be extended (Galima, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21046, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 140, 143; Vivo, etc. v. Arca, etc., et al., L-21589, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 771, 774).

G.R. No. L-32682 February 29, 1972 FORTUNATO TUASON, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT of APPEALS, JUDGE FERNANDO A. CRUZ, LEONOR LIMAS and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL (now Caloocan City), respondents-appellees. Pedro C. Mendiola for petitioner-appellant. Castro M. Baltazar for respondents-appellees.

VILLAMOR, J.: .p This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44523-R denying the petition for certiorari filed by Fortunato Tuason. This case, may be traced back to May 27, 1958, when Fortunato Tuason filed LRC No. 11267 with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, against the spouses Florencio Macaraeg and Leonor Limos. The case was dismissed on September 8, 1958. In the meantime, Macaraeg died. After the dismissal of the case, the widow, Leonor Limos, asked Tuason to vacate the parcel of land (consisting of around 160 square meters) subject matter of the case, since he was occupying the same without paying any rental.

Thus on October 7, 1969, the trial court no longer had the power to grant petitioner-appellant an extension of time, for, the period within which to perfect an appeal having already elapsed, the court lost all jurisdiction over the case, and had no alternative but to order the execution of the final judgment (Galima, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra). Accident is invoked as an excuse. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that petitionerappellant's delay on October 6, 1969, in arriving in court to file his motion was due to accident, still, considering his own admission that he arrived only "a few minutes after 4:00 P.M.," he could have filed said motion that very day by sending the same in Caloocan City itself (where he was then) by registered mail. Since the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case, its order of October 8, 1969, granting petitioner-appellant's third motion for extension, was null and void and of no legal effect. No abuse of discretion could therefore be attributed to said court when, after its attention had been called to its mistake, it issued an order in effect reconsidering and setting aside its erroneous order. On the contrary, it was the proper course of action to take. In Vivo, etc. vs. Arca, etc., et al., supra, we sustained the order of the respondent judge who reconsidered and set aside a previous order to transmit the record of the case to this Court, after it was pointed out to him that the notice of appeal was filed one day late, and that, consequently, the judgment had already become final and executory. Petitioner-appellant's contention that the filing by respondent-appellee Limos of her three motions on October 3, 10 and 15, 1969, interrupted the running of the period to a record on appeal for forty-seven days, i.e., from October 3, 1969 to November 19, 1969, when the trial court finally resolved the motions deserves scant consideration. The October 3 motion was one to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner-appellant's second motion for extension was filed one day late. That second motion for extension was, however, granted in the court's order of October 4, 1969. Consequently, respondent-appellee Limos' October 3 motion must be deemed to have been disposed of by that order, and any reference thereto in the order of November 19, 1969, was unnecessary and superfluous. The October 10 motion was one to dismiss petitioner-appellant's appeal on the ground that the filing of a third motion for extension on October 7, 1969, was one day late. Since, as already stated above, the third motion was indeed filed late, and the trial court's judgment had already become final, respondent-appellee Limos' motion could not have had the effect of suspending the period for perfecting petitionerappellant's appeal; what had already run out could no longer be suspended. The same thing is true with the October 15 motion of respondent-appellee Limos, which was for the reconsideration of the court's order of October 8 granting petitioner-appellants third motion for extension. That order, as we have said above, is null and void, having been issued after the court had lost jurisdiction. In addition to the foregoing considerations, it must be mentioned here as was stated by the Court of Appeals in its appealed decision that the issues of late filing of petitioner-appellant's third motion for extension due to accident, and of interruption of the running of the period to file a record on appeal, were not raised by petitioner-appellant in the trial court. There, petitionerappellant insisted that his third motion was filed on October 6, 1969, and that the record on appeal was filed within the extended period. Petitioner-appellant's failure to lay the said issues before the trial court made his recourse to the Court of Appeals on certiorari doubly indefensible, for questions which courts of first instance are required by law to decide should not be summarily taken from them and presented to a higher court without first giving them an opportunity of deliberately passing on such questions themselves (Herrera, etc. v. Barretto, etc., et al., 25 Phil., 245, 272). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas; (2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes; (3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office; (4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution: [No. 8] RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA. Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas. Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935. (5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified; (6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides: 6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia. (7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period; (8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents. Godofredo Reyes for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission. Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf. No appearance for other respondents. LAUREL, J.: This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas. The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows: (1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal"; (10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest." The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for: (a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly; (b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly; (c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings; (d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed; (e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines. On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses: (a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules: (c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie. The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his special defense: (a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes; (b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission; (c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition; (d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto; (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable; ( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court; (g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936. There was no appearance for the other respondents. The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, 2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly? We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution. The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government. But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers. In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National

Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld. Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: "SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the

Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance. The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.) The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the President. Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows: The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice. The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further

changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows: (6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices. During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft: xxx xxx xxx

the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question. However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged. Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated. Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate. Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications. Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity. Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the members." Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission. Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined. Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose election is not contested? Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested. Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay. Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a case when

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield? THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires. Mr. ROXAS. Willingly. Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members? Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason. Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission. Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct. Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members. Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members? Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the Electoral Commission. Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested. Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose. Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been raised. Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge. In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said: xxx xxx xxx

El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo? El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo. xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56). In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission. As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows: (6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices. The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows: SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly. When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention. The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and nonpartisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government. Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation also took place: El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite? El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo? El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased. 154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they should determine with the strictest impartiality." 155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief

justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons. As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the nonpartisan settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission. The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest. The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court. The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted. We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such

rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction. But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be avoided. From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election contests

was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a memberelect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935). Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166). Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation. Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial. (b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted. (c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. (d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. (e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments. (f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly. (g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. (h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests. ( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests. (k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. (m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed. We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe. In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner answered on December 10, 1971. However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening and revision of the ballot boxes specified therein. Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy. In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]). Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) of the New Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New Constitution did not divest the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction to hear and decide election protests pending before them at the time of its ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the New Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically abolish the office and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut short the tenure of the office, so as to render the issue as to who is the lawfully elected candidate to said office or position moot and academic; that election protests involve public interest such that the same must be heard until terminated and may not be dismissed on mere speculation that the office involved may have been abolished, modified or reorganized; and that the motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for delay. Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner failed to refute the issue of political question; and reiterated his stand, expanding his arguments on the political question, thus: It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source from the 1971 elections for municipal mayoralty. Unsatisfied with the counting of votes held by the Board of Canvassers, the herein protestant filed this present case. And before the termination of the same and pending trial, the Filipino people in the exercise of their free will and sovereign capacity approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW FORM OF GOVERNMENTPARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was enforced. We find this provision under Article XI of the New Constitution, which provides:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979 DANTE O. CASIBANG, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and REMEGIO P. YU, respondents. Nicanor & Bautista and Agaton D. Yaranon for petitioner. Bince, Sevilleja, Agsalud & Associates for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.: Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed on November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the protestant to the effect that the New Constitution "shows that the office of the Municipal Mayor has not been abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE. Otherwise, the provisions of Section 9 of Article XVII, is meaningless. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the Philippines, ... In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the officials and employees working in our government, otherwise, by the force of the New Constitution they are all out of the government offices. In fact, in the case above-cited (Javellana) we are all performing our duties in accordance with the New Constitution. Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the political complexion of our new Constitution should be dismissed because only those incumbent official and employees existing in the new government are protected by the transitional provisions of the New Fundamental Law of the Land. The protestant, we respectfully submit, is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 Article XVII of the Constitution. And in case he will win in this present case he has no right to hold the position of mayor of the town of Rosales, Pangasinan, because he was not then an official of the government at the time the New Constitution was approved by the Filipino People. His right if proclaimed a winner is derived from the 1935 Constitution which is changed by the Filipino people. On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political question theory of respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus: There is no dispute that the Filipino people have accepted and submitted to a new Constitution to replace the 1935 Constitution, and that we are now living under its aegis and protection. ... xxx xxx xxx Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, above-quoted, only those officials and employees of the existing Government of the Republic of

the Philippines like the protestee herein, are given protection and are authorized to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent President of the Philippines, while under Section 2 of Article XI of the new Constitution, also above-quoted, the intention of completely revamp the whole local government structure, providing for different qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties, is very clear. These present questions of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. With respect to the fate of incumbent oficials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines, as well as to the qualifications, election and removal, term of office, salaries, and powers of all local officials under the parliamentary form of government these have been entrusted or delegated by the sovereign people or has reserved it to be settled by the incumbent Chief Executive or by the National Assembly with full discretionary authority therefor. As if to supplement these delegated powers, the people have also decreed in a referendum the suspension of all elections. Thus, in the United States, questions relating to what persons or organizations constituted the lawful government of a state of the Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12, L. Ed 58), and those relating to the political status of a state (Highland Farms Dairy vs. Agnew, 57 S. et 549, 300 U.S. 608, 81 L.ed 835), have been held to be political and for the judiciary to determine. To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and effectivity of the new Constitution has tainted this case with a political complexion above and beyond the power of judicial review. As fittingly commented by Mr. Justice Antonio in a separate opinion in the Javellana, et al. cases, 69 0. G. No. 36, September 3, 1973, p. 8008: The essentially political nature of the question is at once manifest by understanding that in the final analysis, what is assailed is not merely the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President, which is merely declaratory of the fact of the approval or ratification, but the legitimacy of the government. It is addressed more to the frame-work and political character of this government which now functions under the new Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is already effective. In other words, where a complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through political action, the Court whose existence is affected by such a change is, in the words of Mr. Meville Fuller Weston "precluded from passing upon the fact of change by a logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted as the change relates to the existence of a prior point in the Court's "chain of title" to its authority and "does not relate merely to a question of the horizontal distribution of powers." It involves a matter which 'the sovereign has entrusted to the socalled political departments or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." The present Government functions under the new Constitution which has become effective through political action. Judicial power presupposes an established government and an effective constitution. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and authority of the Government under which it is exercising judicial power.

The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new Constitution, particularly Sections 7 and 8, Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) decreeing that all existing laws not inconsistent with the new Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and that all courts existing at the time of the ratification of the said new Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with the new Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force. Again, to the mind of the Court, these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been "entrusted to the so-called political department or has reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action. Hence, this petition. We reverse. The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government." I There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court on the new Constitution which are decisive in the resolution of the political question theory of respondent Yu. WE ruled: 1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases (Santos vs. Castaeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula, 60 SCRA 211 [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-36927, Sunga vs. Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA 522, [1974]). 2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office."' (Santos vs. Castaeda, supra); and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the

herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra). 3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra). 4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution" (Euipilag, supra). 5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term' to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the 'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra). 6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: "Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. 'And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected," and "according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez, Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra). While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the

1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions. 7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision (Euipilag, supra). General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081. 8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their jurisdiction because to do co "is nothing short of unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing. It is unfortunate indeed that respondent Judge is apparently unaware that it is a matter of highly significant historical fact that this Court has always deemed General Order No. 3 including its amendment by General Order No. 3-A as practically inoperative even in the light of Proclamation No. 1081 of September 21, 1972 and Proclamation No. 1104 of January 17, 1973, placing the whole Philippines under martial law. While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not particular instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential decrees raise political questions which the Judiciary would not interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the Executive to determine whether or not We may take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of acts of the Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the martial law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3 PHILAJUR 605, 610-611, 82 SCRA 344 [1978]). II 1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" (Taada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p. 217). And Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term, thus: "The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192

[1946]; Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded against is the President or Congress, or any branch thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited with accuracy; 'political questions' should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..." (Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]). 2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant herein petitioner and protestee herein respondent Yu was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and after the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated. 3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution, as it will merely resolve who as between protestant and protestee is the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; hence, entitled to enjoy the extended term as mandated by said provision of the New Constitution. As construed by this Court, the elective officials referred to in Section 9 of Article XVII are limited to those duly elected as the right to said extended term was not personal to whosoever was incumbent at the time of the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution. Nor would such judgment preempt, collide or interfere with the power or discretion entrusted by the New Constitution to the incumbent President or the Legislative Department, with respect to the extended term of the duly elected incumbents; because whoever between protestant and protestee is declared the duly elected mayor will be subject always to whatever action the President or the Legislative Department will take pursuant thereto. 4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is apparent at once that such power committed by the New Constitution to the National Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the electoral protest case. Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever change or modification the National Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local government code. III The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII of the New Constitution "... that these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the

invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been 'entrusted to the so-called political department or reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action,"' strained as it is, cannot be sustained in view of the result herein reached on the issue of political question as well as Our previous pronouncements as above restated on the same Sections 7 and 8 of the New Constitution. WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS. Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ,, concur.

Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. . The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation. Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his coprotestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.". Petitioners pray that:. "1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners, vs. MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer, respondents. Taada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents. CONCEPCION, J.: Petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the

respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action. "2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents.". Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action is not the proper remedy. . I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.". We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.). Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:. "The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,). The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the

merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. . Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law. In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4. Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate. The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party. xxx xxx xxx

The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an

appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature. In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use petitioner, Taada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Taada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator Taada replied:. "There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.). This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Taada was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.". As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:. "Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers. "As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.). To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions. "It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.). Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 . In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court said:. "At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled. xxx xxx x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.). In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has

been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith. ".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.). It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein. II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?. Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:. "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.). It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Taada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Taada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Taada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Taada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral

Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Taada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343). Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Taada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Taada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Taada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Taada stated:. "On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo M. Taada.". Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:. "Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.". What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate. "SENATOR TAADA. Mr. President. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon. "SENATOR TAADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three. "SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal. "EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.). Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents. Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful. At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Taada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Taada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:. "At present Senator Taada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Taada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.). Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Taada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to nominate," adding that:. ".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Taada was

included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator Taada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Taada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.). The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Taada:. "..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situationthat he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Taada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.). The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Taada the "privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senateleave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator Taada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House. Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6. Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b. The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners herein. Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:. "The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion. "The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada. "Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.). This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:. ".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices. "It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:. ".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.). Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:. "Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.). It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed. Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:. "The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:. "I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority. `But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which

the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions. `I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.). The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:. "The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.). "From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7. As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete. "El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?. "El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?. "El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis supplied.). It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper. This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to Senator Taada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:. "..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.). Senator Sabido replied:. "That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.). Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:. ".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: . "..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal. xxx xxx x x x.

"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.). So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Taada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations. 10. It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376). Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that. "As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).

"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.). What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11. It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned. Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal.

Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13. This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of fact, when Senator Taada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.). In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:. " Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines. xxx xxx x x x.

function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal. xxx xxx x x x.

"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.). The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Taada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator Taada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution. The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Taada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Taada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Taada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio. As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the

".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a

majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar. Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

office of Chairman of the National Science Development Board since April 19, 1962 date of the expiration of the said 60-day period. Succinctly stated, the pertinent facts of this case are as follows: Upon the enactment on June 13, 1958 of Republic Act 2067, creating the National Science Development Board for the avowed purpose of implementing the declared policy of the State to integrate, coordinate, promote and intensify scientific and technological research and development and to foster invention and utilize scientific knowledge as an effective instrument for the promotion of national progress, petitioner herein, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, was appointed by the President of the Philippines, which appointment was duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as the first Chairman of the National Science Development Board for a fixed term of six years, pursuant to Section 6 of the Science Act. Accepting such appointment, petitioner duly qualified, assumed the performance of the functions of the office on July 15, 1958, and organized and since then built up the Board into a real effective instrument for scientific advancement that it is today. As a result of the last national elections held in November, 1961, a change of administration took place. Shortly thereafter, or on February 9, 1962, after petitioner declined to heed what respondents admit as the new Assistant Executive Secretary Rodrigo Perez's "friendly gesture of advising petitioner to resign from his position in order to avoid the unpleasant consequences of having to face an administrative action for violation of the Revised Administrative Code on the basis of evidence then on hand", respondent Executive Secretary required petitioner in writing to explain charges for alleged electioneering based on the affidavits of four individuals. On February 15, petitioner submitted his written explanation denying under oath the said charges claiming them to be false, malicious and unsubstantial. On the following day, February 16, respondent Executive Secretary advised petitioner, by authority of the President, that his explanation was found unsatisfactory, and immediately ordered his preventive suspension from office effective upon receipt of the communication. Thus, the preventive suspension took effect on Monday, February 18, 1962. On the day previous, or on Sunday, February 17, 1962, the respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. was designated by the President as Acting Chairman of the National Science Development Board. By Administrative Order No. 5 dated February 17, 1962, an investigating committee was created. On February 23, another charge of dishonesty in office was filed with the investigating committee against petitioner. On February 27, the investigating committee commenced the investigation of the administrative charges and, after some delays caused by the unpreparedness of the prosecution, the hearing was indefinitely postponed because of the departure for abroad, on March 19, 1962, on extended vacation, of one of the members of the committee (former Justice Ramon San Jose) who, before his appointment, apprised the President thereof but was advised he could go as the investigation could be postponed during his absence. In view of his indefinite suspension, petitioner, on May 5, 1962, filed the present petition praying in effect that the 60-day period prescribed in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension having already expired on April 19, 1962, he be reinstated in the service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act. The clear-cut issue, therefore, before us is the effect and scope of the aforementioned Section 35 of the Civil Service Act, which reads: Sec 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative against the officer or employee under preventive suspension not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-19748 September 13, 1962

PAULINO J. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and JUAN SALCEDO, JR., in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the National Science Development Board, respondents. Claudio Teehankee and Juan T. David for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. Enrique M. Fernando as amicus curiae.

BARRERA, J.: This is a petition filed by petitioner, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, Chairman of the National Science Development Board created by Republic Act 2067 otherwise known the "Science Act of 1958" against the respondents Executive Secretary and Juan Salcedo, Jr., the latter in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the same National Science Development Board, in the form of quo warranto an prohibition with preliminary injunction, with prayer that the further preventive suspension of petitioner beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in Section of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), be declared illegal and void, and that respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. be likewise declared guilty of unlawfully holding an exercising the functions of the

be reinstated in service. If the respondent, officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension. Contrary to the contention of petitioner that the visions of the above-quoted section are mandatory Applicable to him, respondents sustain that the compulsory lifting of the preventive suspension pending administrative investigation provided in this section, applies only to officers or employees whose administrative cases are to be decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, and that with respect to any officer appointed by the President, there is no provision of law regulating the duration of the preventive suspension pending investigation of charges against such officer, as is the case of petitioner. In other words, it is respondents' contention that Section 35 of the Civil Service Act does not apply to officers appointed by the President answering administrative charges against them. At the outset, let it be said that Section 35 is a new provision in our Civil Service Law. In the Revised Administrative Code, in its Article VI on "Discipline of Persons in Civil Service", we find the same power of preventive suspension exercisable by the President and the chief of a bureau or office with the approval of the proper head of department, as is now provided in Section 34 of Republic Act 2260, but there is no counterpart in the Administrative Code, of Section 35 of Act 2260 regarding the lifting of preventive suspension pending administrative investigation. This insertion for the first time in our Civil Service Law of an express provision limiting the duration of preventive suspension is significant and timely. It indicates realization by Congress of the evils of indefinite suspension during investigation, where the respondent employee is deprived in the meantime of his means of livelihood, without an opportunity to find work elsewhere, lest he be considered to have abandoned his office. It is for this reason that it has been truly said that prolonged suspension is worse than removal. And this is equally true whether the suspended officer or employee is in the classified or unclassified service, or whether he is a presidential appointee or not. Having in mind the remedial purpose of the law, is respondents' contention justifiable that Section 35 of the Civil Service Act is applicable only to employees whose administrative cases are submitted to the Commissioner of Civil Service? Except for the insertion of the clause "is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service" (which would presently be discussed), there is nothing in Section 35 which distinguishes between the preventive suspension of an officer appointed by the President and the suspension of subordinate officer or employee undergoing administrative investigation. Note that the phrase "officer or employee" used in Section 35, is not modified by the word "subordinate" as employed in Section 34 when speaking of the preventive suspension ordered by the chief of a bureau or office. In fact, the last sentence of Section 35 which provides that, "if the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay from the period of suspension", is undeniably applicable to all officers and employees whether suspended by the President or by the chief of office or bureau, or investigated by the Commissioner of Civil Service, or by a presidential investigating committee.1awphl.nt The first sentence of Section 35 stating that "when the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of 60 days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service", merely demonstrates, we believe, the feeling of Congress that, in line with its policy of strengthening the Civil Service of the nation and protecting it from the inroads of partisan political considerations, pursuant to the spirit of the Constitution, all disciplinary administrative cases should pass through the impartial scrutiny of the Commissioner of Civil Service, even though the final decision on the matter may not be his, as an appeal from such decision of the Commissioner to the Civil Service, Board of Appeals is expressly authorized by Section 36 of the same law. So also, it may be conceded without deciding, may the President, in the exercise of his power of control and supervision over all offices and departments of the executive branch of the government, revise, review, or revoke the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service and of the Civil Service Board of Appeals. But this power has nothing to do with the preventive suspension, because this power has not intended to be a penalty. As explained by Senator Francisco A. Rodrigo, sponsor of the bill which later became the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), "suspension cannot be more

than 60 days preventive suspension. Even if the case drags on for six months or a year after 60 days of preventive suspension, the suspended employee is reinstated," (Senate Congressional Record, Vol. II, No. 69, p. 2001). It may be noted that Senator Rodrigo did not make any distinction between the preventive suspension of officers by the President and that by the chief of office or bureau, and Section 35 as passed did not contain any such distinction. Neither is such distinction justifiable, for there is no cogent reason and none has been suggested why the protection granted to subordinate employees is not to be applied to more important public officers. As this Court has ruled in the case of Severino Unabia v. The Hon. City Mayor, et al. (53 O.G., No. 1, pp 133-134) . . . There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service; hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service. This can not be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted to the latter. To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of 1 guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service 2 law. This, it is believed, is not conducive to the maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the integrity of which has, in this jurisdiction, received constitutional guarantee, as it places in the hands of the Chief Executive a weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of tenure of public officers. Of course, this is not so in the case of those officers holding office at the pleasure of the President. But where the tenure of office is fixed, as in the case of herein petitioner, which according to the law he could hold "for 6 years and shall not be removed therefrom except for cause", to sanction the stand of respondents would be to nullify and render useless such specific condition imposed by the law itself. If he could be preventively suspended indefinitely, until the final determination of the administrative charges against him (and under the circumstances, it would be the President himself who would decide the same at a time only he can determine) then the provisions of the law both as to the fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal to only for cause would be meaningless. In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. This would set at naught the laudable purpose of Congress to surround the tenure of office of the Chairman of the National Science Development Board, which is longer than that of the President himself, with all the safeguards compatible with the purpose of maintaining the office of such officer, considering its highly scientific and technological nature, beyond extraneous influences, and of insuring continuity of research and development activities in an atmosphere of stability and detachment so necessary for the fulfillment of its mission, uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause. Upon these considerations, there is unanimity of opinion among the members of this Court that the preventive suspension in the case of officers, although appointed by the President but with a fixed term and removable only for cause, cannot be indefinite. To some of the members, the provisions of Section 35 limiting the duration to 60 days is applicable to herein petitioner, as, in their view, it evinces a legislative policy that preventive suspension of a public officer is not lightly to be resorted to, but only after a previous serious and thorough scrutiny of the charges and that the prompt and continued hear in thereof should not be hampered, both in justice to the suspended officer who is without salary during suspension, and in the interest of public service to avoid as much as possible the interruption of the efficient functioning of the office that the suspended official holds. Other justices, however, are of the opinion that while said period may not apply strictly to cases of presidential appointees facing administrative charges to be decided by the President, the preventive suspension shall nevertheless be limited to a reasonable period, and in the circumstances of the present case, they too believe that the further suspension of

herein petitioner, who has been under preventive suspension since February 18, 1962, would no longer be reasonable. WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered holding petitioner Dr. Paulino J. Garcia entitled to immediate reinstatement to his position as Chairman of the National Science Development Board, without prejudice to the final outcome of the investigation of the charges against him on which no opinion is here expressed. Respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. is hereby ordered to immediately vacate and cease to exercise the functions of the said office and to deliver the same to herein petitioner Paulino J. Garcia. No costs. So ordered. Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Paredes and Regala, JJ., took no part.

x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949

LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. L-2044 Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and Araneta for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents. Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae. L-2756 Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners. Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent. Claro M. Recto as amici curiae. L-3054 Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent. Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae. Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici curiae. L-3055 Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents. V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office. Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae. L-3056 Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents. Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent. x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente, vs. EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.

Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae. TUASON, J.: Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it." Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any force and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any dictum or statement herein which may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis. Act No. 671 in full is as follows: AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency. "SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority. SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide. Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides: In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy. Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results. Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).

It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says: It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may not abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . . . Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the legislature. More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions. Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure. Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war. Section 3 provides:

The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as the initial one. As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight, considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should be prolonged. What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the conventing of that body. It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law. Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to which department of government is authorized to inquire whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in issue. As a matter of fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National Assemblycall that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power and, once

ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we take it that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth and on no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense political or directly derived from the Constitution. Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620 contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this provision is that in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620. The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position to operate. After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."

These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for the good of the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the Philippines. Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the normal operation of the Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is hereby decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be charged. Ozaeta, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions MORAN, C. J., concurring: I agree with the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Tuason, except on the points hereunder discussed. I believe, on the one hand, that the emergency power of the President had ceased not in May 1946, when Congress held its regular sessions, as Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria maintain, but on June 9, 1945, when Congress convened in a special session to consider general legislation. The emergency contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671, is "total emergency" which means the state of actual war involving the Philippines, with the impending invasion and occupation of our country by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization and paralyzation of the Government, principally, the impossibility for the National Assembly to act. This was the only reason and justification for the total relinquishment of legislative power by Congress in favor of the Chief Executive under Commonwealth Act No. 671. Such relinquishment was total because the emergency was also total. Clearly, therefore, the inability of Congress to act was the soul of the law, and the moment such inability ceased, the total emergency also ceased and the law likewise ceased to validly exist. On June 9, 1945, the Congress of the Philippines convened in a special session "to adopt such measures as may be necessary to meet the existing emergency" and "for the purpose of considering general legislation." I hold that from that date, June 9, 1945, Congress was able and ready to act on all matters, and the emergency powers delegated to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671, naturally ceased to exist. Upon the other hand, while I believe that the emergency powers had ceased in June 1945, I am not prepared to hold that all executive orders issued thereafter under Commonwealth Act No. 671, are per se null and void. It must be borne in mind that these executive orders had been issued in good faith and with the best of intentions of three successive Presidents, and some of them may have already produced extensive effects in the life of the nation. We have, for instance, Executive Order No. 73, issued on November 12, 1945, appropriating the sum of P6,750,000 for public works; Executive Order No. 86, issued on January 7, 1946, amending a previous order regarding the organization of the Supreme Court; Executive Order No. 89, issued on January 1, 1946, reorganizing the Courts of First Instance; Executive Order No. 184, issued on November 19, 1948, controlling rice and palay to combat hunger; and other executive orders appropriating funds for other purposes. The consequences of a blanket nullification of these executive orders will be unquestionably serious and harmful. And I hold that before nullifying them, other important circumstances should be inquired into, as for instance, whether or not they

have been ratified by the Congress expressly or impliedly, whether their purposes have already been accomplished entirely or partially, and in last instance, to what extent; acquiescence of litigants; de facto officers; acts and contrast of parties acting in good faith; etc. It is my opinion that each executive order must be viewed in the lights of its peculiar circumstances, and, if necessary and possible, before nullifying it, precautionary measures should be taken to avoid harm to public interest and innocent parties. To illustrate the foregoing proposition of individual consideration of specific cases, shall go into a brief discussion of the executive orders involved in the cases now before this Court. With regard to Executive No. 225 on general appropriation, I hold that the court should not declare it null and void till Congress may have an opportunity to provide a substitute measure for the sustenance of government. This view is predicated upon the principle of absolute necessity. Till Congress may pass a valid appropriation act our government cannot survive without the executive order in question. It would be absurd for this court to declare the cessation of an emergency, and by that same declaration permit, if not abet, the formation of another emergency which would be inevitable if, by reason of lack of appropriation, government shall cease to function. In such cases, when apparently the provisions of our laws and Constitution seem inadequate, the courts must go deeper even than the very Magna Carta itself and find solution in the basic principles of preservation of government and of national survival, which in the last analysis, are the very reasons for the existence of a Constitution. In such extreme cases, as can come from the present situation, it would be the height of judicial imprecision to preserve the form of the constitution, and at the same time permit the disruption and cessation of the government which that same constitution so intricately designed and firmly established. Thus, in the remedy of an evil, we shall cause a far greater one. It may be argued that the course of action I am taking is founded upon fear, fear that Congress will again fail to act on the matter of appropriation, and it may be asserted that the members of the Congress are presumed to be as patriotic as the members of this Court, if not more, and that, therefore, we may rest assured that they will not fail to fulfill their duty. I admit this to be true, and accordingly, I ask what is then the hurry and necessity for nullifying the executive order on appropriation which we are sure will soon be substituted by a valid appropriation act? Why not defer judgment and wait until the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it? I can find no reason against this suggestion except, perhaps, a desire to assert judicial supremacy in a case where judicial statemanship is more necessary. It is also true that the possibility that Congress will again fail to provide funds for the operation of the government is a remote possibility. But there is no harm in providing for all the possibilities, both near and remote. If that remote possibility never comes, well and good, nothing is lost and the situation is saved. However, if the remote possibility does come, and it is not impossible, and we had already nullified the executive order on appropriation, how will the government function and survive? On the other hand, if we defer judgment upon the nullity of such executive order, and that remote possibility does come, we still have the saving lifeline of that executive order which may, perhaps, be tolerated to save the country from chaos, until a more proper and adequate remedy can be secured. With regard to the executive order appropriating funds for the conduct of the coming elections, I uphold the same view as in the foregoing, namely, not in abdicating the power of this court to pass upon the validity of an executive order, but to defer judgment upon such an order until the legislature may provide a substitute measure. The reason for this is, likewise, absolute necessity. Without such Executive Order we may have not elections in November. Elections are the very essence of popular government for the establishment and preservation of which, our Constitution has been consecrated. To permit the unwarranted abolition or even suspension of elections, will surely result either in the denial of popular representation or in the perpetuation in power of those already in office. Either result is revolting to our system of government. Briefly stated, I hold that this court should neither ratify nor nullify this executive order, but should defer judgment in the same manner and for the same reasons stated above in connection with the

executive order on appropriations. The Court, in these cases, is confronted not only with bare issues of law, but with actual anomalous situations pregnant with possible dangers to the nation, and it is the duty of the Court, as a dispenser of justice, to find a solution that is both legal and realistic. With reference to Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses, and Executive Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines, I agree that they must be held null and void upon the reason stated by Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Feria and also upon those stated by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Alex Reyes. My vote, therefore, is that the petitions must be granted in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, G. R. No. L2044; Araneta vs. Angeles, G. R. No. L-2756 and Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-3055, and that judgment must be deferred in Rodriguez vs. El Tesorero de Filipinas, G. R. No. L-3054 and Barredo vs. The Commission on Election, G. R. No. L-3056.

PARAS, J., concurring: I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tuason. I wish to add, however the following observations: Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the legislative intent is to make Commonwealth Act No. 671, effective during the existence of the emergency contemplated therein and that it is within the exclusive province of the political departments to determine whether said emergency continues or has ceased to exist, I am of the conviction that, in view of the formal and unmistakable declarations of both the Congress and the President, said Act No. 671, should be held as having lost its force and effect. It is important to remember that the kind of emergency expressly spoken of in the Act is a total emergency resulting from war and that the Act was passed at a time (December 16, 1941) when there was factually a state of war involving the Philippines. In section 1 of Republic Act No. 342, approved on July 26, 1948, it was categorically declared by the Congress that "since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, but not so with regard to those who have suffered the ravages of war and who have not received any relief for the loss and destruction resulting therefrom," and that "the emergency created by the last war as regards these was sufferers being still existent, it is the declared policy of the state that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in force in a modified form." The President, in turn, in his speech delivered on July 4, 1949, plainly proclaimed that "what emergencies it (the Republic) faces today are incidental passing pains artificially created by seasonal partisanship, very common among democracies but will disappear with the rains that follow the thunderclaps not later than November 8 of this year." We thus have a formal declaration on the part of the Congress that the emergency created by the last war exists as regards only those debtors whose war damage claims have not been settled by the United States Philippine War Damage Commission (section 2, Republic Act No. 342), patently meaning that said emergency is, at most, a partial emergency. It is needless to point out that only a small portion of the Philippine population are debtors and not all of those who are debtors are war damage claimants. We also have the solemn declaration on the part of the President that the emergencies faced by the Republic are incidental emergencies artificially created by seasonal partisanship, clearly meaning that such emergencies not only are not total but are not the result of war.

If the emergency is, as admitted by the Congress, not total and, as admitted by the President, not the result of the war, Commonwealth Act No. 671 has lost its basis and cannot legally give rise to the executive orders herein involved. Indeed, it is not pretended that said orders are intended to meet any emergency growing out of the last war. Lack of a budget, an appropriation for the elections, or an import control law, has been brought about by the inaction of the Congress unaffected by the last war, and such emergency, if it may be called so, is not of the kind contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671. The government has for four years since liberation been normally functioning; election had been regularly held; a national census had been taken; Congress had held regular and special session; "people travel freely most everywhere and more quickly, by land, sea and air, to an extent that was not hitherto enjoyed," and "business is more brisk than ever, goods are plentiful, our people even in the remotest communities and barrios of the country are better dressed, their diet has been immensely improved, and they look more healthy than they ever did" (President's fifth monthly radio chat, March 15, 1949); and the sporadic depredations of the outlaws in isolated areas of the country are but the last paroxysms of a dying movement (President's Stateof-the-Nation Message, January 24, 1949), all these certainly negative the existence of any real (much less total) emergency. That the Congress had heretofore recognized the cessation of the emergency is conclusively established by the fact that it had assumed the task of directly enacting, during its past sessions, measures dealing with all the matters covered by the specific legislative powers conceded to the President in Commonwealth Act No. 671. This is in line with the fundamental reason for the approval of said Act, as may be gathered from the following statement of President Quezon: "When it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942, the National Assembly passed into history approving a resolution which reaffirmed the abiding faith of the Filipino people in, and their loyalty to, the United States. The assembly also enacted a law granting the President of the Philippines all the powers that under the Philippine Constitution may be delegated to him in time of war." (The Good Fight, pp. 204205.) When President Quezon said "in time of war", he undoubtedly meant factual war, a situation that existed at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Indeed, the dissenters admit that any delegated power directly exercised by the principal is considered withdrawn from the agent. A cursory examination of Commonwealth Act No. 671 will show that the legislative function therein specified had been discharged by the Congress. The following illustrates the powers delegated in the Act and the measures enacted by the Congress itself covering each: Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 671

(b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Departments: Republic Act No. 51 Act authorizing the President of the Philippines to reorganize within one year the different Executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and their instrumentalities of the government, including the corporations owned or controlled by it. (Approved, October 4, 1946.) (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing: Commonwealth Act No. 732 An Act to create the Department of Foreign Affairs and to authorize the President of the Philippines to organize said department as well as the foreign service of the Republic of the Philippines. (Approved, July 3, 1946.) (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character: Commonwealth Act No. 709 An Act appropriating the sum of five million pesos to enable the national housing commission to resume its functions" (Approved, November 1, 1945.) Commonwealth Act No. 710 An Act to appropriate funds to continue the payment of Retirement gratuities or pensions under existing laws. (Approved, November 1, 1945.) (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence: Republic Act No. 215

(a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities: Republic Act No. 333 An Act to establish the Capital of the Philippines and the permanent seat of the National Government, to create a capital city planning commission, to appropriate funds for the acquisition of private estates within the boundary limits of said city, and to authorize the issuance of bonds of the National Government for the acquisition of private estates, for the subdivision thereof, and for the construction of streets, bridges, waterworks, sewerage and other municipal improvements in the capital City. (Approved, July 17, 1948.)

An Act to amend Section One of the Republic Act numbered eighty-one providing a new time limit for the waiver of, and/or extension of the period, within which to perform, accomplish or comply with, any term, condition, or stipulation required of locators, holders, lessees, operators of mining claims or concessions, and of water rights and timber concessions with the mining industry and the condonation of mining, specific and real estate taxes, under certain terms and conditions. (Approved, June 1, 1948.) Ley No. 321 de la Republica

Ley que eleva los derechos de transferencia de ganado mayor, enmendado al efecto el articulo quinientos veintiochos del Codigo Administrativo Revisado. (Apobada, Junio 9, 1948.) (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of proceeds thereof: Republic Act No. 265 An Act establishing the Central Bank of the Philippines . . . . (Section 87 [e] No. 7.) Approved, June 15, 1948.) Republic Act No. 266 An Act appropriating such sums as may from time to time be released by the Central Bank representing excess monetary reserves, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to issue bonds, certificates or other evidences of indebtedness covering such amounts. (Approved, June 15, 1948.) Republic Act No. 85 An Act creating the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. (Section 2 [f].) (Approved, Oct. 29, 1946.) (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal government to incur in overdrafts for the purposes that he may approve: Various Appropriation Acts. (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments of debts: Republic Act No. 342, approved, July 26, 1948. (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority. The powers included in this subdivision (i) are of course covered by hundreds of other acts approved by the Congress which, it cannot be denied, all tend to "enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Moreover, the withdrawal of the greater and more important powers may be presumed to have carried the accessory and less important powers. There is no merit in the contention that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was enacted by virtue of the war powers of the Congress. As the Act itself expressly states, its basis is section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution which merely authorizes delegation of legislative powers to the President in times of war or other national emergency. The phrase "in times of war or other national emergency" is solely indicative or descriptive of the occasions during which the delegation may be extended and does not classify the act of delegating legislative functions as a war power. It must be borne in mind that said section 26 is peculiar to our Constitution, with the result that the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cited on behalf of the respondents,

expounding the theory that the exercise by the President of his war powers granted by the Congress cannot be interfered with by the courts, are not controlling. Particularly, the case of Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883, in which the opinion of the United States Supreme Court was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, cannot apply, for the further reason that it merely involved the power of deportation which, even in our jurisdiction, is recognized, it being the rule here that the courts cannot control the right of the Chief Executive to determine the existence or sufficiency of the facts justifying an order of deportation. Upon the other hand, the war power of the President is separately covered by section 10, paragraph (2), of Article VII, and that of the Congress by section 25. Article VI, of the Constitution, which are not invoked for the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 671. MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring and dissenting:. The majority opinion holds that Executive Order No. 62 dated June 21, 1947; Executive Order No. 192 dated December 24, 1948; and Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 both dated June 15, 1949 were issued without authority of law and therefore illegal and of no legal force and effect. I concur only in the result. Ordinarily, such concurrence without comment or explanation would be sufficient and satisfactory. However, in view of the radical difference between the reasons had and given by the majority in arriving at the result and those entertained by me, and considering the transcendental importance of these cases, not only because of the vast amounts of public funds and the rights of citizens affected but also of the principles of law involved, and the fact that not only the force and the effect of a law (Commonwealth Act No. 671) but also the legality and the force and effect of numerous executive orders issued by several Presidents during a period of about three years, affecting as they do not only citizens, their interest and their properties but also the different departments and offices of the Government, I deem it my duty to set forth my views and the reasons in support of the same. There is a claim made about lack of personality of some of the parties-petitioners particularly, the petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056. Much could be said for and against that claim, but I am willing to brush aside all defenses and technicalities on this point in order to be able to consider and decide the more important question of the legality of the executive orders involved and whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force. The aforementioned executive orders were issued on the straight of and by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. The majority holds that Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to have any force and effect on May 25, 1946 when Congress first convened in regular session after liberation. In This, I disagree for I believe and hold that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and in effect. But despite this view, I am not of the opinion that the executive orders under consideration were issued without authority. Starting with Executive Order No. 62, we find that it deals with and regulates houses and lot rentals. If the legislature had not already acted and legislated on this matter since the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, this would be a proper field for Presidential action. However, the legislature had already promulgated Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, regulating house rentals and, as late as the month of May, 1947, Congress passed House Bill No. 978 further amending Commonwealth Act No. 689. In other words, in thus acting, the Legislature had already shown its readiness and ability to legislate on this matter, and had withdrawn it from the realm of presidential legislation or regulation under the powers delegated by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Not only this, but in issuing rules and regulations in the form of executive orders under his delegated powers, the Chief Executive merely acts as an agent of the legislature, his principal which made the delegation. As such agent, he cannot go against the policy and expressed desire of his principal.

There are radical differences between Commonwealth Act No. 689, Republic Act No. 66, and House Bill No. 978 on one side and Executive Order No. 62 on the other. That was the reason why President Roxas vetoed House Bill No. 978, believing in good faith that it would not solve and remedy the problem of house rentals as explained by him in his communication to the House of Representatives of June 21, 1947, setting forth his views on the bill. The President may not and could not substitute his opinion however excellent or superior for that of the legislature on matters of legislation when Congress has already acted and expressed its opinion and desire on the matter. With respect to Executive Order No. 192, it will be remembered that Congress passed Commonwealth Act No. 728, approved on July 2, 1946, authorizing the President to regulate, curtail, control, and prohibit the exportation of certain products, merchandise and materials. Under said authority the President issued Executive Order No. 3 dated July 10, 1946, later amending section 2 of said Executive Order by issuing Executive Order No. 23 dated November 1, 1946, regulating the exportation of certain products, materials and merchandise. The important thing to consider is that section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 provided that the authority it granted to the President shall terminate on December 31, 1948, that is to say, that after said date the Executive could no longer validly regulate exports under said law. The President, however, overlooked or ignored said injunction and invoking his emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, promulgated Executive Order No. 192 regulating exports, to take effect on January 1, 1949. What was said with regard to Executive Order No. 62 is applicable to the lack of authority of the Executive to promulgate Executive Order No. 192, namely, that on this matter of export control, the legislature had already withdrawn it from the jurisdiction of the Executive under his emergency powers after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 728. Any Presidential power or authority on the subject of export control was derived from said Act. Not only this, but when in section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 728 the legislature terminated the authority given the President to regulate and control exports on December 31, 1948 and failed or refused to renew said authority, the inference or conclusion and that after said date Congress deemed any presidential regulation on exports unnecessary and inadvisable. Therefore, in promulgating Executive Order No. 192 the Chief Executive acted not only without legislative authority but also against the wishes and policy of Congress. This he may not validly do. With respect to Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the considerations made with regard to Executive Orders Nos. 62 and 192 are equally applicable. By previously enacting necessary legislation on the yearly Government appropriation and on the appropriation of funds for the expenses incurred in national elections, Congress has shown its readiness and ability to cope with the financial problems of the Government on this point. Republic Act No. 80, approved October 22, 1946, appropriating funds for the operation of National Government from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947; Republic Act No. 156 appropriating funds for the fiscal year 1947-48 and Republic Act No. 320, the appropriation law for the fiscal year 1948-49 show that Congress was in a position and able to provide for the yearly expenditures of the Government. And Republic Act No. 73 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray election expenses on March 11, 1947; Republic Act No. 147 appropriating P1,000,000 to defray expenses for the election of provincial city and municipal officials and eight senators held on November 11, 1947, and Republic Act No. 235 appropriating P100,000 for the special elections held on March 23, 1948, to fill vacancies in Representative District No. 4 of Iloilo and No. 1 of Leyte, demonstrated the ability of the Congress to appropriate money for election purposes. By so doing Congress had tacitly and impliedly withdrawn this portion of the field where the President may under his emergency power legislate or promulgate rules and regulations. In this connection, it may be stated that in my opinion, the theory underlying the delegation of emergency powers to the under Commonwealth Act No. 671 and the similar laws is that the legislature because of the emergency resulting from the war, would be unable to meet in order to legislate or although able to meet, because of the emergency, the ordinary process of legislation would be too slow and inadequate and could not cope with the emergency. So, as a remedy, the power and authority of legislation are vested temporarily in the hands of one man, the Chief

Executive. But as regards Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, the legislature has demonstrated that not only it could meet but also it could legislate on this point of appropriations by approving general appropriation laws for the different fiscal years since liberation as well as appropriations for the necessary funds for the different national and provincial elections. Consequently, there no longer was any necessity for Presidential legislation in this regard. Moreover, and this is not unimportant, the failure of the Legislature to pass an appropriation law for the fiscal year 194950 and a law appropriating funds for the elections in November, 1949 was not due to any emergency resulting from the war, contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 671, but rather and possibly due to lack of time and because of the rather abrupt and adjourning of the last session of the Legislature last May. As already stated, the majority holds that Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect on May 25, 1946. The other view is that it is still in force. To me this is the main and the more important issue involved in these cases. In fact the argument of the parties centered on this point. The importance of this issue may readily be appreciated when it is realized that on its determination is based, not only the validity or nullity (according to the theory of the majority opinion), of the four Executive Orders now under consideration, but also of all the Executive Orders promulgated under authority of Commonwealth Act No. 671 after May 25, 1946, up to the present time. Its determination will also decide whether or not the President may still exercise his emergency powers in the future on matters and subjects not heretofore withdrawn by the Legislature. Because of my disagreement with the majority on this point, I deem it necessary to explain and elaborate on my reasons for my disagreement. For purposes of reference and to facilitate the same, I am reproducing Commonwealth Act No. 671 in full as well as section 26, Article VI of the Constitution on which said Act is based: AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY. Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency. SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorize, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the heads of Executive Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal

governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payments of debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce the authority. SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide. In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry our a declared national policy. (Section 26, Article VI, Constitution.) I fully agree with the majority when in its opinion it says: Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be sub-served, and its relation to the Constitution. (Page 5, majority opinion.) The main thesis of the majority is that the only reason for the delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive under the Constitution, such as was done under Commonwealth Act No. 671 was because due to the emergency resulting from the war, the Legislature could not meet to enact legislation; that the moment of Legislature could convene there would no longer be any reason for the exercise by the President of emergency powers delegated to him; that if, when the Legislature could meet and actually is in session, the President is allowed to exercise his delegated legislative powers, there would be the serious anomaly of two legislative bodies acting at the same time, namely, the Legislature and the Executive, "mutually nullifying each other's action" ; that the limited period fixed in Commonwealth Act No. 671 for its life and effectiveness as required by the Constitution is the interval from the passage of said Act and the moment that Congress could convene, not in special session where its power of legislation is limited by the Chief Executive in his call for special session, but in regular session where it could be free to enact general legislation; and that unless this automatic ending or cessation of Act No. 671 is so held, there would be need of another Act or legislation by the Congress to repeal Act No. 671 in which case, the Chief Executive may by his veto power effectively block any effort in this direction. I beg to differ with the foregoing thesis. I believe that, as I already had occasion to state though incidentally, the real reason for the delegation of legislative powers to the Chief Executive is not only because the Legislature is unable to meet due to a national emergency but also because although it could and does actually meet, whether in regular or special session, it is not in a position and able to cope with the problems brought about by and arising from the emergency, problems which require urgent and immediate action. Certainly, one man can act more quickly and expeditiously than about one hundred members of the Legislature, especially when they are divided into legislative chambers. That is why in times of emergency, much as we in democratic countries dislike the system or idea of dictatorship, we hear of food dictator, fuel dictator, transportation dictator, civilian evacuation dictator, etc., where the functions which ordinarily belong to a council or board or to a legislative body, are entrusted under certain limitations to one single official or individual.

Supposing that during a national emergency and while the Legislature is in session, the legislators woke up one morning to find that there was extreme scarcity of imported food, fuel, building materials, equipment required in agriculture and industry, etc., because of a monopoly, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, private controls and profiteering, or that there were wide-spread lockouts and strikes paralyzing transportation, commerce and industry, or rampant espionage or sabotage endangering the very life and security of the nation. How much time would it take the legislature to enact the necessary legislation in order to cope with the situation and pass the necessary emergency measures? We are familiar with the practice and routine of enacting laws. A bill is introduced in the Legislature; it is referred to the corresponding committee, it is studied by said committee, which in some cases holds public hearings; the committee discusses the bill and sometimes introduces amendments; if the bill is not killed in the committee or shelved, it is submitted to the chamber for study, discussion and possible amendment by all the members; it is finally voted and if approved, it is sent to the other house where it undergoes the same process; and if it is finally approved by both houses of Congress, it is submitted to the Chief Executive for his study and approval or veto. All these may consume weeks or months as a result of which, ordinarily, many bills finally approved by the Congress could be sent to the President for approval or veto only after adjournment of the legislative session. And we should not overlook the fact that in some cases for lack of time of due to disagreement among the legislators or between the two houses of Congress, important pieces of legislations like the annual appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-50, appropriation of funds for the election to be held in November, 1949, contained in Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, involved in the present cases, and the proposed amendment to the Election Code etc. have not been passed by Congress in its last session ending last May, 1949, which session lasted one hundred days. If we were to rely on the ordinary process of legislation to meet a national emergency, by the time the necessary and needed law is passed, the situation sought to be remedied, or the problem sought to be solved may have become disastrous or ended in calamity or gone beyond legislation or any remedy. It would be too late. It would be like locking the stable door after the horse had been stolen. Now, for some retrospect. The Philippine National Assembly delegated its legislative powers because of the existence of a state of national emergency as early as the year 1939. During its second special session of that year, it promulgated the following laws: (a) Commonwealth Act No. 494, authorizing the President of the Philippines to suspend until the time of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly, either wholly or partially and under such conditions as he may deem proper, the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444, commonly known as the Eight Hour Labor Law; (b) Commonwealth Act No. 496, authorizing the President to take over, for use or operation by the Government, any public service or enterprise and to pay just compensation in the manner to be determined by him and to prescribe and promulgate regulations he may deem essential to carry out the purposes of the Act; (c) Commonwealth Act No. 498 declaring a state of national emergency due to a state of war among several nations and as a measure to prevent scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculations, profiteering, etc. affecting the supply, distribution movement of foods, clothing, fuel, building materials, agricultural equiptments etc. authorized the President to purchase any of the articles or commodities available for storage, for re-sale or distribution, to fix the maximum selling price of said articles or commodities and to promulgated such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary; and

(d) Commonwealth Act No. 500 authorizing the President in view of the existence of a state of national emergency to reduce the expenditures of the executive departments of the Government by the suspension or abandonment of service, activities, or operations of no immediate importance. At the time, September, 1939 the second world war was only in Europe, quite far from the Philippines and had just begun. There was then no likelihood of the Philippines being involved in the war until more than two years later, in December, 1941. The National Assembly was then free to meet either in regular or special session to enact legislation to meet the emergency. In fact, it met in regular session in January, 1941 lasting 100 days and in January, 1941 for another regular session of 100 days, excluding the several special session held during those two years. And yet the Assembly delegated legislative powers to the President under section 26, Article II of the Constitution. This is clear proof that, contrary to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President even when it could meet and it actually met several times. After passing the Acts just mentioned delegating legislative powers to the President, the Assembly in its fourthly special session on August 19, 1940 repeated and reiterated this practice and policy by passing Commonwealth Act No. 600 delegating additional and more extensive powers to the President in spite of the fact that the war was still far away in Europe and there was no danger or prospect of involving the Philippines, and the Legislature was still free to meet as in fact it met again in regular session in January, 1941. During its regular session begun that month and year, instead of stopping or ending the legislative powers delegated to the President, because according to the theory of the majority opinion, the Legislature was able to meet, the Assembly allowed them to continue by passing Commonwealth Act No. 620 which merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 600. I repeat that all this, far from supporting the view of the majority that the Legislature delegated legislative powers to the President only because it could not meet, fairly and squarely refutes said view. Now, let us consider the theory of the majority that it would be a great anomaly to have two legislative bodies, the Legislature and the President to be acting at the same time, each nullifying the acts of the other. I fail to see the suggested anomaly. In fact, under the view and interpretation given by the majority of the delegation of contemplated the simultaneous functioning of the Legislature and the President, both exercising legislative powers. And it is a fact that there were several instances of the legislature and the President both validly and simultaneously exercising legislative powers. Under section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 496 already referred to, approved on September 30, 1939, the power delegated to the President to prescribe rules and regulations he may deem essential to carry out the purposes of the Act, namely, the taking over of and operation by the Government of any public service or enterprise and to pay for the same, was to last until the date of the adjournment of the next regular session of the National Assembly. This means that, during the regular session of the Assembly which begun in January, 1940 and lasted 100 days, the President could exercise the emergency powers delegated to him. Again, under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 the President could and indeed he exercised his emergency powers during the regular session of the Assembly which began in January, 1941, when President Quezon issued at least nine Executive Orders numbered 321, 333, 335, 337, 339, 340, 342, 344 and 345. The same thing obtains under Commonwealth Act 671. Since under the view of the majority the emergency power of the President granted him in Commonwealth Act No. 671 ended only on May 25, 1946, then the extensive legislative powers delegated to the President under that Act could be exercised and in fact they were exercised during the five special session of Congress in the year 1945, which lasted a total of 84 days. During those special session of 1945, President Osmea issued several Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers.

Is there further proof needed to show that the suggested and feared anomaly and impropriety of the Legislature and the Executive both exercising legislative functions simultaneously, is more fancied than real? The situation was contemplated and expressly intended by the Legislature itself, evidently believing that said condition or state of affairs was neither anomalous nor improper. There is to my mind really no incompatibility. At such a time and during the period of their simultaneous functioning, the Legislature may perform its ordinary legislative duties taking its time to study, consider, amend and pass bills, reserving to the President matters requiring and demanding immediate action. After all, it is for the Legislature to say whether it wants the President to exercise his emergency powers at the same time that it is in session. It may validly and properly stipulate in its grant of emergency powers that they be exercised when the Legislature is not in session. In fact, in one instance, in Commonwealth Act No. 500, section 2, the Notional Assembly expressly provided "that the authority herein given shall be exercised only when the National Assembly is not in session." When in its other acts of delegation, like Commonwealth Act 671, the Legislature not only fails to stipulate this condition, but on the contrary, contemplates Presidential exercise of legislative powers simultaneously with the Legislature, it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended it and saw nothing improper or anomalous in it, and it is not for the Court to pass upon the supposed impropriety or anomaly. As to the possibility of the Chief Executive validly and successfully nullifying the acts of the Legislature, to me that is quite remote, if not impossible. As already stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Chief Executive acting as an agent of the Legislative under his emergency powers, may not go against the wishes and policies of his principal. He can only carry out its wishes and policies, and where his acts and orders run counter to those of the Legislature, or operate on a field already withdrawn because the Legislature had already acted therein, his acts or Executive Orders must give way and will be declared void and of no effect, by the Courts, as we are doing with the Executive Orders involved in these cases. With respect to the claim of the majority opinion that unless the emergency powers were made to end at the time the President made his report to Congress when it convened, it would be necessary to enact new legislation to repeal the act of delegation, in which case the period for the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite, and uncertain, contrary to the constitutional provision, I may say that the President was authorized by Act 671 to exercise emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency," and not a day longer. To me that is a limited period in contemplation of the Constitution. There would be no need for a new law to repeal the Act of delegation, for said Act is self-liquidating. The moment the emergency ceases, the law itself automatically ceases to have force and effect, and the Presidential emergency powers also end with it. Under my view, had the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese forces, which we feared and expected in December, 1941 failed to materialize either because the invasion was repelled or because the Japanese high command at the last moment decided to by-pass the Philippines and divert his forces further south to invade, say Australia, or if the Pacific war had ended as we all or most of us then expected it to end sooner within weeks or months after its commencement and that the emergency resulting therefrom had also ceased soon thereafter, Commonwealth Act No. 671 would have automatically ceased to have force and effect right in the year 1942 without any affirmative act or law of the Legislature. There would be no point or reason for the President to continue exercising emergency powers when there no longer was any emergency. But under the view of the majority, emergency or no emergency even if Congress could meet in special session to enact general legislation, the country must continue to be ruled by the Presidential decree until the next regular session of Congress which may not come till may months later. In my opinion this is not logical. To me the real and only reason and test for the continuance of the exercise of emergency powers is the continued existence of the emergency, not the inability of the Congress to meet in regular session.

The majority, and the parties who initiated these proceedings in court fear that the President may promulgate rules and regulations contrary in purpose and effect to legislation enacted by the Legislature; that he may reenact his rules and regulations after being repealed by the legislature, and that he may even veto a bill passed by Congress repealing the Act of delegation and ending his emergency powers. It is a fear not well founded. It runs counter to the presumption that the Chief Executive like any other public official would perform his functions and conduct himself in every respect for the good and welfare of the people and in accordance with the Constitution. It is fear based on the presumption that the Legislature and the Chief Executive are at loggerheads, working at cross purposes and that the President though acting as a mere agent of his principal, the legislature, would brazenly repudiate his principal and even challenge its authority, and that the Chief Executive is so much in love with his emergency powers that he would perpetuate them by going as far as vetoing an act of Congress ending said emergency powers. Let it be said to the credit of and in justice to the different Chief Executives who have wielded these emergency powers, President Quezon, Osmea, Roxas and the present incumbent President Quirino, that no accusing finger has ever been pointed at them, accusing or even insinuating that they have abused their emergency powers or exercised them for any purpose other than the welfare of the country, or that they had maliciously acted contrary to the wishes of the Legislatures. Even after liberation there has been no claim not even from the Legislatures itself, to the knowledge of this Court, at least to that of the undersigned, that any Chief Executive exercised his delegated powers, knowing that they had ended or had abused the same. There is no charge or insinuation that any of the Executive Orders which we are now holding to be invalid were issued from the ulterior motives or to further and favor the political interest of the President issuing them. It is admitted in the majority opinion that Executive Order No. 62, seeking to regulate house and lot rentals was issued in good faith by President Roxas. Executive Order No. 192 was issued to regulate exports, President Quirino presumably believing that exports at this time still needed regulation and control as was formerly provided by Congress in its Act No. 728, and that the matter was still within the field of his emergency powers as was also mistakenly believed by President Roxas in issuing Executive Order No. 52. As to Executive Order No. 226, it merely appropriated funds to defray the expenses in connection with the holding of the national elections in November, 1949, without which, said election could not be held. With respect to Executive Order No. 225, it merely continues in force Republic Act 320 which appropriated funds for the last fiscal year inasmuch as Congress had failed to pass a General Appropriation Act for the operation of the National Government for the period beginning July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950. There is no insinuation that any political motives or purposes are involved in these Executive Orders. I agree with the majority that since the Constitution provides that the delegation of legislative powers by the Legislature should be done for a limited period, it is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. I even agree to its definition of the word "limited." But I submit that Commonwealth Act No. 671 itself, limited its operation and effectiveness to and make it coextensive with the duration of the emergency resulting from the war and that furthermore, that duration is a limited period within the meaning and contemplation of the Constitution. Surely the emergency resulting from the war contemplated by the National Assembly when it acted Act No. 671 is not permanent or indefinite. It is of limited duration. It may be long or it may be short; but it cannot be for always. It has an end. Presumably the members of the National Assembly thought that the emergency would not last as long as it did. The belief entertained at the time by not a few, in fact by a great portion of the people here not excluding the legislators, was that the war with Japan would be of short duration, a question of months at the longest; that American reinforcements would come at the beginning of the year 1942 and drive away the invading Japanese armies if they ever were able to occupy the Philippines and that, consequently, the war as far as these islands were concerned and the resulting emergency would soon pass away. The wisdom or lack of wisdom of the National Assembly in limiting or rather making the life and effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671 coextensive with the resulting emergency, viewed in the light of what had actually happened, cannot be passed upon this Court. So, as I see it, so long as the emergency resulting

from the War continues, Commonwealth Act No. 671 subsists and so long the Chief Executive retains his emergency powers. The majority believes that as already stated, Act No. 671 was in force only until Congress could meet resume its legislatives functions. Naturally, this view is based on the theory that legislative functions in times of emergency are delegated only because of the inability of the Legislative Department to meet and exercise its functions. I believe I have successfully demonstrated the flaw in this theory, not only by showing that the real reason underlying the delegation of legislative powers is not inability of Legislature to meet but rather it inability to consider and pass legislation in time to meet an emergency which requires as it does urgent and immediate action and can be solved only by the exercise of legislative functions by one single responsible individual, unhamppered by study and prolonged discussion by many members of the legislative body, but also by the fact that although since 1939 when the second world war broke out in Europe and for a period of more than two years thereafter, when the National Assembly could still meet and in fact convened on several occasions and for hundreds of days in regular and special session, nevertheless, it had been delegating legislative powers to the President. The majority view finds no support in the law. Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution does not impose this condition or requirement. The only important conditions imposed by the Constitution are that there be a national emergency and delegation be for a limited period. The same thing is true with Act No. 671 which makes the delegation. The only condition imposed by section 2 of said Act is that the delegated powers be exercised during the emergency. Neither in the Constitution nor in Commonwealth Act No. 671 is there any hint or insinuation, much less express mention about the inability of the Legislature to meet. When every consideration for clearness and for Executive and Judicial guidance loudly called for and demanded an unequivocal and clear expression of Constitutional and legislative intent, both laws, the source and basis of the emergency powers are conspicuously silent on this point. The only conclusion is that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the members of the National Assembly had thought of much less intended to impose this condition. To sustain the majority view would require reading into the law what is not there. In further support of its view that emergency powers may be exercised by the President only until the Legislature could meet, the majority finds comfort in and cites section 3 of Act 671 which reads as follows: SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. I fail to see anything in said section that warrants a holding that upon filing his report with Congress, about the rules and regulation promulgated by him under his emergency powers under Commonwealth Act 671, his emergency powers automatically ceased. I could well imagine that under an act of delegation of legislative powers where the President is authorized to perform one single act such as the suspension of the eight-hour labor law under Commonwealth Act No. 494, or the reduction of the expenditures of the executive departments of the National Government by the suspension or abandonment of services, activities or operations of no immediate necessity under Commonwealth Act No. 500, when the President has exercised his delegated authority and made his report to the Assembly as required by said laws, the latter, as well as his delegated authority thereunder automatically ceased, for the simple reason that nothing remains to be performed or done. However, treating of the grant of extensive emergency powers as was done under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671 where said laws contemplated many different acts, rules and regulations of varied categories and objectives and to be performed not at one at time or instance but at different times during the existence of the emergency, as the need or occasion arose, there is no reason for the belief or the holding that upon submitting a partial report, the whole law making the delegation including his powers under it automatically ended. The legislature during the emergency might be able to convene and naturally, the President will immediately make his report to it of the rules and regulations promulgated by him up to that time; but if the emergency continued or even

became more serious, would it be reasonable to hold that his emergency powers ended right then and there? Would it not be more logical and reasonable to believe that inasmuch as the grant and the exercise of his emergency powers were motivated by and based upon the existence of the emergency and since the emergency continued his work and responsibility were not ended and that his partial report could not possibly affect the continuance of his emergency powers? Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671 provides for the filing of a report with Congress by the President as soon as that body convened. According to the majority opinion on that date the whole Act No. 671 ceased to have force and effect. Under that theory, as soon as the Congress convened in June, 1945, and it is to be presumed that President Osmea, complying with his duty, must have made his report of all the numerous Executive Orders he had issued so far, perhaps including those issued by his predecessor President Quezon who because of his premature death was unable to report his acts to Congress, the President automatically lost his emergency powers. But the majority opinion qualifies this convening of the Congress, for it says that it must be a regular session and not a special session, thereby extending the life of Commonwealth act No. 671 one year longer, to May, 1946 when Congress held its first regular session after liberation. I do not quite see the necessity or the reason for the distinction made between the special and regular session, for at both sessions Congress could well receive the report of the President. The reason given is that "in a special session Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate." But as a matter of fact, the first two special sessions called by President Osmea in 1945, after liberation, each for a period of thirty days were both to consider general legislation. So, actually there is no reason for the distinction. Furthermore, if it were the intention of the Legislature to fix the time at which Commonwealth Act No. 671 would cease in its operation as of the date when the President could file his report before Congress when it first convened not in special session but in regular session, it would have expressly and unequivocally said so. In its other acts of delegation of powers when the legislature wanted to have the report of the President at its regular session, it expressly and explicitly said so. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act 494, in section 5 of Commonwealth Act 496, in section 6 of Commonwealth Act 498, in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 500 and in section 4 of Commonwealth Act 600, the National Assembly provided that the President shall report to the National Assembly within ten days after the opening of the next regular session of the said Assembly of whatever acts have been taken by him under the authority of those Acts. The Assembly left nothing for interpretation or speculation. In section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, however, the same Assembly has not specified the kind of session before which the President should make his report. It merely said that upon the convening of the Congress the President shall report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him. We should make no distinction where the law makes or calls for none. Here again, to support the majority opinion would require reading into the law, section 3 of Act 671, something that is not there. In case like the present where there is room for doubt as to whether or not Commonwealth Act No. 671 has ceased to operate, one view (of the majority) being that it automatically ceased to have any force and effect on May 25, 1946, the other view being that the law operated as long as the emergency resulting from the war existed, the opinion of and the obvious interpretation given by the legislature which enacted the law and made the delegation of powers and the President to whom the delegation was made and who exercised said powers, should have much if not decisive weight. We must bear in mind that we are not passing upon the validity or constitutionality of a law enacted by the Legislature, in which case, the Court may find the act invalid and unconstitutional if it is in violation of the basic law, regardless of the opinion or interpretation given by the Legislature that passed it or of the Executive Department which may be trying to enforce it. We assume that Act No. 671 is valid and constitutional. Here, we are merely trying to ascertain the intention of the National Assembly as to the life and period of effectiveness of Commonwealth Act No. 671.

Do the study and analysis of other acts of the Legislature similar to Commonwealth Act 671, favor the view of the majority? The answer in my opinion is clearly and decidedly in the negative. The majority cites the Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 to support the theory that Commonwealth Act 671 automatically ceased to operate Congress met at its next regular session. But the logical inference or conclusion to be drawn from these two acts is, in my opinion, just the reverse. It is even fatal to the view of the majority as I shall attempt to show. Let us consider Commonwealth Act 600 delegating extensive legislative powers to the President, approved on August 19, 1940, which like Act 671 is silent as to any express provision regarding its life or period of effectiveness, and as to how long the emergency powers granted the President by it will last. Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 600 like section 3 of Act 671 provides that "the President shall within the first ten days from the date of the opening of the Assembly's next regular session report to said Assembly whatever action he had taken under the authority therein granted." Said section 4 of Act 600 is clearly and more specific than section 3 of Act 671 in that it clearly specifies the next regular session whereas the latter refers merely to the convening of Congress. But let us assume arguendo as contended by the majority that "the convening of the Congress" mentioned in section 3 of Commonwealth Act 671, referred to regular session. According to the majority opinion, under section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 600, as soon as the President made the report of the National Assembly at its "next regular session" which was to be and was actually held in January, 1941, Commonwealth Act 600 automatically ceased to operate and the President automatically lost his delegated legislative powers. But this contrary to the very view of the National Assembly which passed said Act 600. Commonwealth Act No. 620 of the National Assembly passed during that "next regular session" and approved on June 6, 1941 merely amended section 1 of Commonwealth Act 600, which enumerated the powers delegated to the Chief Executive. It left the rest of the provisions and sections of Commonwealth Act 600 intact. So that, under section 4 (which was left intact) of Act 600, the President was still required to report to National Assembly within the first 10 days from the date of the opening of its next regular session which should have begun in January, 1942, despite the fact that he had already made a report to the Legislature in January, 1941. Incidentally, this answer and refutes the contention of the majority that the law of delegation of powers contemplated only one meeting of the Congress at which the President was to report his acts of emergency, and that said report was to be the first and the last. Now, what inference may be drawn from this amending of section 1 only of Commonwealth Act No. 600 by Commonwealth Act No. 620? The logical conclusion is that in promulgating Commonwealth Act 620 on June 6, 1941, the National Assembly all along regarded Commonwealth Act No. 600 which delegated legislative powers to the President as still in force and effect despite the report filed with the Assembly by the President at the beginning of its regular session in January, 1941. When the Legislature merely amends a section of a law, leaving the rest of said law intact and unchanged, the logical inference and conclusion is that the amended law was still in force because you cannot amend a law which is no longer in force. The only thing that could be done with a law that has ceased to operate is to reenact it. But in passing Commonwealth Act 620 in July, 1941, the Assembly did not reenacted Commonwealth Act No. 600. By merely amending one of its sections, the Assembly, as late as June 1941, considered said Act 600 as still effective and in operation and consequently, the emergency powers of the President continued and subsisted despite his previously having made a report of his actions in January 1941. This squarely refutes the theory that as soon as the President filed his report on the exercise of his emergency powers with the Legislature, the Act making the delegation ceased to operate and the President lost his emergency powers. As I have already stated in the course of this opinion, in connection with another phrase of this case from January to June, 1941, President Quezon had issued at least eight Executive Orders in the exercise of his emergency powers, by authority of Commonwealth Act 600. From this it is evident that he did not share the majority view, because despite his having made his report to the Assembly in January, 1941, and even before the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 620, he believed and considered Commonwealth Act No. 600 as still in force after that date and that he still retained his emergency powers.

Then, let us see what was the attitude and conduct of the Chief Executive and of Congress after May 25, 1946, when according to the majority opinion Commonwealth Act No. 671 ceased to operate. After May 25, 1946, two Presidents, Roxas and Quirino had issued numerous Executive Orders based upon and invoking Commonwealth Act No. 671. Like President Quezon, they also evidently were of the opinion that despite the meeting of the Legislature in regular session the act delegating legislative powers to them (in the case of Roxas and Quirino Commonwealth Act No. 671) was still in force, that they still retained their emergency powers and so proceeded to exercise them in good faith. Congress also, evidently, believed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force and effect after said date, May 25, 1946. In spite of the several legislative sessions, regular and special since then and up to and including the year 1949, Congress has not by law or resolution said anything questioning or doubting the validity of said Executive Order on the score of having been promulgated after Commonwealth Act No. 671 had supposedly ceased to operate. Not only this, but at least in one instance, Congress had by a law promulgated by it, considered one of those supposed illegal Executive Orders promulgated after May 25, 1946, to be valid. I refer to Republic Act No. 224 approved on June 5, 1948, creating the National Airport Corporation which considered and treated as valid Executive Order No. 100, dated October 21, 1947, by providing in section 7 of said Republic Act No. 224 for the abolishment of the Office of the Administrator of the Manila International Airport established under the provisions of said Executive Order No. 100 and the transfer of the personnel and funds created under the same Executive Order to the National Airport Corporation. This Executive Order No. 100 which appropriated public funds and therefore, was of a legislative nature must have been issued under Commonwealth Act No. 671. It cannot possibly be regarded as having been promulgated by authority of Republic Act No. 51, for said Act approved on October 4, 1946, gave the President only one year within which to reorganize the different executive departments, offices, agencies, etc. and Executive Order No. 100 was promulgated on October 23, 1947, after the expiration of the one year period. Furthermore, it is a matter of common knowledge that during the last session of Congress which ended in May, 1949, there was talk if not a movement in the Congress to end the emergency powers of the President. Nothing concrete in the form of legislation or resolution was done, for if we are to accept newspaper reports and comment, the members of Congress or at least a majority of them were willing and satisfied to have the Chief Executive continue in the exercise of his emergency powers until the end of 1949. All this leads to no other conclusion but that Congress believed all along that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect. If Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and effect the question arises: how long and for what period will said Act continue to operate? As I have already stated, I believe that the delegation of emergency powers was made coextensive with the emergency resulting from the war, as long as that emergency continues and unless the Legislature provides otherwise, Act 671 will continue to operate and the President may continue exercising his emergency powers. The last and logical question that one will naturally ask is: has the emergency resulting from the war passed or does it still exist? This is a fair and decisive question inasmuch as the existence of the emergency is, my opinion, the test and the only basis of the operation or cessation of Act 671. The existence or non-existence of the emergency resulting from the war is a question of fact. It is based on conditions obtaining among the people and in the country and perhaps even near and around it. It is highly controversial question on which people may honestly differ. There are those who in all good faith believe and claim that conditions have returned to normal; that the people have now enough to eat, sometimes even more than they had before the war; that people nowadays especially in the cities are better nourished and clothed and transported and better compensated for their labor, and that the President himself in his speeches, chats and messages had assured the public that normal times have returned, that the problem of peace and order had been solved, that the finances of the Government and the national economy are sound, and that there is an adequate food supply. It is therefore, claimed that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the war.

On the other hand, it is asserted with equal vehemence in the opposite camp that conditions are still far from normal; that the picture painted by the President in cheerful and reassuring colors is based on over optimism and, as to be expected, calculated to show in bold relief the achievements of the administration, and so should be considered with some allowance; that we are now importing more rice than before the war for the reason that many rice farms are idle because of the farmer's fear of or interference by dissidents; that the problem of peace and order is far from solved as shown by the frequent hold-ups, kidnapping, loothing and killings and organized banditry not only in Luzon but also in the Visayas and Mindanao; that whereas before the war, the Constabulary force consisting of only about 6,000 officers and men could provide complete protection to life and property and was adequate in all respects to enforce peace and order, now this Constabulary enlarged to about 20,000 men, provided with modern weapons and equipment and with the aid of thousands of civilians guards and of the Philippine Army and Air Force cannot solve the peace and order problem; that the dissidents who are well organized, armed and disciplined even attack and sack towns and sometimes openly defy and engage the armed Government forces; that as long as more than 100,000 firearms are loose and in the hands of irresponsible parties, not excluding the seemingly regular mysterious supply to them of additional firearms and ammunitions, there can be no peace and order; and as to the barrio folks in central Luzon and now, even in provinces bordering central Luzon whose parents and relatives had been killed by dissidents, whose women folk had been outraged by the same elements, whose homes had been looted and burned and whose very lives had been subjected to constant terror and peril, compelling them to leave their homes and their farms and evacuate to and be concentrated in the poblaciones to live there in utter discomfort and privation, it is said that it would be difficult to convince these unfortunate people that normalcy has returned and that there is no longer any emergency resulting from the war. To further support the claim of the existence of an emergency, the menace of communism not only at home, particularly in central Luzon but from abroad, especially China, is invoked. And it is asserted that all this is a result of the war. I repeat that this question of the existence of an emergency is a controversial one, the decision on which must be based on the ascertainment of facts, circumstances and conditions and the situation obtaining in the country. This Court is not in a position to decide that controversy. It does not have the facilities to obtain and acquire the necessary facts and data on which to base a valid and just decision. Neither did it have the opportunity to receive the necessary evidence as in a hearing or trial at which evidence, oral or documentary, is introduced. We cannot invoked and resort to judicial notice because this refers to things of public knowledge, and not controverted, whereas things, facts and conditions necessary for the determination of whether or not there is still an emergency, are often not of public knowledge but require investigation, accurate reporting and close contact with the people to be able to ascertain their living conditions, their needs, their fears, etc. To me, the department of the Government equipped and in a position to decide this question of emergency are the Chief Executive and the Legislature. The first has at his command and beck and call all the executive officials and departments. He has the Army, the Constabulary, Naval Patrol, the Police of the cities and towns and the barrio lieutenants to inform him of the state of peace and order and the security of the states. He has the Secretary of Education and all the subordinates officers and the school officials under him to inform him as to whether or not there is a school crisis or emergency as a result of the war. He has the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and his men to advise him as to the agricultural needs and the food supply of the country. He has the Secretary of Finance and all the officials under him to inform him of the finances of the Government and the economy of the country as well as the officials to advise him of the land shipping transportation situation. In other words, the President is in a position to determine whether or not there is still an emergency as a result of the war. As to Congress, it is equally in a position and in fact it is the first to called upon to decide as to the existence or non-existence of an emergency. According to the Constitution, section 24, Article VI, either House of Congress may call upon the head of any department of the Government on any matter pertaining to his departure. The members of Congress come from all

parts and the far corners of the country. They are supposed to be in close contact with their constituents and know at first hand their needs, the way they live, etc. Congress therefore should know. Moreover, it is the legislature that must first determine as to whether or not there is a national emergency as a condition precedent to the delegation of its legislative powers. Naturally, it is the one that is called upon to say when that emergency ceases. Now, one will ask, what does Congress think about the emergency? Does it believe that it still exists? To me the answer is YES. What has been said about the acts, conduct and attitude of the legislature as to its belief that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force, are all applicable and may be repeated to show that the Congress believes that the emergency resulting from the war still exist. Under the theory that I maintain, Congress must be of the opinion that the emergency still exists for the reason that as I have shown Congress believes that Commonwealth Act No. 671 is still in force and the life and the operation of said Act depends upon and is coextensive with the existence of the emergency. To this may be added the attitude and the belief of the President as to the continued existence of the emergency. It must be borne in mind that Commonwealth Act No. 671 authorizes the President to exercise his emergency powers only during the existence of the emergency. The inference is that before exercising his emergency powers by promulgating an Executive Order he must first determine and decide that the state of emergency still exists, for that is the condition precedent to the exercise of his delegated powers. In other words, the two departments of the Government, the Legislative and the Executive Departments, best qualified and called upon to determine whether or not the emergency resulting from the war still exists have made manifest in their acts and attitude that they believe that such emergency still exists. I may here state that on this question of emergency, I entertain no personal opinion either way lacking as I do the means of deciding fairly and justly. Neither has the Court. If the decision of the courts on question of fact involved in a controversy are given due respect and weight and are binding, it is because such decisions are based on evidence adduced and received after a hearing. No such hearing was held for the purpose and no evidence been received. In other words, we have nothing in which to decide a question of fact which is the existence or non-existence of emergency. In view of the conclusion we have arrived at, finding these Executive Orders to be void and of no effect, particularly Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 with the evident result that no funds are appropriated for the operation of the Government for the fiscal year beginning July of this year and for the expenses in the coming national election next November, one may inquire as to what will happen or what is to be done. The answer or answers to this question lie with the Chief Executive. Congress will not meet in regular session until next year. It is not for the court, not even the undersigned to suggest the calling of a special legislative session to cope with the perilous situation thus created, altho one may regard that as a logical remedy. But, should the President call a special session and Congress for one reason or another fails to meet or though it meets, for one reason or another it fails to pass an appropriation law, then a real crisis will have ensued. I am confident that the Chief Executive, conscious of his responsibility as the Chief of the nation would not just stand supine and idle and see the Government of the Republic of the Philippines disintegrate and die. He would know what to do and he would do something according to his sound discretion and in accordance with the law, statutory or otherwise and in the discharge of his high executive powers, express or implied. TORRES, J., concurring: I concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Montemayor on the existence of the emergency powers. I reserve my opinion on the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226. REYES, J., concurring and dissenting: The main issue in these cases is whether the emergency which on December 16, 1941 prompted the approval of Commonwealth Act No. 671, delegating extraordinary powers to the

President, still existed at the time the Chief Executive exercised those powers by promulgating the executive orders whose validity is now challenged. On issue similar to the one just formulated there is a diversity of opinions. While some courts would rather leave the determination of such issues to the political department of the Government, others are for making the determination subject to judicial review. But the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court on the point accords with first view and declares that "these are matters of political judgment for which judges have neither technical competence nor official responsibility." (Ludecke vs. Watkins, 92 L. ed., 1883.) In any event the existence or non-existence of an emergency is a question of facts which may not always be determine without the evidence by mere reference to facts within the judicial notice. In the present cases, there has been no trial for the reception of proof, and I am not aware that enough facts have been shown to justify the conclusion that the emergency in question has already ceased. On the other hand, since the exercise of the emergency powers by the President presupposes a determination of the existence of the emergency, the President must be presumed to have satisfied himself in some appropriate manner that the emergency existed when he issued his executive orders. Under the theory of separation of powers and in accord with the latest ruling of the United States Supreme Court, it is not for the judiciary to review the finding of the Executive in this regard. Judicial review would in such case amount to control of executive discretion and place the judicial branch above a co-equal department of the Government. Only in case of a manifest abuse of the exercise of powers by a political branch of the Government is judicial interference allowable in order to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. But with the cold war still going on though the shooting war has already ended; with the world still in turmoil so much so that the American Secretary of the State has declared that "the world has never before in peace time been as troubled or hazardous as it is right now;" with most of the industries of the country still unrihabilitated, so that a large proportion of our food and other necessaries have to be imported; with a great portion of the population still living in temporary quarters; with most of the war damage claims still unpaid; and with peace and other conditions in the country far from normal, it would be presumptuous for this Court, without proof of the actual condition obtaining in all parts of the Archipelago, to declare that the President clearly abused his discretion when he considered the emergency not ended at the time he promulgated the executive orders now questioned. The majority opinion has skirted the issue of whether or not the question of the existence or continuance of the emergency is one for the political department of the Government to determine by restricting "the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding session due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war." I cannot subscribe to this narrow interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 671, for in my opinion it is contrary to both the plain language and manifest purpose of that enactment. The law invests the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the emergency resulting from the war and it expressly says that the President is to exercise those powers "during the existence of the emergency." The Act does not say that the President may exercise the powers only when the Legislature is not session. Much less does it say that the emergency powers shall cease as soon as the Legislature has convened in regular session. An emergency resulting from a global war cannot end with the mere meeting of the Legislature. Neither may be legislated out of existence. The Legislature, once it was convened, may, if it so desire, revoked the emergency powers of the President, but it cannot by any form of legislative action put an immediate end to the emergency itself. Well known is a fact that a deliverative body, such as the Legislature, because of the time consumed in the study and discussion of a measure, may not always act with the promptness which the situation requires so that in an emergency there is really need for the concentration of power in one man. This may well be the reason why Act No. 671 in express terms authorizes the President to exercise the emergency powers "during the existence of the emergency" and not merely during the time that the Legislature could be in session. For one thing to make the life of the emergency powers depend upon the inability of the Legislature to meet is the same as to declare those emergency powers automatically ended the moment they were conferred, for at that very moment of the Legislature that conferred them was in session.

The argument that, unless the emergency powers of the President were made to cease the moment Congress convened in regular session, we should be having two legislatures which could mutually annul each other, will not stand analysis. In supposing that the President, in the exercise of the emergency powers could "repeal or modify a bill passed by the Legislature," the argument overlooks the fact that the emergency powers delegated to the President under Article VI, section 26 of the Constitution could only authorize him "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Only the Legislature (with the concurrence of the President of course) may declare the President may not, under the Constitution, depart from it. Moreover, unless the Presidential veto could be overriden, no bill approved by Congress could become a law if the President did not want it. And if the President approves a bill and allows it to become a law, surely he can have no reason for repealing it; while, on the other hand, there is no point in his repealing that bill, because if there are enough votes to override his veto there must also be enough votes to repeal his emergency powers. The majority opinion has I think placed a rather forced construction upon section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 671, which provides that The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted. As may be seen, the above provision does not say that the President has to report only once, that is, the first time Congress is convened, and never again. But the majority opinion wants to read that thought into the law in order to bolster up the theory that the emergency powers of the President would end as soon as Congress could convene in a regular session. Invoking the rule of contemporary construction, the majority opinion makes reference to a passage in President Quezon's book. "The Good Fight," to the effect that, according to the author, Act No. 671, was only "for a certain period" and "would become valid unless re-enacted." But I see nothing in the quoted phrases any suggestion that the emergency powers of the President were to end the moment Congress was convened in regular session regardless of the continuance of the emergency which gave birth to those powers. A more valid application of the rule of contemporary construction may, I think, be made by citing the executive orders promulgated by President Roxas by Commonwealth Act No. 671. Many of those executive orders were issued after May 25, 1946 when Congress convened in regular session, an event which, according to the majority opinion, automatically put an end to the emergency powers. While we have adopted the republican form of government with its three co-equal departments, each acting within its separate sphere, it would be well to remember that we have not accepted the American theory of separation of powers to its full extent. For, profiting from the experience of America when her Supreme Court, by the application many a New Deal measure which her Congress had approved to meet a national crisis, our Constitutional Convention in 1935, despite the warning of those who feared a dictatorship in his country, decided to depart from the strict theory of separation of powers by embodying a provision in our Constitution, authorizing the delegation of legislative powers to the President "in times of war or other national emergency." It is my surmise that this provision was intended to guard not only against the inability to meet but also against its usual tardiness and inaction. We have proof of this last in the last regular session of Congress, when this body failed to pass measures of pressing necessity, especially the annual appropriation law and the appropriation for the expenses of the coming elections. It is said that the need for an appropriation law for the fiscal year 1949-1950 as well for the coming elections is not an emergency resulting from the war. But I say that if the emergency resulting from the war as contemplated in Commonwealth Act No. 671 still exists, as the President believes it exists or he would not have issued the executive orders in question (and it is not for the Court to change that belief in the absence of proof that the President was clearly

wrong) would it not be a dereliction of duty on his part to fall to provide, during the emergency, for the continuance of the functions of government, which is only possible with an appropriation law? What would be gained by issuing rules and regulations to meet the emergency if there is no Government to enforce and carry them out? The mere calling of a special is no guaranty that an appropriation law will be passed or that one will be passed before the thousands of officials and employees who work for the Government have starved. It is, probably, because of these considerations that the National Assembly, in approving Commonwealth Act No. 671, specifically empowered the President, during the existence of the emergency, "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative." And that Act has authorized the President during the existence of the same emergency "to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the government to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain in force this authority." Under this specific provision, the appropriation for the expenses of the coming elections would, naturally, come, for, without doubt, it is a measure to enable the Government "to fulfill its responsibilities." Consistently with the views above express, I am of the opinion that Executive Order No. 225, appropriating funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic for the fiscal year 194950, and Executive Order No. 226, appropriating funds for the expenses of the coming national elections in November, 1949, are valid so that the petition in G.R. No. L-3054, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr. vs. Treasurer of the Philippines, and the petition in G.R. No. L-3056, Antonio Barredo, etc., vs. Commissioner on Election, et al., in which the said two executive orders are respectively challenged, should be denied. But Executive Order No. 62 (regulating rents) and Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports) stand on a different footing. The validity of Executive Order No. 62 can no longer be maintained because of the approval by the Legislature of Commonwealth Act No. 689 and Republic Act No. 66, which regulate the same subject matter and which, as an expression of the national policy, can not be deviated from by the President in the exercise of the emergency powers delegated to him by Commonwealth Act No. 671. The same is true with respect to Executive Order No. 192 (controlling exports) in view of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 728, regulating the same subject matter, especially because section 4 of said Act terminates the power of the President thereunder on December 31, 1948, if not sooner. Consequently, since the validity of these executive orders (Nos. 62 and 192) can no longer be upheld, the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-2044, L-2756 and L-3055, which seek to prohibit their enforcement, should be granted. PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting: I join in this opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes. I wish to add that I agree with Mr. Justice Bengzon that petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-3054 and L-3056 have no personality to institute the proceedings.

BENGZON, J., dissenting: The majority feels that it has to decide the question whether the President still has emergency powers; but unable to determine in which of the above cases the issue may properly be decided, it grouped them together. When the eye or the hand is unsure, it is best to shoot at five birds in a group: firing at one after another may mean as many misses. It does not matter that the first two cases had been submitted and voted before the submission of the last three. Neither does it matter that, of these last, two should be thrown out in accordance with our previous rulings. The target must be large.

These cases could be, and should be decided separately. If they are, they may be disposed of without ruling on the general question whether the President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 7671. How? This way, which is my vote. 1. L-2044, Araneta vs. Dinglasan; L-2756, Araneta vs. Angeles. The President has presently no power to regulate rents, because his power to do so is granted by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600 and 620 which have lapsed. Under Commonwealth Act No. 671 he has no power to regulate rents. 2. L-3056, Barredo vs. Commission, etc. Dismissed because petitioner has no personality to sue. According to Custodio vs. President of the Senate et al., 42 Off. Gaz., 1243, a citizen and taxpayer, as such, has no legal standing to institute proceedings for the annulment of a statute. 3. L-3054, Rodriguez vs. Treasurer. Dismissed, like the Barredo case. The private rights of petitioner and of his partymen are affected only as taxpayers. 4. L-3055, Guerrero vs. Commissioner of Customs. Supposing that the President still has emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671, and that they include regulation of exportation, inasmuch as the Congress has chosen to legislate on exports (Commonwealth Act No. 728), it has thereby pro tanto withdrawn the power delegated to the President along that field. It is a sound rule, I believe, for the Court to determine only those questions which are necessary to decide a case. Although I am favorably impressed by the considerations set forth by Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes on the existence of emergency powers, I prefer to vote as herein indicated. I reserve the right subsequently to elaborate on the above propositions. For lack of the required number of votes, judgment was not obtained. However, after rehearing, the required number of votes was had, by resolution of September 16, 1949, which follows.

As regards the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, the Court is of the opinion that it must not be considered, it having been presented after Mr. Justice Padilla had given his opinion on the merits of these cases. As we have once said "a litigant . . . cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil., 374.) Furthermore, the fact that Justice Padilla, while Secretary of Justice, had advised the President on the question of emergency powers, does not disqualify him to act in these cases, for he cannot be considered as having acted previously in these actions as counsel of any of the parties. The President is not here a party. All the members of this Court concur in the denial of the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, with the exception of Mr. Justice Ozaeta and Mr. Justice Feria who reserve their vote. II With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases, it appears that Mr. Justice Perfecto died and ceased to be a member of this Court on August 17, 1949, and our decision in these cases was released for publication on August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with Rule 58, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is as follows: SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. All matters submitted to the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the justices who are members of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether such justices were or not members of the court and whether they were or were not present at the date of submission; . . . . Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court at the time an adjudication is made cannot take part in the adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A case can be adjudicated only by means of a decision. And a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding force, must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII, sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No. 296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court). Promulgated means the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at the time a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their vote, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision binding unless and until duly signed and promulgated.

RESOLUTION

September 16, 1949

MORAN, C. J.: Petitioners filed motions asking (1) that Mr. Justice Padilla be qualified to act in these cases; (2) that the vote cast by the late Mr. Justice Perpecto before his death be counted in their favor; and (3) that the opinion of the Chief Justice be counted as a vote for the nullity of Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226. I

And this is practically what we have said in the contempt case against Abelardo Subido, promulgated on September 28, 1948:

que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte Suprema solo se considera decidido una vez registrada, promulgada y publicada la sentencia en la escribania, y que hasta entonces el resultado de la votacion se estima como una materia absolutamente reservada y confidencial, perteneciente exclusivamente a las camaras interiores de la Corte. In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the decisive point is the date of promulgation of judgment. In that case a judge rendered his decision on January 14; qualified himself as Secretary of Finance on January 16; and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held that the decision was void because at the time of its promulgation the judge who prepared it was no longer a judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, 37 Phil., 186.) Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice Perfecto can not be considered in these cases is that his successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed by this Court to take part in the decision on the question of emergency powers because of lack of majority on that question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any opinion previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that matter. There is no law or rule providing that a successor is a mere executor of his predecessor's will. On the contrary, the successor must act according to his own opinion for the simple reason that the responsibility for his action is his and of no one else. Of course, where a valid and recorded act has been executed by the predecessor and only a ministerial duty remains to be performed for its completion, the act must be completed accordingly. For instance, where the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly filed and promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a ministerial duty, may be ordered by the successor as a matter of course. But even in that case, if the successor is moved to reconsider the decision, and he still may do so within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound to follow the opinion of his predecessor, which he may set aside according to what he may believe to be for the best interests of justice. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include the vote and opinion of the late Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases must be denied. Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla, Mr. Justice Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr. Justice Torres concur in this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason dissent. III In connection with the motion to consider the opinion of the Chief Justice as a vote in favor of petitioners, the writer has the following to say: In my previous concurring opinion, I expressed the view that the emergency powers vested in Commonwealth Act No. 671 had ceased in June 1945, but I voted for a deferment of judgment in these two cases because of two circumstances then present, namely, (1) the need of sustaining the two executive orders on appropriations as the life-line of government and (2) the fact that a special session of Congress was to be held in a few days. I then asked, "Why not defer judgment and wait until the special session of Congress so that it may fulfill its duty as it clearly sees it?" It seemed then to me unwise and inexpedient to force the Government into imminent disruption by allowing the nullity of the executive orders to follow its reglementary consequences when Congress was soon to be convened for the very purpose of passing, among other urgent

measures, a valid appropriations act. Considering the facility with which Congress could remedy the existing anomaly, I deemed it a slavish submission to a constitutional formula for this Court to seize upon its power under the fundamental law to nullify the executive orders in question. A deferment of judgment struck me then as wise. I reasoned that judicial statesmanship, not judicial supremacy, was needed. However, now that the holding of a special session of Congress for the purpose of remedying the nullity of the executive orders in question appears remote and uncertain, I am compelled to, and do hereby, give my unqualified concurrence in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Tuason declaring that these two executive orders were issued without authority of law. While in voting for a temporary deferment of the judgment I was moved by the belief that the positive compliance with the Constitution by the other branches of the Government, which is our prime concern in all these cases, would be effected, and indefinite deferment will produce the opposite result because it would legitimize a prolonged or permanent evasion of our organic law. Executive orders which are, in our opinion, repugnant to the Constitution, would be given permanent life, opening the way to practices which may undermine our constitutional structure. The harmful consequences which, as I envisioned in my concurring opinion, would come to pass should the said executive orders be immediately declared null and void, are still real. They have not disappeared by reason of the fact that a special session of the Congress is not now forthcoming. However, the remedy now lies in the hands of the Chief Executive and of Congress, for the Constitution vests in the former the power to call a special session should the need for one arise, and in the latter, the power to pass a valid appropriation act. That Congress may again fall to pass a valid appropriations act is a remote possibility, for under the circumstances it fully realizes its great responsibility of saving the nation from breaking down; and furthermore, the President in the exercise of his constitutional powers may, if he so desires, compel Congress to remain in special session till it approves the legislative measures most needed by the country. Democracy is on trial in the Philippines, and surely it will emerge victorious as a permanent way of life in this country, if each of the great branches of the Government, within its own allocated spear, complies with its own constitutional duty, uncompromisingly and regardless of difficulties. Our Republic is still young, and the vital principle underlying its organic structure should be maintained firm and strong, hard as the best of steel, so as to insure its growth and development along solid lines of a stable and vigorous democracy. With my declaration that Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226 are null and void, and with the vote to the effect of Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Tuason and Mr. Justice Montemayor, there is a sufficient majority to pronounce a valid judgment on that matter. It is maintained by the Solicitor General and the amicus curiae that eight Justices are necessary to pronounce a judgment on the nullity of the executive orders in question, under section 9 of Republic Act No. 296 and Article VIII, section 10 of the Constitution. This theory is made to rest on the ground that said executive orders must be considered as laws, they having been issued by the Chief Executive in the exercise of the legislative powers delegated to him. It is the opinion of the Court that the executive orders in question, even if issued within the powers validly vested in the Chief Executive, are not laws, although they may have the force of law, in exactly the same manner as the judgments of this Court, municipal ordinances and ordinary executive orders cannot be considered as laws, even if they have the force of law.

Under Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the only power which, in times of war or other national emergency, may be vested by Congress in the President, is the power "to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Consequently, the executive orders issued by the President in pursuance of the power delegated to him under that provision of the Constitution, may be considered only as rules and regulations. There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote of eight Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the President. It is very significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation" were included among those that required for their nullification the vote of two thirds of all of the members of the Court. But "executive order" and "regulations" were later deleted from the final draft (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere majority of six members of this Court is enough to nullify them. All the members of the Court concur in this view. For all the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to disqualify Mr. Justice Padilla, and the motion to include the vote of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these cases. And it is the judgment of this Court to declare Executive Orders Nos. 225 and 226, null and void, with the dissent of Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Reyes, upon the grounds already stated in their respective opinions, and with Mr. Justice Torres abstaining. But in order to avoid a possible disruption or interruption in a normal operation of the Government, it is decreed, by the majority, of course, that this judgment take effect upon the expiration of fifteen days from the date of its entry. No costs to be charged. Ozaeta, Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.: These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining order prayed for by the petitioners was issued by this Court on January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Executive Order and statute in question. The facts are as follows: Pursuant to Art. X, 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous Region, Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions. Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 (1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX. (2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will become parts of Region IX. (3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII. (4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995 CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners, vs. HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents. IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON.

(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. (6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities within the existing regions some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Tangub and Ozamiz and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that "the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions." The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX; Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative regions in Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery of field services of government agencies taking into consideration the formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so will violate the rules of statutory construction. The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring (reorganization) of administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the same is not valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734 and Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative 1 districts in provinces and cities. As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.

On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law. In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that the power granted by Art. XIX, 13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. 2 Comelec, and as a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, 16 and Art. VII, 17, respectively, of the Constitution. He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of 3 Binangonan, in which the power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground that [such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces, municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to a more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently. The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it. He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region. Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides: 1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and responsive national government, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and development-oriented governmental framework: (a) More effective planning implementation, and review functions;

(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making process; (c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or overlapping of purposes, functions, activities, and programs; (d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial, sub-ministerial and corporate organizational structures; (e) Further development of the regionalization process; and (f) Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative relationships among government entities. For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority of the President to reorganize shall be interpreted to encompass all agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, including all government owned or controlled corporations as well as the entire range of the powers, functions, authorities, administrative relationships, acid related aspects pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units. 2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions: xxx xxx xxx f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions and authorities, including, with respect to governmentowned or controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant aspects of their charters. g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Decree. Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are: (1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, 13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion; (2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and

(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; and (4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The 4 purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government." The Commission on Reorganization created under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not later than December 31, 1969 to the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after the opening of its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would become effective only upon the 5 approval of Congress. Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which 6 divided the country into eleven administrative regions. By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and made part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975, first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City. Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, 4 of the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces 7 for administrative purposes." The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to 8 9 adjust municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as "administrative in nature." There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the law. First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be 10 gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied 11 in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public 12 business." Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the organization of administrative regions. Nor is Art. XIX, 13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only 13 one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the 14 general subject and all provisions of the statute are germane to that subject. Certainly the reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, 13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy "shall remain in the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 claims: The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear intent of this provision by moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions. Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on areas which did not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The unauthorized action of the President, as effected by and under the questioned EO No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of Region X and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said Region X to Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate in the said plebiscite, were transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4) General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, from Region XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX. All of the said provinces and cities voted "NO", and thereby rejected their entry into the Autonomous Region in Muslim 15 Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require. The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another

except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX. The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation. Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the President. To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, 13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities. What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been 16 by act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center. It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider only if fully briefed and upon a more adequate record than that presented by petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC): A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year). (p. 14, Rollo.) On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime. Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. MELO, J.: The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ. The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.

In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons: 1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069. Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available. It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. 2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests. 3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. (pp. 77-78, Rollo.) Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and

objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion. After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied. On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date. SO ORDERED. (pp. 110-111, Rollo.) Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that: PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE: I. BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS,

CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES; II. PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW; III. THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.) On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684. GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999. (pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty? The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court. To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows: The Extradition Request The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by: 1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force; 2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts; 3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and 4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda. From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming

(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.) Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides . . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?

In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by: 1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the person sought; 2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case; 3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is requested; 4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; 5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense; 6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable. (Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.) 7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there; 8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and 9. A copy of the charging document. (Paragraph 3, ibid.) The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs). In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation." The Extradition Petition Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or

city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee. The Extradition Hearing The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.). The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings? A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers. However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its

responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request. The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation. Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination? The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under nonmilitary penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64). The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution. In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise

judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if

found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property. Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature. The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing. As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The

requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366). Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106). True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64). In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as: 1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution; 2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and 3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above? Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815). In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit: 1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel. 2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing. 3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) 5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).] 6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186). 7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned. From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition. Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process. We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling: The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.

(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656) The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency. (pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.) In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked: One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]). There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty." Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition. In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with? Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without

prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest. Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside. Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.). Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute. The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing". When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions. In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming. We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RPExtradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution? First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12). The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute

and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.). In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents. We disagree. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410). Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial. A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises. One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy. Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"?

Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto? The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration. How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069? Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals: . . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . . (at p. 671) Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.

In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent. Puno, J., please see dissent. Vitug, J., see separate opinion. Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion. Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion. Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ. Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion. Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban. Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno & Panganiban. Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent. On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007 On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void. On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed. On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001. Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus: In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. The facts are: On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government; 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and 4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. SO ORDERED. On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus: Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail. In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, 1 RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:

x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law. On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of 2 Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the 3 Constitution, the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.

The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order. First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents 4 in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained. Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
6 7 5

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and 8 the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a 9 criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may 10 follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between 11 different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential 12 extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in 13 character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and 14 to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently." Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail. While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the 15 assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.