HUMAN RELATIONS

ARTS 19-22
Nikko Hotel Manila V Reyes FACTS: Roberto Reyes aka amay bisaya, gate-crasher Ruby Lim Executive secretary of the hotel Dr. Violeta Filart invited Reyes (daw); friend of reyes several years back Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka hotel manager; bday celebrant Accdg 2 reyes: he was invited by dr.filart to the party and asked her to vouch for her in which she said of course so he went to the penthouse with Dr.filart, carrying her fruit basket (as gift 2 Mr. Tsuruoka). When he was at the buffet table, he was asked by Ms. Lim to leave the party bec he was not invited (other guests can here her). Reyes explained that he was invited by dr.filart, but dr.filart ignored him (adding to his Shame). He was escorted by the guard out of the building (like a common criminal). Accdg 2 Lim: She saw that reyes was not invited and noticed him at the bar ordering a drink. The waiter said that he saw him talking with the group of dr.filart. Lim asked Ms. Fruto, the sister of Dr. Filart, wherein she said that dr. Filart did not invite him. So she asked her to tell reyes 2 leave, but reyes did not leave. She then saw reyes talking to captain batung, so she asked him to asker eyes to leave bec he was not invited. But reyes still lingered. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka s wishes to keep the party intimate, she approached reyes when he was starting to eat and said "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo." But then reyes started making a scene. Accdg 2 Dr. Filart: She did not invie reyes, he merely offered to carry her basket 4 her bec he was also going to take the elevator. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded him that he is not invited and properly dressed, so he has to go back down. she thought that he already left. When reyes was already asked to leave, and looked at her, she merely ignored him bec she was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him RTC gave credence to the testimony of Lim, and that she was discreet in asking him to leave. And that Reyes assumed of being thrown out of the party since he was uninvited. Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of RTC, and believed in the testimony of Reyes. Saying that what Lim did was contrary to morals and good customs, mere rudeness and lack of regard to a person. Damages paid by Nikko Hotel, Lim & Filart.. *** .. Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria,( to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury ) they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher." Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine does not apply since it is still the duty of Lim (under art 19&21 of the new civil code) that petitioners were still under obligation to treat him fairly ISSUE: is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. HELD: RTC and appellate court reached irreconcilable conclusions. (Which version is credible?????). RTC s findings of fact were more credible. it is highly unlikely that Lim would

shout at him at a very close distance .. formal party was in a posh, five-star hotel.. . Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. Lim not liable. Petition by nikko hotel & lim was granted. Decision by appellate court was reversed and set aside. Decision of Rtc was affirmed. Sps. Quisumbing vs MERALCO gr no 142943 april 3 2002 Spouses Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture. On March 3, 1995, MERALCO s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue it is a standard operating procedure of asking permission from the spouses, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, MERALCO 's inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. The spouses were advised by MERALCO 's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, MERALCO had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the spouses unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina informed the spouses that they were just following their standard operating procedure. An action for damages by the spouses alleging that MERALCO acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation. Whether MERALCO observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electric supply of the spouses? Under the law, MERALCO may immeadiately disconnect any electric services on the ground of meter tampering. However, they may do only in the presence of an officer of law or by a duly authorized representative of the energy regulatory board where they can personally witnessed and attested the discovery of the tampering. If there s no government representative, the prima facie authority to disconnect granted to MERALCO by RA 7832 can t apply. The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnection goes into the essence of due process. MERALCO can t be prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. MERALCO can t rely on the contractual right to disconnect if there is non-payment of bills. An adjusted bill shall be prepared and only upon failure to pay the company disconnect or discontinue service. This alo true in regard with the provision of the revised order no. 1 of the former public service commission which requires a 46 hour written notice before the disconnection may be justified. Hence, this case is partially granted wherein both of the parties are to pay each other. Gashem Shokat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals FACTS: -Private respondent Marilou Gonzales,then 21 years of age, met petitioner, a 29 yearold Iranian citizen and an exchange student

taking a medical course in Lyceum Colleges in Dagupan City, through the manager of Mabuhay Luncheonette where the former was working as a waitress. Private respondent claimed that she was a virgin at the time and she never had a boyfriend before. Petitioner started courting Gonzales just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage several times which Gonzales accepted on August 20, 1987. On this same day, they went to Baaga, Bugallon,Pangasinan, to meet with Gonzales parents. -The marriage was to take place during the semestral break in October 1987. Marilou s parents thought that Gashem was good and trusted him, thus they agreed to his proposal of marriage to their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with private respondent during their stay in Bugallon. -Upon being informed of the nearing wedding, Marilou s father already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends. -Upon their return to Dagupan City, the two continued to live together in Gashem s apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, petitioner would tie Marilou s hands and feet whenever he goes to school, and he also gives her medicine at 4 in the morning that made her sleep the whole an entire day. As a result of this live-in relationship, Marilou became pregnant, but was given some medicine to abort the fetus. Still Marilou continued to live with him and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time Marilou left petitioner, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Marilou, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to petitioner to still convince him to marry private respondent, but petitioner insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that he is still single. Thus, Marilou filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the latter s violation of their agreement to get married ISSUE: Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case? HELD: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The New Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise there after becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP vs. CA FACTS: Restituto M. Tobias was employed by GMCRC as purchasing agent and admin assistant to engineering operations manager. In 1972, there had been discovered fictitious purchases and fraudulent transaction which amounted to 7,000 pesos. On

November 10, 1972, Tobias had report such anomalies to his superior, Eduardo Feraranan, the petitioner, Herbert Hendry, as well as his executive Vice President and the General Manager. On November 11, 1972, the petitioner, Hendry confronted Tobias, alleging him as the number one suspect, and ordered a forced leave, without future communications to the company and leave the keys. On November 20, 1972, Tobias returned after the leave, Hendry went to him and called him crooked and a swindler. He was also ordered to take a lie detector test, as well as comply to submit the following requirements, specimen of writing signature for the initial examinations by the police investigator to determine the complexities in the anomalies. On December 6, 1972, the Manila Police Investigators submitted the laboratory crime report, clearing the respondents from the alleged participation. Consequently, the Petitioner hired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, hired by the petitioner, submitted his report finding Tobias guilty though further investigations are still needed. On December 12, 1972, Hendry issued a memorandum, suspending Tobias in preparation for the criminal charges to be filed against him. On December 19, 1972, Lt. Dioscoro Tagle submitted the secondary laboratory crime report, with the same result, such Tobias non-involvement. Despite the two police reports presented in favor of Tobias and the incomplete results from the private investigator, also in favor of the respondents, the petitioner filed with the City of Fiscals of Manila a complaint for estafa, through falsification of commercial documents, which later on amended to estafa. Five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four were on the grounds estafa through falsification, while the other was of Article 290 of the Revised Penal code. Another 2 were refilled with the Judge Advocate General s office; however all six cases were dismissed by the fiscal. Four of the resolution dismissing the complaints which were appealed who later on affirmed the dismissal. On January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice from the petitioner, indicating the termination of employment effective December 13, 1972. Tobias then filed for illegal dismissal to the Labor arbiter, but it was dismissed. On appeal to the NLRC, the ruling was reversed, although the Secretary of Labor to reinstate the arbiter decision. Tobias appealed the order to the Office of the President, during the pendency, the petitioner and respondents entered into a compromise agreement regarding his complaint for illegal dismissal. Tobias sought employment with RETELCO, Hendry, without being asked wrote a letter stating the dismissal of Tobias was due to honestly. Due to this, Tobias filed a civil case for damages and alleged unlawful, malicious and oppressive acts of the petitioner. The Regional Trial Court Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. The petitioners appealed the RTC decision while the respondents appealed as to the total of the damages on August 31, 1987, total have been denied, and the review for certiorari was filed. Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent. On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered. ISSUE: The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent. HELD: The petition filed by Hendry was DENIED. Rationale:

Provided by the Civil Code of the Philippines is the codification of some basic principles which are observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social order. Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. In relation to the case at hand, the Petitioner, Hendry had been construed if not violated the meaning of the principle. As clearly stated, such provision recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights, such that it sets the norms of human conduct. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms, and result in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Article 20 and 21, on the other hand covers the damages which has not been provided in Article 19. Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified. NOTE: RATIONALE The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by

petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See alsoPhilippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code. But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code]. The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed. Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11]. *** To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless *** According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable University of the East vs. Jader Facts: Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination

in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him which was approved by the dean after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. The Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988). The plaintiff attended his investiture on the 16th of April 1988 and held a blowout on the evening of the same date. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination and took review classes only to find out about his academic requirement deficiencies which caused him to drop out of his review classes and not be able to take the bar exam. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorney s fees and cost of suit. Issue: May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? Held The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code which states: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee FACTS: Alfonso married man, works as an agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory, staying in Gasan, Marinduque, adopted son of a Chinese named Pe Beco (relative of Lolita s father), deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita s affection, causing moral damages to plaintiff (ceciio). Alfonso frequently visits Lolita and was allowed free access to their home (bec he was a collateral relative, was considered part of the family) the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs both in Gasan, and Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home on April 14, 1957. Issue: Whether or not defendant caused moral damages to plaintiff, when as a married man, he pursued his love affair with Lolita. Held: Yes. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong

he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita s family contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

ART 26
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCANO FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta s parents. But on February 26, 1948, a letter was received from a San Carlos college student saying that Pacita Noel and Pastor Tenchavez are involved in an amorous relationship. Thus, after translating the said letter to Vicenta s dad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued living with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband. ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines. HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. Court of Appeals FACTS: -In the December 15, 1968 issue of Sunday Times was an advertisement from St. Louis Realty Corp entitled Where the Heart is and it featured the family of Mr. Arcadio S. Arcadio but with Dr. Conrado Aramil s house instead of theirs. The same advertisement appeared again in the SundayTimes dated January 5, 1969. -Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropyshiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, noticed the mistake thus wrote to St. Louis Realty Corp immediately to have the advertisement rectified and an explanation printed out because the advertisement was causing him some problems. Dr. Aramil have had invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues, medical students and friends to his house and after reading your December 15 advertisement some of them have uttered some remarks purporting doubts as to his professional and personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how much are you renting from the Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in the papers as belonging to another husband," and the like which caused him to have mental anguish. The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published. - A week has passed and neither letter of apology, explanation nor any rectification as done. So by February 20, 1969 Dr. Aramil s counsel demanded Php 110,000.00 from St. Louis for moral and exemplary damage. St. Louis answered the demand by saying that it was an honest mistake and if it wants rectification would be published in the Manila Times. By March 18 in the published issue of Manila Times, a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error. On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a space 4 by 3 inches. The notice did not contain any apology to Dr. Aramil for the dilemma it had caused him. -According to Judge Leuterio, St.Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and apology. As a result of the mistke done by St Louis, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the case filed against St. Louis Realty Corporation is covered by Article 26 of the new Civil Code. 2. Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil. HELD: Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. Through that negligence, persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. Furthermore, itnever made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification

".The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 asattorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the CivilCode because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadiobut to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps .WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner

ART 36
SPOUSES VICENTE YU AND DEMETRIA LEE-YU, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, Respondent. Under the Real Estate Mortgage dated August 15, 1994 and Amendments of Real estate Mortgage on April 4, 1995 the spouses Vicente and Demetria Yu, and Ramon and Virginia Yu had mortgaged their title, interest and participation over the parcels of land located in Dagupan and Quezon City as a security for the payment of loan amounting to P9M in favor of PCIB. On July 21, 1998, the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties due. The respondent filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Shefirr of the Regional trial Court of Dagupan, a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of real Estate Mortgage on their Dagupan properties. On August 3, 1998, the sheriff issued a notice of Etxtra-Judicial sale scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998. During the auction on September 10, 1998, the PCIB emerged as the highest bidder. On September 14, 1998, the Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PCIB. On October 1, 1998, it was registered with the Registry Deeds of Dagupan. On August 20, 1999 or two months prior the expiration of the redemption period, the respondent filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Dagupan (Special Proceeding No. 99---988-D, Branch 43) On September 14, 1999, hearing was conducted and respondents presented its evidence ex-parte. The testimony of Rodante Manuel was admitted ex-parte and thereafter the petition was deemed submitted for resolution. On September 30, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Out Testimony of Rodante Manuel stating that the Certificate of Sale dated September 14, 1998 is void because respondent violated Article 2089 of the Civil Code on the indivisibility of the mortgaged by conducting two separate foreclosure proceedings on the mortgage properties in Dagupan City and Quezon City and indicating in the two notices of extrajudicial sale that petitioners obligation is P10,437,015.2012 as of March 31, 1998, when petitioners are not indebted for the total amount of P20,874,031.56.13 Petitioners filed a complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, (Civil Case No. 99-03169-D and raffled to Branch 44 (RTC Branch 44). On February 14, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and to Strike Out Testimony of Rodante Manuel, ruling that the filing of a motion to dismiss is not allowed in petitions for issuance of writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135.14 On February 24, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, further arguing that the pendency of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 is a prejudicial issue to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43, the resolution of which is determinative on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession. On May 8, 2000, RTC Branch 43 denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, holding that the principle of prejudicial question is not applicable because the case pending before RTC Branch 44 is also a civil case and not a criminal case. On June 1, 2000, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.17 On November 14, 2000, the CA dismissed petitioners Petition for Certiorari on the grounds that petitioners violated Section 8 of Act No. 3135 and disregarded the rule against

multiplicity of suits in filing Civil Case No. 99-03169-D in RTC Branch 44 despite full knowledge of the pendency of Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D in RTC Branch 43; that since the one-year period of redemption has already lapsed, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of respondent becomes a ministerial duty of the trial court; that the issues in Civil Case No. 99-03169-D are not prejudicial questions to Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D because: (a) the special proceeding is already fait accompli, (b) Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is deemed not filed for being contrary to Section 8 of Act No. 3135, (c) the filing of Civil Case No. 99-03169-D is an afterthought and dilatory in nature, and (d) legally speaking what seems to exist is litis pendentia and not prejudicial question.18 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration19 but it was denied by the CA on April 26, 2001.20 Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioners pose two issues for resolution, to wit: A. Whether or not a real estate mortgage over several properties located in different locality [sic] can be separately foreclosed in different places. B. Whether or not the pendency of a prejudicial issue renders the issues in Special Proceedings No. 99-00988-D as [sic] moot and academic.21 Real estate Mortgage are indivisible, such can not be Donato vs. Luna Facts: On January 23, 1879, the City Fiscal of Manila filed an information of bigamy against the petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan filed under Criminal Case. On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner s arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. The civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petioner Donato s second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Manlupig on June 3, 1978. In answer to it, petitioner claimed that his 2nd marriage was void because it was solemnized without a valid marriage license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent. Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the criminal case petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that civil case seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed. Issue: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question? Held No, The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar