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l primo tomo della Wissenschaft der Logik fu pubblicato al-

Hegel

ISSN 1122-1259

Teoria
XXXIII/2013/1
la fine di aprile del 1812. Il secondo uscì dalla tipografia nel
dicembre dello stesso anno, recando però come data il 1813.
e
Entrambi erano dedicati alla “Logica oggettiva”. Il terzo volume alutazion azion
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sulla “Logica soggettiva”, che Hegel sperava di far seguire imme-
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Siamo quindi a circa duecento anni dalla pubblicazione di

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Hegel Scienza della logica

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4 INDICE

Michela Bordignon e
a l u t azion t ap. ne
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Dialectic and
p e r vNatural Language. Theories of Vagueness,
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La ragione nella storia. Appunti per una rilettura
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Hegel Scienza della logica

Dialectic and Natural Language.

Theories of Vagueness
Michela Bordignon1

In the context of the contemporary actualization of Hegelian thought sever-

al semantic interpretations of dialectic have been developed. Fulda explicitly
claims that «dialectical process is also a process of modification of
meaning»2. According to Angelica Nuzzo, «Hegel’s logic should be read as an
explicit and highly conscious program of clarification and revision of language
– both of ordinary language and of the language of traditional logic and meta-
physics»3. According to Diego Marconi, «dialectic is a way to adhere to the
equivocalness of natural language, namely a way to maintain this equivocal-
ness but also go beyond it»4. Francesco Berto conceives of dialectic as a
«general holistic theory of meaning»5.
These readings conceive of dialectic as a process of critical re-definition of
the meaning of the conceptual determinations embedded in natural language.
The starting point of this critical analysis is, therefore, natural language,
which provides the immediate and indeterminate characterization of the con-
ceptual determinations in question. In these semantic readings indeterminacy
is often connected with the notion of under-determination, and, more precise-
ly, with the concept of vaguenesss. The first abstract and intellectual moment

1 I thank Graham Wetherall and Clare Watters for kindly correcting the English translation
of this paper. Of course, all remaining errors are mine.
2 «Der dialektische Fortgang auch den Charakter einer Bedeutungsmodifikation hat» (H.
F. FULDA, Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, in Hegel-Bilanz, ed. by R. Heede e J. Rit-
ter, Klostermann, Frankfurt a.M. 1973, p. 243).
3 A. Nuzzo, Vagueness and Meaning Variance in Hegel’s Logic, in Hegel and the Analytic
Tradition, ed. by A. Nuzzo, Continuum, London/NY 2009, p. 62.
4 «La dialettica è un modo per aderire all’equivocità del linguaggio naturale, conservan-
dola. Ma anche, però, andando oltre essa» (D. Marconi, La formalizzazione della dialettica,
Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino 1979, p. 70).
5 F. Berto, Che cos’e la dialettica hegeliana?, Il Poligrafo, Padova 2005, p. 210.

TEORIA 2013/1
009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 180

180 Michela Bordignon

of the dialectic of a determination corresponds to the immediate meaning that

characterizes this determination in natural language. Therefore, the indeter-
minacy of the understanding (Verstand) corresponds to the same kind of
vagueness affecting conceptual contents in natural language.
In my paper, I will show that this interpretative approach is not consistent
with Hegel’s text. In order to do that, I will proceed through four steps:
1) a presentation of the semantic approaches in question, focused on the rela-
tion between dialectic and natural language and on the role vagueness
plays in this relation;
2) an exposition of the most relevant features of the notion of vagueness in
philosophy of language;
3) an explanation of the reasons why the concept of vagueness is not effective
in explaining the failure of determinacy affecting the understanding’s
determination in Hegel’s dialectic;
4) a critical analysis of the relation between dialectical process and natural
language in these semantic interpretations of dialectic.

1. Semantic readings of Hegel’s dialectic and the notion

of vagueness
The semantic readings I have referred to provide a relevant contribution to
the debate on the relationship between dialectic and natural language, be-
cause their focus is on precisely this relation. In Contradiction and the Lan-
guage of Hegel’s Dialectic, Diego Marconi highlights that, in order to under-
stand the relation between dialectic and philosophy in Hegel’s system, we
need to take into account two assumptions:
a. Philosophy is “science free from presuppositions”: it cannot assume, not even
implicitly, any substantial doctrine concerning any aspect of reality.
b. Natural language, with its intensional contents (meanings) and syntactic structu-
re, is the starting-point of philosophical discourse. Philosophy cannot do without natu-
ral language, though it may go beyond it6.

Therefore, if philosophy is meant to be science, it must be presupposition-

less, which means that it «cannot assume its linguistic unities as something
determined, but it must constitute this determinateness»7. In fact, assuming

6 D. Marconi, Contradiction and the Language of Hegel’s Dialectic (PhD Dissertation), Uni-
versity Microfilms International, Pittsburgh 1980, p. 174.
7 «Non può assumere la determinatezza delle sue unità linguistiche, ma deve costituirla»
(D. Marconi, La formalizzazione della dialettica, p. 19).
009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 181

Dialectic and Natural Language 181

the meaning or the syntactic role of a conceptual term implies the assumption
of a determinate theory concerning this term8. Since it must be presupposi-
tionless, philosophy cannot assume any kind of theory.
Nevertheless, philosophy necessarily needs natural language as its expres-
sive mean, such that it necessarily has natural language as its assumption: the
linguistic unities philosophy uses «come from natural language and they keep
their (more or less definite) ordinary and technical uses»9.
Moreover, on the basis of the first point – philosophy must be presupposi-
tionless – the understanding’s determinations, which are the starting point of
the dialectical process, should be completely indeterminate. Yet, no process of
determination can begin from a position of complete indeterminacy. Complete
indeterminacy must be delimited in some way and this is possible only
through the assumption of natural language and, more specifically, of the im-
plicit and immediate way in which conceptual contents are determined in nat-
ural language. However, this implicit and immediate way of conceiving of
some conceptual contents cannot be simply and uncritically assumed by phi-
losophy because of the presuppositionless starting point it is supposed to
have. Rather, it is assumed as a hypothesis that needs to be discussed in the
development of the dialectical process itself.
In this way, natural language turns out to be the assumption and the start-
ing point of the dialectical process. This assumption does not undermine the
presuppositionless character that philosophy is supposed to have. Quite the
contrary, the assumption of natural language is perfectly compatible with the
presuppositionless character of philosophy insofar as it is a critical assump-
tion, namely an assumption which is open to being cast into doubt. This
process of casting doubt on the articulation of natural language is dialectic it-
self, which turns out to be an analysis of language through language itself, or,
differently put, a process through which language corrects itself.
According to this view, the indeterminacy of the starting point of every di-
alectical process, namely the indeterminacy of the determinations of the un-
derstanding, is the same kind of indeterminacy affecting the conceptual con-
tents involved in natural language. It is not a complete indeterminacy, but a
partial one. Marconi claims:
With respect to technical terms, our natural languages are usually bound up with
theories – the most accredited ones [...]. With respect to the other terms, natural lan-
guages are not bound up with any theory, neither univocally nor strictly. Rather, they

8 «Una teoria infatti si costituisce determinando il ruolo sintattico e l’area semantica dei
suoi termini, cioè la forma delle formule in cui ciascun termine può occorrere […] e l’insieme
dei possibili sostituti del termine» (ibid.).
9 «Provengono dal linguaggio naturale e si portano dietro i loro (più o meno definiti) usi
ordinari e “dotti”» (ibid., pp. 9-10).
009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 182

182 Michela Bordignon

involve ways of determining conceptual content which are partial, not precise and so-
metimes contradictory, or corresponding to linguistic practices of various and different
origins. This is what vagueness of natural language consists of10.

According to this semantic reading, vagueness turns out to play a crucial

role in the development of the dialectical process, because the indeterminacy
of the first moment of dialectic is nothing but the failure of determinacy af-
fecting vague terms in natural language. The relationship between the indeter-
minacy of the first moment of dialectic – the abstract intellectual one – and
vagueness is also underlined by Fulda: «At first, their meaning is just mini-
mally determined. The minimum level is established through the rules of ordi-
nary language for the use of abstract terms»11.
Thus, the determinations of the understanding are neither completely inde-
terminate nor completely determinate. On the one hand, if they were com-
pletely indeterminate there would not be any basis for the dialectical process
to start. On the other hand, if they were completely determinate, there would
not be any need for the dialectic process at all, because there would be noth-
ing to determine.
What is at stake in the first moment of dialectic is a failure of determinacy,
and this failure of determinacy is meant to be the same failure of determinacy
that vagueness implies in natural language, which in fact is assumed as the
very starting point of dialectic. As Marconi says: «To start with natural lan-
guage is to start by using linguistic expressions in the somewhat vague sense
in which they are used naturally»12. Fulda endorses a similar interpretative
approach when he writes: «The initial term is not an abstract universality, but
rather a vague term»13. The failure of determinacy implied by vagueness
brings about the need of a process of determination. Therefore this failure of
determinacy turns out to be the moving factor of the dialectical process. Hegel
himself, at the end of the Science of Logic, writes: «The immediate of the be-

10 «Le nostre lingue naturali sono di solito vincolate a teorie – le teorie al momento più ac-

creditate – per quanto riguarda i termini ‘tecnici’: questo è infatti proprio ciò che caratterizza
come tali i termini tecnici. Per il rimanente, esse non sono vincolate, né univocamente né rigida-
mente, a teorie, ma […] contengono determinazioni parziali, incerte e a volte contraddittorie,
corrispondenti a usi linguistici di varia e diversa origine. In ciò consiste la ‘vaghezza’ del lin-
guaggio naturale» (D. Marconi, La formalizzazione della dialettica, p. 19).
11 «Ihre Bedeutung anfangs nur minimal bestimmt. Das Minimum ist festlegt durch um-

gangssprachlich Regeln für das Gebrauch abstrakter Termini, soweit diese Regeln nicht durch
die vorausgegangene Bewusstseinkritik [...] bedeutungsirrelevant gemacht werden sind» (H.F.
Fulda, Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, p. 246).
12 D. Marconi, Contradiction and the Language of Hegel’s Dialectic, p. 179.
13 «Beim anfänglichen Terminus handelt es sich genau genommen nicht um ein abstrakt

Allgemeines, sondern um ein Vages» (H.F. Fulda, Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik,
p. 247).
009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 183

Dialectic and Natural Language 183

ginning must be in its own self deficient and endowed with the urge to carry it-
self further»14.
The failure of determinacy of vague conceptual terms comes to light and
turns out to be the moving factor of the dialectical process insofar as dialectic
does not uncritically appropriate these vague terms from natural language.
Rather, the terms are taken up as hypotheses to be tested. This test consists of
a process through which their conceptual content and the syntactic role they
play in natural language are made explicit. This process unveils some incom-
patibilities concerning the semantic and syntactic commitments involved in
the way the terms in question are determined in natural language. In Hegel’s
technical language, these incompatibilities should correspond to so called
“speculative contradiction”. As Nuzzo puts it, «the vagueness of borderline
cases is essential to dialectic as a logic that admits and works through contra-
diction. Because of their vagueness, borderline cases are the place in which
contradiction is met»15. These incompatibilities need to be solved and the so-
lution is the Aufhebung of the contradiction which arises in the dialectical
process. Hence, by bringing about this contradiction, the failure of determina-
cy turns out to be the moving factor of the dialectical process. The dynamic of
this process is elaborated by Marconi:
Hegel’s conceptual terms are surrounded by an ill-defined semantic halo, whose
authority is always partial and temporary. They are neither purely meaningless sym-
bols nor well defined terms. They are signs accompanied by a variegated complex of
rules for the use of terms and these rules can be partly incompatible with one another;
dialectical process is the critical analysis of these rules: the consideration of the rules
for the use of a term […] is the input of the dialectical process16.

14 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, zweiter Band, Die subjektive Logik. Die Lehre vom

Begriff (1816), in Gesammelte Werke, Meiner, Hamburg 1968 ss. (from now on GW), Bd. XII,
hrsg. von F. Hogemann e W. Jaeschke, Meiner, Hamburg 1981, p. 241; engl. transl. by A.V.
Miller, Science of Logic, Allen – Unwin, London 1969, pp. 573-844, p. 829. With respect to this
lines, Nuzzo claims: «l’inizio è sempre l’immediato e l’indeterminato, ciò che, nel suo proprio
ambito, non può ancora contare su alcuna solida base precostituita o presupposta sulla quale ap-
poggiare la propria immanente determinazione. L’inizio è inoltre sempre una struttura semplice
(Einfaches) e (astrattamente) universale (Allgemeines)» (A. NUZZO, La logica, in Guida a Hegel,
ed. by C. Cesa, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1997, p. 60).
15 A. Nuzzo, Vagueness and Meaning Variance in Hegel’s Logic, p. 76.
16 «Le ‘parole concettuali’ di Hegel si presentano quindi circondate da un alone semantico

non ben definito, la cui autorità e comunque parziale e provvisoria: esse non sono né puri segni
privi di significato (= regole d’uso), né termini ben definiti, come quelli del linguaggio discipli-
nare. Sono segni accompagnati da un complesso variegato di regole d’uso, magari parzialmente
incompatibili; nel confronto critico di queste regole consiste il procedimento dialettico: la con-
siderazione di una regola d’uso […] e l’‘input’ del processo dialettico» (D. Marconi, La formaliz-
zazione della dialettica, p. 20).
009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 184

184 Michela Bordignon

Hence, the task of dialectic is not merely to make explicit the incompati-
bilities hidden in natural language, but also to eliminate these incompatibili-
ties. Angelica Nuzzo claims:
The task of dialectic is to somehow dispel the vagueness of borderline cases and
the fuzziness of boundaries. Discontinuities or transition between discrete logical
spheres […] work as constrains to linguistic vagueness. Dialectic is the procedure
through which boundaries are drawn, spheres of meaning are first instituted, and
terms are systematically assigned to those different spheres17.

Therefore dialectic is meant to be a process of modification of conceptual

contents18. As Fulda puts it, «the whole dialectic can be characterized as a
method for the limitations of vagueness»19.
In Hegels Analytische Philosophie, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer endorses this
semantic approach and interprets dialectical process as the passage from the
level of Verstehen – which corresponds to the immediate, ordinary and pre-
conceptual way of thinking of a term – to the level of Begreifen – which corre-
sponds to the critical analysis of the same term. This critical analysis is aimed
at making explicit the incompatibilities implicit in the ordinary use of the
term and at individuating a solution to enable the removal of these incompati-
bilities20.
In order to understand whether or not this kind of semantic reading of di-
alectic is sustainable I will analyze how the notion of vagueness is defined in
philosophy of language. It will then be possible to assess, on the one and, if
this notion fits with the indeterminacy of the understanding’s determinations
that it is meant to explain, and on the other, if natural language can really be
taken to be the starting point of the dialectical process.

17 A. Nuzzo, Vagueness and Meaning Variance in Hegel’s Logic, p. 76.

18 «Il processo dialettico implica effettivamente una revisione di impegni semantici sul con-
tenuto di certi termini descrittivi – impegni assunti prima che la singola procedura dialettica ab-
bia inizio. E questa revisione o ridefinizione concettuale ha a che fare con la necessità di modifi-
care o rigettare certi postulati di significato» (F. Berto, Che cos’e la dialettica hegeliana?, p. 95).
According to the same view, Fulda claims: «Die dialektische Logik soll nicht nur die Ge-
brauchs-bedeutungen vorhandener Ausdrucke analysieren. Sie soll diese Bedeutungen kor-
rigieren und damit die Mittel für neue propositionale Gehalte bereitstellen» (H.F. Fulda, Un-
zulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, p. 241).
19 «Die ganze Dialektik lasst als ein Verfahren solcher Einschränkungen von Vagheit

charakterisieren» (H.F. Fulda, Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, p. 258).

20 Stekeler-Weithofer claims: «Ihr Ziel ist die Aufhebung von Mangeln in der Bloß faktis-

chen Sprachgebrauch und konventionellen Urteisweisen, die Restitution der Geltung des Wider-
spruchsprinzips» (P. Stekeler-Weithofer, Hegels Analytische Philosophie. Die Wissenschaft der
Logik als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung, Schöningh, Paderborn 1992, p. 26).
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Dialectic and Natural Language 185

2. Vagueness

Fulda defines vague expressions «as expressions that are indeterminate

with respect to the conditions of their application»21. What does this mean?
Rosanna Keefe, in her book Theories of Vagueness, outlines the three main
features of vague predicates, namely: they «admit borderline cases, they lack
[…] sharp boundaries and they are susceptible to sorites paradoxes»22. I will
briefly analyze these three features of vagueness.
First of all, the admission of borderline cases. This is the most important
feature of vague predicates (the other two are consequences of this first fea-
ture). Also with respect to propositions, vagueness implies borderline cases.
In 1902, Peirce writes:
A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning which it
is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he
would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition. By intrinsically
uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter,
but because the speaker’s habits of language were indeterminate23.

The admission of borderline cases is inherently connected with the main

feature of vagueness pointed out by Fulda, namely the indeterminacy of the
conditions of application of a term. Fulda highlights that the vagueness of
conceptual determinations mainly deals with «predication’s borderline
cases»24. It is not clear whether or not a predicate can be ascribed to a subject
only with respect to the borderline cases in question. The traditional example
is the predicate “tall”. The borderline case is that of a person who can neither
be said to be tall, nor short. Obviously, borderline cases can turn out to be
problematic for both the bivalence principle and the principle of excluded
middle.
Secondly, vague predicates do not have precise boundaries, namely they
lack a clearly determined extension. As Keefe claims, «vague predicates are
naturally described as having fuzzy, or blurred, boundaries»25. This second

21 «Denn „vage“ nennen wir ein Ausdruck, der hinsichtlich der Bedingungen seiner An-

wendung unbestimmt ist» (H.F. Fulda, Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, p. 247).
22 R. Keefe, Theories of Vagueness, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, p. 6.
23 C.S. Peirce, Vague, in J.M. Baldwin (eds.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 2

vol., MacMillan, New York 1902, p. 748. According to Sorensen, «there is wide agreement that a
term is vague to the extent that it has borderline cases […]. Vagueness is standardly defined as
the possession of borderline cases» (R. Sorensen, Vagueness, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philos-
ophy, first published Sat Feb 8, 1997; substantive revision Tue Aug 29, 2006, http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/vagueness/).
24 H.F. Fulda, Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, p. 249.
25 R. Keefe, Theories of Vagueness, p. 7. With respect to Peirce, Raspa claims: «l’ambito di
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186 Michela Bordignon

feature is obviously related to the first one: the conditions of application of

these predicates are indeterminate with respect to borderline cases because a
precise boundary distinguishing what a predicate can be ascribed to and what
a predicate cannot be ascribed to is missing.
Thirdly, vague predicates are susceptible to sorites paradoxes, namely that
class of paradoxical arguments whose development is based on the indetermi-
nacy of the boundaries of the predicates they involve. A classic example is the
following: «if one is prepared to admit that ten thousand grains of sand make a
heap then one can argue that one grain of sand does since the removal of any
one grain of sand cannot make the difference»26. This third feature, as the
second one, is related to the first main feature: the presence of borderline cas-
es implies blurred boundaries and therefore the risk to cross these boundaries
without even being aware of this crossing.
Coming back to Hegel, it is worth noting that 15 years before Fulda, John
Findlay acknowledges the important role of vagueness in Hegel’s thought, and
he focuses his attention on exactly those three features I have just outlined.
More precisely, he highlights that conceptual terms involved in natural lan-
guage are determined not only by their “logical geography”, namely by the
system of relations through which they are related to other conceptual terms,
but also by a logical dynamics, namely the inherent movement that makes
them turn into other determinations:
Hegel has certainly made plain that our notions do carry with them a certain natu-
ral shading into other notions, a natural implication of such notions, and a natural fa-
vorableness and unfavourableness to other notions, which it is not in our power to
create or alter, but which may be said to rest solely on their affinity of content. And

applicabilità […] di ogni predicato vago, non è definito, non ha cioè confini netti» (V. RASPA, In-
contraddizione, Parnaso, Trieste 1999, p. 318).
26 D. Hyde, Sorites Paradox, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published Fri Jan

17, 1997; substantive revision Mon Aug 15, 2005. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-para-

dox/). More precisely, if there is a predicate P whose extension is not precisely determined, and
there is xi, which stands for the set of objects with respect to which the conditions of application
of P turn out to be indeterminate, the sorite paradox is characterized by the following structure:
(1) Px1
(2) For every i, if Pxi then Pxi+1
—————————-
(3) Pxn
First of all, it is worth noting that the argument works both by addiction and by subtraction.
Secondly, the argument is based on: (1) a true premise, for instance, 10000 grains of sand make
a heap; (2) plausible conditional premises, that is, in the example under consideration, if 10000
grains of sand make a heap then 9999 grains of sand makes it too, and so on; (3) a conclusion –
one grain of sand still makes a heap – that is a conclusion correctly inferred via modus ponens,
which yet is false when we consider our natural intuitions.
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Dialectic and Natural Language 187

with this affinity of content goes a natural tendency of our notions to slide over into
other notions, to alter or develop in certain ways (many of them contrary), which ten-
dency again we can neither make nor unmake, but can only yield to, or suppress27.

The «natural favorableness» of some terms to other terms in our natural

language indicates what we have called borderline cases. The «natural shad-
ing into other notions» refers to the loss of precise boundaries in the extension
of these terms. The «implication of other notions» and the «natural tendency
of our notions to slide over into other notions, to alter or develop in certain
ways (many of them contrary)» is exactly the consequence of vagueness corre-
sponding to the paradoxical conclusion of sorites paradoxes.

3. Vagueness and indeterminacy of the understanding

Now, the crucial question is the following: can vagueness be used as an ef-
fective tool to grasp where the indeterminacy of the understanding’s determi-
nations lies? If we want to answer this question, we have to consider the three
main features of vagueness just outlined and try to understand whether or not
they fit with understanding’s indeterminacy.
Let us consider the understanding’s immediate articulation of the determi-
nation of the finite. Firstly, does this articulation involve borderline cases? It
does not seem so. Actually, the understanding assumes the finite as something
fixed and opposed to the infinite. The presence of borderline cases is just
what is excluded on the basis of the fixed conception of the finite developed
by the understanding.
Secondly, is the immediate articulation of the finite marked by blurred
boundaries? Again, the answer seems to be negative. The abstractness and
one-sidedness of the determinations of the understanding consists in the artic-
ulation of the determination in question as something self-subsistent and in-
dependent from the other determinations, especially from its opposite: the fi-
nite is different from the infinite, or, better said, it is strongly opposed to the
infinite because it is incompatible with it. There cannot be a blurred boundary
between the finite and the infinite because they are mutually exclusive.
Thirdly, is the finite susceptible to sorites paradoxes? Even this third fea-
ture of vagueness does not work in understanding the immediate conception of
the finite and the way it turns out to be self-contradictory. The abstract and
one-sided conception of the finite is not contradictory on the basis of an argu-

27 J.N. Findlay, Hegel. A Re-examination, Allen & Unwin, London 1958, p. 79. The same

idea is highlighted by Bloch: «Wichtig vor allem wird, zu lernen, daß die Begriffe hier flüssig
sind» (E. Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1962, p. 25).
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188 Michela Bordignon

ment that focuses on the indefinite addition of something finite to the initial
finite and that ends up by equating the outcome of this indefinite addition
with the infinite itself. Rather, the abstract conception of the finite is self-con-
tradictory insofar as it is opposed to the infinite. Since it stands as fixed and
persistent over against of infinity, the finite itself is infinite too. The finite is
opposed to the infinite as the infinite is opposed to the finite. This abstract de-
finition – “A is opposed to B” – applies to both of them: the finite is opposed
to infinity and infinity is opposed to the finite. The finite and infinity, as deter-
mined by this definition, turn out to be indeterminate (the finite turns out to
be infinite, and the infinite as opposed to the finite is the bad infinite, namely
an infinity which is finite). This definition is indeterminate because both the
finite and the infinite fall under it.
However, the indeterminacy of the definition in question is not an example
of vagueness because it is based on the strong exclusive relation between op-
posite determinations. Therefore, the understanding’s characterization of the
finite is not vague at all. The understanding’s determinations, far from being
vague, are based on sharp distinctions, which do away with vagueness as well
as incompatibilities affecting the conceptual content of the determinations at
the level of natural language. For example, the understanding’s determination
of the finite rids itself of the common conception of what is finite. The imme-
diate and abstract characterization of the finite has precise boundaries: the fi-
nite is what is opposed to the infinite, or, the finite is the “non-infinite”.
Hence, the notion of vagueness is a misleading tool when used in attempt
to qualify the understanding’s indeterminacy. If we want to explain the nature
of this indeterminacy in contemporary philosophical language, we have to
look somewhere else. I think that Keefe’s book Theories of Vagueness provides
a useful suggestion for the solution of this problem. Keefe distinguishes the
notion of vagueness, meant in the sense outlined above, from other ways of
conceiving of conceptual indeterminacy. One of these ways is what she calls
«under-specificity». I am convinced that the understanding’s indeterminacy
corresponds to this notion. «Under-specificity» consists in an under-determi-
nation of a conceptual content:
The remark “Someone said something” is naturally described as vague (who said
what?). Similarly, “X is an integer greater than thirty” is an unhelpfully vague hint
about the value of X. Vagueness in this sense is underspecificity, a matter of being
less than adequately informative for the purposes in hand. This seems to have nothing
to do with borderline cases or with lack of sharp boundaries: “is an integer greater
than thirty” has sharp boundaries, has no borderline cases, and is not susceptible to
sorites paradoxes28.

28 R. Keefe, Theories of Vagueness, p. 10.

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Dialectic and Natural Language 189

The indeterminacy of the understanding’s determinations can be said to be

under-specified insofar as they are affected by a failure of determinacy which
is different from vagueness and which is not determinate enough in order to
correspond to their concrete nature, or, as Hegel puts it, to their truth. The un-
derstanding’s determinations have sharp boundaries, and these boundaries are
not incorrect. They are completely correct but they are not the whole truth. We
could also say that they are richtig but not wahrhaft. They are not true on the
basis of a pattern of rationality such as Hegel’s, according to which the truth is
the whole. In fact they can be said to be partly true, insofar as they are affect-
ed by a failure of determinacy which makes them one-sided and abstract.
This explanation of the indeterminacy of the determinations of the under-
standing as under-specificity also allows us to understand the sense in which
the intellectual and abstract moment of dialectic is a necessary step in the di-
alectical process, but, at the same time, one which is to be necessarily over-
come. The determinations of the understanding, in being under-specified,
namely in being partially true, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for
the development of the truth as a whole, which is the aim of the concrete di-
alectic of a determination.

4. Dialectic and natural language

The last point to be analyzed is the relation between dialectic and natural
language in the semantic approaches which assume vagueness as an interpre-
tative tool in order to explain the indeterminacy of the understanding.
The first moment of dialectic is supposed to assume conceptual contents in
the vague characterization they possess in natural language. Dialectic is sup-
posed to be the process of making explicit and critically analyzing of the syn-
tactic and semantic incompatibilities arising from this vagueness. Yet, if the
understanding’s indeterminacy does not correspond to vagueness, the equation
of the first moment of the dialectical process with the level of natural language
is also cast in doubt.
There is, nonetheless, one point which is still valid: natural language is the
starting point of dialectic. This claim is supported by several passages in
Hegel’s texts. For example, in the second preface of the Science of Logic,
Hegel claims: «The forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and
stored in human language»29. Hence, natural language is the locus from which

29 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, erster Band, Die objektive Logik, erstes Buch, Die

Lehre vom Seyn (1832), in GW, Bd. XXI, hrsg. von F. Hogemann, W. Jaeschke, Meiner, Ham-
burg 1985 (from now on WdL I), p. 10; engl. transl. by A.V. Miller, Science of Logic, Allen – Un-
win, London 1969, pp. 23-385, p. 31.
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190 Michela Bordignon

we need to start in order to highlight the structure of thought determinations.

Therefore, what we need to understand is the sense in which natural language
can be the starting point of dialectic without being the source from which di-
alectic simply assumes the conceptual contents to be analyzed.
If we consider Hegel’s famous claim «what is familiar is not understood
precisely because it is familiar», dialectical process can be thought of as the
path that starts from the familiar and goes to the understood. The familiar cor-
responds to the stage of the conceptual contents as they are embedded in our
natural language. In the semantic interpretations we referred to, this level is
equated with the first moment of the dialectical process, namely with the im-
mediate and abstract articulation of the understanding’s determinations. The
knowing process is a kind of explication of this “familiar” and of the contra-
diction involved in it. Therefore, as Francesco Berto writes, «since dialectic
cannot start with the regimentation of the conceptual content of natural lan-
guage, speculative practice is the organon of semantic self-conscioussness,
which means, first of all, the exploration of this various and multiform articu-
lation (namely the articulation of natural language)»30. According to this ap-
proach, the task of the understanding is not a regimentation, but rather an as-
sumption of the various and multiform articulation of natural language which
dialectic is committed to analyze.
Nevertheless, the task of regimentation is precisely what the understanding
is aimed at. Fixity and stability of the determinations, together with their defi-
niteness and abstractness, are the peculiar characteristics of the understand-
ing. These very features which define the nature of the understanding are
what seem to be furthest from natural language and from the concreteness of
the blurred and imprecise definitions of the conceptual contents embedded
within it.
The familiar level of knowledge is the knowledge settled in natural lan-
guage and it corresponds to the most basic level of what Hegel calls «repre-
sentation». In some passages of Hegel’s texts, when compared to the under-
standing, representation stands on a lower level. Whereas representation is
the simple and passive assumption of the conceptual contents of natural lan-
guage, the understanding performs an active process of deconstruction of the
concreteness of these contents in order to gain the fixity, abstractness and def-
initeness which characterize its nature. For instance, in the preface to Phe-
nomenology Hegel writes:
The analysis of an idea (Vorstellung), as it used to be carried out, was, in fact, no-
thing else than ridding it of the form in which it had become familiar. To break an idea
up into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least do not have the

30 F. Berto, Che cos’e la dialettica hegeliana?, p. 308.

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Dialectic and Natural Language 191

form of the given idea but rather constitute the immediate property of the se1f. This
analysis, to be sure, only arrives at thoughts which are themse1ves familiar, fixed, and
inert determinations. But what is thus separated and non-actual is an essential mo-
ment; for it is only because the concrete does divide itself, and make itself into some-
thing non-actual, that it is self-moving” The activity of dissolution is the power and
work of the Understanding, the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the
absolute power31.
The understanding can in no way said to be a mere assumption of the con-
ceptual contents of natural language. Quite the contrary, it exercises its pecu-
liar power, which is an astonishing power and turns out to be fundamental for
the beginning of the dialectical process. This power consists in the «breaking
up» and separation of the different elements of the content of natural lan-
guage. If language – as we said – has an articulation whose nature is various
and multiform, the task of the understanding is the analysis of this articulation
and the partitioning of the several elements and forms involved in it. This
analysis and partitioning allow these elements and forms to be given a «fixed
inert» articulation. This articulation is the «immediate property of the self»,
namely determinations whose fixity, stability and definiteness turn them into a
«fixed and unreal» element. On the one hand, this element is unreal because
the abstractness characterizing it prevents it from grasping the concreteness of
reality, which remains constitutively separated from it. On the other hand, this
«self-division» and this «unreality» represent an essential moment for the de-
velopment of the dialectical process, because they provide the fixed and solid
basis from which the process starts. At the same time they are affected by that
failure of determinacy which gives rise to the need for a further determination
and which therefore is the moving factor of dialectic itself.
In this sense, dialectic does start with natural language and this starting
point is a kind of exploration and critical analysis of it, but this analysis is not
performed by reason and it does not correspond to the whole development of
the dialectical process. Rather, this analysis is performed by the understand-
ing and it corresponds to what Hegel – in the lines quoted – calls «the analy-
sis of an idea (Vorstellung)», namely an analysis that brings about what can be
called a ‘regimentation’ of the conceptual terms involved in natural language.
This regimentation is the one-sided and abstract fixation of the conceptual
content contained in these conceptual terms.
The truth does not lie in a language which is completely different from nat-
ural language. Indeed, it is embedded in natural language itself, but in a way
too immediate to be recognized. The impossibility to grasp this truth is similar

31 G.W.F. Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, in GW, Bd. IX, hrsg. von W. Bonsiepen, R.
Heede, Meiner, Hamburg 1980, p. 27; engl. transl. A.V. Miller, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford
U.P., Oxford [etc.] 1977, p. 18.
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192 Michela Bordignon

to the impossibility of seeing something huge which stands directly in front of

us. We need to take a step back in order to be able to see it as a whole. Our
ordinary language reflects and is structured on the basis of reality, but in an
unconscious way. Thought in its objective value is present in ordinary lan-
guage, but only as an instinct that needs to grow and to become aware of itself.
Becoming aware of the essence of this instinct, which is thought itself, is the
task of Hegel’s logical system. In the Science of Logic, Hegel claims:
to focus attention on this logical nature which animates mind, moves and works in
it, this is the task. The broad distinction between the instinctive act and the intelligent
and free act is that the latter is performed with an awareness of what is being done;
when the content of the interest in which one is absorbed is drawn out of its immediate
unity with oneself and becomes an independent object of one’s thinking, then it is that
the spirit begins to be free, whereas when thinking is an instinctive activity, spirit is
enmeshed in the bonds of its categories and is broken up into an infinitely varied
material32.

The regimentation of natural language performed by the understanding is

the only way we have of taking some distance from the unconscious knowl-
edge embedded within language itself, to analyze this knowledge and to out-
line its concrete articulation.
Nevertheless, the resolution of the incompatibilities dependent on the
vagueness affecting natural language and the regimentation of language itself
that this analysis involves is not what dialectic consists of, but rather it is the
precondition for the dialectical process to start. The first moment of dialectic
– the intellectual abstract one – does not correspond to the level of natural
language, but to the regimentation level which is the outcome of the critical
analysis and the resolution of the syntactic and semantic incompatibilities
arising from language itself. The stage of the understanding, rather than corre-
sponding to natural language, can be traced back to the level of standard log-
ic, that Hegel also defines as the «logic of the understanding» and whose task
is just the regimentation process I have referred to with respect to the role of
the understanding in the dialectical process. That’s what Hegel writes with re-
spect to standard logic:
in the first place, we must regard as an infinite step forward that the form of
thought have been freed from the material in which they are submerged in self-
conscious intuition, figurate conception, and in our desiring and willing […]; that the-
se universalities have been brought into prominence for their own sake and made ob-
jects of contemplation as was done by Plato and after him especially by Aristotle; this
constitutes the beginning of the intelligent apprehension of them33.

32 WdL I, p. 15; p. 37.

33 WdL I, p. 12; p. 33.
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Dialectic and Natural Language 193

In the first moment of the dialectical process the liberation of the cate-
gories involved in natural logic takes place. Natural logic is embedded in nat-
ural language and it needs to be freed from the sensible content in which it is
mixed up with34. This allows us to shed light on the true nature of the cate-
gories in question:
as impulses the categories are only instinctively active. At first they enter
consciousness separately and so are variable and mutually confusing; consequently
they afford to mind only a fragmentary and uncertain actuality; the loftier business of
logic therefore is to clarify these categories and in them to raise mind to freedom and
truth35.

Therefore, natural language can be taken to be the starting point of dialec-

tic, and the three moments of the dialectical process turn out to be three stages
of liberation and concrete articulation of the natural logic embedded in it:
1. The first moment is the understanding’s abstraction process performed on
natural language, whose outcome is the regimentation of language itself ex-
pressed in standard logic.
2. In the second moment of the dialectic, namely the dialectical or negative-
rational one, the fixed and isolated determinations of the understanding ap-
pear as «variable and mutually confusing»: reason shows that the abstract-
ness and one-sidedness of these determinations implies their under-speci-
ficity with respect to their concrete and whole nature. Their content does
not fulfill what they are supposed to be and so they turn out to be self-con-
tradictory. Contradiction provides what Hegel describes as «a fragmentary
and uncertain actuality».
3. The third moment of dialectic, namely the speculative or positive-rational
one, consists of the resolution (Aufhebung) of the contradictions implied by
the second one, and this allows «to raise mind to freedom and truth».
Therefore, the role played by the understanding in relation to natural lan-
guage is crucial in order for the dialectical process to start, and philosophy

34 Ibid., p. 33. Natural logic consists of the set of rules and laws that belong to the nature of

thought itself. They are correctly but also unconsciously performed within thought. In fact, with
respect to the categories of classical logic, Hegel claims: «in life, the categories are used; from
the honour of being contemplated for their own sakes they are degraded to the position where
they serve in the creation and exchange of ideas involved in intellectual exercise on a living con-
tent. First they serve as abbreviations through their universality […]. Secondly, the categories
serve for the more exact determination and discovery of objective relations […]. Such a use of the
categories, which above was called natural logic, in unconscious» (WdL I, p. 13; pp. 34-35). An-
gelica Nuzzo claims: «la logica speculativa […] si propone piuttosto di portare alla coscienza
quella logica (naturale) che costituisce l’essenza stessa del pensiero nella sua verità» (A. Nuzzo,
La logica, p. 49).
35 WdL I, p. 16; p. 37.
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194 Michela Bordignon

needs to acknowledge this role as essential not only for grasping speculative
truth, but also for understanding the sense in which this truth is implicit in
natural language itself. As Findlay claims:
Philosophy must be able to use and absorb the work of the Understanding […] For
philosophy, having separated off aspects from the continuum of the unanalyzed, must
again allow these aspects to ‘pass over into one another’, if it is to reinstate and un-
derstand this continuum, and not merely to reduce it to senselessness36.

Philosophy starts with natural language. It is an analysis that moves away

from this «continuum of the unanalyzed» in order to clarify its structure. How-
ever, philosophy cannot stop at this pure and perfectly articulated structure,
which is «senselessness» insofar as it is unable to grasp and reflect the way
things concretely are – because of its abstract and fixed nature. Philosophy
needs to come back to the concreteness of language which reflects the con-
creteness of reality, not in the immediate form of the starting point, but as
something fully mediated. This mediating process that is meant to be a com-
plete rational articulation of the initial concreteness is possible only by pass-
ing through the understanding’s pattern of thought which allows us to take
some distance from the concreteness in question, to focus on the several ele-
ments of its articulation and to see the different relations constituting it.

5. Vagueness and contradictions

Given the considerations above, the relation between dialectic and vague-
ness, and the ambiguities and incompatibilities pervading natural languages,
can be seen from a point of view that is completely different from the one de-
veloped by the semantic interpretations I have referred to. Vagueness, ambi-
guities, and incompatibilities in natural language are not the cause of a con-
tradiction, which needs to be solved in order to develop a conceptual structure
which is completely coherent but whose fixity and rigor seem at the same time
to be far away from the concreteness and dynamism of reality. The develop-
ment of such a kind of logical structure would make no sense in a pattern of
rationality such as Hegel’s, which is based on the principle according to which
the real is rational, but at the same time the rational is real too. Rather, vague-
ness, ambiguities and incompatibilities rooted in natural language can be un-
derstood to be symptoms of a deeper incompatibility, or, put in Hegel’s terms,
of a deeper contradiction, that is a contradiction which does not simply reside
in the way we think and talk about reality, but in the way reality is in itself.

36 J.N. FINDLAY, Hegel. A Re-examination, p. 62.

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Dialectic and Natural Language 195

This is just what Bloch wants to bring into focus when he refers to the flu-
idity of Hegel’s specific terminology:
[Anyone] Who reads Hegel needs to get familiar with the evident and objective
contradiction which is present in everything there is and which is endlessly mirrored
by conceptual language; […] here the paradox is the voice of the concept opposed to
the common sense which tends to isolate (conceptual contents)37.

More precisely, the dialectical process of each logical determination could

be seen from two parallel perspectives, that is to say, the linguistic side and
the ontological side.
The linguistic-side process starts with an under-specificity of the determi-
nation in question (abstract-intellectual moment). This failure of determinacy
basically consists in a characterization of a category that covers a logical
space that is wider than the one belonging to the category itself and that in-
cludes the opposite category. For instance, the definition of the finite as the
non-infinite includes an infinite logical space and then turns the finite itself
into something infinite. This contradiction is the symptom of something not
working in the first under-specified definition of the determination (negative-
rational moment), but it is also the symptom of the speculative structure of the
determination itself (positive-rational moment).
Coming back to our example, the finite is firstly defined as the non-infinite.
The non-infinite corresponds to a non-definite – and therefore infinite – logi-
cal space: the finite is both finite and infinite. This contradiction is both the
problematic implication of the first abstract definition of the finite, because it
shows how the finite is still not properly defined – the finite and the infinite
seems to be the same. At the same time, this very contradiction shows us the
way in which to develop the first abstract and one-sided definition: the finite
is the non-infinite, but in being the non-infinite, it necessarily ends and this
leads it to pass over into its other, which is the infinite itself. Eventually, the
finite ends up in being infinite, but the proper explication of how this takes
place requires a level of specification of the logical dynamics at stake, which
is way higher than the understanding’s one.
On the ontological side, the under-specificity of the understanding and the
negative and positive value of the contradiction that it implies correspond to
the three phases of the development of an ontological structure. The initial
phase is the under-specificity phase of the understanding, which basically
corresponds to the view on an ontological structure as if it was a state of af-

37 «Dar Leser Hegels muß sich mit dem öffentlichen, dem objektiven Widerspruch in allen

Dingen vertraut machen, den die Begriffssprache Hegels unablässig spiegelt; […] hier ist das
Paradox (gegen die Isoliertheiten des gesunden Menschenverstands) die Stimme des Objekts
selbst» (E. Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt, pp. 26-27).
009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 196

196 Michela Bordignon

fairs, or, something given, something fixed and set into certain limits (the fi-
nite is something immobile over against the infinite). In the conclusive phase
we find the positive contradictory structure of a determination, that basically
corresponds to the same ontological structure we had in the under-specificity
phase of the understanding, which yet is not static anymore, because it has
developed its processual and dynamical nature. It is no more simply given;
rather, it is something that needs to gets through some kind of development in
order to realize what it really is (in order to be itself, the finite has to pass over
into its other, and only the process of the passing over is the true dynamical
structure of the finite – in this passing over the finite actually is both finite
and infinite). In the middle, that is, between the initial under-specificity and
the conclusive speculative-positive contradiction, we find the negative value
of the contradiction. This value ontologically corresponds to the moment in
which the bars of the motionless prison of the first static and intellectualistic
view of reality are broken in order to develop a concrete, dynamic and all-en-
compassing view on the structure of the determination at stake.
In this perspective, the Aufhebung of contradiction, rather than being an
elimination of contradictions aimed at a coherentization of the linguistic and
logical system, is the acknowledgement of the speculative value of contradic-
tion in thought, language and reality. On the one hand, a thought able to make
room for the speculative value of contradiction is a thought able to grasp the
dynamism and the concreteness of reality. On the other hand, a language in-
volving vagueness, ambiguities and incompatibilities, which are the linguistic
embodiments of thought’s speculative contradiction, is a language able to ex-
press the dynamism and concreteness grasped by speculative thought. We
need only recall the famous lines Hegel writes concerning the speculative
character of the German language:
In this respect German has many advantages over other modern languages; some of
its words possess the further peculiarity of having not only different but opposite mea-
nings so that one cannot fail to recognize a speculative spirit of the language in them:
it can delight a thinker to come across such words and to find the union of opposites
naively shown in the dictionary as one word with opposite meanings, although this re-
sult of speculative thinking is nonsensical to the understanding38.

The German language contains words which have incompatible meanings

and those semantic incompatibilities are not considered as defective aspects
of language, namely elements which need to be corrected. Quite the contrary,
these semantic incompatibilities are taken to be symptoms of a contradictori-
ness which primarily belongs not merely to the linguistic level, but to the on-

38 WdL I, p. 1; p. 32.
009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 197

Dialectic and Natural Language 197

tological one. These semantic incompatibilities do not have to be considered

limits of a thought which is not able to grasp reality and that needs to be made
coherent in order to do so. Rather, they need to be accepted for their anticipa-
tory value with respect to a kind of thought that manages to articulate the con-
crete and dynamic structure of reality itself by making room for contradiction.
Angelica Nuzzo mentions this different way to look at linguistic phenomena
such as vagueness: «another type of vagueness […] arises as result. […] Al-
though the continuity of the determination process is interrupted by dialecti-
cal transitions and borders are thereby drawn, borderline cases still coexist
with those borders»39.
In the light of this perspective, the relation of dialectic and natural lan-
guage and the role vagueness plays in this relation turns out to be completely
different from the one defined in the semantic interpretations of dialectic I
have analyzed. This does not imply that it is impossible to develop a semantic
reading of Hegel’s dialectical process. Yet, if a semantic approach is possible,
it has to be developed along a non-conventional and unorthodox path, that is a
path able to make room for vagueness and contradiction not as something to
be removed, but as speculative linguistic phenomena able to express the con-
creteness and dynamism of reality.

Abstract

In the context of the contemporary actualization of Hegelian thought several

semantic interpretations of dialectic have been developed. These readings con-
ceive of dialectic as a process of critical redefinition of the indeterminate mean-
ing of the conceptual determinations embedded in natural language. In these se-
mantic readings indeterminacy is often connected with the notion of vagueness.
In my paper, I will show that this interpretative approach is not consistent
with Hegel’s text. I will first shed light on the relation between dialectic and
natural language and then I will explain why the concept of vagueness is not
effective in order to grasp the failure of determinacy affecting the understand-
ing’s determination in Hegel’s dialectic. Finally, I will show that the ambigui-
ties and incompatibilities pervading natural languages are not the cause of
contradictions that need to be solved. Rather, they are symptoms of a deeper in-
compatibility, or, of a deeper contradiction which does not simply reside in the
way we think and talk about reality, but in the way reality is in itself.

39 A. Nuzzo, Vagueness and Meaning Variance in Hegel’s Logic, p. 76.

009_Bordignon_179.qxd 12-06-2013 16:50 Pagina 198
015_Ficara_297.qxd 12-06-2013 16:54 Pagina 313

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 I
l primo tomo della Wissenschaft der Logik fu pubblicato al-
Hegel

ISSN 1122-1259

Teoria
XXXIII/2013/1
la fine di aprile del 1812. Il secondo uscì dalla tipografia nel
dicembre dello stesso anno, recando però come data il 1813.
e
Entrambi erano azion alla “Logica oggettiva”. Il terzotavolume
lutdedicati one
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peseguire imme-
far
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diatamente, uscì invece alla fine del 1816. c
Siamo quindi a circa duecento anni dalla pubblicazione di
quest’opera. Per tale occasione il presente volume di «Teoria»,

Hegel Scienza della logica

nelle sue varie parti, intende offrire una lettura approfondita di
alcuni e
ionaspetti del testo hegeliano. Ciò viene compiuto, com’è or-
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mai
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copia internazionale e coinvolgendo nel progetto studiosi affermati di
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