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It is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence W. K. Clifford. Is Clifford correct?

? Defend your view.

EVIDENTIALISM THROUGH THE EYES OF W.K. CLIFFORD:


AN EXPLORATION OF AND OBJECTION TO HIS VIEWS W.K. Clifford in The Ethics of Belief (Contemporary Review, 1877) proposes an absolute approach to epistemic theory not merely that belief must be substantiated with sufficient evidence, but that to believe otherwise is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone. This essay will bring forth objections in Cliffords theory, from the absolute angles of all beliefs, anyone and always. The weight behind much of Cliffords evidentialist theory lies in the element of believing or beliefs. But what exactly are these beliefs? Do they refer to scientific notions about the origin of the universe, to theological theories about higher deities; or perhaps to more mundane matters. To label a belief without sufficient evidence as wrong, one must first know what exactly these beliefs are. According to Clifford, we must extend out judgement to all cases of belief whatever no matter how seemingly trivial1. Therefore, by Cliffords reasoning, each time a belief must be made, whether it be believing the local fishmonger a careful inquiry must be made to ensure that these beliefs are founded on sufficient evidence, and are not just formulated on a mere impulse. Imagine, then, the sheer number of meticulous inquiries one would be obligated to make on a daily basis. Simply stepping out of the house would engender any number of potentially time-consuming quests for sufficient evidence to back beliefs how can one believe their cab driver will safely deliver them to their destination, or that the bus will indeed arrive at its stop promptly for that person to get to work on time? Under Cliffords reasoning, such beliefs, taken for granted on a daily basis, would require that person to pass at least several moments in contemplation of whether they are, in fact, laden with evidence. It would not entirely defy logic to suggest that society, quite quickly, would become weighted down with these dreary searches for evidence has the cab driver been involved in car accidents in the past?, will the bus driver be familiar with this specific route?, will they be delayed by heavy traffic conditions, negligence with petrol-refuelling or bad weather conditions? considerations which, in the past, would typically not have been granted such influence. It is even easier to imagine the degeneration of society into an ever-critical, suspicious mob, where truth can no longer be expected or assumed - for how can one be sure of truth, without having first gathered sufficient evidence to make certain of it? It is necessary in society for there to be a presumption in favour of truthfulness, without such, communication (and by natural order, society itself) would become impossible2, perhaps even deteriorating into savagery1. A very similar (and equally likely!) outcome is suggested by Clifford; that holding beliefs without sufficient evidence would cause society to believe wrong things, in turn becoming a credulous mass, fostering lying and cheating, and thus, doomed to this savagery 1. The two scenarios could be seen to suggest a stalemate; in laymans terms, whos to say which

scenario, if either, would come to pass? However, no matter the outcome, to condemn even a simple, everyday belief without Cliffords obligatory inquiries or considerations into its validity as inarguably wrong is as ludicrous as the savagery to which man seems doomed. Cliffords absolutist tendencies extend to those who would engage in such wrong behaviour as to believe without sufficient evidence. Everyone, not only the leader of men, statesmen, philosopher, or poet but also every rustic and hard-worked wife of an artisan, is epistemologically bound to guard the purity of his beliefs 1. This, in itself, presents certain difficulties. Epistemological duty though we may have, we are still creatures bound by practicalities, and are thus limited in our abilities to unearth sufficient evidence for beliefs. Aside from the inner clarity and truthfulness of thought which is inherent in these contemplations or inquiries that Clifford so strenuously advocates, many are not equipped to prove or disprove validity, especially when confronted with more profound beliefs. Consider, for instance, the currently-held theory behind the earths origin; the Big Bang Theory. It would be almost impossible for the typical individual to verify or refute this theory through their own investigations when forming a belief on the matter. They would be forced, naturally, to rely on the expert opinion of qualified researchers or scientists. Clifford would be seen to be in consent with this course of action, for when a belief is founded on true belief (as one would assume for scientific theories), it becomes common property and will hold good for others as well as ourselves 1. From a practical sense, we, as the typical person, can trust in the published opinion of scientists and the like; however, to turn the tables, can it not be said that if we have an epistemic duty to inquiry about the belief, then, in the inability or impossibility of this, should we not inquire about those who bring those beliefs to us? It seems to follow from Cliffords reasoning that, in order to unearth this sufficient evidence, we must investigate the actual belief or, if not, those who unearth or attest it. However, does this mean the overworked mother must dispassionately investigate the reliability or authenticity of her local butcher when he tells her the ground beef came from 100% grain-fed cows, given the fact that she cannot prove or disprove his claim herself? Will the agnostic be forced to scrutinize the background or history of a Catholic priest or Buddhist monk when searching for sufficient proof because they, themselves, cannot prove or disprove the actual belief in the existence of a God or gods? The point behind this conjecture is to underline that not everyone is able to believe based on sufficient proof. Just as it is implausible to suggest that individuals should question those who, in some way, provide the belief in the absence of being able to undertake an investigation into the belief itself, so too is Cliffords everyone, always approach to evidentialism. As discussed, Clifford condemns everyone making beliefs on insufficient evidence and all beliefs based on insufficient evident to epistemological wrongness, and the actual act itself is considered no different. A more common objection to this, Cliffords evidentialism, is that it is the action which follows a misguided, unfounded or invalid belief, rather than the belief itself, which is at fault. Clifford, however, responds with the view that action and belief are intrinsically linked, and that a) a strong belief, or a desire for such a belief, can never allow a man to act in doubt and unbiased 1 thus colouring his actions in inquiry b) every belief, whether or not it is acted upon, adds to an internal collection of beliefs which all have bearing

on the individual, and c) no belief is entirely private; each helps shape our thoughts, speech and deeds, which affects our influence on this world. Despite whatever other objections are raised to this philosopher, Cliffords given ideas here seem to follow a natural logic beliefs and actions cannot be so easily separated, and, by consequence, they have great bearing on each individuals persona. Clifford uses this as a means to strengthen his position; that it becomes even more important to ensure the purity of ones beliefs, and it is in this that objection can be raised once again. In the same way that a belief back by sufficient evidence can shape the word, so too does one of insufficient evidence, that is, a belief that cannot definitively be seen to have truth behind it. It can be said that it is these beliefs of insufficient evidence which colour the societies of our world and give rise to cultural diversity. Religions; mystical or traditional stories (such as those of the Aboriginal Dreamtime); folklores and superstitions of remote communities; even urban legends among youth, such as the cult horror of Bloody Mary or the romanticised story of alligators roaming the sewers of New York none can truly be said to be founded on unbiased, factual or truthful evidence, and so, through Cliffords approach to evidentialism, it would be unequivocally wrong to believe in these. Yet to throw aside all these stories, to neither believe nor pass them on, would be to stifle such cultural richness. Clifford would define these beliefs as wrong because they would lack sufficient evidence; yet, truly, how can any sort of knowledge be classed as wrong (whether morally or epistemologically)? Surely to decree this would be only several steps short of bringing about a communal, utilitarian system of beliefs where singular, preordained, pre-approved beliefs reign supreme.

ENDNOTES 1 W.K. Clifford, Contemporary Review (January 1877), pg. 16-19 2 Ruth Benedict, The Challenge of Cultural Revitalisation (1934) pg. 25-26

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Benedict, Ruth, The Challenge of Cultural Revitalisation (1934) Clifford, W.K., Contemporary Review (January 1877)
Dr. Schroeter, Francois, Lecture 8 Evidentialism and the ethics of belief. The University of Melbourne, Parkville, 18-19 April 2011

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