Post-Communist Nationalism Author(s): Zbigniew Brzezinski Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 5 (Winter, 1989), pp.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski
POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM

as a to confront time has come for the West JLhe policy that for years most Western issue a problem scholars have to ignore and that all Western tended still policymakers consider to be taboo: the rising tide of nationalism in Eastern in the Soviet Union itself. This and especially Europe long in a dynamic and conflictual issue is now becoming, dormant the central reality of the once seemingly fashion, homoge neous Soviet world. Indeed, whereas Marx once described the and Stalin tsarist Russian empire as the prison of nations, turned it into the graveyard of nations, under Gorbachev the the volcano of nations. Soviet empire is rapidly becoming to downplay Until recently, the West preferred the reality of national and to downgrade East European the aspirations
implications of identical non-Russian writh Russia national and awareness within automati the

Soviet Union.
Union as

Moreover,

most Westerners
assumed

perceived
almost

the Soviet

cally that any Soviet citizen was a Russian. This has now conflicts have ruptured National the illusion of changed. and the mirage brotherhood communist of some sort of sis of communism within the once homogeneous Soviet bloc is to define itself through increased national assertiveness likely In fact, there is a high and even rising national turmoil. that the progressing of the East probability self-emancipation
European tiveness most None nations among and the the non-Russian sense of national growing nations of the Soviet distinc "Union" supra-ethnic Soviet nationhood. Henceforth, the ongoing cri

will soon make

acute of this

the existing
conflicts. be should

Soviet bloc the arena for the globe's

as a lament for communism.

national

construed

Its fading is a liberation for those who have had to live under its stultifying and dehumanizing regime. Moreover, though it
at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced is Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski International Studies of The Johns Hopkins at and Counsellor University the Center for Strategic and International inWashington, Studies D.C. His most recent book is The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century. From 1977 to 1981 he served as President Carter's National Security Adviser.

2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
commu itself to be a doctrine of internationalism, proclaimed nism in fact intensified popular nationalist passions. It produced a political culture imbued with intolerance, self-righteoushness, and a massive inclination toward rejection of social compromise On the level of belief, dog oversimplification. self-glorifying thus fused with and even reinforced matic communism intol on the level of practice, the destruction erant nationalism; of internationalist social classes as the aristocracy such relatively or the business elite further reinforced the populist inclination
toward tured, As nationalistic rather the than communist chauvinism. diluted, veneer now Nationalism in the communist fades and was thereby nur sur experience. nationalism

the time is thus becoming faces more assertively, ripe for the to define more deliberately sort of West its interests. What we wish to see emerge from Soviet domi Eastern Europe do
nation? Is the secession of some or all non-Russian nations

to that the West the Soviet Union something ought in that regard between Should we discriminate the encourage? various Soviet nations? How should we react if the Kremlin from
again What adopts should a more be our repressive attitude attitude toward toward Great non-Russians? national Russian

ism, especially as it too becomes more openly assertive? What are the international of strategic and economic implications to the these issues? How does all this relate to our commitment cause of human rights? ii in the This large agenda of related issues must be examined context of a historically of the phe understanding grounded nomenon in the Soviet world. While that of nationalism in the East Euro has rather different meanings phenomenon
pean a As and result, Soviet they contexts, cannot the be two treated are also politically separate related. and as entirely

what is already hap issues. What happens?indeed, to affect the internal is bound Eastern Europe pening?in to demonstrate affairs of the Soviet Union. Evidence abounds the Baltic in Poland have directly affected that the events to light that the is coming evidence states, and mounting are becoming to the and Byelorussia Ukraine susceptible to their west. It may thus events immediately ripple effects of distinct
be only a slight exaggeration to aver Soviet that Union. the potential "Bal

kanization"
eventual

of Eastern
"Lebanization"

Europe
of the

could

be paralleled

by

the

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM
Conversely, massive would affect adversely
ern Europe, but also

in the Soviet Union national repression in East the process of democratization

arouse stronger nationalist passions

within the region. Any such repression would have to be based on Great Russian its assertion would nationalism?and be not only to have a chilling effect on democratic hopes but likely also an intensifying nationalisms, impact on East European internationalist veiled by communist phraseology. only thinly two ethnically has only Eastern Europe homogeneous
states?and none without potentially severe territorial

Poland is conflicts with their immediate neighbors. and religiously the most cohesive, with 95 percent of nationally its almost 40 million people both ethnically Polish and Roman 11 million people are 90 percent of whose Catholic. Hungary, is the second most cohesive country, ethnically Magyar, more fragmented in its religious affinities. Every other though state either has significant national minorities East European or is even ethnically diverse. The two most diverse societies are those of Yugoslavia and an amalgam of six nationally is Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia further divided distinct peoples, in religion. by differences The dominant of the Serbs, with nine million politically the most 24 million represent country's people, significant their dominance has made them the object of plurality, though more animus on the part of the economically considerable but outnumbered Croats and Slovenes advanced and the Albanians. is a federa Czechoslovakia intensely nationalistic more numerous tion between the and developed Czechs, who ten million of the country's 16 million people, and represent the somewhat resentful Slovaks, who for a brief time during World War II had their own state. Both Romania and Bulgaria national
also have substantial all these national states minorities. have borders that are potentially Moreover,

subject to revisionist aspirations on the part of their neighbors. Poland has a lingering, though not acute, territorial grievance and Poland itself could be the object of against Czechoslovakia, German territorial revanchism. Already in the 1980s, a sharp over the maritime border between the developed dispute of Poland and the German Demo communist governments cratic Republic, including access to the Polish port of Szczecin. In addition, territorial claims exist possible countervailing to the east: between Poland and its currently Soviet neighbors and the Ukraine. Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, Byelorussia

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
also harbor some resentments over the treatment of

Hungary

national minorities the other's living within respective into border disputes. and these could mushroom frontiers, even explosive Much more serious and potentially is the their a part of Romania but once part of the sylvania, currently and inhabited by several million Austro-Hungarian Empire who have been oppressed Ro by the dominant Hungarians
manians. Romania, in turn, has historical claims openly antagonistic Hungarian-Romanian dispute over Tran

over Bessarabia and against Soviet Moldavia, Soviet Ukraine and a potential one against Bulgaria over the Black Sea region of Dobruja. To complete the circle, Bulgaria nurtures national Macedonia. in ambitions regarding Yugoslavia's Yugoslavia has a rapidly growing and increasingly restless the meantime in the region of Kosovo, which itself could Albanian majority soon become irredentism. the object of Albanian territorial desires and of national This mosaic of unsatisfied
antagonisms?in itself not necessarily more complex than that

against

the

of many other parts of the world, including Western Europe? of Eastern Europe's the historical is aggravated immaturity by nationalisms. While most of the region's nations are historical some legitimately national histories entities, with boasting to those of any of the West European nations, comparable still tend to be more volatile, Eastern Europe's nationalisms more intense than those in the West. and more emotional
Moreover, the decades separate has East European in Western national states lack the with

tempering
recent Steel the

experience Plan,

of genuine continuing

regional with

cooperation
starting

that in Coal and to

emerged and

Europe,

the Marshall
Community European

the European
into the

eventually

maturing

suprana

tional European Instead, while

Community,
Parliament.

with

its region-wide

elections

and even while their Soviet domination to an allegedly internationalist fidelity proclaimed regimes states developed their economies the East European doctrine, sealed their political systems as hermetically and consolidated under
national entities. Moscow permitted no real economic cooper

dur ation among them. Polish-Czechoslovak plans, developed a genuine the two between federation ing World War II, for
states for all were scuttled by between ran the Kremlin, as was the postwar

initiative by the communist

a confederation lines of cooperation

leaders Tito
Yugoslavia vertically

and Georgi

Dimitrov
Instead, horizon

and Bulgaria. to Moscow, not

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM

states. The Warsaw Pact and the the regional tally among served essentially as Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
instruments Otherwise, Barbed-wire of Soviet each fences control. state was separated isolated strictly communist from states its neighbors. as much from

as they did from the ideologically one another alien West. was strictly controlled, and so was the flow of press and Travel
of educational exchanges. Bilateral economic cooperation was

in favor of national economic also discouraged autarky, the some degree latter only restrained by the policy of promoting on the Soviet Union. With Moscow of economic dependence each state to cultivate both its official ideology encouraging under Soviet domination East and its distinctive nationalism, were further intensified and in some nationalisms European
cases even

of the region as it emancipates The threat of Balkanization itself from Soviet control is thus real. Economically retarded by
the communist experiment, with narrow chauvinism intensi

warped

into

chauvinism.

fied, Eastern Europe is faced with the prospect of internal and external strife as it gropes its way back to a closer relationship it has always admired. That danger with the Western Europe need not express itself in a replay of the old Balkan wars, but can do so through acute ethnic violence, local national clashes
and tions even territorial and collisions. the The Albanian-Serb confronta tensions over in Kosovo Hungarian-Romanian

could be portents of wider things to come. In Transylvania of Eastern Europe is not likely to be brief, the de-Sovietization
automatically tantamount with to the the peaceful European expansion Community of all serv European cooperation, as the model. ing

in

These prospect
national

to the growing dangers pale in significance compared of truly intense and potentially inter quite bloody
strife within the Soviet Union. Its various non-Russian

are less fulfilled and thus even more nationalisms emotionally in some cases with less than those of Eastern Europe, charged historically defined borders and yet with even more commingling of potentially hostile peoples. Moreover, any attempt by Moscow to satisfy the desires of the historically more recognized nations? influ notably the Baltic ones, which have been contagiously in Poland?is enced by developments likely to precipitate
claims from newer national aspirants for equal treatment.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The

of the Soviet national problem scale and complexity is Of the Soviet Union's 290 million people, roughly 145 striking. are Great Russians. The other 145 million?who soon million more the Russians will outnumber because of rapid demo 14 main nations with among dispersed graphic growth?are
their own so-called Soviet republics, accounting for approxi

Another 120 million of the 145 million non-Russians. mately or minor ethnic groupings have been organized hundred
reorganized in a variety of autonomous republics or national

the picture further?and representing regions. Complicating a potential time bomb for truly violent national feuding?is live scattered the fact that about 25 million Great Russians
among the who non-Russians, more national and than strife. more than 40 million non

Russians
ers,"

live outside
number

their ethnic

territories.

These

"outsid
represent

65 million

combined,

the potential
any large-scale

precipitating

cause, as well as the likely victims,

of

nation in the Soviet Union Indeed, not a single non-Russian or some of Russian exists without intermingling significant other ethnic minority (see Table 1). In some, the major the Great line of conflict runs vertically?against potential Kremlin and its local Russian settlers. That is the case, Russian with Estonia 25 percent for example, (with its population Latvia (30 percent Russian), Kirghizia (also 30 per Russian), cent Russian) Russian or Ukrai and Kazakhstan (60 percent the Ukraine (about 20 percent Russian). nian), and potentially In others, the lines of conflict tend to be more horizontal?
either

or against a neigh animus toward the Abkhazians) Georgian and Soviet nation (as with the strife between Armenia boring from the each of which has significant minorities Azerbaijan, other). In others still, the lines of conflict are likely to be both
vertical and and horizontal, as is the case in central Asia, where

against

some

other

non-Russian

minority

(as with

the

considerable
Slavic

commingling
settlers.

exists

among

local ethnic

groups

the Soviet regime has cre Moreover, quite unintentionally, vessels that now can be easily filled with ated institutional content. The Soviet political structure has consisted nationalist for decades of allegedly sovereign republics, each even enjoy (although, under ing the right to secede from the Soviet Union
Stalin, communist In fact, non-Russian that leaders formal were quite often was the shot real

for allegedly
al" option).

planning

to avail themselves

of this "constitution
structure

offsetting

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM
TABLE NATIONAL COMPOSITION 1

OF SOVIET UNION REPUBLICS

Native Russian Others

Population

Republic Russian Ukrainian Uzbek Kazakh Byelorussian Azerbaijan Georgian Moldavian Tajik Kirghiz Lithuanian Armenian Turkmen Latvian Estonian

(millions) 137.6 49.8 15.4 14.7 9.6 5.0 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.8 1.5

(percent) 83 75 66 33 81 74 6.0 67 65 3.9 56 44 80 89 57 2.5 57 68 17 6

(percent) 83 19 22 13 2542 9 10 16 10 9 25 12 24 3212 29 27 11 9 3 9 2915 13 30 7 25

(percent)

Note: Based on 1979 census data.

located in Moscow and wielded power, system of centralized a doctrine of Soviet Great Russians, reinforced by largely by based on the Russian and history. "nationhood" language structure of separate na the fictional political Nonetheless, the Stalinist tional republics continued era; a throughout for the eventual framework and then expression political
assertion of ethnic aspirations was, therefore, ready and wait

ing for the day of national awakening. That time arrived with Mikhail Gorbachev's
and perestroika. Gorbachev's realization that

demokratizatsia
the Soviet system

could not be revitalized without a significant decentralization a broader democ and without of economic decision-making ratization of the political that the system inherently meant
national units would national have to be endowed with greater and for author

ity. That
suppressed

automatically

created
to

an

opportunity

for

long

aspirations potentially
again quite

to focus on the quest for effective control over the local instruments of power. Hence, significant
unintentionally, Gorbachev's a their

grievances

surface

national

legality?so
the gave Moscow's

necessary
non-Russians control over

to the revival of the Soviet

powerful destiny. weapon for

emphasis

on

greater

economy?
contesting

8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
In doing so, they seized on the provisions of the hitherto Soviet constitution. formalistic As Article 76 of that largely
constitution states, "A union

in the socialist state that has united with other Soviet Republics of Soviet Socialist Republics" Union [emphasis added]. The even affirms in Article 80 a union document republic's "right to enter into relations with foreign treaties states, conclude with them" and refers again in Article 81 to "the sovereign Indeed, Article 72 even states, rights of the union republics." without any qualification whatsoever, that "each Union Repub lic shall retain the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R." a constitutional framework for the full assertion Accordingly, has formally existed, almost inviting of national sovereignty
the increasingly assertive leaders of the non-Russian nations to

republic

is a

sovereign

Soviet

advantage of it. of the Soviet empire the expansion Paradoxically, to legitimate also helped Eastern Europe ideologically Soviet peoples. As national aspirations of the non-Russian take deliberate
as the Soviet claim gains come into that a Union that of the was an isolated was But even "socialist" to state, preserve communist non-Russians reason could Estonia why, not of could sacred had claim example, union necessary once other doctrinal

into the long

"the states could for now

Moscow

socialism."

existence, no there was separate but states

communist

any longer still communist

exist

outside

the Soviet

Union?as
of Eastern

was
Europe.

the
The

case with
spread

the
the

communist-ruled

Kremlin's power tional ideological

tions of the Soviet

beyond ammunition,
non-Russian

Soviet

thus provided the national sustaining

communists.

frontiers

addi ambi

Finally, generally

failure of the Soviet the manifest system more not only the official ideology but espe discredited
of the so-called the the very union. existence Most of self exer to view

the practical consequences cially came non-Russians increasingly

the

centralized

Soviet
In of Eastern

state

as

the

cause

of

their

relative

impoverishment. emancipation

that

for those contiguous cised a special attraction, particularly end of the Soviet nations located at the western non-Russian For them, the gradualist of the Polish inde Union. strategy in contesting communist rule trade union Solidarity pendent
organizational mass movements?the Popular of the non-Russian in several served as an model for their own have grass-roots sprung up Fronts?that republics.

context, from Europe

progressive Moscow's control

,' AFGHANISTAN

Armemavis, Latvians Lithuanians,Moldav WEM Azerbaijani, Kazakhs, Kirghiz.,Tatars, Tu 1 1 rsr?>Mi???5 Komis, Atordrtns,Yakuts I I nagestnnis Cjeorgians

10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Five broad
of non-Russian

stages can be discerned

national awakening

in the expanding
and growing

process

self-assertion.

In the first stage, nationalism typically has tended to focus on in some significant for the preservation demands fashion of an almost instinctive the national language, which represent from progressive Russifi desire for national self-preservation self cation. In the second stage, initial success in linguistic national In the cultural autonomy. of distinctive promotion for national demands economic self third, this prompts In the fourth, the foregoing combination then determination. a struggle for national political auton quite naturally fosters nationalism is but a step away omy. In the fifth, non-Russian dreams of national from openly proclaimed sovereignty. in the aroused peoples boldly, the politically Generalizing the end of World War between Baltic republics, independent a historical kingdom prior to the I and 1940, and in Georgia, from 1918 until nineteenth century and briefly independent are now moving from the fourth to the fifth stage. The 1923, which numbers more than 50 important Ukraine, extremely has at least reached the second stage, though million people, in Lvov point clearly in Kiev and especially political winds are and Moldavia toward the fourth and beyond. Byelorussia still in the first or second stage. Most of the Soviet central Asian their Islamic self-confidence by heightened republics?with in neighboring the Soviet debacle moving Afghanistan?are from the third stage into the fourth.
In all of the non-Russian preservation then normally generates a wider insistence on the

sions are being

republics,

however,

national

pas

unleashed.

Russification

is being

openly
elites

de
liter who

for eventual their desire do not hide already sovereignty the Baltic republics politically. Most of the other dominate are experiencing from below, gen similar pressures republics in erated largely by their national Moreover, intelligentsias. of tense interethnic violence has also broken out in hundreds clashes. It with some thousands killed in communal localities, of thousands of that hundreds has been officially admitted have fled national with, for instance, persecution, refugees made homeless and Azerbaijanis Armenians 350,000 by na the problem will get worse, tional strife. In all likelihood,
rather than better.

nounced?occasionally non-Russian ally every

in turbulent republic.

demonstrations?in National-minded

The

national

issue has become

the central dilemma

of Soviet

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM

11

even the economic crisis. It affects political life, overshadowing and vastly complicates of the political almost every dimension It expresses and economic itself in a variety of perestroika. It manifests itself?as in the Baltic republics?in the ways. for the devolution constitutional of power peaceful struggle from Moscow and even in unilateral the legislation mandating
termination of central control over national resources. It

in Kazakhstan's Alma Ata in 1986 explodes periodically?as or Georgia's Tbilisi in 1989?into at Great violence directed
Russian domination, with strong overtones of a national

liberation It takes struggle against the foreign "occupiers." the form?as in Armenia, Uzbekistan Azerbaijan, Georgia, and elsewhere?of interethnic pogroms, bloody unleashing the most primitive it infects those scores of passions. And
smaller peoples who do not even have their own nominal

Soviet republics, prompting tional diversification of what

"Disunion."

further demands for the na is rapidly becoming the Soviet

Last but by no means ismade even least, all of the foregoing more combustible the extensive of the Rus by commingling some 65 million With sians and non-Russians. people living outside their ethnic homelands and thus in potentially hostile the grim possibility has been placed on history's environments, now spin out of control, a battlefield of nations. becoming Such an outcome would be particularly ominous for the over the last Their Great Russians. has expanded empire to approximately several hundred years at a rate equivalent one Vermont In the process, Russia has (or Holland) per year.
become the world's largest and?until now?most enduring agenda that Russia's empire, Marx's "prison of nations," could

multinational empire, controlling by far the largest piece of real estate. Yet for the foreseeable the Great future, global Russians now face the unpleasant that either a policy dilemma
of repression poses complicate of an non-Russians acute matters threat even or a passivity To to their further, policy own of acquiescent exists well-being. a nexus painful

the challenge of East European nationalism and the The Kremlin escalating aspirations of the Soviet non-Russians. would not find it easy to separate a policy of domestic repres sion of non-Russians from a policy of toleration for the East It would nationalisms. to be even more difficult European continue the domestic while engaging in repres perestroika sion of the non-Russian half of the Soviet population. Indeed, between

12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
much of the recent national self-assertion within the Soviet

set by stimulated by the successful precedents in Poland. Repression and the Catholic Church of Solidarity within non-Russian the Soviet Union, nationalism combined with of it within toleration the Soviet in Eastern sphere Union
Europe, would mean that the external contagion would per

was

Poles and Hungarians the emboldened publicly their support for the suppressed and non-Russians, voicing political beach perhaps with such Soviet "allies" providing national heads for continued within the Soviet agitation
Union. Thus the a domestic in Eastern crackdown Europe, would even screws some require if short of direct turning interven of

sist, with

tion. Any
economic.

such
Moscow

effort

would
have

entail
to

real
channel

costs,
its

political
energies

and
and

would

resources and bribing the East Europeans, into intimidating to do so without precipitating and would have highly disrup in the region the last thing the tive outbreaks itself. And could now wish would be a conjunction of East Kremlin and internal Soviet national disorders. European of the physical suppression The domestic of consequences would also entail high costs. A policy of the non-Russians on intensified Great Rus repression would have to be based
sian spread chauvinism. anti-Russian That, in turn, sentiments. would breed even any more attempt wide at Moreover,

control would be met of centralized Muscovite reimposition with political and perhaps even physical resistance. The non are no longer the pliant and illiterate peoples Russians colo victims of Stalinism. They nized by the tsars or the decapitated now have their own national and their own intelligentsias
aroused students and, above would As all, their own awakened severe sense of

national
Repressive

identity.
measures require enforcement.

That

would

be

likely

to jeopardize
a

any
practical

serious
matter,

pursuit
effective

of

economic

decentralization.

repression wrould require enhanced in Moscow, and that would power

continued modest hanced some of economic scenarios economic whom of decentralization. a successful

of political concentration not be compatible with

Since perestroika even the on most en the hinge the non-Russians, to contributors

among activity, especially are the most productive

Soviet

it follows that domestic would economy, repression to preserve In effect, repression kill perestroika. the simply

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM
empire would require self-abnegation by the Great Russians.

13

They would have to forsake any dreams of greater democra for themselves. The brutal tization and of enhanced prosperity
fact erished The is that Great prospects their empire Russian for can national the Great be maintained garrison Russians, only state. however, as an are impov even

if the process of national self-assertiveness continues grimmer to percolate two or three in the fashion of the last dynamically
years. stroika If the Kremlin the falters, acquiesces non-Russians while will become the economic even more pere insis

the tangible fruits of their labors, to the retaining to the extent of the Great Russians. disadvantage Ironically, it is likely that the non-Russians? that perestroika prospers, be its principal beneficiaries. and not the Great Russians?will the Georgians, It is among the Baits, the Jews, the Armenians, entre the Uzbeks and others that the traditions of commerce, and private initiative have been least suffocated preneurship The non-Russian by the Soviet experience. peoples have also less in the Great Russian tradition of subordi partaken much
nating economic activity to state control. to world of natural These subjective

tent on

factors,
access relatively of

combined
the greater

with

the objective

reality

of

the greater
and also in the their

non-Russian

regions concentration

trade

resources

it quite probable that a successful lands, make better would leave the non-Russians considerably
Great Russians.

perestroika off than the

In fact, stripped of any real degree of effective control over the non-Russian lands, the Great Russian plurality could find serious crisis of biological itself, quite literally, in a genuinely
survival. The non-Russians have Russians become are not

tive but also more

quite clearly that

only

more

asser

prolific.
the

Demographic

trend

lines indicate
outnumbered.

The approximately 50 million Soviet Muslims currently pro duce as many babies per year as do the 145 million Russians.
To make matters outlets commercial the Great Russian homeland worse, to the world's arable oceans, adequate lacks land

becoming

It is also cursed by an inhospitable and natural resources. climate and lacks clearly defined natural or ethnic boundaries. Thus any widespread of national implementation separatism would inevitably produce bloody collisions, not to speak of the Russia having to prospect of an impoverished mind-boggling millions of Great Russian accommodate from the expellees
non-Russian lands.

14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS IV
The Great Russians therefore have no choice but to con to some form of relatively intimate clude that they are doomed their neighbors. coexistence with the two likely However, to the rising difficulties of that coexistence? policy responses the essence of the status quo?offer in the hope of preserving true Hobson's choices. The first policy would retain for the Russians effective political power, but engage them in pro and costly efforts to crush national liberation move longed both within the currently Soviet nations and perhaps ments, even within some of the East European ones. The Soviet Union would thereby become a Northern Ireland writ large. A policy of brutal repression would probably also help to rekin for the Russians dle the cold wrar, guaranteeing continued
poverty. repression of the challenge, or reactive evasion of the problem

of largely reactive maneuvering second option?that and economic privilege?is preserve political power unlikely The
prevent the empire's fragmentation. In the absence of positive

to to

change, the Baltic republics would doubtless attempt to secede somehow associated with the Scandinavian and to become states. That might well lead to a subsequent effort at secession in some of the central and also to rising demands by Georgia, for completely statehood. It Asian republics independent of time before the Ukraine, and would be only a matter
eventually even Byelorussia, followed the would same most route. Russia

would

suddenly

be

thrust
The

back
process

to its frontiers

of

the mid
be a

seventeenth

century.

certainly

of the Indian-Pakistani reminiscent bloody one, potentially transfers of the late 1940s, perhaps with some population tragedy of the 1980s. painful similarities to the Lebanese then have, What real policy choices do the Great Russians current dynamics? Quite naturally, would prefer to they given of cost. If forced to the status quo, at a minimum maintain more choose, likely to opt for all-out repression, they are as a last resort. With Great Russian nation though preferably alism on the rise, that option is bound to gain more adherents as acquiescence to look in the near future, especially begins more and more dangerous. is already again much There talk Russians of the unique mission of their nation, with among the role. At the same time, their fated leadership its historically
concern and sense of frustration are likely to grow as national

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM
turbulence
has masked national A mood

15
trans

intensifies
Moscow's rhetoric?continues of desperation

and as the communist

rule with a convenient to fade. among some

ideology?which
veneer of has

Russians

surfaced People's
V. G.

in the course Deputies.

already

of the sessions of the new Congress of in early June 1989, one deputy, Speaking
evoked with great a the memory of of his the great

Rasputin,

a writer,

prerevolutionary
ing words: non-Russian "You,

tsarist prime minister,

speakers sirs, need upheavals?we

Stolypin,
need

in castigat
famous a great

paraphrase

country." To the applause of the deputies, Rasputin charged that the alleged "chauvinism and blind pride of Russians are but fabrications of those who are playing upon your national
sentiments, tude among brothers." respected the non-Russians for Lamenting the sacrifices the lack of on made grati their

behalf

by the Russian

people,

he asked:

. .? Would it perhaps be better for Russia to leave the union. We still have a few natural and human resources left, our power has not yet withered the word could then utter 'Russian' and talk about national away. We . . . We without the fear of being self-conciousness labeled nationalistic. would be able to gather the people into a unified together spiritual body.

the Russian deputies Again, also doubtless many would

sustain the Great Russian

with applause, and responded a repressive to effort applaud in the Russians the status quo by
selective accom

empire.

For the time being, however, the Great Kremlin are most likely to strive to preserve
some combination of manipulative repression,

modation and limited constitutional reform. The first involves the continued of the tried and true policy of divide application
et with off one non-Russian nation another, impera, playing against as arbiter Moscow even and protector and acting using some as enforcers nationals of its will others. The against some to the more second entails concessions estab specific

lished and cohesive national republics, in the hope that their aspirations will thereby be satisfied, but without setting off a chain reaction. That has already happened with system-wide to the Baltic republics, which are gaining real auton respect treatment for some could be omy. Such preferential coupled with intensified suppression of the geopolitically crucial Ukrai
nian and Byelorussian nations, including even the arrest and

exile

of

the nationalist

leaders.

Finally, Moscow

is planning

16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
some powers nomic changes of the realm. in the existing non-Russian constitution, entities, especially to enhance in the the real socioeco

it is more than doubtful that any of these Nonetheless, measures will suffice either in resolving or in containing the of national awakening within the Soviet Union. The dynamics old empire is just no longer tenable. The fact is that the status fashion, will no longer satisfy the quo, even in some modified
national

They may not all be in the same stage of national

they may not be able to coalesce against Moscow,

aspirations

of

the

nationally

awakened

non-Russians.

development,
and they may

and even conflicting demands have different goals (notably cannot any more be territorial ones). But their nationalism squared with continued Great Russian political and economic
domination, even if masked and made somewhat

Moreover, compounded
peans. Their

as already noted, the internal problem is being self-assertion of the East Euro the national by
success has had, and will continue to have, a

gentler.

in the Baltic republics, the direct impact on popular attitudes and Georgia. Central Asia has also been Ukraine, Byelorussia fired up by the almost parallel cases of successful Iranian and of the superpowers. and religious defiance national Afghan creates a conundrum of problems, All of that linking closely with the potential Balkanization the threat of East European Russia's for Soviet Lebanization, thereby vastly complicating crisis. imperial v
The can West have cannot either much longer or remain passive on this issue.

A great historic quences.

remain tional

drama
benign

is in the process
malevolent or move do both.

of unfolding?and
international toward Moreover, conse

it

The
a Great

stark reality
Russian But

is that the Soviet Union

can either
a multina an impe

and expansive Russia, rial Russia is likely to be a militaristic It will is Marxist or simply chauvinistic. its ideology whether not even be able to tolerate freedom for the East Europeans,
out of fear of domestic contagion.

democracy.

empire it cannot

a Russia, hesitantly pursuing democ However, beleaguered to its non freedom ratization while conceding reluctantly several of the with is likely to plunge, Russians, together
non-Russian nations, into protracted ethnic violence. Thus,

for the sake of European

stability, neither

the Balkanization

of

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM
Eastern
the ism one on

17
on

Europe

and the Lebanization

of the Soviet Union

imperial may

For

nor of Great the reassertion Russian hand, outcomes. the other, desirable represent on the silence the moment, part of the West easier?to evade this complex

seem than to

to be the better part of wisdom.

tempting?and

In any case, it is certainly more

issue

is the occasional face it. Even worse than ignoring the problem over the passing of the "stability" that is said wringing of hands to have been inherent in the cold war competition between the
two

artificial. It was derived from the geopolitical and historically two superpowers. The fading ideological collision between the as a comprehensive rival to the United of the Soviet Union
States?with Moscow now

homogenous

blocs.

That

stability?such

as

it was?was

was
nations

bound
that

to bring
were the

to the surface
to out the most will

only

power

in the severe remain

military

realm?

the aspirations not deplored.

not open

of

those

subject easy way

subordination. for

This As

development
case,

is to be welcomed,

In any

in the Soviet Union and in Eastern resorts to an if Moscow gradually the issue will impose itself on increasingly repressive policy, the attention of the West's public opinion and eventually even on its policymakers. a policy of repression At the minimum, will reinject the human rights issue into the still quite fragile
East-West accommodation. Moreover, at some point the ques

both conflicts mount and particularly Europe,

long.

tion will support,

cravings Ukrainians,

to arise: by what standard does the West choose to ignore the for example, Polish independence but
of, say, the for their Lithuanians own national or, before too long, of the statehood?

it is already evident that the focus of the great Moreover, historical East-West contest is shifting eastward. It is useful to recall that during the 1940s and 1950s, and even into the 1960s, the political struggle between the East and the West was line in Europe. It was a waged largely west of the dividing over the future of France and Italy, with their struggle an important role. Meanwhile, Communist the parties playing Soviet Union was relatively free to consolidate its hold over
Eastern

History's dilemmas will now be played out east of the central line. For the next decade, the critical European dividing in Europe will be the fate of Eastern Europe, whether question it will succeed in eventually the rest of Europe, rejoining itself fully from Soviet control. Into the thereby emancipating

Europe.

18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
next century, Estonia and
contest?reflecting

it is also now likely that Lithuania, will be the theaters of the Ukraine
the simultaneous fading of

Latvia, political
as

communism

an ideology and of Russia as an imperial power. to formulate It is therefore its own timely for the West on this large issue before national turmoil in general approach the Soviet world begins to undermine the East-West relation as a whole. The West's attitude should reflect the norms ship in our age and should that have gained universal acceptance that benefit the peoples swept up aim at creating arrangements It should emphasize swell of national feelings. by the ground not seek the fragmentation that the West does either of to Eastern Europe or of the Soviet Union but rather wishes the historically of transforming facilitate significant process into more voluntary political arrangements ongoing repressive
and its cooperative readiness relationships.

More

specifically,
to work

for Eastern
out a

Europe,
long-term

theWest
program

should
of

stress

gradual

with the European for those East Community to adopt internal pluralism as countries prepared European Some forms of inter their basic mode of social organization. status should also be worked mediate out, so that the East can be gradually into the larger pat introduced Europeans terns of European in the Council of cooperation. Membership could be the first steps. for Poland and Hungary Europe association
In limited rangements the meantime, East European are in the West or themselves central should also stress that more ar Hun European For desirable. cooperative example,

gary and Austria Vienna-Budapest

ther economic cooperation

are already working together on the joint for 1992, and fur World's Fair scheduled
between also even to of them Yugoslavia, a confederative seems feasible. where Such certainly

cooperation extend might

Croatia between

and

Slovenia

would

be receptive.

Much

closer
character?

rela

Poland and Czechoslovakia would certainly have eco nomically and politically stabilizing effects in central Europe, and Institutionalized Polish they should be explicitly encouraged. would create a stronger unit in the Czechoslovak cooperation
vulnerable ute future to area greater point, between central new forms Germany European of Balkan and Russia, and thus contrib at some stability. regional Similarly, economic

tions?perhaps

eventually

cooper

so that the fading ation could be encouraged, is not followed by the surfacing of belligerent

of communism nationalisms.

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM

19

and the European The Council of Europe Community could also make an important contribution by offering to assist the creation of a central European for ecological program crisis in the area is grave. The salvation. The ecological German Polish-Czechoslovak-East industrial is the triangle world's most polluted Bitter disputes are breaking out region. and among the states of the region regarding responsibility liability for the rapidly spreading havoc. National hostility and can feed on each other. Thus, ecological devastation genuine is urgently needed, and West European regional cooperation institutions could take the lead in facilitating it. a In recent years, several Southeast Asian nations developed
cooperative ration. Europeans,

tense nationalisms,
Surely,

association?asean?despite

their the

relatively East-central easily, to

in

old quarrels

and great geographical

sepa
do

to urge it is not then, Utopian can so much more who interact

to intrusion by their historical vulnerability and given the potentially destructive ef stronger neighbors, of the national conflicts between them, the advantages of fects wider regional cooperation should not be entirely lost upon likewise. Given
them. Eventually, of some gence in a more all-German central cooperative confederational Europe, arrangement the emer might

a solution to the thus providing become possible, legitimate desire of the Germans for national self-determination and relief for the legitimate fears of Germany's of a neighbors can The division of Germany reunited, powerful Germany.
best be resolved European reassociation within of such the and a broader, two western German and thus more could For reas entail suring, The of framework. states

some special security provisions,

Germany's eastern

designed

to alleviate

the fears
example,

man

could be combined with a through confederation for the continued presence on special arrangement providing German soil of military forces from the existing two alliances for an agreed period of time?say, twenty years. In other the political of the Germans?a self-determination words, in the existing not be situation?would significant change an immediate to tantamount in the existing security upheaval situation. This would make the satisfaction of legitimate Ger Such an arrangement could also become the foundation for an all-European to reduce the risk of security, designed system
aspirations less threatening.

reunification

neighbors.

20

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

of change that the wider processes in central Europe might in the European lead to a sudden imbalance order. The best formula would probably be a joint NATO-Warsaw Pact agree ment the reunification of Germany regarding (subject to the in the preceding outlined para special security provisions with the two alliances thereby becoming graph) joint guaran tors of the ongoing realities, geopolitical including existing but with the Warsaw Pact no longer serving as an borders, In other words, of ideological instrument for imposition. a noncommunist Poland or Hungary might still be a example, of the Warsaw member rather than Pact, but for geopolitical reasons. Such an arrangement would also help to ideological the danger of any renewal of old territorial conflicts, mitigate in Eastern Europe. especially
None of this would be a panacea, resolving once and for all

the national dilemmas of the region. But it is time for Western in more detail the democratic leaders to start outlining vision
of rope the eventual so that the organizational continent's shape recovery of from post-communist the traumas Eu of this

century is relatively stable. Even very general and quite vision can have the positive effect of defining ary formulations
constructive destructive channels forms. VI for the changes already under way and

thus of lessening

the danger

that such changes might

assume

A constructive vision of the future is similarly needed for the Soviet Union. Here, too, the West can help, both by articulat on the painful dilemmas its perspective explicitly ing more almost all of the nations confronting inhabiting what is cur still a Great Russian empire, and by indicating Western rently to assist tangibly a positive process of basic reforms. willingness some sort of peaceful accommodation the among Surely, is preferable Soviet nations either to brutal Russian different or increasingly bloody violence. The West should, repression not be shy in publicly that it favors the therefore, stating in reality of the Soviet Union?which eventual transformation
is a Great eration or Russian empire?into commonwealth. a genuinely voluntary confed

ex vision inevitably must challenge A politically appealing a vision is necessary to impose order on isting reality. But become chaos. It is, that otherwise might change dynamic not Utopian but actually realistic to try to define new therefore,

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM

21

Soviet Disunion. crisis-ridden for the increasingly formulas the intense admiration of all things American Moreover, given now so fashionable among the politically articulate Soviets, it
behooves Americans to proffer concrete suggestions for how

to alleviate Soviet inter-national conflicts the intensifying deliberate adoption of confederational arrangements. through More specifically, as the Soviets grapple with their problems, the possible relevance they would be well advised to examine in the solutions adopted and practiced of some multinational internal West. For example, Canada offers both an excellent the status of Quebec might and external model. Internally,
have secede; some for for a relevance some, for those Soviet the nations economic that choose not to externally, arrangements

between
lines

Canada
possible

and

the United

States

could provide
Some

guide
of the

post-secession

accommodation.

institutions within Western also contain Europe emerging combined with national useful lessons in genuine cooperation absent in all such arrangements is the Notably sovereignty. a monopolistic, existence and doctrinal of disciplined ruling a single national group. Hence the ques controlled party by tion of the eventual dispersal on a national basis of the existing Communist (cpsu) will almost Party of the Soviet Union inevitably have to surface in the course of any truly serious of the national issue. Soviet discussions
In any case, of a the genuine confederation or commonwealth

would
sians,

be
most

the best option

for everyone
and

concerned:
certainly the

the Rus
outside

non-Russians

some that can combine It is, in fact, the only option of continued unity with democracy. For the Russians, it degree mean that democracy and prosperity would no longer would be impossible goals, as the Russians would no longer have to of being the oppressors bear the consequences of others. For it would the non-Russians, and provide genuine political within their homelands, economic but without the power world.
violence and the conflicts that would be the inherent concom

itants of any effort to disentangle the existing ethnic and territorial mosaic. For the outside world, a genuinely pluralis tic Eurasian commonwealth, instead of the Russian-dominated Soviet Disunion, would less centralized, inherently be a much state. less militaristic, and therefore less imperially expansive A real confederation, would have the healthy furthermore, effect of severing the mystical connection between Russia as a nation-state and Russia as an imperial entity. It would de

22

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Great Russian nationalism Rus by transforming mythologize to partners. A division of labor between sians from masters
Moscow and

tional and the other as the national also help capital, might on a national to focus Russian state of symbolically loyalties
their own, with its separate national

Petrograd,

with

one

serving

as

the

confedera

some supranational divine or ideological mission. of the de facto centralized Soviet Union The transformation into a confederation would also require basic changes in the of the ruling cpsu. Its Leninist structure role and organization are fundamentally and discipline incompatible with the func of a decentralized confederation. At the very least, the tioning
formation of separate communist

capital,

rather

than

on

republics, as well as of noncommunist political organizations, It is noteworthy that the Lithua would have to be permitted. a drive in that direction. nians are already spearheading
A under true confederation or commonwealth Soviet could also embrace

parties

within

the

national

a greater
the

variety
existing

of

socioeconomic
centralized

systems

than

is feasible
Some non

system.

Russian republics would be likely to shed rather quickly the last vestiges of the communist planned economy and to adopt some forms of political pluralism. Others, notably Russia itself, for a variety of historical and cultural reasons, might prefer to could retain some form of statist "socialism." All probably
retain wealth, the term the "soviet" word for "soviet" the since confederation not does or imply any common specific

the Russian word for council. ideological content but ismerely means "Councillar Union.") Union" ("Soviet literally of such an outcome Would satisfy the aroused nationalisms not all of them, though for the non-Russian peoples? Probably to the pains of dis some it might be a preferable option of becoming and to the consequences engagement suddenly to hostile neighbors. A genuinely decentralized vulnerable
commonwealth or confederation could

participating
political

nations

not only

certainly common

assure reserved

the

cultural

but real economic

and

self-determination,

subject

to some

A genuine powers for a jointly shared central government. even offer economic and also could confederation benefits, some security advantages, that complete independence might not provide. Hence it could be an attractive option for some of the nations currently dominated by the Kremlin and the Great
Russians. But some of the non-Russian nations may still choose to opt

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM
out. They are, however, more likely to insist on complete

23

if the alternative is the existing, or secession and independence an only slightly modified, Soviet Union. Secession by even one
nation is also much more likely to be

A confederation. Soviet Union than in a genuine dominated no dominated Eurasian decentralized confederation, longer a less unacceptable arrange by the Great Russians, might be
ment.

contagious

in a Russian

Nonetheless,

it is almost

certainty

that

some

non-Russian

nations, notably the Baltic ones, will continue to seek complete status they enjoyed until their incorporation independence?a Soviet-Nazi collusion. Such into the Soviet Union through are certainly legitimate and deserving of Western aspirations public sympathy. The West's public opinion would not be true
to its own

or it was unsympathetic, and to respect for human rights?if to the cravings of the Baltic peoples even merely indifferent, or others for national And that aspiration is independence. to peoples not to be denied that are genuine particularly that have their own history, nations, language and defined political identity. Moscow for the option of a therefore, should, provide a national to determine formal plebiscite whether people
desires to even secede, formal especially secession since need the current Soviet constitu

principles?to

its commitment

to self-determination

tion acknowledges
ever,

the right of

secession
not mean

to republics.
complete

How

rupture.

Secession by nations that might opt for genuine independence could be made conditional on treaty-based associate status with
a Soviet and in economic Confederation?especially even in some arrangements. security perhaps to efforts The West's actual response political cooperation at secession

from the Soviet Union from a should, therefore, be derived careful and prudent assessment of what is actually transpiring on the admittedly within the Soviet Union difficult national issue. After all, the Soviet Union could soon be retrenching instead of reforming, centralized reestablishing imperial rule in which Great Russian dominion is masked by communist The West could not remain silent were police phraseology. units to arrest Baltic or other national and military leaders, with lethal force peaceful national demonstrations (as suppress in Georgia) and in effect reconsolidate already has happened an empire by brutal force. If such a trend should become clearly dominant?and

24

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

is alive and currently it does appear that the Brezhnev doctrine West's commitment well mostly for the Soviet Union itself?the to human rights will dictate a policy response that, in effect,
will be tantamount Even to external if Western support governments countless private for the chose non-Russian to be more aspirations.

circumspect,
would be

much
outraged.

of
The

the democratic

world's

public

opinion
that

in supporting the reflect it will become more heavily engaged conse victims of the Kremlin's heavy hand. The international would for the Soviet Union be highly quences negative. Moscow would be ostracized and sharply criticized?as should in fact stands for its professed be the case, if the West ideals.
However, the West's

organizations

if the Soviet Union does become should be more tempered in a bona fide effort to redress fundamentally the engaged If demonstrably serious reforms national inequities. existing
are inely are transforming multinational gaining a Russian existing and structure, over control effective true confederation or rule into imperial if the non-Russian their own states a genu nations and thus the West

political

response

to

secessionism

It should then tangibly should do more than merely applaud. help that experiment. is not only an imperial Russian The existing Soviet Union state but also largely an underdeveloped society. America, and Japan have the means to help the peoples Western Europe inhabiting the Soviet Union to undo their primitive poverty?a inherent in Rus by the statist centralism poverty maintained A decentralized and communist sian imperialism dogma. would be far more confederation likely to generate genuine social innovation, and itwould certainly pose less of a threat to
the outside world. That outside world, in turn, would there

producing

commonwealth,

fore be well advised to assist tangibly any such institutionaliza and more tion of pluralism through credits, joint ventures a pluralist of Soviet Confederation trade. The emergence the end of the cold war, of the Russian would mean imperial All drive, and of the related enormous military expenditures. would thus benefit. much of that may still lie in the distant future. Admittedly, But given the accelerating velocity of history, the West should
focus on the issue and also take some modest initial steps. One

the States to double concrete action would be for the United for Endowment annual budget of the National $15-million of assisting democratic for the explicit purpose Democracy,

POST-COMMUNIST NATIONALISM
national movements in the Soviet Union.
Russians of mutual and respect and

25

Those
who and

Baits, Ukrai
are striving among equality

nians, Tajiks, Georgians, new to create relations their nations deserve makes sense

others

it encouragement support. Similarly, to encourage Western economic ventures, vastly and increased academic contacts, exchanges diplomatic partic those non-Russian nations that have with shown evident ularly determination to throw off outdated VII imperial structures.

in the Kremlin The specter that haunts the Russians is that within the Soviet Union and in Eastern of nationalism?both is for response to that condition Europe. The only constructive to be given the opportunity to shed their the Russian people that of a Third Rome or of some messianic complexes?either
"internationalist" Leninist mission?and to of almost accommodate

themselves
nations.

to the necessity
After three

of coequal
years

cohabitation

with

other

hundred

continuous

but now increasingly expansion, showing symptoms of impe rial fatigue, the Russian people would be the principal bene ficiaries of such a change in their national ethos. can help especially at this crucial The West the Russians historical juncture by not only articulating positive visions of a confederated but nonthreatening of a regionally Germany,
more

a Soviet and of a post-imperial Russia within institutions, but also by indicating its readiness to assist very Confederation, the translation of such visions into a mutually benefi tangibly
cial reality. Over and democracy the years, the West has propagated pluralism, as the market the social system superior

cooperative

Eastern

Europe

engaged

in

all-European

the Soviet propagandists combination?while derided these even the Soviet Yet today these ideas dominate notions. discussions of perestroika. Similarly, the West should now take
the lead

as the to the potentially arrangements only solution in the emerging post-communist of nationalism challenges

in advocating

open

and

voluntary

confederational

lethal era.